From the American Dream to … Bailout America: How the Government

Total Page:16

File Type:pdf, Size:1020Kb

From the American Dream to … Bailout America: How the Government From the American dream to … bailout America: How the government loosened credit standards and led to the mortgage meltdown Compiled by Edward Pinto, American Enterprise Institute In the early 1990s, Fannie Mae‘s CEO Jim Johnson developed a plan to protect Fannie‘s lucrative charter privileges bestowed by Congress. Ply Congress with copious amounts of affordable housing and Fannie‘s privileges would be secure. It required ―transforming the housing finance system‖ by drastically loosening of loan underwriting standards. Fannie garnered support from community advocacy groups like ACORN and members of Congress. In 1995 President Clinton formalized Fannie‘s plan into the National Homeownership Strategy. President Clinton stated it ―will not cost the taxpayers one extra cent.‖ From 1992 onward, ―skin in the game‖ was progressively eliminated from housing finance. And it worked – Fannie‘s supporters in and outside Congress successfully protected Fannie‘s (and Freddie‘s) charter privileges against all comers – until the American Dream became Bailout America. TIMELINE Credit loosening Warning 1991 HUD Commission complains ―Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac‘s underwriting standards are oriented towards ‗plain vanilla‘ mortgage‖ [Read More] 1991 Lenders will respond to the most conservative standards unless [Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac] are aggressive and convincing in their efforts to expand historically narrow underwriting [Read More] 1992 Countrywide and Fannie Mae join forces to originate ―flexibly underwritten loans‖ [Read More] 1992 Congress passes the inaptly named ―Federal Housing Enterprises Financial Safety and Soundness Act.‖ Rather than protecting taxpayers from having to bailout Fannie and Freddie, affordable housing mandates planted the seeds leading to future bailout [Read More] 1993 Fannie approves ACORN‘s loan program, allowing for ―downpayments of the lesser of $1000 or 3%.‖ 1994 Fannie Mae commits to transform housing finance system and plans $1T in lending to low and moderate income borrowers [Read More] 1994 Fannie's Trillion Dollar Giveaway [Read More] 1994 Fannie proceeds with 3% down loans over objection of chief credit officer [Read More] 1995 HUD‘s National Homeownership Strategy commits lending industry to weakened underwriting standards, including further reductions in downpayments [Read More] 1996 Fannie and Freddie are creating mega-liabilities with miniscule capital to support it [Read More] 1997 HUD study complains Fannie and Freddie‘s credit guidelines are more likely to disqualify borrowers with low incomes, limited wealth, and poor credit histories [Read More] 1998 Flexible underwriting standards are nothing more than standards that lead to bad loans [Read More] 1999 Fannie eases credit to increase lending; increases risk of taxpayer bailout [Read More] 2000 FHA leads the way with looser lending standards [Read More] 2000 Fannie‘s CEO, Franklin Raines, announces new $2 trillion ―American Dream Commitment‖ on top of earlier $1 trillion commitment 2000 HUD imposes massive increases in Fannie and Freddie‘s affordable housing mandates, calls for deeper push into subprime [Read More] 2000 Franklin Raines, Fannie‘s CEO, calls for ‖bending financial markets to serve the families buying [newly built] homes [Read More] 2001 Easy credit creating bull market in housing [Read More] 2002 CEO of government sponsored Fannie Mae cites government agency FHA as its only competitor for public funding of housing [Read More] 2003 Countrywide‘s Mozilo calls for the elimination of downpayments, announces expansion of its ―House America‖ commitment to $600 billion [Read More] 2004 Having met $3 trillion in previous commitments, Fannie‘s CEO, Franklin Raines, announces plans to renew and expand ―American Dream Commitment [Read More] 2004 HUD trumpets ―revolution in affordable lending‖ [Read More] 2004 HUD rulemaking imposes massive increases in Fannie and Freddie‘s affordable housing mandates, calls for Fannie and Freddie to ―reach deeper into the subprime market‖ [Read More] 2004 Fannie‘s Franklin Raines tells national lender group: ―We have to push products and opportunities to people who have lesser credit quality [Read More] 2004 By the end of 2005 there could be a perfect storm of delinquencies [Read More] 2006 National Association of Realtors reports 46% and 19% of first-time buyers and repeat buyers respectively nationwide put down no money. NAR President Thomas Stevens isn‘t worried [Read More] 2010 HUD finds ―the sharp rise on mortgage delinquencies and foreclosures the result of rapid growth in loans with high risk of default [Read More] 2010 Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission ignores the government‘s efforts to promote flexible underwriting standards throughout the mortgage industry. During the boom low delinquency rates reduce losses, making loans appear less risky to investors. The government‘s encouragement of weakened loan standards promoted a race to the bottom and led to the origination of unprecedented quantities of risky loans 2011 Reforming US housing finance [Read More] In the news 2008 The Washington Post | Fannie‘s Perilous Pursuit of Subprime Loans 2008 The New York Times | Mortgage Giant Overstated the Size of Its Capital Base 2008 The Washington Post | Treasury to Rescue Fannie and Freddie 2008 The New York Times | $700 Billion Bailout Plan Wins Approval 2009 The New York Times | Adding Up the Government‘s Total Bailout Tab 2009 USA Today | Congress Passes $787B Economic Stimulus Bill 2010 CBS News | Docs Show Countrywide‘s Cozy Ties to Fannie Mae 2010 Bloomberg | Fannie, Freddie May Draw $363 Billion, FHFA Says 2011 San Francisco Chronicle | Human Nature Often at Odds with DC-Backed Loans 2011 The Wall Street Journal | The End of Fannie Mae 2011 The Washington Post | What a Plan to Replace Fannie and Freddie Should Include From the American Dream to … Bailout America Supplemental Material AEI | From the American Dream to … Bailout America 1 1. In the early 1990s, Fannie Mae’s CEO Jim Johnson developed a plan to protect Fannie’s lucrative charter privileges bestowed by Congress. Ply Congress with copious amounts of affordable housing and Fannie’s privileges would be secure. It required “transforming the housing finance system” by drastically loosening of loan underwriting standards. Fannie garnered support from community advocacy groups like ACORN and members of Congress. In 1995 President Clinton formalized Fannie’s plan into the National Homeownership Strategy. President Clinton stated it “will not cost the taxpayers one extra cent.” ACORN and others were anxious to cash in on millions of dollars from affordable housing initiatives. Members of Congress were eager to take credit for the trillions of dollars in new lending from loosened standards, receive copious campaign contributions, placate groups like ACORN, and in return were willing to protect Fannie and Freddie’s charter privileges against all comers. Fannie used its power over the mortgage market to gain the support of lenders like Countrywide. By 1995 Johnson’s plan was embodied in the “National Homeownership Strategy” and extolled by President Clinton: i “And I can say without knowing that I'm overstating it, that if we succeed in doing this, if we succeed in making that number happen, it will be one of the most important things that this administration has ever done, and we're going to do it [raise the homeownership rate to a record 67.5% by 2000+ without spending more tax money.” He then added for emphasis: “Our home ownership strategy will not cost the taxpayers one extra cent. It will not require legislation. It will not add more Federal programs or grow Federal bureaucracy.” Over the next 16 years underwriting standards across the nation were progressively loosened. At the same time Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac’s charters withstood all efforts to be reined in. During boom periods low delinquency rates reduce losses and tend to promote a progressive weakening of lending standards. The governments push for weaker standards was akin to dynamiting the housing finance system. Financial and economic collapse ensued turning the American dream into the American nightmare. Why transform the housing finance system? From 1957-1997 the US experienced fairly stable housing prices, with no nationwide price decline in inflation adjusted dollars. There were two bubbles—around 1979 and 1989—which resulted in only regional losses. Up until 1992 the housing finance market had three generally distinct components: 1. the prime market dominated by Fannie, Freddie, thrifts, and banks (80% share), 2. the government subprime (FHA) market focusing on low downpayment home purchase loans to borrowers with high debt ratios and more marginal credit (10% share), and 3. a private subprime market focusing on loans with moderate to high equity levels (20+%) for cash out refinance and home purchases to borrowers with high debt ratios and more marginal credit (10% share). Once Fannie and Freddie were required, in 1992, to buy affordable housing loans, the market began to change in radical ways. Mortgage underwriting standards deteriorated significantly as the GSEs first moved to compete with FHA and then private subprime. This competition was driven by the fact that FHA and private subprime loans were rich in the types of affordable housing loans the GSEs were now being forced to acquire. An immense bubble began to grow in 1997, extending through 2006 during which time loan quality standards declined dramatically. The financial crash of 2008 resulted from the collapse of
Recommended publications
  • Housing Finance Reform: Addressing a Growing Divide
    08 Housing finance reform: Addressing a growing divide Barclays examines how United States housing finance policies affect homeownership rates, finding that affordability targets can provide an effective counterbalance to rising income inequality. 2 Foreword More than a decade after the mortgage-focused government- sponsored enterprises (GSEs) Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac were placed under conservatorship during the 2008 Financial Crisis, the debate about the appropriate role of the government in the housing market continues. 13 October 2020 Despite a raft of housing policies including subsidies, taxes We draw several lessons from these results. First, the and mortgage guarantees, the US has similar homeownership government can positively influence housing outcomes. levels to other developed countries that do not offer such Second, the distinct effect of the GSE affordability targets support. Critics of the current policies cite this as evidence suggests that other forms of support, such as the FHA, may that government intervention accomplishes little except create not be sufficient for low income and minority borrowers in distortions in the housing market, and argue for a sharply their current form. reduced role for government going forward. From a housing policy perspective, this does not translate Yet an important structural difference between the US and into support for the status quo. Many interventions in the other developed economies is the high, and rising, level housing market should be reviewed and may be unnecessary, of income inequality in the US. Our analysis indicates that and we cannot ignore the lessons from the financial crisis rising inequality exerts significant downwards pressure and resulting bailouts.
    [Show full text]
  • Financial Crisis of 2008 and the Philippine Policy Responses Global Financial Crisis
    Financial Crisis of 2008 and the Philippine Policy Responses Global Financial Crisis March 2008- Bear SfStearns fails July 2008 - Wall Street plunges FDIC bails out large US banks (IndyMac, Washington Mutual, Wachovia) Global Financial Crisis Sept 2008 - Lehman Brothers fails US government bails out Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac and AIG Global Financial Crisis Oct 2008 - Bailout of UK banks (Royal Bank of Scotland, HBOS and Lloyds TSB) Nov to Dec 2008 - Germany, Denmark, Ireland, Sweden,Italy, Britain, Eurozone, Japan, Hongkong and the US in recession Policy Responses to Global Crisis 1. Central Bank (Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas Reclassification of Financial Assets from Held for Trading or Available for Sale to the Held-to- Maturity (HTM) or Liquidated Debt Securities classified as Loans categories. - Effective July 1. PliPolicy R esponses t o Gl GlblCiiobal Crisis Price of ROPs* from June ’08 to June ‘09 * Republic of the Philippines PliPolicy R esponses t o Gl GlblCiiobal Crisis Price of ROPs* from June ’08 to June ‘09 * Republic of the Philippines Policy Responses to Global Crisis • Amendment of PDIC Charter Oct 2008 - Bills filed in House of representatives to Dec 2008 and Senate to increase the Maximum Deposit Insurance Coverage (MDIC) Policy Responses to Global Crisis March 4, 2009 - Congress approved joint version of PDIC Charter amendments April 29, 2009 - Signed into law by the President of the Philippines June 1, 2009 - Charter Amendments took effect Policy Responses to Global Crisis Amendments to the PDIC Charter . Increase in the Maximum Deposit Insurance Coverage (MDIC) from P250,000 to P500,000 . Institutional Strengthening Measures 1.
    [Show full text]
  • The Role of Government Affordable Housing Policy in Creating the Global Financial Crisis of 2008 STAFF REPORT U.S
    U.S. House of Representatives Committee on Oversight and Government Reform Darrell Issa (CA-49), Ranking Member The Role of Government Affordable Housing Policy in Creating the Global Financial Crisis of 2008 STAFF REPORT U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 111TH CONGRESS COMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT AND GOVERNMENT REFORM ORIGINALLY RELEASED JULY 1, 2009 * UPDATED MAY 12, 2010 INTRODUCTION The housing bubble that burst in 2007 and led to a financial crisis can be traced back to federal government intervention in the U.S. housing market intended to help provide homeownership opportunities for more Americans. This intervention began with two government-backed corporations, Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, which privatized their profits but socialized their risks, creating powerful incentives for them to act recklessly and exposing taxpayers to tremendous losses. Government intervention also created “affordable” but dangerous lending policies which encouraged lower down payments, looser underwriting standards and higher leverage. Finally, government intervention created a nexus of vested interests – politicians, lenders and lobbyists – who profited from the “affordable” housing market and acted to kill reforms. In the short run, this government intervention was successful in its stated goal – raising the national homeownership rate. However, the ultimate effect was to create a mortgage tsunami that wrought devastation on the American people and economy. While government intervention was not the sole cause of the financial crisis, its role was significant and has received too little attention. In recent months it has been impossible to watch a television news program without seeing a Member of Congress or an Administration official put forward a new recovery proposal or engage in the public flogging of a financial company official whose poor decisions, and perhaps greed, resulted in huge losses and great suffering.
    [Show full text]
  • Sharp -V- Blank (HBOS) Judgment
    Neutral Citation Number: [2019] EWHC 3078 (Ch) Case Nos: HC-2014-000292 HC-2014-001010 HC-2014-001387 HC-2014-001388 HC-2014-001389 HC-2015-000103 HC-2015-000105 IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUSTICE CHANCERY DIVISION Royal Courts of Justice Strand, London, WC2A 2LL Date: 15/11/2019 Before: SIR ALASTAIR NORRIS - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - Between: JOHN MICHAEL SHARP Claimants And the other Claimants listed in the GLO Register - and - (1) SIR MAURICE VICTOR BLANK Defendant (2) JOHN ERIC DANIELS (3) TIMOTHY TOOKEY (4) HELEN WEIR (5) GEORGE TRUETT TATE (6) LLOYDS BANKING GROUP PLC - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - Richard Hill QC, Sebastian Isaac, Jack Rivett and Lara Hassell-Hart (instructed by Harcus Sinclair UK Limited) for the Claimants Helen Davies QC, Tony Singla and Kyle Lawson (instructed by Herbert Smith Freehills LLP) for the Defendants Hearing dates: 17-20, 23-27, 30-31 October 2017; 1-2, 6-9, 13-17,20, 22-23, 27, 29-30 November 2017, 1, 11-15, 18-21 December 2017, 12, 16-19, 22-26, 29-31 January 2018, 1-2, 5- 6, 8, 28 February 2018, 1-2 and 5 March 2018 - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - Approved Judgment I direct that pursuant to CPR PD 39A para 6.1 no official shorthand note shall be taken of this Judgment and that copies of this version as handed down may be treated as authentic. ............................. INDEX: The task in hand 1 The landscape in broad strokes 8 The claim in outline. 29 The legal basis for the claim 41 The factual witnesses. 43 The expert witnesses 59 The facts: the emerging financial
    [Show full text]
  • KPMG's European Central Bank Quarterly Update
    KPMG’s European Central Bank Quarterly Update September 2016 Welcome back from Summer holidays. With rest and SREP 2016 vs. SREP 2015 – how will they relaxation behind us now, KPMG's ECB Office looks forward to refocusing on the SSM priorities and key compare? regulatory issues facing banks across the Eurozone. Hot 4 November will mark the second anniversary of the off the press, the ECB has published its Draft Guidance to European Central Bank (ECB) as banking supervisor. This Banks on Non-Performing Loans. One interesting point is second year of supervision will end with a communication that all banks (even those with low NPLs) will be expected to the significant banks regarding the capital decision on to apply several chapters of the guidance, so it will have a the SSM common Supervisory Review and Evaluation widespread impact. The ECB will invite comment on the Process (SREP) methodology for the ongoing assessment Guidance in the coming months before the guidance goes of credit institutions’ risks, governance arrangements and into effect. KPMG’s ECB Office will soon publish an alert capital and liquidity situation, which have been carefully on this and the combined impact of this Guidance and the tailored to the Eurozone banks’ situations. The question on EBA report on NPLs. the mind of many in the banking sector is, “Is SREP 2016 going to be comparable to SREP 2015?” At the end of July the European Banking Authority released the results of the Stress Test 2016, which have revealed that the banking sector is more resilient than in 2014, but this is offset by high credit risk, poor profitability and other factors.
    [Show full text]
  • Contractor Reports: Executive Summaries and Bibliographies
    65 APPENDIX E: CONTRACTOR REPORTS: EXECUTIVE SUMMARIES AND BIBLIOGRAPHIES RAND SETTING PRIORITIES AND COORDINATING FEDERAL R&D ACROSS FIELDS OF SCIENCE: A LITERATURE REVIEW SRI INTERNATIONAL SYMPOSIUM ON INTERNATIONAL MODELS OF BUDGET COORDINATION AND PRIORITY SETTING FOR S&T These reports were prepared as background for the study undertaken for the National Science Board by the NSB Ad Hoc Committee on Strategic Science and Engineering Policy Issues. The contents of these reports are the responsibility of the respective contractors and do not neces- sarily reflect the views of the Committee or the National Science Board. FEDERAL RESEARCH RESOURCES: 66 A PROCESS FOR SETTING PRIORITIES RAND SETTING PRIORITIES AND COORDINATING FEDERAL R&D ACROSS FIELDS OF SCIENCE: A LITERATURE REVIEW Steven W. Popper, Caroline S. Wagner, Donna L. Fossum, William S. Stiles DRU-2286-NSF April 2000 Prepared for the National Science Board Science and Technology Policy Institute The RAND unrestricted draft series is intended to transmit preliminary results of RAND research. Unrestricted drafts have not been formally reviewed or edited. The views and conclusions expressed are tentative. A draft should not be cited or quoted without permission of the author, unless the preface grants such permission. RAND IS A NONPROFIT INSTITUTION THAT HELPS IMPROVE PUBLIC POLICY THROUGH RESEARCH AND ANALYSIS. RAND’S PUBLICATIONS AND DRAFTS DO NOT NECESSARILY REFLECT THE OPINIONS OR POLICIES OF ITS RESEARCH SPONSORS. SETTING PRIORITIES AND COORDINATING FEDERAL R&D ACROSS FIELDS OF SCIENCE: A LITERATURE REVIEW 67 APPENDIXRAND E (CONTINUED) PREFACE The National Science Board is presently exploring how the U.S. federal government sets priorities in research and development and whether changes are needed in the decision-making process.
    [Show full text]
  • Fixed Income
    FX Market Headlines EUR rallies as bailout agreed Greece finally secures second bailout JPY weakens on inflation target BoE minutes indicate that more QE could be on the way EURCHF closes in on 1.20 floor Important Disclosure This document is based on information provided by Citigroup Investment Research, Citigroup Global Markets, Citigroup Global Citi analystsalth Management and Citigroup Alternative Investments. It is provided for your information only. It is not intended as an offer or solicitation for the purchase or sale of any security. Information in this document has been prepared without taking account of the objectives, financial situation or needs of any particular investor. Accordingly, investors should, before acting on the information, consider its appropriateness, having regard to their objectives, financial situation and needs. Any decision to purchase securities mentioned herein should be made based on a review of your particular circumstances with your financial adviser. Investments referred to in this document are not recommendations of Citibank or its affiliates. Although information has been obtained from and is based upon sources that Citibank believes tobe reliable, we do not guarantee its accuracy and it may be incomplete and condensed. All opinions, projections and estimates constitute the judgment of the author as of the date of publication and are subject to ch ange without notice. Prices and availability of financial instruments also are subject to change without notice. Past performance is no guarantee of future results. The document is not to be construed as a solicitation or recommendation of investment advice. Subject to the nature and contents of the document, the investments described herein are subject to fluctuations in price and/or value and investors may get back less than originally invested.
    [Show full text]
  • CONGRESSIONAL RECORD—HOUSE October 28
    H9586 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD Ð HOUSE October 28, 1997 Mr. Speaker, first, this is a very potential threat to philanthropic inter- The Depot Caucus believes this work straightforward rule, one hour of de- ests, it would be difficult for the Pre- should go to the depots, regardless of bate on the conference report. I have sidio Trust to meet its self-sufficiency cost and regardless of what the Defense no problem with the rule. Secondly, I requirements without a timely and Department needs. They are protecting would like to say to my distinguished thorough cleanup of the Presidio. Se- their home turf, and I respect that, but colleague, the gentleman from Ohio curing the leases necessary to generate it is also bad policy, and this is not [Mr. KASICH] that there is a different revenues is essential to the success of what we should be supporting. It puts perspective and point of view on the trust, and can only be accom- our troops at a disadvantage. Bosnia. This obviously is not the time plished if the cleanup is timely and The Secretary of Defense and his nor the place for us to engage in sub- thorough. military commanders need the flexibil- stantive debate on that matter. I would like to yield to the gen- ity on the current law to modernize. To With the balance of the time, Mr. tleman from Colorado for his final re- do so, they need to have the ability to Speaker, I would like to, for the pur- marks. take the best and most appropriate poses of colloquy, engage the distin- Mr.
    [Show full text]
  • Helping People Achieve Their Ambitions – in the Right Way
    Helping people achieve their ambitions – in the right way Barclays PLC Annual Report 2014 What is this report? The 2014 Annual Report includes a Strategic Report that summarises the key elements of the full report. The Strategic Report is in line with the regulations and best practice as advised by the Financial Reporting Council, and the Department of Business, Innovation & Skills. The design changes this year with increased infographics are intended to facilitate more effective communication with all our stakeholders, and to provide more concise and relevant narrative reports. These objectives are entirely in line with our aim to become more clear and transparent on our journey to be the ‘Go-To’ bank. We will continue to engage with stakeholders to identify ways in which we can further advance this agenda. Notes The term Barclays or Group refers to Barclays PLC together with its subsidiaries. Unless otherwise stated, the income statement analysis compares the year ended 31 December 2014 to the corresponding twelve months of 2013 and balance sheet analysis as at 31 December 2014 with comparatives relating to 31 December 2013. The abbreviations ‘£m’ and ‘£bn’ represent millions and thousands of millions of Pounds Sterling respectively; and the abbreviations ‘$m’ and ‘$bn’ represent millions and thousands of millions of US Dollars respectively. The strategic report The comparatives have been restated to reflect the implementation of the Group structure changes and the reallocation of elements of the Head An overview of our 2014 performance, a focus on our strategic direction, Office results under the revised business structure. These restatements were detailed in our announcement on 10 July 2014, accessible at barclays.com/ and a review of the businesses underpinning our strategy.
    [Show full text]
  • Did Repeal of Glass-Steagall for Citigroup Exacerbate the Crisis?
    ETHICS Curtis C. Verschoor, CMA, Editor Did Repeal of Glass-Steagall for Citigroup Exacerbate Freed from the restrictions of the Glass-Steagall Act, giant bank- the Crisis? holding companies appear to have been focused more on industry should be recognized as Citibank and Travelers Group. In meeting the expectations of Wall at least a quasi-public utility, exist- addition to the traditional bank- Street analysts than on protect- ing in large part for the benefit of ing services, this $140 billion ing depositors’ funds from risk. depositors who need to have con- umbrella encompassed brokerage, tinuing confidence that their investment banking, and several funds are safe. insurance companies, including mid the finger-pointing After the savings and loan disas- Travelers. Agoing on in regard to the cur- ter caused the previous banking More recently, urged on by for- rent banking crisis, it seems that debacle, the FDIC Improvement mer U.S. Treasury Secretary we may be forgetting who the real Act of 1991 mandated that insured Robert Rubin, Citigroup’s director culprits are. Should we blame the institutions employ adequate con- and chair of its Executive Com- bungling bureaucrats in Fannie trols to manage their risks in order mittee, Citi acquired heavy expo- Mae, Freddie Mac, the Federal to maintain the safety and sound- sure to Collateralized Debt Oblig- Reserve, the Securities & Exchange ations (CDOs) based on subprime Commission (SEC), and the Trea- mortgages. By 2006, Citi had sury Department? Or are the regu- It will take a major become the second largest under- lators (perhaps they should be overhaul of business writer of CDOs.
    [Show full text]
  • Aviation Industry Leaders Report 2021: Route to Recovery
    The Aviation Industry Leaders Report 2021: Route to Recovery www.aviationnews-online.com www.kpmg.ie/aviation KPMG REPORT COVERS 2021.indd 1 20/01/2021 14:19 For what’s next in Aviation. Navigating Change. Together. Your Partner For What’s Next KPMG6840_Aviation_Industry_Leaders_Report REPORT COVERS 2021.indd 2021 2 Ads x 4_Jan_2021.indd 4 19/01/202120/01/2021 15:37:29 14:19 CONTENTS 2 List of 10 Regional Review 24 Airline Survivorship 36 Return of the MAX 54 Chapter Four: The Contributors and Post-Covid World Acknowledgements Chapter One Assessing which Boeing’s 737 MAX incorporates a regional airlines will survive the aircraft was cleared for The recovery from 4 Foreword from Joe review of the aviation immediate health crisis return to service after the devastation the O’Mara, Head of market. and the subsequent the US Federal Aviation coronavirus pandemic Aviation, KPMG recovery period has Administration officially has wrought on the 18 Government rescinded the grounding world is expected to be Ireland become an essential Lifelines skill for lessors, lenders order. Industry experts slow but how will the 6 Chapter One: and suppliers. discuss the prospects new world environment This section takes a for the aircraft type and impact demand for air Surviving the Crisis deep dive into the levels 28 Chapter Two: Fleet how it will be financed. travel. This chapter also of government support considers the impact This chapter considers Focus for the aviation industry 44 Chapter Three: The of climate change the macroeconomic and around the world and Airlines are likely to Credit Challenge concerns on the aviation geopolitical shock of the considers its impact emerge from the crisis coronavirus pandemic industry.
    [Show full text]
  • The Humbling of the Scottish Banking Industry During the Financial Crisis: Hybris, Financialization and Some Aristotelian Responses
    THE HUMBLING OF THE SCOTTISH BANKING INDUSTRY DURING THE FINANCIAL CRISIS: HYBRIS, FINANCIALIZATION AND SOME ARISTOTELIAN RESPONSES. OWEN KELLY, UNIVERSITY OF EDINBURGH Influencing the world since 1583 OUTLINE • Summarize facts of the cases • The climate of financialization • Hybris and hubris – differing conceptions • Aristotle • Conclusions BANK OF SCOTLAND (HBOS) • Formed from Halifax Building Society and Bank of Scotland – a 'mutual' lost to the economy • Sales culture • Financial markets and trading dominate • Excessive pay (like whole sector) • Bad banking practice • Bailout cost £30 billion and a degree of nationalisation • Taken over by Lloyds – Bank of Scotland exists as subsidiary • Investigation damning but no prosecutions ROYAL BANK OF SCOTLAND (RBS) • Aggressive expansion in UK, taking over other banks • Rapid international growth • "An international bank that happens to be based in Scotland" • Biggest bank in the world! • Bad banking practice • Bailout cost £46 billion and a form of nationalisation • No prosecutions • Legal cases and public ownership continue FINANCIALIZATION • "...the substitution of trading and transactions for relationships...the restructuring of finance businesses.....broader economic effects on stability and inequality......[linked to] market fundamentalism....the exaltation of the role of the trader" (Kay, 2015) • Relationships: Gemeinschaft to Gesellschaft • Restructuring – move away from mutuals and partnerships • Risk becomes financialized and 'managed' • Exchange value dominates Fisher's 'misinterpretation'
    [Show full text]