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The Netherlands BETTER REGULATION IN EUROPE: AN ASSESSMENT OF REGULATORY CAPACITY IN 15 MEMBER STATES OF THE EUROPEAN UNION Better Regulation in the Netherlands EUROPEAN COMMISSION © OECD (2009). All rights reserved. 1 ORGANISATION FOR ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT Pursuant to Article 1 of the Convention signed in Paris on 14th December 1960, and which came into force on 30th September 1961, the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) shall promote policies designed: to achieve the highest sustainable economic growth and employment and a rising standard of living in Member countries, while maintaining financial stability, and thus to contribute to the development of the world economy; to contribute to sound economic expansion in Member as well as non-member countries in the process of economic development; and to contribute to the expansion of world trade on a multilateral, non-discriminatory basis in accordance with international obligations. The original Member countries of the OECD are Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France, Germany, Greece, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, the United Kingdom and the United States. The following countries became Members subsequently through accession at the dates indicated hereafter: Japan (28th April 1964), Finland (28th January 1969), Australia (7th June 1971), New Zealand (29th May 1973), Mexico (18th May 1994), the Czech Republic (21st December 1995), Hungary (7th May 1996), Poland (22nd November 1996), Korea (12th December 1996) and the Slovak Republic (14th December 2000). The Commission of the European Communities takes part in the work of the OECD (Article 13 of the OECD Convention). This document has been produced with the financial assistance of the European Commission. The views expressed herein can in no way be taken to reflect the official opinion of the European Commission. © OECD 2009 Permission to reproduce a portion of this work for non-commercial purposes or classroom use should be obtained through the Centre français d‟exploitation du droit de copie (CFC), 20, rue des Grands-Augustins, 75006 Paris, France, tel. (33-1) 44 07 47 70, fax (33-1) 46 34 67 19, for every country except the United States. In the United States permission should be obtained through the Copyright Clearance Center, Customer Service, (508)750-8400, 222 Rosewood Drive, Danvers, MA 01923 USA, or CCC Online: www.copyright.com. All other applications for permission to reproduce or translate all or part of this book should be made to OECD Publications, 2, rue André- Pascal, 75775 Paris Cedex 16, France. © OECD (2009). All rights reserved. 2 FOREWORD The OECD Review of Better Regulation in the Netherlands is one a series of country reports launched by the OECD in partnership with the European Commission. The objective is to assess regulatory management capacities in 15 member states of the European Union (EU),1 including trends in their development, and to identify gaps in relation to good practice as defined by the OECD and the EU in their guidelines and policies for Better Regulation. The project is also an opportunity to discuss the follow-up to the OECD‟s multidisciplinary reviews, for those countries which were part of this process,2 and to find out what has happened in respect of the recommendations made at the time. The multidisciplinary review of the Netherlands was published in 1999 (OECD, 1999). The completed reviews will form the basis for a synthesis report, which will also take into account the experiences of other OECD countries. This will be an opportunity to put the results of the reviews in a broader international perspective, and to flesh out perspectives for the next ten years of regulatory reform. Regulation: what the term means for this project The term “regulation” in this project is generally used to cover any instrument by which governments set requirements on citizens and enterprises. It therefore includes all laws (primary and secondary), formal and informal orders, subordinate rules, administrative formalities and rules issued by non-governmental or self-regulatory bodies to whom governments have delegated regulatory powers.3 Methodology The starting point for the reviews is a “project baseline” which draws on the initiatives for Better Regulation promoted by both the OECD and the European Commission over the last few years: The OECD‟s 2005 Guiding Principles for Regulatory Quality and Performance set out core principles of effective regulatory management which have been tested and debated in the OECD membership. The OECD‟s multidisciplinary reviews over the last few years of regulatory reform in 11 of the 15 countries to be reviewed in this project included a comprehensive analysis of regulatory management in those countries, and recommendations. The recently completed OECD/SIGMA regulatory management reviews in the 12 “new” EU member states. The 2005 renewed Lisbon Strategy adopted by the European Council which emphasises actions for growth and jobs, enhanced productivity and competitiveness, including measures to improve the regulatory environment for businesses. The Lisbon Agenda includes national reform programmes to be carried out by member states. © OECD (2009). All rights reserved. 3 The European Commission‟s 2006 Better Regulation Strategy, and associated guidelines, which puts special emphasis on businesses and especially SMEs, drawing attention to the need for a reduction in administrative burdens. The European Commission‟s follow up Action Programme for reducing administrative burdens, endorsed by the European Council in March 2007. The European Commission‟s development of its own strategy and tools for Better Regulation, notably the establishment of an impact assessment process applied to the development of its own regulations. The OECD‟s recent studies of specific aspects of regulatory management, notably on cutting red tape and e-government, including country reviews on these issues. Peer review and country contributions The review was conducted by a team consisting of members of the OECD Secretariat, and peer reviewers drawn from the administrations of other European countries with expertise in Better Regulation. The review team for the Netherlands was: Caroline Varley, Project Leader for the EU15 reviews, Regulatory Policy Division of the Public Governance Directorate, OECD. Andrew van der Lem, Director and Head of International (Europe) Team, Better Regulation Executive, Department for Business, Enterprise, and Regulatory Reform, United Kingdom. Tríona Quill, Head of Better Regulation Unit, Department of the Taoiseach (Prime Minister), Ireland. The review team held discussions held in The Hague with Dutch officials and external stakeholders on 26 March 2008 and 13-16 April 2008. Major initiatives and developments since these missions are referenced in the report, but have not been evaluated. The team interviewed representatives of the following organisations: Advisory Board on Administrative Burdens (ACTAL) Association of Netherlands Municipalities (VNG) Business and Policy Research Institute (EIM) Central Unit for Modernising Inspections Confederation of Netherlands Industry and Employers (VNO-NCW) Erasmus University (Faculty of Social Sciences) General Inspection Service House of Representatives Ministry of Agriculture Ministry of Economic Affairs Ministry of Finance Ministry of Foreign Affairs Ministry of General Affairs (Prime Minister‟s Office) Ministry of Interior and Kingdom Relations Ministry of Justice Ministry of Social Affairs and Employment Municipality of Amsterdam Netherlands Court of Audit (NCA) Prime Minister‟s Office © OECD (2009). All rights reserved. 4 Regulatory Reform Group Transport and Water Management Inspectorate Wientjes Commission The report is also based on material provided by the Netherlands in response to a questionnaire, including relevant documents, as well as relevant recent reports and reviews carried out by the OECD and other international organisations on linked issues such as e-government and public governance. The report, which was drafted by the OECD Secretariat, was the subject of comments and contributions from the peer reviewers as well as from colleagues within the OECD Secretariat. It was fact checked by the Netherlands. Structure of the report The report is structured into eight chapters. The project baseline is set out at the start of each chapter. This is followed by an assessment and recommendations, and background material. Strategy and policies for Better Regulation. This chapter first considers the drivers of Better Regulation policies and the country‟s public governance framework seeks to provide a “helicopter view” of Better Regulation strategy and policies. It then considers overall communication to stakeholders on strategy and policies, as a means of encouraging their ongoing support. It reviews the mechanisms in place for the evaluation of strategy and policies aimed at testing their effectiveness. Finally, it (briefly) considers the role of e-government in support of Better Regulation. Institutional capacities for Better Regulation. This chapter seeks to map and understand the different and often interlocking roles of the entities involved in regulatory management and the promotion and implementation of Better Regulation policies. It also examines training and capacity building within government. Transparency through consultation and communication. This chapter examines how the country secures
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