Air Safety Through Investigation JULY-SEPTEMBER 2020 Journal of the International Society of Air Safety Investigators

Research-Based Aviation Safety of Evolution of Mishap Kapustin Scholar Accidents Past, Insights Through Remotely Piloted Prevention: Human Essay—Remembering Accidents Future: Accident Investigations: Aircraft Systems in Factors Evaluation for Before the Crash: Safety in the Age of The Importance of China Unmanned Aircraft Nonvolatile Memory Can Unmanned Aviation Lightweight Flight Systems Change the Course of an Recording Systems Investigation page 4 page 9 page 16 page 20 page 22 CONTENTS Air Safety Through Investigation Journal of the International Society of Air Safety Investigators FEATURES Volume 53, Number 3 Publisher Frank Del Gandio 4 Research-Based Insights Through Accident Investigations: Editorial Advisor Richard B. Stone The Importance of Lightweight Flight Recording Editor J. Gary DiNunno By Beverley Harvey, Senior Investigator, International Operations and Major Investiga- Design Editor Jesica Ferry tions, Air Transportation Safety Board of Canada; Bruce Mullen, Regional Senior Inves- Associate Editor Susan Fager tigator, Operations, Air Investigations-Atlantic, Transportation Safety Board of Canada; ISASI Forum (ISSN 1088-8128) is published quar- and Christina M. Rudin-Brown, Ph.D., Manager, Human Factors and Macro Analysis terly by the International Society of Air Safety Division, Transportation Safety Board of Canada—The authors examine how the absence Investigators. Opinions expressed by authors do of regulations in Canada to implement lightweight flight recorders for private aircraft and not necessarily represent official ISASI position other aircraft not currently required to have crash-protected flight recorders has adversely or policy. affected accident investigations. 9 Aviation Safety of Remotely Piloted Aircraft Systems in China Editorial Offices: Park Center, 107 East Holly Ave- nue, Suite 11, Sterling, VA 20164-5405. Telephone By Lin Yang, Air Safety Investigator and Senior Engineer, China Academy of Civil Avi- 703-430-9668. Fax 703-430-4970. E-mail address, ation Science and Technology, Civil Aviation of China; and China Postal Airlines—The [email protected]; for editor, jgdassociates@ author describes the growth of remotely piloted aircraft systems in China within various starpower.net. Internet website: www.isasi.org. industries; how these aircraft interact with traditional piloted air traffic; and how aircraft ISASI Forum is not responsible for unsolicited regulations, pilot certification, and operation procedures have changed in the course of this manuscripts, photographs, or other materials. new technology. Unsolicited materials will be returned only if submitted with a self-addressed, stamped enve- 16 Evolution of Mishap Prevention: Human Factors lope. ISASI Forum reserves the right to reject, Evaluation for Unmanned Aircraft Systems delete, summarize, or edit for space con- By Elise Lagerstrom, Ph.D., Insitu Inc., Human Factors Mishap Investigator—The author siderations any submitted article. To facilitate suggests that human factors evaluation as part of air safety investigation for unmanned editorial production processes, American Eng- aircraft accidents and incidents lags far behind the focus on safety and mishap prevention lish spelling of words is used. for piloted aircraft that has begun to focus on the human-machine interface and advances Copyright © 2020—International Society of Air in technology. Safety Investigators, all rights reserved. Publica- 20 Kapustin Scholar Essay—Remembering Before the Crash: tion in any form is prohibited without permission. ISASI Forum registered U.S. Patent and Nonvolatile Memory Can Change the Course of an Investigation T.M. Office. Opinions expressed by authors do By Elise Marie Vondra, University of Southern California—The author describes the not necessarily represent official ISASI position importance to accident investigation of nonvolatile memory sources within aircraft systems or policy. Permission to reprint is available upon that can provide information on performance and pattern trends that might not otherwise application to the editorial offices. be evident. Publisher’s Editorial Profile: ISASI Forum is print- 22 Accidents Past, Accidents Future: ed in the United States and published for profes- Safety in the Age of Unmanned Aviation sional air safety investigators who are members By Thomas A. Farrier, Chair, ISASI Unmanned Aircraft Systems Working Group, and of the International Society of Air Safety Inves- Principal Safety Analyst, ClancyJG International—The author asks if lessons from acci- tigators. Editorial content emphasizes accident investigation findings, investigative techniques dents involving manned aircraft can be applied to make unmanned aviation safer and and experiences, regulatory issues, industry ac- will past accident scenarios be repeated with expansion of minimally regulated unmanned cident prevention developments, and ISASI and aircraft operations within manned aircraft flight paths. member involvement and information.

Subscriptions: A subscription to members is pro- DEPARTMENTS vided as a portion of dues. Rate for nonmem- 2 Contents bers (domestic and Canada) is US$28; Rate for nonmember international is US$30. Rate for all 3 President’s View libraries and schools is US$24. For subscription 28 News Roundup information, call 703-430-9668. Additional or 30 ISASI Information replacement ISASI Forum issues: Domestic and 32 A Student’s Perspective of Life in Lockdown Canada US$4; international member US$4; domestic and Canada nonmember US$6; interna- ABOUT THE COVER tional nonmember US$8. Although not required by regulation, a lightweight flight recording system on board this Mitsubishi aircraft aided investigators to sequence events leading to the 2016 collision with terrain near Îles-de-la-Madeleine Airport in Québec, Canada (see page 4). INCORPORATED AUGUST 31, 1964 2 • July-September 2020 ISASI Forum PRESIDENT’S VIEW

TOBY CARROLL RETIRES

utting my thoughts and feelings into words about a life- Upon completing his active duty, Toby worked for a company long air safety advocate and ISASI activist with whom I that investigated aviation accidents for various manufacturers have worked closely for my entire accident investigation and subsequently for the U.S. National Transportation Safety Pcareer is difficult. And in this case, it is about someone Board at its New York field office. My first encounter with Toby who has never been at a loss for words. was during this time in the late 1970s when we investigated a So I will just say it. Toby Carroll has recently retired as presi- general aviation accident together. Toby joined ISASI in 1982. dent of the U.S. National Society and as the U.S. councilor—po- And in all the years since then, he’s missed only two ISASI sitions he has held since 2009. Prior to that, he was vice presi- annual seminars. My wife and I became good friends with Toby dent and treasurer of the Dallas-Ft. Worth Chapter. He served in and his wife, Kathy, and always looked forward to the council those offices with commitment and zeal on behalf of the Society meetings and seminars to spend time together. and aviation safety throughout the world. In 1985, Toby became the manager and later the director of Toby’s military service in the Army included a tour as a flight safety for Continental Airlines, where he was instrumen- fixed-wing pilot in Vietnam and then assignment to the Army tal in establishing numerous safety programs—many of which Aviation School as a committee chief/instructor. Following ac- are now industry-standard practices. He was a strong advocate tive duty, Toby served in the Army Reserve and National Guard for proactive safety programs and chaired numerous aviation as a company commander and operations officer. Toby always industry committees. claims that he was an accidental air safety investigator. He was I was reacquainted with Toby on a Continental Airline acci- “volunteered” to participate in an accident investigation that he dent investigation after I transferred to Washington, D.C., and found interesting and challenging. He took the path less trave- was on the FAA go-team in 1980. I was an FAA investigator, and led, and the rest is aviation safety history. His final assignment he was with the Continental team that participated in NTSB in- was as the 50th brigade safety officer where he established vestigations. He also served as a technical advisor to the NTSB the brigade’s aviation and ground safety programs. During his accredited representatives on International Civil Aviation Or- military career, Toby received numerous decorations, includ- ganization Annex 13 investigations. I quickly learned that Toby ing the Distinguished Flying Cross, the Air Medal with 14 oak was the “go-to” person if I needed information about airlines, clusters, the Bronze Star, and an Army Commendation Medal especially their safety practices and procedures. During his with cluster. active investigation career, Toby participated or was in charge of more than 400 accident and incident investigations. And he was always ready to share his experience and expertise—to an- yone who would listen. I learned a lot about safety investigation techniques and procedures from him—many things you might not understand as well from books or training classes. Some- times my FAA colleagues would ask where I got so much good airline information. I just said my source was reliable. ISASI recognized Toby’s lifetime contributions to aviation safety and to ISASI with the Jerome F. Lederer Award in 2016. He has been a positive force for air safety throughout his career, and his penchant for passing on his expertise to others—including me—will ensure that his contributions will continue for generations to come. All of us involved in ensuring air safety owe Toby a great debt and wish him well in his retirement. Toby Carroll, U.S. National Society president, left, receives the 2016 Frank Del Gandio Jerome F. Lederer Award from ISASI President Frank Del Gandio. ISASI President July-September 2020 ISASI Forum • 3 (Adapted with permission from the authors’ technical paper Research-Based Research-Based Insights Insights Through Accident Investigations: The Importance of Lightweight Flight Recording Systems for Accident Through Accident Investigations: Investigations presented during ISASI 2019, Sept. 3–5, 2019, in The Hague, the Netherlands. The theme for ISASI 2019 was “Future Safety: Has the Past Become Irrelevant?” The full presentation can The Importance of Lightweight be found on the ISASI website at www. isasi.org in the Library tab under Technical Presentations.—Editor) Flight Recording Systems

By Beverley Harvey, Senior Investigator, International Operations and Major Investigations, Air Transportation Safety Board of Canada; Bruce Mullen, Regional Senior Investigator, Operations, Air Investigations-Atlantic, Transportation Safety Board of Canada; and Christina M. Rudin-Brown, Manager, Human Factors and Macro Analysis Division, Transportation Safety Board of Canada

he question for ISASI 2019’s par- crash-protected flight two high-profile accidents investigated by the Trans- ticipants is whether the past has recorders. portation Safety Board (TSB) of Canada. Both involved become irrelevant. Certainly, some Advanced technology privately operated aircraft, and these accidents oc- Tissues have become irrelevant; in this field has result- curred in 2016 within months of each other. There are investigators have come a long way with ed in recorders that are similarities between the two; however, the findings are access to more modern investigation very sophisticated, light quite different because one aircraft had a lightweight techniques because of knowledge gleaned in weight, and much less flight recording system on board and the other aircraft from the past. With modern technology, costly than earlier models. did not. investigators can rely solidly on rapid In the distant past, record- The first accident that this paper will examine is communications and assistance from ers on large commercial from the TSB’s aviation investigation report A16A0032: first responders, coroners, and manu- aircraft were not regarded Collision with terrain/Mitsubishi MU-2B-60, N246W/ facturers whose expertise is instantly as being essential; but once Îles-de-la-Madeleine Airport in Québec, Canada, March available for all phases of the investiga- the benefits were demon- 29, 2016. tion. For example, technology regarding strated in accident investi- photography has improved so much that, gations, recorders became TSB report summary instead of having to wait for good weather mandatory. On March 29, 2016, a privately operated Mitsubishi and a helicopter to film the wreckage site, So it is today—the emer- MU-2B-60 aircraft (registration N246W, serial number excellent drone photography is instant- gence of lightweight flight 1552S.A.) departed Montréal/Saint-Hubert Airport in ly available. This enables investigators recording systems is start- Québec on an instrument flight rules flight to Îles-de-la- to concentrate on their job of combing ing to show the benefits in Madeleine Airport in Québec. The pilot, a passenger-pi- through the wreckage site, photograph- accident investigations and ing components, interviewing witnesses, normal day-to-day data and then taking the accident from the collection. Canada still has outdoors to their computers. sectors of aviation in which However, there is one challenge in recorders are not manda- Canada that still needs to be solved. tory for some commercial This challenge stems from the absence operators and privately of regulations for the implementation of operated aircraft. Our lightweight flight recording systems for challenge is to demonstrate privately operated aircraft (the private how effective lightweight operation of any aircraft type listed in flight recording systems are Section 604.3 of the Canadian Aviation in accident investigations Regulations [CARS] and engaged in and continue to recom- noncommercial flight operations must mend that the government abide by specific regulations set out in address this issue in a CARS Subpart 604) and other commercial timely fashion. Beverly Harvey from the Transportation Safety Board of aircraft not currently required to carry This paper will discuss Canada at the accident scene.

4 • July-September 2020 ISASI Forum lot, and five passengers were on board. ments before impact. The audio retrieved During the final approach to Runway 07, from the Wi-Flight was complete and when the aircraft was 1.4 nautical miles instrumental to the understanding of the west southwest of the airport, it deviated events leading to the accident. south of the approach path. At approx- Although not required by regulation, imately 1230 Atlantic daylight time, the installation and use of a lightweight aircraft control was lost, resulting in the flight recording system during the oc- aircraft striking the ground in a near-level currence flight, as well as the successful attitude. The aircraft was destroyed, and retrieval of its data during the investiga- all occupants were fatally injured. There tion, permitted a greater understanding was no postimpact fire. of this accident. A lightweight flight recording system The final report found that the cause Beverley Harvey was on board the occurrence aircraft, of the aircraft’s upset and subsequent although it was not required by regula- impact was due to a loss of control that tion. This device was a cell phone that occurred when the pilot rapidly added had GPS, voice recording, and acceler- full power at a low airspeed while at a low ometer capabilities; it was attached to altitude, causing a power-induced upset. the aircraft’s radio. Although it was not This resulted in the aircraft rolling sharply a crash-survivable recorder, TSB inves- to the right and descending rapidly. It tigators recovered the recorder from the was the analysis of the recordings that wreckage, and the TSB engineering lab- allowed the determination of the rapid oratory was able to extract and analyze throttle advance by the pilot. its data. The resulting information was The second accident that this paper critical to understanding the sequence of will examine is from the TSB’s aviation Bruce Mullen events that led to the aircraft’s departure investigation report A16P0186: Loss of from controlled flight; without recorders, control and collision with terrain/Cessna crucial information to understand these Citation 500, C-GTNG/Kelowna Airport, events would not have been available. British Columbia, Canada, Oct. 13, 2016.

Data retrieval and analysis TSB report summary The investigation successfully recovered On Oct. 13, 2016, a privately operated data from the terrain awareness and Cessna Citation 500 (registration C-GT- warning system and the Wi-Flight record- NG, serial number 500-0169) departed ing device. These data were used to recon- Kelowna Airport (CYLW) in British struct the flight profile during all stages of Columbia on an instrument flight rules flight, enhancing the investigators’ ability night flight to Calgary/Springbank to understand and analyze the final mo- Airport (CYBW), Alberta, Canada. The Christina M. Rudin-Brown

July-September 2020 ISASI Forum • 5 part of the flight is unknown because there was a lack of data to be able to determine the precise tracking of the aircraft during the steep descending turn. However, it is likely that there was a tight- ening turn to the right given the trend suggested in the data. Investigators were unable to identify and fully understand the underlying causal and contributory factors. The investigation’s sole finding as to cause and contributing factors was that the aircraft departed controlled flight, for reasons that could not be determined, and collided with terrain. The relevant finding in the TSB accident report as to risk was that, if flight data, voice, and video recordings are not Multilateration surveillance data of the accident. available to an investigation, the identification and communication of safety pilot and three passengers were on board. be determined if there was an abnormal deficiencies to advance transportation Shortly after departure, at about 2135 event before the aircraft’s rapid descent. safety may be precluded. Pacific daylight time, the aircraft made a Although there were no recordings on For several decades now, FDRs and tight right turn as it was climbing through board, the TSB engineering laboratory CVRs have been conceived, designed, 8,600 feet above sea level and then was able to work with the raw radar data and installed in order to record flight entered a steep descending turn to the that was available from two radar sites in and cockpit data for accident investiga- right until it struck the ground. All of the the vicinity of the accident site. tion purposes. FDRs record a number of occupants were fatally injured. Impact The goal was to determine the aircraft’s aircraft parameters—such as altitude, forces and a postimpact fire destroyed the flight path (ground track and altitude) airspeed, and heading—many times per aircraft. as well as to calculate vertical velocity, second. CVRs record radio transmissions The high-energy impact resulted in a ground speed, and deviation from the and ambient cockpit sounds, including crater approximately two feet deep. Frag- published standard instrument departure pilot voices, alarms, and engine nois- mented aircraft debris was projected into routing. This information was then used es. Image/video recorders capture and trees and scattered around a small area. to document the flight, synchronized in provide video of the crew immediately The postimpact fire destroyed most of the time with the air traffic control recording. before, during, and after an event. aircraft structure. This raw radar data consisted of mul- Currently, FDRs and CVRs are consid- Investigators were able to determine tilateration (MLAT) surveillance data that the engines were producing power provided by NAV CANADA. The MLAT at the time of impact and that there was data were inaccurate for the takeoff no in-flight breakup or separation of the because there was significant scatter in wings. Weather conditions at the time of the radar targets. For the latter part of the the accident did not appear to be condu- flight, when the aircraft transitioned into cive to significant icing. There were no dif- a steep descending turn, accurate MLAT ficulties with radio communications, and data were also not available. none of the communications between the The climbout segment of the ground pilot and air traffic control revealed any track was generally smooth and consist- sense of urgency or any anomalies with ent. Several radar targets were obviously the aircraft. There was no evidence that false targets (off track) in the MLAT data. pilot fatigue was a factor. Since the aircraft was only equipped with In contrast to the first accident, the a single bottom-mounted transponder information normally contained in flight antenna, depending on the aircraft’s po- data recording systems was not available sition and attitude, the antenna may have to this investigation. The aircraft was been shielded from a significant number not equipped with a flight data recorder of the radar sensors. Position inaccura- (FDR), a cockpit voice recorder (CVR), cies could have occurred because some or any other lightweight flight recording of the blocked sensors may have detected system, nor were any required by regula- reflections off nearby terrain, rather than Although not required by regulation, a cell tion. Consequently, it was a challenge to transponder replies directly from the phone that had GPS, voice recording, and establish a detailed sequence of actions in aircraft. accelerometer capabilities was attached to the cockpit, and, as a result, it could not What exactly happened during the final the Mitsubishi aircraft’s radio.

6 • July-September 2020 ISASI Forum ered the most comprehensive methods regulatory requirements or specifications. the use of FDM, providing informa- of capturing large amounts of flight data To provide an accessible and feasible tion on FDM, including its benefits, for accident investigations. Investigations means of recording valuable flight data costs, and challenges. Due to other can also obtain data from other sourc- information, regardless of the type of ministerial commitments, the TC has es, such as iPads, tablets, smartphones, aircraft and operation flown, several not initiated its work for any of these GPS units, engine monitors, and other lightweight flight recording systems undertakings. nonvolatile memory sources that are not currently manufactured can record In February 2018, the TC conducted a crash-protected. Investigators who have combined cockpit image, cockpit audio, focus group with industry stakeholders access to data from FDRs and CVRs, as aircraft parametric data, and/or datalink to evaluate the challenges and benefits well as from these other types of light- messages. Although there are currently of installing lightweight flight recording weight recording systems, are more likely no regulations in Canada requiring any systems on aircraft that are not currently to identify safety deficiencies than investi- aircraft to be equipped with lightweight required to carry these systems. However, gations who do not benefit from FDR and flight recording systems, these devices until the focus group reaches conclusions CVR data. provide a potential cost-effective alterna- concerning these challenges and benefits In 2016, the International Civil Aviation tive for some sectors of the civil aviation in small aircraft, and the TC provides Organization (ICAO) amended Annex 6 of industry. the TSB with its plan of action following its standards and recommended prac- In 2013, following its investigation into those conclusions, it is unclear when or tices to recommend that certain catego- a fatal in-flight breakup occurrence in how the safety deficiency identified in ries of aircraft and helicopters flown by March 2011 northeast of Mayo, Yukon, Recommendation A13-01 will be ad- commercial operators carry lightweight Canada, the TSB concluded there was dressed. flight recorders. The European Organ- a compelling case for implementing Although Recommendation A13-01 ization for Civil Aviation Equipment lightweight flight recording systems targeted commercial operators, the con- (EUROCAE) established the minimum for all commercial operators. The TSB trast in available evidence demonstrated operational performance specification recommended that the TC work with between the Îles-de-la-Madeleine and the for lightweight flight recording systems, industry to remove obstacles to and Kelowna aircraft accidents discussed in ED-155, and ICAO references this docu- develop recommended practices for the this paper highlights the value of install- ment. As well, ICAO Annex 6 outlines the implementation of flight data monitoring ing lightweight flight recording systems minimum specifications for such systems. (FDM) and the installation of lightweight on privately operated aircraft as well. To comply with recent amendments to flight recording systems by commercial Investigators are at a disadvantage in ICAO Annex 6 and to address 12 safety operators not currently required to carry determining the causes of an occurrence recommendations issued by seven differ- these systems (TSB Recommendation when no flight data are available, regard- ent investigation bodies in Europe, the A13-01). less of whether the investigation involves European Union Aviation Safety Agency The TC has acknowledged that FDM an aircraft operated commercially or a (EASA) published a notice of proposed programs would enhance safety and has business aircraft operated privately. amendment (NPA) in 2017, under which taken the following actions to address the From past TSB investigation reports, new regulations would prescribe light- safety deficiency identified in Recommen- it has been demonstrated that investiga- weight flight recorders for some catego- dation A13-01: tors have been unable to determine the ries of commercially operated aircraft and • In 2013, after conducting a risk reasons for an accident because of the helicopters. assessment to evaluate alternative lack of onboard recording devices. The In Canada, FDR and CVR regulations approaches to FDM, the TC informed benefits of recorded flight data in aircraft the TSB that it supported Recom- are currently specified in Section 605.33 of accident investigations are well known mendation A13-01. In 2015, the TC the CARs, Flight Data Recorder and Cock- and documented. Because of the compel- informed the TSB that it intended to pit Voice Recorder. Under this provision, revisit this risk assessment. ling evidence that the lack of recording the requirements for CVR and FDR equip- devices on board commercial aircraft and ment in aircraft are based primarily on • In 2013, the TC informed the TSB that private aircraft continues to impede the the number and type of engines, number it would develop an advisory circular TSB’s ability to advance transportation of passenger seats, and type of operation. outlining recommended practices for safety, the TSB board recommended that FDM programs. Given the design characteristics and con- the Department of Transport require the figurations, many aircraft flown by private • In 2013, the TC informed the TSB that mandatory installation of lightweight operators, including both aircraft that it would incorporate its analysis and flight recording systems by commercial were involved in the accidents discussed review of Recommendation A13-01 operators and private operators not in this paper, are not required by regula- into its planned assessment for FDRs currently required to carry these systems tion to be equipped with either an FDR or and CVRs, which was scheduled to (TSB Recommendation A18-01 that re- begin in 2014–2015. a CVR. placed TSB Recommendation A13-01). EUROCAE’s minimum operational • In 2014, the TC informed the TSB that In the first accident discussed in this performance specification for lightweight it would consider adding FDM prin- paper at Îles-de-la-Madeleine Airport, flight recording systems defines the ciples in future regulatory initiatives there was a lightweight flight recording minimum specifications for lightweight and amendments. system on board although it was not flight data recording systems; Transport • In 2015, the TC informed the TSB that required by regulation. By recovering the Canada (TC) does not currently have any it would prepare an issue paper on recorder and extracting its data for anal-

July-September 2020 ISASI Forum • 7 ysis, investigators were able to have an accurate understanding of the sequence of events that led to the aircraft’s departure from controlled flight. Had a recording system not been on board, crucial information to understand the circumstances and events leading up to this occurrence would not have been available to the investigation. In contrast, the information normally recorded by FDR or CVR systems was not available for the second accident discussed in this paper. Investigators could not positively determine why the aircraft departed controlled flight and collided The Mitsubishi MU-28-60 suffered a loss of control and collision into terrain while on approach to Îles-de- with terrain. Because la-Madeleine Airport, Québec, resulting in the loss of all seven people on board. this aircraft was not equipped with any type of lightweight flight recording system, investigators were precluded from fully identifying The Cessna Citation 500 also suffered loss of control and collision with terrain while on departure from and understanding the Kelowna Airport, British Columbia, with the loss of all four people on board. sequence of events and the accident’s underlying causes and contributing factors. When investigators have access to recorded data on board an aircraft, they can quickly figure out what happened, and then it is possible to spend precious time and resources concentrating on the issues as to why the accident happened. Otherwise, time is need- lessly spent testing and discounting hypotheses, and other issues that are deemed irrelevant to the investigation.

8 • July-September 2020 ISASI Forum Aviation Safety of Remotely Piloted Aircraft Systems in China By Lin Yang, Air Safety Investigator and Senior Engineer, China Academy of Civil Aviation Science and Technology, Civil Aviation of China; and China Postal Airlines

(Adapted with permission from the author’s technical paper Review of Aviation Safety Regulation and Practices of Remotely Piloted Aircraft Systems [RPAS] in China presented during ISASI 2019, Sept. 3–5, 2019, in The Hague, the Netherlands. The theme for ISASI 2019 was “Future Safety: Has the Past Become Irrelevant?” The full presentation can be found on the ISASI website at www.isasi.org in the Library tab under Technical Presentations.—Editor)

Development of RPAS in China managed by industry associations in The industrial chain related to remotely China totaled 8,113, a significant increase piloted aircraft systems (RPAS) has devel- compared to 1,898 in 2015 and 244 in oped rapidly. 2014. In March 2017, CAAC issued the At the end of 2016, the State Council Annual Report on the Development of issued the National Emerging Industry Civil Aviation Pilots (2016). As of Dec. Development Plan for Five-Years (2016– 31, 2016, the total number of civil RPAS 2020) that promotes the development of pilot licenses was 10,255, an increase of RPAS that can be used in multiple sectors nearly four times compared to the num- to meet market demand. National policies ber of certificates issued in 2015. These and broad prospects will enable the RPAS certificates were mainly distributed to industry to enter a robust development manufactures, research and development phase. RPAS has been applied in various enterprises, and universities. There are industries such as agriculture, forestry, 158 qualified RPAS pilot training institu- mining, infrastructure assessment, power tions, nearly double the number in 2015. line and pipeline inspection and moni- Today, most drone operators in China are toring, aerial mapping, firefighting and individuals under the age of 40. disaster relief, environmental protection, In February 2018, CAAC issued in- meteorological observation, highway formation bulletin General and Small management, postal express delivery, film Transportation Operation Overview 2017 and television production, and aerial pho- (IB-FS-2018-12) and Annual Report on tography, etc. the Development of Civil Aviation Pilots According to the forecast for 2017– (2017). As of Dec. 31, 2017, the number of 2021, the market scale of industry-level certificates held by various types of RPAS RPAS will grow at a rapid rate of 30% per pilots managed by industry associations year, and there is a trend to replace the had increased to 24,407, including 2,121 existing manned aircraft in many fields fixed-wing, 1,343 helicopters, 20,833 such as general aviation and freight multirotors, 9 airships, and 101 vertical aviation. RPAS for agriculture will be takeoff and landing fixed-wing, which popularized nationwide in 2019, and in are mainly distributed to companies that 2022, agriculture and recreational aerial manufacture drones, research and de- photography will be gaining popularity. velopment enterprises, and universities. In February 2017, the Civil Aviation A total of 199 pilot training institutions Administration of China (CAAC) issued have training qualifications. information bulletin General and Small In February 2019, CAAC issued in- Transportation Operation Overview 2016 formation bulletin General and Small (IB-FS-2017-011). As of Dec. 31, 2016, the Transportation Operation Overview 2018 Lin Yang number of RPAS with various certificates (IB-FS-2019-15) and Annual Report on

July-September 2020 ISASI Forum • 9 the Development of Civil Aviation Pilots 11 flights to Chongqing Jiangbei Inter- RPAS. The airspace restriction was lifted (2018). As of Dec. 31, 2018, the number national Airport to ensure flight safety at 2215 once no additional RPAS sightings of registered civil RPAS had increased and ground safety. In April 2017, eight were reported. Due to the timely and to more than 180,000, with 44,573 pilot consecutive RPAS disturbances occurred proper execution of emergency protocols, licenses for various types of RPAS, includ- in the Chengdu region, causing 138 flights there were no significant disturbances to ing 3,131 fixed-wing, 1,624 helicopters, to return and divert. normal flight operations. 39,278 multirotor wings, 11 airships, and On the evening of Feb. 6, 2019, several An RPAS fuselage is mostly made of 529 vertical takeoff and landing fixed- RPAS disturbances occurred over Xi’an aluminum and carbon fiber composite wing. There are eight approved cloud City, causing flight disruptions for nearly materials. After colliding with a manned system providers for RPAS, six of which five hours. At 1734, the pilot on a flight aircraft, the degree of damage is worse are connected to the cloud exchange at about 1,600 meters above the ground than that of a bird strike. However, due system—U-Cloud, U-Care, BD-Cloud, 5U was passing over Xi’an enroute to Xi’an to the limited power and endurance, this Cloud, FindDrone, and Xcloud—with a Xianyang Interntional Airport when he type of RPAS has an active radius of five total of 988,625 flight hours in 2018. reported to the air traffic controller that to 10 kilometers and a maximum rela- According to the report from RPAS an RPAS was spotted within 100 to 200 tive height of climb no more than one Real-Name Registration System, as of meters directly above him. In the past two kilometer. Therefore, the impact on civil Jan. 24, 2019, about 295,000 RPAS had years, CAAC has issued relevant measures aviation is mainly concentrated on the been registered, including 25,000 with a for handling RPAS due to numerous dis- takeoff, approach, and landing phases, maximum takeoff mass (MTOM) of more turbances. Upon receipt of the report, the and conflicts with aircraft mostly occur than 25 kilograms to 150 kilograms, 571 air traffic controller immediately imple- in airport terminals. While there have RPAS with a MTOM of more than 150 mented the emergency response plan and not been any collisions between flights kilograms, and 49 RPAS with a MTOM set up a temporary avoidance airspace. and RPAS in China thus far, there have of more than 650 kilograms. There are This airspace covered a horizontal radius been many incidents in which RPAS have 268,000 RPAS owners, 3,720 types of RPAS, of six kilometers and a vertical radius of intruded airport runways and approach and 1,239 manufacturers and agents 600 meters from the crew. The controller routes, resulting in serious incidents and registered. then directed the aircraft to fly around posing great threats to safety. the airspace, reported the situation to Violations Cases of RPAS/RPAS subsequent flights, and continuously Evolution of Regulations observed the dynamics of the RPAS. Incidents In 2009, CAAC issued the airworthiness About 10 minutes later, another flight Meanwhile, taking advantage of regula- management document Interim Provi- crew reported an RPAS near the east tions and new technologies to supervise sions Related to the Administration of gate of Xi’an City. Due to poor visibility RPAS attracts more attention. In fact, RPAS (ALD2009022), which regulated the and fast flight speed, the crew could not the safety risks of RPAS are not only a registration and administration of civil determine the specific height and type problem for China, but also for the world. RPAS with reference to civil aircraft man- of the RPAS. The air traffic controller In recent years, there have been multi- immediately set up a temporary avoid- agement measures. Before an RPAS can ple incidents of flight delays and airport ance airspace at the reported location fly, the RPAS operator must receive tem- closures caused by the illegal invasion in accordance with the procedures. At porary registration approval from CAAC by RPAS. The illegal operation of low, 1821, the flight crew of an aircraft 2,400 and display the registration on the body slow, and small aircraft such as RPAS has meters above the ground in the south- of the RPAS according to the aviation become a significant concern affecting west part of Xi’an City reported that a procedure Regulation on the Nationality flight safety and even national and social black, barrel-shaped RPAS was flying at a Registration of Civil Aircraft of P.R. China security. As the usage of RPAS becomes horizontal distance of one kilometer from (AP-45-AA-2008-01R3). Prior to each more prevalent so, too, do the conflicts and at a vertical height of 200 meters flight, the operator should apply for a between RPAS operators and airliners. from the crew, which is very dangerous. special flight permit from CAAC Regional On the evening of May 28, 2016, an Due to continuous reports from aircrews Administrations according to the aviation RPAS appeared in the airspace of Cheng- and the influence of the RPAS’s flight procedure Issuing and Managing Air- du Shuangliu International Airport’s height on the safety of normal flights, the worthiness Certificates for Civil Aviation eastern runway, resulting in the runway on-duty leader of the northwest ATMB Products and Parts (AP-21-05R1). RPAS closure for just more than one hour and immediately decided to change the flight with temporary registration certificates 55 flight delays. This was the first time procedures of arriving flights and relayed and special flight permits shall operate that an RPAS had affected the flights at that all flights should avoid flying over in accordance with the rules of air traffic Chengdu Airport, the fourth largest avia- Xi’an City. management, operational management, tion hub in mainland China. In the next few hours, the air traffic and radio management to ensure safety. On April 17, 2017, in the airspace near controller instructed all arriving flights CAAC continued to carry out the Chengdu Airport, an RPAS interfered to avoid the airspace according to the administration of RPAS and successively with flights again. The control center of emergency plan. At about 2200, the published the Advisory Circular Inter- the southwest Air Traffic Management controller gradually directed aircraft to im Operating Provisions for Low-Level Bureau (ATMB) immediately implement- resume the normal flight procedures and Operation of Light and Small Unmanned ed the emergency plan and diverted informed the crews to remain alert for Aircraft Systems (AC-91-FS-2015-31,

10 • July-September 2020 ISASI Forum issued on Dec. 29, 2015) and management optimize the decision-making process on Flight Management of RPAS (draft for document Measures for Air Traffic Man- of regulatory authorities in taking timely comments) in January 2018, seeking the agement of Civil RPAS (MD-TM-2016-004, risk mitigation measures. views of the civil aviation industry and issued on Sept. 21, 2016). In December 2017, CAAC began to wider community, such as the military. In response to illegal RPAS flights that implement the recommended standards This interim regulation includes seven affect the operation of civil aviation in of RPAS Fence and RPAS Cloud System chapters, presenting a range of safe- many airports across the country, major Interface Data Specification to further ty-related issues, including RPAS classi- airports have actively carried out spe- improve the legal and regulatory system. fication, mandatory registration, pilot cial rectification activities for airborne In 2018, CAAC successively issued the education and training, airspace, flight objects such as RPAS in accordance with information bulletin Safe Flight Test plan, commercial operator, role of manu- the Notice on Further Strengthening the Report for Low-Level Networked RPAS facturers/retailers, and legal liability. It is Management of Airborne Objects such (IB-FS-2018-011, issued on Feb. 6, 2018), the first time that China has deployed the as RPAS in the airport clear zone. This management document Interim Admin- management and development of RPAS includes drafting work plans for RPAS istrative Measures for Commercial Flight from the national strategic level. As the and other airborne objects in the airport Activities of Civil RPAS (MD-TR-2018-01, highest administrative regulations for clear zone and becoming more vigilant of issued on March 21, 2018), and Advisory RPAS at this stage, it is the regulation that such zones. The no-fly zone of the airport Circular Regulations for Civil RPAS Pilot civil aviation authorities must comply has been determined through negotiation (AC-61-FS-2018-20R2, issued on Aug. 31, with to supervise RPAS. with the air traffic control station, and 2018). So far, the Interim Regulation on Flight a no-fly zone is an area bounded by 10 In 2019, three Advisory Circulars Management of RPAS (draft for com- kilometers on both sides of the centerline (drafts for comments) Operating Provi- ments) has completed the first round of of the runway and 20 kilometers outside sions for Low-Level Operation of Light solicitation of opinions. both ends of the runway. Major airports and Small Unmanned Aircraft Systems In July 2019, the Interim Regulation on coordinate with relevant departments to (AC-91-FS-2019-31R1, amendment to Flight Management of RPAS (draft for ex- carry out preventive measures, establish AC-91-FS-2015-31), Regulations on amination and approval) and regulation a long-term management mechanism for Submission and Management of Flight description were issued by the Ministry of the joint defense of airports, clarify the Data of Light and Small Civil RPAS (AC- Justice for further comments before Aug. stakeholders for the management of RPAS 93-TM-2019-01), and Regulations for Civil 2, 2019. This document is the result of the and other airborne objects in the airport RPAS Pilot (AC-61-FS-2019-20R3, issued consultation performed with the Inter- clear zone, and publish the map of the on Aug. 31, 2019, amendment to AC-61- im Regulation on Flight Management of airport no-fly zone to the public. FS-2018-20R2) were issued. Advisory RPAS (draft for comments). CAAC has implemented the aviation Circular Interim Regulations for Specific In the airspace management, Interim procedure Regulations on Real-Name Category of RPAS Operation (AC-92-2019- Regulation on Flight Management of Registration of RPAS (AP-45-AA-2017-03, 01, issued on Feb. 1, 2019), Guidance on RPAS (draft for examination and approv- issued on May 16, 2017), which has grad- Airworthiness Approval of RPAS Based al) requires that the RPAS’s flight airspace ually strengthened the management of on Operational Risk (issued on Jan. 25, is classified by the combination of the RPAS pilots. 2019), and recommended standard of horizontal protection range for ground On July 19, 2017, CAAC required that Data Specifications of Unmanned Aircraft target and the restricted height. Under flight crews report potential RPAS con- Cloud System (draft for comments, the premise of a clear horizontal protec- flicts. After spotting an RPAS, flightcrew issued in June 2019) were also issued. The tion area, the height of below 50 meters members should immediately report the management protocols of RPAS training is required for micro RPAS and below 120 key information such as the time and lo- institutions personnel are also being meters for light RPAS, which basically cation of encounter, flight phase, relative developed. covers recreational users. position (left, right, or center), relative Meanwhile, the draft of China Civ- In the flight plan management, the cur- aircraft altitude (above, below, or same il Aviation Regulation Part 92 Safety rent policies that all flights should apply altitude), shape (multirotor, fixed-wing, Management Rules for RPAS (CCAR-92) for a flight permit in advance have been helicoper, or other), and color of RPAS is being developed to further improve revised so that micro RPAS, light RPAS, to the air traffic controller if they believe and integrate the relevant regulations for RPAS for agriculture, and some state that it poses a threat to flight safety. With- the management of RPAS within the civil RPAS do not need to apply for a flight in 24 hours, the flight crew should fill out aviation area. CCAR-92 will include the plan when they are flying in a specific the Drone Encounter Report and sub- registration and certificate of civil RPAS, airspace (light RPAS and RPAS for agri- mit it to the airline's Operation Control personnel management, operational culture need to report their information Department for review. These reports play management, airspace management, and in real time). Small RPAS can properly an important role in mitigating the risk other aspects. simplify the flight plan approval process of RPAS interfering with the operation On the state level, according to the when flying below 300 meters. of flights, promote the smooth flow of legislative framework of the State Council In terms of the legal obligation, it information related to RPAS in all aspects and the Military Commission, the State stipulates that organizations and private of monitoring such as RPAS location data Council and the Office of the Air Traffic individuals flying RPAS are responsible gathering, improve the standardization Control Committee of the Military Com- for ensuring flight safety. Except for of conflict data reporting of RPAS, and mission published an Interim Regulation obvious faults, when an RPAS is involved

July-September 2020 ISASI Forum • 11 in an occurrence with a manned aircraft, tion of RPAS into the aviation system. To small, medium, and large RPAS. the party responsible for the RPAS flight accomplish this, CAAC will develop poli- • Micro—RPAS with an unloaded shall bear the primary responsibility; if cy, standards, regulations, and guidance weight 250 grams or less. the occurence occured between RPASs, material reflecting an appropriate and • Light—RPAS with an unloaded the party that operated in beyond visual proportionate approach to the relevant weight of more than 250 grams but line of sight operations (BVLOS) shall levels of risk consistent with international fewer than four kilograms and seven bear the primary responsibility or share best practices. kilograms MTOM. responsibility. Integration of RPAS into the system of • Small—RPAS with an unloaded The draft of China Civil Aviation Regu- aviation safety should provide enough weight of at least four kilograms but lation Part 92 Safety Management Rules flexibility for innovation in the RPAS fewer than 15 kilograms or 25 kilo- for RPAS (CCAR-92) will be issued after industry without adversely affecting grams MTOM. the release of this Interim Regulation on other airspace users, the traveling public, • Medium—RPAS with an unloaded Flight Management of RPAS. or posing unacceptable risks to people weight of more than 15 kilograms and In June 2017, the Standardization or property on the ground. CAAC will MTOM of at least 25 kilograms but Administration Committee (SAC), the continue to engage with the Internation- fewer than 150 kilograms. Ministry of Industry and Information al Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) • Large—RPAS with MTOM of more Technology, the Ministry of Science and other international aviation safety than 150 kilograms. and Technology, the Ministry of Public agencies to address key policy issues, Security, the Ministry of Agriculture and including the equitable access to air- Here, the classification of micro and Rural Affairs, the General Administration space, privacy, national security, and the light RPAS refer to the practices of most of Sport, the National Energy Administra- environment. It is a long-term process to countries in deregulating RPAS below tion, and CAAC jointly issued Guidelines expand the flight activities of civil RPAS 250 grams. The concept of MTOM is for Developing RPAS Standard System from isolated airspace to nonisolated mostly used for manned aircraft and is Framework (2017–2018 edition) (the airspace and finally integrate the activ- an important indicator for airworthiness Guidelines). The Guidelines establish a ities into the national airspace system. certification. Many countries have direct- two-phase and three-step road map and The management of RPAS will refer to ly adopted this concept in RPAS. Howev- define the requirements, framework, and the existing management system of civil er, as small and light RPAS do not have implementation methods of the RPAS aviation and could be broadly divided airworthiness requirements, they may standard system. The framework will be into flight standards, RPAS airworthiness not be able to provide the officially tested completed in two phases. certification, market management, and maximum certificated takeoff mass. For The first phase (2017–2018) establishes air traffic management. ease of management, it regards MTOM a standard system for RPAS and focuses and unloaded mass as two important on developing a number of key standards classification criteria for light, small, and urgently needed by the market and sup- Classification of RPAS medium RPAS. Light and medium RPAS porting regulatory requirements. In Interim Regulation on Flight Manage- should meet two conditions, and small The second phase (2019–2020) will ment of RPAS (draft for comments) dated RPAS need only to meet one. gradually push forward the develop- January 2018, according to flight safety According to the requirements of ment of standards. By 2020, the standard risks, taking mass as the main index and Advisory Circular Interim Regulations for system will be basically established and combining with RPAS performance such Specific Category of RPAS Operation (AC- improved, including basic standards, as flight height, speed, radio transmission 92-2019-01, issued on Feb. 1, 2019) issued management standards, technical stand- power, and airspace maintenance capa- by CAAC, RPAS operation management is ards, and industry application standards, bility, RPAS are divided into micro, light, categorized as follows: which will meet the application needs of relevant industries. Advisory Circular Interim Regulations for Specific Category of RPAS Operation Here, the basic standards include Category Unloaded Weight (kilograms) MTOM (kilograms) terminology, classification, and identification. Management standards include I 05700

12 • July-September 2020 ISASI Forum According to the operation manage- ministrative Measures for Commercial The General Aviation Air Operator’s ment mode, civil RPAS are also divided Flight Activities of Civil RPAS (MD- Certificate Management Regulations into categories of open, specific, and TR-2018-01, issued on March 21, 2018) (CCAR-290-R1) include four types of certified. The specific category RPAS- in and Advisory Circular Regulations for certificates: passengers, cargo, training, cludes Categories III and IV with higher Civil RPAS Pilot (AC-61-FS-2018-20R2, and aerial work. Management docu- risk of operation and Categories XI and issued on Aug. 31, 2018). ment Interim Administrative Measures XII with less risk. CAAC believes that With certain exceptions introduced for Commercial Flight Activities of Civil the specific category of RPAS should be under the two documents above, RPAS (MD-TR-2018-01, issued on March certificated for operation, while other commercial RPAS operators must hold 21, 2018) applies only to aerial work categories of RPAS do not need to be a remote pilot license and/or RPAS op- and training, excluding passenger and certificated. erator’s certificate (RPAS at and above cargo transportation. In order to meet 250 grams). The exception to the pilot the actual needs of the RPAS operation Mandatory Registration license requirement is when an RPAS is activities, CAAC approved two pilot being operated in Categories I and II in operations of logistics and distribution A requirement for RPAS to display reg- compliance with the information men- of RPAS in Jiangxi and Shaanxi in Au- istration and/or contact details would tioned previously. To obtain a license gust and December 2018. At the same assist in identifying owners involved or certificate, a person above the age of time, relevant legislation was initiated in a reportable incident or accident. 16 must have successfully completed a to improve the regulatory system, and On May 16, 2017, CAAC implemented specific training course and passed an the relevant provisions related to cargo the aviation procedure Regulations examination. Other operations do not transportation will be assessed to deter- on Real-Name Registration of RPAS require a license or certificate or man- mine whether cargo will be regulated in (AP-45-AA-2017-03, issued on May 16, datory education or training. the same regulations. 2017), which required the manufacturer As of Sept. 1, 2018, the current effec- and owner of a civil RPAS with a gross tive RPAS pilot license issued by the weight of 250 grams or more to carry Operation Management of RPAS industry association is automatically out real-name registration effective Since various RPAS are operated in converted to the RPAS pilot electron- June 1, 2017. After Aug. 31, 2017, if the different ways and they use much more ic license issued by CAAC. The rights real-name registration and registration airspace than manned aircrafts in contained in the original license are marks have not been implemented, the China, it is necessary to implement cat- transferred to the electronic license. flight is regarded as illegal in violation egorical management. The management As of Jan. 1, 2019, the applicant’s of laws and regulations, and the regu- of light and small RPAS could be done training experience data must be latory authorities will impose penalties in the following way due to the state of connected to the RPAS cloud system according to relevant regulations. development of RPAS technology. approved in accordance with Advisory The owner of a civil RPAS includes Circular Interim Operating Provisions individuals and organizations. The pro- for Low Level Operation of Light and Operation Management of RPAS— cess of real-name registration involves Small Unmanned Aircraft Systems (AC- the manufacturer and the owner to Deployment of Geofencing 91-FS-2015-31, issued on Dec. 29, 2015) apply for an account on the RPAS Re- An electronic geofence is a hardware to meet the application requirements al-Name Registration System (https:// or software system that is coordinated for license and/or rating for instruction uas.caac.gov.cn). The manufacturer fills with a flight control system to ensure a received and solo pilot time. out the information for its products, certain delimited area of electronic geo- To obtain an RPAS operator’s certifi- and the owner registers the information graphic zones to exclude any intruding cate, the following conditions must be about the RPAS he or she owns with his aircrafts to maintain the safety of the met: (a) The entity engaged in commer- or her name. The registration mark pic- area. cial activities shall be an enterprise ture (including registration number and Under Advisory Circular Interim legal person, and the legal representa- QR code) given by the system is pasted Operating Provisions for Low-Level Op- tive shall be a Chinese citizen; (b) The on the body of the RPAS. The owner eration of Light and Small Unmanned enterprise shall have at least one RPAS, must ensure that the registration mark Aircraft Systems (AC-91-FS-2015-31, is- and the real-name registration shall be is attached to the RPAS during each sued on Dec. 29, 2015), for RPAS of Cate- completed in the name of the enterprise operation. In case of sale, transfer, dam- gories III, IV, VI, and VII and Categories in the RPAS Real-Name Registration age, scrap, loss, or theft, the information II and V operated in key areas and in System; (c) The training institution shall regarding the RPAS must be updated in the airport clear zone, the electronic have the training capacity approved a timely manner. After the ownership is fence should be installed and used. by the competent authority or by its transferred, the new owner must regis- authorized institution; (d) Ensuring ter the information regarding the RPAS third-person liability insurance for Operation Management of RPAS— in accordance with the requirements. RPAS. Applicants should apply for RPAS Registered in Cloud System the RPAS operator’s certificate online An RPAS cloud system (UACS) is a Education and Training through the civil RPAS operator’s certif- dynamic database system for light and In 2018, CAAC successively issued the icate management system (https:// uas. small RPAS operations. This system pro- management document Interim Ad- ga.caac.gov.cn). vides navigation, meteorological, and

July-September 2020 ISASI Forum • 13 other services for users and conducts including five new UACSs and two In addition, some cloud systems also real-time monitoring of RPAS operation UACS updated approval letters in 2018 have relatively rich functions, such as data (including operation information, (see Table 1). online reporting of flight plans, mete- position, altitude, speed, etc.). The RPAS RPAS connected to these UACSs shall orological services, aviation insurance uploads flight data immediately when upload flight data to the cloud during purchase, operation environment connecting to the cloud. If an RPAS flight. monitoring, and other functions, such invades an electronic fence, the RPAS In 2017, CAAC conducted research on as monitoring engine parameters and cloud will send an alarm. the cloud data exchange and developed the temperature and humidity of the Under Advisory Circular Interim Op- a cloud exchange system for RPAS, surrounding environment. erating Provisions for Low-Level Opera- through which several UACSs can be Most RPAS cloud service providers tion of Light and Small Unmanned Air- connected and real-time data exchange have also established quality manage- craft Systems (AC-91-FS-2015-31, issued and sharing are realized—making ment systems and safety management on Dec. 29, 2015), RPAS of Categories registered RPAS in the same airspace manuals according to ICAO Doc. 9859 II and V operated in key areas and the mutually visible. Safety Management Manual. airport clear zone should be connected The RPAS cloud system has been to UACS or send the position of ground operating for nearly three years in Operation Management of RPAS— control equipment to UACS at inter- China. Mainly registered in the cloud Operator vals of at least once per minute. RPAS system are light, small, and agricultural According to the civil aviation law of of Categories III, IV, VI, and VII (gross RPAS. At present, these cloud systems China, the operator of a civil aircraft weight of more than seven kilograms) have realized real-time monitoring of shall be covered by insurance against should be connected to UACS and RPAS position, speed, altitude, heading, liability for third parties on the surface report flight date once per second in registration, etc., and for RPAS invading or obtain a corresponding guarantee. populous areas and once per 30 seconds the electronic fence, it has an alarm in low population–density areas. RPAS function. These systems meet the re- of Category IV should be equipped with quirements of the recommended stand- Flight Plan Application and Approval passive feedback systems. ards of Fence of Unmanned Aircraft Process For RPAS not registered in UACS, the System (MH/T 2008-2017) and Interface The Interim Regulation on Flight Man- operator should apply to the authority Specification of Unmanned Aircraft and agement of RPAS (draft for comments) for approval and provide an effective Cloud System (MH/T 2009-2017). In issued in January 2018 broke through surveillance method before operation. June 2019, CAAC published the recom- the current requirement that all flights Between March 2016, when the first mended standards of Data Specification must be applied for in advance and UACS obtained qualification for trial of Unmanned Aircraft Cloud System implemented only after approval and operation, and Dec. 31, 2018, CAAC (draft for comments), seeking the views appropriately simplified the application approved a total of nine cloud systems, of the aviation industry and community. and approval process for flight plans in

Approval letter number Name of UACS Name of UACS provider Date of approval Note

01 U-Cloud Beijing U-Cloud Intelligence and Aviation Technology Mar. 12, 2018 First update Co.Ltd

02 U-Care Cloud Century Mar. 21, 2018 First update

03 Flying-Cloud Chengdu Flying General Aviation Company Aug. 31, 2016 Expired

04 BD-Cloud Beijing Compass Technology Co. Ltd. Aug. 28, 2017

05 5U Cloud Beijing 5U Cloud Big Data Technology Co. Ltd. Jan. 2, 2018

06 KITE BEAM Nanjing Dwing Aviation Technology Co. Ltd. Mar. 2, 2018

07 FindDrone Qianxun SI Mar. 21, 2018

08 UGRID Smart Grid (Beijing) Tech Co. Ltd. Jun. 4, 2018

09 Xcloud Guangzhou Xaircraft Technology Co. Ltd. Sep. 20, 2018 For agriculture and forestry’s exclusive use

Table 1

14 • July-September 2020 ISASI Forum some operation scenarios. management and flight information The micro RPAS flies outside the service, public safety management, and prohibited airspace and does not user service. need to apply for a flight plan, and Airspace management mainly deals light RPAS and agriculture applica- with the functions of airspace plan- tion RPAS flying in the appropriate ning, approval, release, flight plan dec- airspace do not need to apply for a laration and approval, and real-time flight plan, but dynamic information monitoring of flight. must be submitted in real time to the Civil aviation management and flight supervision platform for RPAS. information management is undertak- In addition, organizations or indi- en by the RPAS air traffic management viduals engaged in other categories of information service system (UTMISS) RPAS flight activities must submit an of CAAC (www.utmiss.com). It mainly application for a flight plan to the lo- implements the functions of mon- cal air traffic control department prior itoring information collection and to flight, and the flight plan should not processing, civil aviation flight safety be implemented until it is approved. assessment, information transmission, user information management, user Dedicated RPAS Branch—National and RPAS information verification, and Aircraft Standardization Technical information integration service, etc. Committee’s RPAS Subtechnical It is deployed in the center southern Committee region administration of CAAC, ATMB, In December 2018, the first RPAS Sub- the Civil Aviation Shenzhen Adminis- technical Committee (SAC/TC435/ tration, and the local air traffic control SC1) of the National Aircraft Stand- station. Through communication with ardization Technical Committee was the civil aviation service, the public established to be responsible for the safety service, and other systems, development of national standards UTMISS provides RPAS flight applica- in the fields of design, manufacture, tion information, real-name registra- delivery, operation, maintenance, tion information of inspectors, pilot li- and management of civil RPAS. In cense information, RPAS airworthiness line with the International Organi- information, RPAS operator certificate zation for Standardization’s Techni- information, and RPAS owner informa- cal Committee on Aeronautics and tion to all service systems. Spacecraft’s Technical Subcommittee Public safety management main- on Unmanned Aircraft Systems (ISO/ ly deals with the functions of public TC20/SC16), it aims to promote the security filing, real-time flight monitor- development of the industry standard ing, and networking of detection and system for RPAS, improve the safety countermeasures equipment, etc. and quality level of RPAS products, User service mainly focuses on the and promote the high-quality develop- functions of user registration, infor- ment of China’s RPAS industry. mation inquiry, flight plan application, submission of flight dynamic information, and notification and reminder, Air Traffic Management System for etc. Civil RPAS The integrated monitoring platform On Nov. 19, 2018, the test project of for RPAS takes flight management as RPAS flight management in Shenzhen its core, including elements such as was launched, and the comprehensive airspace management, civil aviation supervision platform was put on line management, and public safety for trial operation. At the same time, management to meet the needs of fast the Implementation Measures for flight approval, real-time visibility of RPAS Flight Management was issued flight paths, rapid verification of in Shenzhen, announcing that the control, and release of comprehensive comprehensive supervision platform information. Through the platform, the would efficiently connect users and functions and tasks of military, civil management departments. The plat- aviation, and public security are form mainly consists of modules of defined and the coordination relation- airspace management, civil aviation ship is clarified.

July-September 2020 ISASI Forum • 15 Evolution of Mishap Prevention: Human Factors Evaluation for Unmanned Aircraft Systems By Elise Lagerstrom, Ph.D., Insitu Inc., Human Factors Mishap Investigator

(Adapted with permission from he aviation safety team and processes become more reactive, to anticipate the shift the author’s technical paper at Insitu uses both reliable, leading to decreased in the root cause of mishaps in Evolution of Mishap Prevention: proactive and reactive material failures and increased UAS from material to hu- Application of Human Factors evaluation techniques relative prevalence of mishaps man-related causes. Evaluation Techniques for T to improve overall product due to human error. Statis- Unmanned Aircraft Systems (UAS), presented during ISASI quality and usability. Recently, tics on the substantial role of Proactive Mishap Prevention methods such as focus groups human factors in aviation mis- 2019, Sept. 3–5, 2019, in The Hague, Programs the Netherlands. The theme for and interviews, a year-round haps were first published back ISASI 2019 was “Future Safety: Has focus on hazard reporting from in 1993; however, this distribu- One of the ways we are working the Past Become Irrelevant?” The all employees, and use of the tion still holds true today with to anticipate and prevent full presentation can be found on Human Factors Analysis and the latest statistics indicating future mishaps is by moving the ISASI website at www.isasi.org Classification System (HFACS) 70–80% of aviation mishaps are to proactive forms of mishap in the Library tab under Technical in mishap investigations and attributed to human error. In prevention. To do this, we have Presentations.—Editor) near-misses have resulted manned aviation, the focus of implemented several initiatives in actionable and functional safety and mishap prevention with the goal of identifying recommendations. has appropriately shifted to and tracking threats before The most common recom- address the human-machine they result in mishaps. Four of mendations generated by these interface (HMI) and usability these initiatives include a line prevention programs center with advances in technology, operations safety audit (LOSA) on curriculum/training of such as the glass cockpit, aug- program with specific focus on pilots and maintainers, pilot mented reality, and improved UAS, pilot workload and usabil- experience, gaps between training simulations. However, ity assessments, tracking of ac- system capabilities and desired in unmanned aviation, it could tive and latent conditions using functionality, and system docu- be argued that we lag behind, HFACS for near-miss events, mentation. with a focus on perfecting the and the use of focus groups As a result of dispositioning airframe, autopilot logic, and and user interviews with pilots recommendations to the re- performance characteristics and maintenance personnel. sponsible teams, findings from to meet varying operational Each of these methods has the programs and methods demand. While these advances provided different and valuable mentioned in this study have are essential to safe operations, recommendations that can be been used to there is a warped and inappro- pushed upstream to design and engineering teams, as well as • correct documentation priate feel that the role of the downstream to the end users. gaps and errors. pilot and safety of the system • change autopilot logic for are somehow less important improved integration with because of the lack of physical LOSA manned aviation. human presence within the air- According to an FAA advisory craft. This attitude is detrimen- circular, “A LOSA is a formal • improve maintenance tal not only to the development procedures and documen- process that requires expert of systems, but also to attempts tation. and highly trained observers to integrate the unmanned to ride the jumpseat during • modify the pilot curricu- aircraft system (UAS)/remotely regularly scheduled flights to lum. piloted aircraft system (RPAS) collect safety-related data on • change the user interface into airspace with manned environmental conditions, to improve pilot situational platforms. operational complexity, and awareness and monitoring Insitu is a company focused flight crew performance. of aircraft function. on UAS; however, we believe Confidential data collection that to be safe and successful and nonjeopardy assurance for Introduction aviators, we need to refocus on pilots are fundamental to the The evolving root cause of the pilot. In the last year, we process.” For successful LOSA aviation mishaps has been well have integrated human factors program implementation to documented; with technolog- evaluation techniques and occur, there must be support Elise Lagerstrom ical development, materials programs, both proactive and throughout the initiating 16 • July-September 2020 ISASI Forum Figure 1. Human-centered mishap prevention. organization. and created training materials during each phase of flight to are completed by peers during The objectives of implement- for pilots, observation forms, distinguish between the unique actual missions. Before the end ing a LOSA program are as and methods of data manage- threats seen during each state can be achieved, aware- follows: ment and dissemination of period. ness training must be com- • To obtain feedback from results. The LOSA forms that The LOSA observation form pleted with all pilots involved pilots so that system im- were created were designed for for maintainers is designed in the program, and more provements can be made, specific application to UAS. In to capture human error and extensive training must be addition, the LOSA observation areas for improvement during • To obtain baseline data on provided to pilots who wish to forms that were developed are normal maintenance tasks. In crew workload and threat serve as program auditors. Be- management for compar- specific to pilot and maintainer contrast to the LOSA obser- fore conducting this training, ison if and when changes actions. vation form for pilots, which we are working to trial the data are made to the system, The LOSA observation form makes observations during collection forms and methods for UAS pilots was designed each phase of flight, the LOSA during training and simulation • To heighten safety and to capture human error and observation form for maintain- flights. These trials, while not procedural awareness, and areas for improvement during ers assesses maintainer actions providing “true” LOSA obser- • To reduce the incidence normal flight operations with and behaviors during preflight vations, have helped to identify and cost of human er- emphasis on items that are checks, postflight checks, and deficiencies within the meth- ror–related mishaps by known to specifically threaten regularly scheduled mainte- ods, and we have been able to identifying unsafe con- the safety of UAS operations. nance procedures (such as a receive feedback from opera- ditions prior to mishap The LOSA observation form for 50-hour engine inspection). tional personnel on not only occurrence. pilots consists of the following The LOSA program at Insitu the methods, but on how to At Insitu, successful im- sections: demographic and is still in the development best implement the program. plementation of the LOSA flight data collection, a written phase. The data collection program is reliant on coop- narrative evaluation, behav- forms, methods, and training eration and assistance from ioral assessment standards materials have been created, Workload and Usability pilots, training, curriculum evaluation, error identification but they are still being piloted Assessments development, deployed opera- and management worksheet, locally. We are still working to Periodically, workload and tions, management, and safety and a self-assessment form scale and deploy the program usability assessments are com- teams. The Aviation Safety De- that is completed by the pilot to remote sites to achieve pleted on the user interface. partment at Insitu serves as the who was observed. The forms one of the defining features The purpose of the evaluations facilitator of the LOSA program are divided and completed of LOSA, which is that audits is to measure pilot workload July-September 2020 ISASI Forum • 17 and subjective usability during prevented the hazard from united in trying to accomplish recoveries. The targeted focus various operational tasks. Usu- resulting in a mishap. Using a common goal is to reinforce group participants were pilots ally, these tasks and scenarios this database, successful miti- that every time a hazard is and maintainers who had just are designed to verify specific gations can be tracked. A major reported using this system it returned from a deployment. aspects of the user interface strength of the program is that is an opportunity to intervene During these interviews, we for compliance with standards it provides an avenue to solicit in a condition that had the learned the importance of while simultaneously providing field knowledge, circumstanc- potential to result in a mishap. team composition and the feedback, which helps im- es, and expert opinions on a Therefore, by reporting hazards desired skill level of pilots. One prove the HMI to meet future recommended path forward personnel are ensuring a safe of the major topics of discus- operational needs and expand for operational concerns. work environment for them- sion was the gap between the system capabilities. There have been numerous selves, as well as contributing idealized (and trained) aircraft Limitations of the workload instances of maintenance to an overall organizational recovery schema versus how analysis are due to sample errors and near-miss reports mission of reducing the mishap the UAS pilots were expected size, and evaluations thus far being used to create system rate. to interact with airspace and having been conducted during and procedural change at Insi- other aviators. Based on the simulated flight. While there tu. Through use of the Focus Groups/User Inter- information provided, changes are benefits to conducting HAZREP program, these views were made to the software that the evaluations in a simulated errors, near-misses, and pre- allows for greater manipula- environment (the main benefit vention ideas are evaluated, As a part of failure review tion of the approach corridor being elimination of mishap tracked, and implemented. boards spurred by clusters and allows the air vehicle to risk due to divided attention), For example, the Hazard of a specific type of failure, perform more similarly to the simulated environment Review Board received mul- focus groups and user in- manned aircraft in controlled does not perfectly mirror the tiple HAZREPs documenting terviews have been used to airspace. With this expanded stresses of a live flight or mis- the hazard of not being able obtain information from pilots functionality, there was also sion scenario. to communicate between the and operational personnel. the suggestion for expanded As a result of the workload ground crew and the ground The best recommendations training to improve the pilots’ and usability assessments, we control system at a site. There and discussion thus far have ability and comfort in operat- have received both qualitative was concern that the inability developed out of using a focus ing alongside manned aircraft. and quantitative feedback from to communicate would cause group–type session in which questions are posed to groups operational personnel that has an inadvertent launch or could Mishap Investigation/Reac- result in personnel injury. As a of operational personnel rather been translated into actionable tive Mishap Prevention recommendations for software result of the hazard review pro- than one-on-one interviews. development. cess, a new radio system with Using a focus group as a forum, While it is still early in the headsets for the ground crew insight is obtained from mul- development and imple- tiple operational sites at once, mentation of these proactive HFACS for Near-Miss/Hazard was implemented at the site. Currently, the most prevalent and comparison and con- initiatives, the process to track Reporting condition reported using the trast of the challenges under and complete recommen- Insitu has a robust near-miss/ hazard identification program different conditions is easily dations stemming from the hazard reporting system that is the identification of proce- obtained. While a standard list investigation of mishaps is receives hazard reports dural guidance or publications of questions is usually followed, well established. Investigations (HAZREPs) from multiple that create an unsafe situa- when open discussion be- are conducted for all mishaps different sources. These tion. This type of hazard is tween operational personnel is reported to the Insitu Aviation HAZREPs are categorized, commonly identified by either facilitated it has been possible Safety Department that meet triaged, and dispositioned at deployed personnel or the to identify similarities (as well a defined criteria. During the a formal review board. During Training Department. One of as differences) between the investigations, all evidence the triage and review process, the most challenging aspects of failures and challenges occur- that was received is reviewed. the identified hazards are managing the hazard report- ring at different operational This evidence is analyzed for screened for elements related ing program is encouraging locations or using different material, environmental, and to human factors and/or hu- the reporting of problems or product configurations. This human-related failures. Assign- man error. If there is a human deficiencies without creating information has been invalua- ment of a single type (material, component to the identified an environment in which the ble for gathering information environmental, or human) of hazard, HFACS is used to tag team responsible for fixing the on experience and training of failure is often not possible, as and categorize the identified deficiency feels it is to “blame.” personnel, flight operations, the mishaps are due to a com- hazard or near-miss. This is a fine balance and is and desired software improve- bination of conditions that all The HAZREP program is contingent on the cultural ma- ments. aligned to create the circum- beneficial in that we are able turity of the organization. One Most recently, multiple focus stances in which the mishap to identify hazards before of the points that is empha- groups were conducted over a occurred. Therefore, the inves- they result in mishaps; when sized to reinforce the positive period of several weeks to gath- tigator must determine the role paired with HFACS, we are aspects of the program and er information on failures and and contribution of each type able to identify which barriers ensure that the organization is challenges related to air vehicle of contributing factor.

18 • July-September 2020 ISASI Forum Figure 2: Relative frequency of HFACS codes assigned to mishap investigations.

At Insitu, since 2009 material mishaps attributed to human ing deployed locations. operate cooperatively, we need failures have been identified as error are tracked and further One of the complex chal- to develop communication the primary cause of mishaps categorized. Failure to follow lenges we identified and channels and inform air traffic more prevalently than human checklists and procedures and anticipate for the future is the control and other users within or environmental causes. inadequate risk assessment interaction between manned the area of operations on our However, if Insitu follows a are the leading contributory and unmanned aircraft. performance capabilities and similar path to manned avia- human factors in mishaps Changes will need to be made limitations. tion, as aircraft become more attributed to human error. In to regulations, technology, As time progresses, we will (mechanically) reliable, the addition, at the organizational training, and culture to pro- work to improve and mature total number of mishaps will level, providing inadequate vide an environment in which these programs, building the decrease, but the percentage procedural guidance and both manned aircraft and UAS fundamental structure of a of mishaps caused by human publications to sites has been coexist safely and successfully. safety management system. factors will increase. identified as a contributing fac- As regulations are currently One of the greatest challenges To aid in the investigation, tor to many mishaps attributed under development across the is the process to bridge the gap HFACS is utilized to categorize to human error. globe, we are using feedback effectively and efficiently- be casual and/or contributory from controlled encounters to tween operational personnel conditions that were identified. predict and proactively address and design activities. To be ef- The purpose of the identi- Conclusion some of the potential operation- fective, the process to take the fication and categorization As a result of the findings from al challenges. For example, UAS feedback and lessons learned of these factors is to identify mishap investigations and pilots come from a variety of and efficiently distribute this trends and also to guide the the proactive mishap pre- backgrounds and may not have knowledge back to areas that development of recommenda- vention programs previously experience in manned aviation. can execute change should tions and mitigations. This in- described, recommendations To decrease risk and increase be scheduled, solidified, and formation is stored within the are developed and distributed the probability of successful formalized. database and queried monthly to accountable departments interactions, we are working on In looking to the prevention to identify trends and push the throughout the company. These ways to develop the curriculum of future mishaps, the past is latest information out to users recommendations have result- to increase the relative skill level anything but irrelevant; and development groups. ed in changes to the design of of UAS pilots to make them not however, future safety lies not In anticipation of the tran- the software, autopilot logic, simply operators but avia- only in correcting mistakes sition from primarily ma- publication updates and chang- tors. In addition, the need for from the past and preventing chine-related causes to human es, training curriculum develop- education is two-sided. As with reoccurrence, but also in the error mishaps, the causal ment, and even improvements manned aviation, every aircraft anticipation of future chal- and contributory factors for to the infrastructure surround- has operating limitations. To lenges and threats.

July-September 2020 ISASI Forum • 19 The following article is the final of four essays from the 2019 Kapustin scholarship Remembering Before the Crash: winners presented during ISASI 2019. The number of scholars selected each year depends upon the amount of money ISASI members donate Nonvolatile Memory Can Change annually to the scholarship fund. Details about scholarship applications and additional The Course of an Investigation information can be found on the ISASI website at www. isasi.org. Application and By Elise Marie Vondra, University of Southern California essay deadlines are mid-April of each year.—Editor n the last 20 years, investigators have Helios Airways Flight 522 made air travel increasingly safer by Enroute from Larnaca, Cyprus, to Prague, learning from past accidents. Between Czech Republic, a Helios Airways Boeing I1990 and 1999, 541 fatalities in 34 com- 737-300 lost contact with air traffic control mercial aircraft accidents occurred, and (ATC) mid-flight. Loss of cabin pressure those numbers dropped to 67 fatalities caused both pilots to lose consciousness. in eight accidents in the years 2007–2017 The aircraft flew until fuel starvation, (1). Investigators painstakingly find, eventually impacting terrain 33 kilom- sort, and analyze data from the aircraft eters northwest of Athens, Greece. The to determine the accident’s cause. In Air Accident Investigation and Safety the aftermath of an accident, however, Board (AAIASB) of the Hellenic Minis- news media coverage focuses mainly on try of Transport and Communications two major types of data, the flight data concluded that the cabin pressurization recorder (FDR) and cockpit voice re- mode was set to manual control, and both corder (CVR), publishing articles such as pilots failed to identify any subsequent “Crashed Lion Air Plane’s Cockpit Voice warnings. The AAIASB supplemented FDR Recorder Found” (2). and CVR data with data from the NVM of The FDR and CVR seemingly give two cabin pressure controllers. The No. 2 investigators enough data to work slave controller survived the accident, and with, yet an increasingly important and investigators sent it to Nord-Micro, the more-nuanced source of data comes from manufacturer of the sensor. It contained nonvolatile memory (NVM) sources on more than 301 hours of information from the aircraft. NVM data are stored within past flights. In comparison, the FDR used the chip of a component; are utilized in in this aircraft contained the maximum of avionics such as the GPS, altimeters, and 50 hours of flight data. The extended data pressure sensors; and survive without a allowed investigators to conclude that the power source. NVM can record data from pilots’ behavior of selecting manual cabin more flights than current FDRs and CVRs. pressure was abnormal, as past flights did Currently, the widely used Honeywell not show a pattern of this selection (4). Connected Recorder-25 (HCR-25) FDR and CVR store only the last 25 hours of Turkish Airlines Flight 1951 flight data (3). In contrast, an NVM chip on a cabin pressure controller, such as The use of NVM to determine patterns that used on Helios Airways Flight 522, in data was especially useful in Turkish can store more than 300 hours of data (4). Airlines Flight 1951. The Boeing 737-800 As avionics advance, the use of NVM on crashed just under a mile from Runway components and their available storage 18R on approach to Schiphol Airport in will increase. The investigator must adapt Amsterdam, the Netherlands, enroute to find and utilize this data, not only after from Istanbul, Turkey. At the time of the an accident occurs, but also in preventa- accident, the first officer was acting as tive measures. pilot-in-command (PIC). The Boeing Three accidents, Helios Airways Flight 737-800 has redundant radio altimeter 522 in 2005, Turkish Airlines Flight 1951 systems, which default to using the left- in 2009, and a general aviation flight in hand altimeter. However, before the crash, Papua, New Guinea, in 2009, highlight the the left-hand altimeter was incorrectly importance of NVM and how it can be reading an altitude of -8 feet. Since the PIC taken advantage of in accident investiga- was looking at the right-hand altimeter, Elise Marie Vondra tions. which was reading accurately, neither the

20 • July-September 2020 ISASI Forum PIC nor the captain switched the primary additional data and context to accident HCR-25 (8). Although this is an improve- altimeter to the right-hand side. Therefore, investigators. While more-limited FDR re- ment, the EAFR does not replace the de- the B-737 flight computer controlling the cording data may describe what occurred tailed and larger storage of NVM on other autothrottle used incorrect altitude data during the accident, NVM can provide smaller components. on approach to the airport. With a reading information from many previous flights, A component that would greatly benefit of -8 feet, the autothrottle retarded for a revealing trends showing why an acci- from NVM analysis is angle-of-attack flare. The B-737 autopilot detected the dent ultimately occurred. In both Turkish (AOA) sensors on aircraft. With the current slow airspeed and pitched nose up for a Airlines Flight 1951 and Helios Airways controversy surrounding the Boeing 737- flare, which caused the aircraft to stall on Flight 522, NVM data provided trends MAX 8 accidents involving Lion Air in 2018 short final. The FDR contained the past 25 that investigators utilized and applied and Ethiopian Airlines in 2019, investiga- hours of data, but the Dutch Safety Board to existing and future aircraft. As more tors would gain information from looking (DSB) relied on the radio altimeters’ NVM sensors become digitized, and potentially at NVM of AOA sensors of all previous to assist. The radio altimeters stored much contain NVM, investigators can, and must, MAX 8 flights and other airframes that more data than the FDR, as chips inside find, read, analyze, and act upon the data use an AOA indicator. Currently, the main each radio altimeter recorded the past contained in them. source of data on AOA sensor failures is 2,000 flights, recording 217 interruptions. The investigator can also look to other pilot-driven NASA reports in the Aviation These flights contained 58 bad readings sources of NVM that are not installed in Safety Reporting System (9). Reliable, on altimeter serial number 1141 and three the airframe. For example, passengers’ cell robust, and factual data from NVM would bad readings on serial number 1157, the phone data may be used to track GPS and assist investigators, manufacturers, and failing radio altimeter. Investigators did accelerometer data. This has been used carriers in improving safety and reliability of new sensors. not find out why the radio altimeter had by the U.S. National Transportation Safety As well as providing aircraft investiga- produced erroneous values; however, the Board (NTSB) in railroad accidents—the tors with data that would otherwise not be extended NVM on the radio altimeters NSTB analyzed data from 80 different available due to regulations, as in the provided more context regarding the histo- passenger devices in the investigation of DHC-6-300 case, NVM also allows larg- ry of the behaviors of the altimeters (5). the Amtrak 188 derailment in Philadel- er-scale trends to be seen in investigations. phia, Pennsylvania, U.S.A., in 2015 (7). This In the Turkish Airlines Flight 1951 acci- GA Flight in Papua, New Guinea technique can be implemented into avia- dent, the radio altimeter NVM provided As well as helping investigators in major tion applications so that investigators can more context to the crash, showing a airline accidents, the use of data from collect more data leading to the incident. pattern of incorrect altimeter readings that NVM sources is critical in aircraft that do Personal devices may also give investiga- went uncorrected. Adding NVM to new not meet the requirements to carry an tors an eyewitness view of the flight. For components can also assist in using past FDR or CVR. In 2009, a DHC-6-300 Twin example, if a passenger filmed the cabin in flights for current accidents. Learning from Otter enroute from Port Moresby to Koko- extreme turbulence, this could give inves- these accidents, a challenge to investiga- da in Papua, New Guinea, impacted terrain tigators an idea of flight conditions before tors, and especially operators, is to collect mid-flight. the accident occurred. and analyze this data more frequently. The DHC-6-300 does not meet the max- New measures are being taken to im- Taking proactive measures in data analysis imum takeoff weight requirement for air prove flight data by component manu- of components will not only assist carriers carrier operations, negating the require- factures. General Electric is placing its in preventative measures, but also can be ment for an FDR on board. new enhanced airborne flight recorder applied at a multicarrier scale, thus Eleven miles south of the airstrip, the (EAFR) into the Boeing 787 and 777x fleet. assisting component manufacturers in aircraft crashed due to controlled flight The EAFR will allow 50 hours of recorded innovating safer technology and assisting into terrain (CFIT). memory, compared to the 25 hours of the the trend of creating safer air travel for all. However, the Twin Otter was equipped with a Latitude Technology Skynode S100, a small data-logging device that can be References installed in smaller aircraft that do not op- 1. U.S. Air Carrier Safety Data. Bureau of Transportation Statistics. [Online] April 2018. erate under air carrier regulations. Investi- 2. Tassia Sipahutar, Kyunghee Park & Eko Listiyorini. Indonesia Finds Cockpit Voice Recorder of Crashed gators recovered the device at the accident Lion Air Jet. Bloomberg. [Online] Jan. 13, 2019. https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2019-01-14/ site and sent it to the manufacturer for indonesia-finds-cockpit-voice-recorder-of-crashed-lion-air-jet. analysis. This device stores data regard- 3. [Online] https://aerospace.honeywell.com/en/products/safety-and-connectivity/flight-recorders. ing takeoffs, landings, ground speed, and 4. AAIASB. Helios Airways Flight HCY522, Boeing 737-31S at Grammatiko Hellas on Aug. 14, 2005. 2006. GPS position and altitude. The Australian 5. Dutch Safety Board. Crashed During Approach, Boeing 737-800 near Amsterdam Schiphol Airport, Feb. 25, Transport Safety Board (ATSB) used this 2009. The Hague: s.n., 2010. data to recreate the flight path, with data 6. Austrailian Transport Safety Bureau. Controlled Flight into Terrain 11 Kilometers Southeast of Kakoda Air- taken about every seven minutes to track strip, Papua, New Guinea, Aug. 11, 2009. 2010. the flight until the crash. It did not rely on 7. National Transportation Safety Board. NTSB Issues Second Update on its Investiation into the Amtrak Derail- other less-factual sources of data, such as ment in Philadelpha. 2015. ATC recordings or eyewitnesses (6). 8. Rosenkrans, Wayne. Fade-Free Memory. s.l.: Flight Safety Foundation, 2008. In each of these cases, NVM provided 9. Beene, Alan Levin & Ryan. Sensors Linked to Boeing 737 Crashes Vulnerable to Failure. s.l.: Bloomberg, 2019.

July-September 2020 ISASI Forum • 21 ACCIDENTS PAST, ACCIDENTS FUTURE: SAFETY IN THE AGE OF UNMANNED AVIATION

(Adapted with permission from the author’s technical paper he theme of the 2019 ISASI annual information to understand the hazards, Accidents Past, Accidents Future: seminar is “Future Safety: Has the and regulators would ensure that the Safety in the Age of Unmanned Past Become Irrelevant?” This is a rules under which new entrants are Aviation presented during ISASI Ttimely and necessary issue to take granted access would be applied fairly 2019, Sept. 3–5, 2019, in The Hague, up in the context of unmanned aviation. and uniformly. Indeed, this has been the the Netherlands, by Gerard de There are few directly relatable lessons case for generations as the framework Rover. The theme for ISASI 2019 learned upon which to base a path for allowing experimental and homebuilt was “Future Safety: Has the Past forward for the certification and opera- aircraft and less comprehensively trained Become Irrelevant?” The full presentation can be found on the tion of remotely piloted aircraft systems pilots has evolved to incorporate all safely ISASI website at www.isasi.org in (RPAS). Still, countless analogies can into the overall aviation system. the Library tab under Technical and should be drawn to the evolution of At its core, unmanned aviation is just Presentations.—Editor) manned aviation and the history of major another form of aviation, and unmanned aviation accidents to date in considering aircraft are just a different breed of air- how RPAS should join and participate in craft. However, the “unmanned aviation the greater flying community. At the same sector” is a very different collection of time, the historical record is extremely interests, with very different priorities important as a means to avoid repeating from the pioneers of manned aviation. in the unmanned domain errors first Its proponents and practitioners have identified in manned aviation. consistently sought to operate as free of Throughout the first century of pow- regulatory constraints as they can. ered flight, aviators and engineers Two seemingly conflicting arguments constantly ran afoul of what they did regarding unmanned aviation frequently not know about the flying environment, are raised in advocating for widespread the demands it put on both pilots and expansion of the unmanned sector. The aircraft, and the complexities of keeping first is that RPAS can safely be employed ever-faster and more numerous air- in support of a wide range of “integrated” craft safely separated from one another. operations, including those currently car- Gerard de Rover Painful but essential lessons were learned ried out by manned aircraft. The second is through accidents and their investi- that unmanned aircraft should be allowed gations. Perhaps most important, the to operate at will in any class of airspace, speed with which aviation expanded and with minimal obligation to adhere to ex- evolved tended to reduce the likelihood isting rules governing pilot qualification, that important preventive measures, once system certification, aircraft equipage, or implemented, subsequently would be even the conduct of aviation operations abandoned. Lessons learned throughout themselves. aviation’s brief history for the most part In consideration of these two contra- have stayed learned. dictory perspectives, this paper seeks to Against this backdrop of hard-won reemphasize the importance of history in experience, it seems reasonable to as- the growth of unmanned aviation by ad- sume that new entrants into the aviation dressing two key questions with respect Thomas A. Farrier environment would seek all available to the relevance of past experience:

22 • July-September 2020 ISASI Forum By Thomas A. Farrier, Chair, ISASI Unmanned Aircraft Systems Working Group, and Principal Safety Analyst, ClancyJG International. Gerard de Rover, Defense Safety Inspector, the Netherlands, presented this paper during ISASI 2019.

Should lessons from past accidents, overlap among these issues, of course, ration of turbojet, and later fanjet, technol- or even very recent accidents, involving but the challenges to be dealt with moved ogy into airliner design allowed maximum manned aircraft be applied to making forward along the following general lines: gross takeoff weights and corresponding unmanned aviation safer? • Make airframes strong enough to cabin and cargo revenues to increase, even Are past accident scenarios in danger withstand the stresses of flight. as their relative simplicity increased their of being repeated due to the expansion of • Make engines as reliable as possible. reliability and, eventually, their efficiency. minimally regulated unmanned aircraft • Find ways of making operations at Communications, navigation, and surveil- operations in the midst of manned air- night and in adverse weather practi- lance capabilities have evolved—sometimes craft? cal and safe. individually, sometimes in parallel—to make air traffic management steadily more effi- • Find ways of protecting the occu- Safety Developments in Manned pants of aircraft from harm during cient while providing both greater system Aviation: A Brief Overview normal and adverse conditions. capacity and safe separation. The successful growth of aviation always Sharpening the focus on safety, new • Develop means of managing growing aircraft are certified in consideration of should be looked at through the prism numbers of aircraft in the vicinity of experience accumulated over time. Those of the advances in safety that supported airports. its progress. The viability of commer- incorporating new materials or manufac- • Develop means of monitoring aircraft cial aviation itself is directly traceable turing processes are subject to close review movements over large distances and of their novel attributes and have to prove to public confidence in it as a safe and long routes. reliable form of transportation. If aircraft their safety against long-standing standards accidents continued to occur at the rates • Identify areas requiring surveillance suitably adjusted to gauge performance as to keep aircraft separated. seen during the 1930s, the commercial opposed to conformity to possibly outmod- airline industry itself never would have • Identify environments within which ed guidance. This is a realistic approach to been more than an expensive and risky civil and military operations might balancing the need to minimize risk with niche instead of an integral part of global come into conflict and develop rules the need to encourage innovation, again de- and procedures applicable to both. commerce. veloped through careful consideration and It always is appropriate to revisit how • Establish requirements for IFR and years of experience adjusting certification the current level of safety in aviation VFR operations that protect the for- standards as needed in response to both has been achieved, including why we do mer while enabling the latter. identified hazards and new technology. The some of the things we do in certifying • Establish requirements for airspace past matters. aircraft and regulating their operations. based on the control and safety chal- Many accidents that led to new rules and lenges that different densities and Are Manned and Unmanned preventive measures have themselves complexities of traffic can create. Aircraft Different? receded into the past, so it is valuable to Each of the above has seen incre- As we move from the development of be reminded from time to time that little mental and occasionally revolutionary manned aviation toward the blossoming in the body of rules governing aviation is improvements over time, often resulting of unmanned aviation, this would seem arbitrary or capricious in both safety and economic benefits. For to be a purely rhetorical question with Consider how aviation and aircraft ben- example, aircraft construction techniques an obvious answer. Unmanned aircraft efited from examination of safety needs have become steadily more sophisticated, are dependent on either extensive and identified through crashes and their increasing strength and occupant protec- inflexible preprograming or a two-way investigations. There always has been tion while reducing weight. Theincorpo - datalink allowing a “remote pilot-in-com- July-September 2020 ISASI Forum • 23 mand” (RPIC) to control and maintain inconsequential precedent of permitting be allowed to continue. From a “preven- situational awareness in the operation some activities that are known to be more tion” perspective, this is by no means an of the unmanned aircraft. Unless an hazardous than others based on “societal inconsequential part of the landscape. unmanned aircraft is explicitly designed benefits” asserted to justify them. There is no doubt that some types of and expensively equipped to clear its own As the International Civil Aviation Or- aviation operations undoubtedly are safer flight path, itmust have either a func- ganization (ICAO) UAS Toolkit observes, to carry out using unmanned aircraft tioning datalink or totally segregated or “As a regulator, recognizing the societal than is the case with manned aircraft, protected airspace to allow the RPIC to benefits of UAS and the need to facilitate even using relatively simple RPAS. It also avoid in-flight conflicts or even midair operations in a safe manner are key and is undeniable that the lack of a human collisions with other aircraft. Clearly, include humanitarian efforts, search life at risk aboard an unmanned aircraft unmanned aircraft are different from and rescue, firefighting, infrastructure allows a different perspective on how manned aircraft, right? monitoring, and research and develop- and from what platform such operations The real-world perspective on these ment [R&D]. Operations limited to VLOS should be carried out. To date, only a bare differences—each of which represents a [visual line of sight] operations may limit handful of accidents has been attribut- limitation that is not necessarily com- benefits obtained by carrying loads or ed to manned and unmanned aircraft patible with how the current aviation discharging substances (e.g., crop dusting, sharing the same airspace while operat- system works—is more nuanced, seeking insect control).” Of course, this perspec- ing under different rules. However, such to accommodate unmanned aircraft tive sidesteps such practical implementa- occurrences are easy to envision as UAS despite their limitations. However, such a tion considerations as both manned and operations become more common as long supportive approach also provides poten- unmanned aircraft performing the same as manned and unmanned aircraft are tially unwarranted latitude to unmanned operations in the same airspace at the regulated and operated differently. aircraft for shortcomings that would be same time and is essentially silent on the completely unacceptable for manned larger question of risk. Thinking About the “Manned” Past to aircraft. In 1962, ISASI’s esteemed founder, In many states, an unmanned aircraft Jerome Lederer, presented a lecture on Prepare for the “Unmanned” Future simply is, by definition, “an aircraft.” “Perspectives in Air Safety” on his receipt At this point, it may be best to restate Various qualifiers often are added to that of the Daniel Guggenheim Medal from the first of the two questions asked at the fundamental proposition to account for the American Society of Mechanical start of this paper as “In what ways do the limitations mentioned above, but the Engineers. He asked a number of ques- UAS need to be more or less the same, in idea behind starting with the same basic tions about risk throughout this talk, all terms of capabilities and operating rules, definition is that existing operating rules of which resonate in the current debate as manned aircraft in the interests of avi- and certification standards rules can (and about unmanned aviation; for example, ation safety?” To date, there is no general- should) be applied equally, regardless of when considering instances in which a ly accepted answer to this question. This whether an aircraft has a pilot aboard or production aircraft is found to need a is fertile ground for exploring through the on the surface of the earth. safety-related modification. lessons of manned aviation and historical This ideal environment has yet to be The aviation industry resents and accidents. achieved. There is little motivation on protests overregulation and is prone to To start with, consider two proposi- the part of the unmanned aviation sector combat detailed regulation of the nature tions: to pursue it, especially to the extent that that would have overcome such a defi- • What has come to be considered a shared perspective on aviation safe- mandatory equipage associated with spe- ciency. But what is the Federal Aviation ty—a common basis for a “safety cul- cific classes of airspace would cost money Administration (FAA) to do when it finds ture”—is not shared by the unmanned to install and more money to make oper- good safety practices developed by one aviation sector except to the extent it ate through satellite-based datalinks or organization not adopted by others, yet is obliged to conform to it. terrestrial networks. It also would reduce both comply with the regulations? range, endurance, useful payload, or all Should the government, in such cases, • A complex system like aviation is only as safe as its least safe component. of the above. To the unmanned aviation step in retroactively to correct a known sector, “integration” often is seen simply hazardous situation by changing the The first proposition might be hot- as an alternate term for “access to desired regulation, making it more specific? ly contested by the more professional airspace,” not participation in the existing One should it be careful not to discour- operators and manufacturers of UAS. aviation system. age original thinking, imagination, and They could argue, rightly, that they do One of the major advantages of un- ingenuity, which may lead to improved whatever is asked of them to gain access manned aircraft systems (UAS) is that practices? Should the public, therefore, be to airspace. This is true but somewhat they cost less to build, less to maintain, asked to assume some risks for the sake disingenuous. Unmanned aircraft cannot and less to operate than manned aircraft. of progress? The solution to such prob- conform to many rules of certification These savings often are achieved at the lems should not lie entirely in the domain or operation currently in force, meaning expense of being significantly less capable of government regulation in a free society. they must seek permission to operate than the manned aircraft whose airspace It is important to acknowledge that a that is conditioned by mitigations for they share. However, in facilitating more very high–level risk decision has already their various limitations (or that simply widespread operations of RPAS regard- been made regarding unmanned aircraft accepts the increased risk associated with less of their differences, there is the not operations: they are permissible and will them). Since unmanned aviation busi-

24 • July-September 2020 ISASI Forum ness models and risk calculus are quite longer would be acceptable to the general need to be made as to what extent UAS different from those of manned aircraft public. Identifying and implementing regulatory proposals will need to adapt to manufacturers and operators, they tend credible preventive actions will be essen- conventional aviation rules, parameters, to seek to avoid complying with any re- tial to restoring public confidence in regu- procedures, and practices. Considera- quirements not explicitly for the safety of lators and minimizing overreactions that tion should be given to whether existing the overarching aviation system and all of actually could harm the unmanned sector standards and regulations that govern the its stakeholders. more than the laissez-faire approach has operation of manned aircraft can be lev- Manned aircraft pilots are rational helped it. This is where lessons learned eraged, while also addressing the specific actors; they have never been big fans of from past accidents involving manned and unique needs and characteristics of dying. Aircraft manufacturers are rational aircraft will have to be relearned. UAS. When building a regulatory frame- actors; they never have been interested in work for UAS, it is important to ensure seeing large judgments against them for The Lessons of History that the new regulations do not contra- unreliable designs that have led to losses. dict existing aviation regulations.” Since the aviation enterprise as a whole is Commercial air carriers are rational If it is not possible to examine the notoriously slow to act on safety concerns actors; they will not engage in operational course of unmanned aviation’s growth in until catastrophes force action, the air behavior that is likely to place their pas- the greater airspace system prior to an safety investigator community needs to sengers in jeopardy or even to make them accident, air safety investigators will need be ready to highlight where UAS devel- uncomfortable in flight. to have done at least a little advanced opment and certification requirements In unmanned aviation, risk decisions thinking about how to proceed. The ob- have diverged from those of manned are driven by different considerations, jectives of the accident investigation pro- aircraft. Past accident reports will need and the priorities of the manufacturers cess can be summarized in two straight- to be dusted off and reexamined as “new” and operators come from a significantly forward steps: identify causes and make unmanned aircraft accidents, or those different direction. If one digs deeper, it recommendations to prevent recurrence. where unmanned aircraft are involved, becomes clear that, from a regulatory Accidents involving unmanned aircraft— occur in which long-standing adjust- perspective, there is a certain logic in especially where loss of life occurs—will ments have been made to rules governing placing less of a burden—a “price of ad- require two additional steps: manned aircraft. mission,” if you like—on RPAS operators • Determine whether the sequence of For this approach to bear fruit, how- willing to accept a certain amount of loss events might have been different had ever, it is crucial to consider how those in the course of their operations, as long a manned aircraft been the subject of manned aircraft accidents occurred, as those operations do not pose a hazard the investigation. along with the specific changes made to the general public or to other users of • Determine why any difference to aircraft, the regulatory environment, common airspace. between manned and unmanned avi- human-machine interfaces, and pilot However, problems arise when lessons ation requirements or rules identified from the past that speak to current or training and certification that arose from in the sequence of events exists. emerging hazards are not recognized as their investigations and recommendations. The fundamentals—the nature of As observed above, it has been critical such, and a hands-off regulatory ap- to accident investigations over time to proach can result in minimally regulated known risks and the detailed sequence of events documented in similar previous identify instances in which the act of operations interacting with those regu- flying itself has encountered unknown lated on the basis of previously identified accidents—will be critical in such cases. Both regulators and the general public hazards and the expansion of aviation need. The present interest in enabling and has created unrecognized hazards. In encouraging the growth of unmanned often forget that many aviation-related rules have been written in blood and de- the past, the governing principle was aviation means RPAS are being regulated “You don’t know what you don’t know.” In with as light a touch as possible, often rived from accident investigation recom- future investigations involving UAS, it is with the regulators taking on more risk mendations. In the aftermath of aircraft likely that at least some of the accident on behalf of the public than would be accidents, air safety investigators often sequence will be uncomfortably familiar considered acceptable for manned air- are obliged to consider both previous risk and the question to be answered might be craft and operations. decisions and prior accident investiga- “Why didn’t we see this coming?” While this pattern of benign ne- tions whose recommendations were not glect may survive the first catastrophic acted upon. It would seem prudent to do accident directly attributable to an likewise in consciously addressing the The Power of Analogy unmanned aircraft, it will be unlikely to latitude accorded unmanned aircraft in While I prepared this paper, it became survive a second. Public outcry for rapid, “growing the sector” before the pressures clear to me that it can be difficult to align decisive, and effective action will then and passions of a new investigation come previous accidents and preventive actions place national aviation authorities in the into play. involving manned aviation against the difficult position of having to justify their ICAO’s UAS Toolkit offers a good start- unmanned sector. It would be a relatively previous risk decisions (economic benefit ing point for discussions between air safe- simple matter to inquire into an accident to the UAS sector versus risk to existing ty investigators and regulators: “States involving, say, an unmanned aircraft stakeholder operations). will want to make key policy, technical, lacking required two-way communica- More important, however, is the like- regulatory, and programing decisions tions and a transponder colliding with lihood that the permissive status quo no for UAS operations. A determination will a properly equipped manned aircraft in

July-September 2020 ISASI Forum • 25 controlled airspace. The air safety inves- that have become embedded in aviation unlikely might an RPAS CFIT be? tigator simply would ask why the former thinking through decades of experience Runway environment hazards pose a was operating under less-stringent re- and common practice, including some different set of challenges for unmanned quirements than the latter and place the based on accident experience. As such, it aircraft. C2 links tend to be band- decision made and their consequences does not readily highlight certain types width-hungry, meaning only flight-critical in their proper chronological perspec- of accidents whose underlying causes functionalities might be in the “protected tive. might derive from the uniqueness of spectrum.” If the only camera aboard is However, if one applies the principles UAS, except in very general terms. Some part of an unmanned aircraft’s payload, it of system safety in reverse, it is clear that creative thinking, and a fairly detailed may not be available for ground oper- rules and training typically are the last understanding of how UAS work, must be ations or may not provide an adequate hazard controls to be imposed on a sys- applied to “occurrence-based” templates. field of view for safe taxiing. If towed into tem. They typically are far less effective This may be done prior to or in the midst position on an active runway, RPAS may than those associated with earlier stages of an accident investigation, but some interfere with other operations or require in the life cycle—developing warning preparation is needed to engage in such other aircraft to yield to them. systems, modifying a system to eliminate “what if ” strategizing effectively. On final approach, an unmanned a hazard, or, most desirably, designing As an example, the current emphasis aircraft may directly observe its touch- the system to avoid encountering the of ICAO’s Global Aviation Safety Plan down point, or it may fly in a more or hazard in the first place. is on improving runway safety, reduc- less purely automated mode to a GPS-de- Many of the design decisions that ing controlled flight into terrain (CFIT) fined touchdown point. In other words, have resulted in unmanned aircraft not accidents, and reducing loss of control mixed UAS and manned operations at an having air traffic–related avionics—or in in-flight accidents. EUROCONTROL airfield could result in a whole range of some cases lacking redundant con- maintains lists of exemplar accidents as- challenges distinct from those that have trols, standardized pilot interfaces, and sociated with each of the above that can occasioned such concentrated attention other features commonly found aboard be found on www.skybrary.aero. Interest- on runway safety over time. manned aircraft—are a direct result of ingly, these three types of accidents have Perhaps most interesting from both how UAS are certified (or not certified). been quite resistant to preventive efforts historical and prevention perspectives In other instances, it is the nature of over time, but not for lack of attention in the context of unmanned aviation is unmanned aircraft themselves (lacking paid to them. the Skybrary recap of causes seen in a a pilot on board who can assume control For Skybrary, EUROCONTROL had no of an aircraft in an emergency, directly difficulty assembling a representative list whole range of “loss of control–inflight” perceive the environmental conditions of fatal CFIT accidents solely from oc- (LOC-I) accidents, which includes all of affecting it, etc.) that can result in an currences since the beginning of the 21st the following: unmanned aircraft becoming unrecov- century. The list of runway operations • Loss of situational awareness. erable, experiencing a progressively dete- accidents is much longer and includes • Low-level wind shear or higher-level riorating condition or system failure, or a number of events that fairly may be clear air turbulence. otherwise operating in a manner counter considered “landmark accidents,” e.g., the to that intended. For these reasons, it is Tenerife tragedy, a Boeing 737 landing • Structural or multiple powerplant damage (including that suffered dur- worthwhile to consider outcomes—some on top of another aircraft in Los Angeles, ing midair collisions). of which have been declining steadily for California, U.S.A., and other accidents decades—against potential new sources involving occupied runways and miscues • Intended or unintended mishandling of failures or initiating events that can by pilots and/or air traffic controllers. of the aircraft. lead to those outcomes. CFIT accidents would seem to be • Attempted flight with total load or Most categorization approaches to ac- unlikely in routine RPAS operations, load distribution outside of safe cidents have relied on identifying types especially those using platforms that are limits. of events that the aviation community equipped with comprehensive position • Unintentional mismanagement of air- wants to reduce or prevent. For example, tracking provided to their RPICs. Now, craft pressurization systems. the CAST (Commercial Aviation Safety think about what happens if the com- • Takeoff attempts with ice contami- Team)-ICAO Common Taxonomy Team mand and control (C2) link fails and the nation. list of aviation occurrence categories aircraft reverts to a preprogramed mode includes more than 30 types of events. of operation (“lost link profile”). Terrain • Airframe ice accumulation/signif- Only about half of these would seem to awareness and warning systems (TAWS) icant loss of power attributable to be of importance to regulators or RPAS are neither typically provided nor man- engine icing operators simply because they do not dated for any type of RPAS. So given that a • Attempting to maneuver an aircraft have to worry about the lives of peo- C2 link failure takes the RPIC entirely out outside its capabilities to resolve a ple aboard their aircraft (yet), and the of the control loop, and the aircraft might prior problem. latter’s risk tolerance for certain types of “decide” to take up a heading, airspeed, • In-flight fire. losses is correspondingly higher. and altitude from its present position that • Fuel exhaustion or starvation. At the same time, this taxonomy, like would take it to a preprogramed point in so much of the current aviation enter- space, regardless of the possibility of in- • False instrument readings. prise, is based on certain assumptions tervening terrain or surface features, how • Wake turbulence.

26 • July-September 2020 ISASI Forum • Pilot-induced oscillation. developed over time to prevent them, and “The protections built into the • Malicious interference. the deference such operations receive and present-day aviation system are far should receive in that environment. more robust than they used to be, When one familiar with UAS looks at On the other hand, unmanned aircraft this list, it is immediately obvious that asserting a need or a “right” to operate although the foundation of RPAS UAS are vulnerable to many of the same amid other aircraft, whether receiving ‘detect-and-avoid’ technologies conditions, albeit for many different air traffic services or flying purely under rests on understanding that it reasons. Chief among them is the RPIC’s some interpretation of “visual flight rules” is not enough for unmanned inability to directly perceive what is (VFR), represent an entirely different aircraft to ‘see’only aircraft happening to the aircraft from moment to challenge. Current aviation stakeholders emitting transponder or Automatic moment. However, even as work contin- can and should consider the rules they ues on addressing these issues in manned are required to follow; regulators must Dependent Surveillance–Broadcast aviation, it is clear that preventive or take an objective look at how much relief (ADS-B) Out signals; they must be corrective measures that might be effec- from rules unmanned aircraft operat- able to actively detect nonemitting tive in that domain may be completely ing in shared airspace should enjoy and aircraft as well." inadequate for unmanned operations. how much is warranted. In making such One of the great virtues of unmanned determinations, the past will continue to aircraft is that many are inherently matter. similar to that seen in the tragic 1986 more stable than manned aircraft under Finally, attentive readers undoubtedly collision of an Aeromexico airliner and a normal conditions. Onboard automation have noticed that the second question general aviation (GA) aircraft over Cerri- provided in many makes them extreme- posed at the start of this paper has yet to tos, California. The former was operating ly effective at stabilizing themselves, be directly addressed: Are past accident under instrument flight rules in the Los responding to transient conditions that scenarios in danger of being repeated due Angeles terminal control area (TCA), might take them off their programed to the expansion of minimally regulated the predecessor to the current Class A course, etc. However, some of their design unmanned aircraft operations in the airspace; the latter was operating legally features—such as supercritical wings and midst of manned aircraft? under VFR but strayed into the TCA. Most satellite antennae subject to “fuselage The author’s view is that the answer to GA aircraft at that time lacked Mode C blanking” in some attitudes—render this is a qualified “yes.” The protections pressure reporting transponders, and the them vulnerable to unexpected depar- built into the present-day aviation system profusion of 1200 VFR targets flying un- tures from controlled flight. are far more robust than they used to der the TCA boundaries complicated the Experienced UAS pilots often can be, although the foundation of RPAS air traffic controllers’ task immensely. diagnose structural problems, inadvert- “detect-and-avoid” technologies rests on The Cerritos accident resulted in quite ent gear extensions, and the like through understanding that it is not enough for a few changes in the U.S., including close monitoring of the need for unusual unmanned aircraft to “see” only aircraft creation of the “Mode C veil” concept throttle settings, higher than normal emitting transponder or Automatic De- and more-stringent communications fuel consumption, or a constant need for pendent Surveillance–Broadcast (ADS-B) requirements for VFR aircraft flying in heading or altitude corrections. Out signals; they must be able to actively Class B and C airspace. However, it also detect nonemitting aircraft as well. highlighted the distraction inherent in Current-generation transport-category having numerous transponder targets Summing up aircraft use aircraft collision avoidance flying outside airspace for which ATC Current conversations about the effects of systems (ACAS) and only can detect was responsible. The potential for repeat unmanned aviation on airspace include aircraft equipped with transponders. accidents led many facilities to suppress a significant amount of incompletely Therefore, it is possible to envision RPAS display of targets below a certain altitude informed—and occasionally misleading— given relief from the requirement to be to avoid clutter, which in turn may indi- blurring of existing distinctions between equipped with such avionics on the basis rectly have led to the FAA’s new guidance “small” RPAS and larger unmanned air- of their not being designed or certified to controllers that air traffic services are craft seeking to operate side by side with with them. The current architectures not provided to unmanned aircraft below other aircraft, especially in controlled of both the Single European Sky ATM 400 feet AGL. airspace. There is a not inconsiderable Research (SESAR) Joint Undertaking and Small unmanned aircraft bring with amount of risk associated with those at the U.S. next generation air transporta- them their own unique issues, but also the small end of the size and weight spec- tion system (NextGen) heavily rely upon can be managed to some extent by trum interfering with terminal operations participating aircraft being comprehen- keeping them as segregated as possible at low altitude, especially when permitted sively equipped to serve as interactive from manned aircraft. This approach to operate in that environment more or nodes of trajectory information upon cannot work for RPAS flownamong less at will and without the possibility of which optimal clearances for all aircraft manned aircraft. In those cases, history being “seen” either visually or electroni- may be based. Again, if equivalent equi- has taught many lessons that apply to all cally. Addressing the hazards those oper- page requirements are not imposed upon flying, regardless of the pilot’s physical ations present mostly will be a matter of unmanned aircraft, they will be effectively location. The aviation community would looking at the history of midair collisions, invisible to all other aircraft in the system. be wise to reflect on them as unmanned rules (including mandatory equipage) It is possible to envision a scenario aircraft operations continue to expand.

July-September 2020 ISASI Forum • 27 NEWS ROUNDUP

Attention Society Executive, State, Regional, Working Group, presenters who each briefly gave their perspective of the subject under discussion. The speakers represented SIAs in Europe and Committee Officials, and Corporate Member Representatives the United States, regulators, aircraft and engine manufacturers, operators, and training organizations. Delegates had been Please ensure your listing on the Forum “ISASI Information” preassigned seating so that each table had representatives from pages and on the Society website is accurate and current. Send across the aviation industry. Following the presentations, each any required corrections to [email protected]. table addressed several preset questions followed by a plenary discussion. Major Safety Agency Changes in Argentina One of the main points from the workshop was that aviation safety is about managing risk; and while regulators, manufactur- Daniel Barafini, president of the Society’s Latin American Region- ers, operators, and safety investigators are all focused on this aim, al Council, reports that there has been a reorganization among there can be, at times, conflicting priorities. The manufacturer Argentine government agencies responsible for aircraft accident and the European Union Aviation Safety Agency may need to ad- investigation. A new agency was created as a multimodal organi- dress the continued airworthiness of the fleet and the confidence zation that will investigate aviation, highway, railway, and marine of the public, while the national regulator and the operator might accidents and events. The new agency is Junta de Seguridad have to address the operator’s safety management system. At the del Transporte (JST-Transportation Safety Board). The Junta de same time, regulators, the manufacturer, and the operator will Investigación de Accidentes de Aviación Civil (JIAAC), which need to provide assistance and technical advice to the independ- was covered in the April–June 2020 issue of the Forum, is now the ent state accident/incident investigation authority. The timely National Department of Investigations. exchange of information through complex communication Barafini notes that he will no longer be in charge of the channels can result in misunderstandings, with the risk of inad- National Investigation Department, but will be the safety and vertent disclosure of sensitive or proprietary information. The accident investigation advisor for the JST and will assist the involvement of an SIA normally helps to balance the commercial transfer of aircraft accident investigation expertise and experi- pressure and provide a conduit for sharing information. ence to the other transportation modes for which JST is now During the investigation, often only the original equipment responsible. manufacturer has the necessary expertise and test facilities to examine design-related contributory factors. This can some- ESASI Provides Summary of 2019 Workshop times pose a challenge to investigators in maintaining their independence, but it is normally balanced by a team approach Olivier Ferrante, president of the European Society of Air composed of independent accredited representatives. The SIAs Safety Investigators (ESASI), provides an executive summary have a broader validation process and generally need time to of the proceedings of the ESASI workshop “Safety Investigation review testing and work undertaken by the manufacturer. During Throughout the Aircraft Life Cycle—Design for Safety” held in this review, the SIAs may be seen as delaying the progress of the Derby, UK, on May 22–23, 2019. The full report is available at investigation and release of safety information. https://www.esasi.eu/images/Derby2019/Derby_Workshop_Re- Safety recommendations were a key part of the investigation port.pdf. process for effecting change and improving safety, provided they The workshop was split into three sessions, each of which are issued in a timely manner. However, to be totally effective it lasted half a day. The first two sessions focused on the current is important that the SIA consults with the recipient of the safety process of identifying safety issues and ensuring that lessons recommendation during the drafting stage. The work of the learned are fed back into the design specifications. The third European Network of Civil Aviation Safety Investigation Authori- session focused on the effectiveness of the interactions among ties (ENCASIA) was recognized in improving the quality of safety the state investigators, regulators, manufacturers, and operators recommendations by publishing documents on guidance and and questioned whether investigators had the necessary compe- best practice. tencies to investigate design aspects. In addressing the question of how to improve relationships The three sessions were between the parties, it was agreed that this required trust, • Session 1. How can the investigation of design aspects be enhanced to improve safety throughout the life cycle of an education, and commitment. Regular communication and aircraft? collaboration on smaller events, such as serious incidents, allows the different parties to understand each other’s processes and • Session 2. How effective are safety recommendations and challenges. Investigators should develop a greater understanding safety actions related to aircraft design? of the design and continued airworthiness process and the devel- • Session 3. How can we further improve the relationship opment of complex aircraft systems. Manufacturers can facilitate among investigators from the safety investigation authori- this aim by arranging appropriate training and liaison visits ties (SIA), manufacturers, regulators, and operators? for state investigators. Attendance at seminars and workshops Each session was led by a moderator who gave an introductory and supporting major accident exercises were also considered presentation setting out the main points, followed by four or five essential preparation for the different parties to work together on 28 • July-September 2020 ISASI Forum NEWS ROUNDUP

a major safety investigation. ANZSASI 2020 Conference Rescheduled for November A summary of the points raised during the presentations and the discussion session form the body of this report. In the appendices, The Australian and New Zealand Societies of Air Safety Investiga- guidance material is added regarding the draft policy on safety tors (ANZSASI) 2020 conference at the Novotel-Surfers Paradise, recommendations developed by ENCASIA, the continued airwor- Queensland, Australia, has been rescheduled for Nov. 20–22, 2020, thiness process, and the classification of serious incidents (new under the same terms and conditions as originally agreed upon. Attachment C in International Civil Aviation Organization [ICAO] The Australian Society (ASASI), as this year’s host, considered Annex 13). other options, including cancellation, but had a particularly good A clear understanding of the continued airworthiness process is response to the original plan so “we believed it would be benefi- important as design and airworthiness questions are often inter- cial to reschedule. twined. Please note we should use “continued airworthiness” when “We chose the last date available for this year, prior to the we refer to the fleet of a given aircraft type whereas “continuing air- normal pre-Christmas period. We are optimistic that Australia worthiness” should be used when we refer to an individual aircraft and New Zealand will be open for business again in time for us to and the correct application of all airworthiness directives. make final plans for the conference. The hotel contract allows us The continued airworthiness process is a process to collect to make a go/no-go decision at the beginning of October. Howev- information that may be relevant for safety on the products in er, we will keep you informed with progress in the planning and service and to develop and implement corrective actions when this hope we will be able to make definite plans before this date. is needed to ensure that the intended level of safety is achieved or “The speakers who had agreed to deliver presentations in May maintained. Continued airworthiness is actually ensured both by 2020 have all been contacted and offered the opportunity of pre- the manufacturer and the certification authority according to the senting in November 2020. division of tasks and principles established by regulations. Appendix “The information on the website has been updated accordingly. 5 provides a summary of the European regulatory framework for If you have already registered, your registration will automatically type certificate holders and more details on the continued airwor- be transferred to the new dates unless you wish to cancel. A re- thiness process. fund of your registration payment can be made by contacting the An outcome of the workshop was to ask for more guidance, ASASI secretary. The hotel booking information will be updated to notably through an update of ICAO Doc. 9756 Manual of Aircraft reflect the new dates. Accident and Incident Investigation that could include investigation “The seminar will follow our usual format with the Cabin Safety techniques and concepts for highly integrated and modern onboard Working Group meeting on Friday, as well as the annual Austral- systems with intense usage of software. ia-New Zealand golf championship. There may be changes to the To conclude, it is of utmost importance that the collaboration format depending on the aviation industry situation at that time. among industry, regulators, and SIAs under Annex 13 remains A welcome reception will be held on Friday evening, followed transparent to all parties and to the public. Society must under- by two full days of presentations on Saturday and Sunday and a stand, and have trust in, the safety investigation process. dinner on Saturday night. “The success of our annual ANZSASI seminar is always meas- ured by the quality of the papers and associated presentations. The theme of the seminar is “Improving Safety,” and a range of quality papers, collat- ed by Geoff Dell, Rob Chopin, and Mike Walker, will address all aspects of transport safety, safety training and education, human factors, and technical developments. “We will operate a paperless conference for ANZSASI 2020, using an event mobile app, which is now available. To select the app, go to eMobilise and enter ANZSASI2020 for the current information. All information will be updated once we get closer to the conference date and we have a draft program and speakers. We welcome any feedback on this initiative to be as environ- ESASI 2019 participants gather at the Rolls-Royce Learning and Development Center in Derby, UK. mentally friendly as possible.” July-September 2020 ISASI Forum • 29 ISASI INFORMATION OFFICERS President, Frank Del Gandio ([email protected]) Executive Advisor, Richard Stone ([email protected]) Vice President, Ron Schleede MOVING? NEW E-MAIL ACCOUNT? ([email protected]) Secretary, Chad Balentine Member Number ([email protected]) Treasurer, Robert MacIntosh, Jr. ______([email protected]) COUNCILORS Fax this form to 703-430-4970 , or mail to Australian, Paul Mayes ([email protected]) ISASI, Park Center Canadian, Barbara Dunn ([email protected]) European, Rob Carter ([email protected]) 107 E. Holly Avenue, Suite 11 International, Caj Frostell ([email protected]) New Zealand, Alister Buckingham Sterling, VA USA 20164-5405 ([email protected]) Pakistan, Wg. Cdr. (Ret.) Naseem Syed Old Address (or attach label) Ahmed ([email protected]) United States, Toby Carroll ([email protected]) Name ______NATIONAL AND REGIONAL SOCIETY PRESIDENTS Address ______AsiaSASI, Chan Wing Keong ([email protected]) City ______Australian, John Guselli ([email protected]) Canadian, Barbara Dunn ([email protected]) State/Prov. ______European, Olivier Ferrante ([email protected]) Zip ______Korean, Dr. Tachwan Cho (contact: Dr. Jenny Yoo—[email protected]) Latin American, Daniel Barafani, PTE Country ______([email protected]) Middle East North Africa, Khalid Al Raisi ([email protected]) New Address* New Zealand, Paul Breuilly ([email protected]) Name ______Pakistan, Wg. Cdr. (Ret.) Naseem Syed Ahmed ([email protected]) Russian, Vsvolod E. Overharov Address ______([email protected]) United States, Toby Carroll ([email protected]) City ______UNITED STATES REGIONAL CHAPTER PRESIDENTS State/Prov. ______Alaska, Craig Bledsoe ([email protected]) Zip ______Arizona, Bill Waldock ([email protected]) Dallas-Ft. Worth, Erin Carroll ([email protected]) Country ______Great Lakes, Matthew Kenner ([email protected]) Mid-Atlantic, Frank Hilldrup E-mail ______([email protected]) Northeast, Steve Demko *Do not forget to change employment and e-mail address. ([email protected]) Northern California, Kevin Darcy ([email protected]) Pacific Northwest, Gary Morphew ([email protected]) Rocky Mountain, David Harper ([email protected]) Southeastern, Robert Rendzio ([email protected]) Southern California, Thomas Anthony ([email protected]) 30 • July-September 2020 ISASI Forum ISASI INFORMATION

All Nippon Airways Co., Ltd. (ANA) Hawaiian Airlines COMMITTEE CHAIRMEN Allianz HNZ New Zealand Limited Audit, Roger Cox Allied Pilots Association Hogreen Air ([email protected]) Aloft Aviation Consulting Honeywell Aerospace Award, Gale E. Braden ([email protected]) Aramco Associated Company Hong Kong Airline Pilots Association Asiana Airlines Human Factors Training Solutions Pty. Ltd Ballot Certification, Tom McCarthy Independent Pilots Association ([email protected]) Asociación Nicaragüense de Investigación de Accidentes Insitu, Inc. Board of Fellows, Curt Lewis ([email protected]) ASPA de Mexico Interstate Aviation Committee Bylaws, Darren T. Gaines ASSET Aviation International Pty. Ltd. Irish Air Corps ([email protected]) Association of Professional Flight Attendants Irish Aviation Authority Code of Ethics, Jeff Edwards ([email protected]) Australian and International Pilots’ Association Japan Transport Safety Board (AIPA) Jones Day Membership, Ron Schleede ([email protected]) KLM Royal Dutch Airlines Mentoring Program, Anthony Brickhouse Australian Transport Safety Bureau Korean Air ([email protected]) Aviation Accident and Incident Investigation Korea Aviation & Railway Accident Nominating, Troy Jackson Division/Ministry of Infrastructure, Rwanda Investigation Board Aviation Investigation Bureau, Jeddah, L-3 Aviation Recorders ([email protected]) Kingdom of Saudi Arabia Reachout, Glenn Jones ([email protected]) Learjet/Bombardier Aerospace Avisure Lion Mentari Airlines, PT Scholarship Committee, Chad Balentine Azure Aero Ltd Lockheed Martin Aeronautics Company ([email protected]) Becker Helicopters Pty. Ltd. Middle East Airlines Seminar, Barbara Dunn ([email protected]) Bell Midwest University Bundesstelle fur Flugunfalluntersuchung (BFU) Military Air Accident Investigation Branch WORKING GROUP CHAIRMEN Bureau d’Enquêtes et d’Analyses (BEA) Military Aircraft Accident & Incident Air Traffic Services, Darren T. Gaines (Chair) CAE Flightscape Investigation Board ([email protected]) Cathay Pacific Airways Limited Ministry of Transport, Transport Safety Centurion Aerospace Ltd. Investigation Bureau, Singapore Ladislav Mika (Co-Chair) ([email protected]) Charles Taylor Aviation National Aerospace Laboratory, NLR Airports, David Gleave ([email protected]) China Airlines National Department of Investigation Cabin Safety, Joann E. Matley Civil Aviation Authority, Macao, China (Argentina) ([email protected]) Civil Aviation Department Headquarters National Institute of Aviation Safety and Corporate Affairs, Erin Carroll Civil Aviation Safety Authority Australia Services ([email protected]) Civil Aviation Safety Investigation and Analysis National Transportation Safety Board Center National Transportation Safety Committee- Critical Incident Stress Management (CISM), Indonesia (KNKT) David Rye--([email protected]) Colegio Oficial de Pilotos de la Aviación Comercial (COPAC) NAV CANADA Flight Recorder, Michael R. Poole Commercial Aircraft Corporation of China Netherlands Defence Safety Inspectorate ([email protected]) Cranfield Safety & Accident Investigation Ocean Infinity General Aviation, Steve Sparks Centre Pakistan Air Force-Institute of Air Safety ([email protected]) Curt Lewis & Associates, LLC Pakistan Airline Pilots’ Association (PALPA) Pakistan International Airlines Corporation (PIA) Government Air Safety Facilitator, Dassault Aviation Papua New Guinea Accident Investigation Marcus Costa ([email protected]) DDAAFS Commission (PNG AIC) Human Factors, William Bramble Defence Science and Technology Organisation Parker Aerospace ([email protected]) (DSTO) Petroleum Air Services Defense Conseil International (DCI/IFSA) Phoenix International Inc. Investigators Training & Education, De Havilland Aircraft of Canada Limited Graham R. Braithwaite Plane Sciences, Inc., Ottawa, Canada Delft University of Technology Pratt & Whitney ([email protected]) Delta Air Lines, Inc. PT Merpati Nusantara Airlines Military Air Safety Investigator, James W. Roberts Directorate of Flight Safety (Canadian Forces) Qatar Airways ([email protected]) Discovery Aur Defence Rademan Aviation Promotion of ISASI, Daniel Barafani (Chair) Dombroff Gilmore Jaques & French P.C. Republic of Korea Air Force Aviation ([email protected]) DRS C3 & Aviation Company, Avionics Line of Safety Agency Unmanned Aerial Systems, Tom Farrier Business Republic of Singapore Air Force (RSAF) Dubai Air Wing Rolls-Royce PLC ([email protected]) Dubai Civil Aviation Authority Royal Danish Air Force, Tactical Air Command Dutch Airline Pilots Association Royal Netherlands Air Force CORPORATE MEMBERS Dutch Safety Board Royal New Zealand Air Force AAIU, Ministry of Transport Eclipse Group, Inc. RTI Group, LLC Abakan Air Education and Training Center for Aviation Safety Saudia Airlines-Safety Accident Investigation Board (AIB) Army Aviation EL AL Israel Airlines Scandinavian Airlines System Accident Investigation Board Norway Embraer-Empresa Brasileira de Aeronautica S.A. Sikorsky Aircraft Corporation Accident Investigation Bureau Nigeria Embry-Riddle Aeronautical University Singapore Airlines Limited Administration des Enquêtes Techniques Etihad Airways Southern California Safety Institute Adnan Zuhairy Engineering Consultancy EUROCONTROL Southwest Airlines Company Aegean Airlines Southwest Airlines Pilots’ Association Aer Lingus European Aviation Safety Agency (EASA) EVA Airways Corporation Spanish Airline Pilots’ Association (SEPLA) Aero Republica State of Israel Aerovias De Mexico, S.A. De C.V. Executive Development & Management Advisor Statens haverikommission Agenzia Nazionale Per La Sicurezza Del Volo Finnair Plc Swiss Accident Investigation Board (SAIB) Air Accident Investigation Authority of Hong Kong Finnish Military Aviation Authority Taiwan Transportation Safety Board (TTSB) Air Accident Investigation Bureau of Mongolia Flight Data Services Ltd. The Air Group Air Accident Investigation Bureau of Singapore Flight Data Systems Pty. Ltd. The Boeing Company Accident Investigation Committee of Thailand Flight Safety Foundation The Japanese Aviation Insurance Pool (JAIP) Air Accident Investigation Unit-Ireland Fugro Survey Middle East Ltd. Transportation Safety Board of Canada Air Accident Investigation Sector, GCAA, UAE Gangseo-gu, Republic of Korea Turbomeca Air Accidents Investigation Branch-UK GE Aviation Ukrainian National Bureau of Air Accidents and Air Asia Group General Aviation Manufacturers Association Incidents of Civil Aircraft Air Astana JSC German Military Aviation Authority, Directorate of UND Aerospace Air Canada Aviation Safety Federal Armed Forces United Airlines Air Canada Pilots Association Global Aerospace, Inc. United States Aircraft Insurance Group Air Line Pilots Association Grup Air Med S.A. University of Balamand/Balamand Institute of Airbus Grupo Regional de Investigación de Accidentes Aeronautics Airclaims Limited de Aviación University of Southern California Air New Zealand Gulfstream Aerospace Corporation Virgin Galactic Airways New Zealand Hall & Associates LLC WestJet July-September 2020 ISASI Forum • 31 ISASI 107 E. Holly Ave., Suite 11 Sterling, VA 20164-5405 USA

INCORPORATED AUGUST 31, 1964 CHANGE SERVICE REQUESTED

A STUDENT’S PERSPECTIVE OF LIFE IN LOCKDOWN

By Nur in class and outside of class to to have my internship evolve to up new skills. Get your hands Amalina land a job before graduation. A a part-time position and then dirty doing something technical Jumary, couple of my course mates were to a full-time employee of the or go online to learn a new sub- 2019 Kapustin accepted into an airline’s grad- company upon graduation. ject on various free or inexpen- Scholarship uate program before their final Like other businesses, we sive platforms. My pilot-to-be Recipient term and were well on their way adapt and respond to the friend has since picked up her to starting their careers. Airlines changes as quickly and as best flying manual again to refresh hen 2020 began, worldwide have since furloughed we can. Part of my responsibility her concepts after a few weeks of no one could have many of their employees. is ensuring that our clients con- adjusting to this new life. anticipated the words Like many aspiring pilots, a tinue their safety procedures Staying the Course W“unprecedented close friend worked part-time to and practices even as their op- times” would become part of fund her flying fees. When the erating environment changes. If there is one thing any aviation our vernacular in a few months. Cadet Pilot Program in her home Personally, I have found that the student knows from paying The COVID-19 pandemic has country accepted applicants, she principles involved in doing my attention in class is that the far-reaching impacts on our in- applied and was invited to four job remain true as I navigate my industry is cyclical. We have dustry—with airlines relying on separate and intensive inter- way around this pandemic. entered the industry during its government aid to survive, flight views. She was accepted into If you are a fresh graduate like lowest period. Planes will start and ground crews furloughed, the Cadet Pilot Program. Pilots me or have a few more terms in and aircraft flown to their flying again, and our industry worldwide have since gone aviation school, the following will recover. Until then, it would “graveyards” with no scheduled from being in high demand to may benefit you, too. be worthwhile to keep yourself return flight. There was a time being grounded. Another course when the sky was brimming mate had received a job offer Ensuring Oversight of updated regarding how the with life. Individuals moved that required him to move to a Critical Areas industry is responding and across borders freely, and others different state. The same day he Being distant from your peers being shaped by this pandemic ensured that people would was scheduled to move, he was through subscribing to aviation get to their destinations safely. and lecturers may make you feel told the company had down- disconnected from the indus- websites and being active in There are also others who were sized to remain operational. This aviation associations. studying to build their careers in try. Reading about the state of is what it is like graduating in a our industry in the news may Perhaps worrying about an this industry but have graduated time of pandemic, and in a time discourage you from putting in aviation career may not be at the to an industry that has come to a when aviation is not enjoying its the effort or keeping the passion top of your priorities now. When standstill. golden spell. alive. Consider the university you are ready again, stay the I am an aviation school grad- Since the beginning of 2020 being closed as a change in your course and review your critical uate of the class of 2020. During and well before the pandemic, operating environment. areas. Afterall, success comes my time in aviation school, I I became the deputy audit pro- Be present with all these when your preparation today was in the company of passion- gram manager at the same com- changes and ensure that you meets opportunities in the ate students who were equal pany that I began my aviation have oversight of critical are- future. parts determined and smart in stint during my second semester as—your study plan and career Editor’s note: This article is adapted knowing what they had to do in aviation school. I was lucky goals. This is your time to pick from the ASASI News, June 2020.

32 • July-September 2020 ISASI Forum