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Tough Talk, Cheap Talk, and Babbling: Government Unity, Hawkishness

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Tough Talk, Cheap Talk, and Babbling: Government Unity, Hawkishness Tough Talk, Cheap Talk, and Babbling: Government Unity, Hawkishness and Military Challenges By Matthew Blake Fehrs Department of Political Science Duke University Date:_____________________ Approved: ___________________________ Joseph Grieco, Supervisor __________________________ Alexander Downes __________________________ Peter Feaver __________________________ Chris Gelpi __________________________ Erik Wibbels Dissertation submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in the Department of Political Science in the Graduate School of Duke University 2008 ABSTRACT Tough Talk, Cheap Talk, and Babbling: Government Unity, Hawkishness and Military Challenges By Matthew Blake Fehrs Department of Political Science Duke University Date:_____________________ Approved: ___________________________ Joseph Grieco, Supervisor __________________________ Alexander Downes __________________________ Peter Feaver __________________________ Chris Gelpi __________________________ Erik Wibbels An abstract of a dissertation submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in the Department of Political Science in the Graduate School of Duke University 2008 Copyrighted by Matthew Blake Fehrs 2008 Abstract A number of puzzles exist regarding the role of domestic politics in the likelihood of international conflict. In particular, the sources of incomplete information remain under-theorized and the microfoundations deficient. This study will examine the role that the unity of the government and the views of the government towards the use of force play in the targeting of states. The theory presented argues that divided dovish governments are particularly likely to suffer from military challenges. In particular, divided governments have difficulty signaling their intentions, taking decisive action, and may appear weak. The theory will be tested on a new dataset created by the author that examines the theory in the context of international territorial disputes. A number of significant findings emerge from the data. First, divided governments are significantly more likely to face challenges and increasing government unity markedly decreases the likelihood of a challenge. Second, unified hawkish governments were far less likely to be the targets of challenges than divided dovish governments. Finally, the substantive impact of key variables was much greater than that of the control variables. The causal process postulated in the theory is examined in eight case studies, two for each of the four government types. These case studies show that government type not only impacts the signaling of democratic states but also influences the perceptions of potential challengers. iv For Kimberly, who can always make me laugh. v Table of Contents Abstract iv List of Tables ix List of Figures x Acknowledgements xi Chapter 1: Introduction 1 The Theory 4 Alternative Explanations 8 The Organization of the Dissertation 10 Chapter 2: Theory 14 Four Democratic Puzzles 17 Democracies and International Disputes 27 Theory 34 Alternative Explanations 42 Conclusion 54 Chapter 3: Statistical Tests 56 Hypotheses 57 Methods 63 Results 78 Discussion 90 Chapter 4: Divided Doves 99 Kashmir, 1965 The Conflict 101 Divided Government and Mixed Signals 106 Dovish Government 110 The Impact of Disunity on India’s Ability to Signal 113 The View from Pakistan 118 Alternative Explanations 122 The Korean War The Conflict 128 Divided Government and Mixed Signals 133 Dovish Government 142 The Impact of Disunity on the U.S.’s Ability to Signal 144 The View from North Korea 150 Alternative Explanations 155 Chapter 5: Divided Hawks 163 The October War vi The Conflict 166 Divided Government and Mixed Signals 170 Hawkish Government 178 The Impact of Disunity on Israel’s Ability to Signal 181 The View from Egypt 190 Alternative Explanations 193 The Kargil War The Conflict 200 Divided Government and Mixed Signals 205 Hawkish Government 211 The Impact of Disunity on the India’s Ability to Signal 214 The View from Pakistan 220 Alternative Explanations 223 Chapter 6: Unified Doves 230 Israel’s Peace Process under Rabin The Conflict 233 Unified Government and Clear Signals 235 Dovish Government 242 The Impact of Unity on Israel’s Ability to Signal 247 The View from Jordan, Syria, and the PLO 256 Alternative Explanations 260 Sino-Indian Relations under Nehru The Conflict 266 Unified Government and Clear Signals 268 Dovish Government 272 The Impact of Unity on the India’s Ability to Signal 278 The View from China 283 The Price of Extreme Unity 285 Alternative Explanations 289 Chapter 7: Unified Hawks 296 Arab-Israeli Relations under Ben Gurion The Conflict 299 Unified Government and Clear Signals 302 Hawkish Government 309 The Impact of Unity on Israel’s Ability to Signal 312 The View from Israel’s Neighbors 317 Alternative Explanations 321 United States-North Korean Relations under Nixon The Conflict 327 Unified Government and Clear Signals 329 Hawkish Government 336 The Impact of Unity on the United States’ Ability to Signal 339 vii The View from North Korea 343 Alternative Explanations 345 Chapter 8: Conclusion 352 Theory 355 Findings 359 Policy Implications and Future Research 364 Appendices A: Independent Variable Coding Procedures 374 B: List of Dyads in the Dataset and Period Covered 393 C: Coding Details and Sources 394 Bibliography 421 Biography 468 viii List of Tables 2.1 Summary of Government Types and Outcomes 38 3.1 Government Typologies 61 3.2 War Target by Level of Government Unity 79 3.3 War Target by Level of Hawkishness 79 3.4 War Target by Government Type 80 3.5 Militarized Dispute Target by Government Unity 80 3.6 Militarized Dispute Target by Hawkishness 81 3.7 Militarized Dispute Target by Government Type 81 3.8 Likelihood of War Targeting 82 3.9 Likelihood of Militarized Dispute Targeting 84 3.10 Substantive Effects for War Targeting 85 3.11 Substantive Effects for Militarized Dispute Targeting 86 3.12 Classification Table 87 3.13 ROC Curve Area for War Target 89 3.14 ROC Curve Area for Militarized Dispute Target 90 3.15 Frequency of Government Types 96 8.1 Summary of Testing Results for Hypotheses 361 ix List of Figures 3.1 Case Selection Process 65 3.2 ROC Curve for War Target 88 3.3 ROC Curve for Militarized Dispute Target 89 3.4 Predicted Probability for Levels of Government Unity 91 3.5 Predicted Probability for Levels of Government Unity by Hawkishness 93 3.6 Probability of Attack by Government Type 94 x Acknowledgements The work on this project began several years ago in long discussions with colleagues at Duke University. What has emerged is the result of insights, criticism, and assistance from a broad array of people. In fact, the entire writing process was made much easier by a large support network of fellow graduate students, faculty, and family members. The first group to which I am indebted is the graduate students at Duke University. The collegial atmosphere in the department meant that people were always willing to discuss ideas, answer questions, and provide constructive criticism. In addition to helping me work my way through the dissertation, having a group of colleagues with whom I could discuss things that are not academic is equally important. In this group I include all the Duke political science basketball game participants, and organizer Dave McIvor in particular. Few things could be further from being sequestered in the basement of the library than our pick-up games. As someone who knew the ins and outs of the department and the discipline, Gerry DiGuisto was an invaluable resource and a great friend. Further, my time in graduate school would have been much less interesting without my roommate Daniel Lee. In the early stages of this project I received input from Mark Axelrod, Bruno Borges, Camber Warren, and Lindsay Cohn. Finally, Libby Jenke provided excellent research assistance and edited nearly the entire document. A number of faculty members have influenced my work and the course my research has taken. From my undergraduate studies, Tom Ilgen and Nigel Boyle were pivotal in leading me to pursue a career in academia. Both of them offered me the xi kind of mentoring and encouragement that modeled for me the ideal in faculty- student interaction. At Duke I have benefited from the insights of a number of faculty members. Both Erik Wibbels and Chris Gelpi offered help with the research design. Peter Feaver, despite being in Washington during two years of my work, was nevertheless invaluable. His insights on the presentation of the case studies and helping to secure research assistance were important for the final project. Throughout this process Alex Downes has been a constant source of encouragement, constructive criticism, and ideas. Alex always found time to meet and remained unwaveringly supportive of the project even when my own motivation occasionally ebbed. Finally, as my advisor who guided me through this project, Joe Grieco constantly pushed me to refine my theory and concepts. In our many meetings over the years, Joe helped in ways both small and large. Without the help of these faculty members this project would not have reached fruition. During the ups and downs of this project, my family has been unwaveringly supportive. My parents, Mary and Delmer Fehrs, both PhDs themselves, were sympathetic ears for the occasional rants about graduate school and continually offered sound advice. I am always grateful that neither of them reminded me that they both completed their dissertations in far less time. Likewise, my brother Peter Fehrs has offered support and helped keep me in good humor. Finally, endless thanks go to Kimberly, who during the course of this project went from being my girlfriend, to my fiancée, to my wife. Throughout this process, she made tremendous sacrifices without complaint. Day after day, she allowed me to xii bounce ideas off her, discuss arcane issues, and helped enormously in the editing process. Her support, good humor, love, and zest for the moment always put my problems in perspective.
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