Vol.XVIII,XXIII No. (79) 66 - -2017 2012 5

Croatia, United Kingdom, foreign relations, KEY WORDS: future relations with the UK are likely to be determined by the nature of Brexit negotiations and the future relations with the UK are likely to be determined by the nature of Brexit negotiations and the evolution of British policy toward the pace and direction of EU integration. during Yugoslavia’s breakup and wars. ’s accession to the EU in 2013 offered an opportunity opportunity an offered 2013 in EU the to accession Croatia’s wars. and breakup Yugoslavia’s during their past behind, since and London had similar for the two countries to leave the burdens of Brexit changed everything. Croatia’s preferences on a number of crucial EU policy fronts. However, Relations between the two countries during this period were frequently strained partly due to this period were frequently strained partlyRelations between the two countries during to due democratic shortcomings,but partly War also due to competing visions of post-Cold Zagreb’s conflicting policies Britain’s and rooted in Croatia’s Southeast Europe and due to long-lasting biases Apart from relations with its neighbours, Croatia’s relations with the United Kingdom (UK) were relations with the United Kingdom (UK) were Apart relations with its neighbours, Croatia’s from undoubtedly its greatest international challenge since it won its independence in the early 1990s. Abstract Josip Glaurdić Brexit the Past: Croatia’s Relations with the with the Relations Croatia’s the Past: to Independence from United Kingdom Struggling for the Future, Burdened by Burdened for the Future, Struggling ISSN 1848-5782 1848-5782 ISSN UDC 327(497.5:41-4) DOI 10.1515/cirr-2017-0013 CIRR XXIII (79) 2017, 5-39 XXIII (79) CIRR its independence of continental constraints” (Wallace 1992: 424)? the West” and a bridge between the US and Europe, and instead turning US and Europe, the and a bridge between West” the a European of edge the on kingdom VIII: a Henry “England under into to assert system, attempting both to play politics and a part in continental Europe and the geopolitical transformation of the continent, was Britain of the continent, Europe and the geopolitical transformation of “pivot the of position the Germany reunited a to losing of verge the on 1992: 155) – or was it to remain on its side-lines? Britain’s What role was “special (US) to play relationship” with the in its positioning of in America’s perception the change in the budding EU? Considering wheel of European integration – to be “at the heart of Europe”, as the newly newly as the Europe”, of heart be “at the – to integration European wheel of G. (Smith, 1990 November in exclaimed Major John Minister Prime installed reunification of Germany, and the process of deepeningintegration left Britain’s political of European class torn over the redefinition of Britain’s supposed to jump behind the steering international priorities. Was Britain was engaged in a profound debate regarding its foreign policy strategy policy strategy its foreign debate regarding was engaged in a profound the end of the Soviet threat, The and the shift in its geopolitical position. Over the course of the same two and a half decades, the United Kingdom of the Over the course of its standing in opposite transformation a completely (UK) went through time of the end of the Cold War, Britain the international system. At the Treaty Organisation (NATO) and European Union (EU). Treaty Organisation (NATO) and European status quo. It is a country at peace with its neighbours (despite with its neighbours peace at country is a It quo. status European tensions), desperate to maintain comparatively minor, though frequent, Atlantic North the of membership the through receives it protection the system changes in order to extricate itself from a troublesome regional regional troublesome a itself from to extricate in order system changes in the midst status quo. Today, shifts of a new round of tectonic the in larger or regional the alter to keen system, Croatia is hardly international powers’ policies during the war – were troublingly acrimonious. Twenty- troublingly acrimonious. the war – were during powers’ policies five years ago, Croatia wasattempting to ride the wave of international internationally recognised, its territorial integrity was far from secured. integrity was far from its territorial internationally recognised, partly on – powers world and European most with its relations Moreover, of these and partly on account of its pursuit of independence, account a brutal war that left thousands of its citizens dead, several hundred several hundred citizens dead, of its war that left thousands a brutal Although occupation. under its territory of a third and homeless, thousand and and its position in January 1992, when it was finallyTwo and starker. could not be Community, states of the European member recognised the by barely surviving after its independence won ago Croatia a half decades The contrast between Croatia’s standing in the international system today today system international in the standing Croatia’s between contrast The

Vol.XVIII,XXIII No. (79) 66 - -2017 2012 6 Vol.XVIII,XXIII No. (79) 66 - -2017 2012 7 created more obstacles for Croatia in the completion of those foreign obstacles for Croatia in the completion created more to establishing functional relations with its neighbours and positioning with its neighbours relations establishing functional to EU the of structures security and economic, political, the within firmly itself of Southeast Europe (SEE) outside Arguably no other country and NATO. powerful. In the two and a half decades of its independence, Croatia its independence, a half decades of and two the In powerful. integrity its territorial securing from challenges: policy foreign many faced imbalance. Both of those conclusions, however, would be incorrect. however, imbalance. Both of those conclusions, a thin means Croatia and Britain is by no story of relations between The the wishes of powerless simply adjusting to the the depicting volume object of British foreign policy, never a truly independent subject in the subject in independent a truly policy, never foreign British of object power obvious the matter no countries, two the between interaction this period were at best inconsequential. The obvious disproportion in their obvious disproportion The this period were at best inconsequential. could relations their that conclude to capabilities us power may also lead an have been could only is, Croatia that unidirectional: only have been years, coupled with Britain’s traditionally low interest in Eastern Europe, in Eastern interest Britain’s traditionally low with coupled years, during countries two the between relations that conclude to us lead could Such a clear disparity in the direction and nature of change in the of change Such a clear disparity nature in the direction and international positions of Croatia and Britain over the past twenty-five reversal between Britain and Croatia, if one compares their positions reversal between Britain and Croatia, was complete. toward Europe’s present and future, and extremely divisive referendum campaign. From one of the pillars of pillars of the of one From campaign. divisive extremely referendum and into European political Britain suddenly turned and economic security, role The status quo. Europe’s geopolitical to threats largest of the one politics for five decades, materialised in summerthe of wing and Eurosceptic by its Party Conservative ruling the of capture facto 2016 into a de from the EU after a bitterly fought of the UK departure the consequent was truly our future, rather as if it was a threat, or an adversary” (Cradock adversary” an or threat, was a if it as rather future, our was truly 1997: 207). That error, simmering on and under the surface of British Chairman of the Joint Intelligence Committee under Margaret Thatcher Thatcher Margaret under Committee Intelligence Joint the Chairman of the greatest that one of thought Sir Percy Cradock, and John Major, as if it “[not] Europe treating policy was British foreign modern of errors its special relationship with Washington, and maintaining its connections its connections and maintaining Washington, relationship with its special throughout its former Empire (Jović 2007). Then, however, came Brexit. trepidation, a new status quo in Europe – that was highly beneficial to the to beneficial highly was that – Europe in quo status new a trepidation, of shaping was quickly. rather UK – developed forefront at the London all political new European on the while building structures, and security Although the British political class welcomed these questions with with questions these class welcomed British political the Although supported Milošević and

the preservation of stability in Eastern Europe. As the Foreign Secretary Foreign the As Europe. Eastern stabilityin of preservation the Balkans, no in the interest strategic no had it, “We put Douglas Hurd later consumed the federation’s political landscape in the years leading up leading years the political landscape in federation’s the consumed regarding to war. It also matched the West’s larger policy preference economically benefit from steady centralisation. This policy preference essentially implied powers that the Western debates which constitutional republics in the Yugoslavia’s northwest not (West) Germany which did not deviate from the mainstream until real war real until mainstream the from deviate not did which Germany (West) began in the summer of 1991 – strongly believed that the Yugoslav not only would politically and they but also that together, stick republics had to had to remain united (Hall 2005). This position of the Foreign Office was – including powers all Western this period, During way exceptional. in no Office to Ambassador Peter Hall’s distressed 1989 and 1990 reports about the harmful consequences of Milošević’s campaign was that “they really Yugoslavia simply that and happening” be to it not prefer much would consequent blind spot for the campaign of Slobodan Milošević’s Serbia Foreign of the response Yugoslavia. The a recentralized over control for later labelled by Brendan Simms (2002) as Britain’s “unfinest hour”, was 1980s: 1) London’s late the dynamics from closely related two upon founded and 2) the Yugoslav federation, existence of the continuing to the devotion Britain’s policy toward the violent in the early 1990s, early violent breakup of Yugoslavia in the the Britain’s policy toward of Yugoslavia The “original sin”: Britain, Croatia and the breakup the breakup and Croatia Britain, “original sin”: The and the UK’s policies toward its continued development. and the UK’s policies relations could not be properly understood: the European Union. The Union. European the be properly understood: not relations could only not of future the understanding better of hope the in that does article project European the also of but countries, two these between relations for independence in the early 1990s until the present day, with particular day, with present 1990s early until the the in independence for which those variable without intervening one to the devoted attention in Europe’s political architecture that we are currently witnessing, it is witnessing, currently we are that architecture political in Europe’s two these between relations the of evolution the of stock take to time struggle its from UK with the relations article traces Croatia’s This countries. policy challenges than Britain. Considering the extraordinary changes changes extraordinary the Considering Britain. than challenges policy

Vol.XVIII,XXIII No. (79) 66 - -2017 2012 8 Vol.XVIII,XXIII No. (79) 66 - -2017 2012 9 help. To say that Britain was wary of a new European order dominated by some explanatory power, though probably only when it comes to the probably though some explanatory power, approach that a different fact war in Croatia. The earlier stages of the was eventually advocated by a recently reunited Germany also did not 26). London’s decision to stick to the policy of keeping Yugoslavia united mayhem does have descent into federation’s troubled the even after What could explain the content of Britain’s activism during this period? What could explain the content More than a century ago Lord Salisbury that “the commonest remarked dead policies” (Hill carcasses of 1988: the in politics [is] sticking to error and villages falling prey to the onslaught of ’s military machinery. Belgrade’s of onslaught the to villagesfalling prey and run destroyer of Yugoslavia, whereas Britain was seen in Zagreb not only not Yugoslavia, whereas Britain was seen in Zagreb of destroyer run as the country protective of Milošević’s Serbia and hostile to blind to the plight of a series of Croatian towns but also independence, Croatia’s looking good. Croatia, largely due to its president Franjo Tuđman and his (HDZ), was seen in Whitehall as the nationalist- Croatian Democratic Union Croatia among British foreign policy makers and of Britain among their policy makers and of Britain among Croatia among British foreign Croatian counterparts were decisively shaped during those first months came out country – and neither independence for Croatia’s struggle of abuse of historical imagery by a number of its diplomats abuse of historical imagery by and foreign the in steeped were conflicts Yugoslav the that argued who makers policy of perceptions Contemporary 2011). (Glaurdić hatreds” “ancient region’s Yugoslav republics; its refusal to establish Yugoslav republics; its refusal to establish diplomatic with Croatia relations neo-colonial least, the and, last but not its recognition; after months for most benign form of ceasefire monitors; its support for an arms embargo the vast military which cemented and its allies supremacy of Serbia the of recognition the halt to efforts its determined come; to years for in condemning the Yugoslav National Army (JNA) use of force; its Army (JNA) use of force; dogged the Yugoslav National in condemning even in the – military intervention international of any form opposition to strong policy strong activism war came to of that “quiet” once real in pursuit of rejection – Croatia: Whitehall’s extent a far greater and – to its equivocation declarations of independence; Slovenia’s and Croatia’s Hurd’s image of Britain simply wishing for “quiet” to return to a region in a region to return to “quiet” for simply wishing Britain of Hurd’s image part one only course, is, of interests particular strategic had no which it part was Britain’s interesting more and by far the larger The story. the of should return” (Hurd 2005). (Hurd return” should commercial commercial interest, no selfish interestat all. We simply wished that quiet 17). This was realism alright, but it was realism which was fully aware of its Conference on Yugoslavia and the former foreign secretary, Lord on Yugoslavia and the former Conference “all impossible people… Yugoslavs were the it, succinctly put Carrington, Serbs” (Simms 2002: more are just and there all as bad as each other, of guilt in Western perceptions of Yugoslav conflicts than British foreign policy makers and diplomats (Conversi 1996). As the Chairman of the made not only that the origins of the Yugoslav conflict were “ancient”, contributed guilty. Indeed, no one but also that all parties were equally campaign of moral relativism to the distorting and the equivalence more – as well as many in the British public, press, and politics – as well as many in the British public, – who were calling be case had to the aggression, against Serbian intervention a forceful for makers were committed to actively of what warping the interpretation makers were committed to build policies. a case for their preferred was happening on the ground In order to dissuade the international community the various members of every aspect of the West’s policy – military or diplomatic. And third, the third, And diplomatic. West’s policy – military or the aspect of every British policy which to extent the reveal fails to argument will” of “lack when it comes to its relations with reunited Germany, but later also with the with also later but Germany, reunited with relations its to comes it when This clash US under the Clinton administration. of wills not only centred was with virtually but was concerned of military intervention, the question on influence on the decisions of the Yugoslav protagonists. Second, the “lack the Second, protagonists. Yugoslav the of decisions the on influence of will” clash of wills argument also serves to mask the serious among the a decisive particularly Western powers to which Britain made contribution, more than a troubled observer of what was more than a troubled observer happening in Yugoslavia indirect and direct participant with proactive was a highly it fact, in when, This argument certainly does have its logical appeal. Nevertheless, it is Nevertheless, does have its logical appeal. This argument certainly flawed for several reasons. First, it implicitly suggests that Britain was little Yugoslavia because it did not wish to jeopardise its own post-Cold War jeopardise its own wish to it did not Yugoslavia because war. by getting embroiled in a Balkan “peace dividend” will” to intervene militarily in the Yugoslav conflicts(Gow 1997: 174-183). Western (and, to varying levels, other to this view, London According in former ground the on power of (im)balance the capitals) accepted may be the one offered by James Gow who saw Britain’s “pusillanimous lack of the of “triumph Western the to decisively contributing realism” (as well as Paris) to a great extent based its policy toward Yugoslavia Yugoslavia toward its policy based extent great a to as Paris) (as well time, the at developments European larger of considerations the on interpretation useful more limits. A its also has argumentation of line this Germany would be an understatement (Glaurdić 2011). Although London London Although 2011). (Glaurdić understatement an be would Germany

XXIII (79) - 2017

Vol.XVIII, No. 66 - 2012 10 Vol.XVIII,XXIII No. (79) 66 - -2017 2012 11 reached its climax during the war in Bosnia-Herzegovina in Bosnia-Herzegovina war the its climax during reached realpolitik in London which, together with the administration of François Mitterrand in Mitterrand with the administration of François in London which, together Western foreign policy makers actively worked to limit their involvement limit their to actively worked policy makers foreign Western war. civil intractable but unfortunate an as conflict the recast publicly and they were determinedly led by the administration Major In this effort, of John (Almond 1994: 321). argued against the repeal of the arms embargo on Bosnia-Herzegovina on arms embargo the repeal of against the argued by suggesting that the West should not be creating a “level killing field”. The obvious implication was that an uneven killing field was preferable told the BiH government, “There is no cavalry over the hill. There is no hill. There the cavalry over is no “There told the BiH government, international force coming to stop this” (ibid.: 20, 30). And Douglas Hurd throughout the summer of 1992. continued to insist the summer Lord Carrington that throughout “Peace will is not come to Bosnia until there facto partition”. The a de Douglas Hogg, Affairs, and Commonwealth Foreign for State Minister of country. What is worst, this approach did not change even once the Serb the once even change did not this approach is worst, What country. cleansing and genocide ethnic of form in the materialised military threats happened. Instead, it withheld the international recognition of Bosnia- of recognition international the it withheld Instead, happened. the force to military threats Serb and used the in early 1992 Herzegovina of its de facto ethnic partition the a deal for to accept BiH government Bosnian Serbs and their Belgrade sponsors, the European Community Belgrade sponsors, the Bosnian Serbs and their it before aggression the halt to did nothing – by Britain decisively led – British war by the of preparations for (BiH). obvious escalation In spite of the The triumph of realism: Britain, Croatia and the Croatia Britain, of realism: The triumph of former Yugoslavia – then this was it. of former Yugoslavia ultimately guarantee security in the Balkans” (ibid.: 12). If there was a 12). If there Balkans” (ibid.: in the security guarantee ultimately region years in the the over to stuck London policies that dead of carcass consequences acceptable. As one British journalist observed at the time the at observed journalist British one As acceptable. consequences July 1995, genocide in say so in public, “Ministers don’t of the Srebrenica can Serbia only a strong remains that British view fundamental but the consequences for the situation on the ground, and which found those found which and ground, the on situation the for consequences , the government of Bosnia- of , the government Royal United Services Institute Journal well as the huge influx of Bosniak refugees into Croat-controlledin Central areas Bosnia, however, directly led to the Croat-Bosniak conflict of 1993-1994 which resulted in a near catastrophe for the BiH Croats and favourable to the Croats (Hodge 2008: 412-413). The perverse incentives as ground, the parties on policies by the exclusionary plans for these of closely mirrored the preferences of Croatia’s president Franjo of the BiH Croats; and the Vance-Owen and his proxies in the leadership Tuđman territorially arguably were 1993 of plans peace Owen-Stoltenberg the and the war in Bosnia-Herzegovina remain extremely controversial as well. controversial extremely remain Bosnia-Herzegovina in war the territorialisation of Bosnia-Herzegovina ethnic for Britain’s preference The interaction between Britain and Croatia when it comes to the war in war the to it comes when Britain and Croatia between interaction The – which is perhaps controversy great of Bosnia-Herzegovina is still a subject during that the policies countries a great surprise, considering of both not objective” of British policy (Hogg 1994: 16). objective” of British policy (Hogg that land has been seized by force, and that there has to be a degree of be a degree has to there and that seized by force, land has been that accept is that that they must thing other The fact… acceptance of that was a “major wrote, This, he be abandoned”. has to military option the the face, the in them stares it when defeat recognize to “have Herzegovina rewarded land grab through violence and (Toal and violence and ethnic land grab through rewarded Britain’s policy in Bosnia- of crux the formed which Dahlman 2011), and to explained in his 1994 contribution Hogg As Douglas Herzegovina. finally, through the work of the Contact Group (the UK, the US, , , Germany). Unsurprisingly, all of these peace plans on were the deeply flawed principle of ethnic territorialisation which ultimately based Secretary, , who in August 1992 succeeded Carrington as Carrington 1992 succeeded August in who David Owen, Secretary, and Yugoslavia; for the Former of the Conference the EU co-chairman in Bosnia’s five “safe areas”. Britain also maintained strong influence on the during negotiated were plans which peace various the of shape the war – first through Lord Carrington; then through another former Foreign protection protection for UNHCR convoys throughout the country, and finally (and extremely reluctantly) as ceasefire monitors and a quasi-protective force Herzegovina. Britain was, thus, instrumental in framing the UN intervention intervention UN the framing in instrumental was, thus, Britain Herzegovina. in Bosnia-Herzegovina only in humanitarian terms – first as assistance in as then aid, humanitarian carrying flights for airport Sarajevo the opening Paris, took the reins of the Western military and diplomatic effort in Bosnia- in effort diplomatic and military Western of the reins the took Paris,

XXIII (79) - 2017

Vol.XVIII, No. 66 - 2012 12 Vol.XVIII,XXIII No. (79) 66 - -2017 2012 13 and the crimes of looting, arson, and murder of several hundred civilians and the crimes of looting, arson, and murder of several hundred image and Croatia’s international sullied also, however, remained, who come. proved an enormous political and economic burden for years to a complete shift of balance in Bosnia-Herzegovina that directly led to the to a complete shift of balance in Bosnia-Herzegovina that directly led 150,000-200,000Serbs, of Krajina exodus as well. The there war the of end all of Croatia’s previously occupied territory by defeating the so-called the by defeating territory occupied Croatia’s previously all of Storm was a militarily “Republic of Serb Krajina”. Operation successful four- war in Croatia and caused ended the day campaign which practically forces whose in August 1995 not only succeeded in only succeeded 1995 not in August Storm whose Operation forces nearly also in regaining but this “safe area”, of blockade the ending Bihać, however, avoided Srebrenica’s fate, largely thanks to Croatia’s The “new original sin”: Operation Storm and the Operation “new original sin”: The war end of the Croatian that from happening (Freedland 1995). that from happening (Freedland thousands of Bosniak men and boys, and that a similar men and boys, and that a thousands of Bosniak likely awaited fate heavy attack, and under surrounded the “safe area” of Bihać which was be no international action to prevent Britain was would adamant there as the Dayton Agreement which finally ended the war awarded 49% of Bosnia-Herzegovina to the Serbs (ibid.: 106-126). Even after by a genocidal massacre of was followed Srebrenica fall of the clear that it became mounting calls for international intervention, and its diplomats and its diplomats were calls intervention, for international mounting well as plan, peace Group’s Contact the that sure making in instrumental Washington Agreement which led to the formation of a Bosniak-Croat of a Bosniak-Croat the formation which led to Washington Agreement half a and last year the in saw little change Britain’s policy but federation, suppressing in succeeded policy makers foreign Its war. Bosnian the of also led the calls for sanctions on Croatia (Hodge 2006: 66-67). Zagreb 1994 to the US-brokered a fate by consenting to avoid such managed and Bosniak-dominated Army of the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina, Bosnia-Herzegovina, of Republic of the Army Bosniak-dominated and to equalise makers and diplomats policy of British foreign efforts and the Croatia’s and Serbia’s roles in Bosnia-Herzegovina intensified. London Croatia Croatia itself. Significant territories were lost tonumerically the superior ethnically pure state. Serb refugees’ right to return; but also on the de facto revision of Croatia’s but also on the de facto revision Serb refugees’ right to return; of criminal enterprise” a “joint of an element of its victory into perception aim was an supposed its highest civilian and militaryleadership whose makers and diplomats insisted not only on Croatia’s judicial prosecution of judicial prosecution Croatia’s only on makers and diplomats insisted not the of the enforcement civilians guilty of crimes against Serb and on those independence and Britain’s strong insistence on criminalising that victory criminalising that insistence on strong and Britain’s independence original “new became the next decade and a half the of course the over policy Britain’s foreign countries. two the relations between sins” in the strong opposition to it were the two countries’ “original sins” in their mutual “original sins” in their countries’ two it were the to opposition strong war for of Croatia’s victory in its character the perceptions of each other, To say that Operation Storm and the nature of the end of the war in Croatia in war the of end the of nature and the Storm Operation say that To would be an and Zagreb London between contention of became a bone and Britain’s independence Croatia’s pursuit of Whereas understatement. apparently still to be established. Meanwhile, the preferred actions of the international actions of the international community were Meanwhile, the preferred exactly such behaviour because Croatia’s in fact supposed to reinforce internationally recognised borders – was shape on the map – despite its work” (Wintour 1995). 1995). chastised for allegedly “killing tens work” (Wintour Croatia was territory”. more and more seize “to trying and people of thousands” of illuminating: “The object of international efforts must be to bring the parties the bring must be to efforts international object of illuminating: “The to the negotiating table, to establish a map, to establish a ceasefire and then allow the UN to police that ceasefire and continue its humanitarian always been to try and get more than one party to agree that it is in their than one party always more been to try and get and more seize more just to than a peace rather negotiate to interests His on the aims territory.” opinion was of the international community less no of victims, Portillo also shed a revealing light on Britain’s view of Croatia’s also shed a revealing light on Britain’s of victims, Portillo internationally recognized borders: “The difficulty with this conflict has based on shifting hundreds of thousands of people and in the process the in and people of thousands of hundreds shifting based on is killing of moving just not an acceptable way tens of thousands more towards a peace settlement.” Aside from grossly inflating the numbers the operation – was a perfect case in point. He labelled Operation Storm Operation He labelled in point. case – was a perfect operation the which is that “a conclusion expressed the view cleansing” and “ethnic before the crimes – which took place over the course of several weeks weeks several of course the over place took – which crimes the before reaction public. The – became operation the after lawless interregnum of of Defence Secretary Michael Portillo on 7 August 1995 – the last day of Britain’s response to Operation Storm was extremely negative even even negative extremely was Storm Operation to response Britain’s

XXIII (79) - 2017

Vol.XVIII, No. 66 - 2012 14 Vol.XVIII,XXIII No. (79) 66 - -2017 2012 15 in January 1996, “At one Guardian Throughout the first half of 1996, Tuđman

year he had to relent. What seemed to seal the deal was the US insistence US deal was the seal the to seemed What relent. year he had to Tuđman, of because apart fall to was Federation Bosniak-Croat the if that, question now” (Palmer 1996). that of by early August but efforts, EU’s Mostar the dismissive of remained position. As one EU diplomat told the position. As one time Tuđman had friends in high places in some member states. the of out is completely That EU. the eventually joining Croatia of was talk There movement between the two parts. Tuđman and his government supported government his and Tuđman parts. two the between movement repercussions for Croatia’s their obstinacy, but with serious international Agreement gave a new impetus to the EU efforts of unifying the city, but impetus to the EU efforts gave a new Agreement administrative provisions for a series of to objected local Croats strongly the of and freedom of refugees, policing, return joint reorganisation, The principal arena of conflict was the cityBosniak-Croat conflict of Mostar, into split twoduring the ethnically defined halves. The Dayton Herzegovina on the other – conflict which ensued, with varying levels of presidency. intensity, throughout the rest of Tuđman’s prerogatives and thus inevitably prerogatives and thus inevitably by dominated numerically the superior Bosniak community. This led to a serious conflict between the BiHCroats and Tuđman on one side, and the international mediators in Bosnia- defined cantons with significant self-rule that Tuđmanbelieved it to be, central was to become an entity with strong the Bosniak-Croat Federation principal tenets without much fuss. Soon after the Accords were signed, without much fuss. Soon after the principal tenets fulfilled be to going not were goals strategic his that realised he however, than a loosely organised collection of ethnically Rather on the ground. Bosnian war and with the various earlier iterations of Western peace plans, peace plans, of Western with the various earlier iterations Bosnian war and Tuđman was cooperative at Dayton and accepted the agreement’s Dayton was an extension of Federation Bosniak-Croat the between divided Bosnia-Herzegovina the Contact Group peace plan the case throughout 51:49. As was the ratio with the and the Serb entity which pressure which was decisively shaped and driven by London. One of the decisively pressure which was shaped and driven by London. Dayton the of implementation the concerned pressure that of causes first ways, many 1995. In in November to agreed were which Accords Peace Tuđman’s Tuđman’s basking in the glow of victory over the Krajina Serbs was short- international strong under was placed his government months lived. Within Postwar acrimony: Tudman and regional integration and regional Tudman acrimony: Postwar and the wars in Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina, was decimated at the and Bosnia-Herzegovina, wars in Croatia and the business deal with the Milošević regime for the sale of Serbian Telecom (Hodge 2006: 127-128). This Conservative establishment, which decisively Yugoslavia breakup of the Britain’s and Europe’s policy toward crafted Foreign Office Political Director Pauline Neville-Jones, in their capacities lucrative highly a concluded Markets, NatWest of officials high-ranking as bias of the Conservatives was a broadly accepted fact of Britain’s political of fact broadly accepted was a Conservatives the bias of life, repeatedly confirmed during the war and once again in the summer of 1996 when the former Foreign Secretary Douglas Hurd and the former Croatia’s hopes for a change in Britain’s approach got a boost in May 1997, May in boost a got approach Britain’s in change a for hopes Croatia’s pro-Serb The Party. Labour the and Blair Tony of victory electoral the with and the British media had a field day equalising Tuđman with Slobodan Milošević (Glenny 1996; Traynor 1996). HDZ throughout 1996 and 1997. Relations turned London, particularly as the British officials once again sour called for sanctions on Zagreb with and its relations with the international community thus continued to be to continued thus community international and its relations with the international government, against the protests by public dominated threats and reprimands, and increasing obstinacy by Tuđman and the for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) (Guardian 1996). Although Croatia was officially admitted to the Council of Europe later that autumn, very little political environment Its internal fronts. those any of was made on progress also asked to lift its barriers to the return of Serb refugees and to improve improve and to refugees Serb of return the to lift its barriers also asked to Criminal Tribunal International proactive newly the with its cooperation Council of Europe delayed Croatia’s accession to that organisation delayed Croatia’s accession Council of Europe approval despite previous Assembly by the Council’s Parliamentary – the first timethis happened in the organization’s history. Croatia was the opposition victory in the local elections in Zagreb to his regime’s in Zagreb to victory in the local elections opposition the treatment of the media. In May 1996, the Committee of Ministers of the of implementation of the Dayton Agreement in Bosnia-Herzegovina. Dayton Agreement of the of implementation The domestic policies of the Tuđman government garnered even more accept to unwillingness Tuđman’s from circles: international from criticism This pattern of interaction between the West and post-war Croatia, with Croatia, post-war and West the between interaction of pattern This strenuous conflicts and threats of sanctions, was not limited to the issue officials in London and Mostar for possible economic sanctions on Croatia Croatia on sanctions economic possible for Mostar and London in officials Borger 1996). (Barber 1996; Croatia was to become an international pariah, as well as calls by UK calls by well as as pariah, an international become to was Croatia

XXIII (79) - 2017

Vol.XVIII, No. 66 - 2012 16 Vol.XVIII,XXIII No. (79) 66 - -2017 2012 17 of London’s support because of Zagreb’s extreme irritation with the EU’sof London’s support because of Zagreb’s extreme irritation with beginning of negotiations with all CEE prospective candidates and stronglyand candidates prospective CEE all with of negotiations beginning the EUbelieved in bilateralism as the guiding principle in relations between and the CEE states (Lippert 2001: 11). This raised Croatia’s expectations (CEE) was to be based on the principle of individual evaluation of each(CEE) was to be based on the principle of individual evaluation candidate country’s own merits. Britain was against the across-the-board Europe unless we matter in Europe” (Smith, J. 2005: 708). And one way of forward a real agenda for enlargement.mattering in Europe was pushing EuropeCrucially, this agenda for enlargement in Central and Eastern of the new government’s more proactive stance regarding EU eastwardof the new government’s more expansion. Tony Blair came to office believing that “We cannot shape Such a rigid stance by the Foreign Secretary came as somewhat of aof somewhat as came Secretary Foreign the by stance rigid a Such abring would Labour that hopes of because only not Zagreb to surprise in Southeast Europe, but also becausedifferent approach to Britain’s policy member of the EU in the foreseeable future” (Binyon 1997). member of the EU in the foreseeable Fund (IMF) loan to Croatia and he rebuffed Tuđman’s request for support Fund (IMF) loan to Croatia and he to press reports, of Croatia’s According closer association with the EU. a becoming Croatia of prospect’ ‘no saw “Britain that Tuđman told Cook be no more arrests for war crimes in the British-controlled sector of Bosnia- of sector British-controlled the in crimes war for arrests more no be Herzegovina (ibid.: 140-143). More importantly, during his visit to Zagreb, Monetary Britain had blocked an International that announced Cook Plavšić – one of the chief ideologues and leaders of the Bosnian Serb war Serb Bosnian the of leaders and ideologues chief the of one – Plavšić would promised there publicly and he struggles local power – in her effort for the failure to implement the Dayton Agreement – although the Serbian Serbian the – although Dayton Agreement the implement failure to the for entity was unanimously identifiedby the international organisations in BiH He also endorsed Biljana violator of the Agreement. as the overwhelming that nothing substantive really that nothing substantive situation on changed in London’s view of the Bosnia-Herzegovina in all sides blame for equal reserved Cook ground. the Zagreb’s hopes were, however, very soon dashed. The visit very soon dashed. The visit of the new however, were, Zagreb’s hopes clear it made 1997 July late in region the to Cook Robin Secretary Foreign made arrests of two Bosnian Serbs under sealed ICTY indictment that July, ICTY indictment sealed Serbs under of two Bosnian made arrests policy in the region. Britain’s earlier from shift away London’s thus signalling Secretary Malcolm Rifkind – two prominent voices in favour of a tough tough a of favour in voices prominent – two Rifkind Malcolm Secretary a new Hopes for seats. parliamentary – losing their Zagreb line against (SAS) units Air Service the British Special when increased further approach polls, with both the Defense Secretary Michael Portillo and the Foreign Foreign the and Portillo Michael Secretary Defense the both with polls, track to full EU membership” (Bechev 2006: 35). And Romania and Bulgaria and Romania And 35). 2006: (Bechev membership” EU full to track the region. With the end of NATO operations against Belgrade in June 1999,the region. With the end of NATO operations against Belgrade in June Thethe EU initiated the launch of the Stability Pact for Southeast Europe. “the fastPact’s Special Coordinator Bodo Hombach famously labeled it as alliance needed regional support for its intervention against the Milošević towardregime and it bought that support by redesigning the EU’s policies Tuđman’s death in December 1999 and the subsequent electoral defeat of defeat electoral subsequent the and 1999 December in death Tuđman’s what changed the EU’s – and Britain’s – approachhis HDZ in January 2000, Westernto SEE and Croatia was the in the summer of 1999. The and, as a result, little or no progress on association with the EU. Althoughand, as a result, little or no progress changed this acrimonious malaise wasmany authors suggest that what truly relations with the international community; pressures and threats regardingand pressures relations with the international community; refugee return, implementation of theCroatia’s record on human rights, with the ICTY, and regional integration;Dayton Agreement, cooperation The last two years of Tuđman’s presidency were thus marked by tense Croatia into unions with other states which could lead to the restoration Croatia into unions with other states of a Balkan state formation the state community or Yugoslav of the dom 1997). community in any form” (Zastupnički Tuđman’s response was characteristically defiant. He initiated the process the initiated He defiant. characteristically was response Tuđman’s inserted changes in Croatia and had an amendment constitutional of of association of the Republic of prohibiting “the initiation of a process Croatia’s closer integration with the EU, but it also – in contrast to its policy to but it also – in contrast EU, with the Croatia’s closer integration Europe. for Southeast the EU Regional Approach CEE – backed toward Regional Approach as Regional Approach of a regional attempt to rebuild some form an superstructure akin to former Yugoslavia. To Tuđman’s disappointment, of support for his request rebuffed only not British government new the hold Croatia back on its road to the EU. Even more so, he opposed it opposed he so, more Even EU. the to road its on back Croatia hold EU the saw because he ideological) grounds even (or political on future membership (Bechev 2006: 31). Tuđman’s reaction to such a policy a such to reaction Tuđman’s 31). 2006: (Bechev membership future grounds pragmatic partly on it opposed He negative. was obviouslyvery – was to – far less economically developed region the that the rest of The implication of this policy was that the EU was in Southeast Europe Southeast in was EU the that policy was this of implication The for its conditionality an element of into cooperation regional making Croatia together with FR Yugoslavia (), Bosnia- and Montenegro), (Serbia FR Yugoslavia with together Croatia 1996. in introduced was which and Albania, and Macedonia Herzegovina, Regional Approach policy toward Southeast Europe which bundled which Europe Southeast toward policy Approach Regional

XXIII (79) - 2017

Vol.XVIII, No. 66 - 2012 18 Vol.XVIII,XXIII No. (79) 66 - -2017 2012 19 SEE states based on EU on SEE states based individual was ruled by a coalition government of six parties under Prime Minister of six parties under was ruled by a coalition government At the turn of the century all conditions for a dramatic improvement in Croatia be met. to seemed EU Britain and the with Croatia’s relations cooperation with the ICTY cooperation Old policies and new beginnings: EU accession and Old policies and new beginnings: view of Tito until the very end – as “the closest I would ever get to talking to get closest I would ever very end – as “the until the Tito view of superiority” national and bombast full of fascist, European real-life a to (MacShane 2011: 27). Foreign Secretary Robin Cook, remembered Tuđman – former member generous who maintained a rather of Tito’s WWII resistance movement him “just as ruthless and corrupt, and as guilty of precipitating appalling as guilty of and corrupt, and ruthless as “just him Yugoslav in Belgrade, the contemporary as his notorious slaughter (Times 1999). Slobodan Milosevic” And British politicians, like the President, have ever admitted that anyway. Their distaste for the Croatian president the Croatian distaste for anyway. Their have ever admitted that came to its government member state or was such that no head of any EU his funeral. As for Britain, Tuđman’s obituaries in the London press labeled (Tuđman 2009: 219-221). He did not live long enough to see that his view prevailed policy makers would – not that Western diplomats and foreign integration which would repeat the historical errors of Yugoslavia. He also, He Yugoslavia. of historical errors the repeat which would integration integration and international European path to a clear for called however, individual merit own their on determined be to region, the states of all for the Stability Pact on 30 July 1999 in Sarajevo, Franjo Tuđman stayed true regional of form any to opposition pledged Croatia’s and himself to to deepen contractual relations with relations contractual deepen to criteria of democratisation and market reform (Bechev 2006: 35). In one speeches before passing of his last public launching away, at the summit More importantly, the EU abandoned its Regional Approach in favour Approach its Regional abandoned EU the importantly, More was supposed which (SAP), Process Association and Stabilization the of NATO in its intervention against Belgrade – received a pledge from Tony from a pledge – received Belgrade against in its intervention NATO (Binyon 1999). stand by you” stood by us, we’ll Blair: “You – whose EU accession process had stalled until their cooperation helped cooperation their until stalled had process accession EU whose – principal coalition partner Dražen Budiša travelled to London to present Relations between the Račan government government in in London, however, Zagreb seemed to and get Already the during off the electoral campaign to in Blair October 1999, a Račan and his flying start. Zagreb’s (lack of) cooperation with Tribunal. other Eastern European candidate countries and join the EU within severalwithin EU the join and countries candidate European Eastern other proved to be unfounded, largely dueyears. This optimism, however, soon relations with Britain on account ofto Croatia’s steadily deteriorating association agreement reserved for SEE countries. The optimism in Zagrebassociation agreement reserved belief Croatia could catch up withwas such that there was widespread of SEE states which, in turn, endorsed the principles of the Stabilisationof SEE states which, in turn, endorsed summit, Croatia started negotiations onand Association Process. At this Agreement (SAA) – a new form of EUthe Stabilisation and Association the train of Eastern European enlargement. At a summit in Zagreb on 24on Zagreb in summit a At enlargement. European Eastern of train the perspective membership the confirmed states member EU 2000, November Francis Maude, enlargement was Britain’s “moral imperative” (CrowsonFrancis Maude, enlargement was 2007: 104). Once Slobodan Milošević was ousted Europe seemed to be catching up withOctober 2000, the whole Southeast from power in early supported enlargement because it was not only stabilising the wholesupported enlargement because “superpower, global a into EU the turning in crucial also but continent, Secretary Foreign Shadow the for And 2000). (Blair superstate” a not but When it came to enlargement, there was firm politicalconsensus onthe all major UK parties. For Tony Blair, Britainneed for its real progress among the Secretary General of NATO, and Chris Patten took the for External Relations. European Commissioner post of the security. British diplomats were placed into highest international foreign international highest placed into British diplomats were security. policy offices. In October 1999, for example, George Robertson became support for the work of The Hague Tribunal. What was equally Hague Tribunal. What important, of The the work support for was still riding the wave of its proactive in London the Labour government policy to foreign and particularly when it came European agenda, announced its clear commitment to a speedy to a its clear commitment announced EU, a into the accession reversal of Tuđman’s policy toward Bosnia-Herzegovina, as well as full in opposition. Tuđman’s successor as the president of Croatia became the HDZ dissident Stjepan Mesić who campaigned on the platform of a government policies. The new his predecessor’s from radical departure Ivica Ivica Račan of the Social Democratic Party (SDP), with the HDZ firmly

XXIII (79) - 2017

Vol.XVIII, No. 66 - 2012 20 Vol.XVIII,XXIII No. (79) 66 - -2017 2012 21 fell apart (Peskin and Boduzyński 2003: 1126-1131). committed against Serb civilians. Five months later, however, when the committed against Serb civilians. when Five months later, however, sealed indictments against brought ICTY Chief Prosecutor nearly coalition governing the Ademi, Rahim and Gotovina Ante generals and managed to fend off the challenge from the right in February 2001 in February right the from challenge the off fend to managed and crimes war for court local a by Norac Mirko General of indictment the after debilitating pattern emerged of recurring media speculation, followed media speculation, followed of recurring emerged debilitating pattern defensiveness and internal division, and by public protests, government stayed united government brittle The pressure. ultimately international coalition of the recently defeated political right and the various veterans’ and the political right defeated recently the of coalition in its investigations, a politically made progress Tribunal associations. As the to international pressures, the government of Ivica Račan reversed that position with a parliamentary Declaration of 14 April dom 2000) 2000 and thus entered into (Zastupnički open conflict with the extremely vocal Tribunal’s jurisdiction over Operations Flash and Storm which ended the Operations Flash and Storm Tribunal’s jurisdiction over war in Croatia in 1995 (Peskin and Boduzyński 2003: 1124). Primarily due during the second half of the 1990s. Tuđman relatively easily succumbed pressures when it came to extraditing Bosnian Croats international to refused to accept the but his government Tribunal, indicted by the Although Croatia under Tuđman strongly supported strained best was at Hague The with cooperation Zagreb’s ICTY, the the formation of of normal diplomatic practice regarding the extremely of normal diplomatic and regarding the extremely challenging practice with The Hague Tribunal. politically toxic issue of cooperation support for Croatia’s membership in the WTO, which finally materialised of the sort. What he instead did nothing in November 2000, he received boundaries crossed the often pressures which receive were enormous one of the main reasons why the HDZ lost the elections – Račan needed from But apart reforms. economic needed the push through to aid real foreign policy. Behind those courteous and encouraging interactions, encouraging and courteous policy. Behind those foreign government his and Račan for substance of little very was there however, – which was situation economic dire with an extremely Faced to. on hold to the convention of the Labour Party where he again met with Prime Minister with Prime he again met where Party Labour of the convention the Croatia’s on gave a speech and Cook Robin Secretary Foreign Blair and destination destination of one of his first international visits, where he and his ministers in year, same the of in September And counterparts. British with their met travelled to he Social Democrats, Croatian the of president the of his role their their post-election platform. In May 2000, Račan chose London as the Iraq by some Croatian politicians, most notably president Stjepan Mesić ended in the spring of 2003 with the death of the 84-year-old general, but general, 84-year-old the of death the with 2003 of spring the in ended relations between the two countries dipped to a new acrimonious low, to some extent also due to particularly vocal critique of the 2003 invasion of the , General – in the fall of 2002, London suspended the SAA ratification process. The Bobetko affair ultimately additional pressure on Croatia, ostensibly regarding cooperation with the additional cooperation pressure on Croatia, ostensibly regarding ICTY. When the Croatian government decided to file a legal challenge Chief of Staff of – this time of the former ICTY indictment against another Association Agreement was signed on 29 October 2001, but its ratification its but 2001, October 29 on signed was Agreement Association in Britain which used this process as a form of particularly was protracted, With The Hague albatross Croatia continued to make around its neck, road to EU membership. The Stabilisation on its and slow progress Croatian authorities failed to capture General Gotovina who, instead of to go on the run. turning himself over to the ICTY, chose only through the judicial of this the judicial at the Tribunal. The outcome only through process a decade than more politics for Croatian haunt was to affair, however, or political to come. In an act of either incompetence short-sightedness, hold on to power by winning the parliamentary vote of confidence with allegations indictment’s address the could Croatia that argument the led to a serious cabinet crisis during which four ministers from the SDP’s the from ministers four which during crisis cabinet serious a to led principal Budiša’s Social Liberal Party (HSLS), coalition partner, Croatian tendered their resignations. Prime Minister Račan, however, managed to possibly genocidal. Gotovina was alleged to have been part of a criminal a of part been have to alleged was Gotovina genocidal. possibly effort involving President Franjo Tuđman, whose aim was the purging of 2001). of its Serb population (ICTY the Krajina region allegations These the ICTY Office of the Prosecutor suggested the very nature of Croatia’s only criminal, but also 1995 was not of summer in the military operations Hague, Zagreb had very little manoeuvring space. More importantly, the importantly, space. More very little manoeuvring Hague, Zagreb had indictment against General Gotovina carried far more serious charges than the indictment against General Norac. In the Gotovina indictment, the government under the EU’s magnifying glass. Since the government government Since the magnifying glass. EU’s the under government the of FR Yugoslavia just days earlier extradited Slobodan Milošević to The indictments presented a far greater problem for the government for several for government for the problem a far greater presented indictments they that which meant ICTY, the from obviously, they came Most reasons. they thus placed and that obligations of Croatia’s international were part Unlike the indictment against General Norac by the Croatian court, these these court, Croatian the by Norac General against indictment the Unlike

XXIII (79) - 2017

Vol.XVIII, No. 66 - 2012 22 Vol.XVIII,XXIII No. (79) 66 - -2017 2012 23 2003). Blair, however, gave him little more than a polite hearing. As Denis issue “has taken over the relationship with Great Britain,” Račan told the because punished be cannot “Croatia London. leaving for media before to do” (Traynor been able it should have done something that it has not visit London in the midst of electoral campaign Tribunal Hague The respite. some for Blair Tony lobby his British counterpart in September 2003 to of Karadžić and Mladić, and Croatia was equally culpable as Serbia for 2008: 418). This (Hodge Tribunal Hague with The cooperation lack of the campaign reached such a level that Prime Minister Račan decided to authorities (Hodge 2006: 195; Hartmann 2007: 289). The implication of this those with par on were Gotovina of crimes alleged the clear: was strategy Security Council insisted that the UNSC resolution 1503 from 28 August of that year names Gotovina together with Radovan Karadžić and Ratko Mladić as the remaining indictees deserving particular attention of the standing vis-à-visout of 20 though The Hague with that of Serbia. Even ICTY indictees still at large in the summer of was from Croatia and the other 19 diplomats were Serbs, British at the UN 2003 only one (Gotovina) The British government also continued its effort of equalising Croatia’s of its effort also continued British government The basis. More importantly, MI6 seemed to feed the ICTY Prosecutor Carla Del Ponte with information that Gotovina was hiding in Croatia and that elements in the state administration. he was protected by nationalist whole political and intelligence apparatus in Zagreb, with accusations with Zagreb, apparatus in intelligence political and whole a daily on media coverage the dominating counteraccusations and persuade London and its like-minded EU partners not only that Gotovina with Croatia was fully cooperating but also that was out of the country, disturbed the operation The be a mistake. to out This turned Tribunal. the SAA ratification was still blocked on account of the ICTY. By agreeing to let the MI6 conduct its operation on Croatian territory, Račan hoped to territory with the purpose of capturing General Gotovina (Traynor 2005b). (Traynor Gotovina General capturing of purpose the with territory Although that month Croatia submitted its because the progress was bound to make little membership, its accession official application for EU According to a series of media reports in Croatia and the UK, in February February in UK, the and Croatia in reports media series of a to According 2003 London compelled the intelligence operation Račan led by the British Secret Service ‘MI6’ government on Croatian to consent to an Washington, further intensified its campaign of pressure on Croatia. on of pressure its campaign intensified further Washington, (Jović 2007). Britain, now backed by the displeased Bush administration in administration Bush displeased the by backed now Britain, 2007). (Jović diplomatically too costly. In December of that year, Britain also failed to from acquiring the European Commission’s endorsement of candidacy from acquiring the European Commission’s of candidacy endorsement in candidate its of confirmation official Council’s European the and 2004 April a move to be likely because it deemed such status later that June, Due to Del Ponte’s positive report, however, Britain did not block Croatia Britain did not however, positive report, Due to Del Ponte’s Adriatic Unit at the Foreign Office, Karen Pierce, said at the time – by “fast- by – time the at said Pierce, Karen Office, Foreign the at Unit Adriatic the EU and NATO mechanisms” (Hodge track[ing] Serbia some of through 2006: 198). to sustain the resulting pressures (Hartmann 2007: 288-291). Britain was at of efforts to shore up Belgrade – as of the East the director the forefront pressure on Del Ponte to refrain from issuing new indictments of Serbian issuing new indictments from refrain to pressure on Del Ponte officials, supposedlydue to fears that the Serbian government after the assassination of Prime Minister Zoran Đinđić in March 2003 was too weak supposedly It is important to note alienating Serbia by praising Croatia. significant placing time the at were Britain and States United the both that the British ambassador in The Hague came to her officeby an he was followed thereafter Shortly displeasure. government’s to express his official of the American embassy who chastised the Chief Prosecutor for level of Croatia’s cooperation and her report was positive. According to was positive. According report her and Croatia’s cooperation level of Hartmann, advisor Florence and Del Ponte’s Tribunal’s spokesperson the public, becoming report minutes of Del Ponte’s within twenty however, status as an official EU candidate country. On 14 April, the Tribunal’s Chief Tribunal’s the April, 14 On country. candidate EU official an as status the on comment to EU was asked by the Carla Del Ponte Prosecutor associated with the Croat wartime entity in BiH, the Croatian Republic of Republic of Croatian in BiH, the entity wartime Croat the associated with by decisions with the came concurrently extraditions The Herzeg-Bosnia. Croatia’s regarding and the European Council the European Commission – Mladen Markač and Ivan Čermak – crimes accused of as well as six Bosnian Croats Storm, Operation with accused of crimes associated position toward Croatia, even though Croatia’s cooperation with The with The cooperation Croatia’s though even Croatia, position toward came in case in point perfect improved markedly. The Hague Tribunal generals Croatian two Tribunal the to extradited Croatia after 2004 April As expected, the return of the HDZ did not lead to a shift in Britain’s to a shift in Britain’s lead HDZ did not of the the return As expected, Brussels Brussels leads through The Hague” (Castle 2003). Račan lost the Several election to the reformed weeks HDZ under the leadership later, of Ivo ICTY. policy toward the government’s partly due to his Sanader, MacShane, his minister for Europe, said for Europe, his minister MacShane, to “road time, Croatia’s at the

XXIII (79) - 2017

Vol.XVIII, No. 66 - 2012 24 Vol.XVIII,XXIII No. (79) 66 - -2017 2012 25 and extradited to The Hague. It soon transpired that he Hague. The Canary Islands and extradited to Croatia was doing everything possible regarding the capture of General Gotovina (Browne 2005a). Two months later, in part thanks to the work of Croatia’s intelligence services, Gotovina indeed was arrested on the positions) now facing humiliation themselves, Carla Del Ponte helped Ponte Del Carla humiliation themselves, facing positions) now suggesting report submitted a She surprisingly deadlock. the break both Croatia and Turkey got what they were hoping for: the official start (especially Britain members Council the With negotiations. accession of seemingly uncompromising publiclytheir announced which and Austria proponent of Turkey, and Austria being the strongest proponent of proponent strongest and Austria being the of Turkey, proponent In a last-minute compromise, however, of Turkey. Croatia and opponent with Turkey. The Council was in a heated debate for several days with the several debate for Council was in a heated The with Turkey. overlapped perfectly nearly countries both of status the dividing lines on of Croatia and opponent strongest being the example, – Britain, for Britain favoured further delay of Croatia’s negotiations, but its problem delay of Croatia’s negotiations, Britain favoured further negotiations of start approve the the Council to it also wanted was that Croatia rejected this advice and six months later the issue of its accession this advice Croatia rejected Council. the European agenda of the again on was once negotiations humiliation of postponement, and to resubmit it once there was progress there resubmit it once and to humiliation of postponement, on the Gotovina front. enough of its partners on the European Council that Croatia’s accession Croatia’s that Council European the on its partners of enough advised even government British The postponed. be should negotiations application, supposedly Croatia to suspend its membership to avoid the London with evidence of her government’s efforts to locate and to curb the activities interlocutors his local associates, but her British of Gotovina managed to persuade 2005a). (Traynor London were unconvinced actually shielding Gotovina. On the eve of Croatia’s start of accession negotiations, its foreign minister Kolinda Grabar-Kitarović travelled to one of the surveillance vans its agents were using was burned, probably vans its agents were using one of the surveillance strongly turned rhetoric Del Ponte’s result, As a detractors. local by their was Croatia Council that European the to reported negative and she and Germany. But by March 2005, things changed dramatically. The full nature of the MI6 operation in Croatia was exposed by the media and the provisional date of 17 March 2005 for Croatia’s clash regarding of the 2004). a repeat In (Traynor negotiations the beginning of accession Britain between primarily again once was conflict the 1991, in recognition fend off Croatia’s supporters on the European Council from giving Croatia Croatia from giving Council on the European supporters off Croatia’s fend spotlight off Serbia, and compelling its government to boost its own efforts to boost spotlight off Serbia, and compelling its government justice in Belgrade, as well as a tool of pressure control on the Serbian on the control of pressure as well as a tool justice in Belgrade, with the ICTY in Placing emphasis government. on Croatia’s cooperation the same time removing of at the potential had the forums international larger strategic implications for Britain’s policy in the region. Putting pressure transitional process of the legitimation of of served as a form Zagreb on Personal animosities aside, however, it is undeniable that the Gotovina Tribunal had with The Hague case and the issue of Croatia’s cooperation Gotovina’s appeal was successful and he was found not guilty, the former the guilty, not found was he and successful was appeal Gotovina’s British minister remained silent. took an unprecedented step and wrote a statement for the Croatian the for a statement step and wrote an unprecedented took media in which he compared Gotovina both to the Nazis and to Stalin’s 2012, after November In 2011). and Muhar (Trkanjec Katyn at executioners in Tuđman’s war of ethnic cleansing in Croatia” (MacShane 2011: 27, 71, 82). After Gotovina’s first-degree verdict of guilty inApril 2011, MacShane distaste for both Gotovina and the late President Tuđman: Tuđman was “war a and “thug” a was Gotovina whereas mini-Mussolini”, “latter-day a criminal” who had supposedly “awarded himself the rank of ‘General’ like the former minister for Europe, Denis MacShane, the whole affair also the Denis MacShane, Europe, minister for former like the his part-memoir, part-diary, part-policy seems to have been personal. In booklet published in 2011,rather undiplomatic MacShane exposed a due to his alleged connections with the IRA and its headquarters attack in 2000 (Rufford and on Walker 2004). For some the British officials, MI6 by insisting that it allow a foreign intelligence service to operate freely it allow a foreign intelligence service by insisting that it is possible that various press reports, to According within its borders? the British intelligence service took the Gotovina case personally Why did Britain pursue Gotovina so vigilantly and why did it place such its sovereignty on infringing brazenly Croatia, on pressure extraordinary Neither Carla Del Ponte nor the British government addressed the issue of the addressed British government the nor Carla Del Ponte Neither whereabouts during his escape. Gotovina’s actual received received the finaland complete confirmation,” Croatia’s Prime Minister 2005b). (Browne arrest the while welcoming media, the told to many other countries, including , , , the Czech Czech the China, Chile, Argentina, including countries, many other to Republic, , Russia, Mauritius, and Tahiti (Guardian 2005). “Those who today Croatia in not was Gotovina that saying were we when us believed had had not been in Croatia since his flight in 2001, but had instead travelled

XXIII (79) - 2017

Vol.XVIII, No. 66 - 2012 26 Vol.XVIII,XXIII No. (79) 66 - -2017 2012 27 government was intent on delaying Croatia’s accession by refusing to on delaying Croatia’s was intent government and Fundamental on the Judiciary accept the opening of negotiations the EU continued. Documents of the US government uncovered in the uncovered government US the of Documents EU continued. the British the which to extent the of us a glimpse 2010 give in WikiLeaks affair negotiations seemed to suggest that relations between Croatia and Croatia between relations that suggest to seemed negotiations Britain would finally acquire some semblance of normalcy. Croatia’s accession to slow down to Britain’s efforts however, scenes, Behind the The arrest of Ante Gotovina and the start of Croatia’s EU accession True allies at last? Croatia and Britain in the EU Croatia allies at last? True EU member state not driven all of us mad with the stories” of Croatia of stories” the with mad us all of driven not state member EU harbouring Gotovina (Palokaj 2008). to the Gotovina case. As the former EU commissioner for enlargement Günter Verheugen said in an intelligence service of one EU had one interviewwould have already been in the in September 2008, “Croatia (Hartmann 2007: 291). Whatever the case may be, the fact remains that on its path toward EU accession due Croatia lost several crucial years into the EU and to thus give Serbia the chance to make up for its own to thus give Serbia the chance into the EU and entry possibility joint the of consider to Europe enable to order delay, in EU” the Yugoslavia into former the from countries neighboring two the of of London, which is ready to make back-room deals for other indictees other deals for make back-room which is ready to London, of and is less determined to stop the impunity of Karadžić and Mladić than Gotovina,…[has] given Britain the chance to slow down Croatia’s entry quote Florence Hartmann, who witnessed the interaction of the Tribunal the of interaction witnessed the who Hartmann, Florence quote and British diplomats first-hand: “The obvious inconsistency in the policy neglected by the literature which tends to present international players as international present to tends which literature by the neglected democratic in justice and unidimensional actors largely interested rather progress in the region (e.g. Subotić 2009; Freyburg and Richter 2010). To the strategic give-and-take Britain and other Western powers have Western Britain and other give-and-take strategic the states are often successor with Yugoslavia’s in their relations employed issue of Croatia’s cooperation with The Hague was obviously an extremely an extremely obviously was Hague The with cooperation of Croatia’s issue with vis-à-vis relations its region the of future the in shaping tool powerful and process justice transitional the of nature “regionalized” This EU. the in extraditing the remaining indictees. More importantly, however, the however, importantly, More indictees. the remaining in extraditing on account of Croatia’s of Croatia’s on account Acquis Communautaire Acquis Croatia knows all too well the numerous obstacles that could present could obstacles that numerous well the knows all too Croatia the responses of other EU member states – brought a dose of hard reality to states – brought EU member responses of other the consensus. based on a process are EU the with “Negotiations Edinburgh: enlargement. all decisions related to to agree states have to All member case its voters opted for independence. The response from the Croatian the from response The independence. for opted case its voters government of Zoran Milanović – which did not substantively differ from government led by the Social Democrats took a more muted approach. muted a more took Social Democrats by the led government Salmond Alex of government Scottish the referendum, the to run-up the In was automatic EU membership in eager to secure support for Scotland’s among some political who saw commentators in Croatia the demise of policies, Croatian London’s karmic punishment for United Kingdom as the Croatia or Southeast Europe, but from the UK. held in September referendum presented by the Scottish independence The first challenge was independent Scotland was welcomed 2014. the prospect of an Although a phase of relative calm. Unfortunately, this phase proved to be rather to this phase proved Unfortunately, relative calm. a phase of from come did not however, brief. This time the sources of turbulence, and protector, Germany. entered countries two the between accession, relations Croatia’s EU With same year. Britain was one of the last countries to ratify it in January 2013, January in it ratify to countries last the of one was Britain year. same supposed EU ally Croatia’s it did so before that it should be noted though in Croatia’s negotiations with the EU – chiefly due to Britain’s influence on the negotiating process. Negotiations were, however, finallycompleted in June 2011 and the Accession Treaty was in December of the signed negotiations by its north-western neighbour Slovenia because of their their of Slovenia because neighbour north-western by its negotiations Fundamental Judiciary and the dispute, it was exactly maritime border closed be last to the and opened be last to was the that chapter Rights a reassessment of the entrenched UK position” (Guardian 2010; Traynor blockade of Croatia’s was given to the 2010). While much media attention era and are inclined to assume GOC bad faith in its ICTY.” dealings He with also the suggested that a visit from the US officials to Londonacquaint “to senior officials with theserealities might offer the only hope for Croatia, David Blunt, told his American colleague that “some key officials officials key “some that colleague American his told Blunt, David Croatia, Tudjman the since virtually unchanged as Croatia regard London in alleged alleged lack of effort to turn over to the ICTY report the to According Storm. Operation from artillery documentation Office of the Prosecutor Embassy of the US November 2009, in Zagreb from British ambassador to Rights chapter of the EU’s of the chapter Rights

XXIII (79) - 2017

Vol.XVIII, No. 66 - 2012 28 Vol.XVIII,XXIII No. (79) 66 - -2017 2012 29 an “unnecessary” referendum which turned a crisis party an “unnecessary” referendum within his own different from Orešković’s. Gone were the calls for change and recognition and change for calls the were Gone Orešković’s. from different of the EU’s democratic deficit. of succumbing to the populists for Cameron’s strategic error and calling Instead, Plenković focused on David was a career diplomat before joining the HDZ in 2011, was a member of HDZ in 2011, was a member the joining diplomat before was a career Brexit was substantively His view of time. at the Parliament European the prior to the UK referendum. Three weeks after the Brexit vote, the senior Three prior to the UK referendum. ousted its unpopular president HDZ coalition partner and installed a new leadership under Andrej Plenković. Plenković, who political class regarding Brexit, one did not have to listen to His Orešković. government suffered a resounding vote of no confidence just days decision making in Brussels” (Vlada 2016b). decision making in Brussels” (Vlada the pulse of Croatia’s a real feel for get wanted to if one Of course, stated. “The Union needs to change to be able to resolve the issues which resolve the able to be to change to needs Union “The stated. of transparency issue of scepticism, like the and driving discontent are Rodrik (2000) (which states one cannot have a completely integrated cannot Rodrik (2000) (which states one and democracy) to argue common market, national sovereignty, against deeper integrative efforts. “A change is necessary,” Orešković enlargement to our neighbouring nations is Orešković worked revealing. on” more bit (Vlada a 2016a). were statements Orešković’s Minister Prime Dani economist by the proposed trilemma” “globalization the invoked as the “greatest strike against the unity of Europe from the very beginning the from unity of Europe strike against the “greatest as the when us a particularly sensitive issue at a time and for its integration, of considering how divided considering how how little its weak it was, and considering and EU the UK voters and the remaining to both mattered opinion would have labelling it result with regret, the shocking referendum partners? It greeted government of Tihomir Orešković had any real position toward the two could it have had, How Brexit referendum. the of possible outcomes Referendum fever in the UK, however, soon continued with the Brexit Brexit with the continued soon however, UK, fever in the Referendum coalition short-lived the say that to generous be would It campaign. cause of independent Scotland, their government did not wish did not wish to rock their government independent Scotland, cause of boat. UK nor the EU neither the that all states which wish to become members must go through a detailed, a detailed, through must go members become wish to which all states that of negotiations” and just process out, thought carefully all-encompassing, (Veljković 2013). As sympathetic as the Croats may have been for the themselves themselves in each individual case. Croatia stands firmly on the position two countries were not driven by Britain’s preferences and Croatia’s and by Britain’s preferences driven not were countries two for and achieved Croatia pushed adaptation to them – on the contrary. undoubtedly its greatest foreign policy challenge since independence. undoubtedly its greatest foreign policy challenge since independence. the between relations however, disparity, power clear Despite their Apart from relations with its neighbours, Croatia’s relations with Britain were with Croatia’s relations its neighbours, with relations from Apart Conclusions the Trump administration in Washington whose commitment to European the Trump administration in Washington future near the issues will determine These best. at is suspect integration Croatia, but also with the rest of the EU. of Britain’s relations not only with its remaining member states” (Independent 2017). Brexit negotiations will, negotiations Brexit 2017). (Independent states” member remaining its with real test of this claim, as will Britain’s relations the present however, for hard Brexit wanted to assuage Europe’s fears: “The decision to leave hard Brexit wanted for distant to you, our friends more the EU represents no desire to become any of to itself or EU the to harm do to attempt was no It neighbors. and of pro-EU politicians on the continent. Whether Brexit does jeopardise the Whether of pro-EU politicians on the continent. future of the EU, however, is still anybody’s Theresa guess. UK Prime Minister May in her 17 January 2017 speech announcing her government’s plans Brexit could easily become Britain’s if it jeopardizes the new “original sin” generation whole a little from probably differ they that In EU. the of future whole continent much less relevant globally, and that would be a step a be would that globally, and less relevant much continent whole and values” (HRT performance economic both of us in terms back for 2016). For Plenković and his government sworn in on 16 October 2016, because that is a project which will last despite the current crisis. a project which will because that is If we last despite the current make the will I think that it down, water wish to that forces the give way to Indeed, as Plenković stated to the Croatian Television in response to a Visegrád the to closer get should Croatia whether regarding question Group in post-Brexit EU, “I believe we must be strongly pro-European in Orbán’s Hungary or Kaczyński’s Poland. Hungary or Kaczyński’s in Orbán’s Plenković’s Plenković’s statements were particularly interesting since he was already was signalling his own party. He leadership of mode for the in campaign a who found role-models predecessor nationalist with his more clear break into a crisis of national, European, and global significance (Hina 2016).

XXIII (79) - 2017

Vol.XVIII, No. 66 - 2012 30 Vol.XVIII,XXIII No. (79) 66 - -2017 2012 31 is, however, more important for another reason. It reveals that Whitehall still It reveals that reason. another for important is, however, more have no clue. Foreign Office’s historically inaccurate view of the breakup of Yugoslavia his reforms clearly suggests that the Foreign Office does not have a merely a have not does Office Foreign the that suggests clearly reforms his oversimplified view of what happened in former Yugoslavia – it seems to interpretational absurdity that Milošević was a reformer who apart Yugoslavia apparently fell in 1989 and that in Yugoslavia power came to comfortable with the speed of not because Slovenia and Croatia were path to independence” (FCO 2012). Setting aside the highly problematic aside the (FCO 2012). Setting independence” to path first sentence of that passage and its clumsy wording, the factual and 1989. Slovenia and Croatia, both then federal states within Yugoslavia, federal states within Yugoslavia, then both 1989. Slovenia and Croatia, and political reforms of economic became disillusioned speed with the under his leadership. By January 1990 themselves on the they had set War (and even further). Its more recent history was strongly by influenced Slobodan Milošević, who came to power in the former Yugoslavia in 1988: 24). Foreign Office, for example, in its online profile for Croatia until of Croatia’s traumatic emergence “The roots claimed that, recently 1990s World in the date back to the Second state as an independent Judging by Ambassador Blunt’s candid comment regarding his superiors candid comment Judging by Ambassador Blunt’s in Whitehall, perhaps the root of it all was in historical oversimplification make (Hill to tendency have a strong British policy makers error – one one of Europe’s great powers? one of Europe’s how do we explain Britain’s policy activism when it comes to Croatia to it comes when we explain Britain’s policy activism do how seemingly inconsequential country Why did a small and and its region? from commitment and policy such interest generate in Southeast Europe factors. Small simply states are not objects of great power politics, the but However, own and their regions’ destinies independently. can shape their virtually all of its foreign policy aims. This is a cautionary tale for many many for tale cautionary is a aims. This policy its foreign virtually all of relations and EU politics scholars of international to theoretical committed privilege state power capabilities approaches which all other over region – also against Britain’s wishes. A relatively small European state European relatively small A wishes. against Britain’s also – region defied one of the greatest European powers and managed to achieve and ultimate victory in the war for independence – against Britain’s Britain’s – against independence war for in the victory ultimate and the Scylla It successfully wishes. and Charybdis through navigated of the the rest of before a full member state and became EU negotiations independence – against Britain’s wishes. It secured its territorial integrity integrity territorial its secured It wishes. Britain’s against – independence that negotiating process, although consensus within the EU will consensus within the needed. that negotiating process, although be Rather than future collaboration on the pace of EU reforms or enlargement or reforms EU pace of the on collaboration future than Rather questions preoccupied with be will now they however, in Southeast Europe, of Britain’s exit from the EU. Croatia is unlikely to have great influence on deepening of economic integration. meant that Zagreb and London could have become true allies within the true could have become and London Zagreb that meant with relations Union’s the from – policy fronts crucial of number a on EU or even the process of enlargement the United States to the EU eastward process as a tool of pressure on Croatia, have made the Croatian public process as a tool of pressure on and political elite less which would have Europhile and more Atlanticist, relations between the two countries will develop in the years to come. years to will develop in the countries two the relations between Ironically, the failures of EU policies – to a significant extent and Britain’s Britain – during the , use of the EU accession crafted by Croatia until Croatia’s entry into the EU. Recent events, however, have however, events, Recent EU. the entry into until Croatia’s Croatia profoundly altered the game, making it difficult to predict how the ultimately guarantee security in the Balkans.” ultimately guarantee security in determinants of Britain’s These factors were important relations with British policy in this region. British historical biases regarding Croatia were British policy in this region. Serbia can that “only a strong likely with that realist conception reinforced terrorism, and EU decision making (YouGov 2012). Britain’s actions toward actions Britain’s 2012). (YouGov making decision EU and terrorism, in a particular kind of “historical Croatia were also, however, embedded about and in a long tradition of thought Europe about Southeast thinking” example, only 10% of UK respondents stated they wished to see Croatia on enlargement further majorities opposing overwhelming with join the EU, immigration, negative effect on unemployment, account of its supposed and by the general reluctance of the UK public to support EU enlargement. EU support public to UK the of reluctance general and by the Croatia’s EU accession, for eve of the on conducted In a national survey 2011: 374). London’s actions were obviously guided by the events on the ground, Croatia’s own democratic deficit, the limitations of diplomacy in in the region, of British interests the perception a multilateral environment, Croatia over the past two decades has been some sort of vendetta for the for vendetta of sort some has been decades past two the over Croatia (Glaurdić baby” “our calling 1991 in were diplomats British what of demise western republics and not on Serbia. In the eyes of London, the breakup of breakup the republics western of London, the eyes In on Serbia. and not relations discordant countries’ two the for point – the starting Yugoslavia policy toward say that Britain’s sin”. This is not to “original – was Croatia’s lays the bulk of blame for Yugoslavia’s dissolution on the federation’s north- federation’s the on dissolution Yugoslavia’s for blame of bulk the lays

XXIII (79) - 2017

Vol.XVIII, No. 66 - 2012 32 Vol.XVIII,XXIII No. (79) 66 - -2017 2012 33 bone of contention between Croatia and Britain, though this time with and Britain, though Croatia between of contention bone out. Croatia will be in, and Britain one crucial difference: swayed toward who knows what kind of destabilising policy coming from from policy coming destabilising of kind what knows who swayed toward challenges words, In other Moscow in the near future. Washington and/or principal again be the once might quo geopolitical status Europe’s to European Union and a pillar of European security. It remains to be seen seen be to remains It security. European pillar of a and Union European will words will those if London be policy, or translate into actual whether their relations with the UK based on the evolution of British policy toward toward British policy of the evolution on UK based with the relations their was Minister May Prime integration. EU future of direction pace and the the of a friend Britain will remain that its EU partners reassure to eager Croatia, and all other remaining EU member states, will states, member EU remaining all and Croatia, shape however other

, . 6 , 31 July. 31 , London: London: , 31 July. Times Independent Times London: John Murray. Journal of Southern Europe and Europe Southern of Journal http://www.cvce.eu/obj/address_ , 9 December, 43. , 10 October, 14. Times In Pursuit of British Interests: Reflections on Foreign Policy Foreign on Reflections Interests: British of Pursuit In Europe’s Backyard War: The War in the Balkans. in the War The Backyard War: Europe’s , 8(1): 27-43. This Time We Knew: Western Responses to Genocide in Responses to Genocide Western This Time We Knew: , 5 August, 1. Prime Minister’s speech to the Polish Stock Exchange Polish Stock to the Minister’s speech Prime . New York: New York University Press. pp. 244-281. , 4 October, 2. S. G. eds. Bosnia under Margaret Thatcher and John Major. Independent the war in the former Yugoslavia. In: Cushman, T. and Meštrović, Times holiday isle. given_by_tony_blair_to_the_polish_stock_exchange_warsaw_6_ october_2000-en-f8c765d9-ad33-4ce3-bfbe-7dd6d01141d7.html (Accessed 8 February 2017). Guardian October [online]. Availableat: [online]. October 2 August, 10. Europe. in Southeast cooperation the Balkans Heineman. Cradock, P., 1997. P., Cradock, Conversi, D., 1996. Moral relativism and equidistance in British attitudes to Castle, S., 2003. Croatia’s EU bid hampered by war crimes legacy. Browne, A., 2005b. War crimes fugitive caught as he dines in style on as he crimes fugitive caught 2005b. War A., Browne, Browne, A., 2005a. Last-minute deal paves way for EU talks on Turkey. talks on EU deal paves way for 2005a. Last-minute A., Browne, Borger, J., 1996. EU plans to pull out of Mostar as Croats reject power deal. deal. power reject Croats as Mostar of out pull to plans EU 1996. J., Borger, Binyon, M., 1999. Binyon, M., 1999. prosperity for the Balkans. Leaders pledge 2000. Blair, T., Binyon, M., 1997. Cook reins in Tudjman with IMF loan veto. Cook reins in Tudjman with IMF Binyon, M., 1997. Bechev, D., 2006. Carrots, sticks, and norms: The EU and regional Barber, T., 1996. Clinton urges Croats to end election boycott. election end to Croats urges Clinton 1996. T., Barber, Almond, M., 1994. M., 1994. Almond, Bibliography

XXIII (79) - 2017

Vol.XVIII, No. 66 - 2012 34 Vol.XVIII,XXIII No. (79) 66 - -2017 2012 35 , 10 Journal Guardian Croatia: Country Croatia: British Foreign Policy: Foreign British https://web.archive.org/ London: Unwin Hyman. pp. Unwin London: 5 June, 13. , 7 August. http://www.politikaplus.com/ Times Paris: Flammarion. London: Routledge. London: , 17(2): 263-281. (Accessed 8 February 2017). (Accessed 8 February 9 December. . [online]. Available . [online]. at: New York: Columbia University Press. Paix et Châtiment. The Conservative Party and European integration since integration European and Party Conservative The The Hour of Europe: Western Powers and the Breakup of Powers Western The Hour of Europe: War crimes suspect was using a false passport. crimes suspect War New Haven, CT: Yale University Press. US embassy cables: US and UK clash over Croatia’s EU Croatia’s over clash and UK embassy cables: US US Democratic test for Croatia. (Accessed 18 February 2017). Triumph of the Lack of Will: International Diplomacy Triumph of the Lack of Will: and the International Andrej Plenković kaže da je Brexit veliki trijumf populista. populista 24-49. 28 June [online]. Available at: - novost/139827/Andrej-Plenkovic-kaze-da-je-Brexit-veliki-trijumf policy. In: Smith, M., Smith, S. and White, B. eds. policy. In: Smith, and Transformation. Change Tradition, December. membership bid. Yugoslav War. of European Public Policy of European Public Yugoslavia. 1 August, 3. impact of EU political in the Western Balkans. conditionality Profile – History web/20120614095219/http://www.fco.gov.uk/en/travel-and- living-abroad/travel-advice-by-country/country-profile/europe/ croatia/?profile=history 1945: At the Heart of Europe. Heart of At the 1945: Hina, 2016. Hill, C., 1988. in British The historical background: Past and present foreign Hall, P., 2005. Interview with the author, 22 May. Hall, P., 2005. Interview with the author, Hartmann, F., 2007. Guardian, 2010. Guardian, 2005. Guardian, 1996. Glenny, M., 1996. Tudjman the terrible. Glenny, M., 1996. Tudjman the terrible. 1997. J., Gow, Glaurdić, J., 2011. J., Glaurdić, Freyburg, T. and Richter, S. 2010., S. identity matters: The limited T. and Richter, National Freyburg, Freedland, J., 1995. Portillo and Perry offer Bihac cold comfort. offer Perry and J., 1995. Portillo Freedland, FCO – Foreign and Commonwealth Office, 2012. Crowson, N., 2007. N., Crowson, RUSI Croatia London: London: eđunarodne , 11 January, , http://vijesti.hrt. (Accessed 18 , 15 March. British and German uardian 17 January [online]. Times London: Haus Publishing. (Accessed 18 February 2017). February 18 (Accessed London: Royal Institute of International Royal Institute London: http://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/home- heresa May’s Brexit speech in full: Prime Minister heresa May’s Brexit speech in Why Kosovo Still Matters. Britain and the Balkans: 1991 until the present. until the 1991 Balkans: and the Britain , 139(4): 15-19. 7(3-4): 24-40. 10. Interests in EU Enlargement. Affairs. studije, news/full-text-theresa-may-brexit-speech-global-britain-eu- european-union-latest-a7531361.html Britanije i Sjeverne Irske i prema Hrvatskoj. M No: IT-01-45-I, 21 May. negotiations. for 12 objectives outlines her Available at: raspravu-konzervativne-podigao-na-globalnu-krizu February 2017). Journal 24 June [online]. Available globalnu krizu. at: hr/340670/plenkovic-britanski-premijer-cameron-unutarstranacku- diplomacy. diplomacy. In: Ramet, S. P., Clewing, K., and Lukić, R. eds. since Independence: War, Politics, Verlag. pp. 407-428. Munich: R. Oldenbourg Society, Foreign Relations. Routledge. Palokaj, A., 2008. Günter Verheugen: ‘Tajne službe su lagale o Gotovini’. Palmer, J., 1996. EU tells Croatia to enforce pact. G MacShane, D., 2011. Lippert, B., Hughes, K., Grabbe, H. and Becker, P., 2001. P., Becker, and H. Grabbe, K., Hughes, B., Lippert, LeBor, A., 2005. Croatia acts against fugitive hero. LeBor, A., 2005. Croatia acts against Jović, D., 2007. Vanjsko-politički prioriteti Ujedinjenog Kraljevstva Velike Independent, 2017. T ICTY Office of the Prosecutor, 2001. Indictmentof Ante Gotovina.Case Hurd, D., 2005. Interview with the author, 11 May. Hurd, D., 2005. Interview with the HRT, 2016. Plenković: Cameron unutarstranačku raspravu podignuo na Hogg, D., 1994. Central Europe: The new security relationships. security new The Europe: 1994. Central D., Hogg, Hodge, C., 2008. Britain’s relations with Croatia: A study in active study in active A Croatia: with Britain’s relations 2008. C., Hodge, Hodge, Hodge, C., 2006.

XXIII (79) - 2017

Vol.XVIII, No. 66 - 2012 36 Vol.XVIII,XXIII No. (79) 66 - -2017 2012 37

9 10 March, 55(7): 1117- 55(7): Guardian, 71(4): 155-170. Daily Telegraph, 30 December, 9. Foreign Affairs, 7 March, 12. Europe-Asia Studies, Europe-Asia 14(1): 177-186. Bosnia Remade: Ethnic Cleansing and Bosnia Remade: Ethnic Cleansing Guardian, 29 September, 15. 81(4): 703-721. Guardian, Guardian, 17 October, 13. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press. Hijacked Justice: Dealing with the Past in the Balkans. Hijacked Justice: Dealing with the Unfinest Hour: Britain and the Destruction Bosnia. of 9 September. 18 March, 16. International Affairs, ambitions, Croatia told. Guardian, crimes suspect. December, 16. its Reversal. 2005. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press. Sunday Times, London: Penguin Books. 14. Perspectives, Journal of Economic politics: Post-Tudjman Croatia and the International Criminal politics: the International Croatia and Post-Tudjman Yugoslavia. for the Former Tribunal 1142. , Jutarnji Traynor, I., 2010. WikiLeaks cable exposes US-UK rift over Croatian accession I., 2010.rift over Croatian Traynor, WikiLeaks cable exposes US-UK Traynor, I., 2005b. Operation Cash: How MI6 lost hunt for Croatian kingpin. Croatian for hunt lost MI6 How Cash: Operation 2005b. I., Traynor, Traynor, I., 2005a. Traynor, Trace fugitive general within 10 days your EU or forget Traynor, I., 2004. War crimes cause EU rift over Croatia. I., 2004. War Traynor, Traynor, I., 1996. Two tired tyrants. Traynor, I., 1996. Two tired tyrants. Traynor, I., 2003. Croatian PM lobbies Blair for softer line on wanted war Toal, G. and Dahlman, C. T., 2011. Times, 1999. Franjo Tudjman. 13 December. Subotić, J., 2009. Smith, G., 1992. Britain in the new Europe. Smith, G., 1992. Britain in the new 1997- policy European Labour’s New opportunity? missed A 2005. J., Smith, Simms, B., 2002. Simms, B., 2002. Rufford, N. and Walker, T., 2004. ’Gaffe-prone’ MI6 hit in Balkan turf war. Rodrik, D., 2000. How far will international economic integration go? go? integration economic will international far 2000. How D., Rodrik, Rennie, D., 2005. Croatia faces loss of EU talks. Rennie, Peskin, V. and Boduzyński, M. P., 2003. International justice and domestic

18 Narodne International Jutarnji list, Jutarnji Narodne Novine, Narodne 30 June [online]. Zagreb: MATE d.o.o. Zagreb: 24 June [online]. Available [online]. 24 June 24-25 June. https://vlada.gov.hr/vijesti/predsjednik-vlade- (Accessed 14 February 2017). 9 December. redsjednik Vlade Orešković: U Hrvatskoj se danas Priopćenje Vlade RH o rezultatima referenduma o 21 December. Hrvatska, Europa, Europska Unija. Europa, Europska Hrvatska, 8 August, 1. EU Expansion. 135, 15 December. 68(3): 423-442. Guardian, https://vlada.gov.hr/vijesti/priopcenje-vlade-rh-o-rezultatima- Novine, Haagu. Den u sudom kaznenim Međunarodnim s 41, 18 April. Guardian, Republike Hrvatske. izmjenama i dopunama Ustava europskoj-uniji/19217 Affairs, (Accessed 14 February 2017). (Accessed 14 February osjećaju prednosti članstva u Europskoj Available at: uniji. oreskovic-u-hrvatskoj-se-danas-osjecaju-prednosti-clanstva-u- izlasku Ujedinjenog Kraljevstva iz EU. at: referenduma-o-izlasku-ujedinjenog-kraljevstva-iz-eu/19192 April. Večernji list, to EU. to EU. Zastupnički dom Sabora Republike Hrvatske, 2000. Deklaracija o suradnji YouGov, 2012. Zastupnički dom Sabora Republike Hrvatske, 1997. Ustavni zakon o Wintour, P., 1995. Portillo at odds with US in attacking Croat ‘cleansing’. Wallace, W., 1992. British foreign policy after the Cold War. Cold the policy after foreign 1992. British Wallace, W., Vlada RH, 2016b. P Vlada RH, 2016a. Tuđman, F., 2009. Tuđman, Veljković, S., 2013. I Hrvatska traži da Škotska prođe pregovore za EU. Trkanjec, Trkanjec, Ž. and Muhar, A., 2011. Zadovoljan presudom.

XXIII (79) - 2017

Vol.XVIII, No. 66 - 2012 38 Vol.XVIII,XXIII No. (79) 66 - -2017 2012 39 ) is an Associate Professor Professor Associate ) is an [email protected] ( War: Political Competition in Postwar Southeast Europe”. Competition in Postwar Southeast War: Political 2022, he will lead a team of scholars on a project funded by funded project a scholars on of a team will lead 2022, he a €1.5 million ERC Starting Grant, titled “Electoral Legacies of (with distinction) from Yale University in 2009. He is the author is the He 2009. in University Yale from distinction) (with and the Breakup of Powers Europe: Western of “The Hour of Yugoslavia” (Yale University Press, 2011). In the period 2017- the Department of Politics the Department Studies of the and International political science in his PhD earned He Cambridge. of University die Wissenschaften vom Menschen in Vienna (2008), in Vienna vom Menschen die Wissenschaften Fellow of Clare College, University of Cambridge (2008-2017), and a Leverhulme Early Career Research Fellow (2012-2016) at of Political Science and ERC Fellow at the University of of University the at Fellow ERC and Science Political of Luxembourg. He was a Junior Visiting Fellow at the Institut für Josip Glaurdić Josip