Central Asia the Caucasus

Home , Asia Council, European microstates

CENTRAL ASIA AND THE CAUCASUS Volume 15 Issue 2 2014 CENTRAL ASIA AND THE CAUCASUS Journal of Social and Political Studies

Published since 2000

Volume 15 Issue 2 2014

CA&CC Press® SWEDEN

1 Volume 15 FOUNDEDIssue 2 2014 AND PUBLISHEDCENTRAL ASIA AND THEBY CAUCASUS INSTITUTE INSTITUTE OF FOR CENTRAL ASIAN AND STRATEGIC STUDIES OF CAUCASIAN STUDIES THE CAUCASUS Registration number: 620720-0459 Registration number: M-770 State Administration for Ministry of Justice of Patents and Registration of Sweden Azerbaijan Republic PUBLISHING HOUSE CA&CC Press®. SWEDEN Registration number: 556699-5964

Journal registration number: 23 614 State Administration for Patents and Registration of Sweden

E d i t o r i a l C o u n c i l

Eldar Chairman of the Editorial Council ISMAILOV Tel./fax: (994 - 12) 497 12 22; E-mail: [email protected] Murad ESENOV Editor-in-Chief Tel./fax: (46) 70 232 16 55; E-mail: [email protected] Jannatkhan Deputy Editor-in-Chief EYVAZOV Tel./fax: (994 - 12) 596 11 73; E-mail: [email protected] Kalamkas represents the journal in Kazakhstan (Astana) YESSIMOVA Tel./fax: (7 - 701) 7408600; E-mail: [email protected] Ainura represents the journal in Kyrgyzstan (Bishkek) ELEBAEVA Tel./fax: (996 - 312) 61 30 36; E-mail: [email protected] Saodat OLIMOVA represents the journal in Tajikistan (Dushanbe) Tel.: (992 372) 21 89 95; E-mail: [email protected] Farkhad represents the journal in Uzbekistan (Tashkent) TOLIPOV Tel.: (9987 - 1) 125 43 22; E-mail: [email protected] Ziya KENGERLI represents the journal in Azerbaijan (Baku) Tel.: (+994 - 50) 3006694; E-mail: [email protected] David represents the journal in Armenia (Erevan) PETROSYAN Tel.: (374 - 10) 56 88 10; E-mail: [email protected] Kakhaber ERADZE represents the journal in Georgia (Tbilisi) Tel.: (+995 - 95) 45 82 88; E-mail: [email protected] Sun ZHUANGZHI represents the journal in China (Beijing) Tel.: (86) 10-64039088; E-mail: [email protected] Konrad SCHÄFFLER represents the journal in Germany (Munich) Tel.: (49 - 89) 3003132; E-mail: [email protected] Vladimir MESAMED represents the journal in the Middle East (Jerusalem) Tel.: (972 - 2) 5882332; E-mail: [email protected] Irina EGOROVA represents the journal in the Russian Federation (Moscow) Tel.: (7 - 495) 3163146; E-mail: [email protected] Robert represents the journal in the U.S. (Buffalo, NY) GUANG TIAN Tel: (716) 880-2104; E-mail: [email protected] Rustem represents the journal in Ukraine (Kiev) ZHANGUZHIN Tel.: (380 - 44) 524-79-13; E-mail: [email protected] 2 CENTRAL ASIA AND THEE CAUCASUSD I T O R I A L B O A R D Volume 15 Issue 2 2014

Bülent ARAS Doctor, Chair, Department of International Relations, Fatih University (Turkey) Mariam ARUNOVA Doctor of Political Science, leading research associate, Institute of Oriental Studies, RAS (Russian Federation) Garnik ASATRIAN Doctor of Philology, professor, head of the Department of Iranian Studies, Erevan State University (Armenia) Ariel COHEN Doctor, leading analyst, The Heritage Foundation, U.S.A. (U.S.A.) William FIERMAN Doctor of Political Science, Professor of Indiana University (U.S.A.) Paul GOBLE Senior Advisor, Voice of America (U.S.A.) Sergey GRETSKY Doctor, Chair of Central Asian Studies, Foreign Service Institute, U.S. Department of State (U.S.A.) Xing GUANGCHENG Doctor of Political Science, professor, Deputy Director of the Institute for East European, Russian and Central Asian Studies, Chinese Academy of Social Sciences (China) Alexander IGNATENKO President, Institute of Religion and Politics, Doctor of Philosophy, specialist in Islamic studies, leading expert of the Institute of Social Systems, Moscow State University, member of the Council for Cooperation with Religious Associations under the Russian Federation President (Russian Federation) Ashurboi IMOMOV Ph.D. (Law), assistant professor, head of the Department of Constitutional Law, Tajik National University (Tajikistan) Lena JONSON Doctor, senior researcher, Swedish Institute of International Affairs (Sweden) Klara KHAFIZOVA Doctor of History, Director, Center for Strategic and International Studies, professor at the International Relations and Foreign Policy Department, Kainar University (Kazakhstan) Zaynidin KURMANOV Doctor of History, professor, head of the Chair of International Relations, the Kyrgyz-Russian University (Kyrgyzstan) Jacob M. LANDAU Professor of Political Science, The Hebrew University of Jerusalem (Israel) S. Neil MACFARLANE Professor, Director, Center for International Studies, The University of Oxford (Great Britain) Alexei MALASHENKO Doctor of History, professor, Scholar-in-Residence, Ethnicity and Nation-Building Program Co-Chair, The Carnegie Moscow Center (Russian Federation) Abbas MALEKI Doctor, Director General, International Institute for Caspian Studies (Iran) Akira Doctor, History of Central Asia and the Caucasus, Program Officer, The Sasakawa Peace MATSUNAGA Foundation (Japan) Roger N. McDERMOTT Affiliated Senior Analyst, Danish Institute for International Studies, Copenhagen (Denmark) Vitaly NAUMKIN Doctor of History, professor, Director, Center for Strategic and International Studies of RF (Russian Federation) Yerengaip OMAROV Professor, Rector of Kainar University, President of the Academy of Natural Sciences, Republic of Kazakhstan (Kazakhstan) Vladimer PAPAVA Doctor of Economics, professor, Rector of the Ivane Javakhishvili Tbilisi State University (Georgia) S. Frederick STARR Professor, Chairman, The Central Asia-Caucasus Institute, The Johns Hopkins University (U.S.A.)

The materials that appear in the journal do not necessarily reflect the Editorial Board and the Editors’ opinion

Editorial Office: CA&CC Press AB Hubertusstigen 9. 97455 Luleå SWEDEN WEB ADDRESS: http://www.ca-c.org

CENTRAL ASIA AND THE CAUCASUS Journal of Social and Political Studies

Volume 15 Issue 2 2014

IN THIS ISSUE:

GLOBALIZATION AND GEOPOLITICS

Grant EASTERN PARTNERSHIP FROM PRAGUE TO VILNIUS. Mikaelian. WHAT WENT WRONG? ...... 7

Rustem THE EURASIAN UNION CONCEPT: Zhanguzhin. POLITICAL OR CIVILIZATIONAL? ...... 20

Gouli THE IRANIAN-PAKISTANI FACTOR Yuldasheva. IN THE GEOPOLITICS OF CENTRAL AND SOUTH ASIA ...... 32

Kubat Umurzakov, THE PROSPECTS OF Nazira KYRGYZSTAN’S ACCESSION TO THE CUSTOMS Tyulyundieva. UNION AND COMMON ECONOMIC SPACE ...... 41

Sergey AZERBAIJAN AND GEORGIA: Minasian. ASYMMETRICAL RELATIONS ...... 51

Rasoul Rezae Faramani, UZBEKISTAN: A REGIONAL POWER Heydar IN CENTRAL ASIA? Moradi. REALITY OR DILEMMA? ...... 59

ENERGY POLICY

Sreemati CENTRAL ASIA-SOUTH ASIA ENERGY COOPERATION: Ganguli. QUEST FOR ENERGY SECURITY AS A DEPENDENCY VARIABLE ...... 73

4 CENTRAL ASIA AND THE CAUCASUS Volume 15 Issue 2 2014

Roman THE EU’S ENERGY PRIORITIES Melikian. IN THE SOUTHERN CAUCASUS ...... 82

RELIGION IN SOCIETY

Maxim RELIGIOUS PARTIES IN GEORGIA: Kirchanov. POLITICAL PLATFORMS AND IDEOLOGICAL TRANSFORMATIONS ...... 94

Kanatbek THE MUSLIM COMMUNITY OF KYRGYZSTAN Murzakhalilov. IN 1991-2013: GROWING PAINS ...... 101

Zayniddin OFFICIAL RELIGIOUS EDUCATION Nabotov. IN TAJIKISTAN. IMAM E AZAM ABU HANIFA ISLAMIC INSTITUTE OF TAJIKISTAN: PAST AND PRESENT ...... 112

ETHNICITIES AND ETHNIC RELATIONS

Irina URGENT PROBLEMS OF Babich. THE WESTERN CIRCASSIANS IN THE 21ST CENTURY ...... 121

Dosmir Uzbekov, Zaynidin UIGHURS AS POLITICAL ACTORS Kurmanov. IN THE KYRGYZ REPUBLIC ...... 132

NATION-BUILDING

Saodat Olimova, PUBLIC OPINION, DEMOCRACY, Muzaffar AND AUTHORITARIANISM Olimov. IN CENTRAL ASIA ...... 142

Rashid THE 2013 PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION: Gani LEGITIMACY AND Abdullo. THE ISLAMIC REVIVAL PARTY OF TAJIKISTAN ...... 161

5 Volume 15 Issue 2 2014 CENTRAL ASIA AND THE CAUCASUS

FOR YOUR INFORMATION

The Special Feature section in the next three issues will discuss:

 Central Eurasia: Integration Processes  Central Eurasia: Religion in the Sociopolitical Context  Central Eurasia: Politics Today

Contributors please use the following guidelines: — begin articles with a brief abstract of 300-500 words and keywords; — articles should be no less than 3,000 and no more than 6,000 words, including footnotes; — footnotes should be placed at the bottom of each page; if there are references to Internet resources, please give the author’s name, the name of the document, the website address, and the date it was made available, for example, available 2007-04-19; — quotations, names of authors and other information from English-language sources should be duplicated in brackets in the original language, that is, in English; — the article should be divided into sections, including an introduction and conclusion; — the author should include the following personal information: first name, last name, academic degree, place of work, position, city, country.

All articles accepted are published in Russian and English, in the Russian-language and English-language versions of the journal, respectively. The editorial board takes responsibility for translation of the articles.

6 CENTRAL ASIA AND THE CAUCASUS Volume 15 Issue 2 2014

GLOBALIZATION AND GEOPOLITICS

EASTERN PARTNERSHIP FROM PRAGUE TO VILNIUS. WHAT WENT WRONG?

Grant MIKAELIAN Research Fellow at the Institute of the Caucasus (Erevan, Armenia)

ABSTRACT

n 28-29 November, 2013, Vilnius This did not put a full-stop to the rela- hosted the 3rd Eastern Partnership tions between the Eastern Partnership (EP) O Summit, at which several former So- members and the EU, however the Vilnius viet republics were expected to ascend to a Summit marked an intermediate finish of higher institutional level in their relations with sorts. The old strategy ran into a dead end, the European Union. Belarus and Azerbaijan leaving Brussels without a new strategy for preferred to step aside, while two other mem- its relations with its Eastern neighbors. To bers (Armenia and Ukraine) left the program move forward, the EU should try to find out in the fall of 2013 when the talks were over. what went wrong. Georgia and Moldova initialed, but did not We should analyze what has happened sign, the Association Agreement with the and why. Here I have tried to comprehend EU.1 This means that four-and-a-half years of how the relations between the EU and So- this highly ambitious program produced very viet successor-states developed under the modest results, to say the least, very much project to provide (probably delayed) an- due to the fact that Ukraine, the region’s big- swers to the following questions: gest player, excused itself from signing. 1. Did the summit fail because Russia was very skeptical about the results 1 The article was written before 27 June, 2014, the of European integration for its neigh- date Georgia signed the Association Agreement with the EU. bors? 7 Volume 15 Issue 2 2014 CENTRAL ASIA AND THE CAUCASUS

2. Why did this problem come to the I will rely on the chronology of the EP fore in mid-2013 rather than in 2008 project divided into three key periods: when it all started? — from May 2008 when the program 3. Why did the Russian factor (de- was announced to May 2009 when it scribed as an imminent threat to the started; European programs on the post-So- viet space) remain neglected? — repeated actualization of the program, which stretched from the sum- To correctly understand the motivation mer of 2010 to the summer of 2011; of what has been done and to avoid unsub- stantiated assessments, we need to look at — speeding up the talks in preparation what happened in Vilnius from the perspec- for the Vilnius Summit and the zero tive of Brussels, Moscow, and the post-So- sum game between Russia and the viet capitals involved. EU (2013).

KEYWORDS: Eastern Partnership, the European Union, Customs Union, Armenia, Georgia, Ukraine, Moldova.

A Very Necessary Introduction

European Integration: Pro et Contra

The end of the Cold War stirred up hopes that the dividing lines would disappear to make the continent a union of all European countries. The Maastricht Treaty was signed in February 1992; during the next twenty years, the European Union steadily went eastward.2 The relations between the EU and former Soviet republics within the Council of Europe were based on expectations of continued expansion.3 We have to bear in mind that the European Union has brought together countries that are very close politically and economically. Indeed, the economic development level is as important as what is said about democratic standards and human rights. The Brussels bureaucracy, which plays an important role in the EU, issues numerous directives to be invariably followed in all spheres of social and economic life. The legal and regulatory framework is vast and continues to expand4; any country talking about EU membership should be ready to accept, without a murmur, all the technical standards and regulations issued by Brussels—not a cheap (not to say costly) procedure. It is wrong to say that European integration tolerates a selective approach to its rules and regulations, even though certain exceptions are possible. There are supporters and opponents of integration in the partner countries. The opponents object to the alien social standards, diffusion of sovereignty, and open markets, which, they argue, infringe on the rights of national producers and increase the dependence of the partner states on the common European economy.

2 Before 1995, the EU consisted of 12 countries; by the end of 2013, there were 28 members. 3 Today, 47 countries belong to the Council of Europe; Belarus is the only European country (if we do not count the European microstates) to be left outside it. 4 Regulatory documents go into the minutest details regarding agricultural production, including the angle at which cucumbers should grow on their stems and the size of apples; there are obligatory quotas on the products sold by any specific country (overproduction is condemned). This makes the European economy short of planned.

8 CENTRAL ASIA AND THE CAUCASUS Volume 15 Issue 2 2014

The supporters, in turn, point out that implementation of European legislation will consolidate human rights, enhance the anti-corruption struggle, and upgrade the quality of governance through new laws and political reforms. They look at the European market (the world’s largest) as a source of future prosperity. These two opposite views cannot meet halfway: those who hold the first are best described as conservatives, while those who adhere to the second can be considered globalization supporters. The expert community, likewise, is divided and is, therefore, unable to bring together the arguments of the skeptics and optimists to answer their questions. Those who talk about the standard of living tend to oversimplify the situation: EU membership per se will not make a newcomer as economically developed as Denmark. It should be said that the opponents have never offered any alternative to the EU economic model. The “European values” invigorate confrontation over European integration. Today, all values normally described as European across the post-Soviet space are universal; they are present in most of the U.N. documents, accepted by the majority of democratic states all over the world, and meet with no more or less obvious ideological opposition. Inside the European Union, however, values are developing and transforming; approaches to many issues of social importance are constantly changing.

Did Participation in the EP Project Transform Post-Soviet States into “Eastern Partners?”

We have to agree on terms. Can we speak of the six EP participants as the post-Soviet space? I am convinced that the term has exhausted its relevance and no longer suits reality: the former Soviet republics have parted ways. Today, the geographic, albeit politicized, term Eurasia is used as a synonym for the post-Soviet space. Brussels called the former Soviet republics its “Eastern partners,” but from the point of view of the “partners,” this term is hardly correct. According to Russian political scientist Dmitry Trenin, there are three regions in the post-Sovi- et space (apart from Russia): New Eastern Europe (Belarus, Ukraine, and Moldova), the Southern Caucasus, and Central Asia.5 Poland’s Novaya Polsha writes about a wider region—Central and Eastern Europe and Central Asia (the former includes the Southern Caucasus).6 Extremes can be forgotten: New Eastern Europe (NEE) includes Ukraine, Belarus, Moldova, and the Southern Caucasus, which cannot be described as a political entity. This term is very much needed because what was described as Eastern Europe has become Central Europe.

1. Eastern Partnership: From Announcement to Launching

All the NEE countries followed a more or less identical pattern in their relations with the EU; the differences were mostly chronological.

5 See: D. Trenin, “Rossia i Novaya Vostochnaya Evropa,” Polit.ru, 22 April, 2010, available at [http://polit.ru/ article/2010/04/22/trenin/]. 6 See: K. Burnetko, “Novaya Vostochnaya Evropa,” Novaya Polsha, No. 7-8, 2010, available at [http://www.novpol. ru/index.php?id=1354].

9 Volume 15 Issue 2 2014 CENTRAL ASIA AND THE CAUCASUS

In 1994, Ukraine and Moldova signed the Partnership and Cooperation Agreements with the European Union. Each of them outlined the framework of cooperation and consisted of about 100 articles.7 In 1995, Belarus joined the Partnership and Cooperation Agreement, followed in 1996 by the three South Caucasian countries. These agreements were practically identical,8 which means that at the first stage the process was more or less synchronous with minor chronological deviations. In 2004, the EU launched the European Neighborhood Policy for 16 of its neighbors, including the NEE countries. In 2008, when the high economic growth rates made it much easier to deal with the political problems, Brussels decided to set up the Union for the Mediterranean and the Northern Dimension to differentiate its cooperation with its closest neighbors. Finally, on 26 May, 2008, the European Council on Foreign Relations in Brussels baptized Eastern Partnership; the idea belonged to Poland and Sweden. While Warsaw treated the idea as its own political project, it was Foreign Minister of Sweden Carl Bildt who drew his country into it. Germany, which showed no enthusiasm over the Mediterranean project, hailed the Eastern Partner- ship initiative.9 It was expected that the EP would offer the NEE countries, or at least those that would implement European legislation, good prospects of EU membership. In bureaucratic parlance, this meant that the countries involved should do their “homework” and implement European laws under the formula “more for more;” the “best pupils” would progress on toward European integration.10 Poland wanted to expand the EU at the expense of the NEE countries11 to gain more consequence within the division of Europe into New and Old firmly established in 2008. None of the EU members objected to EP in its initial form; Rumania and Bulgaria merely pointed out that they would prefer to keep the structures of the Black Sea states intact, the Organization of Black Sea Cooperation in particular.12

Eastern Partnership: A Flop from the Beginning

The EP constituent congress in Prague proved to be disappointing. Seven pages of the joint declaration signed by the EU and its new “Eastern partners” (Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, Moldova, and Ukraine) said nothing about enlargement; the term “prospects” meant nothing more but a chance to join, some time in the future, the DCFTA and an Association Agreement13; membership was not mentioned.

7 The text of an agreement with Ukraine, Partnership and Co-operation Agreement between the European Communities and Their Member States, and Ukraine, is available at [http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2003/october/tradoc_111612.pdf]. 8 Compare the text of agreement with Armenia: The European Union and the Republic of Armenia. Partnership and Cooperation Agreement, available at [http://www.mineconomy.am/uploades/PCA_EU-Armenia.pdf]. 9 See: “Poland, Sweden Defend ‘Eastern Initiative’,” Euractiv.com-EU News & Policy Debates, 26 May, 2008, available at [http://www.euractiv.com/central-europe/poland-sweden-defend-eastern-ini-news-219864]. 10 See: N. Popescu, “More for More in the Neighborhood,” EUObserver, 22 March, 2011, available at [http://blogs. euobserver.com/popescu/2011/04/04/more-for-more-in-the-neighbourhood/]. 11 See: R. Goldirova, “‘Eastern Partnership’ Could Lead to Enlargement, Poland Says,” EUObserver, 27 May, 2008, available at [http://euobserver.com/foreign/26211]. 12 See: Y. Nasshoven, “TEPSA Brief: Eastern Partnership,” Trans European Policy Studies Association, July 2008, available at [http://www.tepsa.eu/download/publications/Eastern%20Partnership.pdf]. 13 See: Joint Declaration of the Prague Eastern Partnership Summit, Brussels, 7 May, 2009, available at [http://www. consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/en/er/107589.pdf].

10 CENTRAL ASIA AND THE CAUCASUS Volume 15 Issue 2 2014

There were even more unpleasant discoveries in store: a week before the summit, the text of the declaration drafted by the Czechs was truncated once more: “An earlier Czech EU presidency text of 29 April referred to the 27 EU states plus Ukraine, Belarus, Moldova, Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia as ‘European countries.’ It also spoke of ‘visa-liberalization.’ The latest document, rubber- stamped by EU diplomats in Brussels on Wednesday (6 May), renamed the six as ‘Eastern European Partners’ and ‘partner countries.’ It added that the visa move is a ‘long-term goal’.” The FRG and the Netherlands insisted on these changes.14 The changes were probably caused by fears that immigrants from Eastern Europe would pour into the EU, in which unemployment was high anyway and rising.15 Most of the European leaders did not attend the summit; this came as another far from pleasant surprise and “deflated” the summit to a certain extent.16 The proposed funding was very modest, to say the least: between 2009 and 2013 the six “partners” could count on a meager €600 million. Divided between the six aspirants, the sum was too small for the planned reforms, especially in view of the fact that Ukraine should have received more than the others for objective reasons. This shortened EP agenda meant that Brussels had lost interest in the program. The Vilnius failure was predetermined: EU membership (even if merely declared) remained out of reach. It should be said that the candidate status of the Balkan countries and Turkey does not mean that they will join the EU any time soon; this low level of expectations may lower the program’s priority among the New East European countries. The EP countries will have to cope with economic modernization and introduction of European standards on their own with no funding from the EU.

Why the EU is Losing Interest in the EP Project

Why did the EU change its attitude toward the project between May 2008 and May 2009 and why did Brussels revise its previous plans? There were three main factors behind the U-turn: (1) Russia’s position. Warsaw spared no effort to stress that the EP was not spearheaded against Russia, which remained convinced that it threatened its influence,17 while the EU members more loyal to Moscow carefully avoided irritating statements.18 There was a growing awareness that the post-Soviet space might be a source of problems in relations with Russia. The August 2008 events and the Russian-Ukrainian “gas war” four months later strengthened the position of skeptics, who insisted that the New East European countries remained far removed from the EU and should cherish no hope of joining it even in the distant future. It should be said that Russia’s efforts were not strong enough to disrupt the EP process; it produced a psychological impact and remained one of several factors.

14 A. Rettman, “EU Summit Text Loaded with Eastern Tension,” EUObserver, 7 May, 2009, available at [http:// euobserver.com/foreign/28081]. 15 In Estonia, for example, unemployment increased from 5.5% in 2008 to 16.9% in 2010; in Ireland, it rose from 6.4% to 13.9% in the same period; and in Spain from 11.3% to 20.1%. This went on everywhere across the EU, Germany being the only exception (see: Eurostat, Unemployment Rate by Sex and Age Groups—Annual Average, %). 16 See: A. Rettman, “Absent Leaders Deflate EU’s ‘Eastern’ Summit,” EUObserver, 7 May, 2009, available at [http:// euobserver.com/foreign/28088]. 17 See: Y. Nasshoven, op. cit. 18 See: “Glava MID Italii opasaetsia antirossiyskoy napravlennosti programmy ES ‘Vostochnoe partnerstvo’,” 16 March, 2009, available at [http://www.regnum.ru/news/1137757.html].

11 Volume 15 Issue 2 2014 CENTRAL ASIA AND THE CAUCASUS

(2) The skepticism of part of the European bureaucracy with respect to the post-Soviet space and expansion of the EU in general. Brussels looks at the post-Soviet space as a source of never-ending conflicts and instability, a Pandora’s Box of sorts. This explains why the EU preferred to avoid any resolute steps in general. The mounting anti-post-Soviet skepticism has internal sources as well. In the 2000s, the EU was enlarging too fast: in 2004, it acquired 10 new members and in 2007, 2 more. This meant that in three years the EU had grown 1.5-fold; many of its members proved unable to discuss issues related to the recent acquisitions. Some of the European countries were not prepared to embrace the EP project: France, which had initiated the Union for the Mediterranean, and Bulgaria and Rumania concerned about the health of their Black Sea projects. Other countries, far removed from Eastern Europe, remained indifferent to the EU eastward expansion. At the same time, isolationism was growing more and more obvious in the United States: Barack Obama was less interested in New Eastern Europe than George W. Bush, his predecessor in the White House. (3) The world economic crisis. It badly hit the EU economy and played into the hands of the Euroskeptics and isolationists. Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania, which suffered more than others, received no more or less considerable aid; the Bulgarian and Rumanian economies declined, and the economies of several countries of old Europe (Ireland, Italy, Spain, and Greece) proved to be especially vulnerable. The new EU members were accused of the crisis.

2. EP Actualized

For some time, the economic crisis loomed too high to keep the EP and related subjects in the center of attention. By 2010, however, the favorable EP-related context invigorated its implementation. The economic crisis, which was a negative, albeit indirect, political factor, retreated to an extent that allowed the EP to be gradually revived; the negative subjective factors disappeared to improve the context of interaction between the EU and the NEE countries. The economy. In late 2009, economic growth, which had hit bottom in the summer of 2009 in all countries, including those more badly hit than others by the world economic crisis, revived in many of the EU members; by 2010, the positive trend became obvious. Georgia: end of isolation. After the Russian-Georgian war of 2008, Tbilisi found itself in international isolation because the West shifted part of the blame onto its Georgian partners, which meant no invitations for President Saakashvili. Those who instituted this semblance of blockade believed that his chances of remaining in power were few and weak: between November 2007 and September 2009, the country was shattered by massive protests. We all know that the Western leaders invariably try to move to the “right side of history.” In the summer of 2009, Saakashvili resumed the initiative; in June 2010 he was invited to France on an official visit where he said that this visit “buried Russia’s efforts to isolate Georgia.”19 Russia: passivity. To avoid international attention, the Kremlin refrained from harsh statements: many observers compared August 2008 with the Soviet Union’s attacks on Finland, Czechoslovakia, etc. The lower and lowering oil prices somewhat dampened the self-confidence of Russian leaders. Belarus: normalizing relations with the EU. Significantly, in 2010, even Minsk started moving toward normal relations with the West. Before the crisis, Russia allowed Belarus to sell the hydrocar-

19 S. Ortola, “Mikheil Saakachvili: ‘Ma visite enterre les efforts de la Russie pour isoler’,” 8 June, 2010, available at [http://www.20minutes.fr/monde/russie/576147-mikheil-saakachvili-ma-visite-enterre-efforts-russie-isoler-pays].

12 CENTRAL ASIA AND THE CAUCASUS Volume 15 Issue 2 2014 bons it received from Russia for preferential prices to Europe for world prices in order to use the money thus obtained for developing its economy. Amid the crisis, Russia was inclined to discontinue this practice. President Lukashenko turned to the West and was promptly offered considerable financial aid. The time that remained until the presidential election was the best in the country’s recent history20; the honeymoon with the EU, however, was spoiled by the vote counting after the presidential election.21 The mass protests that followed the elections and vote counting showed Lukhashenko that the West probably did not associate his country’s “bright future” with him and that what had been done was merely ignored. The protesters were dispersed; the contacts with the EU were severed, but until December 2010 many hoped that Minsk would continue to contemplate closer cooperation with the EU. Ukraine: new leader, old priorities. In January 2010, the democratic elections in Ukraine brought Victor Yanukovich, a nominally pro-Russian candidate, to power. Very soon, however, he announced that Ukraine remained devoted to European integration as its strategic priority.22 In No- vember 2010, at the Ukraine-EU summit, the sides signed a protocol on the Association Agreement and Action Plan toward visa liberalization for Ukraine and other cooperation trends.23 The Arab Spring: summing up. The chaos in North Africa and stronger position of the Islamists caused by the Arab Spring buried the Union for the Mediterranean. The previously popular opinion that the EU periphery could not and should not be divided into European and non-European (this division was viewed as cultural racism) retreated under the pressure of the differences that, by 2011, had become too obvious to be further ignored. The bloody revolutions in North Africa were too different from the “velvet revolutions” in Central and Eastern Europe and in the former Soviet republics that formulated the modernization agenda. In the final analysis, most of the revolutions in Central and Eastern Europe produced no positive results, while the attempts at democratization in North Africa either brought to power or strengthened the anti-modernization forces that had previously stood opposed to the military authoritarian regimes inclined toward modernization. It turned out that the EU was not prepared for this turn: so far, it remains unclear who rules in North Africa. The EP new external context added to its topicality and imbibed it with new meaning; the Ukrai- nian integration model became a standard: all the other NEE countries were invited to sign Associa- tion Agreements with the EU.

3. Eastern Partnership: Entangled in the Web of Its Successes

By mid-2011 and for the above reasons, the EU and the NEE countries concentrated on the EP project. The talks were gaining momentum: in 2011, Ukraine, without much trouble, coordinated the

20 See: “‘Hundreds of Protesters Arrested’ in Belarus,” BBC, 20 December, 2010, available at [http://www.bbc.co.uk/ news/world-europe-12037486]. 21 See: “Prezidentskie vybory v Respublike Belarus,” 22 February, 2011, Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR), available at [http://www.osce.org/ru/odihr/76092]. 22 See: “Yanukovich: Evrointegratsia—glavny prioritet Ukrainy,” Podrobnosti, 1 March, 2010, available at [http:// podrobnosti.ua/power/2010/03/01/669091.html]. 23 See: Joint Press Statement, available at [https://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/en/ er/117912.pdf]; EU-Ukraine Summit Factsheet, available at [https://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/ pressdata/en/er/117751.pdf].

13 Volume 15 Issue 2 2014 CENTRAL ASIA AND THE CAUCASUS text of the Association Agreement; initialing (which proved to be a technical procedure that went on without much ado)24 was postponed because of the arrest of former prime minister Yulia Timoshenko, who was brought to court and sentenced to a prison term. Other NEE countries, likewise, were involved in negotiations on Association Agreements: Moldova joined the process in January 2010; Georgia, Armenia, and Azerbaijan in July of the same year. A year later Ukraine, Georgia, and Moldova were treated as favorites; Armenia joined them in 2012. I do not feel it necessary to follow the process step by step and describe all the summits and other meetings that took place in 2011 and 2012. It should be said, however, that in 2012 many of the NEE countries held general elections, which slowed down the integration process. Nobody doubted that integration would go on,25 and by 2013 all the “i’s” had been dotted. Table 1 shows the EP rating by years.26 The rating for 2011 used a different methodology, which means that the countries’ rank rather than their absolute figures are important. Table 1

Integration Rating of Eastern Partnership

2011* 2012** 2013*** Dynamicsa

Armenia 0.44 0.50 0.53 0.18

Azerbaijan 0.36 0.38 0.39 0.12

Belarus 0.25 0.26 0.29 0.13

Georgia 0.68 0.56 0.60 0.01

Moldova 0.75 0.65 0.66 —

Ukraine 0.62 0.58 0.59 0.06

a Dynamics in relation to the leader in 2011-2013.

S o u r c e s: *European Integration Index for Eastern Partnership Countries, 2011 // International Renaissance Foundation, November 2011, available at [http://www.eap-index.eu/sites/default/files/EaP%20Index%202011.pdf]. **European Integration Index for Eastern Partnership Countries, 2012 // International Renaissance Foundation, May 2012, available at [http://www.eap-index.eu/sites/default/files/EaP%20Index%202012_0.pdf]. ***European Integration Index for Eastern Partnership Countries, 2013 // International Renaissance Foundation, available at [http://www.eap-index.eu/sites/default/files/EaP_Index_2013_0.pdf].

Table 1 shows that in 2012 Armenia demonstrated a slightly better performance, while the leading countries remained comparatively passive. In 2013, Armenia and Georgia showed certain progress (Belarus’ performance looked well, mainly because of the corrected assessment methods); Ukraine, Moldova, and Azerbaijan were trailing behind with indifferent indices.

24 See: European Union and Ukrainian Negotiators Initial Association Agreement, including Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Area, European Commission — MEMO/12/238, 30 March, 2012, available at [http://europa.eu/rapid/press- release_MEMO-12-238_en.htm?locale=en]. 25 After the parliamentary elections of October 2012 in Georgia, many foreign observers doubted the country’s further foreign policy orientation. The new people in power confirmed that it would remain the same (see: Address of the Prime Minister of Georgia H.E. Bidzina Ivanishvili to the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe, available at [http://www. government.gov.ge/index.php?lang_id=ENG&sec_id=270&info_id=36672]). 26 Average by “linkage”, “approximation” and “management.”

14 CENTRAL ASIA AND THE CAUCASUS Volume 15 Issue 2 2014

By the early 2013, all the details of the future Agreements had been discussed and coordinated. The upcoming summit in Vilnius “of epochal importance” riveted general attention, while the progress made (mainly of a technical nature) was hailed as a “civilizational choice.” And there was a choice: by that time the Customs Union had been functioning as an alternative project.

4. Customs Union

Because of the very different styles of work of Russia and the EU, the public knew next to nothing of how the Customs Union was being formed. The Generalized Scheme of Preferences (GSP/GSP +) that the EU offered the NEE countries was well known, while the 50% tax rebate in the CIS countries was not actively discussed. In 2010, Russia, Belarus, and Kazakhstan set up the Customs Union of EurAsEC; they reduced customs duties to naught at their borders and raised them for all other countries. At that time, Russia expected Ukraine to join the Customs Union sooner or later.27 Russia hoped that Eurasian integration would attract many of the former Soviet republics, Ukraine in particular,28 to the Customs Union; this would have made it the first efficient association in the post-Soviet space. The Ukrainian leaders were evasive, while other countries showed no enthusiasm either. In 2011, Russia suggested that a Free Trade Area should be set up in the CIS within which customs duties should be slashed by one quarter. In September-December 2012, Russia, Ukraine, Belarus, Armenia, Kazakhstan, and Moldova joined it, followed by Kyrgyzstan in January 2014. How, from the point of view of the NEE countries, does the Customs Union differ from the Association Agreement? The Association Agreement (the published text of the Association Agreement between Ukraine and the EU) consists of 1,000 pages; three-quarters of it deal with economic regulations. This is, in fact, a detailed Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Agreement (DCFTA) that lowers customs duties to practically zero.29 If we put aside the political part of the Agreement, we can safely describe it as being absolutely identical to the first stage of economic integration of Ukraine, Moldova, and Arme- nia with the countries of the Customs Union within the Free Trade Area of the CIS. The document’s remaining quarter is a political and mainly declarative document; it, however, establishes much closer relations up to and including joint commissions on cooperation with third countries. At the same time, the Customs Union is the second stage of integration, which explains why the technical parameters of joining the Customs Union and DCFTA are different. The EurAsEC is skill- fully using protectionist measures to dampen competition with external players in its markets. In other words, the members of Customs Union pay no customs duties when trading among themselves and claim higher customs duties from the producers of third countries. This means that one and the same country cannot simultaneously reduce to naught its tariffs for the EU and EurAsEC countries. In other words, members of the Association with the EU should leave it to join the Customs Union and vice versa.

27 See: “Putin predlozhil Ukraine vstupit v Tamozhenny soiuz,” RIA-Novosti, 5 March, 2010, available at [http://ria.ru/ politics/20100305/212412980.html]. 28 See: F. Lukyanov, “Nastoiashchaya Evrazia,” Gazeta.ru, 24 October, 2013, available at [http://www.gazeta.ru/ comments/column/lukyanov/5721721.shtml]. 29 See: O. Sushko, “A Fork in the Road? Ukraine between EU Association and the Eurasian Customs Union,” PONARS Eurasia Policy Memo, No. 293, September 2013, available at [http://www.ponarseurasia.org/sites/default/files/policy-memos- pdf/Pepm_293_Sushko_Sept2013.pdf].

15 Volume 15 Issue 2 2014 CENTRAL ASIA AND THE CAUCASUS

In view of the fact that the Free Trade Area of the CIS had been operating for some time, the choice was not an easy one. The larger part of preferences that the NEE countries had already acquired within the CIS could have been increased thanks to trade with the EU. Meanwhile, Moscow concluded that in preferential conditions for the NEE countries the less competitive producers (post-Soviet, including Russian) would lose; it had no choice but announce that the preferential regimes with Russia and the EU could not be saved; this argument was used to put pressure on Ukraine and partly on Armenia because the NEE countries export agricultural products to Russia and raw materials to the EU. There was another no less important consideration: the Association Agreement made trade a one-way street: the quotas on products remained, while transfer to the EU technical standards was very expensive. It should be said that there are no detailed and profound studies of which of the two solutions will be most profitable in the short-, mid- and long-term perspective. Today, the NEE countries are not so concerned about duties, incomes and losses as about ideological and reputational gains.

5. The Customs Union and Association with the EU: Zero-Sum Game

Until the early 2013, Russia did not herd its partners into the Customs Union. The EP, on the other hand, fell victim to its own popularity among, at least, some of the public and political elites of the NEE countries and in the EU: it became a “civilizational” project that drew a line between the “imperial past” and “European future,” etc. One of the rivaling projects, therefore, was doomed to failure. The Russian elites, the interests of which were ignored, did not like this; Moscow launched a much more active campaign in favor of the Customs Union; the European bureaucracy responded in kind. Contrary to their usual self-as- suredness (it is believed that the EU neighbors are striving for European integration), the top figures in Brussels had no choice but to insist on their integration model30; Moscow did the same.31 The fact that on the eve of the Vilnius Summit, the EU removed the demand to release Yulia Timoshenko from prison speaks volumes about the scope of politicization of the EP and its involvement in the geopolitical game with Russia.32 The competition is caused by the fact that the two projects offer two different models of integration, which means that there is no sense in putting the blame on one of the sides and finding the culprit for the zero-sum game. For a long time, the NEE countries remained unconcerned about the projects’ incompatibility and took their time to make the final choice. Very much in line with its complementarity (“and-and”

30 See: Š. Füle, “Ambitions of EU and East Partners for the Vilnius Summit,” 28 May, 2013, available at [http://europa. eu/rapid/press-release_SPEECH-13-477_en.htm]; “Ukraine Must Choose Russia’s Customs Union or EU Trade Agreement— President Grybauskaitė,” The Lithuania Tribune, 6 February, 2013, available at [http://www.lithuaniatribune.com/28813/ ukraine-must-choose-russias-customs-union-or-eu-trade-agreement-president-grybauskaite-201328813/]. 31 See: “Assotsiatsia s ES i Tamozhenny soiuz nesovmestimy—sovetnik Putina,” NBNews.ua, 27 July, 2013, available at [http://nbnews.com.ua/ru/news/95061/]. 32 See: A. Nosovich, “U razbitogo koryta: itogi Vilniusskogo sammita Vostochnogo partnerstva,” Analytical portal about the Batic Region, 2 December, 2013, available at [http://www.rubaltic.ru/article/politika-i-obshchestvo/u-razbitogo-koryta- itogi-vilnyusskogo-sammita-vostochnogo-partnerstva-02122013/]

16 CENTRAL ASIA AND THE CAUCASUS Volume 15 Issue 2 2014 against “either-or”) policy, Armenia tried to bring the two projects together33; in an effort to avoid confrontation with Moscow, Ukraine sought an observer status in the Customs Union to be able to sign the Association Agreement; Azerbaijan did nothing to move closer to either of the projects, while Georgia and Belarus remained absolutely sure of their (different) preferences. Moldova proved to be the “boldest” among the Soviet-successor states; as distinct from most of the post-Soviet countries, it was ruled by the Alliance for European Integration, rather than by an “omnivorous party.” It was the only republic in which the Association Agreement ran into a serious confrontation caused by the unwavering choice that allowed no options. It should be said that the zero-sum game perfectly fit the Cold War mentality that is still alive in Russia and the EU, albeit to a lesser degree,34 and in the NEE countries. To some extent, the Cus- toms Union/Eastern Partnership confrontation was a self-fulfilling forecast caused by increasingly frequent and increasingly loud alarmist statements coming from the NEE states about Russia’s allegedly strong pressure, which did nothing but increase the pressure even more. The leaders of the four NEE countries (Armenia and Ukraine included) were engaged in an active PR campaign designed to justify their own civilizational choice, which Russia perceived as a threat to its own influence. By the beginning 2013, the Association Agreement and DCFTA had been drafted; the minutest details of the programs of action caused no serious public opposition in any of the NEE countries (Moldova was the only exception) and were adopted by the governments. Judging by the Russian leaders’ rhetoric that became public in July 2013, Russia was determined, at least, to prevent its neighbors from the signing the free trade agreement with the EU, which excluded their integration with the Customs Union. Strange as it may seem, Moscow’s determination was affected by the course of events unrelated to European integration of Russia’s neighbors. I have in mind the expected military operation against Syria and the trade conflict with Belarus over the Belaruskaliy company, launched by the detention in Minsk of Vladislav Baumgertner, a Russian businessman and the company’s general director.35 This was the first time that the EU expansion project ran into opposition from Russia, which had so far never objected to European integration of its former satellites. The EU, which had no previous experience in games of this kind, limited itself to statements about Moscow’s policies.

6. Moscow: Blackmail Based on High-Pressure Arguments?

Moscow relied on three arguments to dissuade its neighbors from joining the EP.  First, harsh security-related decisions up to high-pressure arguments invariably used across the post-Soviet space. In the summer of 2013, they were used against Moldova and Arme- nia; and in February 2014 against Ukraine. This stirred up secessionist forces in Moldova

33 See: R. Stepanian, “Armenia deystvuet po printsipu ‘i-i’,” Radio Freedom-Armenia, 26 June, 2013, available at [http://rus.azatutyun.am/content/article/25028736.html]. 34 For example, Carl Bildt, one of the authors of the EP project, says that it was devised to remove the borders in Europe, one of the ideas popular in Europe during the Cold War (see: C. Bildt, “Vostochnoe partnerstvo—Evropa bez razmezhevatelnykh granits,” Den-Kiev, 3 October, 2013, available at [http://day.kiev.ua/ru/article/den-planety/vostochnoe-partnerstvo-evropa- bez-razmezhevatelnyh-granic]. 35 See: “Interpol podtverdil vydachu mezhdunarodnogo ordera na arest top-menedzherov ‘Belaruskaliya’,” Stolichnoe televidenie, 27 August, 2013, available at [http://www.ctv.by/novosti-minska-i-minskoy-oblasti/interpol-podtverdil-vydachu- mezhdunarodnogo-ordera-na-arest-top].

17 Volume 15 Issue 2 2014 CENTRAL ASIA AND THE CAUCASUS

(probably) and in Ukraine (obviously). Armenia was warned that Russia had sold a large batch of weapons to Azerbaijan, its enemy.36 The EU could not offer Armenia any alternative security methods, leaving the country with no leeway. In 2008, Russia lost all levers of pressure on Georgia (even though there were absolutely unfounded rumors that Russia wanted to capture Tbilisi in 2008 and later).  Second, gas prices as an equally strong argument. Gas prices for Armenia were increased, while Russia had promised earlier to lower them if it moved away from European integration. Moldova and Ukraine received similar offers, that is, considerably lower gas prices if they rejected the Association Agreement in favor of the Customs Union. Russia could not raise the price because both countries were paying world prices anyway: about $400 per 1,000 cu m, while Armenia paid $270 per 1,000 cu m after the price was raised. It appeared that for Ukraine these tactics were more efficient. Georgia, which received its gas from Azerbaijan, no longer depended on Russia.  Third, foreign trade. Ukraine, Moldova, and Armenia were informed that they might lose their privileges within the Free Trade Area of the CIS, which would cost them a share of the Russian market. Ukrainian commodities were detained at the border, a de-facto embargo, a heavy blow to the Ukrainian economy. Moscow’s opponents accused it of blackmailing, however its measures (with the exception of encouraging separatism and blocking Ukrainian cargos at the border) could hardly be called blackmail. The thing is that Russia offers Armenia security guarantees itself and can retreat from them if it so wishes, which will hardly please Erevan. The same applies to gas: it is its privileged price, and not the world price, that is “political;” this also applies to access to the Russian market. The Free Trade rules as applied to the NEE countries are a privilege extended on conditions of closer integration rather than because of “friendship among peoples.” In fact, Russia’s capacious market, which is less demanding than the EU market, makes the Free Trade regime much more attractive for the NEE countries than for Russia. Moscow’s attempts to rely on pro-Russian public movements and public discontent over the current policies failed probably because these factors must be active for a long time and be supported by the active minority rather than the passive majority, Russia’s normal social basis; otherwise no desirable results can be expected. The pro-Russian politicians of Moldova managed to exert pressure on the people in power, but it was not enough to force them to change the decision.37 In Ukraine, where supporters of Eurasian integration predominated, such results proved impossible.

7. The NEE Countries Part Ways

Russia’s pressure destroyed the NEE quartet; the leaders had nothing to do with it: their objective situations were too different. Russia’s arguments proved to be very convincing in Armenia: its military security was at stake.38 On 3 September, the Armenian president arrived in Moscow to announce that his country intended to join the Customs Union. Many were taken by surprise; the decision meant rejection of European in-

36 See: Z. Agayev, “Azeri-Russian Arms Trade $4 Billion amid Tension with Armenia,” Bloomberg, 13 August, 2013, available at [http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2013-08-13/azeri-russian-arms-trade-4-billion-amid-tension-with-armenia.html]. 37 The ruling coalition in Moldova is called Alliance for European Integration. 38 See: “Shchit vazhnee. Mezhdu Evropeyskim i Tamozhennym soiuzami Armenia vybrala ODKB,” Vzgliad, 3 Sep- tember, 2013, available at [http://www.vz.ru/politics/2013/9/3/648340.html].

18 CENTRAL ASIA AND THE CAUCASUS Volume 15 Issue 2 2014 tegration. Russia, in turn, was able to show that other countries would join Eurasian integration and that it could win the “race” with the EU. After it rejected European integration, Erevan tried to convert this decision into economic advantages. On 5 November, the Ukrainian leaders still believed that signing the Association Agreement had been decided39; ten days later, they changed their minds.40 Armenia retreated because of the security issue, while Ukraine, because of the problems connected with the energy industry, foreign trade, gas prices, and the need to pay debts. Ukraine, which resisted right up until the end, explained that its decision was economically motivated. Prime Minister Nikolai Azarov said that the country would need €150-165 billion to modernize its economy to meet the EU standards41; no calculation methodology was presented. In fact, it was absolutely clear that Ukraine could not afford the luxury of European integration; its economy was lingering at the brink of a default, harsh financial crisis, and loss of the Russian market. Georgia found itself in a strange situation: access to the Russian market had been closed for a long time; all agreements within the CIS had been discontinued that deprived Russia of pressure levers. Moscow had no choice but to normalize relations with Georgia and gradually open its market to Georgian products throughout 2013. This strengthened Georgia’s position in general, as well as at the talks with the EU. The situation around Moldova was even more interesting: Russia had numerous pressure levers at its disposal, but when applied they did nothing to force Moldova to retreat from its political decisions. Moldova was the only NEE country in which there was a fairly massive political movement in favor of Eurasian integration organized by the Party of Communists of the Republic of Moldova with the highest rating among the country’s political forces. With the Gagauz autonomy and a large Russian-Ukrainian community in the north, Moldova is fairly sensitive to separatist sentiments. Economic arguments could have been fairly convincing, but after being used once (Moscow introduced an embargo on Moldavian wines in 2006), this measure no longer worked. The republic borders on ethnically close Rumania, while pro-Western sentiments of its political elites are fed by irredentism (unionism). We all know how the Vilnius Summit ended: no agreements were signed, although Georgia and Moldova initialed theirs. Agreements on simplified visa regimes were signed with Armenia and Azerbaijan. Ukraine, the key player among the NEE states, was an observer.

Conclusion

The failure of the Vilnius Summit is not the end: Ukraine might come back to discuss the As- sociation Agreement; Armenia might try to negotiate less strict terms; Moldova and Georgia will probably sign the Agreement in 2014: there are factors that might dissuade them. The EU will give money to Moldova to make it the hero of a success story in the EP space. If the EU gives money to Moldova and, possibly, to Ukraine, the EP will acquire a different image: in 2009-2013, the project suggested that while moving toward European integration, these countries should be relying on their internal resources.

39 See: “Azarov ne somnevaetsia v uspeshnosti Vilniusskogo sammita dlia Ukrainy,” Obozrevatel, 5 November, 2013, available at [http://obozrevatel.com/politics/56392-azarov-ne-somnevaetsya-v-uspeshnosti-vilnyusskogo-sammita-dlya- ukrainyi.htm]. 40 See: “V Evroparlamente poniali, chto Yanukovich uzhe ne khochet assotsiatsii s ES,” Vlasti.net, 16 November, 2013, available at [http://vlasti.net/news/179240]. 41 See: “Dlia modernizatsii pod standarty ES nuzhno 165 mlrd Evro—Azarov,” LIGABiznesInform, 23 November, 2013, available at [http://news.liga.net/news/politics/928309-dlya_modernizatsii_pod_standarty_es_nuzhno_165_mlrd_evro_azarov.htm].

19 Volume 15 Issue 2 2014 CENTRAL ASIA AND THE CAUCASUS

The positions of Russia and the EU differ in one, yet very important, respect: Russia is ready to pay for integration with money and its image on the world arena, while the EU refused to pay for what it has little need for. To correct the mistakes, the sides should understand what caused the failure in the first place: first the NEE countries (Moldova, Armenia, and Ukraine) were confronted with a hard choice fraught with risks and paying a high price for political and economic stability. There was no clear alternative in the form of EU funding of economic modernization and guaranteed EU membership, even in the distant future. The mutual misunderstanding between Moscow and Brussels played a negative role. Moscow is frightened by Brussels pursuing an active public policy to which it cannot respond in kind. The EU, in turn, cannot stand opposed to Russia’s pressure tactics. It seems that the NEE countries would benefit most from cooperating with both Russia and the EU; this means that these two strongest players should listen to each other more often.

THE EURASIAN UNION CONCEPT: POLITICAL OR CIVILIZATIONAL?

Rustem ZHANGUZHIN D.Sc. (Political Science), Chief Research Fellow, Institute of World Economy and International Relations, National Academy of Sciences of Ukraine (Kiev, Ukraine)

ABSTRACT

he author probes deep into the con- exhaustively analyzed in one or even several cept of Eurasianism, the subject of dozen articles. Nevertheless, the subject de- T heated discussions interpreted as an serves clarification as a target of analysis. integration attempt in the post-Soviet expanse. The political and economic vs. civiliza- He looks at the idea of Eurasianism as a civi- tional discourse looks very much like the lizational project designed to unify all entities chicken or the egg dilemma. The author pre- of the geostrategic expanse into a single fers a civilizational discourse, although many whole. This multilayered problem cannot be will probably disagree with him.

KEYWORDS: Eurasia, the Eurasian project, liberal empire, multiculturalism, migration flows, autochthonous population, ideocracy, colonial or liberal democratic order, the legal field, integration, assimilation, autonomism, civilizational project, civilizational egregore.

20 CENTRAL ASIA AND THE CAUCASUS Volume 15 Issue 2 2014 Introduction

Any discussion should begin with a clear definition of imperative concepts and terms, as well as ways to categorize the process and target of study. This means that Eurasianism as a concept should be discussed in the context of the processes unfolding all over the world, primarily taking into account the European countries have expanded beyond their historical and ethnic boundaries thanks to their military-technological and economic breakthroughs. On the other hand, we need to go back to the original state of the discussed subject with the help of its immanent properties and realistic features. At the same time, we should not be misled by the numerous prejudices and outdated ideological clichés that have accumulated throughout modern and recent history. Analogies cannot be used to explain the exclusive features and characteristics of any country, although most of them can be easily categorized. Columbus, who landed in America in 1492, opened the Age of Discovery; it continued while Spain and Portugal moved deeper and deeper into Central and South America in the mid-16th century and ended when France and Britain entrenched themselves in North America in the early 17th century. In 1580, Ataman of the Russian Cossacks Yermak conquered the Siberian Khanate of Khan Kuchum; thirty years later, the Russians reached the Yenisey, and one hundred years later, Kam- chatka and the Bering Strait. Many of the Siberian cities (Tobolsk, Tomsk, Krasnoyarsk, Irkutsk among others) are older than the American megalopolises. Russians moved to Siberia in great numbers. By the early 19th century, people from the Russian metropolis constituted the absolute majority in Siberia: over 70% of the population had their roots in European Russia; the same picture also applied to North America.1 Yu. Krizhanich, V. Kliuchevskiy, G. Potanin, N. Yadrintsev, and G. Fedotov, to name a few Russian historians and thinkers, agreed that Siberia was a colony. Later, the North American European colonies declared their independence: between 1776 and the mid-1820s, that is, within a fairly short period of time, the British, Spaniards, and Portuguese lost their overseas dominions. Siberia remained part of Russia and a source of minerals, noble metals, furs, etc. In the 18th century, the Europeans conquered India, China, Southeast Asia, and also Australia and South Africa. The second stage of colonial expansion saw no mass migration to the newly acquired lands; Europe relied on military force and vassal relations to maintain law and order in their new dominions, while the Europeans accounted for a meager 1.5% to 2% of the total population. (Australia and South Africa were colonized by American patterns; these were practically the last territories with more or less friendly nature and climate, relatively sparsely populated by peoples with no consistent statehoods.) Throughout the 19th century, the leading powers finally divided the world into zones of their strategic interests. The Berlin Treaty of 1885 completed the division of Africa. Russia, which operated within its zone, joined Georgia in 1800, Azerbaijan and several of the north and northeastern parts of Armenia in 1801, Ingushetia and Abkhazia in 1810, Daghestan in 1813, the larger part of contemporary Kazakhstan in 1822, Chechnia in 1859, Kyrgyzstan in 1862, and Adigey in 1864 (as a result of the Caucasian War of 1763-1864 most of the Adighe were driven into the Ottoman Empire; those who stayed behind moved to the left bank of the Kuban River). In 1868, Russia moved into

1 [http://calvaryguard.com/ru/kanz/hist/genoz/]; [http://ycnokoutellb.livejournal.com/9160.html].

21 Volume 15 Issue 2 2014 CENTRAL ASIA AND THE CAUCASUS

Central Asia; in 1885 it came dangerously close to the borders of the British dominions in this part of the world. In the latter half of the 20th century, the European colonies became independent; Russia was the last to withdraw from its colonies: the colonial regime of the Union republics of Central Asia and Transcaucasia was soft, while the share of Russian-speaking population was high. According to the 1989 figures, the autochthonous population in Kazakhstan amounted to 44.4%, in the Chechen-Ingush Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic to 24.8%, and in the Kirghiz S.S.R. to 24.3%. The exodus of Russian speakers from the former Soviet republics was the largest re-immigra- tion wave: 4.5 million left the Central Asian and Transcaucasian republics. Today, the largest share of ethnic Russians in the post-Soviet expanse (up to 30%) lives in Latvia.2 This means that Russia can be regarded as a “problem zone” and an area of transition from one taxonomic level to another. In other words, we can observe a transition from the Soviet ideological discourse complete with its ideological and cultural features and clichés toward a new civilizational identity composed of eclectic cultural blocks which have little in common both with the real state of these cultures and the rapidly changing globalizing space of a new world. These processes are not controlled either at the local or the federal level. Today, Eurasianism (the foundation of which was laid early in the 20th century by Russian émigrés) has come to the fore as one of the models for a new arrangement of Russia, in which Sibe- ria serves as a system-forming and economically attractive segment of the Eurasian geopolitical project. During the last Soviet years, Siberia accounted for 13% of the country’s economic potential and less than 10% of its population living in 57.1% of the country’s total territory. Today, the Russian lands to the east of the Urals comprise 74.8% of the total territory of Russia with just 20.3% of its population. In 2012, the resources produced or pretreated in Siberia constituted from 68% to 75% of Rus- sia’s exports. A great share of the federal budget (50.7%) consists of taxes on mineral extraction and oil and gas (primarily Siberian) export taxes. This puts Russia in 9th place among the biggest global exporters.3 Even a superficial analysis of Siberia’s role in Russia’s aggregate economy vs. its real political and economic status easily reveals contradictions causing a lot of displeasure with federal policies seen as discriminatory by many of those who live in Siberia. It seems that the political and administrative institutions of the Russian Federation should have tried to balance out their regional strategies. We should never forget that Russia’s political and economic stabilization concerns not only its leaders and population: a destabilized Russia may cause a lot of problems for many other countries, its neighbors in particular. Siberia should be modernized and become more independent economically; this means that the mounting systemic degradation of the eastern regions should be stemmed through political, administrative, and economic reforms. Today, the lion’s share of Russia’s export income is earned in Siberia and redistributed from Moscow. The local financial experts are convinced that redistributed investments do not compensate for the retracted money and that redistribution should become fairer. The region, with its considerable economic and intellectual potential, stands a good chance of becoming a new development hub rather than a raw-material appendage and a consumer market for

2 See: Distribution of the Population in the Republic of Latvia by National Composition and State Affiliation as of 01.01.2013, available at [http://ru.wikipedia.org/wiki/Население_Латвии] (in Lettish). 3 See: [http://www.gks.ru/free_doc/doc_2013/rus13.pdf].

22 CENTRAL ASIA AND THE CAUCASUS Volume 15 Issue 2 2014 cheap “made in China” products. The region should be steered toward producing high-tech products with high value added to be sold in the Pacific and Atlantic markets.

Siberia: A Geopolitical Trophy or Part of Russia?

The concept of Eurasianism reconstructed at a new development stage of the super-region is directly related to the problem of rational governance in the ethnic margins. This became obvious when the Russian Empire was spreading far and wide. At one time, prominent Russian historian Vas- ily Kliuchevskiy described the steadily spreading borders as a “curse of the territory” and noted “as the state swelled, the people shrank.”4 This puts the problem of integration of the conquered variegated population in a nutshell and speaks volumes about the multitude of other obvious and latent stumble blocks created by the need to incorporate individual ethnicities into a unified political nation seeking the best algorithm of its historical and cultural development. To adequately understand the problem of Eurasianism, we must remove the large number of stereotypes that distort the true picture. There is a fairly widespread conviction that the Russian Empire subjugated those living in the ethnic margins; political scientists and other experts disagree on the origins of this stereotype: some believe that it was generated by the imperial policies of Russification of the local population; others blame the low professional level, incompetence, and irresponsibility typical of the controlling structures of the Russian Empire, which ignored the specific cultural needs of the titular peoples of the newly acquired territories. There is a different opinion: the empire introduced technological novelties into the area’s primitive production and economic system and educated the autochthonous population. Those who think so are also convinced that the imperial authorities preserved the national and cultural identity of the local populations and treated them with a lot of compassion. The truth is somewhere between the two opposites; to reach it we need to answer the following questions:

 What were the specific (progressing and turbulent) administrative problems the Russian Empire had to cope with in the ethnic margins?  What possibilities could be used to “enforce loyalty?”  What development prospects did come to the fore in these regions? The way this problem, “pivotal” for the Russian academic community, geopoliticians, and population of the colonized territories, was resolved was of special but not absorbing importance. The degree to which the empire realized its resource and constructive potential very much needed for the future of the conquered peoples was much more important. The extent to which the relations between the Great Russians as the empire’s titular nation and the ethnic minorities extended beyond the interests of Russia proper and fitted the emerging

4 V. Kliuchevskiy, “Kurs russkoi istorii. Lektsia XLI,” in: V. Kliuchevskiy, Sobranie sochinennii v 9-ti tomakh. Tom III. Mysl Publishers, Moscow, 1988, p. 12.

23 Volume 15 Issue 2 2014 CENTRAL ASIA AND THE CAUCASUS geopolitical space of civilizational discourse and globalized international politics is no less important.

Eurasianism as the Liberal Empire’s Geopolitical Concept

Eurasianism as a geopolitical theory was created by the Russian émigré intelligentsia of the 1920s as a response to the events of 1917. They did not justify the Bolsheviks and their authoritarian power, but approved of their methods for preserving the territorial integrity of the Russian Empire, which was gradually acquiring a new image. The authors of this theory, severely criticized by prominent scholars and public figures (N. Berdya- ev, I. Ilyin, and G. Fedotov) for their alleged sympathies for the Bolsheviks, did a lot to help the peoples of Russia identify themselves as component parts of a geopolitical entity. A wide discourse of the geostrategic idea of Eurasianism (which went back to certain ideas of Dostoyevsky and the Slavophiles) attracted prominent Russian figures: philologist and culturologist Prince N. Trubetskoy, historian G. Vernadskiy, geographer P. Savitskiy, art critic P. Suvchinskiy, religious philosopher G. Florovskiy, philosopher of history and geographer L. Gumilev, who spoke of himself as “the last Eurasianist,” and many others. On the whole, their ideas can be summed up as: Russia is not Europe and not Asia; it is a very specific continent-country they called Eurasia dominated by the Asian (Turan) elements much more congenial to it. On the other hand, the ideologists of Eurasianism never looked at Europe (including the Western Slavs) as an example to be emulated, but as a threat to the very exclusive culture of all Russians. They were convinced that the artificial transfer of West European ideas of representative democracy, socialism, and liberalism to Russia would do more harm than good. The Eurasianists regarded Russian society as a “symphonic entity” in which Orthodoxy as a system-forming element never clashed with other, non-Christian religions and cultures; it was living side by side or even integrated with them, this symbiosis bearing rich fruit. In this context, Christian Orthodoxy stopped being the element of a certain culture and became an active element of “fermenta- tion” in diverse religious-cultural and social strata (N. Trubetskoy). The Eurasianists criticized Europe (as much as the Slavophiles did) and objected to Eurocen- trism, but they never idealized the social context of the Great Russians and admitted that, although outstripping the Russians in experimental sciences, the Europeans were trailing behind the Russians in terms of ideology and morality. Being deeply rooted in everyday life, the Eurasian doctrine shaped the ideas of its followers about the state and its role: an institution of mobilization and coercion absolutely indispensable in Eurasia where liberalism and weak power were rejected by a greater part of population. After reinterpreting the Slavophilic idea of sobornost as “symphonic unity of collective individuals,” the Eurasianists concluded that Russia needed ideocracy and statism, that is, the organizational principle in which “the ruling stratum” elected by popular vote closed ranks under the banner of a certain idea (doctrine) realized by a strictly authoritarian power and that this power should be represented not by the Bolshevist version of Marxism, but by traditional Orthodoxy. Prince Trubets- koy had the following to say about this: “The type of selection which, according to Eurasianism, should establish itself in the world and in Russia-Eurasia in particular is called ideocratic; the members of the ruling layer are selected and brought together by their common ideas of the world.”5

5 N.S. Trubetskoy, “Ideokratiia i armiia,” in: Evraziiskaia khronika, Issue 10, Paris, 1928, p. 3.

24 CENTRAL ASIA AND THE CAUCASUS Volume 15 Issue 2 2014

According to the Eurasianists, the Bolsheviks realized this principle by cynically replacing Orthodoxy with their quasi-Marxist ideology. The Eurasianists, as apologists of the Russian ideocratic idea, stir up a lot of interest mainly because they place the Eurasian multinational community higher no matter what its political (including national and confessional) specifics. In his address to the citizens of future Russia, Petr Suvchin- skiy wrote: “We should cherish the Motherland above all else happening in society; we should not lose this attitude lest we lose our patriotic pride together with it and fall victim to helpless individual pride, which makes service impossible. Meanwhile, to serve means to understand the destinies of the Motherland and, having grasped it, shape it by one’s own will... We should stir up the depths of Rus- sia’s historical memory ... which in the last few centuries has become too shallow and lost the ability to synthesize the past of its faith, culture, and statehood and no longer recreates the past in the present.”6 When analyzed, everything said about the concept of Eurasianism suggests that its architects (members of the socio-philosophical and culturological school of Russian scholars of the humanities in emigration) tried to preserve the territorial integrity of the Russian Empire. The philosophical ideas of the Eurasianists (highly respected by the scholarly community) may stir up all sorts of feelings, but the high intellectual level is keeping them alive to serve as the starting point for academics and politicians alike striving to resolve the problems of Russia’s civilizational identity as a multi-ethnic and multi-cultural entity. Certain political forces have borrowed concepts and terms from the Eurasianists to use them as the cornerstone of the national idea of Russia striving for geostrategic domination. I will not comment on what Russian politicians say about Eurasianism: they have come close to the ideas of geopolitical revenge and reincarnation of the empire and are obviously unconcerned about the future of this geopolitical space. The format described by the Eurasianists and supported today by their followers requires cruel authoritarianism that does not shun repressive and mobilization methods of governance. This is confirmed by imperial and Soviet practices and is fraught with total corruption and a new GULAG archi- pelago. Today, we can see a wave of conflicts (very similar to that which arose on the eve of World War I) rising in the Russian Federation. The people in power responded with quasi-patriotic rhetoric; they are trying to defuse the tension by talking about Orthodox values, “rising from the knees,” re- unification of the lost Russian lands, and talks about conspiring Jews and Free Masons. I have posed myself the very limited task of discussing the Eurasian theory in the light of the civilizational problems that are rapidly coming to the fore amid the mounting globalization in all spheres of human life and the urgent need to seek and find a cultural-historical identity as the starting point of strategic development of any entity. It should be said that the Eurasian civilization in the territory of the disintegrating Russian Empire was interpreted by the founders of Eurasianism as the sum-total of peoples living together in Eurasia and bound together by a common history and cultural traditions. Different ethnic origins, languages, religions, and traditions apart, these peoples share a common typology.

Eurasia as a Civilizational Egregore

The Eurasianists call the territory that coincides with the territories of Russian Empire and the Soviet Union which replaced it Eurasia (Russia-Eurasia).

6 P. Suvchinskiy, “K preodoleniiu revolutsii,” Nash Sovremennik, No. 2, 1992, pp. 157, 158.

25 Volume 15 Issue 2 2014 CENTRAL ASIA AND THE CAUCASUS

They insisted that the commonly accepted division into European and Asian parts along the Urals was unjustified and that it was a single ecosystem and, naturally enough, geostrategic space. They pointed out that the empire’s European part (up to the geographical border with Asia) and the territories in the eastern and southern sectors (situated in Asia) had very similar landscapes, climates, flora, and fauna. At the same time, they pointed to obvious differences between the geography and climates of the former Russian Empire and Eastern and Western Europe: the territories stretching up to the borders of the Russian Empire were a patchwork landscape with mild winters and moderate summers. Beyond the imperial borders, there were plains with a continental climate, which meant cold winters and scorching summers. The closely interconnected ecosystems and ethnogenesis (Lev Gumilev looked into all the details of the process in his Ethnogenesis and the Biosphere, Progress Publishers, Moscow, 1990) and the macro- and micro-climatic conditions determine the living conditions and the way of life in all the territories; they shape civilizations and the “symphonic” individual of the civilizations and are responsible for the basic systemic features of the people living in the Eurasian expanse. The peoples of the forests and steppe, mainly Slavs (Great Russians, Ukrainians, and Belaru- sians), Turks, Finno-Ugrians, and Mongols (Turans), outnumber those living in the sparsely populated tundra and deserts. The fact that they inhabited the same geopolitical and geostrategic area presupposes close economic, social, and political ties and led to the emergence of a single system of coordinates, a civilizational “matrix” of sorts. The Eurasianists could discern a lot of similarities in the Eurasian peoples, even though they followed different religions and traditions, belonged to different anthropological types, and had different ethnic roots. (It should be said that anthropologists detected long ago that any, even very different “smaller races” are connected by chains of “transition” each of which taken separately is practically unnoticeable and can be regarded as a variation of the same genotype.) There are many phonological similarities in the languages of ethnicities and sub-ethnicities of Eurasia (which belong to different linguistic groups). Nikolai Trubetskoy and Roman Jakobson underpinned this approach with the concept of a “linguistic union” that united languages by geographical location rather than linguistic closeness, a typical feature of a language family (Jakobson also spoke about a “Eurasian linguistic union”).7 The confessional specifics of the Eurasian peoples do not disunite, but rather keep them fairly close together: Orthodox Slavs, Turkic Muslims, and Lamaists (Buryats, Tuvinians, Kalmyks, and Mongols) alike keep religion and everyday life very close together and prefer to build the state and its policies on the principles of ideocracy rather than pragmatism. Having elaborated the “Eurasian system of coordinates” based on their observation and conclusions, the Eurasianists arrived at the following: (1) From the geostrategic point of view, Russia-Eurasia was neither Europe nor Asia, nor their blend, but a special territory called Eurasia. (2) The peoples of Eurasia cannot be divided into Slavs (Europeans) and Turanians (Asians)— they are all Eurasians. The official Russian/Soviet historiosophy, which acquired its final shape under the Romanovs, follows the Westerners to regard the Great Russians as Eastern Slavs and to exclude their Asian

7 See: [http://russkayagazeta.com/rg/gazeta/fullstory/live-trub] (see also: R. Yakobson, “K kharakteristike evraziiskogo iazykovogo soiuza,” in: R. Jakobson, Selected Writings. I. Phonological Studies, ‘s-Gravenhague, 1962; cf.: R. Jakobson, Über die phonologische Sprachbünde, TCLP, 4, 1931; idem, Sur la théorie des affinités phonologiques entre les langues, «Actes du IV Congrès international des linguistes», Copenhague, 1938).

26 CENTRAL ASIA AND THE CAUCASUS Volume 15 Issue 2 2014 identity. The founding fathers of Eurasianism, in turn, did a lot to prove the Eurasian nature of the Great Russian ethnicity. They also pointed to the Turanian, eastern roots of the Great Russians, the system-forming super-ethnicity of Eurasia, a product of mixed ethnic elements of Turks, Finno- Ugrians, and even Mongols. This fully applies to their language, which brims with direct and indirect Tatar borrowings.8 The Eurasianists considered the Russian political tradition to be eastern or Asian rather than European. Eastern Christianity as the religion of the Great Russians was more mystical and irrational than Western Christianity and, in this respect, was close to the Oriental faiths. The Eurasianists were convinced that the Great Russians should shake off Western illusions and admit that they were not Europeans (in fact, Europe never accepted them as such) and reconcile themselves to their closeness to the Eastern peoples as an objective reality and formulate their geostrategic tasks accordingly. The geographic, climatic, sociocultural, religious, and linguistic factors responsible for the homogenous nature of the Eurasian civilizational egregore were responsible for its very exclusive historical, political, economic, and cultural landscape. The Eurasianists went even further: they insisted on a gradual shift (though unconfirmed by historical facts) toward political integration. History is not a chain of wars, but a space of trade, economic, ethnic, cultural and other contacts that led to cultural and ethnic admixtures, the role of which should be taken into account.9 The Eurasianists pointed to one more ethnocultural and geopolitical specific feature of Eurasia, namely, at all times it was the home of strong authoritarian states. They were convinced that any attempt to set up a liberal democracy of the Western type in Eurasia (as a sociopolitical and economic space) would bring total degradation and social collapse. They paid particular attention to the Golden Horde, the state of the Turkic-Mongol tribes, and pointed to the geopolitical and institutional continuity between the Golden Horde and the Muscovite State and the obvious closeness of their political traditions (ideocracy and authoritarianism) and anti- Western foreign policies. The Eurasianists never denied that the Turkic-Mongol invasion destroyed Rus and pointed out that its vassal dependence on the Golden Horde incorporation into the Golden Horde played a positive role. It should be said that the rulers of the Golden Horde demonstrated a lot of religious tolerance, while Western knights tried to impose Catholicism on the Russians. Prince Alexander Nevsky, who considered the Golden Horde an acceptable ideologeme, saved Russian Orthodoxy and Russia. The Eurasianists believe that the Golden Horde protected Russia against the hostile West and created a zone in which the future Russian state could develop in safety. The Eurasianists divided the history of Russia into several periods.  The first period from the 1st millennium B.C. to the 14th century was a time of the nomadic empires of Scythians, Sarmates, Huns, Bulgars, Khazars, and Tatar-Mongols, which came one after the other; the leading layer was nomadic, the dominant ideology (as the Eurasianists understood it) was paganism, which they confused with Tengriism.  The second period from the 14th century to 1917 was an epoch of Great Russian domination in Eurasia represented by the Muscovite State and the Romanovs, the former being the highest point of Russian history (the Eurasianists agreed with the Slavophiles on this).

8 Later this was convincingly confirmed by Kazakh poet and student of protolanguages Oljas Suleymenov in his books Az i Ya, Yazyk pisma and Tyurki v doistorii. 9 In the mid-1990s, I offered a specific discussion of this subject in: “Turkestan-Turan—illiuzia realnosti ili realnost illiuziy,” Tiurkskiy mir, No. 2, 1999, available at [http://www.analytics-iss.ru/articles/library/libr_rus_18_8_00gp.htm] and “Gimn Evraziystvu kak epitafia Rossiyskoy imperii,” available at [http://gazeta.zn.ua/CULTURE/gimn_evraziystvu_kak_ epitafiya_rossiyskoy_imperii.html].

27 Volume 15 Issue 2 2014 CENTRAL ASIA AND THE CAUCASUS

On the other hand, while the Slavophiles pointed to the Orthodox nature of the Muscovite State, the Eurasianists considered it a geopolitical descendant of the Golden Horde from which Muscovy inherited its statehood and lands. Both were states of “those who served,” in which all and everyone, either peasant or aristocrat, served the czar (khan), while the ruling class was replenished with those loyal to the state-forming idea. This differed from the West where relations between the patrons and patronized (between the feudal lords and the kings or between feudal lords and vassals) were negoti- ated, while the social status depended on ancestry. The Europeans argued that the social status/ancestry introduced in Russia divided its society into the nobility, which thought of themselves as Europeans, and the ordinary people, who learned to regard the aristocrats as an alien element. This led to the revolutions of 1905 and 1917 interpreted by the Eurasianists as the response of the Russians and other Eurasian peoples to forced Europeanization.

A New Phase of the Eurasian Concept

The October revolution of 1917 (which the Eurasianists interpreted as a national-liberation revolution) ushered in the third, Soviet, period in Eurasian history: the Bolsheviks liberated the country from the bonds of foreign capital that had turned it into the semblance of a Western colony. At this point they fell into the trap of contradictions. As adepts of the radical Western idea, the Communist-Bolsheviks who headed the October coup knew next to nothing about Russia’s specifics and misinterpreted its geostrategic status. They restored its territory, set up a strong authoritarian ideocratic state, which contradicted their ideas of interna- tionalism and their conviction that the state should wither away and the former colonies should become independent. The Eurasianists regarded declarative federalism, a one-party system, the Komsomol, the Sovi- ets, etc. as very useful novelties; they accepted as positive the new practice of drawing representatives of all nations and social groups into the ruling structures. At the same time, they rejected the ideas of Communist-Bolsheviks as absolutely false, unacceptable in Eurasia, and unsuitable for its cultural specifics. They went as far as predicting that sooner or later the gap between the Western ideas and the Eurasian spirit would destroy the Soviet Union. They even naively believed that the West would use the disintegration of Eurasian space as a chance to destroy the Soviet Union to give a new lease of life to Eurasia armed with a new ideology and capitalizing on the best results of the Soviet institutional reforms.

Siberian Eurasianism Seen from the Inside, or the Siberian Egregore

When trying to reconstruct the political identity of Eurasia as a historical, social, and cultural space, the classical Eurasianists, who had no direct knowledge of the subject, were confronted with criticism. I want to introduce here Grigory Potanin (1835-1920), a prominent student of Siberia and Central Asia, a “patriot of Siberia,” and an Eurasianist to a much greater extent than the “classical” Eurasianists. There are even more illustrious names associated with Eurasia and Eurasianism: P. Semenov- Tianshanskiy (1823-1914), N. Przhevalskiy (1839-1888), V. Grum-Grzhimaylo (1861-1921), N. Yadrin- tsev (1842-1894), V. Radlov (1837-1918), N. Konrad (1891-1970), Kazakh Ch. Valikhanov (1836- 28 CENTRAL ASIA AND THE CAUCASUS Volume 15 Issue 2 2014

1865), Buryats D. Banzanov (1822-1855) and G. Tsibikov (1873-1930), Yakut G. Ksenofontov (1888-1938), and others. All of them can be called trailblazers. Even the briefest analysis of the works of these real founders of the theory of Eurasianism goes far beyond the limits of this article, yet I deem it necessary to say here that they regarded Eurasia as a historical and cultural entity rather than a “liberal empire” (Anatoli Chubais). The present generation of Eurasianists (they have assumed this title without sufficient grounds) either knows next to nothing about the scholarly heritage of their predecessors or deliberately ignores it for ideological reasons. A comprehensive study and revival of the ideas found in the works of the above-mentioned giants of Eurasianism (which can be described as an academic treasure) could have been used to harmonize ethnic, social, and cultural relations within the geopolitical space of Eurasia. If continued and further developed, their ideas could have revived Eurasia as an equal entity of world civilization; so far, however, nothing has been done in this respect. I would like to dwell here on certain theses formulated by Grigory Potanin, which official Rus- sian and Soviet science preferred to pass over in silence. They are related to the administrative status of the Siberian Territory; in fact, his academic legacy was suppressed because he was an ardent sup- porter of what he called “autonomism” or “Siberian patriotism,” which speaks more of his civil and philosophic position. He was convinced that the Eurasian space needed a horizontal system of self-governance as the best model of social, political, and administrative arrangement and that values created by the local traditions and sociocultural realities should be accepted as the political, economic, historical, and cultural priorities rather than as imposed abstract values that had nothing in common with the local economic system, cultural traditions, and mentality. In a letter to his colleague Nikolai Yadrintsev, he discussed the possibility of patterning the Siberian administration on the Swiss Confederation: “I want to demonstrate that everything is so good in small states where all public figures know each other, where people are very close to the everyday life of their leaders, where a public figure acts not as a theoretician far removed from life, but is involved in local developments, and where there is close control over all and everyone involved in public life.”10 While in exile in 1868-1871, Potanin became absolutely firm in his conviction that the bureaucratic mindset destroyed local specifics and unified interests. It was then that he started writing a textbook on what he called “science about motherland” based on his belief that the child should be taught to think that his native town or village represented the whole world; his worldview should be later expanded to the region and, still later, to the country, and quite logically concluded that each region should have its own textbook.11 A concise description of czarist administrative and social policy in Siberia will clarify the point.12 After ascending to power, the Bolsheviks made no attempt to cardinally revise the imperial laws relating to ethnic relations and the political, legal, social, and economic status of the autochthonous peoples or readjust the region’s administrative-territorial division. The command form of administration that the Soviet Union inherited from the Russian Empire and the state, which was present in all spheres of social life, reduced the autochthonous peoples of Siberia to a target of exploitation. The state regarded them primarily as taxpayers, while deliberately disregarding their ethnic origins and ethno-psychological specifics; this deprived the Siberian peoples of homogenous existen- tial self-perception and ideas about the world. Until the early 20th century, there was no clearly for-

10 Quoted from: I. Podshivalov, “Patriotizm svobodnoy Sibiri,” available at [http://www.syndikalist.narod.ru]. 11 Ibidem. 12 See: “Aborigennaia (inorodcheskaia) politika,” available at [http://bsk.nios.ru/enciklodediya/aborigennaya- inorodcheskaya-politika].

29 Volume 15 Issue 2 2014 CENTRAL ASIA AND THE CAUCASUS mulated nationalities policy; on the other hand, this attitude toward the local peoples speeded up their assimilation. While spreading far and wide in Siberia, the czarist authorities had a no more or less clear ideology; what was done was done for the sake of acquiring new lands and making their population subjects of the Russian Empire. This brings to mind the rulers of the Muscovite State who “gathered” lands and interacted with the non-Russian peoples of the Urals and the Volga Area, all of them not Orthodox Christians. Certain elements of the Golden Horde policies were applied to the subjugated peoples of Siberia. The methods used to unify individual territories and peoples with Russia did nothing to change the administrative principles used in Siberia for a long time. Here I have in mind, first and foremost, cooperation with the non-Russian clan and tribal elites and the administrative measures and repressions used to pacify the masses. The local Siberian administrations used more violence to adjust the unified methods recommended from above to the real Siberian context.

 First, not all Siberian peoples meekly accepted Russians and their power; many of them used arms to resist the colonialists.  Second, the czarist administration, which had promised to protect the local peoples from the arbitrary rule of local administrators, failed to keep its promises at all times and in all cases. The local administrations used violence, extortion, plundering, and lies when gathering taxes from the aborigines. The situation was further aggravated by frequent intrusions of private entrepreneurs into the hunting reserves of the locals; not infrequently, their lands were occupied by migrants from Russia, while merchants increased their income by lending money on interest. In the 18th and 19th centuries, the number of Slavs in Siberia increased many times over. The declining fur (sable) trade and the government’s decision to develop agriculture, mining, and trade as the main sources of budget revenues transformed the local people into land-tillers and industrial workers. The Europeanization, modernization, and bureaucratization of Russia and paternalism as an instrument of the Siberian administrators created the false impression of the Siberian peoples as “primitive” to be enlightened, civilized, and assimilated. In the Russian Empire and the Soviet Union, this meant Russification; nothing was done to preserve ethnic specifics: the state was determined to radically change the lifestyle of the autochthonous population through administrative control and regimentation of all spheres of social life. The czarist colonial regime relied on the local clan and tribal elite and increased its administrative powers specified by S. Vladislavich-Raguzinskiy in 172813; his instructions written for the Trans- Baikal Territory were applied across Siberia. The Senate further specified them in its decrees of the 1703s-1750s and the instructions given by the czar to Second-Major A. Shcherbachev of the Life Guards of the Semenov Regiment in 1763 when he was appointed head of the First Yasak (Tax- Gathering) Commission.14 In the early 18th century, it was decided to turn the autochthonous Siberian peoples into “true subjects of the Russian Empire” through mass and at times enforced Christianization. By the end of the same century, all more or less large Siberian peoples had been baptized, with the exception of those who embraced Buddhism and Islam. In an effort to avoid religious clashes and remain in con-

13 [http://interpretive.ru/dictionary/438/word/vladislavich-raguzinskii-sava-luki]; [http://ez.chita.ru/encycl/ person/?id=353]. 14 See: “Aborigennaia (inorodcheskaia) politika.”

30 CENTRAL ASIA AND THE CAUCASUS Volume 15 Issue 2 2014 trol, the czarist administrators revised their previously negative attitude toward both faiths, which were legalized. After a while, the Russian state readjusted its attitude toward the autochthonous population of Siberia, but the resultant administrative reforms did nothing much to soften the negative repercussions of the originally cruel colonization to any considerable degree. At that time, capturing the lands of the locals by peasants who had moved from European Russia was being carried out on a wide scale, which made reconciliation between the locals and the migrants impossible. The local people were turned into serfs to be bought and sold, while the authorities preferred to ignore what was going on.15 The Charter on Ruling the Aliens was one of the basic documents by which those who admin- istered Siberia were guided; it can be described as an attempt to reconcile the conservative course of Russian autocracy applied to the Siberian autochthonous peoples and overdue reforms. It was issued because by that time it had become clear that the local people should be incorporated into the system of Russian legal, social, and economic relations. Under this document, the local peoples acquired the right to their land; it also specified the size of taxes, regulated the rules of trade with Russian merchants, and extended Russian criminal laws to the autochthonous population of Siberia. This act was relatively tolerant toward different religions even though the clergy of the aliens were controlled by the police. On the whole, the Charter preserved the traditional economic, social, and cultural context, but pushed the local people toward gradual and complete assimilation. The document remained valid until 1917; it downplayed, to a certain extent, the regional specifics, even if did not destroy them altogether. In the latter half of the 19th century, czarism readjusted its administrative policy to the newly acquired Caucasus, Kazakhstan, Central Asia, the Amur and Maritime areas. Russia strengthened its position in Mountain Altai and energetically moved into Tuva and Mongolia. Territorial expansion stabilized the situation along Russia’s southern borders; the empire became less concerned about the foreign influence in Southern Siberia and Central Asia, which strove to liberate themselves from the Russian Empire. Russia, on the other hand, acquired more opportunities to assimilate the aliens and move into their territories in the form of mass migration of Russian peasants to Siberia. It should be said that from the very beginning, peasant migration was seen as the key factor of Russification of the newly acquired lands. In the latter half of the 19th and early 20th centuries, it became the main geopolitical tool used to complete annexation of Russia’s Asian territories. On the whole, between the end of the 16th and the early 20th centuries, the administrative system of Siberia developed from military-colonial to administrative-territorial, which changed the social and legal status of the autochthonous population and contributed to the emergence of new economic and cultural types. The local people mastered new types of economic activities; later, when this area became part of the empire’s legal space, the “social status of aliens” was abolished; and the local people became assimilated, while Siberia became a single ethnic and cultural space.

15 See: M.M. Fedorov, The Legal Status of the Peoples of Eastern Siberia (17th-early 19th centuries), Yakutsk, 1978; L.M. Dameshek, Internal Policy of Czarism and the Peoples of Siberia (19th-Early 20th Centuries), Irkutsk, 1986; A.Yu. Konev, Autochthonous Peoples of Northwestern Siberia in the Administrative System of the Russian Empire (18th-Early 20th Centuries), Moscow, 1995; Peoples of Siberia as Part of the State of Russia, St. Petersburg, 1999; Russia’s Multinational Civilization: Unity and Contradictions, Moscow, 2003; Asian Russia in Geopolitical and Civilizational Dynamics. The 16th-20th Centuries, Moscow, 2004; E.P. Kovalyashkina, “The Aliens” Question in Siberia: Concepts of State Policies and Regional Ideas, Tomsk, 2005 (all in Russian); Andreas Kappeler, Russland als Vielvolkerreich: Entstehung, Geschichte, Zerfall, Verlag C.H. Beck, Munich, 2008, 416 pp.; English translation: Andreas Kappeler, The Russian Empire: A Multiethnic History, Longman, London, 2001, xxiii, 455 pp.

31 Volume 15 Issue 2 2014 CENTRAL ASIA AND THE CAUCASUS

The centralized administrative system, which encouraged the fairly passive bureaucrats, created a completely corrupt and arbitrary system. There were even more problems, which were either swept under the carpet or resolved in favor of bureaucrats, while the efforts of the local population to stand opposed to the unbridled tyranny were cruelly suppressed.

By Way of a Conclusion

No matter what, the Eurasian project is moving to the fore in Moscow since, to quote Vladimir Ulyanov-Lenin, leader of the Russian proletariat, “the lower classes do not want the old way and the upper classes cannot carry on in the old way.” Implementation of this geostrategic project (in which Siberia with its highly qualified scientific and technical potential and progressively minded intelligentsia will play the central role) completely depends on whether the people in power can master new ideas and acquire political will. Siberia’s future as part of the geopolitical and civilizational space, which also includes the newly independent states of Central Asia and the Caucasus, depends on whether it will become an inalienable part of the Russian Federation. It is highly important that these newly independent states become civilized and economically and technologically developed entities of the Eurasian community without losing their state sovereignty, but rather strengthening it by means of equal and mutually advantageous relations.

THE IRANIAN-PAKISTANI FACTOR IN THE GEOPOLITICS OF CENTRAL AND SOUTH ASIA

Gouli YULDASHEVA D.Sc. (Political Science), Research Associate, Central Eurasia Project (Tashkent, Uzbekistan)

ABSTRACT

he author has chosen Iran and Paki- twined, as well as the extent of their interac- stan, two giants of the Muslim world, tion with other actors (the U.S., Russia, T as the subject of her analysis and China, India, Saudi Arabia, Afghanistan, and identifies their place in the context of the the Central Asian republics). geopolitical changes underway in Central She also points to the potentially useful and South Asia. She investigates in detail factors that might eventually help to overcome the degree to which their interests are inter- all the challenges, risks, and threats that, so

32 CENTRAL ASIA AND THE CAUCASUS Volume 15 Issue 2 2014 far, remain prominent enough to slow down from Afghanistan, are further destabilizing the progress in the relations between Iran and already destabilized situation in the AfPak Pakistan. The talks between the West and zone. This negatively affects the relations be- Iran, which have been going on far too long tween the two countries, their potential impact and complicated by the Ukrainian crisis and on the Central Asian region, and the pros- the rapidly approaching NATO drawdown pects for the geoprojects related to them.

KEYWORDS: Iran, Pakistan, Central Asia, South Asia, Afghanistan, geopolitics, the U.S., Saudi Arabia, India, interest, factor, strategy, security.

Introduction

Today, the security of Central and South Asia, the Middle East, and the CIS largely depends on the level of relations between the Islamic Republic of Pakistan and the Islamic Republic of Iran, as well as on the strategy the latter pursues in the so-called AfPak zone. It has become clear to one and all that the nuclear haggling between Tehran and the P5+1 (the U.S., Russia, China, the U.K., France, and Germany), which has been going on and on, and the upcoming drawdown of the coalition forces from Afghanistan are destabilizing the domestic situation in Pakistan. This is affecting the relations between Iran and Pakistan and the intensity of their impact on Central Asian and global geopolitics.

Interests, Challenges and Threats

Pakistan, Washington’s key ally in Central Asia, and Iran are stubbornly pursuing political and economic domination in the regional countries, with which they share common cultural and historical ties and geographical proximity. Islamabad is seeking regional domination by becoming a gate to the Indian Ocean and to the world markets for the Central Asian countries. In addition, Pakistan is securing its long-term geopolitical aims in Central Asia—integration with the region’s countries and drawing them into its geopolitical orbit. At all times, Afghanistan has always been regarded as the best geo-economic access to Central Asia. It comes as no surprise that Islamabad is building up its influence on Kabul. It is working hard to regain its lost position in Afghanistan by becoming actively involved in its economic and political rehabilitation; the pro-Pakistani forces may be represented in the new Afghan government. It is expected that the Turkmenistan-Afghanistan-Pakistan gas pipeline and the related transportation projects designed to give the land-locked partners access to the Pakistani ports of Karachi and Gwadar will play a great role in the process. So far, Pakistan’s ambitious Central Asian strategy remains on paper because of nagging material and financial problems and the high level of internal instability, a product of the Afghan crisis. To be more exact, radical religious movements of the Taliban type that figure prominently in Pakistan can be described as a factor that provokes and maintains instability in the AfPak zone and complicates relations among Pakistan, the Central Asian countries, and Afghanistan. It should be said that in the not-so-distant past these movements were incorporated into the government and military structures,

33 Volume 15 Issue 2 2014 CENTRAL ASIA AND THE CAUCASUS while experts did not exclude their possible ties with the conservative elements in Iran and other Middle Eastern countries.1 In any case, the religious and political fundamentalism of the Taliban, ill- fitted to the Central Asian secular lifestyle, widens the gap between the Central Asian republics and Pakistan and strongly affects their formal relations. On the other hand, Iran, which relies, among other things, on the Shi‘a communities in Pakistan (10 to 20% of the total population) and Afghanistan (10 to 19%)2 is trying to outbalance Pakistan’s presence in Central Asia. This means that Iran is a partner and also a potential rival of Pakistan in the Afghan issue. On the other hand, both countries prefer a balance of power in Central Asia, which looks fragile amid the mounting instability and geopolitical struggle exacerbated by the upcoming NATO pullout. To ensure their security interests, Iran and Pakistan should try harder to settle the Afghan crisis, cut short drug trafficking and organized crime, address the refugee crisis, etc. Both are very interested in comprehensive regional partnership within the U.S.-inspired New Silk Road project3 or Heart of Asia project launched by the Afghan Institute for Strategic Studies (AISS).4 Their realization totally depends on whether the transit and transportation routes between Cen- tral Asia and South and Southeast Asia and Europe are implemented; they are of vital importance for the Iranian and Pakistani economies now in crisis. It should be said that Iran’s interests are impaired by Pakistan’s weakening and marginalization; it lost its former position in Afghanistan and is struggling with a political and economic crisis. To avoid instability in their territory, the people in power in Tehran are doing their best to maintain flexible economic and security cooperation with Pakistan. On the other hand, Iran boosted its diplomatic activities to extend Central Asian transit across its territory; the ten rounds of talks carried out with railway companies of the Central Asian countries are the best proof of Tehran’s frantic efforts to preserve its domination in Central Asia.5 Islamabad figures prominently in Tehran’s plans relating to the regional transportation routes and fuel pipelines from Central Asia to Europe and Asia, amply confirmed by the recently launched modernization of Pakistani railways in the areas bordering on Iran. On the other hand, closer economic cooperation between Iran and Pakistan may decrease the conflicting potential in Central Asia and around it; to achieve this the Central Asian states should be actively involved in joint (and mutually advantageous) regional projects. This will accelerate the local countries’ economic integration indispensible for sustainable economic growth. So far, full-scale economic cooperation between Tehran and Islamabad cannot be realized due to the following factors: — Iranian-American; — American-Russian; — Saudi;

1 See, for example: J. Stern, “Pakistan’s Jihad Culture,” Foreign Affairs, Vol. 79, No. 6, November/December 2000, pp. 119, 123. 2 [http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Shia_Islam], 9 March, 2014 (accessed 16 March, 2014). 3 For more details, see: New Silk Road Strategy: Problems and Perspectives—Interview with Prof. S. Frederick Starr, The Jamestown Foundation, 22 November, 2011, available at [http://jamestownfoundation.blogspot.com/2011/11/newsilk- road-strategy-problems-and.html]. 4 [http://aiss.af/index.php/flagship-initiatives/afg-pak-india-trilateral-meeting/article-categories/415-aiss-launched- heart-of-asia-research-project-1]. 5 See: “Spros na tranzitnye perevozki gruzov cherez territoriiu Irana prodolzhaet rasti,” available at [http://www.iran. ru/news/economics/92881/Spros_na_tranzitnye_perevozki_gruzov_cherez_territoriyu_Irana_prodolzhaet_rasti], 14 March, 2014.

34 CENTRAL ASIA AND THE CAUCASUS Volume 15 Issue 2 2014

— Chinese; — Afghan; — Indo-Pakistani.

The Iranian-American and American-Russian Factors

Since the 1979 Islamic revolution, Iran has been consistently opposing any foreign interference in the region. This explains its strong disagreement with the American military presence in Afghani- stan after 2014. Pakistan, on the other hand, as a strategic partner of the United States, which has always depended on Washington for its security and economic status, is one of the main “foes” of the Iranian conservative establishment. The United States spared no effort to keep Iran isolated and prevent its closer relations with Pakistan. In doing this, Washington relied on:

 the Pakistan-Saudi tandem. Immediately after September 2001 events, the U.S. decided that it would be more effective6 to combine its aid to Pakistan with contacts with other Muslim countries in the expectation that this combination would help to address and resolve a wide range of problems (primarily stabilization in Afghanistan). When applied, however, this aggravated the Shi‘a-Sunni disagreements and invigorated regional rivalry between Iran and Saudi Arabia.  economic instruments used to force Islamabad to select business partners suggested by Washington. Pakistan, as the main recipient of American financial aid, is living under con- stant pressure from Washington, which torpedoes all economic projects with Tehran. It does not like the plans to build an Iranian-Pakistani gas pipeline under the agreement signed in 2002: Washington suspects that Tehran will spend the money thus earned on international terrorists and proliferation of WMD. Recently, Pakistani oil minister Shahid Khaqan Abbasi said that work on the pipeline was not possible because of the sanctions “imposed by the United States and the European Union on Tehran over its controversial nuclear drive.” It is expected that the pipeline, the cost of which is assessed at $7.5 billion, will bring 21.1 million cu m of Iranian gas everyday to Pakistan, which is “struggling with a severe gas crisis.” Today Iran has already completed its 900 km of the pipeline, while 780 km on the Pakistani side is still under construction.7  possible interference of the special services of the United States and the Gulf countries in terrorist groups’ activities in the zones of the planned Iranian-Pakistani pipelines. Some believe that these groups might have been involved in terrorist actions in the provinces of Sistan and Baluchistan.8  further exacerbation of Indian-Pakistani relations (see below).

6 See: Razmyshleniia o terrorizme: vliianie na Iuzhnuiu Aziiu i Blizhniy Vostok: Materialy mezhd. seminara 3 aprelia 2002 goda, Center for Strategic and International Studies, Washington, 2002. 7 See: “Iran Says Pakistan Obliged to Finish Pipeline,” RFE/RL, 27 February, 2014, available at [http://www.payvand. com/news/14/feb/1185.html], 17 March, 2014. 8 See: A. Evstratov, “Glavny istochnik irano-pakistanskoy napriazhennosti,” 25 February, 2014, available at [http:// www.iran.ru/news/analytics/92691/Glavnyy_istochnik_irano_pakistanskoy_napryazhennosti], 27 February, 2014.

35 Volume 15 Issue 2 2014 CENTRAL ASIA AND THE CAUCASUS

The American-Russian factor. Geopolitics of Central and South Asia and the Middle East is rooted in the contradictions between the United States and Russia. The rivalry of these superpowers for domination in this vast zone predetermines, to different extents, the pace and specifics of what is going on there: the balance of power in the area depends on the orientation of the states aligned along the America-Russia axis. This makes Iran an important factor in building a world order advantageous to the U.S. or the RF. Confrontation between the United States and Iran forces both Washington and Moscow to seek support for their policies in the AfPak zone in Islamabad, which inevitably affects relations between Iran and Pakistan. In particular, the agreement between Delhi and Washington on strategic partnership and the newly recognized role and importance of the Pakistani Taliban in stabilizing Afghanistan have forced Russia to shift its political preferences from India to Pakistan.9 At the same time, relations between the United States and Pakistan are rapidly cooling because of drones, transportation of coalition troops, etc. The Iranian-Pakistani tension subsided and the number of more or less considerable conflicts decreased. On the eve of the pullout, the United States is becoming more and more aware of Pakistan’s key role (both positive and negative) in the Afghan settlement. India, in turn, which expected to establish much closer relations with the United States after 2014, is very concerned about what it sees as Wash- ington’s efforts to establish constructive contacts with Islamabad. The Ukrainian developments shifted the accents in regional geopolitics once more. After the Crimean referendum held on 16 March, 2014 with Moscow’s support, the U.S.-led Western community promised harsh anti-Russian sanctions. The situation is very dynamic, the variables are too numerous to allow for more or less reliable forecasts. One thing is clear: the American-Russian partnership on Afghanistan is threatened; this might affect, at least partially, the implementation of joint Iranian-Pakistani projects and continued functioning of the Russian-Pakistani workgroup set up to fight terrorism. Today, the position of Iran, which officially sides with Moscow, contradicts Paki- stan’s latent neutrality as an American ally. In any case, Tehran will have to adjust its regional conduct to Moscow’s economic interests. It cannot be excluded that Delhi and Moscow will move closer because of the present disagreements between India and the United States,10 which will keep the disagreements between India and Pakistan very much alive.

Other Factors

Saudi Arabia. The U.S. efforts to establish more or less stable relations with Iran have stirred up political aggressiveness in Saudi Arabia, Tehran’s regional rival. If the talks between the P5+1 and Iran prove successful, Saudi Arabia will lose some of its present geopolitical and economic clout in the Middle East and Central Asia. Riyadh has already identified Islamabad as one of the allies in the struggle again Tehran’s higher regional status; it “will use its channels to negotiate a deal with Tehrik- i-Taliban (TTP).”11

9 See, for example: A. Davydenko, “V.I. Matvienko: Otnosheniia Rossii i Pakistana—na pod’eme,” Mezhdunarodnaya zhizn, available at [http://interaffairs.ru/read.php?item=9205], 28 February 2013; “Otnosheniia Rossii i Pakistana nachalo 2013,” Svargaman, 31 May, 2013, available at [http://voprosik.net/otnosheniya-rossii-i-pakistana-nachalo-2013], 19 March, 2014. 10 See: “Pakistan-Rossia: novy format otnosheniy s islamskim mirom,” Pakistan Today, 12 September, 2013 [http:// www.islamnews.ru/news-141723.html], 19 March, 2014. 11 “Saudi-Pak Deal: Pakistan Promises to Keep Its Borders Open for Afghans,” 7 January, 2014, available at [http:// www.dispatchnewsdesk.com/saudi-pak-deal-pakistan-promises-keep-borders-open-afghans], 17 March, 2014.

36 CENTRAL ASIA AND THE CAUCASUS Volume 15 Issue 2 2014

It is equally important that “Saudi Arabia was seeking Pakistani assistance to train rebels in Jordan and Turkey with the goal of creating a regular military force” in Syria. “It is reasonable to assume that Pakistan will assist the kingdom in providing small arms and training for the Syrian rebels, at least to the extent that this does not upset Islamabad’s relations with Washington,”12 and Tehran. It is unwise to entrust the balance of interstate forces to radically-minded and heavily-armed people; their haphazard and uncontrolled moves might lead to far-reaching repercussions in the Mid- dle East and in Central and South Asia. Ukraine is the best example. On the other hand, experts do not exclude that Riyadh might try to upturn the joint Iranian- Pakistani energy projects. Under pressure from the Saudi opposition and the Western sanctions, “Iran says it has canceled a planned $500 million loan to Pakistan to build part of a pipeline to bring natural gas from Iran.”13 This means that Riyadh and Islamabad are pursuing a two-faced policy: on the one hand, both capitals are talking to the Taliban, which is aimed at adjusting the Afghan political field to their own interests. On the other, they support the riots in Syria and are fanning the Sunni-Shi‘a strife and religious extremism in Central Asia probably guided and funded by unofficial radical groups in both countries. China. Despite China’s current friendly relations with both countries, in the future (when the sanctions are completely removed), it might concentrate on more predictable and sustainable Iran. This is illustrated by the current plans to raise the volume of bilateral Iranian-Chinese trade to $38 billion14; Beijing and Islamabad are only cooperating in the military-political sphere. It is absolutely clear that this partnership—arms deliveries, assistance in modernization of armed forces and a Chinese naval base in Gwadar—is a strong irritant for Iran, which is claiming regional leadership. We should also bear in mind that the use of military force against the Shi‘a community of Pakistan cannot be excluded. Tehran is obviously concerned about China’s involvement in transportation projects that will connect it with Central Asia because they compete with similar Iranian projects. Afghanistan. This country is still a target of rivalry between Pakistan and Iran. The following figures of Afghan refugees illustrate the scope of the Afghan problem up to and including extremism, drug trafficking, etc., which affect both countries: 2.4 million, of whom 1 million are registered and 1.4 million are unregistered refugees, remain in Iranian territory,15 while 2.6 million (1.6 and 1 million, respectively) camp in Pakistan.16 The U.S. State Department set up an Afghanistan and Pakistan Strategic Partnership Office. The sides, however, have very different ideas about their future development and the role it will play in the future of Afghanistan. Tehran would particularly like to see the Shi‘a community of Af- ghanistan being afforded wider rights. Islamabad, in turn, with its own political ambitions, believes that the interests of the Taliban should be taken into account to stabilize relations between Pakistan and Afghanistan. The very different ideological approaches and preferences of Iran and Pakistan explain their very different approaches to what the Taliban is doing. Iran cannot accept the philosophy of the

12 “Saudi Arabia Overhauls Its Strategy for Syria,” 26 February, 2014 [http://www.stratfor.com/analysis/saudi-arabia- overhauls-its-strategy-syria], 5 March, 2014. 13 “Iran: Loan for Pakistani Pipeline Canceled, Minister Says,” 14 December, 2013, available at [http://www.stratfor. com/situation-report/iran-loan-pakistani-pipeline-canceled-minister-says], 5 March, 2014. 14 See: “Do kontsa goda ob’em tovarooborota mezhdu Iranom i Kitaem dostignet 38 mld doll.,” 11 December, 2013, available at [http://www.iran.ru/news/economics/91734/Do_konca_goda_obem_tovarooborota_mezhdu_Iranom_i_Kitaem_ dostignet_38_mlrd_dollarov], 5 March, 2014. 15 [https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/ir.html], March 2014 (accessed 18 March, 2014). 16 Ibidem.

37 Volume 15 Issue 2 2014 CENTRAL ASIA AND THE CAUCASUS

Taliban, which dominates in Pakistan and partly in Afghanistan. The situation in Pakistan is complicated by the rivalry of two parties—the Pakistan Muslim League (PML Nawaz Group) and the Paki- stan Tehreek-e-Insaf party founded by Imran Khan—which might strengthen the Taliban on the lookout for an opportunity to seize power. “Pakistan has been pushing for a balance of power between the Taliban and anti-Taliban forces,” while the expert community is convinced that “the Pakistani Taliban wish to see Pakistan serve as a launchpad for the creation of an international caliphate” and that “a politically dominant Taliban in post-NATO Afghanistan would also embolden the Pakistani Taliban to act against Islamabad.”17 On the other hand, successful talks with Iran, the drawdown of American troops, and a strategic agreement with Iran will open new vistas for Washington, namely, practical cooperation with Iran, which the United States sees as a potential strategic partner in peaceful transformation of Afghani- stan, something which Islamabad is not interested in. Likewise, Pakistan does not need partnership between India and Iran, on the one side, and Af- ghanistan, on the other; Afghanistan does not want to see the Taliban or any other extremist group at the helm; it is seeking closer relations with the Central Asian countries within the Heart of Asia project, which will trim the role Pakistan is playing in the region. The disagreements and conflicts preserve the continued threats presented by all sorts of terrorist groups (al-Qa‘eda, Jundallah, and others) operating in close proximity to Iran and in Pakistan. This is confirmed by the recent blast at the Iranian consulate in Peshawar, abductions of Iranian border guards by terrorists who came from Pakistan, and a terrorist attack in Quetta on a bus carrying Shi‘a pilgrims.18 India. The relations between India and Pakistan should be analyzed within the Washington’s turn toward the APR. “South Asia … represents a key axis with India as the linchpin in the Asia- Pacific strategy of U.S. vis-à-vis China.”19 According to this strategy, “India is a crucial and key player in the future security and development of Afghanistan … and a leader in the new silk road, in the heart of Asia process.”20 Some believe that if developed, these processes will create “an arc of containment” of which India will be the center; in the future, it will stretch from the southeast to Central Asia.21 If realized, this strategy might ensure India’s regional domination and infringe on Pakistan’s interests. The rising regional rivalry between India and China keeps the tension between Islamabad and Delhi at a high level; their bilateral relations are developing according to the well-known formula “one step forward, two steps back.” When the country was celebrating the 65th anniversary of the Republic of India, Pakistani troops opened fire in Kashmir22 to demonstrate that Islamabad was extremely vexed with the Delhi- Tehran partnership. The two capitals, meanwhile, promote the idea of a north-south transportation route that will bring together Russia and Central and South Asia. None of the sides wants a stronger “Sunni bloc

17 “Afghanistan and Pakistan after the 2014 NATO Drawdown,” available at [http://www.stratfor.com/analysis/ afghanistan-and-pakistan-after-2014-nato-drawdown], 15 April, 2013. 18 See: Dawn, 23 January, 2014; “Pakistanskiy deputat osudil vzryv okolo iranskogo konsulstva,” available at [http:// www.iran.ru/news/politics/92745/Pakistanskiy_deputat_osudil_vzryv_okolo_iranskogo_konsulstva], 18 February, 2014. 19 [http://www.atimes.com/atimes/South_Asia/SOU-01-150114.html]. 20 “Comments on India’s Relations with Iran, Afghanistan, and the U.S. Remarks Wendy Sherman Under Secretary for Political Affairs — New Delhi, India,” available at [http://www.state.gov/p/us/rm/2013/202682.htm], 24 May, 2013. 21 See: “SShA derzhat indo-pakistanskie otnoshenia pod kontrolem,” Asia Times Online, 18 January, 2014, available at [http://www.war and peace.ru/ru/exclusive/view/87011/], 19 March, 2014. 22 See: “A Special Project with the New America Foundation and Johns Hopkins SAIS,” Times of India; The Hindu, 30 January, 2014.

38 CENTRAL ASIA AND THE CAUCASUS Volume 15 Issue 2 2014 comprising Afghanistan, Pakistan and Saudi Arabia,” which “poses an ideological as well as security challenge.”23 Under the pressure of geopolitical reality, which interferes with its Afghan initiatives, the rapidly approaching pullout and much more active contacts between Pakistan and the United States, Delhi is rearranging its regional priorities; it wants a treaty with Saudi Arabia and has already signed several treaties in the economic and security spheres with Japan to protect itself against the impacts of Pakistan and China.

The Cornerstones of Mutually Advantageous Partnership

Mutually advantageous partnership between Iran and Pakistan in Central Asia is possible despite the contradictions and barriers I have written about above; today, the following can be described as positive trends in this respect. (1) Since 2001, when the Taliban regime was overthrown in Afghanistan, both countries have done a lot to defrost bilateral relations. On 14-16 December, 2005, the then Foreign Minis- ter of Iran Manouchehr Mottaki visited Islamabad,24 a sure sign that it might become Teh- ran’s key ally in South Asia in the future. Iran expects that Pakistan (an Islamic nuclear state) might help it in many respects, up to and including its dealings with the IAEA. On the other hand, “commentators in Pakistan, Iran’s Muslim neighbor and a strong U.S. ally, call on Washington to eschew violence and seek a diplomatic solution.”25 Islamabad expects that Tehran will broker a settlement of the Kashmir issue.26 (2) The predominant (89% according to the Pew Research Center) anti-American sentiments in Pakistan27 and a certain share of Islamic solidarity might make it easier for Islamabad to start talking to Tehran. (3) Expecting that the sanctions will be lifted ultimately and completely, Iran will hardly risk marring its international image or aggravate the smoldering Sunni-Shi‘a strife; its very re- strained response to the challenges coming from Pakistani territory is the best proof of this. (4) The New Silk Road strategy consistently promoted by the United States favors reintegration of South and Central Asia as the best scenario in which all the regional players will be able to realize their interests. “A U.S. strategy for Asia that does not contemplate Pakistan’s role is incomplete, and a U.S. strategy for Pakistan that primarily considers its role in the context of Afghanistan is shortsighted,” says American expert Daniel Markey.28 He has outlined “a

23 A. Вhatnagar, “Indo-Iranian Cooperation in Afghanistan Faces Challenges,” The Institute of Peace and Conflict Studies, 22 August, 2012, available at [http://atlanticsentinel.com/2013/05/indo-iranian-cooperation-in-afghanistan-faces- challenges], 7 May, 2013. 24 See: A.M. Vartanian, “Iran i Pakistan: novoe navedenie mostov?” Institut Blizhnego Vostoka, 21 December, 2005, available at [http://www.iran.ru], 5 March, 2014. 25 “Regional Press Split over U.S. Iran Threat,” BBC news, 25 January, 2005. 26 See: Z. Farzinnia, “Iran and Pakistan: Continuity and Change,” Iranian Journal of International Relations, Tehran, Vol. XVII, No. 2-3, Summer-Fall 2004, pp. 324-325. 27 See: F. Kapralov, “Pakistan: ot takticheskikh otnosheniy s Zapadom—k strategicheskim s Vostokom,” peacekeeper. ru [http://www.centrasia.ru/newsA.php?st=1391633220], 5 February, 2014. 28 D.S. Markey, “Reorienting U.S. Pakistan Strategy: From Af-Pak to Asia,” Council on Foreign Relations Press, January, 2014, available at [http://www.cfr.org/pakistan/reorienting-us-pakistan-strategy/p32198], 10 March, 2014.

39 Volume 15 Issue 2 2014 CENTRAL ASIA AND THE CAUCASUS

two-pronged approach to future U.S. policy for Pakistan: defend against security threats, and support Pakistan’s economic growth and normalized relations with its neighbors.” America means business; this is confirmed by the talks on regional security and bilateral relations between Sartaj Aziz, National Security Advisor and key advisor on foreign policy to Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif, and U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry, which took place in Washington on 27 January, 2014. (5) Pakistan, Iran, and Afghanistan interested in beneficial economic reintegration with Central and South Asia and the Persian Gulf support “expanding transit trade and encouraging private sector investment, as well as promoting cooperation in projects related to infrastructure, transport and communications.”29 Pakistan President Asif Ali Zardari said that “Paki- stan was committed to timely completion of the IP gas pipeline. He said a number of other economic projects were in the pipeline between Iran and Pakistan, including electricity import and wheat export, rail and road connectivity,”30 and also the TAPI project. The Pakistani leaders in general confirm that they will live up to their obligations under the gas pipeline agreement; comprehensive bilateral talks on construction and various alternatives are going on.31 (6) The Central Asian countries are actively involved in projects of a vitally important regional transportation and transit network of cargo hauling and pipelines, including the trans-Afghan and Pakistan routes. They are especially interested in the Termez-Mazar-i Sharif-Herat-Bandar Abbas and Chabahar corridors and a no less important transport corridor between China and the Gulf created by a railway that will reach the port of Gwadar on the Arabian Sea.

Conclusion

The region of Central and South Asia dotted by seats of instability offers very good conditions for gradual and sustainable development and wider economic cooperation. Religious and political confrontation, ethnic and tribal disagreements, and the territorial dispute between India and Paki- stan are sending waves of instability across Central Asia, which might provoke local armed clashes. Instability is further exacerbated by Islamabad’s pro-American policy pursued against the background of the continued confrontation between Iran and the United States and by solidarity demonstrated by the radical Islamic organizations in both countries. This process is deepened by the tactics designed to squeeze Russia out of geopolitical projects associated with Central Asia, which contradicts their logic of regionalism. This is fraught with new threats and challenges in Central and South Asia. It should be said that the worsened relations between Russia and the West because of what is going on in Ukraine echoes in the region: the explosive situation might provoke unpredictable developments. It is hoped that the economic and political interests shared by the Euro-Atlantic community

29 Tahir Khan,” Pakistan, Iran, Afghanistan to Step Up Business Ties,” The Express Tribune, 10 January, 2013, available at [http://tribune.com.pk/story/491834/pakistan-iran-afghanistan-to-step-up-business-ties/], 10 January, 2013. 30 “Zardari for Early Convening of Pak-Iran-Afghanistan Summit,” available at [http://www.nation.com.pk/pakistan- news-newspaper-daily-english-online/national/22-Mar-2013/zardari-for-early-convening-of-pak-iran-afghanistan-summit], 22 March, 2013. 31 See: “Pakistan reshitelno nastroen na realizatsiiu proekta po importu iranskogo gaza,” available at [http://www.iran. ru/news/economics/92894/Pakistan_reshitelno_nastroen_na_realizaciyu_proekta_po_importu_iranskogo_gaza], 14 March, 2014.

40 CENTRAL ASIA AND THE CAUCASUS Volume 15 Issue 2 2014 and Russia will push them to hold talks and engage in a gradual settlement of the current crisis. It seems, however, that Moscow will play a more limited role in the region in the near future. Much depends on how the Iranian nuclear problem will be settled and who will be elected as the next president of Afghanistan, as well as on the political will of the actors with outstanding interests in Central and South Asia and their readiness to reach a consensus for the sake of national and regional security. Taken together, this will decide the nature of relations between Iran and Pakistan.

THE PROSPECTS OF KYRGYZSTAN’S ACCESSION TO THE CUSTOMS UNION AND COMMON ECONOMIC SPACE1

Kubat UMURZAKOV Ph.D. (Econ.), Associate Professor at the Academy of State Governance under the President of Kyrgyzstan (Bishkek, Kyrgyzstan)

Nazira TYULYUNDIEVA Ph.D. (Econ.), Associate Professor at the Academy of State Governance under the President of Kyrgyzstan (Bishkek, Kyrgyzstan)

ABSTRACT

his article looks at the goals, condi- economy in the past decade. It studies the tions, and possible consequences of alleged positive effects and risks that could T Kyrgyzstan’s accession to the Cus- arise if Kyrgyzstan joins the CU and CES and toms Union (CU) and Common Economic presents the data of an analysis of the com- Space (CES), describes the current state of parative advantages of commodity groups. the country’s export and import situation, and The authors justify the importance of pursu- analyzes the role of re-export in the Kyrgyz ing a coordinated policy with the other CU

1 This article was prepared based on the results of a study of the prospects for Kyrgyzstan’s participation in the integration project being implemented by the Russian Federation, Kazakhstan, and Belarus carried out in 2013 by a group of experts. This article refers to certain provisions of the report published by the National Institute of Strategic Studies of the Kyrgyz Republic (see: “Prospects for Kyrgyzstan’s Participation in the Eurasian Economic Union: Pluses and Minuses,” National Institute of Strategic Studies, Bishkek, 2013, 99 pp.), which the authors participated in writing.

41 Volume 15 Issue 2 2014 CENTRAL ASIA AND THE CAUCASUS countries to develop priority industrial and orientation after the country joins the CU agricultural sectors. This will encourage large and CES, the authors conclude that a cer- companies to come to Kyrgyzstan and open tain transition period will be needed to en- their branches in the country, as well as help able gentler adaptation of the economy. The to solve tasks aimed at modernizing agricul- authors propose creating a mechanism ture and creating an agroindustrial cluster. based on EU experience within the CU and Keeping in mind that commodity flows CES to support countries with slower rates and business will have to undergo major re- of development.

KEYWORDS: Kyrgyzstan, Customs Union, Common Economic Space, Common Customs Tariff, economic modernization, competitiveness, sensitive commodities, transition period.

Introduction

The creation of a Customs Union (CU) and Common Economic Space (CES)2 by Belarus, Ka- zakhstan and Russia is very conducive to CIS integration. Several other republics of the former So- viet Union, including Armenia, Tajikistan, and Kyrgyzstan, are also considering joining this integration group. Their governments have already submitted an application to join the CU. However, we should not forget the important role that re-export has been playing in the country’s foreign trade in the last decade. It is having a significant influence both on the state of the economy and on the employment and income of the population. Since commodity flows and business will need to undergo major reorientation following accession to the CU and CES, the country will require a certain transition period to enable gentler adaptation of the economy to the new foreign trade conditions. The main mid- and long-term goals of accession to the CU and CES are sustainable economic growth, economic modernization, and closing the gap (or at least not permitting it to widen) between Kyrgyzstan’s level of development and that of the other member states. The key tasks to be solved when joining the CU and CES are also being examined.

The Attraction of Integration Projects

The Kyrgyz government has adopted a decision on the country’s accession to the CU created by Russia, Kazakhstan, and Belarus. The CU officially went into operation on 1 January, 2010; a Common Customs Tariff (CCT) came into force in trade relations with third countries. The Customs Code (CC) of the CU came into force on 1 July, 2010 and envisages the main customs regulations. All coordinated types of monitoring were shifted to the outer periphery of the CU on 1 July, 2011. There is no longer any customs, transport, sanitary, veterinary, and phytosanitary control on the internal borders of the CU member states. When the CU went into operation, preparations were accelerated for creating a legal base for transfer to a higher level of integration; the matter concerns the CES.

2 The Customs Union was created in 2010 by the Russian Federation, Kazakhstan, and Belarus. The agreements of the said countries on the establishment of a Common Economic Space came into force on 1 January, 2012.

42 CENTRAL ASIA AND THE CAUCASUS Volume 15 Issue 2 2014

The CES was established in order to implement the “four freedoms” in the territory of the three countries—movement of goods, services, capital, and labor. On 1 January, 2012, a basic set of 17 agreements forming the contractual and legal framework of the CES came into force. It is very obvious that it only makes sense for Kyrgyzstan to join this integration project if it can later become a member of the CES. So this article examines accession to the CU and the CES as a single project. As the economic literature notes,3 when assessing the effect of regional integration, the differences between the static and dynamic factors should be understood. The static effect of regional trade agreements reflects the influence of price changes caused by lowering the tariff and non-tariff barriers. This results in an increase in trade volume among the member countries by means of trade creation. In so doing, more efficient producers from the CU member countries replace local producers in the market. Trade diversion can also take place, when more efficient producers from third countries are replaced by producers from the CU member states. Static factors are important when evaluating nonrecurring change in the standard of living of the member states resulting from establishment of the CU. In contrast to the static, the dynamic effect is related to the mid- and long-term consequences of regional integration, thus it is more important for the economy. The dynamic effect that influences practically all spheres related to the branch’s competitiveness is the most widespread. The benefits from dynamic factors include an increase in effectiveness as a result of growing competition, greater specialization, economy of scale, introduction of new technology and know-how, and so on. Benefits from deeper regional integration, including comprehensive harmonization of policy, legislation, and institutions and capable of generating dynamic effects related to an increase in the market volume, an increase in foreign direct investments, technology transfer, and a general increase in competition can be noted among the alleged positive aspects of the country’s accession to the CU and CES. The positive economic factors include, in particular, gaining access to a larger market; this will make it possible to satisfy the demand for goods consumed in the region and become a stimulus for attracting investments. When making their decisions, investors will keep in mind the larger regional market and invest their capital in major projects. This will make it possible to take advantage of economy of scale, keep in mind regional division of labor, and organize the production of new types of products that have never been manufactured before in the country. However, it should be kept in mind that specific regional trade agreements operate in specific situations. Whether joining the CU will promote Kyrgyzstan’s further successful socioeconomic development will depend on the correlation of conditions in the region and in the CU member countries. Decisions concerning the country’s accession to the CU should be made keeping in mind the state of the country’s economy and the possible consequences of this step. Therefore, keeping in mind the political and economic instability existing in the country, it is very important to ensure sufficiently soft conditions for the “sensitive” sectors of the economy during the transition period to joining the CU.

Current State of Commerce

In the past ten years, Kyrgyz exports have lagged significantly behind its imports. This has resulted in a large trade balance deficit in Kyrgyzstan, as well as in several other CIS countries.

3 See, for example: Preferential Trade Agreement Policies for Development: A Handbook, ed. by J.-P. Chauffour, J.-Ch. Maur, World Bank, 2011; How to Design, Negotiate, and Implement a Free Trade Agreement in Asia, ADB, 2008.

43 Volume 15 Issue 2 2014 CENTRAL ASIA AND THE CAUCASUS

On the whole, most of the commodities Kyrgyzstan exports to the CIS countries (mainly to Russia, Kazakhstan, and Uzbekistan) consist of raw materials (including cotton, tobacco, and non-ore minerals), electricity, and some foodstuffs (fruit, vegetables, dairy products, and so on). Products of the manufacturing industry are also exported: garments, goods produced by the metallurgic industry, incandescent lamps, vehicles, and spare car parts. Export to the countries of the Far Abroad is much less diversified, which makes it extremely vulnerable to external conditions (changes in the price and regional demand for water/electricity, for example); it is limited to gold, cotton, wool, furs, leather, metal scrap, and non-organic chemicals. Kyrgyzstan’s main export partners are traditionally Russia and Kazakhstan. In 2012, the share of these countries in the country’s export amounted to 11.2% and 19.3%, respectively. In recent years, Switzerland has become another of Kyrgyzstan’s leading partners (32.6% in 2012), where the country’s main export commodity, gold, is exported. In 2011, when gold prices reached a historic high, export of this precious metal topped 50% (of the total export volume). How- ever, in 2012, as a result of changes in the geological situation, the volumes of gold production dropped sharply, bringing the share of export in the total volume down to 33.4%. In recent years, the volume of petroleum products has increased in Kyrgyzstan’s imports, the main articles of which are fuel, wheat, medication, cars, etc., which was related to an increase in their re-export, including for filling foreign war craft. The increase in import of consumer goods was due to the increase in income of a percentage of the population (including the significant increase in migrant remittances during this time). Due to the increased housing construction rates, the import of building materials, equipment, and other commodities also rose. What is more, investment projects were intensively implemented (by means of private capital and state investment programs). Kyrgyzstan continues to import from a relatively small number of countries, its main partners traditionally being Russia and Kazakhstan. In 2012, the percentage of these partners in the total volume of Kyrgyz imports amounted to 33.2% and 9.7%, respectively. China acquired the status of second most important partner after Russia among the Far Abroad countries, the share of which reached 22.5% in 2009. Beginning in 2004, the policy of the Kyrgyz government was de facto aimed at creating favorable conditions for importing goods and their subsequent re-export. As a result, in recent years, Kyrgyzstan has become a regional hub for re-exporting Chinese goods to the countries of Central Asia and Russia, which was also promoted by its advantageous geographical location and streamlined logistics. In so doing, Kyrgyzstan’s Dordoi and Karasu bazaars, which act as the main transshipment bases for Chinese export, play an important role. According to the assessment of World Bank (WB) experts, the volume of re-export carried out through the mentioned bazaars reached $2.7 billion in 2008.4 Along with the total amount of import, which, according to official data, equaled $5.3 billion in 2012, in 2008, the total volume of re-export from Kyrgyzstan amounted to $10 billion5 (according to the estimates of Roman Mogilevskii). This shows a large volume of unregistered import and re- export and of shadow turnover as a whole. In 2009, there was a drop in re-export volumes, which was associated with the decrease in economic growth rates in Russia and Kazakhstan as a result of the global crisis. In 2010, in conditions of the political instability that ensued, export and re-export decreased even more; at that time, the border between Kyrgyzstan and Kazakhstan was closed to vehicle and passenger traffic. Customs

4 See: Bazaars and Trade Integration in CAREC Countries, Report prepared by World Bank, May 2009. 5 See: R. Mogilevskii, “Trends and Patterns in Foreign Trade of Central Asian Countries,” Working Paper No. 1, May 2012, University of Central Asia.

44 CENTRAL ASIA AND THE CAUCASUS Volume 15 Issue 2 2014 control was also tightened when the CU went into operation. It is important to note that Kyrgyzstan’s bazaars are the main source of income for the local residents, whereby employment is not determined only by the number of people who work there (that is, vendors and administrative and service personnel). Bazaars promote an increase in indirect employment, such as jobs associated with shipping operations and freight handling. Vendors working at other bazaars and product suppliers (including to warehouses located outside the bazaar’s boundaries) should also be included here. According to the assessment of WB experts, the total fixed costs of the bazaars studied amounted to approximately 33% of Kyrgyzstan’s GDP. Labor costs amounted on average to around 30% of Kyrgyzstan’s total fixed costs.6 On the other hand, the significant orientation of foreign trade toward re-export operations does not in itself solve the problem of ensuring sustainable economic growth in the mid and long term, even though it provides jobs for a large percentage of the population. Sustainable economic growth can more successfully be ensured by a high level of competitiveness of Kyrgyz companies in the regional markets and a stable increase in the export of goods produced in the country. At the same time, keeping in mind the re-export specialization that has developed in Kyrgyz- stan, it can be presumed that if it joins the CU, there will be significant reorientation of commercial flows and business, so a certain transition period will be needed for the country’s economy to undergo gentler adaptation.

The Main Goals and Restrictions in Kyrgyzstan’s Accession to the CU and CES

Kyrgyzstan is undoubtedly hoping that its accession to the CU will enable it to reach a new level of economic and social development. At present, not one document adopted by the Kyrgyz government or president has envisaged the specific goals to be achieved as a result of Kyrgyzstan’s accession to the CU and CES. In our opinion, the main mid- and long-term goals of Kyrgyzstan’s accession to the CU can be formulated as follows:

 ensuring sustainable economic growth;  carrying out economic modernization;  closing (or preventing an increase in) the gap between the country’s level of development and that of the other CU states. In order to ensure these main goals are reached, the following sub-goals must be fulfilled:  creating jobs and ensuring a high level of employment;  attracting foreign direct investments;  increasing the use of new technology;  becoming incorporated into international production chains;  improving production structure.

6 See: Bazaars and Trade Integration in CAREC Countries.

45 Volume 15 Issue 2 2014 CENTRAL ASIA AND THE CAUCASUS

On the whole, accession to the CU and CES corresponds to the main aims designated in the country’s sustainable development strategy. Kyrgyzstan is a small country that lags significantly behind the CU member states in level of economic development. For example, according to the IMF, in 2012, the volume of Kyrgyz- stan’s GDP amounted to $6.5 billion, while in Belarus this index was equal to $63 billion, in Ka- zakhstan to $196 billion, and in Russia to $2,022 billion. In other words, in terms of this parameter, Belarus has an almost 10-fold advantage over Kyrgyzstan, Kazakhstan more than 30-fold, and Russia 311-fold. In 2012, the per capita GDP in Kyrgyzstan (in terms of purchasing power parity) was equal to $2,376, while in Belarus it amounted to $15,634, in Kazakhstan to $13,893, and in Russia to $17,709. So the index for Belarus was approximately 6.6-fold, for Kazakhstan 5.8-fold, and for Russia 7.5-fold higher than Kyrgyzstan’s. Kyrgyzstan’s striving to join the CES, to which countries with a higher standard of living belong (6-8-fold higher than the Kyrgyz standard), is naturally associated with certain positive expectations for the future. It is presumed that the country’s accession to this integration union will allow it to modernize its economy, achieve high production volume growth rates, and, in the future, reach a qualitatively new level of development. However, at present, creating prerequisites for accelerated development requires carrying out a whole set of measures aimed at preparing the Kyrgyz economy for the CU conditions. The Road Map draft drawn up by the country’s government along with the Eurasian Eco- nomic Commission envisages a set of measures that includes Kyrgyzstan signing the agreements within the CU, adopting corresponding regulatory documents, strengthening the infrastructure of border crossings (including setting up and providing technical furbishing of 15 primary check points), setting up the external border, modernizing the material and technical base of laboratories, raising the potential of customs, veterinary and other services, training specialists of ministries and departments, etc. Implementing these measures requires issuing large amounts of funding in several areas. Joining the CU also envisages an entire set of measures for streamlining agriculture and pro- cessing its produce. This sector requires serious reforms that will help to resolve problems related to developing animal husbandry and crop cultivation, enlarging farms, ensuring the well-run organization of veterinary services, improving the epizootic situation, ensuring sustainable pastoral farming, monitoring the technical state of irrigation systems, and so on. Another important measure is modernizing the material and technical base of laboratories that issue certificates corresponding to international specifications. It will be impossible to carry out the demands set forth in the relevant agreements or raise the competitiveness of Kyrgyz foodstuffs in the markets of the CU member countries without resolving the above-mentioned issues. Funding measures aimed at preparing the country for joining the CU is a separate problem. It can be solved by obtaining grant support from the CU countries, including Russia. It is presumed that it will be possible to negotiate waiver of payment of the Common Customs Tariff during the transition period, as well as carry out other common regulation measures in certain sectors and sensitive types of goods. Their list, which will include the fabric and accessories necessary for manufacturing garments, medication, certain types of equipment and devices, mineral fertilizers, chemicals, plastics, and other types of products, must be discussed by the government. There are also plans to discuss versions of stage-by-stage transition with long terms for certain types of sensitive products (or sub-branches). There is also the possibility of instituting a transition period for national legislation regulations on technical regulation issues and receiving funding to 46 CENTRAL ASIA AND THE CAUCASUS Volume 15 Issue 2 2014 support economic development (in particular for ensuring the development of infrastructure and several production branches). Joining the CES also requires fulfilling several other conditions necessary for creating a common market of goods and services, as well as carrying out a coordinated (in some cases common) policy. For example, if Kyrgyzstan signs the Agreement on a Coordinated Macroeconomic Policy adopted on 9 December, 2010, it will have to meet several quantitative parameters, including:

 ensuring a state budget deficit of no more than 3% of GDP;  maintaining the size of the state debt at a level no higher than 50% of GDP;  ensuring a low level of inflation (it should be no higher than 5 percent of the average inflation level of the other CES member states with the lowest inflation rate). The actual state of affairs shows that when it joins the CES, Kyrgyzstan could have problems associated with meeting at least two of the three above parameters. As Table 1 shows, the state budget deficit and state debt indicators with respect to Kyrgyzstan’s GDP are higher than the regulation envisaged by the agreement.

Table 1

Macroeconomic Indices Regulated within the CES by the Agreement on Carrying Out a Coordinated Macroeconomic Policy in Kyrgyzstan

2011 2012

Inflation (compared to December of the previous year) 105.7 107.5

Budget deficit, % of GDP 4.7 7.1

State debt, % of GDP 50.1 51.5

An analysis of the state of Kyrgyzstan’s economy makes it possible to conclude that it may take several years to improve the situation in the two indicated parameters (state budget deficit and size of state debt). The prospects for the country joining the CES and later the Eurasian Economic Union being created will greatly depend on how successful Kyrgyzstan’s accession to the CU is and at what level the positive possibilities for developing priority sectors will be carried out.

Assessment of the Consequences of Joining the CU and CES

When assessing the alleged consequences of the country’s accession to the CU and CES, the following pluses and minuses can be singled out for Kyrgyzstan at each stage of integration. For example, access to a much larger market can be classified as a positive effect of Kyrgyz- stan’s accession to the CU, while economy of scale will give a boost to investments and the incorporation of new technology. Increased competition will also mean an increase in efficiency and decrease in spending.

47 Volume 15 Issue 2 2014 CENTRAL ASIA AND THE CAUCASUS

The risks of accession to the CU include a slump in low-competitive sectors, bankruptcy of certain small and medium businesses, an increase in unemployment, and an increase in inflation. The positive aspects of joining the CES include modernization of the country’s economy, the arrival of large companies in the country, the creation of their branches, and the formation of an agroindustrial cluster and new industries. The negative consequences of joining the CES might take the form of an increase in population migration, widening of the gap in development between the center and the backward regions, and bankruptcy and absorption in the financial sector. When assessing the influence of the integration processes within the CU on the change in the structure of branches and sub-branches, it should be kept in mind that certain sectors and production branches might undergo rapid development, while others will not be able to withstand the competition. Correspondingly, the level of employment in certain industries will change. An analysis of the comparative advantages in terms of commodity groups shows that dairy products and other animal foodstuffs, fresh and dried fruit and vegetables (as well as their processed products), jewelry and stone-cutting items, women’s clothes, and so on could have high comparative advantages in export (both to the CU countries and to third countries). Despite the significant change in commercial conditions, products exported to the CU countries will only improve their positions. At the same time, products with insignificant comparative advantages could be successful if they receive government support, marketing efforts are made to promote them in the markets of the CU countries, and so on. When comparing the competitive advantages of the companies of Kyrgyzstan and the CU countries, the significant differences in their economic policy in support of national manufacturers should be kept in mind. An analysis of the development programs of the industrial and agricultural industries in the CU countries shows the significant level of state support. For example, the government programs of Russia, Kazakhstan and Belarus envisage actively subsidizing interest rates for loans, providing subsidies and grants to exporters of industrial products, issuing preferential loans, insuring trade operations, and so on. In particular, in 2013, the Russian government envisaged issuing up to $14 billion in financial support of export. A large part of this amount was meant for insuring export loans and state guarantees during export.7 The amount of state support of agriculture to GDP in agriculture in Belarus is equal to 18%, in Russia to 6%, and in Kazakhstan to 4%.8 Due to the large budget deficit in Kyrgyzstan, the level of state support of national manufacturers is at a very low level, which leads to large untapped small and medium business development reserves. Carrying out a joint policy coordinated with the CU countries for developing priority industrial and agricultural sectors is one of the most important factors for promoting an increase in investments and new technology. This will help to draw large companies to Kyrgyzstan, create their branches in the country, resolve agricultural modernization tasks, and form an agroindustrial cluster. When assessing the consequences of the country’s accession to the CU and CES, it is vital that the gap in development level between Kyrgyzstan and the other CU member states be closed in the mid and long term. This issue can be put in different terms: “Can Kyrgyzstan’s economic growth rates be expected to enjoy positive dynamics in the future and how will they correlate with similar indices in the three current CU member countries?”

7 See: RBC Daily, 28 August, 2013, available at [http://www.rbcdaily.ru/economy/562949988684705], 29 January, 2014. 8 See: Website of the Ministry of Agriculture of the Republic of Kazakhstan, available at [http://mgov.kz/tezisy- doklada-na-temu-razvitie-pererabaty-vayushhej-promy-shlennosti-v-respublike-kazahstan/], 29 January, 2014.

48 CENTRAL ASIA AND THE CAUCASUS Volume 15 Issue 2 2014

Regional integration could not only promote the development of all the branches of the economy of the countries belonging to the CU, but also ensure an upsurge in economic growth rates and improvement in the population’s standard of living. According to the estimates of academics of the Russian Academy of Sciences, the macroeconomic effect from creating the CU and CES within the EurAsEC will amount to no less than 5% of an increase in GDP calculated for five years and around 15% for ten years. However, the benefits might be unequally distributed among the members of the integration union, which is explained by the differences in the countries’ starting conditions. If political measures aimed at reducing the inequalities and imbalances are not carried out, the more developed countries (and regions in them) could obtain greater benefits from the voluminous CU market than the less developed states.9 In exactly the same way, large transnational corporations (for example, Russian) could obtain greater benefits from the CU market, since they have more opportunities for organizing their cooperative ties and production and supply networks than small and medium businesses, which, as we know, predominate in Kyrgyzstan. In order to facilitate closing the gap between the level of Kyrgyzstan’s development and that of the CU countries, a coordinated policy must be carried out aimed at developing the economic branches of all the members of the integration union. Otherwise, Kyrgyzstan’s incorporation into the integration process will not yield the desirable results. The difference between Kyrgyzstan’s development and that of the other CU members could also create an imbalance in the countries’ financial and institutional opportunities to promote production and export. World experience should be used to ensure more balanced development of Kyrgyzstan within the CU and CES. Several integration unions use mechanisms adopted under interstate agreements; they envisage measures for supporting the development and diversification of the economy of the backward member states. In the EU, this problem is resolved by carrying out a coordinating policy of support of certain industries, as well as by creating special structural funds. For example, there are two funds (the Struc- tural Fund and the Cohesion Fund); their resources are used to support development projects in the less developed regions of the EU. Countries with a high level of income per capita issue funds for this purpose. It is a well-known fact that successful interaction within an integration group can be achieved if all of its members are at more or less the same level of development. When talking about minimizing the negative consequences of Kyrgyzstan joining the CU and its future successful integration, it should be emphasized that the country needs help, including financial. In our opinion, the CU should follow the example of the EU and look at the possibility of creating a mechanism for supporting countries with lower levels of development. This applies both to Kyrgyzstan and future CU members. Summing up the above, it can be said that Kyrgyzstan’s accession to the CU and CES will help to expand the possibilities for developing and modernizing its economy, as well as raise the population’s prosperity and standard of living. However, in order to achieve success, a corresponding state policy must be carried out. There is a certain amount of hope that the gap in development between Kyrgyzstan and the CU member countries will be narrowed. Whether or not this hope is justified depends on many factors,

9 See: Trade and Development Report, 2007, UNCTAD, 2007.

49 Volume 15 Issue 2 2014 CENTRAL ASIA AND THE CAUCASUS including financial resources, creating a favorable investment climate (foreign investors must be interested in investing in Kyrgyzstan for this to happen), the willingness of large and medium corporations of the CU countries to transfer some of their intermediate business to Kyrgyzstan (for example, the manufacture of spare parts), and the ability of the country’s state institutions to carry out a well- considered and balanced policy. On 31 May, 2013, the Higher Eurasian Economic Council adopted a decision on the main areas for coordinating the national industrial policies of the CU countries. It envisages several measures for intensifying cooperation among manufacturing companies, creating technological platforms, and forming industrial clusters in priority sectors. The Kyrgyz government should already be initiating joint consultations with corresponding ministries and departments of the CU member countries on adopting coordinated development strategies for industry and other branches, keeping in mind the advantages of regional labor division, the creation of production networks, clusters, and so on. The pertinence of such consultations is dictated by the need to carry out joint projects with companies of the CU countries in the future.

Conclusion

The analysis carried out of Kyrgyzstan’s accession to the CU and CES has made it possible to draw the following conclusions. The positive effects of accession include access to a larger market, while economy of scale will give a boost to investments and the incorporation of new technology. Increasing competition will promote greater efficiency and lower spending, modernization of the country’s economy, the arrival of large companies and the creation of their branches, as well as the emergence of new industries. The risks that might arise during Kyrgyzstan’s accession to the CU and CES include a slump in low-competitive sectors, bankruptcy of certain small and medium businesses, an increase in unemployment, a higher inflation rate, more migration, a widening of the gap between the development of the center and the backward regions, aggravation of the situation in the financial sphere, and so on. The difference between Kyrgyzstan’s development and that of the other CU and CES members could also become aggravated due to the imbalance in the countries’ financial and institutional opportunities to promote production and export. From this it follows that achieving positive results will largely depend on the CU countries pursing a coordinated policy for developing the priority branches of industry and agriculture. This will draw large companies to Kyrgyzstan, encourage them to establish their branches in the country, help to modernize agriculture, and promote the formation an agroindustrial cluster. It would also be helpful for the CU and CES to create a mechanism for supporting countries with a lower development level, whereby the experience of the EU could be useful in achieving this.

50 CENTRAL ASIA AND THE CAUCASUS Volume 15 Issue 2 2014 AZERBAIJAN AND GEORGIA: ASYMMETRICAL RELATIONS

Sergey MINASIAN D.Sc. (Political Science), Deputy Director, Institute of the Caucasus (Erevan, Armenia)

ABSTRACT

he relations between Georgia and important factor that may end in a geopoliti- Azerbaijan are a key factor in regional cal triangle of sorts in the Southern Cauca- T politics and security in the Southern sus. On the other hand, these relations can- Caucasus. They strongly affect economic not and should not be described as a for- contacts and trade, as well as the imple- malized full-scale political, let alone, mili- mentation of all sorts of communication and tary-political alliance with corresponding energy projects. The two countries agree on mutual obligations. The author discusses many issues of regional policy, the way eth- these and other aspects of bilateral rela- nopolitical conflicts should be settled, and tions, assesses the prospects for further the degree to which external actors could or cooperation, and points to the possible should be involved. Turkey’s presence in challenges and problems that might crop up bilateral Georgian-Azeri relations is another later.

KEYWORDS: Georgia, Azerbaijan, Turkey, the Southern Caucasus, Russia, regional security, energy projects, Azeri-Georgian relations, ethnopolitical conflicts, the Azeris of Georgia.

Introduction

Regional politics and security in the Southern Caucasus largely depend on the relations between Georgia and Azerbaijan; they strongly affect the energy, transport, and transit spheres, the priority areas of their cooperation, and the key regional factors. Suffice it to mention Baku-Supsa (BS) and Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan (BTC) oil pipelines, the Baku-Tbilisi-Erzurum (BTE) gas pipeline, and the Kars-Akhalkalaki railway still under construction. It is planned to move the gas produced during the second development stage of Shah Deniz, an Azeri gas field, via the TAP/TANAP gas pipeline still to be built to replace Nabucco and several other failed projects. Baku and Tbilisi share more or less similar conceptual approaches to the settlement of the ethnopolitical conflicts of the 1990s that deprived them of control over some of their autonomous regions. (In the August 2008 “five-day war” Georgia lost control over South Ossetia and Abkhazia.) Both countries support each other in international organizations, which considerably expands the framework of their cooperation. The tripartite cooperation format is, likewise, highly important at the regional level: Turkey, one of the sides, is Georgia’s biggest economic and trade partner and Azerbaijan’s most important

51 Volume 15 Issue 2 2014 CENTRAL ASIA AND THE CAUCASUS military-political partner. Their relations with Russia are far from simple, however Baku, unlike Tbilisi, tries to keep them at an acceptable level. The above strongly affects the dynamics of the relations between Tbilisi and Baku, and also reveals the prospects for future development, as well as possible problems and limitations.

The Post-Soviet Dynamics of Relations Outlined

The present structure of bilateral relations was laid in the mid-1990s when both countries, while healing the deep scars left by the ethnopolitical conflicts, turned their gaze toward the region and its problems. This brought them closer together; there was probably another factor behind the process: the fairly confidential relations between Heydar Aliev and Eduard Shevardnadze went back to Soviet times and were rooted in the shared experience of the first secretaries of the corresponding republican communist parties and members of the Politburo of the C.C. C.P.S.U. Both struggled with identical domestic, social, and economic problems of their respective countries. Relations were further promoted and strengthened by the talks on the production and transportation of Caspian energy resources to the western/world markets across Georgia. From that time on, their bilateral relations and the very similar approaches of both capitals to post-Soviet integration (including in the military-political sphere) were determined, among other things, by the energy factor. Both countries joined the CIS and the Collective Security Treaty and both refused to extend the CST in 1999. On the other hand, Azerbaijan and Georgia, which founded the GUAM and were actively involved in it, hoped that this involvement would decrease their dependence on Russia. In March 1996, Georgia and Azerbaijan signed two important documents: the Treaty on Strengthening Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Security and the Declaration on Peace, Security and Cooperation in the Caucasian Region. Late in the 1990s, they started talking about the transit of Azeri’s early oil, first via the already functioning Baku-Batumi and later via the new BS oil pipeline. In 1999, the government of Azerbaijan and AIOC (an international operational consortium set up in 1994 under the Contract of the Century) agreed to build the main BTC oil pipeline across Geor- gian and Turkish territory. Started in September 2002, it was completed in the summer of 2006. This was when the BTE gas pipeline was laid with the aim to move the gas produced during the first stage of gas extraction at Shah Deniz. Starting in 1999, a certain amount of early oil was moved by rail from Azerbaijan to Batumi on the Black Sea coast. In recent years, the railway has also been used to move about 3 million tons a year of Kazakh oil delivered to Azerbaijan by tankers. As soon as the BTC was commissioned, the railway was not as useful for the AIOC; and the same can be said about the BS oil pipeline currently used by the State Oil Company of Azerbaijan (SOCAR). The Rose Revolution of November 2003 in Georgia brought to power a new team headed by Mikhail Saakashvili, who never concealed his pro-Western and obviously anti-Russian attitude. A new stage in the two countries’ bilateral relations began. Ilham Aliev, the new president of Azerbaijan, largely followed his father’s foreign policy course, up to and including Georgia. In the new reality of the 2000s, this preserved continuity of post- Soviet relations between Azerbaijan and Georgia. 52 CENTRAL ASIA AND THE CAUCASUS Volume 15 Issue 2 2014 Relations in Policy and Security

Both countries are involved in GUAM and can coordinate their positions with respect to West- ern structures and states; after becoming President of Georgia, Saakashvili added more vigor to the process, which subsided when Azerbaijan joined the Non-Aligned Movement in May 2011 and deliberately limited the level of its integration with the West. Tbilisi and Baku are trying hard to draw Ankara deeper into cooperation in foreign policy and security. The three countries have established permanent cooperation at the presidential, prime ministerial, and foreign ministerial levels, which can be described as an important tool of regional foreign policy and economic coordination. By early 2007, this trend had been institutionalized: during the official visit of President of Azerbaijan Ilham Aliev to Georgia, President Saakashvili and Prime Minister Erdoğan met for a tripartite session that adopted several important documents to lay the foundation of tripartite cooperation in regional policy. On 8 June, 2012, the earlier agreements became known as the so-called Trabzon Declaration; in March 2013, the leaders of the three countries met for the second time to sign a Trilateral Sectoral Cooperation Action Plan for 2013-2015.1 At all the meetings, Turkey and Georgia assured Azerbaijan that they were prepared to help resolve the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. Late in 2012, when new political leaders came to power in Georgia, it became absolutely clear that Baku attached great importance to the Karabakh factor. The Azeri leaders negatively responded to the intention of the new Georgian leaders to restore the Abkhazian railway to improve relations between Moscow and Tbilisi. Baku, in turn, feared that this would lighten the communication pressure on Armenia and strengthen its Karabakh-related position. Today, Georgia and Azerbaijan are still coordinating their positions in all sorts of international forums and organizations (the U.N. GA, PACE, OSCE, BSEC, etc.), the corresponding understand- ings going back to the active phase of GUAM (the late 1990s). Much attention is paid to the problems related to conflict settlement and domestic policy. I have already written that Baku is demonstrating restraint when dealing with Russia. Tbilisi is of a different opinion, which it demonstrated during the voting on Abkhazia in the U.N. GA. Military cooperation between the two countries includes two important components: (1) bilateral and multilateral (mainly within NATO programs) training and exercises, as well as peacekeeping and other missions; (2) direct cooperation in supplying and/or transit of armaments and military equipment from third countries. It should be said that neither in bilateral, trilateral (Azerbaijan-Georgia-Turkey), nor multilateral formats (within cooperation with NATO) are these countries obliged to jointly use their military potential or cooperate at the operational level. Moreover, at the political level, there are no mutual guarantees of security and defense between Azerbaijan and Georgia. There are no reasons, so far, to talk about a clearly delineated military-political union between the two countries with clear aims and obligations. There are still fewer reasons to say that the level of their cooperation is higher than an officially formalized “strategic alliance.”2

1 See: Z. Shiriyev, K. Kakachia, “The Foundations and Challenges of the Strategic Alliance”, SAM Review, Special Double Issue, Vol. 7-8, July 2013, pp.40-41. 2 Ibid., pp. 12-18.

53 Volume 15 Issue 2 2014 CENTRAL ASIA AND THE CAUCASUS

The two countries exchange military-political information and information related to the military-industrial complex. Georgia is an important transportation space through which Azerbaijan gets armaments and military equipment. In recent years, cooperation has become even more active: between 2002 and 2005, Azerbaijan acquired 13 Su-25 (including one training Su-25UB), which the aviation plant in Tbilisi has been manufacturing since Soviet times. It seems that Azerbaijan repairs its aviation and armored vehicles at the plants Georgia inherited from the Soviet Union (the aviation and 142nd tank repair plant). The two countries have not yet delineated the common state borders; this overdue and still unresolved task is complicated by the contradictions over the Azeri parts of the David Gareja Orthodox rock-hewn monastery complex of the 6th century.3 So far, the frantic efforts to reach an agreement have failed; this stirs up a lot of displeasure in both countries and adds negative hues to their relations.

Relations in the Economy, Energy, and Communication

Azerbaijan holds a fairly strong position in the Georgian economy, particularly in the energy industry: SOCAR, an Azeri company, owns one hundred gas filling stations across Georgia and an even larger number of facilities of the Georgian gas distribution system. It owns and manages the Black Sea Kulevi oil terminal bought late in 2006 from Badri Patarkatsishvili. A very rough assessment of the company’s annual turnover in the Georgian energy market is tens of millions of dollars. In recent years the company has been moving into the Georgian real estate market. “Azerbaijan in- vested $138 million in the Georgian economy in 2012, accounting for 12 percent of the total volume of FDI to Georgia in that year. These close bilateral economic ties are reflected in volumes of trade between the two countries. Azerbaijan is Georgia’s second largest trade partner after Turkey, with a total trade turnover of $1.26 billion, accounting for more than 10 percent of Georgia’s total trade turnover of $10.2 billion. Georgia’s role in Azerbaijani trade is more modest and constitutes less than 4 percent of the latter’s trade turnover of more than $40 billion.”4 Recently, the two countries have been demonstrating a shared interest in communication and tourism: tourists from Azerbaijan are much attracted to the affordable Georgian Black Sea resorts. In the socioeconomic sphere, the two countries are tied together by the transit of Azeri energy resources across Georgia. It comes as no surprise that Tbilisi is trying to wring dry this potentially promising monopoly: it charges transit fees for pumping energy resources and also receives some of Azerbaijan’s share for moving the latter’s oil across its territory. Georgia can buy gas at comfortable prices—about $135 per 1 thousand cu m—created by the transit of Azeri gas along the BTE pipeline (part of it Georgia receives as transit fees). According to the Georgian Oil and Gas Corporation, in 2012, the BS carried about 3.9 million tons of crude oil across Georgia, while the BTC moved 32.9 million tons, that is 4.6% lower than in 2011 (because of decreased oil production in Azerbaijan).5

3 For more on historical and political state-border related problems, see: E.V. Arkhipova, “Azerbaidzhano-gruzinskaia granitsa: istoricheskie faktory poiavleniya sovremennykh territorialnykh sporov,” Vestnik Volgogradskogo gosudarstvennogo universiteta, Seria 4, Istoria, No. 2 (22), 2012. 4 M. Tsereteli, “Azerbaijan and Georgia: Strategic Partnership for Stability in a Volatile Region,” Silk Road Paper, September 2013, p. 51. 5 See: “KNGG obnarodovala statistiku tranzita nefti po territorii Gruzii,” available at [http://bizzone.info/ energy/2013/1358799736.php], 21 January, 2013.

54 CENTRAL ASIA AND THE CAUCASUS Volume 15 Issue 2 2014

Today, a new and promising project of a pipeline to bring Azeri gas (produced during the second stage of the development of Shah Deniz) across Georgia and Turkey to the EU has come to the fore. In June 2013, when the Nabucco project (expected to use Turkmen gas brought to the Caucasian shore through a Trans-Caspian gas pipeline) failed, it was decided to concentrate on the TAP project, which relies on the Azeri offshore gas fields (Shah Deniz). It should be said that the proved reserves leave little hope of satisfying the much greater needs of the European Union. The project raises a lot of doubts, not only because of the difficult terrain; its political rationale and economic expediency, in the context of alternative routes along which shale and liquefied gas will be brought to Europe, have lost a lot of their value. This is best illustrated by the fact that, after appointing Richard Morningstar, U.S. Special En- voy for Eurasian Energy, as Ambassador to Azerbaijan, Washington scrapped his previous post. The U.S. and EU are losing interest in Caspian energy resources. Whatever the case, TAP is the idea that unites Azeri and Georgian lobbyists, propaganda structures, and experts in their efforts to promote the project in the United States and the EU to keep it alive.6 In 2006, Azerbaijan tried to buy the Georgian stretch of the North-South main pipeline, which brings Russian gas from Mozdok via Tbilisi to Armenia, in order to put pressure on Erevan. Tbilisi stood firm: its stretch of the pipeline was sold neither to Azerbaijan nor to Gazprom. The Kars-Akhalkalaki railway funded by Azerbaijan is another pressure lever: when finished, it will connect Georgia, Azerbaijan, and Turkey and exclude Armenia (previously connected with these countries by the Kars-Gumri railway closed in 1993 on Turkey’s insistence). Georgia and Azerbaijan expected to commission the new railway by 2011; for different reasons, the project has not been commissioned and will not be commissioned any time soon; but sooner or later it will be completed. In October 2012, after winning the parliamentary elections in Georgia, Bidzina Ivanishvili, leader of the opposition Georgia Dream Bloc, announced that the Kars-Akhalkalaki railway, as a potential rival of the Georgian sea ports, was not needed at all. Baku was concerned. In December 2012, after visiting Baku, Ivanishvili changed his position. In the summer of 2013, Mikhail Saakash- vili, still president of Georgia, announced that the project would be suspended for two years and that it threatened Georgia with the “loss of the function of a regional center.”7

Ethnic Relations: The Azeri Community of Georgia and the Georgian Community of Azerbaijan

Ethnic problems have been and remain at the center of relations between the two countries, the main one being the future of the fairly large Azeri community of Georgia. According to the latest population census (2002), the Azeris (there were about 284 thousand of them) were the biggest ethnic minority in the Georgia-controlled territory. “Georgia’s ethnic Azeri population is concentrated in the south-eastern Kvemo Kartli region (the Marneuli, Bolnissi, and Gardaba districts) where there are

6 This can be clearly seen in the hectic activities of the pro-Azeri and pro-Georgian structures in the United States, viz. Jamestown Foundation and Central Asia—Caucasus Institute. 7 “Zavershenie zh/d Baku-Akhalkalaki otlozheno na dva goda—Saakashvili,” IA Novosty-Gruzia, available at [http:// newsgeorgia.ru/politics/20130708/215768142.html], 8 July, 2013.

55 Volume 15 Issue 2 2014 CENTRAL ASIA AND THE CAUCASUS some 226,000 Azeris (45.5% of the total regional population); approximately 33,600 live in the eastern region of Kakheti, with 18,000 more living in Tbilisi.”8 The Azeris, and the other ethnic communities for that matter, are fully aware of the problems caused by infringements on their rights. It should be said, however, that the Georgian Azeris are not as politically active as the Armenians of Samtskhe-Javakheti. The Azeris are dissatisfied with the way their social and economic rights are realized by Tbilisi and respected by Georgian society: the unresolved linguistic, educational, political, and religious problems are too many to be ignored. It should be said that starting in the 1990s, the local authorities, unwilling to sell the best lands to Azeris in Kvemo Kartli, either sold them to ethnic Georgians or refused to sell them at all, thus forcing the local Azeris to rent these lands. The Azeris are practically absent from regional, district, and even communal administrations, a fact that they interpret as discrimination.9 Between 60 and 70 percent of the Azeris of Georgia are Shi‘a Muslims; the others are Sunnis. Recently, radical Salafism has been gaining popularity among both groups. Both countries are very concerned about the mounting influence of Iran (since the 1990s, Irani- ans have been fairly prominent in Georgia’s economy) in the Azeri regions of Georgia, which threatens their gradual Islamization. Iran built a big mosque in Marneuli; most of the local Muslim clergy look to Iran for guidance. “Pro-Iranian Ahl-ul Bayt is headed by Rasim Mamedov, who received his religious education in Qom in the 1990s.”10 Turkey is as active among the Georgian Azeris as Iran; it built a mosque close to the Red Bridge crossing point between Georgia and Azerbaijan. So far, it remains unclear whether the Turkish religious organizations operating among the Georgian Azeris are Nursists, that is, followers of Fethullah Gülen. Islamization of the Georgian Azeris is very similar to what is going on in Azerbaijan, where the Shi‘a of Iran and Salafis of the Northern Caucasus are increasing their influence.11 “Local NGO sources estimate that some 20 percent of young Azeri males in the Kvemo Kartli region have already turned to Salafism.”12 The Azeri authorities are doing their best to keep the protest sentiments of the Georgian Azeris in check lest to endanger the most important (particularly energy) projects. During one of his Geor- gian visits, Foreign Minister of Azerbaijan Elmar Mammadyarov said in Marneuli that each of his visits convinced him that the problems of the Azeris in Georgia are diminishing steadily.13 From time to time, Azerbaijan and Turkey raise the Meskhetian Turks issue to persuade Tbilisi to allow them to return to their homeland. This is explained not so much by ethnic closeness, but by the fact that most Meskhetian Turks, or their descendants, would like to move to Georgia from Azer- baijan, to which they were driven by pogroms in Central Asia and deportations of the late 1980s and early 1990s. Today, there are about 100 thousand Meskhetian Turks in Azerbaijan (including those who received Azerbaijan citizenship).14 Georgia, in turn and in disregard of its international obligations, raises all sorts of obstacles to prevent their massive resettlement. This means that a tiny group of several hundred Meskhetian Turks

8 C. Prasad, “Georgia’s Muslim Community: A Self-Fulfilling Prophecy,” ECMI Working Paper #58, February 2012, p. 4. 9 See: Georgia’s Armenian and Azeri Minorities, International Crisis Group Europe Report, No. 178, 22 November, 2006, pp. 4-6. 10 C. Prasad, op. cit., p. 6. 11 See: A. Yunusov, Islam v Azerbaidzhane, 2004, pp. 244-270. 12 C. Prasad, op. cit., pp. 8-12. 13 [http://www.news.az/articles/georgia/38433], 14 June, 2011. 14 See: A. Yunusov, Meskhetinskie turki: dvazhdy deportirovanny narod, Baku, 2000, pp. 109-111.

56 CENTRAL ASIA AND THE CAUCASUS Volume 15 Issue 2 2014 can aspire to move to Georgia. Azerbaijan, in turn, unwilling to spoil relations with its neighbor, prefers to keep this “not so important issue” on the backburner. The Georgians, in turn, carefully avoid any complications in their relations with Azerbaijan by ignoring the demands coming from the Ingiloy Georgians living in the northeast of Azerbaijan (the Qax, Zaqatala, and Balakan districts). According to the 1999 population census, there were about 15 thousand of Ingiloys in Azerbaijan living compactly in the Qax District15; they are not very active politically and socially. The fact that in February 2013, during his first official visit to Azerbaijan as President of Geor- gia, Giorgi Margvelashvili visited the regions populated by ethnic Georgians is an exception rather than the sign of a changed position.

In Lieu of a Conclusion: Problems and Prospects

At the official level, both countries are talking about the strategic and long-term nature of their relations. The National Security Concept of Georgia adopted in 2011 describes its relations with Azerbaijan as strategic partnership (and says nothing of the sort about Armenia). It should be noted that its strategic partnership with Azerbaijan is limited to energy and communication projects. The same document says the following about Turkey: “Turkey, as a NATO member state and a regional leader, is an important military partner for Georgia. Georgia attaches great importance to further developing its partnership with Turkey in the areas of defense and security.”16 This means that the bilateral format (Georgia-Azerbaijan) is gradually turning into a triangle—Turkey-Georgia-Azerbaijan. The new Georgian leaders are deliberately following in Saakashvili’s footsteps. In January- February 2014, newly elected President of Georgia Giorgi Margvelashvili paid his first official visits in the region to Turkey (late in January 2014), then Azerbaijan (13-14 February, 2014), where he met the heads of state and government and speakers of the parliament. The expert and political communities of Georgia agree that Tbilisi is building a geopolitical strategic partnership with Baku and Ankara; some people say that they are moving toward a Cauca- sian Triple Alliance of sorts. Azerbaijan, in turn, appreciates Georgia as one of the elements of its “greater strategy” of putting economic and communication pressure on Armenia. Baku relies on money and the economy to draw Tbilisi and the Georgian political elite to its side; it uses the functioning (BTC and BTE) energy and communication projects and those under construction (TAP), as well as the very visible propaganda and information presence of state Azeri structures in the Georgian information and public fields. In future, the relations between the two countries might lose some of their previous vehemence: under Saakashvili they were whipped up by two factors.  First, construction or commissioning of several important communication and transit projects (BTC, BTE, and TAP);  Second, Tbilisi’s intense anti-Russian policy, which Baku and Ankara strongly approved.

15 There are reasons to believe that the number of Ingiloys in Azerbaijan is bigger: the census registered Ingiloy Chris- tians as Ingiloys while those who adopted Islam very registered as Azeris. 16 National Security Concept of Georgia [http://www.mfa.gov.ge/index.php?lang_id=ENG&sec_id=12/].

57 Volume 15 Issue 2 2014 CENTRAL ASIA AND THE CAUCASUS

Today, the two countries, at best, will commission the Kars-Akhalkalaki railway (exact date unknown) and TAP scheduled for 2019. It is more or less clear that even if the new leaders of Georgia do not retreat too far from their previous radical anti-Russian position, they will try to repaint it in subdued colors. On the other hand, the recent developments around Ukraine, the rapidly worsening relations between Russia and the West, and what happened in the Crimea will hardly ignite pro-Russian enthusiasm among the Geor- gian political elite and ordinary people. This explains why the Azeri leaders were sort of shocked by the results of the October 2012 parliamentary elections in Georgia; their forebodings were strengthened by the first steps of the new Georgian leaders and by what Bidzina Ivanishvili said during his first official visit to Armenia in January 2013. Speaking of the obvious advantages of Armenia’s balanced foreign policy, he said: “Armenia is a good example for Georgia [in this respect]. We can only be jealous of it.”17 It looks as if Baku was unduly worried: during the so-called cohabitation when real power belonged to the new parliament and the government was staffed with supporters of Ivanishvili’s Geor- gian Dream, Mikhail Saakashvili, who called himself an “opposition president,” sabotaged everything the new government was trying to do. This explains why the new leaders have failed to arrive at a clearly defined foreign policy so far. As could be expected, the relations between Moscow and Tbilisi have lost some of their previous tension; there is another important factor that might affect the dynamics of Georgia’s relations with Azerbaijan and Armenia: on 27 June, 2014, Georgia signed an Association Agreement with the EU. For obvious reasons, Azerbaijan is very concerned about Georgia’s inevitable liberalization.18 A large part of the Georgian public and the “non-Saakashvili” political elite are very concerned about the possible loss of symmetry in Georgia’s relations with Azerbaijan. These sentiments, encouraged by the anti-Russian policy during Saakashvili’s tenure, allowed Azerbaijan and Turkey to consolidate their positions in Georgia (Turkey acquired even more influence in Ajaria and is rapidly expanding its economic and trade contacts). In fact, Georgia could have profited from its unique transit advantages; instead it is growing increasingly dependent on Azeri’s energy and transportation projects. Anti-Turkish/anti-Muslim sentiments in Georgia broke out in the form of riots in Ajaria and the Adygensky District of Samtskhe-Javakheti with its predominant Georgian migrant population; this happened after the parliamentary elections of October 2012. Some researchers think that the intensification of Christian sentiments among at least certain segments of Georgian society under certain conditions might negatively affect the future of Georgian- Azeri relations.19 The outlines of possible developments are still very vague; therefore, it is premature to talk about their possible impact.

17 “Interview: Georgian Prime Minister Bidzina Ivanishvili,” RFE/RL, 18 January, 2013 [www.rferl.org/media/ video/24877492.html]. 18 For more details, see: S. Minasyan, “Armenia and Georgia: A New Pivotal Relationship in the South Caucasus?” PONARS Eurasia Policy Memo, The George Washington University, PONARS Eurasia Policy Conference, Washington, D.C., No. 292, September 2013. 19 See: M.H. Cecire, “The Merchant Hegemon: Georgia’s Role in Turkey’s Caucasus System,” in: Georgian Foreign Policy: The Quest for Sustainable Security, Konrad Adenauer Stiftung, Tbilisi, 2013, pp. 121-123.

58 CENTRAL ASIA AND THE CAUCASUS Volume 15 Issue 2 2014 UZBEKISTAN: A REGIONAL POWER IN CENTRAL ASIA? REALITY OR DILEMMA?

Rasoul Rezae FARAMANI M.A., Political Science, ECO College, Allameh Tabataba’i University (Kermanshah, Iran)

Heydar MORADI M.A., Political Science, Young Research and Elites Club, Sanandaj Branch, Islamic Azad University (Sanandaj, Iran)

ABSTRACT

fter the collapse of the Soviet Union, neous population, natural resources, favor- the Central Asian states became in- able geographic location, U.S. support of its A dependent and tried to pursue their secular state, and the willingness of the lat- foreign policy free from Russian control. Uz- ter to recognize its regional hegemony. bekistan is the only Central Asian state to However, the country continues to face sev- pursue a proactive and independent foreign eral limitations that hinder its leading role. policy. Uzbekistan has higher regional power Despite its capabilities, it is not engaging ambitions than the other Central Asian states. wholeheartedly in regional integration and is So what is preventing Uzbekistan from hampered by its geographic location, water fulfilling its dream? It has the necessary sub- shortages, structural economic constraints, jective and objective prerequisites for this: political problems, and fundamentalism is- military potential, a large and fairly homoge- sues.

KEYWORDS: Uzbekistan, regional power, Central Asia, regional cooperation.

Introduction

Uzbekistan gained its independence at the end of 1991 with the breakup of the Soviet Union. The landlocked country is a potential Central Asian regional power by virtue of its population, the largest in the region, its substantial energy and other resources, and its location at the heart of regional trade and transport networks.1

1 See: J. Nichol, Uzbekistan: Recent Developments and U.S. Interests, Congressional Research Service, 21 August, 2013.

59 Volume 15 Issue 2 2014 CENTRAL ASIA AND THE CAUCASUS

The chief objective of Uzbekistan’s foreign policy since the country gained its independence has been to preserve internal stability for its super-presidential, authoritarian regime. Preventing un- welcome intervention or pressure from outside actors has been instrumental to this goal, which has been recognized for some time.2 Uzbekistan, one of the leading Central Asian states, has been having a significant influence on the geopolitical processes taking place in the South since the disintegration of the former Soviet Union. It is very conditioned by the central geographic location of this country in the region, its history, and the specific political course of the Uzbek administration. This administration is trying to adhere to a special way of state development.3 Home to more than half of the population of Central Asia, Uzbekistan seeks to play a leading role in regional affairs. Foreign policy is highly dependent on presidential decision-making. A new foreign policy concept was submitted to the legislature by President Karimov and quickly approved in early August 2012. It states that the main objectives of Uzbekistan’s foreign policy are strengthening the state’s independence and sovereignty; ensuring a role in international affairs; joining the ranks of the democratic and developed countries; and creating security, stability, and cooperative ties with neighboring states.4 The Central Asian countries are trying to play a key role in the region alongside foreign powers, which is shown by Uzbekistan’s foreign policy activities and its regional ambitions. It has the potential to play the role of a regional power; different factors, such as historical and cultural traits, could help it to reach this objective. If we take a look at the past, we can see that Uzbekistan had a special role to play in the eyes of the Communist Party leaders, who saw that it had particular potential for implementing the Kremlin’s orders in the region. Most of Tajikistan’s leaders and army commanders were appointed by Uzbek elites. Uzbekistan regarded its potential advantages for performing the role of a regional power to be its geographic location, sizable population, Uzbek communities in the region, military power, military and security cooperation with the U.S. in countering terrorism, Islamic fundamentalism, and the fact that Samarkand and Bukhara were cultural and religious centers and Tashkent a religious center for Muslims in the Soviet era.

Regional Power

Regional powers (also called regional leaders, major regional powers or regional/local great powers) are considered powerful in their own regions, irrespective of whether they represent regional relations of enmity or amity.5 In international relations, a regional power is a state that has power within a geographic region. Regional powers shape the polarity of a regional area. Typi- cally, regional powers have capabilities that are important in the region but do not have capabilities on a global scale. There are slightly different definitions of what makes a regional power. The Eu- ropean Consortium for Political Research defines a regional power as “a state belonging to a geographically defined region, dominating this region in economic and military terms, able to exer-

2 See: D.R. Spechler, M.C. Spechler, “The Foreign Policy of Uzbekistan: Sources, Objectives and Outcomes: 1991- 2009,” Central Asian Survey, Vol. 29, Issue 2, July 2010, pp. 159-170. 3 See: A. Menteshashvili, Security and Foreign Policy in Central Asian and Caucasian Republics, Tbilisi, 1999. 4 See: “Uzbekistan to Adopt Concept of Foreign Policy Activities,” UzDaily News Service, 31 July, 2012; “Legislative Chamber Approves Concept of Foreign Political Activities,” UzDaily News Service, 1 August, 2012; J. Lillis, “Uzbekistan: Tashkent Says No to Foreign Military Bases and Blocs,” Choihona -Eurasianet, 3 August, 2012. 5 See: M. Wright, “Power Politics,” in: Classical Theories of International Relations, ed. by H. Bull, et al., London, 1978, p. 63.

60 CENTRAL ASIA AND THE CAUCASUS Volume 15 Issue 2 2014 cise hegemonic influence in the region and considerable influence on a world scale, willing to make use of power resources and recognized or even accepted as the regional leader by its neighbors.”6 Regional powers are expected to play the role of regional peacemakers and policemen, as well as taking on the role of a moral authority. They are responsible for keeping their backyard neat and tidy, sometimes with a measure of support from the great powers. Furthermore, regional powers seem to be expected to support and promote acceptable rules and regulations for conducting regional policy and relations.7

Regional Power Characteristics

A regional power is a country that (1) Is part of a region that is geographically, economically and political-ideologically delimited; (2) Has a significant influence on geopolitical delimitation and the political-ideological construction of the region; (3) Possesses the material (military, economic, and demographic), organizational (political), and ideological resources for regional power projection; (4) Is economically, politically, and culturally interconnected with the region; (5) Has truly great influence on regional affairs (activities and results); (6) Exerts this influence (and increasingly so) by means of regional governance structures; (7) Is integrated into interregional and global forums and institutions where it articulates not only its own interests, but also acts, at least rudimentarily, as a representative of regional interests8; (8) Is appreciated as a regional power by the other powers in the region and beyond, particularly by other regional powers; (9) Defines the regional security agenda to a high degree; (10) Claims to be a regional power (thinks of itself as one).9

The Main Principles, Objectives, and Vectors of Uzbekistan’s Foreign Policy

31 September, 1991, the day Uzbekistan’s independence was officially declared, became the starting point of the country’s full-scale integration into the world community. After gaining its sov-

6 “A Maturing Regional Power?” available at [www.essex.ac.uk/news/2006/nr20060314.htm]. 7 See: D. Flemes, “Conceptualising Regional Power in International Relations: Lessons from the South African Case,” June 2007, available at [www.giga‐hamburg.de/workingpapers], p.10. 8 See: D. Nolte, How to Compare Regional Powers: Analytical Concepts and Research Topics, GIGA German Institute of Global and Area Studies, Hamburg, Preliminary version Paper prepared for delivery at the ECPR Joint Session of Work- shops, Helsinki, 7-12 May, 2007. 9 See: D. Nolte, “Macht und Machthierarchien in den internationalen Beziehungen. Ein Analysekonzept für die Forsc- hung über regionale Führungsmächte,” in: GIGA Working Paper No. 29, GIGA, Hamburg, 2006, p. 28, available at [www. giga-hamburg.de].

61 Volume 15 Issue 2 2014 CENTRAL ASIA AND THE CAUCASUS ereignty, Uzbekistan also gained the opportunity to independently conduct its foreign policy. It is based on the following general principles and objectives: 1. The priority of the country’s national interests and regulations of international law, non-interference in the internal affairs of other states, equal cooperation, and striving to resolve all disputes in a peaceful manner. 2. Uzbekistan does not consider any country its military or political adversary. 3. State military policy is based on the Constitution of the Republic of Uzbekistan, the Law on Defense, the Military Doctrine of the Republic of Uzbekistan, the obligations of Uzbekistan as a member of the U.N., OSCE, CIS, NATO’s Partnership for Peace, and other international organizations. 4. In the Law on Defense of 1992 Uzbekistan’s military doctrine is strictly defensive, with no territorial ambitions against any other state. 5. Uzbekistan’s overall military doctrine does not permit strategic or tactical nuclear weapons, as well as chemical weapons in the inventory of the Uzbek armed forces. 6. Although its armed forces are small in comparison with international standards, Uzbekistan is rated as the strongest military power among the five newly independent Central Asian nations. 7. Particular emphasis is placed on preventive diplomacy, targeted first of all toward adjusting and preventing conflicts at the international or regional level. 8. At the same time, the experience of prevention and resolution of different types of military conflict both throughout the world and in the territory of CIS countries shows that peace efforts are more efficient when based on sufficient military power and support.10 The preventive diplomacy developed under the guidance of President Islam Karimov is a distinguishing feature of Uzbek diplomacy and aimed at timely prevention of the escalation of tension and elimination of conflicts. The Republic of Uzbekistan has made timely and repeated appeals to the world community to resolve the Afghan problem, fight terrorism, extremism, and drug aggression, and create a nuclear-weapons-free-zone in Central Asia. The enhancement and development of relations with neighboring countries is one of Uzbeki- stan’s most important foreign policy priorities. Further intensification of regional cooperation is a vitally important condition of peace, stability, and prosperity in Central Asia. Special attention is paid to constructive cooperation within the framework of the Central Asian Cooperation Organiza- tion. By dynamically and gradually developing its relations with the countries of the West, Asia- Pacific, South-East and South Asia, Uzbekistan is aspiring to make these relations more substantial. Based upon the Partnership and Cooperation Agreement (1996) between Uzbekistan and the Euro- pean Union, the country is intensifying a political dialog and trade relations with the EU.11 After it declared its independence, Uzbekistan gained an opportunity to establish direct contacts with the Islamic countries of Asia and the Middle East, countries that are close to Uzbekistan spiritu- ally, culturally, and traditionally. The development of political, economic, and cultural relations with

10 See: M. Pikulina, “Uzbekistan in the Mirror of Military Security: A Historical Preface to Current Events,” Conflict Studies Research Centre, Defense Academy of the United Kingdom, November 1999. 11 See: “Foreign policy of Uzbekistan,” The Governmental portal of the Republic of Uzbekistan available at [www.state. gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/2924.htm Uzbekistan].

62 CENTRAL ASIA AND THE CAUCASUS Volume 15 Issue 2 2014 these countries has a positive dynamics. Cooperation aimed at preserving regional and global peace and stability is one of the main priorities of Uzbekistan’s foreign policy.12 Uzbekistan is pursuing a multivectoral foreign policy, in which disengagement from Russia is sought through: (1) Participating in different multilateral blocs; (2) Strengthening relations with the West13; and (3) Acquiring the position of a regional leader.14 In its proposals on ensuring national and regional security, Uzbekistan concentrates on the following vectors: 1. Strengthening national security, with the emphasis on building up and fortifying the national armed forces. 2. Strengthening the regional security system, with the emphasis on building trust with neighboring countries and coordinating defense activity in Central Asia on the basis of a Central Asian alliance (with Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan) and on bilateral cooperation (with the other countries of the region and CIS, including Russia). 3. Strengthening collective security within the framework of the CIS with primary attention on efforts under the Collective Security Treaty. 4. Strengthening the security system on a Eurasian scale to ensure general tolerance of peacekeeping activity: strengthening relations with the OSCE and NATO. 5. Strengthening the global security system, with the emphasis on cooperation with the U.N.15

Uzbekistan and the Central Asian States Tajikistan

The foreign policy of independent Uzbekistan within the borders of Central Asia has always shown a particularly high profile, the real threat to Uzbekistan’s attempts to pursue a more assertive regional policy in the 1990s undoubtedly being Tajikistan.16 On 4 September, 1992, together with the Russian and Central Asian leaders, Karimov issued a warning that the conflict in Tajikistan endan- gered the security of the whole region. Uzbek fighters from Hissar and Kurgan Tube, as well as Ku- lob, were armed and trained in Uzbekistan. On 6 December, forces backed by Uzbek aircraft attacked the capital, and Rakhmonov was able to take up his post in Dushanbe 8 days later. 17 It stands to

12 See: Ibidem. 13 See: S. Akbarzadeh, Uzbekistan and the United States: Authoritarianism, Islamism and Washington’s Security Agen- da, Zed Books, London, 2005, pp. 65-67. 14 See: S. Horsman, “Uzbekistan’s Involvement in the Tajik Civil War 1992-1997: Domestic Considerations,” Central Asian Survey, Vol. 18 (1), 1999, pp. 44-45. 15 See: M. Pikulina, op. cit. 16 See: L. Ozzano, “Uzbekistan’s Foreign Policy (1991-2001): A Decision-Making Analysis,” Working Papers Anno dipartimnto di studi political, Torino, Italy, No. 4, 2004. 17 See: B.H. Rubin, “Tajikistan: From Soviet Republic to Russian-Uzbek Protectorate,” in: Symposium “The Interna- tional Relations of Central Asia,” in: Central Asia and the World: Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan, and Turk- menistan, New York, 1994.

63 Volume 15 Issue 2 2014 CENTRAL ASIA AND THE CAUCASUS reason that Tashkent began supporting all the groups fighting against the regime: in the following months, relations between the two neighbors dramatically deteriorated, and Rakhmonov accused Uzbekistan of supporting the Uzbek mercenaries now fighting with the opposition,18 and even of complicity in the assassination attempt against Rakhmonov of April 1997 during his visit to Khu- jand.19 Tashkent was also allegedly implicated in several attempts to carry out an armed rebellion in the north of the country, which was successfully countered by Russian troops.20 Tajikistan accused Uzbekistan of supporting the separatists. Tajikistan feared that ethnic Uzbeks, who represent 25% of the population of Tajikistan, could seek autonomy. Uzbekistan accused Tajikistan of harboring Uzbek and Tajik terrorists intent on overthrowing the Uzbek government.21 Tajikistan is highly dependent on Uzbekistan for its imports. In 2010, Uzbekistan held up railway cars for long periods at the border in order to impede dam construction work and quite possibly also to cause other shortages, thus putting pressure on the Tajik government.22 Uzbekistan began to restrict railway and road transport to and from Tajikistan in February 2010, perhaps to dissuade Tajikistan from building a dam that might limit water flow to Uzbekistan.23

Afghanistan

When Central Asia gained its independence in 1991, the three southern republics bordering on Afghanistan had to draw up a foreign policy toward their turbulent neighbor that consisted mainly of preventing an escalation of its widespread conflict. At that time, Karimov, according to most scholars, decided to rely on the Uzbek faction of Afghanistan (led by warlord and former army general during the Soviet war in Afghanistan Dostum) to create a buffer zone of stability protecting its southern region from further Islamic influence.24 For this purpose, Tashkent allegedly began providing Dostum with funds and arms (some commentators even talk about Karimov’s dream of a so-called Greater Uzbekistan that would absorb Dostum’s provinces).25 For several years, Karimov’s strategy worked well, and even after the rise of the Taliban Dostum continued to control the six northern Provinces of Afghanistan, while the Uzbek leader unsuccessfully tried to consolidate a wide anti-Taliban coalition involving Russia and Central Asia after1994.26 Recent trends in Uzbekistan’s foreign policy, especially toward Afghanistan, reveal a strategic uncertainty in its own right due to Uzbekistan’s recent controversial moves on the international arena. In turn, this perplexity reflects the ambiguity of the political trends throughout the entire region. Uzbekistan’s foreign policy posture toward Afghanistan appears ambivalent.27

18 See: J. Anderson, The International Politics of Central Asia, Manchester University Press, Manchester/New York, 1997, p. 183. 19 See: A. Bohr, “Uzbekistan: Politics and Foreign Policy,” Central Asian and Caucasian Prospects, Royal Institute of International Affairs, London, 1998, p. 52. 20 See: Ibid., p. 54. 21 For more on Uzbek-Tajik water issues, see e.g.: “Uzbekistan vs Tajikistan: Competition over Water Resources Intensifying,” Eurasianet, 8 December, 2010. 22 See: “Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan Agree on Border Cooperation,” RFE/RL, 4 March, 2009. 23 See: J. Nichol, op. cit. 24 See: A. Bohr, op. cit., p. 55. 25 See: G. Capisani, The Handbook of Central Asia, Tauris, London/New York, 2000, p. 97. 26 See: A. Rashid, Talebani. Islam, petrolio e il Grande scontro in Asia centrale, Feltrinelli, Milano, 2001, p. 184. 27 See: F. Tolipov, “Strategic Uncertainty in Uzbekistan’s Afghanistan Policy,” CACI Analyst, 22 July, 2011, available at [www.cacianalyst.org/?q=node/5583].

64 CENTRAL ASIA AND THE CAUCASUS Volume 15 Issue 2 2014

Kazakhstan

Uzbekistan’s relations with Kazakhstan have long been regarded as rivalry over regional leadership between Karimov and Kazakh president Nazarbaev.28 Since Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan became independent in 1991, their governments have signed approximately one hundred bilateral agreements. The most important include the Strategy for Economic Cooperation between Kazakhstan and Uz- bekistan for 2007-2016 and the Program of the Economic Cooperation between Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan for 1998-2005. The two countries’ interests seem to overlap most on issues of national security, particularly on countering threats from Muslim extremists. In March 2006, the Kazakh authorities allowed one of Karimov’s fiercest domestic opponents, dissident Imam Obidkhon Qori Naz- arov, to leave Kazakhstan for asylum in Europe a few days before Nazarbaev visited Uzbekistan rather than accede to Uzbekistan’s extradition requests.29 At a news conference on 9 September, 2002, the presidents of Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan announced that they had resolved their differences regarding the Kazakh-Uzbek border and that they had no disputed issues left. President Nazarbaev even suggested that in the future, in light of the existing political and military blocs, Kazakhs and Uzbeks may have to unite into one country. There has been no official Uzbek response to this egregious sug- gestion, which should probably be considered an expression of friendship and common interest. The first step in the direction of closer cooperation might be better synchronization of the two economies.30 Aware of the opportunities presented by Kazakhstan’s booming economy, Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan signed a new cooperation strategy in July 2007, intended to last ten years. Kazakh Prime Minister Karim Masimov called his southern neighbor a “strategic partner.” Bilateral trade volumes have increased rapidly.31

Kyrgyzstan

Uzbekistan’s relations with Kyrgyzstan have been problematic. One issue is a piece of border- land over which Uzbekistan gained usage rights under Soviet rule and which has not been restored to Kyrgyz sovereignty.32 Despite the potential for conflict over resources or territory,33 relations between Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan throughout the 1990s have remained essentially peaceful.34 The trigger- ing factors have been the intensification of the threat posed by Islamist militants to the ruling regime in Uzbekistan, which dramatically manifested itself in the Tashkent bombings on 16 February, 1999 and in the incursions of Islamist militants—belonging to the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan— through Kyrgyzstan territory into Uzbekistan in the summer of 1999 and 2000.35 Islamic fundamen- talists who entered the country from Kyrgyzstan were blamed for the bombings in Tashkent in 1999.

28 See: Uzbekistan page, available at [www.ncsj.org/Uzbekistan.shtml]. 29 See: R. Weitz, “Karimov-Nazarbayev Rivalry Pervades Bilateral Summit,” CACI Analyst, 14 May, 2008, available at [www.cacianalyst.org/?q=node/4856]. 30 See: H. Plater-Zyberk, Uzbekistan: Old Threats & New Allies, Conflict Studies Research Center, Defense Academy of the United Kingdom, January 2003. 31 See: D.R. Spechler, M.C. Spechler, op. cit. 32 See: N. Megoran, “Bad Neighbors, Bad Fences,” Asia Times, 15 March, 2000, available at [http://www.atimes.com/ casia/ BC15Ag01.html]. 33 See: Central Asia: Border Disputes and Conflict Potential, Crisis Group, Report 33, 4 April, 2002. 34 See: N. Megoran, The Borders of Eternal Friendship? The Politics and Pain of Nationalism and Identity along the Uzbekistan-Kyrgyzstan Ferghana Valley Boundary 1999-2000, Cambridge, unpublished PhD dissertation, 2002. 35 See: V.V. Naumkin, Militant Islam in Central Asia: The Case of the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan, Berkeley Program in Post-Soviet Studies, Spring, 2003.

65 Volume 15 Issue 2 2014 CENTRAL ASIA AND THE CAUCASUS

This led Uzbekistan to implement more restrictive border-crossing measures and to plant antiperson- nel landmines in border regions. Another source of tension was Kyrgyzstan’s refusal to repatriate hundreds of Uzbeks who had fled across the border after the Andijan Massacre in 2005.36 In October 1999, the Uzbeks criticized the Kyrgyz for not making sufficiently dynamic attempts to destroy the Islamic militants in their territory.37 Relations between Tashkent and Bishkek are improving, but in October 2002 Islam Karimov, speaking about security in the region, suggested that some states were still only talking about terrorism and “flirt too long with terrorism.”38 On 17 May, 2005, Karimov asserted that the Tulip Revolution in Kyrgyzstan had facilitated the flow of arms into Uzbekistan for terrorism and accused Kyrgyzstan of harboring the fleeing “terrorists.”39 The Kyrgyz prime minister rejected claims by Karimov in 2005 that Kyrgyzstan had provided training facilities and other support for the Andijan militants. The conflict between ethnic Uzbeks and ethnic Kyrgyz in southern Kyrgyzstan in June 2010 further strained relations between the two countries. Up to 100,000 ethnic Uzbeks fled the fighting in southern Kyrgyzstan to take up residence in refugee camps in Uzbekistan.40 One year later, the clash between Uzbeks and Kyrgyz was still subject to different allegations and interpretations. It was a highly dramatic lesson for the so-called newly independent states of Central Asia, especially Kyrgyzstan and neighboring Uzbekistan. During the clash, the question of Uzbekistan’s interference or non-interference in order to save the Uzbeks in southern Kyrgyzstan was crucial for the further development of the conflict and its outcome.41

Turkmenistan

Relations between Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan have at times been far from friendly and tension-free since the countries gained their independence in 1991. Various factors have contributed to this situation, including border disputes, a major source of tension in the bilateral relations of all the Central Asian countries. Certain factors have worsened Turkmenistan’s ties with Uzbekistan. Like just about all the other Central Asians, the Turkmen have been concerned about Uzbekistan’s efforts to establish itself as the dominant power in Central Asia. However, this general concern became a specific fear in November 2002 as a result of the unsuccessful assassination attempt on President Niyazov, which the Turkmen government interpreted as part of a coup attempt.42 Relations between Turkmenistan, a state that has minimized contact with the outside world, and Uzbekistan have been tense, each country has ethnic minorities owing to the way the Soviets drew the boundaries. Both the Uzbek minority in Turkmenistan and the Turkmen minority in Uzbekistan have experienced discrimination in contexts of economic decline.43 Since 2004, relations between the two countries have improved marginally. The President of Turkmenistan paid a visit to Uzbekistan in 2004. In October

36 See: O. Oliker, “Why America Shouldn’t Sever Ties with Uzbekistan,” RAND, 6 September, 2005, available at [http://www.rand.org/commentary/090605BS.html]. 37 See: H. Plater-Zyberk, op. cit. 38 See: Ibidem. 39 See: The White House, White House Briefing, May 13, 2005; The State Department, Daily Press Briefing, May 18, 20, 24, and 26, 2005; The White House, President’s Press Conference, 31 May, 2005. 40 See: Opening Statement of Assistant Secretary Schwartz, U.S. Department of State, 29 June, 2010 (see also: “Tashkent’s Response to Kyrgyz Crisis Boosts Karimov’s Image,” Eurasianet, 15 July, 2010). 41 See: F. Tolipov, “Uzbekistan-Kyrgyzstan Relations after June 2010 Imply a Continued Lack of Regionalism,” CACI Analyst, 3 August, 2011, available at [www.cacianalyst.org]. 42 See: H. Peimani, Turkmenistan Reconsiders Relations with Uzbekistan, Johns Hopkins University, Central Asia Caucasus Institute, 4 June, 2003, available at [www.cacianalyst.org]. 43 See: Ibidem.

66 CENTRAL ASIA AND THE CAUCASUS Volume 15 Issue 2 2014

2007, President Karimov paid a state visit to Turkmenistan, now under new leadership, sparking hopes for improved bilateral relations.44

Uzbekistan’s Obstacles with Respect to the Regional Power Project Human Rights

The Constitution of the Republic of Uzbekistan (Art 13) asserts: “Democracy in the Republic of Uzbekistan shall rest on the principles common to all mankind, according to which the ultimate value is the human being, his life, freedom, honor, dignity and other inalienable rights.” However, Uzbekistan has controlled press and electronic media. Even some Internet sites, such as those based in Russia, are blocked. Several well-known international news organizations and human rights watch- ers have been ordered to leave on flimsy justifications when it suited overall policy.45 In May 2005, the repression of the civil unrest in the city of Andijan (eastern Uzbekistan) resulted in an international outcry. The U.S. government criticized with increasing vehemence the Karimov regime’s conduct and demanded an independent investigation of the events.46 Dozens of civilians were reportedly killed or wounded during this crackdown. Many of the deaths occurred after Uzbek troops fired on demonstrators on the main square, according to international reporters on the scene and other credible observers.47 According to the State Department’s Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 2009, the Uzbek government continued to commit serious human rights abuses. Human rights problems included arbitrary arrest and detention; denial of due process and fair trial; restrictions on freedom of speech, press, assembly, and association; governmental control of civil society activity; and forced labor in cotton harvesting. Torture and abuse were common in prisons and detention facilities. There were allegations that some persons had died from torture while detained or imprisoned.48 Uzbekistan is not a democracy and does not have a free press. Several political parties have been formed with government approval but have yet to show interest in advocating alternatives to government policy. The police force and the intelligence service use torture as a routine investigation technique.49

The Political System

Opposition parties have been denied registration, their members face harassment and sometimes arrest, and there is increasing pressure on NGOs and civil society in general. Freedom of expression

44 See: B. Pannier, “Uzbekistan: President Makes Landmark Visit to Turkmenistan,” RFE/RL, 18 October, 2007, available at [http://www.rferl.org/featuresarticle/2007/10/a3c5c120-764e-4c37-811f-75f56e39c3b3.html]. 45 See: D.R. Spechler, M.C. Spechler op. cit. 46 See: S. Akbarzadeh, “Uzbekistan and the United States: Friends or Foes?,” Middle East Policy, Vol. 14 (1), 2007, pp. 113-114. 47 See: Bullets Were Falling Like Rain, Human Rights Watch, FBIS, 14 May, Doc. No. CEP-27134; 18 May, Doc. No. CEP-27011; and 27 May, 2005, Doc. No. CEP-115; June 2005; Xinhua News Agency, 28 May, 2005. 48 See: Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 2009, U.S. Department of State, 11 March, 2010, available at [www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/2009/sca/136096.htm]. 49 See: U.S. Department of State Background Note, March 2007, Infoplease Country Profile: Uzbekistan.

67 Volume 15 Issue 2 2014 CENTRAL ASIA AND THE CAUCASUS remains extremely limited.50 Power is primarily concentrated in the hands of executives.51 President Karimov’s rule became increasingly authoritarian, especially after the adoption of a new Constitution, which extended the powers of the President on 8 December, 1992.52 President Karimov’s complete domination of Uzbek political life could produce a devastating political and social vacuum after his departure.53 Between 1989 and the outbreak of the civil war in Tajikistan in May 1992, Islam Karimov endured only a small measure of democratization and allowed quite a few political opposition movements and independent religious groups to function overtly.54 Some of the articles of the new Consti- tution gave excessive powers to the President of the Republic of Uzbekistan 55

Fundamentalism & Terrorism

Islam as a political force and democratic element of society constituted a threat to Uzbekistan’s post-Soviet elite unwilling to lose its privileged position. Aiming at eradication of opposition of any kind, religious or secular, the government actively used anti-Islamic fundamentalism and anti-opposition propaganda, accusing them of attempting to overthrow the legitimate government. In the late 1980s, alternative movements challenged the Communist party’s (C.P.S.U.) power in the Soviet Union, including Central Asia.56 The emergence of new challengers to the undisputed power of the centralized Communist party instigated a negative reaction from the Uzbek government headed by Islam Karimov, the then First Secretary of the C.C. C.P.S.U.57 Internally, Karimov’s regime was later systematically challenged by such organizations as the Islamic Revival Party of Uzbekistan (IRP), the IMU, and Hizb ut-Tahrir (HT).58 The IMU was the only organization that took a military pan-Islamic approach to its endeavor to topple Islam Karimov’s regime. The IMU was created in 1996 by Tahir Yuldosh, who served as the movement’s political leader, and Juma Namangani, who was the IMU’s military commander. The year it was founded, the IMU received critical support and training from the Taliban. It also had close links with Osama bin Laden’s Arab Brigade and was financed by Osama bin Laden.59 All forms of religious fanaticism are seen as a security threat for Central Asia. Uzbekistan is extremely wary of fundamentalist-sponsored terrorism, in any form, and is constantly on the lookout for the spread of radical politicized Islam.60 Islamic radicalism, perceived as the main threat to the existing order, represents the main influence on Uzbekistan’s foreign policy decisions.61

50 See: The Failure of Reform in Uzbekistan: Ways Forward for the International Community, ICG Central Asia Report No. 76, Osh/Brussels, 11 March, 2004. 51 See: Ya. Masood, “Islamic ‘Threat’: The Case of Uzbekistan,” available at [www.caei.com.ar]. 52 See: N.J. Melvin, “Uzbekistan: Transition to Authoritarianism on the Silk Road,” Harwood Academic, Amsterdam, 2000, p. 32. 53 See: H. Plater-Zyberk, op. cit. 54 See: United States Commission on International Religious Freedom Report on Uzbekistan, May 2002. 55 All the articles mentioned in this part are taken from the following web-site: [http://www.umid.uz/Main/Uzbekistan/ Constitution/constitution]. 56 See: R. Yalcin, The Rebirth of Uzbekistan. Politics, Economy and Society in the Post-Soviet Era, Ithaca Press, 1st edition, 24 June, 2002, p. 165. 57 See: “Uzbekistan Nations in Transit,” 1998, available at [http://www.freedomhouse.org/nit98/uzbek.html]. 58 See: D.F. Eickelman, J. Piscatori, Muslim Politics, Princeton University Press, NJ, 1996, p. 139. 59 See: R. Ahmed, “Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan’s Incursion Assists the Taliban,” available at [http://www. cacianalyst.org/sept-13/islamic_movement_of_uzbekistan.htm]. 60 See: “On Initiatives for Regulating the Afghan Conflict,” Narodnoye slovo, 11 January, 1997. 61 See: L. Ozzano, op. cit., p. 90.

68 CENTRAL ASIA AND THE CAUCASUS Volume 15 Issue 2 2014

Being Landlocked & Shortage of Water

Landlocked countries are completely dependent on their transit neighbors’ infrastructure to transport their goods to port. Landlocked countries depend on strong political relations with transit countries. If a landlocked country and its transit neighbor are in conflict, either military or diplomatic, the transit neighbor can easily block borders or adopt regulatory impediments to trade. Even when there is no direct conflict, landlocked countries are extremely vulnerable to the political vaga- ries of their neighbors.62 The landlocked countries of the Southern Caucasus and Central Asia have been acutely affected by cross-border disputes. After the dissolution of the Soviet Union, the former republics were divided according to previous administrative boundaries. These boundaries have been the source of many disputes. Uzbekistan has been particularly affected by such challenges as it suffers from strained relations with four of its five neighbors: Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Turkmenistan. Uzbekistan’s other neighbor, Afghanistan, suffers from extremely weak infrastructure.63 Uzbekistan’s water shortage worsens each year because of the cotton fields and population growth. The shortages and waste of water should force all Central Asian states to adopt a program of water management.64 Water issues have always been important in Uzbekistan—a landlocked state in the center of Central Asia. The problem of water shortages has been present in the country for a long time; however, in 2008 farmers estimate shortages as catastrophic. Currently, 90% of the republic’s water resources are used for irrigation. Uzbekistan’s famous and valuable monoculture—cotton—is also apparently bearing the consequences of massive water shortages; Uzbekistan’s authorities are unable to solve the water shortage problems. The water issues in Uzbekistan could partially be solved if the state were willing to improve relations with neighboring upstream Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan. Perhaps the current situation with acute water shortages in Uzbekistan will prompt a reconsideration of the state’s policies and initiate much-awaited cooperation.65

Environmental Issues

Uzbekistan, contrary to its comparative advantage, became one of the largest cotton producers in the world.66 The Aral Sea, in short, is considered to be the biggest environmental disaster of the 20th century. As the water receded, more than 33,000 sq km of former seabed has been left bare.67 The Aral Sea, half of which is in Uzbekistan, has been severely desiccated by overuse of its tributary rivers. Enormous overdrafts on these rivers are caused by the extremely low efficiency of

62 See: M.L. Faye, J.W. McArthur, J.D. Sachs, Th. Snow, “The Challenges Facing Landlocked Developing Countries,” Journal of Human Development, Vol. 5, No. 1, March 2004. 63 See: N. Tavitan, “The Blockade of Armenia by Turkey: None of Your Business?” in: Forum of Armenian Associa- tions of Europe, Geneva, 2001. 64 See: H. Plater-Zyberk, op. cit. 65 See: E. Akhmadov, “Uzbekistan Experiences Serious Water Shortage,” CACI Analyst, 28 May, 2008, available at [www.cacianalyst.org]. 66 See: D. Lee, “Comparative Advantage,” Foundation for Economic Education, 1999, available at [http://www.fee.org/ Publications/the- Freeman/article.asp?aid=4962]. 67 See: R. Mnatsakanian, “Fertilizer Crop by Use in Uzbekistan: Chapter 2—Agro-Ecological Zones and Land Quality,” U.N. FAO Corporate Document Registry, 2003, available at [http://www.fao.org/DOCREP/006/Y4711E/y4711e05.htm].

69 Volume 15 Issue 2 2014 CENTRAL ASIA AND THE CAUCASUS irrigation systems in Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan. Without the moderating influence of the sea, winters became significantly colder and summers hotter.68

The Economy

Soviet economic legacy has left Uzbekistan with a weakened infrastructure, over-dependency on cotton as the only crop worth exporting, and deteriorated environment. Following its independence in December 1991, the government sought to maintain a kind of command economy through subsidies and tight control on production and prices. This resulted in high inflation rates, which forced the government to introduce some reform policies in 1994.69 After the collapse of the Soviet Union, the Uzbek economy had to face many problems in the following areas: (1) economic institutions, (2) privatization, (3) lack of infrastructure and the inability to modernize, repair and/or expand the necessary infrastructure, (4) insufficiently developed agricultural and industrial sectors and products, (5) inadequate foreign financial assistance, whether in the form of aid packages or direct investments, (6) increasing external debt; (7) high inflation rates after the independence from the Soviet Union; and (8) the shortage of trained human resources.70 Since the country did not have the vital institutional infrastructure for successfully managing and resolving the first problem—weakness of economic institutions—the authorities declared the need to transfer to a liberal economy.71 Uzbekistan continues to suffer serious economic stagnation, unemployment is rising, and living standards are declining. While central Tashkent retains an air of relative prosperity, the reality for many in the capital, and even more so in the provinces, is growing poverty.72

Drug Trafficking

After the collapse of the Soviet Union, newly independent states have born. “Along with the newly independent countries came new borders that had to be patrolled and new border guards who had to be trained. These new borders remained virtually transparent until new national customs services were created in 1993-1994. This was one of the reasons that international drug traffickers took a strong interest in the region.”

68 See: Library of Congress—Federal Research Division Country Profile: Uzbekistan, February 2007, available at [www.eurasiacritic.com/articles/drug-trafficking-Uzbekistan]. 69 See: Sh. Akiner, “Central Asia: New Arc of Crisis?” Royal United Services Institute for Defense Studies, 1993, p. 34. 70 See: H. Peimani, Failed Transition, Bleak Future?: War and Instability in Central Asia and the Caucasus, Praeger, Westport, Conn., 2002, p. 27. 71 See: Ibid., pp. 30-39. 72 See: Ibidem.

70 CENTRAL ASIA AND THE CAUCASUS Volume 15 Issue 2 2014

“The Government of Uzbekistan and independent analysts have argued that the most significant threats that Uzbekistan currently faces are related to complex linkages between terrorism, trafficking in drugs and firearms and persons, and corruption, in particular where the proceeds of transnational organized crime are used to fund terrorism.” After gaining its independence, “the Government of Uzbekistan has repeatedly emphasized the importance of international cooperation in the fight against drugs and transnational organized crime, and has made efforts to integrate the country in the system of international cooperation.”73 Despite attempts to limit drug production in Afghanistan, the warlords there regard drug production and trafficking as their main source of income. Drug trafficking is not a new phenomenon in Uzbekistan, but the Uzbek border guards and law enforcement bodies will have to face this additional challenge brought about by the sudden positive changes in Afghanistan. A long-term antidrug war is the task the Central Asian law enforcement agencies and security services will have to be ready to conduct, irrespective of their other duties.74 The IMU’s involvement in drug trafficking is yet another problematic issue in Central Asia. In the late 1990s and early 2000s, the IMU had efficient control over the Afghanistan-Kyrgyzstan (Osh) drug route. There are several other terrorist groups operating in Central Asia and particularly Uzbekistan, most of them are connected directly with drug trade in the region. Al-Qa‘eda, probably the world’s most notorious terrorist organization, correlates with narcotics trafficking.75

Conclusion

Uzbekistan is an emerging Central Asian regional power by virtue of its relatively large population, energy and other resources, and location in the heart of the region. This country occupies a key strategic position in Central Asia; Uzbekistan is a large country (about the size of France) and is strategically situated in the middle of the region, not only bordering on the other four Central Asian countries, but also on Afghanistan. Under Soviet rule, Moscow recognized Uzbekistan as a primus inter pares in the region. Uzbekistan was also the most represented of the five republics in the U.S.S.R.’s central institutions. All of these factors cooperated to provide the country with vital infra- structures and a political experience that proved essential to its success as an independent state. It can be said that in the problematic context of contemporary Central Asia, Uzbekistan is the only country with comparative advantages allowing it to perform a significant role at the international level too. These factors make Uzbekistan a potential regional leader. Uzbekistan also has the only viable armed forces in the region capable of defending it and carrying out combat action in the region. The ability of the Uzbek leadership to play on the security interests of major powers like the U.S., Russia, and China and its claim to be a buffer against Islamic fundamentalism have also increased Uzbeki- stan’s image as independent force in regional affairs. However, despite its potential and favorable capabilities for playing an effective role in Central Asia, Uzbekistan faces many problems that are hampering its attempts to become a regional power. These obstacles include human rights violations and repression in the country, torture and prosecution of journalists, prohibited NGOs and political parties, political structural problems, such as Islam Karimov’s dictatorship, the role of some clans in the power process, the high level of corruption, the lack of party pluralism and civic engagement, and the economic limitations after the collapse of the Soviet Union. The Uzbek economy faces many

73 M.Ya. Tüylüoğlu, “Drug Trafficking in Uzbekistan,” May 2010, available at [www.eurasiacritic.com/articles/drug- trafficking-uzbekistan]. 74 See: H. Plater-Zyberk, op. cit. 75 See: M.Ya. Tüylüoğlu, op. cit.

71 Volume 15 Issue 2 2014 CENTRAL ASIA AND THE CAUCASUS problems relating to privatization, its underdeveloped infrastructure, its inability to modernize, repair and/or expand the necessary infrastructure, its insufficiently developed agricultural and industrial sectors and production, the insufficient amount of foreign financial assistance, whether in the form of aid packages or direct investments, its increasing external debt, high inflation rates, shortage of trained human resources, etc. The country also has problems relating to its geographic location—it is a landlocked state with no access to the high seas. Water shortage is another significant problem, exacerbated by the fact that it is a downstream state requiring large amounts of water for irrigating its cotton plantations and for industry, as well as for meeting the needs of its growing population. The most important environmental issue in Central Asia is the Aral Sea and its dangerous consequences for the region, especially for Uzbekistan. Fundamentalism and the activities of terrorist organizations are also growing in Central Asia and Afghanistan. The increasing number of terrorist attacks in Uz- bekistan by these terrorist organizations has led to the suppression and prosecution of all Islamic groups.

72 CENTRAL ASIA AND THE CAUCASUS Volume 15 Issue 2 2014

ENERGY POLICY

CENTRAL ASIA-SOUTH ASIA ENERGY COOPERATION: QUEST FOR ENERGY SECURITY AS A DEPENDENCY VARIABLE

Sreemati GANGULI Fellow, Institute of Foreign Policy Studies, University of Calcutta (Calcutta, India)

ABSTRACT

his article focuses on India’s energy chain—the Central Asian countries as pro- security demands, as well as the en- ducers, Afghanistan and Pakistan as both T ergy security scenario of its immediate transit and market states, and India as the neighbors, mainly Pakistan and Afghanistan, market to make this cooperation feasible. But and of its strategic neighborhood, i.e. the there has scarcely been any serious effort to Central Asian countries. It attempts to con- put this energy chain into a meaningful de- centrate on the factor of energy interdepen- pendency variable. For both regions, the dence among these countries and argues other always seems too distant, either as a that the possibility of an interregional energy source or as a market. The continuing inse- cooperation mechanism is essential for en- curity in Afghanistan and bilateral distrust be- ergy security, and ultimately, stability in the tween India and Pakistan are two of the major wider region. A concept of interregional coop- factors that always put energy relations be- eration based on interdependence is vital for tween Central and South Asia on the back- security in the broad sense of the term. These burner. But future prospects may not be so two neighboring regions do enjoy energy in- bleak, since the changing security scenario in terdependence. The wider region has all Afghanistan calls for greater regional eco- three ingredients of the energy supply nomic cooperation, which will be beneficial 73 Volume 15 Issue 2 2014 CENTRAL ASIA AND THE CAUCASUS for Afghan economic reconstruction. More product is a factor of geopolitical and geo- important, it will make the regional states economic conflicts the world over, and there shareholders not only in the Afghan recon- is also plenty of supporting evidence. This struction process, but also in ensuring great- article, on the other hand, focuses on the po- er interregional cooperative mechanisms as tential of using energy as a vector of alliance well. It is widely believed that energy as a in the regional and interregional context.

KEYWORDS: energy security, India, Pakistan, Afghanistan, Central Asia, interregional cooperation.

Introduction

Energy security as a functional concept depends on mutual three-way interdependence—energy producers, transit states, and market states. The producers search for a viable market, the market states base their search for secure supply on viable interactions between the producers and the transit states, while the transit states are looking for economic benefits from transit fees, which is essential for their economic development. The interdependence among the three is essential for this supply chain to function successfully. And it is essential to forge a cooperative environment to ensure energy security for each component of this chain. It is a known fact that in the post-Cold War, post-disintegration era, the single most important trademark (or may we take the liberty of using a commercial term, the USP) of the Central Asian region is its energy resources. Energy is one of the most vital components of sustainable economic development in today’s world, and so energy is one of the most precious marketable commodities. There is geo-economics and there is geopolitics concerning energy as a product, as a marketable commodity, and as the driving force behind economic growth the world over. The yet untapped energy resources of the Central Asian region (it is estimated that the total proven oil reserves of the CARs amount to 40,900 million barrels or 3.4% of global oil reserves; and proven gas reserves are 7.73 trillion cubic meters or 4.3% of global gas reserves),1 its landlocked position, the need for the post-Soviet energy-producing states to reach out to the wider global market for energy revenues to restructure their economies, and the growing global demand for energy as the driving force for economic growth are all factors that have enhanced the significance of this region for global energy security. Pipelines are the carriers of this energy from the producer states to the markets across transit territories, initiating a complex and intertwined process of competition, as well as cooperation, both countering and balancing. The virgin newness of the proven, possible, and probable energy resources of Central Asia has catapulted the region into the center of these geostrategic activities. Energy pipelines become geopolitical fault lines, as they put geopolitical pressure on the transit states, aside from the transit fees they receive. The choice of routes and the participants of any pipeline project in the post-Cold War world involve an interesting compromise formula of geopolitics and geo-economics. There are quite a few interesting examples in India’s broader and strategic neighborhood. This is quite evident in the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan project, which bypasses both Russia and Iran to provide the Central Asian states with an alternative route, the Russo-German Nord Stream project, which bypasses Belarus, Poland, and the Baltic republics to lessen Russia’s dependence on non-

1 See: BP Statistical Review of World Energy, June 2007.

74 CENTRAL ASIA AND THE CAUCASUS Volume 15 Issue 2 2014

Russian Baltic ports and on other transit states, and the EU’s Nabucco project, which bypasses Russia to take Caspian gas to Europe via Turkey. Energy pipelines are also said to be the region’s economic lifeline, given the energy-dependence of the involved states—producers, transit states, and market states. And this factor is supposed to create a bond of intra- or interregional interdependence among these states.

Central Asia: The Alternative in Global Energy Geopolitics?

It must be clarified that this article does not argue that the Central Asian region is the one and only alternative source of energy for global energy needs, but it does argue that each and every power involved find its own reasons to structure and pursue alternative strategies regarding the energy geopolitics centered round Central Asia. This search for alternative strategies is a vital part of their overall energy policy. These alternative strategies are now competitive, now cooperative. The energy policy pursued by the external states provides ample proof of the region’s geo-economic significance. Again, the involvement of not only Russian, but also other international companies in the extraction and development of oil and natural gas in the area, the choice of pipeline routes, and the fact that other external countries prefer non-Russian pipelines show that this is not just a geo-economic exercise based on purely economic logic. The geopolitics of energy is the most important point, since each country wants to use energy as a lever to gain a foothold in the region and outbid the other nations in the process. The pipeline routes initiated by the EU and the U.S. bypass Russian territory and, in most cases, geopolitics prevails over geo-economics. For instance, even though establishing the BTC route as the alternative route through Iran made more sense economically, it was not politically feasible because of the U.S.-Iran hostilities.

The Russian Context

For Russia, control over Central Asian energy resources is vital as it is mostly Central Asian energy that Russia exports to the EU market. Russia is just as dependent on the EU as a market—78% of all Russian oil export and over 90% of all Russian gas exports go to the EU states. There are a number of pipelines that currently supply energy to Europe from Russia—Druzhba, Yamal-Europe, and two proposed pipelines, Nord Stream (its first branch is operating) and South Stream. Interest- ingly, Russia buys Central Asian gas at prices much lower than the international market price and uses this for domestic use, exporting Russian gas at higher prices to the EU market. Central Asian energy is a crucial alternative for Russia to gain control over the EU energy market.

Chinese Involvement

China has various imperatives for establishing energy relations with Central Asia. China’s search for alternative energy sources, apart from the traditional ones, such as Saudi Arabia, Iran, Oman, Yemen, etc., and the need to avoid single-supplier dependence as in 2006 led to China import- 75 Volume 15 Issue 2 2014 CENTRAL ASIA AND THE CAUCASUS ing nearly 46% of its oil requirements from the Middle-East. The political volatility and instability in the Middle East during and after the U.S.-led Operation Iraqi Freedom and the need to reduce its dependence on U.S. naval protection of critical maritime routes like the Strait of Hormuz and the Strait of Malacca to import energy are other pressing reasons for China to opt for energy supplies from Central Asia. The projected energy resources of the South China Sea islands of Spratlys, Para- cel, Scarborough Shoal, and others, as well as the national claims and counterclaims to them by China and the neighboring countries of Vietnam, Philippines, Thailand, and Indonesia show a brew- ing trouble spot in China’s energy security scenario. Two notable Chinese pipeline projects in Central Asia are the Atasu-Alashankou pipeline with Kazakhstan and the China-Turkmen pipeline, which also involves contributions from Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan. Vitaly Kozyrev2 noted that “the energy potential of China’s ‘northern backyard’ (meaning Russia and Central Asia) provides it with additional options to advance its energy security interests.” It also enables China to further its geopolitical influence in Central Asia, which is considered a “geo-economic extension” of its territory. In other words, China’s growing relations with the energy- producing states of Central Asia “reflect its perceived ‘energy vulnerabilities’ and a desire to ensure energy security by diversifying supply away from Middle Eastern sources.”3 And this strategy is in perfect harmony with its so-called Grand West Development program.

The Western Choice

One of the most important reasons for the prominence of the Central Asian region in the West- ern perception, after the disintegration of the Soviet Union, is that the energy resources of Central Asia offer a viable alternative to the Middle East and Russia. For the U.S., the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan (BTC) pipeline has been the first opportunity to put Central Asian energy to use. The BTC pipeline project is a crucial part of U.S. global energy diplomacy. The Report4 by the U.S. National Energy Policy Development Group placed the emphasis on securing more energy from diversified foreign sources in order to support U.S. economic growth and maintain energy security interdependence among America, Europe, and Japan. This pipeline was expected to lessen U.S. dependence on OPEC oil. Most significantly, this pipeline represents the Multiple Export Pipeline concept of the U.S. government, or the so-called anti-monopoly concept. This concept aims at preventing Russia from having a unilateral advantage over the transportation of the region’s energy resources to the external market, thereby gaining geo-economic, as well as geopolitical clout over both the producing states in the region and the global market. So, to quote Svante Cornell, the BTC pipeline “is clearly the most strategic project that America has supported outside the security sector in the former Soviet space.”5 Oktav also commented that the Baku-Ceyhan project “is essentially, from Washington’s perspective, a matter of geo-strategic and political significance

2 V. Kozyrev, “China’s Continental Energy Strategy: Russia and Central Asia,” in: China’s Energy Strategy: The Im- pact on Beijing’s Maritime Policies, ed. by G.B. Collins, A.S. Erickson, et al., Naval Institute Press, Annapolis, 2008. 3 G. Xuetang, “The Energy Security in Central Eurasia: The Geopolitical Implications to China’s Energy Strategy,” China and Eurasia Forum Quarterly, No. 4 (4), 2006. 4 Quoted from: Ö.Z. Oktav, “American Policies Toward the Caspian Sea and the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan Pipeline,” Per- ceptions, Spring 2005. 5 S. Cornell, M. Tsereteli, V. Socor, “Geostrategic Implications of the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan Pipeline,” in: The Baku- Tbilisi-Ceyhan Pipeline: Oil Window to the West, ed. by S. F Starr, S.E. Cornell, Central Asia-Caucasus Institute & Silk Road Studies Program, Johns Hopkins University-SAIS, Washington, D.C., 2005, available at [www.silkroadstudies.org], 20 May 2007.

76 CENTRAL ASIA AND THE CAUCASUS Volume 15 Issue 2 2014 rather than an economic one.”6 Stanislav Zhiznin stated that at the 1998 Ankara Summit, the “BTC pipeline was regarded as a strategic pipeline and political factors played a leading role in the declaration.”7 The emphasis on the strategic aspect of the BTC project points to another angle of these energy alliances—there is much more than just geo-economics involved in their formation and operation. The Energy Corridor, of which this project is an integral part, is aimed at reducing the “strategic dependence” of the EU on Russian gas. As forecasts for 2020 suggest, the EU’s dependence on gas imports will increase from 40% at present to 70-80%, while Russian gas exports to the EU in the same period will increase from 26% to 40-50%. The urge to ensure supply security prompted the EU Council to launch the Energy Policy for Europe initiative. It identified three main challenges—a common external policy approach, diversification of energy sources, transit routes, and resources, and common crisis management “based on solidity and subsidiarity.” For the EU, the option of a diversified energy source, apart from Russia, consists of Norway, the Middle East, and North Africa. But more relevant to this discussion is the EU’s attempts to exploit the energy resources of the Caspian states. The first attempt to institutional- ize the EU’s interest in the region was the Interstate Oil and Gas Transport to Europe or the INO- GATE Program of 1995. This Program was initiated to facilitate the construction of regional pipeline systems to transport energy to Europe. In 2004, another program, the Baku Initiative, was established by the European Commission and the Caspian Sea and Black Sea littoral states. The basic objective of the Baku Initiative is to establish cooperation among these countries in the following spheres in order to enhance energy security for the entire region: convergence of energy markets, taking into account the particular features of each state; addressing the issues of energy exports/ imports supply diversification and energy demand; transparency and capacity-building in the governance of the energy sector; support of rehabilitation of the existing and construction of new projects of common and regional interest, as well as building a regional electricity transport network; development of comprehensive action programs to promote energy saving, energy efficiency, and renewable energy to meet commitments under the Kyoto Protocol; facilitation of the Global Energy Efficiency and Renewable Fund Initiative, and support of a new Caspian Sea-Black Sea-EU Energy Corridor. Significantly, Georgia, Azerbaijan, Ukraine, Kazakhstan, Lithuania, and Poland initiated the Concept of the Caspian Sea-Black Sea-Baltic Energy Transit Space (at two Energy Summits—in Krakow in May 2007 and in Vilnius in October 2007). The primary goal of this Corridor project is to create a Single Energy Space among the interested countries of the region, as well as form and develop mechanisms to secure production, transit, and delivery of hydrocarbons from the Caspian region to the European and international markets, “while providing for a mutually beneficial balance of interests among producers, consumers, and transit countries,” according to the provisions of the Energy Charter Treaty.8 But the most important point is that within this international structure of diverse energy options, it is the dependency factor between a particular producer and a particular market that counts. The option of diversity restricts the unilateral advantage of monopolistic sellers and monopolistic buyers. It hardly allows any state, in any position in the supply chain, to act in such an irresponsible manner that it affects a large section of the population. The Russian decisions to stop gas supplies to Belarus and Ukraine were based on a blend of political and economic calculations, and Russia was successful in gaining increased rates for its energy supplies from these states. On the other hand, Russia’s moves, which affected a growing percentage of the EU population during the cold winter months on each such occasion, prompted the EU to search for alternative energy transit corridors

6 Ö.Z. Oktav, op. cit. 7 S. Zhiznin, “Fundamentals of Energy Diplomacy,” 2003 (quoted from: G. Xuetang, op. cit.). 8 See: P. Belkin, The European Union’s Energy Security Challenges, CRS Report for the Congress, 2008.

77 Volume 15 Issue 2 2014 CENTRAL ASIA AND THE CAUCASUS and, in this connection, the Nabucco pipeline became a seriously considered option. The Nabucco Summit was held in Budapest in January 2009 and the intergovernmental agreement was signed in Ankara in July 2009. This 3,300 km long gas pipeline from Turkey to Austria is to pass through Bulgaria, Rumania, and Hungary. There are also plans to connect it with the Tabriz-Erzurum pipeline and the South Caucasus pipeline to make it a part of the ambitious plans for a Trans-Caspian gas pipeline project in the future. The significance of this project lies in the fact that it represents a totally non-Russian alternative. The source of gas supply will mainly be the second phase of the Shah Deniz gas field in Azerbaijan, with Kazakhstan remaining as a future source; and the route bypasses Russian territory entirely.

Central Asian Response

The Central Asian states have two strategic levers to use in the ongoing complex geopolitical interactions: first, its energy resources, and second, its advantageous location. Central Asia is sur- rounded by or located not so far from states (except for the U.S.) that are viable market options for its resources—Russia, China, and the EU countries. Both the sheer number of diverse pipeline routes, as well as the involvement of different international energy companies in the development of the energy fields and pipelines suggest that the Central Asian states are willing participants in this scenario, where the concept of alternatives rules the game. Although Russia still enjoys its traditional near-monopoly over the pipeline routes and energy fields of the region, Central Asia is not totally dependent on Russia as the only market or the only transportation alternative to lucrative external markets, such as China and the EU. This makes South Asia (particularly India, along with Pakistan and Afghanistan) a viable market option for Central Asian energy resources. Notably, it represents an interesting scenario, since for South Asia, Central Asia remains an alternative, although yet untapped, source for energy, in addition to its traditional sources, such as the Middle East, North Africa, and Latin America; for Central Asia, South Asia is also a highly promising virgin market yet to be cultivated.

The South Asian Option

There are some potential projects to be considered. The first is the much talked about Turkmen- istan-Afghanistan-Pakistan-India pipeline. The 1,680 km long TAPI pipeline, worth $7.6 billion (carrying 90 million standard cubic meters of gas per day), is to start from the Dauletabad gas field of Turkmenistan and cross Herat and Kandahar in Afghanistan and Quetta and Multan in Pakistan to reach Fazilka in India. This project was planned way back in 1995. At that time, it was called TAP (the Turkmenistan-Afghanistan-Pakistan pipeline) and was to be funded by UNOCAL (U.S.) as the principal sponsor. Later, Bridas (Argentina) also became involved in the project. The bombing of U.S. embassies in 1998, the prevalent insecure situation in Afghanistan, the rise in the anti-Taliban mood among U.S. government circles, and later the anti-Taliban operations carried out since 2001 by the U.S. and the ISAF following the 9/11 incident placed this project on the backburner. Some progress has been made with TAPI since India was formally invited to join the project in 2006. In 2008, India, Pakistan, and Afghanistan signed a framework agreement to buy gas from Turkmenistan. India will receive 38 mmcmd of gas from the pipeline. In early 2012, they agreed among themselves on the formula of a Uniform Transit Fee (50 cents per million British Thermal Units) for gas transport. The

78 CENTRAL ASIA AND THE CAUCASUS Volume 15 Issue 2 2014 four participant countries also signed a gas sale-purchase agreement. The TAPI pipeline, as was mentioned, has a planned capacity for transporting 90 million metric standard cubic meters of gas a day for the next 30 years.9 Natural gas constitutes the largest segment of Pakistan’s energy consumption basket. And TAPI would be much more beneficial for the country, since it would receive transit fees of $0.50/MMbtu to be paid by India for the pipeline, while the 38 mmcmd of gas delivered via this pipeline would help address Pakistan’s severe energy shortage. Afghanistan would receive 14 mmcmd of gas and would also benefit from the transit fee to be paid by India. The project would also be a critical source of employment generation in Afghanistan and, more important, contribute to Afghanistan’s energy security.10 The TAPI pipeline has the great potential of becoming a project through which India, Pakistan, and Afghanistan can become stakeholders in the wider sense of the term. The context is also significant in view of the withdrawal of Western and U.S. forces from Afghanistan by 2014. Afghanistan is facing an uncertain future in terms of political stability and economic reorganization. For Turkmenistan, the South Asian market will be a virgin one to explore, as well as an experimental cooperative venture that, if successful, may open up new vistas of energy cooperation involving other Central Asian states, such as Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan in the petro-energy and Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan in the hydro-energy spheres. The proposed India-Russia energy pipeline could offer another golden opportunity for this interregional energy cooperation scenario. The idea of bringing gas from Russia to India through a pipeline that passes through Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Afghanistan, and Pakistan is promoted by ONGC Videsh Limited (OVL). This idea was also discussed during the visit of Kazakhstan’s foreign minister to New Delhi in March 2013 and later on the sidelines of the Heart of Asia Conference in Almaty. G. Sachdeva commented that the “India-Russia hydrocarbon corridor could become a game changer in regional geopolitics and economics. It would re-energize the India-Russia strategic partnership, create solid linkages between South Asia and the emerging Eurasian Economic Union, stabilize Afghanistan economically, and could create incentives for peace between India and Pakistan.”11 The completion of this project would provide India with another important energy source, i.e., Russia; whereas for Russia, the burgeoning Indian energy market would be more lucrative than that of the EU, which is facing economic stagnation. More important, the energy vector of Eurasia-South Asia cooperation would have greater opportunities to become viable, both economically and strategically. There is another project, CASAREM (Central Asia-South Asia Regional Electricity Market) or CASA1000, funded by the Asian Development Bank (ADB), European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD), the Islamic Development Bank (IsDB), the World Bank (WB), and the Inter- national Financial Corporation (IFC). This project involves Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan (as exporters) and Afghanistan and Pakistan (as market states) to achieve the goal of a common electricity market among them.12 Although this project was initiated in 2005, the vast and growing Indian energy market must be included in the scheme in order to ensure its success and market viability. To join the project, it is also imperative that India demonstrate its power as the largest energy market in the regional scenario.

9 See: G. Sachdeva, “Central Asia: India’s New Strategic Neighbourhood,” Geopolitics, No. III (V), October 2012. 10 [www.the hindu.com.business/Economy/tapi-pipeline-gas-sale-agreement-signed], 25 May 2012, accessed on 19 May 2013. 11 G. Sachdeva, “India’s ONGC Plans to Bring Russian Hydrocarbons to South Asia,” 15 May 2013, available at [www. cacaianalyst.org], 16 May 2013. 12 See: N. Kravtsov, “Project CASAREM (CASA 1000) and Its Impact on Central Asian Countries,” Perspectives from the Region, NGO Forum on ADB, 2009, available at [www.forum-adb.org/docs/BW2009Q3-4.pdf], 15 May 2013.

79 Volume 15 Issue 2 2014 CENTRAL ASIA AND THE CAUCASUS

Two developments have made Central-South Asia energy cooperation even more meaningful in the present context: the first is the development of the SCO (Shanghai Cooperation Organization) into the SCO Energy Club to make it more economically viable. All the members of this Club—Rus- sia, China, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan—share the energy component strategically. They are constituents of the energy supply chain, either as producers or as market states. The proposal was first mooted at the 2006 Shanghai Summit by the Russian President Vladimir Putin to coordinate the energy policies of the member states and increase energy cooperation among them. It was endorsed at the Prime Ministerial Summit of the SCO in Tajikistan in late 2006. Before the 2007 SCO Summit in Bishkek, Kazakhstan presented a plan for an Asian Energy Strategy. It was followed by the formal signing of the SCO Energy Charter at the August 2007 Bishkek Summit to address energy cooperation among the members. Now there is the growing necessity for the Club to include both India and Pakistan, since both are observer states in the SCO and are also large emerging energy markets.13 Such a move will make the energy dependence chain function more smoothly and profitably. The second development is the U.S. New Silk Road Initiative, which emphasizes making Afghanistan a transit hub of trade and transport corridors and also of energy pipelines between Cen- tral and South Asia. TAPI also plays an important role in this scenario. There is a gaping void in terms of Central Asia-South Asia economic cooperative ventures in terms of trade, transport corridors, and energy projects. It is significant in the sense that the Central Asian region, and the whole of Eurasia for that matter, is now in the process of making connections with their other neighbors, such as the EU and China, through economic initiatives, transport corridors (like TRACECA), and energy pipelines. Prospective energy cooperation between these two regions may become the initiator of greater economic collaboration in the not-too-distant future.

Roadblocks

However, a good number of obstacles remain that could spoil interregional energy cooperation and prevent it from becoming viable enough to pursue. The first and foremost is the continuing inse- curity in Afghanistan, which affects the security of the pipeline and so the stability of energy supply. A closely linked obstacle is the bilateral mistrust between India and Pakistan—historical baggage that does not allow the countries to cooperate in a meaningful way for future gains. The third factor is the continuing apathy of multinational energy companies in involving themselves in regional ventures since the first two factors offer little guarantee that the energy projects will be viable. Another notable factor is the repeated instances of India being prevented from gaining stakes in the energy fields of Central Asia (the latest being Kashagan in Kazakhstan in September 2013). This surely hampers the process of India-Central Asia energy cooperation, since here a strange combination of economic prowess and petty political gains rule the show.

Conclusion

It must be realized that the Central Asian region will not replace the Middle East or North Af- rica as the primary source of energy for South Asia in the immediate future. It should also be noted

13 For more on SCO Energy Club, see: S. Ganguli, “The SCO: An Energy Alliance in the Making,” in: The Shanghai Cooperation Organization and Eurasian Geopolitics: New Directions, Perspectives and Challenges, ed. by M. Fredholm, NIAS Press, Copenhagen, 2013.

80 CENTRAL ASIA AND THE CAUCASUS Volume 15 Issue 2 2014 that other geographical regions are being developed, such as the South China Sea region and the Arctic, although the viability of these regions to become energy sources for South Asia is still a de- bated issue. However, the significance of Central Asia as an energy-producing region lies in the fact that, in the post-disintegration period, it has become a geopolitical and geo-economic space where alternative energy strategies of various powers are at play. And it is imperative for South Asia to engage this region and cultivate this alternative energy space of Central Asia. In the energy market too, the diversity of supply sources ensures better energy security for the market countries, whereas diversified market access is essential for the energy producers. So Central Asia also needs an alternative market in its close neighborhood where the three growing energy markets of India, Pakistan, and Afghanistan are ready for energy access. More significant, these three South Asian states could at least attempt to see their shared age-old bilateral security problems through this small prism of interregional energy cooperation, viewing themselves less as inimical neighbors and more as joint stakeholders in a long-drawn-out peace process. Such cooperation could also be a key factor in fostering a better opportunity for these South Asian countries to engage themselves in more positive bonding, since each will be a stakeholder in the project for its own gains. A dedicated guard force for TAPI, established by these states along the lines of the Caspian guard for the BTC Pipeline, may provide a guarantee of security and, thus, viability of the project. On the other hand, an interregional common energy market between Central and South Asia would ensure better financial gains, provide more opportunities to attract regional and international private investments, and ultimately offer more viable reasons for greater interregional economic integration. TAPI could become the first step toward realizing such a dream. Since no country is self-sufficient in meeting its own energy needs, interdependence becomes the key component of any energy strategy to succeed on a long-term basis. Security in the nuclear era basically rested (until the new NMD or National Missile Defense concept was introduced in 2000) on the MAD or Mutually Assured Destruction concept. This concept worked on the assumption that each of the parties involved had a clear concept of the other’s nuclear capability to inflict unacceptable destruction on it, and this mutually recognized fact assured security among them. Energy security as a concept in this energy-driven global economic structure rests on a different assumption that the dependency quotient among the producers, transit states, and market states guarantees energy and, in the larger context, economic security. Therefore, it may not be stretching the point to conclude that energy security as a functional concept is based on another interpretation of the MAD theory—Mutually Assured Dependence.14 This interdependence is a vital part of any energy geostrategy pursued by a country or by a region, and it is bound to be optimistic and futuristic. This is because for any strategy to be successful, it must keep in mind long-term planning and consequences, since the current geopolitical reality may not always be prevalent in the future. For example, TAPI was thought of as an entirely unviable project during the 1998-2001 era when the U.S. had a tough choice between supporting the Taliban regime to make the project a success and the global opinion against the anti-humanitarian policies adopted by the regime in Afghanistan. Even the successful Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipeline project was considered untenable at one point in time, because a number of green groups considered it environ- mentally dangerous. It was conceived to score geopolitical brownie points because it bypassed Rus- sia, although the route through Iran would have been much more profitable. This article attempts to focus on the point that energy is not only a commodity that incites international geopolitical rivalry, but is also a commodity around which international cooperation and alliances can be developed and sustained. The success of OPEC, GECF, and ASEAN Energy Coop- eration suggests the institutionalization of energy as a vector of alliance. The logic of this article may

14 See: S. Ganguli, “Introduction,” in: Strategising Energy: An Asian Perspective, ed. by S. Ganguli, KW Publishers, New Delhi, 2014.

81 Volume 15 Issue 2 2014 CENTRAL ASIA AND THE CAUCASUS be considered as too optimistic and futuristic, since energy cooperation in this interregional context is still at the nascent stage. But there is certainly something beyond the considerations of today’s critical insecure reality and interregional environment of suspicion and petty political gains, and that is the dream of a successful regional energy cooperation scenario in the future. If current reality is the only criterion for engaging in strategic planning for the future, the hope behind the establishment of the ECSC in 1951, against the background of post-World War II Europe, might also have been considered a far-fetched idea at the time the Organization was conceived.

THE EU’S ENERGY PRIORITIES IN THE SOUTHERN CAUCASUS

Roman MELIKIAN Ph.D. (Political Science), Lecturer at the Academy of State Administration under the President of the Republic of Armenia (Erevan, Armenia)

ABSTRACT

he recent geopolitical events, and pri- historical and cultural terms than the Central marily those unfolding along the Asian countries. T West-Russia trajectory, have dramat- The energy-rich countries (Azerbaijan, ically changed the forecast of how long the Turkmenistan, and Iran) and countries with EU can continue using Russian energy re- considerable transit capacities (Turkey and sources. The European countries wish to Georgia) have found themselves in the epi- slowly free themselves from their energy de- center of the European establishment’s at- pendence on Russia and make new adjust- tention. At the beginning of 2014, several ments to the conceptual approaches to this important new projects for the South Cauca- problem. In particular, the EU has been ac- sian Region were articulated (Nabucco, Na- tively fortifying its position in the Black Sea- bucco West, TAP, Shah Deniz-2, and oth- Caspian Region by dividing it into two key ers). strategic components—the Southern Cau- The EU is now faced with making an casus and the Caspian. urgent choice between its former depen- The Eastern Partnership Program, dence on Russia or undertaking gradual which extends to Georgia, Ukraine, Azerbai- modernization by finding new energy part- jan, Moldova, Armenia, and Belarus, has ners. In this respect, the most radical part of implied close cooperation between these European society is willing to engage in any post-Soviet countries and the EU at all lev- economically promising cooperation (in the els from the very beginning. The Europeans form of low energy prices), as long as it is find these countries easier to understand in not with Russia or the U.S. 82 CENTRAL ASIA AND THE CAUCASUS Volume 15 Issue 2 2014

The rest of society holds a more mod- vest huge sums in the implementation of the erate position in favor of diversifying suppli- energy projects that, as already noted, are ers; it is not against either Russian energy being actively discussed by some countries resources or American shale gas, but is also of the region. Moreover, the American factor considering alternative energy sources. continues to play an important role: the U.S. It should be noted that, on the whole, the is striving to squeeze Russia out of the Eu- EU inclines more toward the second scenario. ropean energy zone. In so doing, it is clearly However, after making its South Cau- striving to monopolize the European region- casian choice, the EU is not rushing to in- al gas market.

KEYWORDS: energy priorities, European energy resources, the EU, the Southern Caucasus, shale gas, energy resources, energy dynamics, energy dependence.

Introduction

The appearance of new geopolitical challenges has made adopting a new energy conception an urgent issue for the EU countries. Its main emphasis is on acquiring energy independence or becoming as free as possible from energy dependence on Russia.1 The need to introduce a new energy conception appeared as early as 2006 when problems caused by the gas conflict between Ukraine and Russia, who could not come to terms and reach a price compromise, arose on the Russia-EU transit line.2 The 2014 events in Ukraine and the Crimea added fuel to the fire, which led Brussels to urgently look for ways to free itself from its dependence on Russian energy suppliers.3 The concluding statement made on 21 March, 2014 in Brussels at the Summit of the 28 EU countries clearly voiced the Europeans’ concern: “The European Council (EU summit) calls on the European Commission to conduct an in-depth study of European energy security and present, by June, a comprehensive plan for the reduction of the dependence of the EU and particularly of the most energy-dependent states on external sources of energy.”4 It seems that the reason for this urgency was not so much the EU’s geopolitical position caused by the Ukraine events and the desire of the European establishment to punish Russia by introducing sanctions as its striving to build a more independent energy policy5 (at present supplies from Russia cover around 60% of the EU’s demand for oil and gas).

1 It is worth noting that the main efforts are being made by the European Commission, which is presenting the conception of a single EU energy and security policy in the form of a Green Book. The latter, a European Energy Security Strategy, is the most comprehensive document to date, showing the current situation in the European energy industry and envisaging the aims of EU diplomacy until 2020-2030 (see: Energy Policy and Energy Efficiency Committee, Commission of European Com- munities, Green Book, available at [http://www.rsppenergy.ru/main/static.asp?art_id=1552], 25 March, 2014). 2 See: “Gazprom is Leaving Ukraine without Russian Gas,” Newsru.com, available in Russian at [http://www.newsru. com/arch/finance/01jan2006/gazaend.html], 24 March, 2014. 3 See: “Brussels and Kiev are Looking for Ways to Reduce their Dependence on Russian Gas,” Euronews.com, available in Russian at [http://ru.euronews.com/2014/03/20/eu-meets-to-discuss-energy-security-against-background-of-ukraine-crisis/], 25 March, 2014. 4 “The European Commission has been Called on to Draw Up a Plan for ‘Reducing the European Union’s Energy De- pendence on Russia,’” ITAR-TASS, available in Russian at [http: //itar-tass.com/ekonomika/1063836], 25 March, 2014. 5 See: Ibidem.

83 Volume 15 Issue 2 2014 CENTRAL ASIA AND THE CAUCASUS

President of the European Council Herman Van Rompuy mentioned the start of a new strategy in his speech at the summit, saying that in ten years Russian oil and gas supplies could comprise up to 80% of all the EU’s consumption, which would mean complete energy dependence on Moscow. It should be noted that Europe intends to replace fuel from Russia with shale gas from the U.S. But this also has its negative aspects, since the cost of shale gas is increasing with each passing year (due to the increase in expenditures on its development and production), while when replacing Rus- sian energy resources with alternative sources of energy, the Europeans need to at least retain the current trade, payment, and price balance. Director of the Analytical Department of the Alpari Company A. Razuvaev had the following to say about this: “The production of shale gas in many European countries is prohibited for environmental reasons. Europe is unlikely, to put it mildly, to go for an increase in production because the Greens and the opposition are against this. In any case, it will require enormous investments and time. Even if the Europeans do go for it, I think it will be another three years before the first deliveries appear. It could be that Ukraine has shale gas, but there is none in Europe itself. An infrastructure will have to be built for receiving liquefied natural gas; this also means tens of billions of dollars and a time-limit of three to five years. And if we are talking about America, it is impossible to say what production will be like there in five years.”6 The European leadership is placing its hope of acquiring rapid energy independence to some extent on the U.S., which has already made it clear that it is equally concerned about this problem and is willing to carry out direct deliveries of natural gas to Europe. So, when talking at the summit in Brussels held in March 2014, U.S. President Barack Obama said: “We recognize that … these sanctions … will have some impact on the global economy as well as on all the countries that are represented here today. And we’re mindful that that’s going to be different not just between the United States and Europe but also among different countries inside of Europe, some of whom are more dependent, for example, on energy from Russia than others are. And we’ve already licensed, authorized the export of as much natural gas each day as Europe uses each day. But it’s going into the open market; it’s not targeted directly. It’s going to private companies who get these licenses and they make decisions on the world market about where that energy is going to be sold.”7 So it is unlikely that alternative deliveries of American gas will be possible in the short or medium term, since this will require multibillion investments. Moreover, according to the calculations, the price of American energy resources will be several times higher than the price of Russian deliveries to the EU. On the other hand, another alternative is hypothetically possible, which presumes developing energy resources on the basis of domestic sources. For example, shale gas could be produced at fields in the EU countries, particularly in Poland. However, this project will require significant investments, which the EU is essentially unable to provide today. The European countries will profit much more from the import of energy resources and the use of renewable sources; this will require introducing measures aimed at increasing energy efficiency of production and consumption and gradually modernizing their energy grids. This will make it possible to ensure sufficient energy security for the EU countries, as well as reduce the emissions of greenhouse gases in their territory and, thus, improve the environment.

6 “The price of the EU’s ‘Energy Independence’ from Russian (AUDIO),” Radio “Voice of Russia,” available in Rus- sian at [http://rus.ruvr.ru/2014_03_24/Cena-jenergeticheskoj-nezavisimosti-ES-ot-Rossii-4019/], 27 March, 2014. 7 Press Conference by President Obama, European Council President Van Rompuy, and European Commission Pres- ident Barroso, Council of the European Union, Brussels, Belgium, 27 March, 2014, available at [http://www.whitehouse.gov/ the-press-office/2014/03/26/press-conference-president-obama-european-council-president-van-rompuy-a].

84 CENTRAL ASIA AND THE CAUCASUS Volume 15 Issue 2 2014

The development of domestic resources will most likely not meet the needs of European consumers. However, according to Sanford C. Bernstein & Co., if the EU turns away from Russian energy resources, more than 10,000 jobs will be lost in the next five years, along with a decrease in gas consumption (by 15 bcm a year) and transfer to alternative sources of energy. Switching from gas to coal will also dump an additional 300 million tons of CO2 into the European environment, while atomic energy plants will have to increase their capacity by 5%. Enterprises that use large amounts of natural gas will be forced to close down or transfer to other types of fuel. All of this indicates that Europe will essentially be unable to give up Russian gas any time soon. So after examining different scenarios of Europe foregoing deliveries of Russian gas, the analysts and experts at Sanford C. Bernstein & Co. conclude that not one of them is attractive.8 The broader public and scientific circles of Europe, which are already talking about the inefficiency of transferring to a new energy system, are of the opinion that shale oil and gas will only provide the American economy with limited profit, while they will be of even less benefit to Europe. The report of the well-known French Institute of Sustainable Development and International Relations (IDDRI) said on this account: “…the shale gas boom in the U.S. proved beneficial for the local state economies, but on a nation-wide scale, it has had very little effect on economic growth. What is more, the sharp drop in gas prices noted after the discovery of shale deposits is unlikely to last long. The positive effect will be even less noticeable in Europe due to its different geological conditions, special environmental considerations, and amount of time required for developing fields. We forget that the shale gas revolution in the U.S. was possible only after decades of geological exploration.”9 This is why the most optimal response to the notorious energy challenges for the EU is to take advantage of the opportunities provided by the Southern Caucasus. This region is acting as a “special energy zone” for Brussels even if only by merit of the alternative route it offers for transporting energy resources to Europe. In the mid-1990s, the EU was included in regional energy projects through the INOGATE and TRACECA programs, but this was clearly not enough for it. In addition to everything else, an important vector in the European neighborhood policy, in the form of the current Eastern Partnership program, is energy cooperation and primarily the building of the West-East gas pipelines; but things are not entirely smooth there either. The geopolitical strivings of the European Commission aimed at drawing the Southern Caucasus (as an energy resource supplier) into the European energy system are encountering a whole series of difficulties. A clear example of this is the Nabucco project, which has still not come to fruition and which, as European experts believe, is inferior to the Nabucco West and Shah Deniz projects.10 From the viewpoint of the EU’s energy interests in the South Caucasus region, its cooperation with Azerbaijan seems particularly important, which has a key role in the more promising South Gas Corridor project. At the same time, Europe recognizes full well that Azeri energy resources alone will not be enough (which is essentially why the Nabucco project was suspended), so it will be necessary to include Turkmenistan or Iran in the project, which is fraught with several serious problems. They are related to the conflicts and uncoordinated interests existing among the potential participants (the Azerbaijan-Turkmenistan opposition over Kiapaz-Serdar, gas competition, the status of Azeris in Iran, and so on).

8 See: “Giving up Russian Gas will Cost the EU More than $200 Billion,” Steelland.ru, available in Russian at [http:// www.steelland.ru/news/business/1148.html], 14 April, 2014. 9 “The French Refuse to Consider Shale Gas a Panacea for the EU Energy Industry,” Lenta.ru, available in Russian at [http://lenta.ru/news/2014/02/13/shale/], 29 March, 2014. 10 See: “Will TANAP and Nabucco-West Take the Place of Nabucco? Sobytiia i fakty, available at [http: //allwebb.info/ article/budet-li-vmesto-nabucco-tanap-i-nabucco-west.html], 10 March, 2014.

85 Volume 15 Issue 2 2014 CENTRAL ASIA AND THE CAUCASUS

On the other hand, without Turkmen blue fuel deliveries from Azerbaijan will not be able to have any strong impact on gas prices in Europe. Despite this, Azerbaijan still provides Turkmenistan with a window of sorts to Europe. Consequently, neither Azerbaijan, nor Turkmenistan will go for open confrontation with Russia in the medium term if only because both of these countries are gas exporters to Russia, and Gazprom is still the main gas supplier to Europe.11 The complicated Azeri-Iranian relations12 could prompt Baku and Tehran to rapidly draw up joint energy projects for delivering gas in the European direction. However, on the other hand, this proposal does not correspond to today’s reality,13 which European investors are very well aware of. At the same time, since the Ukrainian events of 2014, which resulted in the Crimea becoming part of Russia, energy cooperation within GUAM has become more complicated. This is explained by the fact that Russia is no longer interested in laying pipelines through the buffer zone of Ukraine to transit gas through Crimean territory. During recent decades the EU, on the whole, has been consolidating its foreign energy policy, which was prompted both by the internal needs of its member states and by external factors. Parallel to this, the role of the Southern Caucasus is growing as the most important strategic corridor for transporting energy resources, the demand for which is continuing to rise in the current globalizing world. We take the liberty of presuming that the EU will become more flexible in its involvement in the South Caucasian region in the future and that it will continue to initiate new energy projects.

European Energy Interests and the Southern Caucasus: A Survey

The EU’s demand for imported energy is continuing to grow. At the same time, the countries to the East of the EU are striving to make maximum use of their own energy resources. In its cooperation with its Eastern neighbors, the European side found the way things are entirely acceptable. It resulted in a whole series of projects that envisaged creating predictable and transparent energy markets capable of stimulating investment and economic growth, as well as ensuring safe deliveries. In so doing, both the energy producers and the transit countries are important for the EU. For example, according to the Statement of the EU General-Directorate for Energy, if the EU wants to reach its goal of a safe, competitive, and sustainable energy industry, it has to attract other countries and cooperate with them, be they producers, consumers, or countries providing the transit of energy resources.14 This strategy is extremely acceptable for almost all the EU countries, since pursuing a common foreign policy, including in security, has long been a topic of broad public discussion. However, its practical implementation often contradicts the tactical and strategic precepts of the EU member states.

11 See: “Turkmenistan and Azerbaijan are Pumping their Gas Muscles,” Teknoblog.ru, available in Russian at [http:// teknoblog.ru/2013/11/11/], 22 March, 2014. 12 See: “Both Countries, Azerbaijan and Iran, are Inclined toward Developing Bilateral Relations,” Zia.az, available in Russian at [http://zia.az/kose/1266-obe-strany-azerbaydzhan-i-ran-sklonny-k-razvitiyu-dvustoronnih-otnosheniy.html], 22 March, 2014. 13 See: A. Abasov, “Azerbaidzhan i Iran: protivorechia i perspektivy razvitiia otnoshenii,” available at [http: // theanalyticon.com/?p=478&lang=ru], 22 March, 2014. 14 See: Official website of the European Union. Statement of the EU General-Directorate for Energy, available at [http:// ec.europa.eu/dgs/energy/index_en.htm], 25 March, 2014.

86 CENTRAL ASIA AND THE CAUCASUS Volume 15 Issue 2 2014

The European economy today is in general characterized by a steadily growing consumption of energy that is mainly obtained from mineral fuel (oil, coal, and natural gas). It is these energy resources that provide 4/5 of Europe’s total energy consumption, whereby almost 2/3 of the fuel today is imported. And whereas radical measures to change the current trends will not be taken until 2030, the share of import in overall European energy consumption will significantly grow. In 2000, 15 EU countries imported 49% of the energy consumed; it is presumed that by 2020, this figure will increase to 62%. The EU Green Book on Energy, published in 2000, forecasts an increase in this figure to 51% by 2020.15 The South Caucasian countries are also alternative sources for expanding import. The Europeans began assimilating this region as a sphere of EU energy interests as early as 1883 when the Rothschild family financed the building of the Baku-Poti railroad, via which oil was transported to the international market.16 The West was denied access to the region during Soviet power, but after the collapse of the Soviet Union, the situation dramatically changed. It should be noted that the European states began stepping up their policy regarding the Southern Caucasus in the end of the 1980s, which was related to the ethnic conflicts in the South Caucasian republics. After the collapse of the Soviet Union, the Southern Caucasus became an arena where the interests of the largest regional (Russia, Iran, Turkey) and extra-regional actors (the EU, U.S., NATO, China, Central Asian countries, and Arab states) met. This was generated by the fight for control over the water areas and resources of the Black and Caspian seas and influence on the Southern Caucasus, which was a potential transit route for energy resources from Central Asia and the Middle East to Europe. In 1993, the TRACECA transport corridor program (Europe-the Caucasus-Asia) was launched in Brussels, which was an attempt to activate the Great Silk Road. This project was instituted as the main component of the TACIS program (Technical Assistance to the CIS). All three South Caucasian states were among the TRACECA participants. At that time, the main vector of the transport (and subsequently energy) strategy of the EU in the Southern Caucasus was established—creating a corridor that bypassed Russia17 designed to “diversify the traditional centralized trade and transport flows and open new (alternative) trade routes to the Western countries.”18 In order to ensure the safety of energy transportation from the Caspian and Black Sea regions, the European Commission adopted the INOGATE program (an international energy cooperation program between the EU and its partner countries) in 1995, which envisaged not only pumping hydrocarbons to Europe, but also encouraging the development of the oil and gas infrastructure of the countries concerned. It should be noted that at the first stage of implementation of the TRACECA and INOGATE projects, the EU was not even thinking of developing a methodology for forming its energy security strategy. The thing is that those projects, which were mainly technical, did not have any definite strategic operators, and this significantly reduced their influence.

15 See: M.E. Bogucharskiy, “Energeticheskaia strategiia Evropeiskogo soiuza na sovremennom etape,” Finansy. Pravo. Menedzhment, available at [http: //www.flm.su/?actions=main_content&id=828#_ftn1], 11 April, 2014. 16 See: J. Wisniewski, “EU Energy Diversification Policy and the Case of South Caucasus,” Political Perspectives, Vol. 5, No. 2, 2011, p. 60. 17 By 2008, a very unusual situation had developed in the Southern Caucasus. Georgia was actively supported by the Bush administration while being in just as active conflict with Russia. The EU policy toward Georgia was diversified. On the whole, it seems that, in the context of the West’s general policy, the role of the EU in the Southern Caucasus until 2008 was to oust Russia from the region by supporting the GUAM countries (Georgia, Ukraine, Azerbaijan, and Moldova) and advance the global energy Nabucco project (see: A.D. Tsiganok, Voina na Kavkaze 2008: russkiy vzgliad. Gruzino-osetinskaia voina 8 avgusta 2008 goda, 2nd edition, supplemented, AIRO-XXI, Moscow, 2011). 18 Official website of the TRACECA program, available at [http: //www.traceca-org.org/ru/traseka/istorija-traseka/], 5 April, 2014.

87 Volume 15 Issue 2 2014 CENTRAL ASIA AND THE CAUCASUS

Beginning in 2000, the EU started taking active steps in developing an integral strategy. For instance, the official documents concerning Eastern Partnership emphasize that the energy industry is the main indicator for this structure. In particular, the European Commission notes that stepping up strategic energy efforts with neighboring countries is the main element of strategic development for Eastern Partnership, while the Southern Caucasus is a vital region for developing and transporting resources.19 An important milestone in extending the energy interests of the EU to the Southern Caucasus was instituting a new format called the Baku Initiative. Within the framework of this initiative, a Road Map was adopted in 2006 in Astana that determined the spheres of energy cooperation. It particularly mentioned the gradual convergence of energy markets with the principles of the internal EU energy market, ensuring energy security and energy efficiency, and improving the investment environment in the energy sector.20 The South Gas Corridor program was the last stage in drawing the South Caucasian countries into the orbit of the EU’s energy interests. On the whole, there are many such energy projects today. However, not one of these projects has been put into operation yet, despite the willingness of the sides to engage in their permanent implementation. The Nabucco gas pipeline is one of the ambitious projects that the EU has tried to implement while looking for an alternative to Russian gas. It was supposed to stretch for 4,000 km from Azer- baijan to Austria and deliver more than 30 bcm of gas a year. However, implementation of this grandiose project immediately encountered two problems: its high cost (around $13 billion) and the lack of a guaranteed raw material base. There was clearly not enough Azeri gas, Turkmen gas was offshore, and deliveries from Iran were halted due to international sanctions. Consequently, the Na- bucco project divided into two parts—TANAP (the Trans-Anatolian gas pipeline) and Nabucco West. The first will stretch from the east to the west of Turkey to the border with Bulgaria or Greece, and the second from the borders of Turkey and Bulgaria to Baumgarten in Austria. Azerbaijan, Turkey, Turkmenistan, and the European Commission, inspired by such a promising prospect, continue to hold talks on the delivery of Turkmen gas via TANAP; it is presumed that by 2023, its volumes will reach 23 bcm a year. At the same time, keeping in mind Europe’s growing need to increase gas export volumes, the sides began actively showing an interest in implementing the Shah Deniz-2 project, development of which is scheduled for 2016-2017.21 Speaking at the World Economic Forum in Davos in January 2014, President of the Azerbaijan Republic Ilham Aliev said: “At present, the main priority is to carry out grandiose energy projects. I am referring to the Shah Deniz-2 project, which we began implementing last month. According to the project, two gas pipelines will be built: one in Turkey and the other from the Turkish-Greek border toward Italy. One is called the Trans-Anatolian and the other the Trans-Adriatic. These two projects envisage the transportation of natural gas from gigantic fields, and this will become the largest infrastructural project of Europe.”22

19 See: European Neighborhood Policy—Strategy Paper, Commission of the European Communities, Communication, Brussels, 12 May, 2004, pp. 17 & 11, available at [http://ec.europa.eu/world/enp/pdf/strategy/strategy_paper_en.pdf], 15 March, 2014. 20 See: “The Eastern Partnership Multilateral Platforms,” available at [http://eeas.europa.eu/eastern/platforms/index_ en.htm], 3 April, 2014. 21 Shah Deniz is a gas-condensate field situated on the shelf of the Caspian Sea in Azerbaijan. The total reserves are estimated at 1.2 tcm of natural gas and 240 million tons of gas condensate. The first well went into operation at the end of 2006. At present, gas production at the field amounts to 9 bcm a year. The anticipated total volume of production from the second stage is 16 bcm a year (see: Will TANAP and Nabucco-West Take the Place of Nabucco?). 22 “President Ilham Aliev: Shah Deniz-2 will be the Largest Infrastructural Project of Europe,” APA.AZ, available in Russian at [http: //ru.apa.az/news/264057], 26 February, 2014.

88 CENTRAL ASIA AND THE CAUCASUS Volume 15 Issue 2 2014

The Azeri leader’s proposal could be worth considering if all the gas were exported only to Europe. But it is important to note that Turkey is making a bid for 6 bcm of gas from the second Shah Deniz line, which, obtaining it at present from Russia and Iran, is also interested in diversifying deliveries. The fact that Turkey is the main participant in the Trans-Anatolian project makes it essentially impossible for the Azeri side to transport gas without going through its territory. As a result, Europe will be left with only 10 bcm of Azeri gas, which is not very much even for Nabucco West. Despite the fact that Baku is willing to increase the production volume to 30 bcm a year by 2030, this project, which is very expensive, could remain a long-term prospect, since Europe’s energy appetite will inevitably grow in time.

Prospects for Delivering Azeri Gas to Europe— Reality or Metaphor?

As early as 8 April, 2013, meetings were held in Baku to discuss pumping South Caucasian regional energy resources to Europe. At one of them, Turkish Minister for Energy and Natural Re- sources Taner Yıldız said that next year, real steps will be taken to create trans-Anatolian energy resources. In particular he said: “Along with implementing the South Stream project from Russia, Turkey is also successfully carrying out the Trans-Anatolian gas pipeline project with fraternal state Azerbaijan.”23 Taner Yıldız added that it should be extended to North Europe either by means of Nabucco West or the Trans-Adriatic Pipeline. However, the Shah Deniz company has the right to choose one of these pipelines since it is to this company that Nabucco is conceding more than 50% of its share in the work to implement the Nabucco West project. Moreover, the State Oil Company of the Azerbaijan Republic, which intends to sell 29% of its shares to BP, Statoil, and Total, has pledged to invest $17 billion in Turkey’s energy sector in the next five years.24 So this proposal looks very promising not only for Europe, but for Turkey too, the companies of which already own more than 20% of the state shares of Azeri oil. The initiative of the Azeri side to assume the main expenditures is also in the interests of Turkey.25 As U.S. Ambassador to Azerbaijan Richard Morningstar said recently, official Washington does not intend to interfere and will most likely assume a neutral position regarding all the energy projects along the Caspian-Europe route, since they could create geopolitical contradictions in the region. For instance, speaking at the First World Economic Forum on a Strategic Dialogue on the Fu- ture of the Southern Caucasus and Central Asia organized in Baku, Richard Morningstar said that the U.S. was taking a neutral position regarding the transportation of Azeri gas via TAP and Nabucco West. Mentioning several commercial and geopolitical difficulties, he added that he thought that in addition to Azeri gas, Turkmen gas would also be transported in the future via the pipelines passing through this region, and Turkmenistan would also become part of the Southern corridor.26

23 “Taner Yıldız: ‘Baku-Tbilisi-Kars and Baku-Tbilisi-Erzurum are the Key Regional Projects,’” News.day.az, available in Russian at [http: //news.day.az/economy/394458.html], 7 April, 2014. 24 See: “BP, Statoil, and Total will Buy Shares in the Azerbaijan-Turkey-Europe Gas Pipeline,” Center for Transport Strategies, available in Russian at [http: //cfts.org.ua/news/49031], 7 April, 2014. 25 See: “Pipeline Prospects-2014: The Large Diameter is Making a Comeback,” UGMK.info, available in Russian at [http://www.ugmk.info/print/art/1391447662.html], 7 April, 2014. 26 See: “Unprecedented Event in Azerbaijan,” Haqqin.az, available in Russian at [http: //haqqin.az/news/4885], 8 April, 2014.

89 Volume 15 Issue 2 2014 CENTRAL ASIA AND THE CAUCASUS

The above citations make it possible to conclude that the EU intends to obtain Azeri energy resources bypassing Russia, whereby they will be transported at the supplier’s expense. This scenario is related to the unwillingness of European companies to invest in such large-scale projects and their concern about the rapid exhaustion of Azeri oil. Investments from the EU countries can only be expected if Turkmen hydrocarbons are hooked up to the pipelines. As a result, the European players have seen to it that the Azeri side will only be responsible for work on the section of the Nabucco West project that encompasses EU territory. So if Azerbaijan decides to export its oil to Europe, it will not only have to build pipelines that reach the EU borders, but also take responsibility for carrying out half of the work in its territory. It should be noted that Turkey is particularly interested in these projects. As a transit country, it could not only gain large profits from these transactions, but also be able to put pressure on the European countries in the future. Ankara, like the EU, has no intention of making vast investments in these projects and is trying to implement them using Azeri funds. The difference in the EU and Turkish positions is that the latter is concerned not so much about the possible exhaustion of Azeri oil supplies, as about interference from Russia. Moscow might try to prevent Turkmenistan from joining these projects, or pressurize Georgia into not participating in them; the latter depends on Russia for its energy so is not at all interested in any new opposition with it. Richard Morningstar’s statement above about the U.S.’s neutral position regarding the transportation of Azeri gas can also be related to similar concerns. Evidently, Azerbaijan, which is augmenting its financial possibilities and has still not found any adequate support from Turkey or the EU, is the most interested in implementing the above-mentioned projects.

Iran—New European Startup of South Caucasian Energy Dynamics?

Europe and the U.S., which have introduced tough sanctions against Iran, have begun dramatically changing their attitude toward it. This change in mood was essentially prompted by the abrupt deterioration in relations between the West (including Japan) and Moscow. This was prompted in turn by the events in Ukraine, which created a dangerous bed of international tension. The EU and U.S. made a decision to temporarily (for six months) remove some of the sanctions against Iran27; this did not have any particular impact on the world economic situation. However, cancellation of the sanctions essentially proved the hypothesis that the West knew from the very beginning that Iran was not intending to use its nuclear reserves for purposes other than peaceful. This moved the topic of replacing Russian energy resources with Iranian to the foreground. Meanwhile, the crisis in Ukraine, which threatens to become regional, is deteriorating, particularly in the energy sphere (the matter concerns Ukrainian transit of Russian energy resources). Further aggravation of the situation might create serious obstacles for the safe transit of Russian energy resources to Europe. At present, there are two alternatives for Europe: expensive American shale gas (it is $200-300 more expensive than Russian), which is being considered as an alternative to Russian gas, and Ira- nian gas, which is difficult to deliver. The first alternative is too expensive; the second is realistic, but does not suit either the Americans or the Russians. What is more, according to some assess-

27 See: “The U.S. and EU have Lifted Multibillion Sanctions against Iran,” Newsru.com, available in Russian at [http:// www.newsru.com/world/20jan2014/iransanct.html], 22 April, 2014.

90 CENTRAL ASIA AND THE CAUCASUS Volume 15 Issue 2 2014 ments, Iranian gas is uncompetitive not only with respect to delivery terms, but also in quality. However, Europe, which is not in the best shape today, is quite happy with cheap, albeit low quality Iranian gas. In turn, the U.S. and Russia do not want to miss their chance. Russia continues to look for alternative energy transit routes that bypass Ukraine, the Baltic states, and even Turkey (the North Stream and South Stream). As for the U.S., it is investing billions of dollars in various projects that circumvent Russia and Iran, as well as striving to advance its shale energy products in the large Eu- ropean countries, particularly those that are EU members. In light of the above, the recent step taken by the leaders of Iran (oil and gas being the basis of its economy), who came forward with a statement about their intention to fortify their position in the world gas market, but without competing with Russia, looks entirely logical. Minister of Industry, Mining, and Trade of the Islamic Republic of Iran Mohammad Nematza- deh noted on this account: “We want to play an ever greater role in the world gas market in the future. As of today, Iran has the largest reserves of natural gas in the world. At present, we are working on a large-scale project to build a gas pipeline for pumping blue fuel from the south of Iran to the north- west, to the borders of Turkey. From there we could export energy resources to the countries of the West.” He also mentioned that Tehran had already entered contracts with Swiss and Spanish enterprises, as well as with Shell, which it has been unable to implement because of the international sanctions. Mohammad Nematzadeh also added: “We do not want to compete with Russia, but we know that the Europeans will be needing more and more gas and we want to acquire our part (of the market). Iran could become a reliable and long-term partner for Europe. We have energy reserves and cooperation plans.”28 Iran’s categorical unwillingness to spoil its relations with Russia is largely explained by the strong ties (economic, political, partner, and strategic) between these countries. However, there is another significant aspect—at present Russia is almost the only state that supports Iran’s geopolitical and geostrategic interests on the international political arena. It is very understandable that Iran’s national interests consist not only of gaining access to the international economic markets, but also of fortifying its position among the world exporters of energy resources. At the same time, its statement of intention to increase its energy deliveries to the West without competing with Russia is at best not serious and even naive. The decision will ultimately be made by the seller (Iran), the transit country (Turkey), and the consumer (the EU). Meanwhile, it is no secret that Turkey continues to pay in gold for the energy products exported from Iran and, in general, is not against becoming a transit country in a major EU-Iran energy project.29 The EU also agrees to buy cheap Iranian energy resources, but, on the other hand, there are clear risks related not only to financing and technical servicing, but also to geopolitical and geostrategic issues. The matter might concern the following components of the problem in particular: 1. The EU is still not sure about the good intentions of the Turkish and Iranian authorities to implement a project that must be underpinned with real security guarantees. Moreover, Turkey as a transit country could put forward its own conditions, including demands for its integration into the EU, and in time become a strong regional player that dictates its own rules.

28 “Iran States its Intention to Deliver Gas to the EU without Competing with Russia,” Vzgliad, available in Russian at [http://www.vz.ru/news/2014/4/14/681916.html], 22 April, 2014. 29 See: “Turkey Pays in Gold for Iran’s Energy Resources,” Vestifinance.ru, available in Russian at [http: //www. vestifinance.ru/articles/20188], 25 April, 2014.

91 Volume 15 Issue 2 2014 CENTRAL ASIA AND THE CAUCASUS

On the other hand, Brussels is very well aware of the influence the U.S. has on Turkey, the first being one of the sides interested in this project. America, worried about competition from other gas suppliers, might not only undermine its implementation, but periodically also use the Turkish factor in various geopolitical regional issues concerning Iran in particular. This position of the U.S. could be related to the introduction of sanctions against Iran. 2. Brussels is also skeptical about this project because, in contrast to Azerbaijan (TANAP and Nabucco West), Iran and Turkey are evidently trying to place all the financial obligations on the EU without particularly thinking about who is going to be responsible for funding its implementation. What is more, the EU is still stalling about holding talks with Tehran. This is likely due to the unresolved problems relating to identifying cooperation opportunities with the U.S. regarding the import of shale gas, attracting American investments in the development of European and Ukrainian fields, and the new conceptualization of relations with Russia on deliveries of energy resources to Europe. In addition, the EU is not against building new alternative gas pipelines with Iran’s participation, but only if Turkmenistan and Azerbaijan are also involved. This kind of concern is explained by the fact that such extensive financing might not only generate security risks, but also a shortage of energy products for European consumers. However, keeping in mind the current geopolitical and geo-economic situation in the region and around it, the EU is not rushing to put the question of implementing new energy projects with Iran’s participation on the agenda.

In Lieu of a Conclusion

For many decades now, the main challenge for the EU has been overcoming its energy dependence. Most EU member states do not have their own reserves of mineral fuel; only 12 of them have oil, natural gas, and coal deposits in their territory, which, however, cannot meet the growing needs of the European economy. After the EU underwent two enlargements (in 2004 and 2007), the oil and gas dependence of the countries belonging to it grew by 10-17% (from 72% for oil and 48% for gas in 1999 to 83.5% and 64.2% in 2009, respectively).30 Brussels is particularly concerned about the strong dependence of European consumers on Rus- sian gas. Confirmation of this is the recent statement by Polish Head of Government Donald Tusk. Calling on the EU countries to join in an energy union that could reduce the dependence of the Euro- pean states on gas deliveries from Russia, he said: “Regardless of how events develop in Ukraine, one lesson is already clear: extreme dependence on Russian energy resources is making Europe weak. And Russia does not sell its goods cheap, at least not to everyone. This is an economic axiom—the supplier who has a dominating position can raise prices and reduce deliveries.”31 For several decades now, the EU has been looking for alternative energy resources, and every time it faces the dilemma of choosing suppliers. It stands to reason that such factors as a change in the world economic development trends, new geopolitical trends, an international financial crisis, a price hike on essential products, and so on can influence the choice.

30 See: Energy, Transport and Environment Indicators, Publications Office of the European Union, Luxembourg, 2011, p. 24. 31 “The EU Countries Should Join in an Energy Union—Tusk,” Censor.net.ua, available in Russian at [http://censor. net.ua/news/282249/strany_es_doljny_obedinitsya_v_energeticheskiyi_ soyuz_tusk], 24 April, 2014.

92 CENTRAL ASIA AND THE CAUCASUS Volume 15 Issue 2 2014

After the Ukrainian events and worsening of relations between the West and Russia, the energy accent shifted to the Southern Caucasus. Today, the EU is focusing on implementing its plans to build the Trans-Caspian gas pipeline, which is one of the key segments of Nabucco.32 However, the Europeans are in no rush to choose major projects, including in the Southern Caucasus. In so doing, they recognize the priority of projects with the participation of Azerbaijan, which is willing to assume a large part of the expenses for their implementation. The main bone of contention for the European partners is expert assessments, according to which the Azeri supplies of oil and gas capable of meeting only a small part of the needs of Euro- pean consumers will be totally exhausted in the near future. Based on this, Brussels is placing the stakes not only on Azerbaijan, but also on Iran and Turkmenistan. The latter, in turn, is still not showing any reciprocal interest. This is most likely explained by its desire to gain maximum benefit from possible cooperation with the EU. Incidentally, keeping in mind the diversification scenario already in the offing, it can be presumed that the EU will not be long in making its decision, particularly since its energy cooperation with Russia is becoming more aggravated with each passing day.

32 See: N.A. Gegelashvili, “Sovremennaia politika ES i SShA na Iuzhnom Kavkaze i v Bolshom Prichernomorie,” Vestnik Evropy, No. 33, 2012.

93 Volume 15 Issue 2 2014 CENTRAL ASIA AND THE CAUCASUS

RELIGION IN SOCIETY

RELIGIOUS PARTIES IN GEORGIA: POLITICAL PLATFORMS AND IDEOLOGICAL TRANSFORMATIONS

Maxim KIRCHANOV D.Sc. (Hist.), Associate Professor at the Chair of Regional Studies and the Economy of Foreign Countries of the International Relations Department, Voronezh State University (Voronezh, Russia)

ABSTRACT

he Georgian Apostolic Autocephalous clerical parties in Georgia is of a mixed nature. Orthodox Church plays a significant The religious parties are developing ideas of T role in the political and intellectual life of political traditionalism. Georgian conservative Georgian society. Religious parties are active theorists also support liberal theories in the in Georgia’s political landscape. The ideo- economic sphere. Political instability is pro- logues and theorists of clerical parties are de- moting an increase in the moral and political veloping ideas and concepts of Georgian po- authority of the Church in Georgia. The pros- litical nationalism and supporting the Georgian pects for the development and transformation language and identity. The ideology of the of clerical parties are vague and still uncertain.

KEYWORDS: Georgia, Orthodoxy, the Georgian Apostolic Autocephalous Orthodox Church, nationalism, identity, political parties, conservatism, political Christianity.

94 CENTRAL ASIA AND THE CAUCASUS Volume 15 Issue 2 2014 The Church and Politics: A Brief Introduction into the Problem

The Church in present-day Georgia performs not only religious, but also important political functions, articulating and reflecting the moods of primarily the traditionalist or nationalist part of society. Several factors should be kept in mind when analyzing the political component of present- day Georgian Orthodoxy. For instance, despite the Church’s influence, its role as a political actor and its participation in different kinds of political processes, state-building, and making and implementing political decisions are nevertheless limited: political activity is not the Church’s main and dominating function as an institution, although present-day Georgian Orthodoxy has definite political content and a clear political orientation. On the other hand, when analyzing the political importance of the Church and its active position in political life, we inevitably risk going to ideological extremes and taking cues from Soviet histori- ography, which made no qualms about accusing the Church of dancing to the political tune of the bourgeoisie and believed that it ideologically supported the interests of the ruling political circles. This kind of activity, of course, did take place or could have taken place, but it was never one of the Church’s priority or central tasks, either in Catholic or in Orthodox countries. Political and largely secular functions were successfully performed with the help of a variety of secular institutions related in some way to the Church. For example, public organizations and intellectual communities associated with the Church were able to draw up an ideological agenda. Various kinds of higher educational institutions, whereby not always strictly religious, could have played an equally important role in articulating the political preferences of the clerical or traditionally oriented circles close to them. However, the mentioned institutions played a secondary role in articulating the political views and preferences of the Church compared to another institution that had a distinct secular, political, and ideological nature. The matter concerns political parties, particularly Christian or those that constantly pointed out and emphasized if not their direct affiliation to church circles, at least their empa- thy toward the ideas of the Church or adherence to a major rightist trend or fundamentalist movement in political life. Religious parties are a very natural phenomenon and inevitable for most countries that used to or still have developed religious traditions. The presence of religious parties in the political field or, on the contrary, their underdevelop- ment or complete absence does not have anything to do with the country’s affiliation to the Catholic, Orthodox, or Protestant world. Clerical political parties in contemporary society, which has been significantly changed by secularization and the general decline in the authority of the Church and religion, belong to those phenomena that are just as natural and inevitable as parties that diverge on the grounds of political and ideological (rightist or leftist, liberal, communist, socialist, or socio- democratic) sympathies, interests, and preferences.

Georgia’s Clerical Political Parties

Present-day Georgia is an exception among other European states. The Church plays a predominant role in Georgia’s political life, while religious parties are very active in politics. This article 95 Volume 15 Issue 2 2014 CENTRAL ASIA AND THE CAUCASUS concentrates on those conservative and national parties1 that actively use religious and national rhetoric, in particular, the Conservative Party of Georgia2 and the Christian-Democratic Movement.3

Georgian Nationalism: The Religious Version

The Conservative Party of Georgia is largely performing a dual function at present: on the one hand, the conservatives continue to develop the political tradition of Georgian nationalism, or to be more precise, the trend of it that is related to the activity of the first leader of independent Georgia Zviad Gamsakhurdia; while on the other, the party’s role as a retransmitter of the ideas of the supreme church hierarchies is just as important in its activity. In particular, the sermons of Patriarch Ilia II can be found on the official website of the Conservative Party, including those texts that concern not only religious, but also primarily secular and political problems. Such texts emphasize not only the unity of the Orthodox world, but also address political problems relating, for example, to Georgia’s territorial integrity. Theorists of the Conservative Party have been focusing particular attention on a sermon in which Ilia II declared: “The territorial integrity of our country has been violated, while Abkhazia and the Tskhinvali Region are bleeding wounds on the body of our Homeland.”4 The Christian Democrats have been more consistent in expressing religious narrative, emphasizing not only the Church’s independence from the state,5 but also the “need to strengthen the Church’s role in public life,” as well as the church’s presence in the Armed Forces and in education.6 The Conservative Party is not only relaying the ideas of Ilia II to its supporters, but is also essentially helping to distribute them, striving in so doing to emphasize its connection with the Church as one of the most influential and respected institutions in contemporary Georgian society.

Politicization of Christianity or Christianization of Politics?

The ideology of the Conservative Party is based on principles of Georgian civil nationalism, while the Christian-Democrats are largely oriented toward the political participation of believers. The

1 There has been very little study of the problems relating to the history and present-day ideology of Georgian parties in Russian political science, while the number of publications on this theme is very small. The cycle of articles by N. Devdar- iani and G. Vekua on parties is largely of an introductory and informative nature (see: N. Devdariani, “Edinoe natsionalnoe dvizhenie Gruzii,” available at [http://georgiamonitor.org/detail.php?ID=189&sphrase_id=570446], 21 March, 2014; idem, “Republikanskaia partiia Gruzii,” available at [http://georgiamonitor.org/detail.php?ID=233&sphrase_id=570446], 21 March, 2014; G. Vekua, “Politicheskoe ob’edinenie ‘Natsionalnyy forum,’” available at [http://georgiamonitor.org/detail. php?ID=190&sphrase_id=570446], 21 March, 2014; idem, “Leiboristskaia partiia Gruzii,” available at [http://georgiamonitor. org/detail.php?ID=201&sphrase_id=570446], 21 March, 2014; idem, “Khristiansko-demokraticheskaia partiia Gruzii,” available at [http://georgiamonitor.org/detail.php?ID=223&sphrase_id=570446], 21 марта 2014). 2 The Conservative Party was originally called The Union of National Forces—Conservatives. In 2002, the party joined a coalition with the United National Movement. In 2004, the party participated in the elections as part of the National Move- ment—Democrats bloc, and in 2012 supported The Georgian Dream (for more details on the history of the Conservative Party, see: [http://conservatives.ge]). The party leader is Zviad Dzidziguri. 3 The Christian-Democratic Movement was founded in 2008 by Giorgi Targamadze. It came third in the 2012 elections. 4 “Patriarch Ilia Speaks in Istanbul on the Preservation of Territorial Integrity,” available at [http://conservatives.ge], 21 March, 2014 (in Georgian). 5 See: “Why I am a Christian-Democrat,” available at [http://cdm.ge/index.php/ka/2013-10-01-13-53-53/2013-10-01- 13-58-32], 21 March, 2014 (in Georgian). 6 See: “Mission of the Christian-Democratic Movement, 2009-2013,” available at [http://cdm.ge/index.php/ka/2013- 10-01-13-53-34/2013-10-01-13-56-46], 21 March, 2014 (in Georgian).

96 CENTRAL ASIA AND THE CAUCASUS Volume 15 Issue 2 2014 theorists of the Conservative Party believe that the party’s goal should be “to create a united and democratic Georgian state and encourage national patriotism, national ideology, and ideals, as well as ethnic, religious, and cultural personality-forming traditions.”7 The Christian-Democrats insist on the need to introduce principles of Christian morals into political life, defining Christian democracy as “the political lifestyle of the 21st century” and the only real alternative to globalization challenges, making it possible to “preserve national and cultural identity.”8 In so doing, the Conservatives claim that they also share such traditional values of civil society as self-government, respect of the rights of minorities, protection of private property and business, and human rights and freedoms. Moreover, the Conservative Party emphasizes the need for Georgia’s Euro-Atlantic orientation and integration into the EU and NATO.9 The Christian-Democratic movement largely shares such ideas, believing that building a democratic society based on respect of rights and freedoms, an independent judicial system, and division of power is a vitally important task.10

Political Traditionalism

Today’s Georgian Conservatives are striving to follow in the footsteps of earlier rightist movements and trends that took place in Georgia, positioning themselves as heirs of the first contemporary Georgian president Zviad Gamsakhurdia.11 The very ideas of Georgian statehood and conservative ideology, as the theorists of the present-day Conservative Party believe, are closely intertwined. The Georgian Conservatives are also inclined to juxtapose the traditional values of “land, language, and religion” to different kinds of globalization and liberal challenges. It is worth noting that when discussing international problems, the Georgian Conservatives act as supporters of the territorial integrity of other countries and recognize their right to develop as national states. In particular, in January- March 2014, the Conservatives repeatedly supported Ukraine, commenting either neutrally or sym- pathetically on the actions of the opposition12 and very negatively evaluating Russian policy, perceiv- ing it as occupation.13 The Christian-Democrats, like the Conservatives, are insistently giving voice to the views on territorial integrity.14 The national state is a key concept in the political imagination of contemporary Georgian nationalism. The Conservatives have a very negative view of alternative political projects: in particular, Georgia’s presence in the Soviet Union is perceived as “Soviet occupation.”15 The idea

7 Charter of the Georgian Conservative Party, available at [http://conservatives.ge], 21 March, 2014 (in Georgian). 8 “Why I am a Christian-Democrat.” 9 See: Charter of the Georgian Conservative Party, available at [http://conservatives.ge/პარტიის-წესდება/], 21 March, 2014 (in Georgian). 10 See: Charter of the Political Citizen Union “Christian-Democratic Movement,” Tbilisi, 2008, available at [http:// cdm.ge/index.php/ka/2013-10-01-13-53-34/2013-10-01-13-56-02], 21 March, 2014 (in Georgian). 11 See: “Twenty Years since the Death to Zviad Gamsakhurdia,” available at [http://conservatives.ge], 21 March, 2014 (in Georgian). 12 See: Statement by David Usupashvili on the Situation in Ukraine, available at [http://conservatives.ge], 21 March, 2014 (in Georgian). 13 See: “Plenum Resolution on the Current Events in Ukraine,” available at [http://conservatives.ge], 21 March, 2014 (in Georgian); “The Georgian Parliament Adopts a Resolution in Support of Ukraine,” available at [http://conservatives.ge], 21 March, 2014 (in Georgian). 14 See: “Mission of the Christian-Democratic Movement, 2009-2013.” 15 “Exhibition Devoted to the Soviet Occupation of Georgia,” available at [http://conservatives.ge], 21 March, 2014 (in Georgian).

97 Volume 15 Issue 2 2014 CENTRAL ASIA AND THE CAUCASUS of Russian occupation, the victims of whom are Abkhazia and the Tskhinvali Region, is related to the concept of Soviet occupation in the political imagination of contemporary Georgian nationalism.16 The Conservatives insist that Georgia should develop precisely as a national Georgian state, emphasizing the need for government participation in maintaining and preserving the Georgian language, culture, and identity, as well as stimulating ties with the Georgian diaspora.17

Christian Parties as Liberal

The Conservatives and Christian-Democrats are also amenable to liberal values, pointing to the importance of human rights and freedoms, respect of the rights of minorities, division of power, the supremacy of international law, and the priority of the market economy. The Christian-Democrats insist that, in the economic sphere, the state should focus on “building a fair state based on humanness and solidarity, individual freedoms, and spiritual and material wellbeing.”18 The fewer in number, but more radical supporters of a synthesis of Christianity and politics promote ideas of Christian socialism.19 The Conservatives are also paying keen attention to economic issues, but do not share the paternalistic moods of the Christian Democrats. The Conservatives believe that Georgia coming closer to European legislative standards will stimulate an inflow of foreign investments into the republic’s economy. However, the Conservatives are very skeptical about the state’s participation in the economy, believing that this could lead to the creation of unequal conditions in competition and promote monopolization of the economy.20 The Christian-Democrats, in turn, insist on making the Georgian economy investment-attractive.21 On the other hand, the Conservatives are promoting the initiatives of European economic players, in particular the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, believing that its activity will have a positive impact on development of the business environment in Georgia.22 In contrast to the liberal-minded conservatives in the economic sphere, the Christian-Democrats insist on Georgia developing within the framework of a “social market economy.”23 The Conservatives’ assessments of the EU Association Agreement vary from neutral to positive,24 while attention is focused specifically on Georgia’s European choice and the development of Georgia’s relations with the European Union member states.25 The Christian-Democrats, like the

16 See: “The Georgian Ministry of Foreign Affairs has Come forward with a Statement,” available at [http://conservatives. ge], 21 March, 2014 (in Georgian). 17 See: “Our Values Approved by the Political Party Council in May 2005,” available at [http://conservatives.ge], 21 March, 2014 (in Georgian). 18 “Mission of the Christian-Democratic Movement, 2009-2013.” 19 See: “Christian Socialism,” available at [http://christiansocialistge.blogspot.ru/p/blog-page_3749.html], 21 March, 2014 (in Georgian). 20 See: “Information from the Committee on the Economy and Economic Policy,” available at [http://conservatives.ge], 21 March, 2014 (in Georgian). 21 See: Charter of the Political Citizen Union “Christian-Democratic Movement.” 22 See: Statement by David Usupashvili on the Situation in Ukraine. 23 “Mission of the Christian-Democratic Movement, 2009-2013.” 24 See: “Georgian Products in the EU Markets Will Be Exempt from Customs Fees,” available at [http://conservatives. ge], 21 March, 2014 (in Georgian). 25 See: “The Rumanian Senate Adopts a Resolution in Support of Georgia,” available at [http://conservatives.ge], 21 March, 2014 (in Georgian).

98 CENTRAL ASIA AND THE CAUCASUS Volume 15 Issue 2 2014

Conservatives, also believe that the Euro-Atlantic vector should be a priority in Georgia’s foreign policy,26 emphasizing how much Georgia’s party structure has in common with Western societies. This similarity is manifested, as the ideologues of the Christian-Democrats believe, in the fact that both Georgia and the West European countries have Christian-Democratic parties.27 The Georgian Conservatives are in favor of developing local self-government, but in so doing insist that Georgia should evolve as a single and unitary state and the local government bodies should resolve socioeconomic problems and be engaged in regional development, while not striving to become institutionalized as independent power entities. The Christian-Democrats are also in favor of increasing the economic powers of the regions,28 while preserving Georgia’s overall unity. In the concept of contemporary Georgian conservatism, the state loses its central meaning, being perceived and imagined as a collective manager hired by citizens to defend national interests and human rights and freedoms. In this respect, the political program of contemporary Georgian nationalism is synthetic in nature, a blend of both conservative and liberal moods.29

Research Results and Prospects

So several factors must be kept in mind relating to the ideology of Georgia’s clerical political parties and those parties in whose ideological and political preferences the religious factor plays a special role. The genesis of religious political parties in Georgia is one of the problems being discussed. On the one hand, their appearance is related to the role that the Church has played and continues to play in the life of Georgian society, the former not being hesitant to adopt political roles that are not inherent in it. In this respect, the activity of clerical political parties is an entirely natural, inevitable, and quite normal continuation of the Church’s social activity. However, on the other hand, there are essentially no strictly religious parties in Georgia that have arisen as the result of the direct interference of the Church in politics. Most of the political parties in present-day Georgia that can very provisionally be defined as clerical are essentially secular political parties, that is, ideological movements or groups united by common political interests or ideological preferences, sympathies, or antipathies toward political opponents and adversaries. In this respect, formally religious parties can most likely be perceived and viewed as the consequence of adaptation or ideological transformation, mimicry of essentially secular parties and movements. Such parties, which have a clear understanding of the political situation and external situation, recognize that the authority of secular parties and movements has largely been undermined by the negligent and inconsistent policy of the ruling elites during the 1990s-2010s and that today the Church is one of the real consolidated political, social, and cultural institutions, have changed the appearance of secular movements to become parties that reflect traditional values and religious principles in their ideological programs.

26 See: “Mission of the Christian-Democratic Movement, 2009-2013.” 27 See: “Why I am a Christian-Democrat.” 28 See: “Mission of the Christian-Democratic Movement, 2009-2013.” 29 See: “Our Values Approved by the Political Party Council in May 2005.”

99 Volume 15 Issue 2 2014 CENTRAL ASIA AND THE CAUCASUS

What is more, when analyzing such political parties in contemporary Georgia, nationalism factors must be kept in mind, as well as the fact that Georgia is a country where political, cultural, and social organization has been progressing at a slower pace and not as actively as in other European states. The link between clerical parties and Georgian nationalism appears obvious and quite natural. A political doctrine is essentially presented in the ideological programs of such movements with the variations characteristic of it, although implemented in a primarily religious system of coordinates. The theorists of the clerical parties, like the secular nationalists, suggest advancing and developing their versions and forms of Georgian identity with the only formal and external difference that greater emphasis is placed on the traditional and religious in these national identity projects than secular nationalistic precepts. Such political preferences in Georgia’s contemporary party life could be dressed in different ideological clothing, but a set of nationalistic narratives developed and advanced by entirely secular political parties and movements will inevitably lurk behind outer religiosity. Moreover, religion can be a way to advance essentially liberal values and ideas. This is mainly manifested in the economic programs of clerical parties. This means that clerical parties should be described not as an entirely independent political phenomenon, but as a specific form of development and transformation of the ideology of Georgian political civil nationalism. The existence of clerical parties in contemporary Georgia can likely also be linked to the specifics of modernization processes in this peripheral European country. As we know, political and social modernization processes that ended in the emergence of a modern civil Georgian political nation began later in Georgia than in other European countries. Being on the periphery of the European world, Georgia has historically been under the control of states of other cultures and other religions that did not belong to the European world, or whose affiliation with which was disputable (the Rus- sian, Ottoman, and Persian empires). The final stages in Georgia’s nationalistic modernization and formation as a contemporary nation most likely came during the Soviet period, which led to certain deformations in the development of the Georgian identity. Compulsory modernization under the Soviet model not only led to the nation becoming a universal political institution, but was also manifested in the striving of the elites to eliminate traditional and archaic institutions, one of which was the Church. So it was very natural that the Church became much more popular during the post-Soviet period, this being perceived as the defense reaction of a society in which the political and social modernization processes were still incomplete. It was precisely the incomplete and indefinite nature of the main trajectories of development and possible subsequent transformations in society associated with this that is the reason for the noticeable ideological diversity and heterogeneity characteristic of the program precepts of the clerical and traditionalist political parties in present-day Georgia. In this situation, in conditions of general uncertainty about the further development of the political field and real party and ideological pluralism and diversity relating to the systemic characteristics of the Georgian political space, analyzing the clerical parties and their intellectual preferences and ideological programs is one of the most significant and pertinent tasks in the comprehensive study of Georgia.

100 CENTRAL ASIA AND THE CAUCASUS Volume 15 Issue 2 2014 THE MUSLIM COMMUNITY OF KYRGYZSTAN IN 1991-2013: GROWING PAINS

Kanatbek MURZAKHALILOV Post-Graduate Student, I. Arabaev Kyrgyz State University (Bishkek, Kyrgyzstan)

ABSTRACT

he author analyzes the current state are divided into jamaats) and, at times, de- of affairs in the Muslim community of structive. T Kyrgyzstan and its relations with the The author offers his own cures for the state. old and new problems of relations between Emerging and developing amid never- the state and the Muslim community, the ending conflict, the community has inevita- resolution of which is absolutely indispens- bly become relatively radicalized (the faithful able for their future development.

KEYWORDS: Islam, the Muslim community, Kyrgyzstan, the SAMK, Mufti, revival, Kurultai, kazyiat, struggle, confrontation, the State Commission, mosque, madrassah, the Ulema Council.

Introduction

In the last twenty years, the Kyrgyz Republic has been looking for new approaches to relations between the state and Islam, the republic’s prevailing religion (over 80 percent of the local population are its followers). The liberalization of public and political life across the post-Soviet space launched a religious, Islamic in the case of Kyrgyzstan, revival. This was a far from simple process burdened with never-ending conflicts around the Spiritual Administration of the Muslims of Kyrgyzstan (SAMK) torn apart by the struggle for the post of Mufti. During the 20-odd years of its independence, the republic has lived through two revolutions: in fact, the power struggle in the top echelons is still going on. This explains why the SAMK, which is seeking more stable and adequate relations with the state and more harmony in its own ranks, is unable to achieve either. Without enjoying uncontested spiritual authority, the SAMK is brimming with intrigues of those seeking greater powers and access to the Administration’s financial resources. Confrontation among all sorts of destructive religious groups, including radical and extremist organizations of the Hizb ut-Tahrir-al-Islami (HTI) type, does nothing for the unity of the republic’s Muslim community, which is divided into small groups. The gaps between them are being made even wider by the egoistic desire of certain theologians to dominate or come to power. This undermines the position of Islam in the republic and weakens the Muslim community as a whole.

101 Volume 15 Issue 2 2014 CENTRAL ASIA AND THE CAUCASUS

In fact, the recent history of the Muslim community of Kyrgyzstan can be described as a revival amid irreconcilable disagreements.

The Spiritual Administration of the Muslims of Kyrgyzstan is Set Up

In Soviet times, the Kazyiat of the Muslims of Kirghizia was part of the Central Asian Spiri- tual Administration of the Muslims (CASAM). Until 1991, the republic had 39 mosques and no official religious educational establishments. Those wishing to study theology went to the Bukhara madrassah or the Tashkent Islamic Institute; on rare occasions students were sent to Arab countries; pilgrimage to Mecca and Medina was limited to an absolute minimum. The downfall of the Soviet Union in 1991 started an Islamic revival in Kyrgyzstan: new mosques were built and new madrassahs opened, while the number of hajji and Kyrgyz students in foreign Islamic educational establishments increased manifold. Local governments, individuals, and Muslim countries extended wide support to the republic’s Islamic community, gaining popularity for foreign Islamic centers, organizations, and missionaries and undermining the authority of secular power. The number of registered mosques steadily grew from 464 in 1998 to 1,850 in 2013, a 47-fold increase in the last twenty-two years. Today, one Islamic university, nine higher educational establishments, and 67 madrassahs offer Islamic education; annual hajj attracts over 4,500 Muslims every year. The Muslim revival in the republic has encouraged the forces wishing to create a Caliphate and change the social and political landscape accordingly,1 which might tell the HTI and its Salafi and Wahhabi supporters that their time has come. Disintegration of the Soviet Islamic community began on 4 February, 1989 when prominent spiritual leaders and theologians from Uzbekistan and Tajikistan gathered at the Barak Khan Madras- sah, the official premises of the CASAM, to announce that they had started an Extraordinary Gen- eral Assembly of the Muslims and insist on dismissal of CASAM Chairman Mufti Sh. Babakhanov. The process of restructuring the system of spiritual administrations began.2 Between 1987 and 1990, the Kazyiat of the Muslims of Kirghizia was headed by Sadykjan kary Kamalov.3 In 1990, the CASAM presidium replaced him, “because of his confessional ideas contra- dicting the traditional norms of the Muslims of Central Asia,”4 with Kimsanbay azhy Abdrakhmanov,5 who filled the post twice: in 1990-1996 and 2000-2002.

1 See: K. Murzakhalilov, “Transformatsia institutov musulmanskoy obshchiny Kyrgyzstana v Rossii na rubezhe XX- XXI vv.,” Information portal Islam in the CIS, 26 December, 2013. 2 See: R. Silantiev, Noveyshaia istoria islama v Rossii, Moscow, 1997, 105 pp. 3 Sadykjan kary Kamalov, born in 1950 in the Kara Suu District of Uzbekistan. Between 1977 and 1986, he was imam of a mosque in Osh; in 1987 the CASAM Presidium appointed him Kazy of Kirghizia; he was also a member of the same presidium and received his religious education at the Mir Arab Madrassah in Bukhara and the Al-Asmariya University in Libya, graduating with a Masters degree in theology. Today he heads the International Center of Islamic Cooperation in Kyr- gyzstan situated in Osh and the Sadykjan kary Kamaluddin Madrassah in Kara Suu. 4 Central State Archives of the Kyrgyz Republic (TsGA KR), rec. gr. 2597, inv. 2, f. 133, p. 65. 5 Kimsanbay azhy Abdrakhmanov, born in 1940 in the Batken District of Kirghizia; in Soviet times, he received a primary private religious education (hujra) and continued his education at Al-Asmariya University (the Shari‘a and Laws Faculty); between 1980 and 1990, he taught at Bukhara Mir Arab University; today he is imam of the Makhmud Kashkari mosque in Bishkek.

102 CENTRAL ASIA AND THE CAUCASUS Volume 15 Issue 2 2014

Three years later, in 1993, the CASAM split into national spiritual administrations of Muslims controlled by the powers of independent Central Asian states.6 In fact, since 1991, the Kazyiat of the Muslims of Kyrgyzstan has been independent in everything except spiritual leadership, which still belonged to the Muftiat in Tashkent. In August 1993, the Ministry of Justice of Kyrgyzstan registered the charter of the Kazyiat of the Muslims of Kyrgyzstan as one of the CASAM structures; on 17 September, 1993, it registered the charter of the Spiritual Administration of the Muslims of Kyrgyzstan (SAMK)7 as an independent religious organization8 headed by Kimsanbay azhy Abdrakhmanov, former Kazy of the republic’s Muslims. The structure of the SAMK looked very much like the structure of the organs of state power (it has survived until the present).9 At the local level, the SAMK structures corresponded to the country’s administrative-territorial division; the leaders were appointed by the SAMK. The regional kazyiats, for example, are subordinated to the mufti, the district imam-khatibs to the regional kazys, while the imams of local mosques are under the jurisdiction of the district kazys. The local Muslim communities and mosques are headed by imams, while the main mosques in which Friday services are held are led by imam-khatibs. Classical Islam demands that each mosque hire a mutavli to look after finances and economic affairs and an imam responsible for religious issues (not infrequently, in Kyrgyzstan, these functions are performed by the imam of the mosque). Appointments to nearly all the top posts in the SAMK and personnel rotation in general are discussed with the local administrations (a normal practice registered in the charters of all religious structures from the SAMK down to the local mosques). The present system of control of the spiritual administrations of the Muslims has not changed since the time of Catherine the Great, who created it late in the 18th century; the Soviet government borrowed the system to fit Islam into the political system of the Soviet state.

Crisis in the SAMK: Beginning (1995-1996)

By early 1995, the Islamic revival and that of other religions caused a lot of concern in the corridors of power.10 On 4 March, 1996, the government set up a State Commission for Religious Affairs to control religious groups, coordinate relations between state structures and religious organizations, and create an adequate regulatory and legal framework.11

6 See: A. Khalid, “Politika antiterrorizma v Tsentralnoy Azii,” Neprikosnovenny zapas, No. 4 (66), 2009. 7 See: O. Mamayusupov, K. Murzakhalilov, K. Mamataliev, Islam v Kyrgyzstane: tendentsii razvitia, Osh, 2004, 350 pp. 8 The Spiritual Administration is headed by a mufti, hence the frequently used term Muftiat. 9 In December 2013, the SAMK had the following structures: (1) Mufti of the Muslims of Kyrgyzstan; (2) Naib-Mufti; (3) advisor to Mufti; (4) hajj department; (5) fatwa department; (6) da’wah department; (7) halal certification and standards committee; (8) youth and women department; (9) department of Islamic economics; (10) department of construction; (11) law department; (12) department of madrassahs and mosques; (13) information and public relations department; (14) administration; and (15) secretariat, available at [http://muftiyat.kg/]. 10 See: N. Kurbanova, Proiavlenia politicheskogo islama v postsovetskikh tsentralnoaziatskikh gosudarstvakh na rubezhe XX-XXI vv, Altyn tamga, Bishkek, 2008, 184 pp. 11 See: K. Osmonaliev, K. Murzakhalilov, K. Mamataliev, Mezhdunarodnye normy, obespechivaiushchie svobody sovesty i veroispovedania. Zakonodatelnye i normativno-pravovye akty Kyrgyzskoy Respubliki, reguliruiushchie sferu religii, Osh, 2010, 151 pp.

103 Volume 15 Issue 2 2014 CENTRAL ASIA AND THE CAUCASUS

In 1996, amid the sharp and intensifying contradictions and power struggle among the clergy, the SAMK acquired new leaders. The rivals were seeking control over the money flows from Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Turkey, and Pakistan, as well as from Islamic charities, which created nontaxable dividends. To boost their personal authority, which largely depended on the number of people each of the spiritual leaders managed to bring to Mecca, they needed control over the hajj. Today, these factors still figure prominently in the power struggle and still threaten the unity of the republic’s Muslim community. The state officials dealing with religious affairs criticized the SAMK and, especially, Mufti Kimsanbay azhy Abdrakhmanov for the following: (1) Lack of legitimacy. In 1993, the mufti was elected by a narrow circle of his supporters,12 which gave his opponents the opportunity to dismiss the SAMK leaders as “self-appointed.” On 23 December, 1996, this fact was confirmed by Temirbay azhy Orunbaev, chairman of the initiative group of the Muslims of the Chu Region.13 In 1996, the Ministry of Justice was inundated with letters from people concerned about the illegitimate nature of the SAMK Charter, demanding that it should be registered according to the republic’s laws. On 19 December, 1996, the collegiums of the Ministry of Justice discontinued the SAMK’s activities and annulled its registration. (2) Inconsistent personnel policy. The clergy opposition insisted that the SAMK’s personnel policy should be more democratic, which caused confrontation between Saipjan azhy Ab- duvakhidov, kazy of the Muslims of the Osh Region, and Mufti Kimsanbay azhy Abdra- khmanov, who lost his post. In August 1996, the mufti had replaced Saipjan azhy Abduvakhidov with Mukhama- ddin Usmanov, imam of the Shaiyt Tube mosque in Osh. The angered and displeased clergy of the Osh Region closed ranks around the kazy and referred to the charter of the kazyiat to dismiss the muftiat’s decision as illegal.14 When the Kazyiat of the Osh Region was set up,15 the religious leaders of the republic’s south became independent from the SAMK, which meant that practically none of the clergy accepted Kimsanbay azhy Abdrakhmanov, or his deputy Khabibulla azhy Zlaikhaev (a Darginian), as their leaders. The conflict was further fanned by Duyshonbek azhy Otonbaev, one of the officials of the Muftiat, who, together with Mukhamaddin Usmanov, traveled from one mosque to another to strengthen the position of the SAMK. The sides went as far as saying that Islam should be separated from the state and that the state structures should be ignored.16 The process was ultimately suppressed by early 1997. (3) Lack of influence at the local level. Throughout the 1990s, the larger part of the Islamic structures (mosques, madrassahs, and institutes) refused to recognize the SAMK and operated outside its control.

12 See: “Na kurultae v Bishkeke izbrano rukovodstvo musulman Kirgizii,” Interfax, 26 December, 1996. 13 See: “Bolshinstvo musulman Kirgizii podderzhvaiut ideiu provedenia kurultaia—Initsiativnaia gruppa,” Interfax, 22 December, 1996. 14 According to the Charter of the kazyiat, the right to elect and reelect the kazy belonged to the conference of the region’s imams; the region’s kazy was elected for 5 years in September 1995. 15 The Charter of the Kazyiat of the Muslims of the Osh Region was registered at the Osh Regional Administration of Justice on 7 September, 1995. 16 See: M. Khamidov, “Skandal v blagorodnom semeystve”, Slovo Kyrgyzstana, 3 October, 1996, p. 4.

104 CENTRAL ASIA AND THE CAUCASUS Volume 15 Issue 2 2014

Kimsanbay azhy Abdrakhmanov admitted that in 1995 the republic was moving toward regionalization in the religious sphere: many regions set up their own administrative structures, which were gradually liberating themselves from the control of the Muftiat.17 This was when the prominent spiritual leaders divided the country into the present zones of influence. This was especially obvious in the Osh Region and the city of Osh where Sadykjan kary Kamalov controlled about ten mosques in Osh and half of the mosques of the Kara Suu District; Rakhmatulla kary Kasymov controlled more that 20 mosques in Osh, while Kim- sanbay azhy Abdrakhmanov had control over a certain number in the region. According to E. Kaptagaev, who filled the post of Chairman of the State Commission at that time, hundreds of mosques remained outside the SAMK for two years.18 (4) Mercantilism. The faithful agree that the SAMK leaders were unscrupulous when it came to financial issues and did not hesitate to accept donations of dubious origin. Organization of the hajj offered other reasons for the biting criticism.19 (5) Incompetence. Since 1990, the mufti issued no fatwas; the SAMK was accused of the extremely low level of the republic’s religious educational establishments; even the largest of the republican madrassahs had no curricula and limited their teaching efforts to learning the cannons of the Holy Books by heart; the teaching staff was hired from among hujra imams.20 Many of the SAMK opponents and some of the officials pointed out that the SAMK members had no well-substantiated or convincing arguments in their polemics with extremist structures. On 19 November, 1996, some of the parliament deputies circulated an open letter to President Akaev and the prime minister, in which E. Kaptagaev was accused of unacceptable voluntarism and forcing the Muftiat to reschedule the date of the kurultai. Before that the mufti had complained to the parliament about E. Kaptagaev’s interference in the affairs of the SAMK.21 On 13 October, 1996, the village of Kochkor (Naryn Region) hosted a majilis of representatives of the Muslim communities, which decided to convene a kurultai of the Muslims before the end of 1996. The First Kurultai of the Muslims of Kyrgyzstan, attended by 420 out of the 470 elected delegates, was held on 26 December, 1996.22 The Kurultai approved the new SAMK Charter and elected the Ulema Council (a SAMK leading body of 25 members); it also set up a Central Auditing Commission of 5 members. The Ulema Council was expected to unite the Muslims of the republic into a single community.23 Moldo Abdusatar Majitov24 was elected Mufti; a refugee from the Jirgatal district of Tajikistan, he knew next to nothing about the religious situation in Kyrgyzstan.25

17 See: “V blizhaishee vremia v Kirgizii proidet kurultai respubliki,” Interfax-Religia, 4 November, 1996. 18 See: “Bolshinstvo musulman Kirgizii podderzhvaiut ideiu provedenia kurultaya—Initsiativnaia gruppa.” 19 See: O. Mamayusupov, Voprosy (problemy) religii na perekhodnom periode, Gos. Kommissia pri Pravitelstve Kyr- gyzskoy Respuliki po delam religiy, Bishkek, 2003, 353 pp. 20 See: Ibidem. 21 See: M. Zulfiya, “Kyrgyzstan: Krizis v otnosheniiakh mezhdu gosudarstvom i dukhovenstvom uglubliaetsia,” Tsen- tralnaia Azia, No. 7, 1997. 22 See: Muratali azhy Zhumanov, The Road of Islam in the Country, Bishkek, 2004, 67 pp. (in Kyrgyz). 23 See: O. Mamayusupov, K. Murzakhalilov, K. Mamataliev, op. cit. 24 Moldo Abdusatar Majitov (1932-2009), a Kyrgyz who lived in the village of Oruk Zar, Kdamjay District, Batken Region, which until 1991 belonged to Tajikistan, received a private religious education from many religious figures of Uzbeki- stan and Tajikistan; under Soviet power clandestinely taught fundamentals of the Shari‘a and fiqh; was a respected authority on the Shari‘a. Until his last days, he remained the spiritual teacher at the Khazreti Usman madrassah, which he set up himself. Today, many of the madrassahs of Kyrgyzstan hire his pupils as heads and mudarices (teachers). 25 See: O. Moldaliev, “Islamic Extremism in Central Asia,” Central Asia and the Caucasus, No. 5, 2000.

105 Volume 15 Issue 2 2014 CENTRAL ASIA AND THE CAUCASUS

He was a compromise figure, on whom the conflicting sides—the spiritual leaders and the government represented by the State Commission—agreed. His advanced age and canonical convictions kept him away from the intrigues; he never interfered in the conflicts among the spiritual leaders, thus giving the government a chance to take control of the Muslim community and carry out its own religious policy.

Crisis: The Second Wave (2000-2002)

Moldo Abdusatar Majitov remained Mufti until 2000 when he was either removed by the decision of the Ulema Council of the Muslims of Kyrgyzstan or by Head of the State Commission Zh. Zhorobekov and State Secretary N. Kasiev.26 It should be said that the governments of all the Central Asian republics never hesitated to interfere in what the muftiats were doing or lobby the clergy they wanted to put in high posts.27 The vacated place went once more to Kimsanbay azhy Abdrakhmanov. Late in 2001, the Muslim community was plunged into another round of tension created by a power struggle among the top religious figures, ill-considered appointments, and unjustifiably frequent replacements of heads of the local religious structures. In 2001 alone, the mufti removed his first deputy Muratali azhy Zhumanov, deputy Lugmar azhy Guyakhunov, kazy of the Osh Region Saipjan azhy Abduvakhidov, kazy of the Chu Region Moldo Ashir Saydilaev, imam-khatib of the Alay District Avazkhan azhy Maripov, imam of the central mosque of Bishkek Abdumanap kary Masaliev, and others. Moreover, Kimsanbay azhy Abdrakhmanov usurped some of the powers of the Ulema Council; in two years he replaced nearly two-thirds of its 25 members.28 He ignored the Shari‘a and went as far as appointing a woman with no religious education his advisor, who started meddling in the affairs of the Muslim communities, an amoral step from the point of view of many.29 The wave of criticism of the Mufti was rising higher: the Muslims were displeased with the way hajj was organized; everything the state officials had to say about religious stability in the country was dismissed by the Mufti as interference in the affairs of the SAMK. On 23 January, 2002, Kimsanbay azhy Abdrakhmanov published a fatwa that closed the Mus- lim cemeteries to followers of other faiths and stirred up unrest and even clashes between Muslims and Protestants in the Chu Region (the villages of Spartak, Myrzake, Chon-Tash, Ak-Tyuz and Tash- Dobo).30 This split the clergy into several conflicting groups, one of which was headed by the mufti, another by Moldo Sabyr Dosbolov, Rector of the Rasul Aqram Islamic Institute.

26 See: M. uulu Taabaldy, “Avoid Temptations and Follow Your Straight Road,” El sozu, 3 May, 2011 (in Kyrgyz). 27 See: V. Khliupin, “Islam v Tsentralnoy Azii: realnaia ‘hizbutizatsia’ na smenu falshivoy ‘demokratii’?” Izvestia, 2 December, 2000. 28 See: “V Dukhovnom upravlenii musulman Kirgizii proizoshla smena rukovodstva,” RIA Novosti, 13 August, 2002. 29 See: “V Kirgizii za narushenie zakonov shariata smeshchen s posta mufti,” Interfax-Religiya,” 15 August, 2002. 30 See: N.N. Shadrova, “Gosudarstvo i religia: put k edinstvu i dialogu,” in: Buddhism i Khristianstvo v kulturnom nasledii Tsentralnoy Azii, Mater. mezhdunar. konf., 3-5 oktyabrya 2002, Bishkek, 2003, pp. 240-248.

106 CENTRAL ASIA AND THE CAUCASUS Volume 15 Issue 2 2014

On 10 August, 2002, the Ulema Council met for an extraordinary meeting attended by 18 members to remove Kimsanbay azhy Abdrakhmanov from his post for violations of the SAMK Charter and numerous mistakes. Muratali azhy Zhumanov was elected the new mufti.31

Crisis: The Third Wave (2002-2010)

The Second Kurultai of the Muslims of Kyrgyzstan was held in Bishkek on 20 April, 2003, seven years after the first kurultai, which discussed how to keep fundamentalism in check and prevent religious extremism and terrorism. The kurultai elected Muratali azhy Zhumanov mufti; the delegates (150 people in all) amended the SAMK Charter and ruled that from that time on kurultais would become a regular feature of the country’s religious life with an interval of seven years between them. It was decided to set up an Islamic University of Kyrgyzstan and kazyiats in Bishkek and Osh. The kurultai increased membership of the Ulema Council to 30. During the previous period it published several fatwas dismissing the religious ideas of HTI and political Islam as unacceptable. It denounced the efforts to limit publication and distribution of religious literature and recommended improving the plans for building new mosques and madrassahs, completing registration of Islamic facilities, and adding more order to da’wah.32 In 2005, the political storm that removed President Akaev and his regime put several questions on the republican agenda. Correctly answered, they were expected to improve the “quality” of the imams, exclude hajj-related corruption, and oppose extremist organizations. In 2005, certain forces tried to organize the Muslims to take part in the parliamentary and presidential elections. Between 2005 and 2007, the country was watching a fracas between Mufti Muratali azhy Zhu- manov and the “Muslim opposition,” which demanded his removal. He was accused of manipulating the organization of hajj, as well as the money received from charities, and was severely criticized for everything what the Muftiat had done under his rule.33 After 2007, the contradictions in the Muslim community gradually subsided, giving the SAMK the opportunity to strengthen its vertical and horizontal structures. Some of the NGOs and religious figures remained dissatisfied with what they called poor organization of hajj, poor personnel policy, bans on hijabs at schools, wrongly dated Ramazan (orozo) and the Muslim holidays Orozo-ayt and Kurman-ayt, etc.

31 Muratali azhy Zhumanov (1 May, 1973-7 July, 2010) was born in the village Yntymak, Nookat District, Osh Region; graduated from the Khazreti Usman madrassah in Kyzyl-Kyia and Islamic Institute in Ufa (Baskiria, RF). Until 1996, was a mudaris at the madrassah and later imam of the mosque in Kyzyl-Kyia. Between 1996 and 1998, was deputy of the kazy of Osh Region; between 1999 and 2002 was SAMK Executive Secretary, first deputy of the Mufti of the Muslims of Kyrgyzstan. Between August 2002 and April 2010, served as Mufti of the republic’s Muslims; resigned in the wake of the April 2010 events. On 21 April, 2010, was beaten in his home and abducted by unidentified persons; the abductors demanded $1 million for his freedom; he died under dubious circumstances. His contribution to the development of religious and spiritual values of the Muslims of Kyrgyzstan cannot be underestimated. 32 See: O. Mamayusupov, K. Murzakhalilov, K. Mamataliev, Kratkiy analiz religioznykh system v Kyrgyzstane, Bishkek, 2006, 172 pp. 33 See: E. Usubaliev, “Perspektivy uchastiia musulman Kyrgyzstana v politike,” Analitika, 27 December, 2008.

107 Volume 15 Issue 2 2014 CENTRAL ASIA AND THE CAUCASUS

The Third Kurultai of the Muslims of Kyrgyzstan was held on 15 April, 2009 in Bishkek; it brought together 220 delegates from all over the country to adjust the SAMK Charter to the Law on the Freedom of Religion and Religious Organizations.34 The kurultai extended the numerical strength of the Ulema Council to 35 members, heard the report of the Mufti and the chairman of the Republican Auditing Commission, and approved uniforms for kazys and imams.

The Fourth Wave: More Problems and a Turning-Point (2010-2014)

The 2010 riots, which upturned the Bakiev regime, and the national conflict in the republic’s south exacerbated the contradictions in the country’s religious communities, the Islamic community in particular. The riots stirred up the Muslims to even greater political activity and made the political hues of Islam in the republic more obvious.35 Mufti Muratali azhy Zhumanov was the first victim: he left his post under pressure from the politicized part of the Muslim community and very soon died under fairly suspicious circumstances. The next mufti, Rector of the Islamic University of Kyrgyzstan Abdyshukur azhy Narmatov, held his post for six days. In fact, this post became an apple of discord among all sorts of Muslim groups. The next mufti, Suyun azhy Kuluev, former first deputy mufti, held his post for 45 days and was removed from his new post by force.36 Ruslan azhy Zhumagulov remained mufti for over two months; he lost it to the accompaniment of accusations of exceeding his authority, poorly educated anyway, he was not popular with the Muslim community. On 26 August, 2010, for the first time in the history of Kyrgyzstan, the mufti was elected on an alternative basis. Chubak azhy Zhalilov was elected out of nine candidates by 21 votes out of 33 of those present at the meeting of the Ulema Council.37 As soon as the euphoria caused by the reformist hajj of 2011 (which earned the mufti a diploma from the government) subsided, Chubak azhy Zhalilov was accused of using his Center of Hajj and Umrah to steal the hajji’s money; parliament deputies elected to supervise the preparations for hajj were also criticized. Some members of the religious hierarchy refused to obey the mufti (the kazy of the Osh Region was one of them). The conflict spread far and wide, acquiring political hues in the process. Members of the State Commission, the head of the presidential administration, and members of the law and order structures

34 See: The Law of the Kyrgyz Republic on the Freedom of Religion and Religious Organizations in the Kyrgyz Republic No. 282, 31 December, 2008. 35 See: S. Dyushenbiev, “Islam v sovremennom Kyrgyzstane: sostoianie i problemy,” Religiovedenie, No. 3, 2011, pp. 107-126. 36 On 6 June, 2010, fifteen young men headed by Ruslan azhy Zhumagulov (kazy of the Chu Region) burst into the SAMK offices where the kazys were holding a meeting and demanded immediate resignation of Suyun azhy Kuluev. The mufti was beaten up, kidnapped, and detained until he did what was wanted of him. A medical examination registered numerous traces of severe beating and concussion; he was placed under a dropper (see: “Pobili muftia, trebuia otstavki,” Delo No., 9 June, 2010). 37 At that time, the author who worked at the State Commission for Religious Affairs of the Kyrgyz Republic as Depu- ty Director was involved in the stabilization efforts.

108 CENTRAL ASIA AND THE CAUCASUS Volume 15 Issue 2 2014 were accused of an “attempt to remove the mufti and seize power in the SAMK.”38 Parliament deputies tried to reconcile the sides, but failed.39 Confronted with the mounting and irreconcilable contradictions inside the country’s religious elite, Chubak azhy Zhalilov left the post. The Ulema Council accepted his resignation on 17 July, 2012 and elected Rakhmatulla azhy Egemberdiev, head of the SAMK foreign relations department, as the new mufti by a simple majority. The new mufti had no choice but to agree to amend the SAMK Charter within the next two months to make the Ulema Council an independent structure to which the mufti would be account- able. The same day, the council scheduled the next kurultai for 15 December, 2012. Rakhmatulla azhy Egemberdiev was elected mufti amid a scandal. On 14 December, 2012, the special services of the Kyrgyz Republic initiated a criminal case against Chubak azhy Zhalilov and Rakhmatulla azhy Egemberdiev, who had failed to pay 8 million soms in taxes on the hajj money. The case is still in court, while the defendants are under recognizance not to leave.40 Two days before the election, he circulated a video statement and accused certain officials and members of the special services of putting pressure on him to force him to stay away from the election.41 The Fourth Kurultai of the Muslims of Kyrgyzstan gathered on the appointed day (15 Decem- ber, 2012) to discuss a long agenda, including election of a new mufti. The discussions added nine new names to the list of candidates, Rakhmatulla azhy Egemberdiev initially being the only one; six of them stepped down when the voting began. Rakhmatulla azhy Egemberdiev left the other three candidates (Kimsanbay azhy Abdrakhmanov, Sayasat azhy Asanov, and Ubaydulla azhy Sarybaev) behind to be elected mufti with 25 out of 33 votes. The kurultai agreed with the amended Charter, which allowed the SAMK to set up a Muslim Academy, an administrative structure of the SAMK.42 It was suggested that the Muftiat acquire a Central Auditing Commission and its own Administration (Islamic waqf). Two hundred delegates represented all the regions of the Kyrgyz Republic; there were guests from Russia’s European part, Kazakhstan, Mongolia, and South Africa. Very much like his predecessors, Rakhmatulla azhy Egemberdiev received his share of accusations of financial irregularities, unjustified personnel decisions,43 and inability to resolve the structural problems and was held responsible for the complete failure of the religious and ideological efforts (the critics were especially dissatisfied with the Muftiat, which had done nothing to neutral- ize the foreign emissaries who arrived in the republic to conscript new fighters for the Syrian conflict).44 The decisions of the Fourth Kurultai remained on paper; the reforms, which had barely started, were discontinued to cause another crisis in the SAMK. Late in December 2013, the Internet community had the opportunity to watch a video of a very intimate nature with Rakhmatulla azhy Egem-

38 N. Kurbanova, “Chto-to ne tak v ‘sviatom semeystve,’ ili O problemakh gosudarstvenno-islamskikh otnosheniy v Kyrgyzskoy respublike,” Slovo Kyrgyzstana, 8 August, 2012. 39 See: Z. Baktybaev, “V konflikt vokrug muftia vmeshalas obshchestvennost,” Radio Azattyk, 30 June, 2012. 40 See: “Ex-verkhovny Mufti Kyrgyzstana Chubak azhy Zhalilov nakhoditsia pod podpiskoy o nevyezde,” K-News Information portal, 14 December, 2012. 41 See: E. kyzy Beyshenbek, “Mufti stal geroem skandalnogo video,” Radio Azattyk, 1 January, 2014. 42 Under the draft Charter, the Mufti would be removed from financial and economic issues; his deputy would be expected to deal with money; the authors of the draft charter meant that the Academy would be engaged in teaching and compil- ing curricula, accreditations, and licensing religious educational establishments. The mufti nominated a candidate to the post of the head of the Academy to be endorsed by the Ulema Council. The decision has not been executed. 43 See: Sh. Turaev, “Predstaviteli muftiata Kyrgyzstana oprovergaiut obvineniia v svoy adres,” Information Agency 24.kg, 15 November, 2013. 44 See: B. Malikova, “Abdilatif Zhumabaev: ‘Muftiat nuzhdaetsia v reforme,’” Vecherniy Bishkek, 10 January, 2014.

109 Volume 15 Issue 2 2014 CENTRAL ASIA AND THE CAUCASUS berdiev and an unknown young woman playing the central roles. The mufti admitted that he had married his partner under Muslim marriage law;45 on 2 January, 2014, the SAMK press service announced that the video “offended all Muslims.”46 On 6 January, 2014, the rally outside the SAMK offices demanded resignation of the mufti. The next day, he pointed to the officials whom he suspected of putting the scandalous video on the Inter- net and explained why this had been done47; he also applied to President Almazbek Atambaev48 and resigned.49 In turn, the press service of the State Commission issued a statement50 saying that the mufti spared no effort to shift public attention from his personal problems to the alleged interference of the state structures in his efforts to improve the situation in the SAMK. The same day, the Ulema Council met for an extraordinary sitting (convened by a group of Council members) attended by 25 out of 35 members to put deputy mufti Maksat azhy Toktomushev in the vacant post of mufti; the decision was unanimous. The sitting agreed to elect a new mufti at the next kurultai scheduled for the beginning of Febru- ary and put Maksat azhy Toktomushev on the list as the Council candidate.51 Later, the Ulema Council rescheduled the date to 4 March, 2014 to allow the workgroup headed by former mufti Chubak azhy Zhalilov to complete the draft Charter. The Fifth Kurultai practically unanimously (199 votes out of 200) supported the candidature of Maksat azhy Toktomushev for mufti. The Kurultai had two more points on the agenda: the new SAMK Charter and elections of the Ulema Council.52 The new charter limited the powers of the mufti: the head of the SAMK, his deputies, and the regional kazys lost their previous positions as voting members of the Ulema Council.53 According to Director of the State Commission O. Moldaliev, the Mufti’s authoritarian rule was rooted in the old charter; the new Charter corrected the balance by dividing the powers of the executive (mufti, his deputies, kazys, and imams) and the legislative branches (the Council of the Ulema [Alimah]).54 Under the new Charter, the mufti and the members of the Ulema Council (now called the Aalymdar keneshi—the Alimah Council) were to be reelected every three years; the number of the council members was cut from 35 to 21. The vice speaker of the parliament T. Zulpukarov informed the kurultai that President Atam- baev had received acting mufti Maksat azhy Toktomushev and approved the draft charter.55

45 See: A. Yalovkina, “Poyavlenie pornograficheskogo video s muftiem udarilo po islamu,” Vecherny Bishkek, 8 Janu- ary, 2014. 46 The information that appeared on the Internet about Head of the SAMK R. Egemberdiev damaged not only his family, but also all Muslims (see: SAMK, AKIpress Information Agency, 4 January, 2014). 47 See: “Mufti R. Egemberdiev nazval imena chinovnikov, kotorykh on podozrevaet v rasprostranenii skandalnogo video,” AKIpress IA, 7 January, 2014. 48 See: Zh. Akaev, “Mufti: Est pravda, kotoruiu dolzhen znat president,” Radio Azattyk, 7 January, 2014. 49 See: A. Stenin, “Lider musulman Kirgizii ostavil post posle sex-skandala,” RIA Novosti, 14 January, 2014. 50 See: “Goskomreligiy: Mufti R. Egemberdiev pytaetsia smestit vnimanie ot skandala vokrug sebia,” AKI press IA, 7 January, 2014. 51 See: “Sovet ulemov naznachil i.o. muftia M. Toktomusheva, vopros utverzhdeniia budet reshatsia na kurultaie,” AKIpress IA, 7 January, 2014. 52 See: E. kyzy Sagyndyk, “Kurultai musulman Kyrgyzstana utverdil Maksatbeka azhy Toktomusheva verkhovnym muftiem DUMK,” 24.kg IA, 4 March, 2014. 53 This was done to prevent the mufti’s unilateral decisions on all sorts of applications and complaints addressed to him; the mufti cannot be chairman of the Ulema Council. 54 See: E. kyzy Sagyndyk, “DUMK: perezagruzka,” 24.kg IA, 5 March, 2014. 55 See: “Kurultai musulman prinial novy Ustav DUMK,” AKIpress IA, 4 March, 2014.

110 CENTRAL ASIA AND THE CAUCASUS Volume 15 Issue 2 2014

In religious circles, Maksat azhy Toktomushev is known as the leader of Tablighi Jamaat in Kyrgyzstan,56 an organization banned in Russia, Kazakhstan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan. There is hope that the new mufti will finally launch real reforms, that the Muftiat’s financial transactions will become transparent, that personnel will be carefully selected, and that the hajj will no longer be associated with corruption. Time is short: the next hajj scheduled for September and October 2014 will show whether the reforms were efficient.

Conclusion

The Islamic revival in Kyrgyzstan has been going on for about thirty years now. So far, relations between the state and Islam are far from perfect because the authorities have not yet found the best model of cooperation with religious organizations. The never-ending power struggle among all sorts of elite groups seeking monopoly on hajj and control over the SAMK financial sources does nothing for the situation as a whole. Nothing is being done to attract well-educated people to the Ulema Coun- cil or to modernize the Islamic education system. The struggle for the post of the Mufti of the Muslims of Kyrgyzstan (between 1991 and 2013 the country saw 10 muftis) was another fairly high obstacle. We should admit that the state sometimes trails behind the Islamic revival: thousands of new mosques had no choice but to employ poorly educated or absolutely ignorant imams. After twenty years of the Islamic revival, Islamic education in Kyrgyzstan is still in a bad way; the Islamic University alone stands apart as nearly fitting the standards of a higher educational establishment; the other 76 educational establishments look more like courses of Arabic. In the absence of a new generation of educated imams, the void is being filled with graduates from foreign religious schools belonging to different religious traditions. This promises no acceptable future for the republic’s Muslims; the split in the ranks of spiritual leaders and noticeable impact of all sorts of jamaats add even more gloom. We should say in all justice that the country’s authorities have put up no serious opposition to religious extremism: members of HTI and other radical groups are detained with no positive impact: in most cases they can count on small or even suspended prison terms. So far, the state has no clear idea of how a democratic country should oppose religious extremism. The jamaats take no orders from the SAMK and act on their own; they are small (Tablighi Ja- maat being the only exception), but their common aim (an Islamic Caliphate) makes them efficient enough even without a single leader. When the share of their followers among the Kyrgyz Muslims reaches the critical point (7 to 10 percent), they will come to power in the SAMK by exposing its moderate members to public criticism. In the next 6 or 7 years, the present trends, if continued, will push the country toward an armed religious conflict. This means that the people in power, unable to formulate a correct policy, will be held responsible. The continued conflicts in the SAMK, lack of educated people, and the growing influence of all sorts of radical groups destroy everything positive the Muslim community has accumulated so far. If the state policy of the last 15 years continues, disaster is inevitable. The following may help remedy the situation: (1) The state should develop a clear policy in its relations with Islam and identify the internal and external priorities of their cooperation.

56 See: Z. Baktybaev, “Muftiat opredelilsia s kandidatom,” Radio Azattyk, 14 January, 2014.

111 Volume 15 Issue 2 2014 CENTRAL ASIA AND THE CAUCASUS

(2) The regulatory and legal framework related to the religious sphere should be improved. (3) The SAMK should be encouraged to elaborate a long-term concept of the development of Islam in the country and stabilize the religious situation. (4) The SAMK should modernize its vertical and horizontal systems to add efficiency and competitiveness and make it better adjusted to current reality. (5) Excessive interference of all sorts of groups and public organizations in the SAMK’s internal affairs and its actions under the Charter should be discontinued. (6) The controlling functions of the Ulema Council should be strengthened with the post of the Chairman and removal of the clause that makes the mufti the Council’s chairman. (7) The educational level of the imams should be upgraded, while the Muslim community should be supported in its efforts to train specialists in secular and religious disciplines. (8) A strict and transparent system of financial reports should be introduced to make it possible to analyze the results of the SAMK’s financial and economic activity. The above suggests that the time has come to move toward a healthier ideological situation in the republic and to realize the state’s systemic and integrated policy regarding Islam.

OFFICIAL RELIGIOUS EDUCATION IN TAJIKISTAN. IMAM E AZAM ABU HANIFA ISLAMIC INSTITUTE OF TAJIKISTAN: PAST AND PRESENT

Zayniddin NABOTOV Ph.D. (Philos.), Imam Khatib, Former Head of the Chair of Fiqh at the Islamic Institute (Dushanbe, Tajikistan)

ABSTRACT

he author tells us how the Islamic In- country became independent. He also looks stitute of Tajikistan (until 2007, the at the moving forces and stages of the de- T Tajik Islamic University) was set up velopment of the official higher religious and is developing; he follows the far-from- education system in Tajikistan, the key fig- easy road the official religious education ures involved, and the problems caused by system has covered as part of the process the remnants of the Soviet anti-religious of Islamic revival that began as soon as the past. 112 CENTRAL ASIA AND THE CAUCASUS Volume 15 Issue 2 2014

He identifies the main problems—lack in developing official religious education as of qualified teachers and textbooks—as well part of Tajikistan’s education system. as the main obstacle, viz. defects of manage- The author traces the stages that final- ment and organization of the teaching pro- ly brought the Islamic Institute of Tajikistan cess and funding, as well as clashes between under the patronage of the state, a process the traditional and modern principles and that transformed the non-state religious edu- methods for teaching religious disciplines. cational establishment into a state educa- Much attention is paid to the role of the state tional institution.

KEYWORDS: Islam, Tajikistan, religious education, madrassah, methods for teaching religious disciplines.

Introduction

In Tajikistan, aggressive atheism of the Soviet period did not completely suppress the religious feelings of the people, among whom Islam survived as the predominant religion. The most active local Muslims carefully preserved the Muslim theological traditions and spoke about the norms of the Shari‘a at religious ceremonies, in mosques, during religious rituals, etc. Islam survived thanks to the clandestine and highly ramified network of private religious education that used theological literature Tajiks secretly brought into the country from Muslim countries they managed to visit under different pretexts. Perestroika which began in the Soviet Union in 1986 started an Islamic revival; in 1987-1990 mosques were built in large numbers; people flocked to attend Persian graphics (based on the Arabic) and the Arabic language classes. The schools and madrassahs in Tashkent and Bukhara could not satisfy the growing need for religious education. In 1991, the Soviet Union fell apart into independent states. Shortly before that, the Tajik department of the Kaziat of the Spiritual Administration of the Muslims of Central Asia and Kazakhstan (SAMCAK) was set up to administer the country’s religious life under the general guidance of the government.1 In 1989, the SAMCAK opened a religious school at the republic’s Kaziat with no official status. Nor did it have a curriculum to be endorsed by the Committee for Religious Affairs under the Govern- ment of Tajikistan or the Ministry of Education, an established lesson schedule, specified duration of study time, or generally accepted examination system. However, the school did determine the compulsory subjects to be studied, established a study schedule, and hired teaching staff. The Tajik civil war, which began in May 1992, disrupted the teaching process. However, in 1995, half of the former teachers and students joined forces to revive the school, and the madrassah began functioning again. After three years of civil war, the school found it hard to catch up with the demands of the times: it remained devoted to the outdated style of the Bukhara madrassah in terms of study form and content.2 This explains why the heads of the Committee for Religious Affairs started thinking about a religious educational institution better adjusted to reality.

1 Until 1993, the Kaziat of Tajikistan was part of the Spiritual Administration of the Muslims of Central Asia and Ka- zakhstan with its center in Tashkent. In February 1993, the muftiat of Tajikistan was set up at the first conference of the republic’s Muslims. 2 In the Soviet Union, higher religious education was limited to the Mir-i Arab madrassah in Bukhara.

113 Volume 15 Issue 2 2014 CENTRAL ASIA AND THE CAUCASUS State-Patronized Madrassah Set Up

In 1995, the Committee for Religious Affairs announced that it intended to set up a state-patronized madrassah: it gathered together 200 to 250 former students and 12 to 15 teachers from the religious school that had been functioning at the Kaziat. The new madrassah was set up under the government; the Religious Center under the RT Gov- ernment appointed a man absolutely ignorant of the structure and functioning of similar schools and higher educational establishments as its head. Sayidnuriddin Shakhobiddinov,3 a leading research associate at the Institute of Oriental Studies and Written Heritage of the RT Academy of Sciences, was also involved in upgrading the quality of teaching at the newly established madrassah. Later, he shouldered the much heavier burden of deputy principal responsible for drawing up the curriculum. He outlined a program of activity and a set of subjects to be taught at the madrassah, as well as their schedule and the structure of different types of lessons. In 1995-1996, the students studied the Koran, Hadiths, the fundamentals of Islam, and Arabic grammar. The Committee for Religious Affairs allowed Sayidnuriddin Shakhobiddinov to invite highly-qualified teachers from Tajik universities; at that time I, adviser to the deputy principal for curriculum at the Tajik National University, was invited along with others. I started working with Shakhobiddinov in January 1996; he had his own ideas about the aims, tasks, and prospects for religious Islamic education on which he relied in restructuring the madrassah and readjusting its methods. At first, we organized several seminars on teaching methods; then we brought the following suggestions to the attention of Chairman of the Committee for Religious Affairs S. Akhmadov: (1) to considerably expand the curriculum by including social and other disciplines; (2) to spread the regulations, rules, and demands applied to other higher educational establishments to the madrassah in order to make it a higher religious educational establishment. Chairman Akhmadov agreed with our suggestions and instructed his subordinates to elaborate a new Statute of the Islamic University of Tajikistan complete with relevant instructions, plans, etc. In keeping with the dictates of the times, we decided that three faculties would be enough: Ko- ranic reading and Koranic studies (or the fundamentals of Islam); the Shari‘a and the history of Islam; and the Koran and Tawhid. The Hadiths, the fundamentals of Islam, the history of Islam, Arabic grammar, and social subjects were part of the curriculum in all the faculties. In view of the fact that the first students lacked the necessary knowledge normally taught at secondary schools, we decided that the students of all the faculties should be taught according to the same curriculum so that they could master the basics of Arabic grammar and graphics, the Tajik language and Tajik literature, the fundamentals of the Shari‘a, etc. Then, after they passed the exams, they could move on to higher classes. It should be said that this was not easy: as soon as the young students learned how to read the Koran and memorized a couple of the ayats, their happy parents imagined that their children had mastered all the subtleties of Islamic science and become domullo (teacher of the faith). The parents preferred to ignore the fact that half-baked domullo knew next to nothing about the fundamentals of Islam and fiqh, or about the rich and diverse history of their country and the traditional literature of their ancestors.

3 Sayidnuriddin Shakhobiddinov, prominent expert in the Arabic language and history and specialist in text analysis translated al-Qānūn fī al-Ṭibb (The Canon of Medicine) by Ibn Sīnā (Avicenna) from Arabic into Tajik.

114 CENTRAL ASIA AND THE CAUCASUS Volume 15 Issue 2 2014

We had to cope with problems caused by the shortcomings in organization and teaching methods. Until 1997, students had student identification cards but no report books for registering their achievements; the results of tests and exams were registered on sheets of paper. The students sat exams on the Arabic grammar used in the Koran; there were no clear cut rules about which subjects required exams and which could be passed in the form of tests. In some cases, regular attendance was enough to pass. The shortage of teaching equipment, which went as far as not enough blackboards in the classrooms, was another problem; teaching organization left much to be desired; not infrequently, teachers forgot to write down information about classes and attendance. In most cases, teachers relied on traditional methods: the students listened to the teacher or read new material together with their teachers; translated it or even retold it, did homework, etc. There was no sign of more modern teaching methods.

The Imam at-Tirmidhi Tajik Islamic University Opened

The Statute of the Tajik Islamic University and its curricula were ready by the summer of 1997; faculties were set up; the number of courses was determined, types of student report books and other documents were drafted, etc. The Committee for Religious Affairs conferred this educational establishment with the status of a university and gave it a new name: the Imam at-Tirmidhi Tajik Islamic University; it was officially opened soon after the decision was passed. The new university was entrusted to the Committee for Religious Affairs, but it officially belonged to the Tajik Islamic Center because the university continued using its buildings. The university status forced us to address serious tasks, including the level and quality of education and better conditions for studies. Classrooms were renovated and well-equipped; the examination system was regulated; the registering documents were improved, etc. We invited many prominent lecturers working at secular higher educational establishments. In an effort to upgrade the teachers’ professional skills and raise the level of teaching, we turned to the teaching experience of the Muslim countries. The Committee for Religious Affairs helped us to restore contact with the embassies of Turkey and Iran, as well as with the Cultural Center of Iran in Dushanbe and some of the Arab countries (Saudi Arabia and Egypt). In the summer of 1997, several teachers came from Saudi Arabia with preliminary permission from the Committee for Religious Affairs to teach at a 20-day seminar organized for our lecturers. At first our foreign colleagues were disappointed with the level of knowledge of religious subjects of our teaching staff and even referred it to the lowest level of spiritual education. After a while, however, they discovered they were wrong: our lecturers were as competent as Saudi theologians, although their knowledge of the fundamentals of the Koran, fiqh, and Arabic grammar was mostly theoretical because of lack of practice. The seminars were useful in two respects. First, after establishing contact with the theological communities of the Islamic countries, the Imam at-Tirmidhi Tajik Islamic University put itself on the map of the Islamic world. Second, it finally destroyed the delusion that Soviet power had killed Is- lamic thought in Central Asia; the very fact that there was an Islamic university in Tajikistan destroyed the myth of a negative attitude toward Islam in the country. In June 1997, the Committee for Religious Affairs appointed, without preliminary consultations with the Ministry of Education, young domullo A. Aliev as principal of the university. The ministry, 115 Volume 15 Issue 2 2014 CENTRAL ASIA AND THE CAUCASUS on the other hand, showed no interest in the study structure and the problems of the university super- vised by the Committee for Religious Affairs and the Islamic Center. The wages were much lower than what lecturers of secular universities received for their teaching activities, but no one complained. In June 1997, as soon as the Imam at-Tirmidhi Tajik Islamic University was officially established, the Jumhuryat newspaper informed its readers about the conditions for enrolling in the first year and published a list of documents to be sent to the admission commission: a certificate of secondary education or a diploma of a secondary specialized school/college; passport, medical certificate, residence certificate, photos, etc. The commission was staffed by university lecturers, members of the Islamic Center, and Com- mittee officials. We compiled 50 examination question-papers (three questions in each) for each of the subjects for the oral entrance exams (reading, Tawhid, fiqh, Arabic grammar) and a written exam in the Tajik language and made a special effort not to reveal the questions before the exams. The Committee helped us a lot at the preliminary stage. We set 10 August (when all other universities would have completed their entrance exams) as the date of our first exam for the simple reason that if the number of those willing to join our university proved smaller than the needed 150 we would be able to draw on those who had failed the entrance exams elsewhere. Our fears proved groundless; the number of willing was twice as high as the number of places, which gave us a chance to select the best. The exams carried out in full accordance with the decision of the Ministry of Education were also attended by officials of the Committee for Religious Affairs and other religious organizations of the Republic of Tajikistan. Tajiks and Uzbeks, all of them citizens of the RT, comprised the majority of entrants; the knowledge of Tajik, the language of instruction, was one of the basic requirements. Some of the new students were imam-khatibs, others were journalists, teachers, or even officials of local departments for religious affairs.

The Islamic University in 2005-2007

The contribution of the University’s administration and teaching staff to its development can hardly be overestimated. At first it had two faculties—the methodology in religious studies and the Shari‘a. It should be said that our teachers could not expect academic promotion, but concerned about the future of the university and religious education as a whole, they did their best to interest the students in academic activity, who were invited to write tests and diplomas, discuss theological subjects, etc. At the first stage, the university had no deputy principal for academic work and no post-graduate course. In 1996-2007, the university produced between 150 and 200 graduates every year; a third of them were accomplished domullos armed with good knowledge of the Shari‘a and with answers to practically all possible questions related to Islam. At that time, it was still unclear whether the university would be patronized by the Ministry of Culture or the Ministry of Education; all other religious institutions were in a similar situation. De- spite its vague status, we drafted a Statute of the Higher Religious School of the Future, which we 116 CENTRAL ASIA AND THE CAUCASUS Volume 15 Issue 2 2014 presented to the Ministry of Education; the curriculum of the future school was compiled with the great and inestimable help of the heads of our Faculty of Tajik Philology. A large number of patriots from among the lecturers at the republic’s higher educational establishments and research fellows of the republic’s Academy of Sciences deemed it necessary to start teaching at the Tajik Islamic University. After a while, it became clear that jobs for university graduates were few and far between: they were rejected by state structures, organizations, and schools. No one was interested in the quality of their education; they were reproached for having selected a non-state university. This triggered heated discussions about how to define the profession of our graduates. In 2004-2005, the University, supported by the Committee for Religious Affairs, asked the government to make it a state educational institution. This looked like the only remedy for the numerous and fairly painful problems; indeed, since 90% of the republic’s population were Muslims, the state should train experts in religious enlightenment and religious education.

Methods for Teaching Religious Disciplines

From the very beginning, there was no consensus about the methods for teaching religious disciplines, the disagreements becoming even more vehement when lecturers from secular institutes joined our staff. The teachers of religious disciplines knew next to nothing about teaching methods, even if their knowledge of religious subjects was impeccable. We had to invite teachers from national universities or Egyptians to teach Arabic to our students; the same applied to social disciplines. After a while it became absolutely clear that we should revise the methods for teaching religious disciplines, something the traditional domullos could not understand or accept. Together with M. Toirov and other literary critics, we helped our teachers compile teaching plans and individual lesson plans, select subjects for written papers and diplomas; formulate the methods of lectures, seminars, educational programs, meetings, and scientific conferences. This helped us identify the gaps in the methods for teaching religious disciplines; much has been done in this respect and much remains to be done. So far we know next to nothing about the teaching methods of the Orient, including the Tajik- Persian methods. Great Ibn Sina, who had his own ideas about science, education, and teaching wrote a lot about these problems; he pointed out that the age of the students was extremely important in the teaching process because thinking developed by stages. He paid particular attention to the creative and constructive thinking of students. Today, his experience and his ideas remain practically neglected. The great pantheist poet Movlane Jalāl ad-Dīn Muhammad Rūmī organized circles very similar to the classes in our schools and practiced diverse teaching methods, such as lessons, groups of pupils arranged by ages, intervals between lessons, holidays, exams, etc. Abd ar-Rahmān Jāmī, Sufi Sheikh, theologian, and philosopher, wrote a textbook for his children that can still be used to teach Arabic grammar. Examples of this sort are numerous. The Muslim teachers of faith remain devoted to the reproductive method of teaching, which presupposes active perception and memorizing of information supplied by the teacher or any other 117 Volume 15 Issue 2 2014 CENTRAL ASIA AND THE CAUCASUS source; teachers offer facts, arguments, and concepts as ready-made; they do not discuss them, nor do they offer different opinions or hypotheses. This method, widely popular before the revolution, cannot be applied today. This is confirmed by the methods used to teach calligraphy. In the Bukhara madrassahs, calligraphy was taught through imitation; no other teaching equipment (blackboards) were used; this explains why in the 18th-19th centuries calligraphy was no longer developing. For many reasons (bans on teaching activity, lack of textbooks, pressure of the authorities, etc.), the domullos of the Soviet period could not fully use the old methods, to say nothing of mastering new ones. In his book K istorii Bukharskoy revolutsii (Materials Pertaining to the History of the Bukhara Revolution), Ustod Sadriddin Ayni pointed out that in 1916-1920 schools appeared in Bukhara that used new methods and where students learned to read and write in 3 to 4 months. The author admitted that it was inconceivable: “At that time I thought that at least two years were needed to master calligraphy.”4 I regret to say that the madrassahs in Tajikistan have not yet completely mastered the modern teaching methods: calligraphy is taught either by old methods or the methods elaborated by Prof. Kh. Karimov and Prof. M. Kosimova, which are not free from serious shortcomings. Teaching begins with the letters, which have two or four forms; only seven letters have one form, others (with the exception of “ayn,” “ghayn,” and “ha-i hawwaz”) have two forms—either isolated or ligature. In the Persian alphabet based on Arabic graphics, there are 7 letters with two (=14) and 25 letters with four forms (=100), which means that there are 114 forms. It is not easy to master them all. On the other hand, if we take 7 letters with one, 22 letters with two, and 3 letters with four forms, we get 63 forms, the number being equal to the number of printed and handwritten forms of the contemporary Tajik alphabet. Some of the letters differ only by the placement of dots. All of this makes teaching much easier. It should be said that each of the religious disciplines has its own highly specific teaching method that does not suit any other. The Koran reading (qiroat) and recitation (tajweed) use the same methods, while teaching grammar (Nahw) relies on absolutely different methods. They, however, have common features: visual aids, various methods of questioning, techniques of formulating questions and dialectical approaches—moving from the simple to the complex and from specific to abstract. These methods have been practically forgotten; today students cannot describe the learned material in their own words and find it hard to draw conclusions; this shows the low level of their creative thinking. The textbooks have not yet been logically structured to lead the student from the simple to the complex. Let us take Mabdaul-qiroat as an example. This is a very complicated composition that requires a lot of learning by heart, at least at the initial stages; its content has nothing to do with any curriculum; there are no teaching plans or teaching programs (that is, regulatory documents) related to it. Teachers of Islamic subjects in Turkey, Iran, India, and Pakistan, as well as in the Arab countries, rely on the latest teaching methods, equipment, and teaching materials; the textbooks they use fully correspond to the teaching programs.

4 S. Ayni, K istorii Bukharskoy revoliutsii, Dushanbe, 1987, p. 47.

118 CENTRAL ASIA AND THE CAUCASUS Volume 15 Issue 2 2014

In Central Asia, Afghanistan, and the Caucasus, teachers, instead of being guided by teaching plans, rely on books written many centuries ago, dealing with purely religious issues and having nothing in common with the changing reality. These books are not adjusted to the different ages of those who study them: they are not textbooks, but rather sources of knowledge. This means that we need textbooks on religious matters based on the latest achievements of pedagogical science. Our domullos cannot accomplish this: they know next to nothing about the modern teaching methods, teaching plans, and curricula used in advanced Islamic educational establishments. We should entrust the task of writing religious textbooks fully adjusted to the demands of the times to respected and knowledgeable domullos who should cooperate with the Ministry of Education, Scientific-Research Institute of Pedagogical Sciences, and the Academy of Pedagogical Sciences.

Religious Education as Part of the State Education System

No matter what, by 2007 the university had scored many victories and acquired many problems. On 24 May, 2007, when speaking at a meeting with the public, President Emomali Rakhmon said that the university should be supported. Several months later, on 30 October, he signed the Decree on Setting up the Tajik State Islamic Institute based on the Imam at-Tirmidhi Tajik Islamic University5; in 2009, it was named after Imam e Azam Abu Hanifa. In this way, our educational establishment finally acquired a state status and adequate funding. The curriculum compiled by the republic’s Ministry of Education included religious subjects and also the history of the Tajik people, Tajik and foreign languages, IT, ecology, fundamentals of contemporary natural science, etc. In 2008, the curriculum consisted of the following subjects: (1) Koranic sciences (al-ulumul quran); (2) Arabic philology; (3) history of Islam and religion; (4) theology and Islamic philosophy; (5) Islamic sciences. In 2010, the Islamic Institute was transferred from the Ministry of Education (now the Ministry of Education and Science of the RT) to the Committee for Religious Affairs under the republic’s government. Today, it offers education to over 1,500 students, including more than 200 girls. There is no shortage of trained teachers, the worst headache of the early years. Its teaching staff consists of the best graduates of the institute and graduates of religious educational establishments of Tashkent, Kazan, Jordan, and Egypt; specialists in Arabic and academics from the National Univer- sity and the Academy of Sciences are also among our lecturers. In recent years, the university has created textbooks and teaching aids printed at the institute’s print shop.

5 See: M. Khasanova, “V RT sozdan islamskiy institut s izucheniem gumanitarnykh nauk,” Asia Plus, 16 November, 2007, available at [http://www.news.tj/ru/news], 16 September, 2009.

119 Volume 15 Issue 2 2014 CENTRAL ASIA AND THE CAUCASUS By Way of a Conclusion

The time has come to develop religious enlightenment and education in every possible way to raise the next generation of well-qualified domullos. We should remain devoted to our traditions and be bold enough to face the contemporary world; we should study and develop the latest methods for teaching religious disciplines. I should say that development of Islamic thought, theology, and philosophy is a time- and money-consuming process. If we can manage to educate religious intellectuals armed with the latest knowledge, we can rest assured that the time and money were well spent.

120 CENTRAL ASIA AND THE CAUCASUS Volume 15 Issue 2 2014

ETHNICITIES AND ETHNIC RELATIONS

URGENT PROBLEMS OF THE WESTERN CIRCASSIANS IN THE 21ST CENTURY

Irina BABICH D.Sc. (Hist.), Senior Fellow, Department of the Caucasus, Institute of Ethnology and Anthropology, Russian Academy of Sciences (Moscow, the Russian Federation)

ABSTRACT

he author analyzes the most urgent The article is based on ethnographic problems of the Western Circassians field polls carried out in areas populated by T (the Shapsugs of the Caucasian Black Western Circassians, leading the author to Sea coast and the Adighe of the Republic of conclude that the government should pay Adigey) caused by the 2014 Winter Olym- more attention to the social, economic, and pics in the Krasnodar Territory, as well as cultural problems of the Shapsugs of the the religious context that took shape after Black Sea coastal area and concentrate on the election of the new mufti of the Republic preventing Islamic radicalization in the Re- of Adigey in December 2012. public of Adigey.

KEYWORDS: Shapsugs of the Black Sea coast, Olympic Games, the problem of the Circassian language, the International Circassian Association of Shapsugs, Adyge Khase, congress of the Muslims of Adigey, Kabardino-Balkaria, Islamic leaders, mufti of the Republic of Adigey and the Krasnodar Territory.

121 Volume 15 Issue 2 2014 CENTRAL ASIA AND THE CAUCASUS Introduction

In the 21st century, the Western Circassians of the Republic of Adigey and the Krasnodar Ter- ritory became fully aware of the negative impact of the “new” policy of the Russian Federation and the republican authorities (shaped to a great extent by the 2014 Winter Olympics in Sochi), as well as of the activities of the local Muslim community. I would like to dwell here in greater detail on the urgent problems of the Western Circassians living in two constituent territories of the Russian Fed- eration—the Krasnodar Territory and the Republic of Adigey—mainly between Sochi and Tuapse, as well as along the Black Sea coast.

The Shapsugs of the Black Sea Coastal Area

In 2008, I conducted a comprehensive study to find out the extent to which the Shapsugs of the Black Sea coastal area have been preserving their identity in the 21st century; the results were summarized in the “Issledovania po prikladnoy i neotlozhnoy etnologii” (Studies of Applied and Urgent Ethnology) Series published by the Institute of Ethnology and Anthropology, RAS.1 The choice of Sochi as the venue for the 2014 Winter Olympics proved to be of immense significance for the Black Sea coastal area and caused huge social, economic, and cultural shifts in the life of the Shapsugs of the Tuapse and Lazarevskoe districts of the Krasnodar Territory.2

Social and Political Life

In the last few years, the International Circassian Association, Adyge Khase, a public organization of the Shapsugs of the Black Sea coastal area chaired by Majid Chachukh, has been concentrating on the problem of its official attitude toward the 2014 Winter Olympics. It called on its members to support the Sochi Olympics, which cost the International Circassian Association its popularity among the Shapsugs: many of them were very unhappy that the Interna- tional Circassian Association had failed to acquire privileges and preferences for the community in exchange for its support of this major international sports event. Ruslam Gvashev, one of the founding fathers of the Adyge Khase (earlier a research fellow at the Sochi history museum), is one of the most active critics of Chairman Chachukh.3 On 30 April, 2011, the congress of the Adyge Khase elected Ruslan Gvashev as chairman of the Council of Elders of the Black Sea Area. Speaking at the congress, the newly elected chairman pointed out that in recent years he had written several letters to the top figures of the Russian Fed- eration, drawing their attention to the problems created by the Sochi Olympics. He pointed out that

1 See: I.L. Babich, Problemy sokhranenia identichnosti shapsugov Prichernomoria v XXI v. Issledovania po prikladnoy i neotlozhnoy etnologii Series, Moscow, No. 213, 2009; I.L. Babich, “Prichernomorskie shapsugi: problemy sokhranenia kultury,” Filosofia, sotsiologia, kultura, No. 5, 2006, pp. 107-114. 2 Makopse, Golovinka, Psebe, Shkhafit, Akhintam, Bolshoy Kichmay, Maly Kichmay, Khajiko, Tkhagapsh, Bolshoe Pseushkho, Maloe Pseushkho, Tsypka, Aguy-Shapsug as well as Lazarevskoe, an urban-type settlement, and the cities of Tuapse and Sochi. 3 Ethnographic field materials of the author (further PEMA), Vol. 1, File 1, interview with A.Kh., the aul of Bolshoi Kichmay, 3 November, 2013.

122 CENTRAL ASIA AND THE CAUCASUS Volume 15 Issue 2 2014 the authorities of the Krasnodar Territory practically ignored the Circassians in general and the Shapsugs in particular, who are the area’s “autochthonous population.” In one of his letters he wrote: “We are deeply convinced that only the President of the Russian Federation can defuse the tension created by the future Olympics and the upcoming 150th anniversary of the end of the Russian- Caucasian War of 1817-1864 in 2014 and show us reasonable prospects.”4 In one of his letters, Ruslan Gvashev informed Moscow that for over a decade the Adyge Khase, as an official Shapsug-Circassian structure, had been trying in vain to insist that the Federal Law of the RF On the Autochthonous and Numerically Small Peoples of the RF, which included the Shap- sugs-Circassians, should be executed in the Krasnodar Territory. Ruslan Gvashev is convinced that this explains why the rights and interests of the Shapsug- Circassians of the Black Sea area are neglected and the problems remain ignored. There is no official list of the places of their traditional settlement and economic activity; there is no decision to make the Circassian language an obligatory part of the school curriculum. The official Charter of the Krasnodar Territory says nothing about the Adighe-Circassians (the autochthonous people) or the Shapsug- Circassians (an autochthonous minority of the Krasnodar Territory). He believes that the anthem of the Krasnodar Territory based on a Cossack song of the time of World War I calls for annihilating the basurmans (which he interprets as “followers of other than Christian faiths”). In October 2013, Gvashev stressed, in an interview with Reuters, his negative attitude toward the republican authorities and the local public organizations because of their posture regarding the upcoming Sochi Olympics. He stressed that “specialists in the Caucasus and members of the Adighe- Circassian community were not invited to discuss the design or implementation of the construction projects related to the future Olympic Games; this failure buries the unique material culture of this people. We were not given the opportunity to move the remains of our ancestors to new places. Ur- gently forming a commission of archeologists, ethnologists, ethnographers, and members of the autochthonous people—Adighe-Circassians—could have minimized the losses. Neither the media, nor officials mentioned the fact that the center of Sochi and Krasnaia Poliana (Kbaade) were the historical homeland of the Adighe-Circassians and Ubykhs (one of the sub-ethnicities of the Adighe-Circassian ethnicity); today, they no longer live there. The year of the Olympics is the year of the 150th anniversary of the end of the Caucasian War, which pushed the local peoples to the brink of extinction. This explains why the majority of us are very negative about the upcoming international sports event. The odious statements coming from federal officials are adding tension to the already tense situation.” Today, one of the settlements (the aul of Bolshoy Kichmay in a picturesque valley) has been chosen as an example of “Shapsug prosperity.” It has everything up to and including the Internet; there is also a new school (built by the efforts of its former director A. Gvashev long before it was decided to make Sochi the capital of the next Winter Olympics). The local authorities, however, have usurped the right to present the school as evidence of their care for the Shapsugs. The aul is a shopwindow of sorts: all guests are invariably taken there. In Oc- tober 2013, Kabardins, graduates of the Kabardino-Balkarian State University (“loyal to Putin” according to one of our interviewees), were treated to a concert in Lazarevskoe, where the local Cos- sacks greeted them “on the land of Lazarev.”5 The Shapsugs are worried about the rapid “Russification” of their settlements. Some think that “Governor of the Krasnodar Territory Tkachev and his representatives are convinced that the Black Sea lands populated by the Shapsugs are in fact Cossack lands. They say: ‘We conquered these lands and they became ours.’ Local officials say that ‘there were not enough ships to move all the Circas-

4 [www.natpress.net]. 5 PEMA, Vol. 1, File 1, interview with A.Kh., Bolshoy Kichmay, 2 November, 2013.

123 Volume 15 Issue 2 2014 CENTRAL ASIA AND THE CAUCASUS sians to Turkey.’ In other words, the Shapsugs believe that the local authorities are acting from the position of strength.”6 The Shapsugs’ contribution to the Olympic Games was limited to two spheres: (1) dance and singing groups performing together with the Cossack and folklore groups of other peoples functioning at the Center of National Cultures in Lazarevskoe; and (2) an exhibition of everyday Shapsug life and culture together with exhibitions of other peoples of Russia; it was implied that the political difficulties between the Circassians and the Russian Empire should be kept strictly outside the exhibition’s scope. The local authorities were invited to organize A Circassian Household exhibition in the Imereti Valley based on the collections of the Museum of Local Lore in Lazarevskoe and the national museum of the Republic of Adigey.7 The reasons why the International Circassian Association failed to achieve an agreement with the Olympic Committee of the RF on creating souvenirs portraying Circassian national ornaments was one of the issues that troubled our interviewees. The local public leaders were convinced that Shapsug businessmen (and there are businessmen among the Shapsugs) would have never done this for the simple reason that the right to go into business in the Black Sea area is reserved for those who are loyal to the local authorities and, therefore, would not interfere with the preparations for the Olympics. On the other hand, concentrating on the Circassian problem contradicts the “vector of tolerance” in Russia’s politics, so the Shapsug businessmen preferred to stay away lest they upset the preparations. There are problems in the linguistic sphere as well. Here is an example. In the Shapsug villages, the names of streets are written in Russian; on the eve of the Olympics they were also given in Latin script. The Shapsugs’ request to write the names in Circassian was declined for the following reason: “The Circassian language is not a regional language in the Krasnodar Territory.” This means that the auls in the Krasnodar Territory should use the Russian language for the names of streets. If they had been in the Republic of Adigey, the Circassian language could have been used to name them. Here is another example. A monument to a Shapsug hero erected in Bolshoy Kichmay had an inscription in Circassian; the local authorities asked for it to be written in Russian too. Even though this was a fair compromise, since officially the inscription should only have been in Russian, the Shapsugs were dissatisfied. The leaders of the Shapsug public movement are convinced that the youth “do not agree with the Sochi Olympics” because “Russia has failed to recognize the Shapsugs as an autochthonous people of the Black Sea Area, thus losing the chance to reconcile the peoples.” My ethnographic field studies, however, proved that the leaders are not entirely correct: there were young men (mostly students of Sochi higher educational establishments) ready to work as volunteers at the Olympic Games.8 (The local authorities actively promoted the Sochi Olympics at schools.) One of our young Shapsug interviewees said that he wanted to work as a volunteer and added that he was amazed to learn that Circassian websites abroad were calling for a boycott of the Sochi Olympics “because they are being organized on land drenched in blood.” He added that he would have liked the leaders of the Sochi Olympics to point out that the games were being organized on the land of the Shapsugs.9 It seems that, on the one hand, the Olympic Games were used by the Circassian (more specifically Kabardin) human rights movements as a pretext; this means that the Shapsugs and their prob-

6 PEMA, Vol. 1, File 2, interview with A.G., Bolshoy Kichmay, 5 November, 2013. 7 See: PEMA, Vol. 1, File 1, interview with A.Kh., Bolshoy Kichmay, 3 November, 2013. 8 See: PEMA, Vol. 1, File 2, interview with A.G., Bolshoy Kichmay, 5 November, 2013. 9 See: PEMA, Vol. 1, File 3, interview with R.A.., Golovinka, 7 November, 2013.

124 CENTRAL ASIA AND THE CAUCASUS Volume 15 Issue 2 2014 lems were used as instruments of alien politics. On the other hand, the Shapsugs themselves tried to capitalize on the Sochi Olympics, but instead of addressing social, economic, and cultural problems, they plunged into politics.

Reproduction of the Ethnic Circassian Culture

Today, the ethnic Circassian culture is preserved among the Shapsugs through Circassian language and literature classes and optional history lessons in school, which include history of culture and everyday life. History of the Kuban Region (not the Circassian history) is another part of the school curriculum, because the Shapsug auls administratively belong to the Krasnodar Territory. The Circassian literary language is indispensable for the Shapsug national identity; in most schools, however, it remains an optional subject. In Bolshoy Kichmay, it forms part of the school curriculum thanks to the efforts of its former director A. Gvashev, even though the number of hours is obviously inadequate (see Table 1).

Table 1

Number of Hours per Week of Circassian Language and Literature Classes in the 2nd-11th Grades at the Secondary School of Bolshoy Kichmay

Grade Circassian Language Circassian Literature

2nd 2 —

3rd 1 1

4th 1

5th 2 1

6th 1 —

7th 1 1

8th 2 1

9th — 1

10th 1 1

11th 1 2

In recent years, the number of hours dedicated to the ethnic culture was reduced to increase the number of hours of physical education and the history and culture of the Kuban Region.10 Today, Shapsug children are fluent in the Circassian literary language (based on the dialect used by the Temirgoy tribe), which they study in school, but are practically ignorant of the language used in everyday life. An interviewee in Golovinka told us that he had been aware of his Circassian (Shap- sug) ethnicity since the age of 10, even though he did not know either the Circassian literary language

10 See: PEMA, Vol. 1, File 2, interview with A.G., Bolshoy Kichmay, 5 November, 2013.

125 Volume 15 Issue 2 2014 CENTRAL ASIA AND THE CAUCASUS or its everyday (Shapsug) variant.11 When asked why he preferred to call himself Circassian he explained that the world knew more about Circassians than Shapsugs, but added that during the recent population census his father had registered himself and his son as “Shapsugs.” Bolshoy Kichmay has an ethnographic museum; the office of the Circassian language and literature at the local school displays a map of Circassia before the Russian-Caucasian War and the tamgas (family symbols); schoolchildren can watch films about the history, traditions, and customs of the Circassians. The school has an anthem written by its director A. Gvashev and a tamga designed by him showing the attributes of Circassian culture: a three-legged table, cradle, dagger and a fur hat. Many of the elements of the Circassian culture and morals affect and correspondingly adjust the behavior of the young people12; even children are fond of drawing national rites and holidays. Young people are aware of how the behavior of the local Shapsug community and the people who come to the seaside resorts differs. Marriage and funeral folk traditions are faithfully observed.13

Islam among the Shapsugs

Practically no auls have mosques; in some of them they are still being built (in the settlement of Novomikhaylovsky and the auls of Psebe and Aguy-Shapsug); in others there are prayer houses (the auls of Kalezh and Maly Kichmay; in the latter imam N. Umaru conducts services in N. Ach- mizova’s house). There are only two functioning mosques: a new and impressive mosque in the aul of Bolshoy Pseushkho built in 2002 and the restored old mosque in the aul of Tkhagapsh.14 Unlike the other North Caucasian peoples, the Shapsugs are not enthusiastic Muslims; they have no single religious administration: the Muslims of the Tuapse District obey the district imam; while the Muslims of the Lazarevskoe District are subordinate to the imam of Sochi; both belong to the Spiritual Administration of the Muslims of the Republic of Adigey and the Krasnodar Territory (SAM of RA and KT).15 Ardent Muslims among the youth go to mosques and perform namaz; there are Shapsugs who never go to mosques and never perform namaz, but who consider themselves to be Muslims.16 A large number of young men know nothing about nekyakh (the Muslim marriage ceremony), but they are convinced that each man should pay kalym for his bride.17 On 8 December, 2012, B. Shkhalakhov, imam of the Tuapse District, convened a meeting of Muslims of the Krasnodar Territory in Shkhafit, a Shapsug aul; I. Shkhalakhov and M. Khasani, leaders of young Muslims of Adigey, were also present.18 It was pointed out at the congress that several local Shapsugs studied at Islamic institutes. In November 2012, Ibrahim Shkhalakhov, a local Shap- sug, was elected Deputy Mufti of Adigey and the Krasnodar Territory.

11 See: PEMA, Vol. 1, File 3, interview with P.A., Golovinka, 7 November, 2013. 12 See: Ibidem. 13 See: Ibidem. 14 See: “Neugasimy svet islama: Vozrozhdenie Islama v Respublike Adigey i Krasnodarskom krae,” in: TsPO Duk- hovnoe upravlenie musulman RA i KK, ed. by N.M. Emizh, Kachestvo Ltd, Maykop, 2011, pp. 110-122. 15 See: A. Nibo, “Vozrazhdaia dukhovnost,” Shapsugia, No. 8, 2006. 16 See: PEMA, Vol. 1, File 3, interview with R.A., Golovinka, 7 November, 2013. 17 See: Ibidem. 18 See: “Sobranie musulman Chernomorskogo poberezhia,” Svet, newspaper of the SAM of RA and KT, No. 7 (65), 2012.

126 CENTRAL ASIA AND THE CAUCASUS Volume 15 Issue 2 2014 Ethnic Culture and the Economy

Since 2008, the economic situation in Shapsug villages has considerably improved, which confirmed the local people, very much as people elsewhere in Russia, in their belief that money is the main value.19 There are no traces of economic development in the Shapsug villages; people (young people in particular) are employed at the local spas. Our interviewees (especially members of local intelligentsia) are convinced that the spa economy has a negative effect on young people and their behavior.20 Circassian-style cafes along the road leading to a tourist attraction called Thirty-Three Water- falls beyond Bolshoy Kichmay serve barbeque, and there are dance groups to add local color. These trips, which are highly popular among tourists, bring in good money.21 Today, there are five or six such places in Bolshoy Kichmay; this fairly profitable business belongs to A. Gvashev, former director of the local school. It was expected to develop into ethnic tourism (I wrote about this five years ago).22 Five or seven years ago, there were people interested in the history and culture of the Caucasian peoples (the Circassians in particular); today barbeque and dances are the main attraction. The people who organize the trips pay agents who gather groups on the seashore and bring them to the auls. In winter, there are 2 to 3 parties a week; in summer, they are daily events.23 The Mez- dakh complex has a hotel, sauna, restaurant, billiard room, ethnographic museum, dolmen, and a basin with live trout set up along the road leading to the waterfalls; the dances performed for the tourists are a melee of different Caucasian dances. A folklore dance ensemble famous for its perfor- mances at the Mezdakh waterfalls advertizes itself as follows: “Impressive dances with daggers, swords and drums; unique interpretations of well-know dances and old legends. We will introduce you to the culture of all the peoples of the Caucasus.” These cafes are prepared to go to all lengths to earn money: the administration of one of them (Kavkaz) was ready to go as far as celebrating Halloween. It seems that the Sochi Olympics did not affect the social, political, and economic life of the Shapsugs of the Black Sea coast, yet their traditional culture is strongly affected by the proximity of the Black Sea resorts and tourist economy; the culture of other Circassian groups (Adighe and Kabar- din) living in other areas, is more or less protected against alien impacts. The traditional culture of the Shapsugs has been and remains an important part of their self-identity.

A “Soft Islamic Revolution” in Contemporary Adigey

In the 1990s, the Muslim renaissance caused by the political changes and freedom of religion spread far and wide in the Islamic regions of the Russian Federation.

19 See: Field materials of the author. The Lazarevskoe District of the Krasnodar Territory, 2007 (further PMA). Note- book 1, Inventory 1, File 1. 20 See: PMA, the Tuapse District of the Krasnodar Territory, 2007, Notebook 1, Inventory 2, File 10. 21 See: PEMA, Vol. 1, File 3, interview with R.A., Golovinka, 7 November, 2013. 22 See: I.L. Babich, Problemy sokhranenia identichnosti shapsugov Prichernomoria v XXI v., p. 23. 23 See: PEMA, Vol. 1, File 2, interview with A.G., Bolshoy Kichmay, 5 November, 2013.

127 Volume 15 Issue 2 2014 CENTRAL ASIA AND THE CAUCASUS

In the Northern Caucasus, the emerging Islamic community went the same way as the other Muslim regions; there are, however, certain specifics attributed to local history, the degree of religiosity of the local people, the region’s geopolitical situation, etc. At all times, the Islamic revival in the Northern Caucasus has been a complicated and contradictory process; today it is deeply rooted in the far from simple interaction between Islam and politics and their mutual influence in Russia. On 24 November, 2012, Maykop hosted a congress of the Muslims of the Republic of Adigey and the Krasnodar Territory (the last one was held four years previously, on 12 November, 2008). Attended by 177 delegates out of the 225 invited, the congress in Maykop proved to be all-important for the religious life in the Republic of Adigey.24 It should be said that I personally obtained the above figures while attending the congress; they are somewhat different from the figures (176 present out of 201 invited) quoted in the newspaper Svet (Light) published by the SAM of RA and KT.25 The congress heard the report of Nurbiy Emizh, Mufti of the SAM, who pointed out that the congress had been organized by an Organizing Committee headed by Ibrahim Shkhalakhov, one of the young Muslims,26 and that he personally had not been involved. Ibrahim Shkhalakhov was born in 1975 in Bolshoy Pseushkho, the Tuapse District; he graduated from the Marine Professional Technical College in 1993 and in 2007 became Deputy Mufti of the SAM of RA and KT and imam of the Main Mosque of Maykop. Significantly, he is one of the few of those sent to Islamic higher educational establishments in Saudi Arabia and Syria to complete the course.27 Nurbiy Emizh summarized the activities and financial status of the Spiritual Administration; the delegates had no questions and offered no comments. The mufti stressed that in recent years many Circassians had developed the tendency to join all sorts of sects rather than attend mosques.28 In 2012, the SAM responded with a decision that said in part: “Members of Circassian families, one of whom have joined a sect, may not be buried in Muslim cemeteries.”29 Elections of a new mufti attracted a lot of attention; the older and the younger (around 40 years) generations could not agree on the candidate: the former wanted Mufti Emizh re-elected, while their opponents preferred to see one of the “young Muslims” in this post. The final list of candidates included Mufti Emizh; imam of a Maykop mosque A. Kardanov; imam of the Main Mosque of the Republic of Adigey I. Shkhalakhov; and imam of the aul of Mafekh- abl Kh. Mukhamad, who had moved to the Caucasus from Kosovo. The latter three were members of the Organizing Committee. Ibrahim Shkhalakhov, an outstanding and ambitious leader, left the race at the last moment in favor of Askarbiy Kardanov, an intelligent young man with no leadership talents, but with good contacts at the very top. As a candidate to the post he said that “the time has come to clear the way for the young” (the three contenders were around 40). Kh. Mukhamad, likewise, left the race in favor of Kardanov. The voting by show of hands gave 44 votes to Emizh and 125 votes to Kardanov. It appears that we saw a “soft Islamic revolution” in the Republic of Adigey and the Krasnodar Territory that brought “young Muslims” to power in the republic’s Islamic community.

24 See: Field materials gathered by the author. Congress of the Muslims of the RA and KT, 24 December 2012, Maykop, Republic of Adigey (further PZA). 25 See: “Sostoialsia ocherednoy s’ezd musulman Respubliki Adygea i Krasnodarskogo kraya,” Svet, No. 7 (65), 2012. 26 [www.adigea.aif.ru]. 27 See: Field materials of the author, Republic of Adigey, Vol. 1, File 1, 25 November, 2012. 28 See: I.L. Babich, “Protestanskoe dvizhenie v Adygee,” in Khristianstvo na Severnom Kavkaze: istoria i sovremen- nost, ed. by I.L. Babich, L.T. Solovyeva, Moscow, 2011, pp. 162-185. 29 PZA, 24 December, 2012, Republic of Adigey.

128 CENTRAL ASIA AND THE CAUCASUS Volume 15 Issue 2 2014

In the new context, the mufti will be a formal rather than a real leader; a neutral candidate was elected to allow the new Council of the SAM (which included the strongest figures from among the Organizing Committee and Shkhalakhov and Mukhamad, two former candidates to the post of mufti) to concentrate real spiritual power in its hands. Ibrahim Shkhalakhov preserved his post of Deputy Mufti of the SAM of RA and KT. After December 2013, these people moved into the limelight of new Islamic reality in the Repub- lic of Adigey; the fact that on 26 October, 2013, Deputy Mufti Shkhalakhov, rather than the mufti, was interviewed by Argumenty i fakty about the state of affairs in the local Islamic revival speaks volumes.30 Here is another telltale fact: Emizh declined an invitation to the new Council of the SAM. This was a democratic transfer of power from the old to the new Muslim forces (the so-called “young Muslims”), who have their own ideas about Islamic revival in the republic and who want to defend their right to introduce their own forms and methods very different from those used by Emizh.31 Here I want to summarize the 12-year term of Nurbiy Emizh as a mufti, as well as the realized and possible trends of his successor. It should be said that the power struggle within the Muslim community and the Islamic institution is very typical of the North Caucasian republics. It has been going on endlessly in Kabardino- Balkaria, where the so-called young Muslims represented by A. Astemirov, M. Mukozhev, and others have been trying, for the last 10 to 15 years, to acquire “legal Islamic power” in the muftiat. Having tried, without much success, all the legal methods, they turned to illegal methods of struggle and suffered a crushing defeat from the republican and federal defense and security structures.32 On 13-14 October, 2005, groups of local Muslims attacked the buildings of the republican defense and security structures in Nalchik, the capital of Kabardino-Balkaria. The republic found itself in a new religious situation: the local Islamic community, after gaining strength in the 1990s, was ready to create a new reality for the Muslims of Kabardino-Balkaria in the Russian context. On the other hand, the Northern Caucasus acquired a new seat of religious and political extremism: judging by the recent developments in the republic, a large part of the local youth is ready to join the political struggle under Islamic slogans. Today, the peaceful nature of Muslim renaissance in Kabardino-Balkaria and other Muslim republics depends on the degree to which the causes behind the 2005 events in Nalchik have been analyzed and taken into account. These events have separated the Islamic youth opposed to the SAM of Kabardino-Balkaria and the religious extremists opposed to the government and ready to use force. Igor Dobaev has pointed out that the political extremists and terrorists are not only calling for violence, but are also using it.33 Today, the religious context in the republic is greatly affected by an even fiercer struggle for leadership at all levels of the Islamic community waged by exclusively legal methods. At the first

30 See: I. Shkhalakhov, “Radikalizatsiia islama iskhodit ot malogramotnykh liudei,” Argumenty i fakty, 26 October, 2013, available at [www.adigea.aif.ru]. 31 See: I.L. Babich, “The Republic of Adigey: Islam and Society at the Turn of the Century,” Central Asia and the Caucasus, No. 6, 2004, p. 58. 32 See: I.L. Babich, Antropologia vlasti i Islam, Moscow, 2009; idem, “Sovremennye islamskie obshchiny v Kabardino- Balkarii,” Rossia i musulmansky mir, No. 7, 2003, pp. 48-61; idem, “Sovremennye islamskie dvizhenia v Kabardino-Balkarii,” in: I.L. Babich, A.A. Yarlykapov, Islamskoe vozrozhdenie v sovremennoy Kabardino-Balkarii, Moscow, 2003, pp. 76-112; I.L. Babich, Islam i pravo v Rossii, Islam i pravo v Rossii Series, ed. by I.L. Babich, L.T. Solovyeva, Moscow, 1994, Issue 1; Pravovoy status islama na Severnom Kavkaze. Kabardino-Balkaria. Adigey. Krasnodarskiy Kray, Islam i pravo v Rossii Se- ries, Issue 3. 33 See: I.P. Dobaev, V.I. Nemchina, Novy terrorism v mire i na yiuge Rossii, Rostov on Don, 2005, p. 48.

129 Volume 15 Issue 2 2014 CENTRAL ASIA AND THE CAUCASUS stage, the sides strove to occupy the top posts in the Spiritual Administration; at the second, they are seeking influence on the republican authorities. This suggests logical questions: Why did the young Muslims fail in Kabardino-Balkaria and fairly peacefully achieve their aim in the Republic of Adigey? What makes the confrontation between age groups in these republics different? Will the events in both republics follow the same pattern? Throughout his twelve years of service, Mufti Emizh pursued a fairly consistent policy of Is- lamic revival; he paid much attention to the academic community, which was invariably aware of his friendliness and conscientious attitude toward his duties. In 2002 -2006, I regularly discussed with him the practically inevitable confrontation between different generations of Muslims, especially in the context of what happened in October 2005 in Nalchik. The mufti was sure that he would remain in control and would be able to keep the young Muslims of Adigey within certain limits. His confidence was not quite justified: young Muslims did come to power, but they never demonstrated the radicalism that was very obvious in Kabardino-Balkaria. It was a natural and even inevitable process, which could not be reverted by legal means. Nurbiy Emizh, a shrewd and far-sighted man, accepted this, which made it possible to transfer power without confrontation. Aware of what was coming, he correctly assessed all the possible repercussions to refrain from accusing the young Muslim leaders of radicalism; he never tried to use his contacts in the upper echelons of power or incite the defense and security structures against the young Muslims—this had happened in Kabardino-Balkaria with lamentable results.34 The first year of the new SAM of RA and KT provided an answer to the question about the trends in the local Muslims’ spiritual life. Nurbiy Emizh worked with the older generation to uproot the false national and false Islamic (burial) traditions that had struck root by the early 1990s. Judging by I. Shkhalakhov’s interview with Argumenty i fakty, the new people at the helm will concentrate on the younger generation: “We want to plant correct ideas about Islam in the minds of the younger generation through lectures, lessons, sermons, and talks with children.”35 The new people strive to educate the youth, shape their spiritual conscience, and spread the rules of Muslim behavior among them. This is further confirmed by an interview of Mufti Kardanov; still at the stage of preparations for the congress in Maykop, the Organizing Committee made up of members later elected to the Spiritual Administration exerted great efforts to draw the young men of the republic to its side. Ac- cording to Shkhalakhov, today only two districts—Shovgen and Krasnogvardeysk—remain outside their influence.36 The deputy mufti believes that only five imams (out of the total 45) can be considered well- educated; he said that the Spiritual Administration was planning a series of lectures to raise the educational level of the others. The deputy mufti spoke about the huge problems created by the Internet: the “moral values” preached by the Worldwide Web have little in common with what the muftiat strives to plant in young minds and hearts. It seems that today the new people at the helm of the SAM are building a following among the republic’s youth to acquire a strong social foundation in all the districts of the republic.37

34 See: I.L. Babich, “Sovremennye islamskie obshchiny v Kabardino-Balkarii,” pp. 48-61; idem, “Sovremennye islamskie dvizhenia v Kabardino-Balkarii,” pp. 76-112. 35 I. Shkhalakhov, op. cit. 36 See: Field ethnographic materials of the author. Republic of Adigey (further EMA), Vol. 1, File 2, 8 November, 2013, interview with A.K. 37 See: EMA, Vol. 1, File 1, 6 November, 2013, interview with R.Ts.

130 CENTRAL ASIA AND THE CAUCASUS Volume 15 Issue 2 2014

In the late 1990s and early 2000s, the young Muslims of Kabardino-Balkaria pursued a similar aim: they promoted their ideas of Muslim renaissance through the newly established Islamic educational system, which positively affected the minds of young Muslims all over the republic. Unofficial Islam represented by Astemirov and Mukozhev in particular attracted a large number of followers. On 21 June, 2013, Head of the Republic of Adigey Aslan Tkhakushinov met Mufti A. Kar- danov and imam of the Main Mosque of the aul of Mafekhabl M. Khasani38 to discuss the burial rites the republic’s population had acquired in the last twenty years. He pointed out that many of the novelties had nothing to do with Islam (in particular, funeral feasts on the 7th and 40th days after the death and after twelve months). I have already written that Emizh was actively opposed to these novelties; the present leaders of the republic fully agree with this. In an effort to persuade people to abandon these rites as alien to the Islamic tradition, the president of the republic (very much like Emizh before him) talked to people all over Adigey. It turned out that the people wanted a madrassah to educate imams and educational courses for the effendi. President Tkhakushinov pays a lot of attention to what the people have to say and supports all acceptable ideas.

Weakening Radicalization and Blocking Terrorism

Alexander Ignatenko has described how Islamic communities slip into radicalization: they are either tempted by the ideological garbs of social discontent stirred up by social and economic decline or by the active propaganda of Salafi ideas.39 It seems that a combination of ideological and legal methods and the use of force is the most efficient tool the government should arm itself with to return the social, political, and religious situation back to normal. We should be keenly aware of the difference between the Islamic youth and the Wahhabis. Ac- cording to Ignatenko, “Wahhabism is a political trend, the supporters of which rely on a very specific and highly subjective interpretation of Islam in an effort to preserve the status quo (by using force) in the Islamic countries in particular, and not only there.”40 Igor Dobaev uses the term neo-Wahhabism to describe the ideology of religious extremism and terrorism with political hues.41 The events in Kabardino-Balkaria have supplied us with a clear understanding of the process of radicalization of the Muslim community to help us avoid similar developments in Adigey. To lower the degree of “Islamic tension” in the republic we should protect its youth against the “young Islamic ideology” through the concerted efforts of the academic and creative intelligentsia to replace radicalism with positive mountain ideology rather than relying on the defense and security structures, which are doing their job anyway. Igor Dobaev has convincingly demonstrated that educational efforts and propaganda of the right ideas should become more active.42 The older generation of the local intelligentsia stays away from the Islamic revival and the efforts to formulate an ideology adjusted to the current public and social context expected to become

38 See: Svet, No. 3 (68), 2013. 39 See: A.A. Ignatenko, Islam i politika, Moscow, 2004, p. 22. 40 Ibid., p. 32 41 See: I.P. Dobaev, V.I. Nemchina, op. cit., p. 66. 42 See: Ibid., pp. 270-271.

131 Volume 15 Issue 2 2014 CENTRAL ASIA AND THE CAUCASUS part of the moral foundation of the region’s mountain communities. Islamic ideology is being created essentially from scratch: the national Caucasian cultures, which have a marginal role in the mountain communities, cannot stand opposed to the impact of Islamic revival. R. Khanakhu and O. Tsvetkov, prominent experts in Adigey, who write a lot about Islam, have predicted a more vehement conflict between the “traditional” and “young” Muslims (of the older and younger generations of local Muslims).43 I have a different view of the future of Islam in Adigey. The “young Muslims” have already won and come to power through legal means. There is no need for them to keep on fighting the older generation for spheres of influence in the Muslim community, since the disagreements in the past were not over rites and rituals but over power. This means that the young leaders will concentrate on brainwashing the republic’s youth and will leave the older generation in peace. The tension between the SAM of RA and KT and all sorts of administrative and, probably, defense and security structures will most likely increase to a certain extent in the near future.

43 See: R.Kh. Khanakhu, O.M. Tsvetkov, “Islamskaia obshchina v Adygee: vnutrenniaia dinamika i perspektivy evo- lutsii (po itogam sotsiologicheskogo issledovania),” Vestnik Adygeyskogo gosudarstvennogo universiteta, Issue 1 (92), 2012, pp. 132-138.

UIGHURS AS POLITICAL ACTORS IN THE KYRGYZ REPUBLIC

Dosmir UZBEKOV Professor at the Chair of International Relations of the Kyrgyz-Russian Slavic University (Bishkek, the Kyrgyz Republic)

Zaynidin KURMANOV Head of the Chair of International Relations of the Kyrgyz-Russian Slavic University (Bishkek, the Kyrgyz Republic)

ABSTRACT

n the Middle Ages, the Uighurs, who are mass exodus of the freedom-fighting Ui- one of the oldest and largest peoples of ghurs to the CE countries. I Central Eurasia (CE), were driven into The Uighurs are vigorously engaged in East Turkestan and then conquered by the economic activity; in other spheres they are Qing Empire. The Chinazation policy carried traditionally closed and alienated from the out in relation to these people led to the outside world, which prevents them from be- 132 CENTRAL ASIA AND THE CAUCASUS Volume 15 Issue 2 2014 coming actively integrated into contempo- having a certain influence on the foreign and rary society. domestic policy of the Kyrgyz Republic (KR), This article analyzes the roots and rea- as well as on political stability and security of sons for this social phenomenon, which is the entire Central Asian region.

KEYWORDS: Uighurs, Uighur diaspora, Kyrgyzstan, XUAR, PRC, Central Eurasia, Uighur separatism, East Turkestan Republic.

Introduction

Uighur statehood dates back to the 3rd century. The Uighurs, whose power extended from Altai to Manchuria in the Middle Ages, deservedly consider themselves the direct heirs of the historical past of these territories. Despite their nomadic origin, they were the first to inculcate a sedentary civilization among the Turkic tribes and peoples of the Central Asian steppes. This resulted in the establishment of a powerful Uighur khaganate, which replaced the East Turkic Empire. It is worth noting that the Uighurs were the first Turkic peoples to adopt Islam. In 840, the Uighur khaganate was destroyed by the Yenisei Kyrgyz, against whom it fought for 20 years. Under the attack of the Kyrgyz, the Uighurs moved to East Turkestan, where they established their own theocratic state. In the 18th century, East Turkestan was incorporated into the Qing dynasty and, consequently, was drawn into unending military, religious, and ethnic conflicts. The Uighurs were one of the peoples who populated the Karakhanid state (9th-13th centuries), which was situated along the Great Silk Road. The cities of Balasagun and Uzgen, now present-day Kyrgyzstan, were the capitals of this powerful Muslim state. In the Middle Ages, the territory of Kyrgyzstan, which did not acquire its current name until the 15th century, was populated by numerous Turkic-Mongolian tribes (Turks, Karluks, Kidani, Turgeshi, Kara-Kitais, and others), including Uighurs. The discovery of new sea routes from Europe to Asia and the wars of conquest carried out by the Mongols and Tamerlane led to the degradation of the Great Silk Road and the mass exodus of Uighurs to East Turkestan. All of these references to the past are necessary to understand the true role and place of the Uighurs in the contemporary life of Kyrgyzstan and its foreign policy. The Uighurs’ struggle for independence in the 20th century ended twice in the declaration of independent republics that lasted for a very short time. These were the Islamic Republic of East Turkestan (1933-1934) and the East Turkestan Republic (1944-1949). After the PRC was formed, the Xinjiang Uighur Autonomous Region (XUAR) was established with its center in Urumqi, where the Uighurs comprise almost 50% of the population (more than 7 million people). However, the Uighurs, who were essentially one step away from gaining their independence, did not give up the hope of restoring historical justice. At present there are around 50 Turkic-speaking peoples in the world, but only six of them (Turks, Azeris, Kazakhs, Kyrgyz, Uzbeks, and Turkmen) have succeeded in establishing their own sovereign states. Most Turkic peoples live compactly in Russia and the PRC. For example, the PRC has its autonomous regions of Uighurs, Kyrgyz, and Kazakhs, the Russian Federation has Tatars, Bashkirs, Altaians, Tuvins, Yakuts, Khakases, Karachays, Balkarians, and Chuvashes, Moldovia has the Gaga-

133 Volume 15 Issue 2 2014 CENTRAL ASIA AND THE CAUCASUS uz, and Uzbekistan has the Karakalpaks. As for the Kumyks, Nogais, Crimean and Siberian Tatars, Dolgans, Turkoman, and others, they do not have their own state-territorial formations.

General Description of the Diaspora

At present, there are Uighur communities in such countries of the world as the U.S., Canada, Germany, Belgium, Japan, Australia, Turkey, Saudi Arabia, Pakistan, the UAE, and others. There are also Uighur enclaves in Munich, Mecca, Beijing, Shanghai, Sydney, Almaty, and Dushanbe. Today the size of the Uighur diaspora living in Kyrgyzstan amounts to 60,000 people (an even larger diaspora of these people lives in Kazakhstan). Analysts believe that soon the Uighurs could become the third largest ethnicity of Kyrgyzstan, which is due to the mass exodus of Russians from the country. The Uighurs of Kyrgyzstan usually settle in groups (mallia), forming urban and rural communities (or quarters) with a very high level of mutual assistance. The Uighurs live, work, rest, celebrate holidays, and attend funerals together. They live compactly in Karakol and Bishkek (the Tokoldosh district), as well as in the villages of Lebedinovka, Novo-Pokrovka (the Chu Region), and a few others (situated primarily in the Jalal-Abad and Osh regions). Of late, the Xinjiang Uighurs have begun settling in the Batken Region of Kyrgyzstan. After becoming full-fledged citizens of the republic, they officially have every opportunity to preserve and develop their own language, culture, national traditions, and customs. However, things are not so straightforward in reality.

Economic Activity

The Uighurs of Kyrgyzstan living in rural areas are engaged in farming, handicrafts, and commerce. In the cities, they are primarily engaged in commerce and the restaurant business. Uighur cafés are extremely popular among the population of Kyrgyzstan; they offer dishes that are part and parcel of contemporary Oriental cuisine. The numerous markets called “Chinese” in Kyrgyzstan are mainly filled with Uighur merchants. Thanks to mutual assistance and their own enterprising nature, which is one of the distinguishing traits of their national character, many Uighurs are able to quickly rise from being ordinary merchants to the owners of markets, cafés, or restaurants. So there is no reason to doubt that the Uighurs are becoming integrated into the Kyrgyz economy. However, in a country with prevailing Soviet values, the wealth of the Uighurs gives rise to common nationalism. It should be noted that Kyrgyzstan has a large goods turnover with the PRC (approximately $5 billion a year, which is approximately double the goods turnover with Russia), and earns significant dividends by re-exporting Chinese goods to other Central Asian countries. Due to the fact that the goods flow from China to Kyrgyzstan passes through XUAR, a large number of ethnic Uighurs are involved in this business. So the situation in XUAR cannot help but have an influence on the state of regional policy, security, and commerce.

Political Life

Uighurs participate less than other national diasporas in the domestic political life of Kyrgyz- stan and are poorly represented in the legislative power structures, for which there are several reasons. 134 CENTRAL ASIA AND THE CAUCASUS Volume 15 Issue 2 2014

 First, the local Uighurs have a traditionally low educational level. The thing is that in So- viet times, Uighur students were very rare, which accounts for the low motivation to work in government structures.  Second, in keeping with national legislation, which came into force after the country acquired its independence, the Jogorku Kenesh (JK) began determining the polling stations. This led to the territories densely populated by Uighurs being redrawn in favor of other nationalities. The majority election system did not allow the Uighurs to procure seats for their representatives in the country’s parliament; they could only be elected to the local representative power structures—aul, district, city, and regional keneshes.1  Third, the Kyrgyz law-enforcement structures began treating the representatives of the Uighur diaspora with suspicion after international terrorism began gaining momentum, believing that they might be supporting their brothers-in-arms in Xinjiang. The influence of official Chinese sources on Kyrgyzstan and other states of the region is largely to blame for the Uighurs being treated as separatists. Worried about being under the scrutiny of the law-enforcement structures, the Uighurs had to be extremely cautious regarding their political expression. As we know, as early as the years of mass Stalinist repressions, many Uighurs were labeled “enemies of the people” and “Chinese spies.” So essentially there are no Uighurs among the members of opposition parties and movements. Well-known Uighur businessmen and public figures Parkhat Tulendybaev, Tursuntai Salimov, and others are recognized for their loyalty to the official authorities. Parkhat Tulendybaev was an active member of the moderate party “Menin olkom” (My Coun- try) and subsequently became deputy of the fourth convocation of the national parliament from the ruling Ak Zhol party (he was the first Uighur deputy since independence). Tursuntai Salimov is a deputy of the current fifth convocation of the JK from the ruling SDPK party, the leader of which is the current head of state. The facts presented above show that the Uighurs intend to continue taking active part in the political life of Kyrgyzstan and advance their interests. Kyrgyzstan’s transfer to a system of party democracy and the introduction of quotas for seats for national minority representatives (15%) could give this a significant boost. At present, the most well-known personality among the Uighurs of Kyrgyzstan is Correspond- ing Member of the National Academy of Sciences, D.Sc. (Philos.), Professor Aziz Narynbaev. How- ever, his career growth ended with the collapse of the Soviet Union. Since then there have been very few scientists, physicians, or representatives of creative professions among the Uighurs of Kyrgyz- stan, although this in no way detracts from their significant contribution to world science and culture. There are almost no Uighur Kyrgyzstan citizens in the executive power system who confess the same religion and speak the same language as the population of Kyrgyzstan. At best, they occupy low posts at the district level. Only recently, one of them was appointed to the post of deputy director of the State Registration Service under the Kyrgyzstan Government. There are two main reasons for the absence of Uighurs in the executive power structures: ethnic discrimination and lack of competitiveness due to their low level of education. Analysts believe that it is their ethnic origin that prevents Uighurs from gaining access to government structures. Were this not true, the economically powerful Uighur diaspora could have long bought posts in the corrupted Kyrgyz state department (as other diasporas have been doing).

1 There have been no regional or district keneshes in the Kyrgyz Republic for several years now.

135 Volume 15 Issue 2 2014 CENTRAL ASIA AND THE CAUCASUS

Analysts also believe that different forms of propaganda (including the media) are implanting the myth about Uighur terrorism and extremism public consciousness. Mistrust and suspicion of the Uighurs is preventing them from being hired and promoted to state posts. “You never know what the authorities will accuse you of,” said the delegates at a congress of the Uighur diaspora.

Culture

A high percentage of Uighurs have a command of their own and the Kyrgyz languages. Until recently, they were unable to obtain even primary education in their own language. Today, there is a specialized grammar school, No. 2, which teaches in Uighur, in the village of Lebedinovka. What is more, young Uighurs today usually speak Russian very well. The contemporary Uighur elite is making an effort to ensure that young people today study and obtain a good education in the prestigious universities of Europe, the U.S., and PRC. Drawing Ui- ghurs into the education process is accompanied by an increase in national self-awareness, which presumes, among other things, feeling oneself to be an integral part of a unified political, historical, and ethnocultural community. It should be noted that in the context of the ongoing political and economic crisis in Kyrgyzstan, it is very difficult to find a job in one’s field of specialization. So most Uighur graduates are unable to realize themselves in intellectual and political spheres, and go into business instead. Marriages between Kyrgyz and Uighurs are still very rare, which is explained by the cultural differences between these ancient peoples (the Kyrgyz are nomads and the Uighurs are farmers). This essentially deprives the Uighurs of the opportunity to participate in government by taking advantage of kinship ties with Kyrgyz. When analyzing the above, it can be concluded that the role of the Uighur diaspora in the life of Kyrgyzstan is gradually beginning to change for the better. Its traditional alienation from the outside world is having an increasingly negative effect on this process. The Uighur diaspora in Kyrgyzstan is closely related to its Kazakh and Xinjiang compatriots. Gatherings in commemoration of outstanding Uighur cultural and art figures are regularly held at the republican level. In particular, recent years have seen celebrations of the anniversaries of 14th century thinker Lutfuliy, poet Zh. Kasymov, and composer N. Tursun, etc.

On Uighur “Separatism”

Uighurs migrated en masse to Soviet Central Asia in the mid-1950s. As already mentioned above, this was promoted by the elimination of the East Turkestan Republic and the Chinazation of Xinjiang. When the Turkic peoples of Central Asia gained their independence, the Uighurs hoped that East Turkestan would soon be liberated. However, when the Soviet Union collapsed, the PRC hurried to establish diplomatic relations with all the CA republics, since the sovereignization of nations close to the Uighurs might cause a new wave of separatism among them. The Turkic peoples of CA did not buy into the ideas of pan-Turkism to the detriment of their own national interests, while the local Uighurs became a “convenient” factor in relations with China. For example, the Uighur diaspora holds the Chinese secret services responsible for the murder of its former charismatic leader Nigmat Bazakov. The Kyrgyz authorities, on the other hand, think that the Uighur separatists from Xinjiang, whom he refused to finance, are to blame for this tragedy. 136 CENTRAL ASIA AND THE CAUCASUS Volume 15 Issue 2 2014

There is another, non-political, and more realistic version, according to which Nigmat Baza- kov’s murder was the result of internal contradictions in the Uighur diaspora. The post of chairman made him an influential business rival for its other members. It turns out that it was to the advantage of both the Uighurs and the Kyrgyz authorities to make a foreign policy issue out of this murder (just like other similar events). Sources in the Kyrgyz Foreign Ministry think that the so-called Uighur question has become the main trump card in relations with the PRC. Taking advantage of the opportunities offered by democracy, the Uighurs at one time tried to register the East Turkestan Liberation Party. The Kyrgyz Ministry of Justice refused to legalize it, believing that its aim was “separation of the territory of an adjacent state.” The matter ended in the establishment of the Ittipak (Unity) Uighur Enlightenment Center, which belongs to the Assembly of the Peoples of Kyrgyzstan. There are also several autonomous Uighur organizations in Kyrgyzstan that are not related to each other. The Association of Uighurs of Kyrgyzstan, the Bishkek Human Rights Democracy Orga- nization, and the Erpan Uighur Information Center are claiming the right to represent the interests of the diaspora. The reason for such fragmentation lies in the conflict of interests between Uighur businessmen and the intelligentsia. As experts believe, the businessmen do not want to risk their business for the sake of politics, while the representatives of the intelligentsia are accusing them of insufficient patriotism in the fight for the liberation of Uighurstan. This has resulted in a situation where even the official leaders of Ittipak have no influence on their diaspora. The World Uighur Congress is the organization that unites all Uighur communities and associations. At the beginning of the 1990s, the Uighurs made several attempts to hold meetings and pickets in front of the Chinese embassy in Bishkek, but soon these forms of protest were banned by the Kyr- gyz authorities. They did not want to spoil relations with their great neighbor, with whom very close and advantageous trade and economic ties had developed during the years of independence.2 During the “bazaar economy” years in Kyrgyzstan, a powerful pro-Chinese lobby formed that is now in favor of stepping up integration relations with the PRC. After 9/11, the Uighurs lost their support from the Western democracies3; before that, the PRC leadership, which carried out repression of activists of the separatist movement in XUAR, was severely rebuffed by them. The West, Russia, and China pulled closer together regarding the activity of radical Islamic groups in the Central Asian region. In 2002, the U.S. administration included the East Turkestan Is- lamic Movement (ETIM) on the list of terrorist organizations, which was held responsible for several terrorist acts in Western China. The Islamic organizations operating in XUAR were suspected of having relations with the Taliban movement and the al-Qa‘eda international terrorist network. At the same time, the intense contacts between the American embassy in Bishkek and representatives of the Uighur diaspora perceptibly cooled off. In 1998, several terrorist acts and scandalous murders supposedly organized by “Uighur separatists” were carried out in Kyrgyzstan, although many of them could have been the result of com- monplace criminal blowups. After the explosion in a shuttle bus in Osh that took human lives, four citizens of China, Turkey, and Russia of Uighur origin were detained. They were accused of organizing and carrying out the

2 The defense and security structures of Kyrgyzstan have banned the Uighur diaspora from holding protest demonstrations, available in Russian at [www.rssclub.ru/3309/43.html]. 3 See: V. Grebenshchikov, “Uigury v Kyrgyzstan,” available at [http://zonakz.net/articles/13629].

137 Volume 15 Issue 2 2014 CENTRAL ASIA AND THE CAUCASUS terrorist act and sentenced to death. The Kyrgyz media presented them as members of the East Turke- stan organization. The investigation insisted that the accused were members of an international terrorist organization that operated from Chechnia to Xinjiang. The aim of the terrorist act was an attempt to provoke a Kyrgyz-Uzbek clash and create a zone of instability in the border areas with China. The lawyers of the condemned thought that all the accusations against their defendants could not be proven and were based on pure speculation. Since then, the Kyrgyz authorities have been attacking so-called Uighur extremism, representatives of which are supposedly active in the country. In the spring of 2003, 19 Chinese citizens travelling in a bus from Bishkek to XUAR were killed in the Naryn Region of Kyrgyzstan. The newspaper Vechernii Bishkek saw signs of a certain “Uighur organization” in this event. The diaspora leaders (who do not deny that some of the crimes could indeed have been committed by Uighur militants) are particularly concerned about the fact that very often no distinction is made between the few extremists and the main mass of the law-abiding Uighur population in Kyrgyzstan. The Chinese embassy in Bishkek tries to avoid contact with its citizens, including former, regarding all these happenings. Chinese diplomats usually say that the Chinese embassy has no ties with the Uighur diaspora of Kyrgyzstan. The Uighur diaspora also agrees with this statement. Two small Uighur monthly newspapers, Ittipak and Vizhdan Avazi (they have a circulation of 1,000 and 500 copies, respectively), are the mouthpieces of the legal protest against the Chinese. The activity of these newspapers is devoted to maintaining the national spirit of the Uighurs and providing information about what is going on in their historical homeland. With reference to the Uighur information agency in the U.S., they print articles about the Chinese genocide in Xinjiang and the death sentences of Uighurs accused of separatism and terrorism. At first the Chinese embassy tried to protest against such publications, but it soon understood that the newspapers’ circulation was so small that it would be very ineffective in spreading information very far. The restricted information field leaves the Uighurs to deal with their problems by themselves. The situation is also aggravated by the severe pressure from the Russian media, which liken them to the Chechens. According to Russian information policy, both the Uighurs and the Chechens are separatists aiming to destroy Chinese and Russian statehood. After Chinese citizens (Uighurs fighting on the side of the militants) were imprisoned in Chech- nia, Kyrgyzstan began making active use of the so-called Uighur factor, not only in its relations with China, but also with Russia. The country’s government often inflates the importance of the Uighur question and turns it into foreign policy issue, which makes it possible for it to acquire financial assistance from both Russia and China. The integration of the PRC, Russia, and the Central Asian countries into the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), one of the primary goals of which is fighting ethno-separatism, does not leave the Uighurs any chance of rapid liberation of their historical homeland. The Uighurs living in Kyrgyzstan are concerned about the unfair attacks from the authorities justified by the struggle against Islamic extremism. They are right in thinking that they have become hostages of a political game being played by the government in the hope of pleasing dynamically growing China. As some analysts, politicians, and law-enforcement structures believe, Kyrgyzstan is being played along by the Chinese special services, which benefit from accusing the Uighurs of terrorism and religious extremism. In their opinion, persecutions of the Uighurs gained momentum after Kyr- gyzstan joined the SCO, a leading role in which is played by China. The Uighurs first felt the pressure from the Kyrgyz authorities in the mid-1990s when they were accused of Wahhabism. The thing is that Uighurs are much more religious than the Kyrgyz; they 138 CENTRAL ASIA AND THE CAUCASUS Volume 15 Issue 2 2014 perceive Islam as part of their national tradition and the guarantor of ethnic self-preservation. How- ever, the Kyrgyz special services see their following the regulations of traditional Islam as “religious extremism.” Over time, the accusations of Wahhabism gave way to attempts to find ties between the Uighurs and the Hizb ut-Tahrir party, leaflets of which were found not only in the south (where Uzbeks live), but also in the north of the republic (in places of compact Uighur residence). In 1999-2000, the south of Kyrgyzstan twice fell victim to attacks by international terrorists. So in order to support the antiterrorist coalition in Afghanistan, the republic’s government deployed the Gansa military base at the Manas airport. As a result of the successful military operation against the Taliban and al-Qa‘eda, the threat of a new terrorist invasion was eliminated. However, after their defeat in Afghanistan, international extremist and terrorist organizations stepped up their activity in the Central Asian region (including in Kyrgyzstan). In this respect, in April 2003, the Prosecutor General’s Office of Kyrgyzstan instigated court proceedings to recognize Hizb ut-Tahrir as extremist and the Turkestan Liberation Organization, East Turkestan Islamic Party, and Islamic Party of Turkestan as terrorist organizations. In November of the same year, according to the decision of the republic’s Supreme Court, their activity was banned in Kyrgyzstan. This step was taken as an effort by the international community to combat terrorism. As we know, in 2002, on the initiative of several countries, including the U.S., the U.N. Secu- rity Council included the ETIM on the list of terrorist organizations. According to the U.S., the members of this organization, which maintains close contacts with al-Qa‘eda, took part in combat action against the international forces on the side of the Taliban, and also carried out several hundred terrorist acts in China and the Central Asian region. Proceeding from its national security interests, Kyrgyzstan is developing and intensifying mutually advantageous bilateral cooperation with the PRC with the help of the law-enforcement, border, and defense departments. It should be noted that in 1999 China rendered Kyrgyzstan timely support in rebuffing the attack of international terrorists. In addition, Kyrgyzstan receives assistance every year from the PRC in training personnel and fortifying the material and technical base of the Ministry of Defense and Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The legal basis for cooperation between the two countries in the law-enforcement sphere is also developing. Along with the Treaties on Extradition and Rendering Legal Assistance in Civil and Criminal Cases, in 2002, Kyrgyzstan and the PRC entered an Agreement on Cooperation in Fighting Terrorism, Separatism, and Extremism. The sides also signed a Treaty on Good-Neighborly Rela- tions, Friendship, and Cooperation, which is based on principles of mutual respect of each other’s sovereignty and territorial integrity.4

XUAR-Kyrgyzstan: New Trends

There are close commercial and cultural relations between Kyrgyzstan and XUAR. Small businessmen (so-called shuttle merchants) constantly cross the border in both directions. After the two state coups in 2005 and 2010, which plunged Kyrgyzstan into a long period of chronic political instability, there has been a trend toward Kyrgyz Uighurs returning to Xinjiang (the PRC) to take up permanent residence. There is also information that the Uighurs, increasingly re-

4 See: Statement by the Kyrgyz Foreign Ministry on the status of the Uighurs in Kyrgyzstan, relations with China, and terrorism, available in Russian at [http://www.centrasia.ru/newsA.php?st=1076101440].

139 Volume 15 Issue 2 2014 CENTRAL ASIA AND THE CAUCASUS pressed by China, have found a new tool for their self-preservation; striving to escape assimilation, they have been gradually moving to CA. The Xinjiang Uighurs come to the border regions of Kyrgyzstan under the guise of merchants where they often succeed in gaining the support of big businessmen and high-ranking officials, as well as acquiring Kyrgyz citizenship. The Bayman Batyr market opened recently in the village of Khal- mien in the Kadamjai district of the Batken Region and is slowly becoming a new center of the Uighur diaspora.5 In so doing, it should be acknowledged that the level of separatist moods among the Uighurs of XUAR could have some influence on the sociopolitical situation in Kyrgyzstan. After the well-known events in Urumqi in May 2009, during which 196 Khans and Uighurs were killed, the Chinese authorities made several significant changes to their domestic national policy.6 For instance, all the national schools switched to teaching in Chinese and the law-enforcement structures stepped up their work with the ethnic minorities. Plans to modernize the main cities in the XUAR with a predominantly Uighur population, Urumqi, Kashgar, Khotan, Artush, and others, were also drawn up and adopted. According to some sources, modernization will be carried out using funds raised from East coast twin cities. This will entail resettlement of up to 20 million residents from the interior regions before 2018, which will undoubtedly cause drastic changes in the national composition of XUAR. According to the XUAR Housing and Urban and Rural Building Administration, from 2011 to January 2014, 74.25 billion yuan were spent on building housing in rural area and 3.6 million peasants moved into new houses. A total of 24 billion yuan has been allotted for resettling 300,000 families (around 1.5 million people) before the end of 2014. This will put an end to the mono-national districts where Uighurs are concentrated—makhallas. They have been home to many generations of Uighurs, who are largely the custodians of public opinion-forming national traditions. People are being moved to new Western-style cottages situated in districts created for mixed ethnic groups. The Chinese authorities most likely believe that this will help to subdue separatist moods. However, these widespread undertakings have not yet led to the elimination of the separatist terrorist underground in Xinjiang. According to the official site of the newspaper Renmin Ribao, on 15 December, 2013 another terrorist act was carried out (in the Kashgar district). On 14 February, 2014, 12 terrorists armed with explosives and hatchets attacked a police pre- cinct in the district of Uchturfan of the Aksu region of XUAR; there is no information about the number of victims as a result of this attack. On 1 March, 2014, 10 Uighur terrorists stormed the station in Kunming in the southwest prov- ince of Yunnan and attacked passengers; 33 people were killed and 130 were injured. Terrorist groups consist of 10-12 members; they are often armed with only knives and hatchets. However the acts they carry out often generate the same number of victims as the terrorist acts in some other countries in which explosives or firearms are used.

Conclusion

An analysis of the most recent events affords us a new look at the incident relating to the pen- etration of a group of eleven Chinese citizens into Kyrgyzstan (in the area bordering on the mountain- ous borough of Ak-Shyirak) on 23 January, 2014. It was later revealed that they were Xinjiang Ui-

5 See: “Kamchibek Tashiev—a Kashgar Uighur? The Influence of Emigrants from China is Rising in Kyrgyzstan,” available in Russian at [http://www.paruskg.info/2012/05/14/62729]. 6 See: Renmin ribao, available at [Russian.people.com.cn].

140 CENTRAL ASIA AND THE CAUCASUS Volume 15 Issue 2 2014 ghurs. An employee of the hunting club who tried to detain the violators killed two of them and was killed himself. Using his rifle, the violators put up active resistance against the border guards who arrived; after a short fight, they were all killed. The members of the group who entered Kyrgyz territory were around the age of 25 to 30; their only weapons were knives. We can only guess the purpose of their attempt to cross an inaccessible section of the state border in winter. Perhaps they were preparing to commit a terrorist act in Kyrgyz- stan, or reach people who would provide them with documents and money and then move on to the al-Qa‘eda bases in Afghanistan or Pakistan. Whereby the second version is not that far-fetched; it is enough to recall the large number of financially wealthy Uighur merchants at Madina, the largest fabric market in CA situated in Bishkek. It can be presumed that the more severe the persecution of separatists by the Chinese special services, the more frequently they will be squeezed into Kyrgyzstan. Due to the significant length of the Kyrgyz-Chinese state border, its insufficient technical infrastructure, and small number of border troops, it could be fraught with a deterioration in the sociopolitical situation in Kyrgyzstan and an increase in the terrorist threat from the radical Islamic underground. On the other hand, the dispute with the West could result in Kyrgyzstan’s dangerous and long- term dependence on China. So Kyrgyzstan’s current policy regarding the Uighurs, who are traditionally closed to the outside world, and their expulsion from China into the CE countries will provoke instability in which not only Islamic terrorists might be interested, but also other forces striving for disintegration of the region as a whole and the PRC in particular.

141 Volume 15 Issue 2 2014 CENTRAL ASIA AND THE CAUCASUS

NATION-BUILDING

PUBLIC OPINION, DEMOCRACY, AND AUTHORITARIANISM IN CENTRAL ASIA

Saodat OLIMOVA Ph.D. (Philos.), Director of the SHARQ Research Center, Representative of Central Asia and the Caucasus in Tajikistan (Dushanbe, Tajikistan)

Muzaffar OLIMOV D.Sc. (Hist.), Coworker at the SHARQ Research Center (Dushanbe, Tajikistan)

ABSTRACT

ased on Tajikistan’s experience, this governance and how effectively value judg- article examines the evolution of views, ments are being implemented. B values, and preferences of the popu- The paper shows that despite the differ- lation of the Central Asian (CA) countries ences in the traditional social institutions of that support the sustainability of their politi- the CA states, as well as in the development cal regimes. Based on public opinion poll paths they have chosen, they are all evolving results, this article presents the population’s according to the neopatrimonialism model. preferences regarding the political system, However, the evolution of political views in sheds light on its attitude toward state power the CA societies shows that democratic val- and its institutions, and gives assessments ues and preferences continue to occupy an of the current regime and efficiency of differ- important place in the mass consciousness. ent forms of citizen engagement. It also From this it follows that the government’s ne- looks at the ways citizens participate in state cessitated support of certain elements of de- 142 CENTRAL ASIA AND THE CAUCASUS Volume 15 Issue 2 2014 mocracy is generated not only by its desire to ry and fragmented. They form the base for create a façade or its willingness to make mass support of democracy, on the one concessions to foreign donors and the inter- hand, and for social consensus regarding re- national community, but also by social pres- strictions of citizen rights and recognition of sure. At the same time, the population’s po- the privileges of heads of state, including pat- litical views and preferences are contradicto- rimonial supremacy, on the other.

KEYWORDS: Central Asia, Tajikistan, public opinion, elites, political regimes, political preferences, democracy, neopatrimonialism, elections, values, forms of citizen engagement.

Introduction

The collapse of the Soviet Union gave the West reason to hope for rapid democratization of the independent states that formed on its ruins and rejected the communist ideology. However, democratization has failed to take hold during the two decades of the post-Soviet transit in the CA countries, as well as in many other former republics of the U.S.S.R. Authoritarianism based on the concentration of political, economic, and military power in the hands of the ruling elites has become the norm. All the same, the regimes that have been established in the CA countries have proven quite stable. This stability was achieved not so much from applying forceful measures as by reaching a certain consensus between society and the state. What has been the basis of this consensus? What popular views, values, and orientations have made it possible for the present-day CA states to survive? To answer these questions, let us first present a brief review of the transit in the CA countries and, second, describe the political views and preferences of their population. Although the CA countries have basically developed along the same lines, they are nevertheless quite different now, so this public opinion analysis is based on the experience of one of them. The authors use the empirical data of public opinion polls carried out in Tajikistan by the Sharq Research Center between 1996 and 2013 to write this article.

The Formation of Autocracies as a Research Target

Once they became free of the totalitarian yoke, the Western world expected the post-Soviet nations to build European-style democratic states. There were several reasons for this presumption. The post-Soviet countries (including those in Central Asia) that rejected the planned economy began carrying out democratic and market reforms, establishing new political institutions (the presidency, parliamentarianism, independent courts, plurality, and so on), and engaging in privatization. They also signed the Helsinki Agreements and joined the OSCE and made building democratic, law-based, and social states, conducting market reforms, and engaging in national consolidation their main priorities. The fact that the statehood of the CA countries sprung from the Soviet Union is making national consolidation just as difficult as democratization and transition to the market. 143 Volume 15 Issue 2 2014 CENTRAL ASIA AND THE CAUCASUS

Before Russian expansion, three feudal monarchies existed in Central Asia: the Kokand Khan- ate, the Khiva Khanate, and the Bukhara Emirate. Turkic dynasties relied on the Tajik bureaucracy to rule these Islamic states with their multiethnic populations. In 1924, Russia carried out so-called national delimitation in CA, which was called upon to ultimately destroy local forms of statehood, break the traditional social structures, and create prerequisites for forming new “socialist nations.” Soviet modernization led to sweeping social transformations and the creation of new statehood, which resulted in new identities (during the pre-Soviet period, ethnic and civic identities were very underdeveloped and perceptibly deferred to regional, sociocultural, and confessional identities). However, despite all the efforts of Soviet power, the national identity did not dominate (at least in Tajikistan and Uzbekistan), although a certain amount of success was nevertheless achieved in this direction. For example, ethnic territories that did not exist before began to slowly form.1 National consolidation became a very important problem during national state-building; therefore, both local and foreign researchers exerted great effort to study a broad range of issues relating to their resolution.2 This problem still needs to be urgently resolved today, which is graphically shown by the deadlock experienced by Central Asian integration, ethnic conflicts, state ethnic ideology, and the transformation of the national identity in every CA state reflected in the censuses. Studies of the post-Soviet transit appeared along with the large number of publications by Western academics about identity in Central Asia, as well as works by their Central Asian colleagues trying to revise history and create ideological bases for national consolidation in the first decade of independence.3 Transitology4 has been most frequently used for analyzing the post-So- viet transit. Following the idea of rational choice, transitology experts concentrated their attention on agents, politicians (primarily the representatives of political elites), and their priorities, as well as on the development of civil society. But they did not take into account the roles of various factors (structural, economic, and international) and believed that programs for exporting democracy could be created for transit countries.5 Institutional reform projects and privatization programs were drawn up for this based on the experience of previous transits. In the 2000s, the West was disappointed in the post-Soviet transit, it also being unexpectedly discovered that the authoritative regimes taking shape were not alike. When searching for the reasons of such mysterious diversity in the authoritarian models, Western researchers turned to ancient times to unlock the secret of the sociocultural development of post-Soviet societies. They were particularly

1 It is difficult to agree with M. Laruelle’s statement that by the time the Soviet Union disintegrated the national identity of each of the republics was already clearly established and recognized by its population (see: M. Laruelle, “Vneshniaia politika i identichnost v Tsentralnoi Azii,” Pro et Contra, Nos. 1-2, January-April 2013, p. 14). Ethnic territories did not begin to form in Central Asia until the beginning of the 1980s. Their lack of formation in the Ferghana Valley continues to feed ethnonational and border conflicts. 2 See: M. Atkin, “Tajik National Identity,” Iranian Studies, Vol. 26, No. 1, 1993; I. Bashiri, “Tajik Ethnicity in His- torical Perspective,” 1998, available at [http://www.angelfire.com/rnb/bashiri/Ethnicity/Ethnic.html]; S.C. Levi, “Turks and Tajiks in Central Asian History,” in: Everyday Life in Central Asia: Past and Present, ed. by J. Sahadeo, R. Zanca. Indiana University Press, Bloomington, 2007; S. Abashin, Natsionalizmy v Srednei Azii: v poiskakh identichnosti, Aleteiyia, St. Pe- tersburg, 2007. 3 This article is limited to a brief review of Western studies, since a comparison of the transit conceptions of Western researchers and academics from the CA countries requires a separate study. 4 See: J.J. Linz, A.C. Stepan, Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation: Southern Europe, South America, and Post-Communist Europe, Johns Hopkins University Press, Washington D.C., 1996; G. O’Donnell, P. Schmitter, L. White- head, Transitions from Authoritarian Rule: Tentative Conclusions about Uncertain Democracies, Johns Hopkins University Press, Washington D.C., 1986. 5 See: G. Nodia, “The Democratic Path,” Journal of Democracy, Vol. 13/3, 2002.

144 CENTRAL ASIA AND THE CAUCASUS Volume 15 Issue 2 2014 interested in zhuzes, clans,6 traditional social institutions, classes, traditional leadership, and so on. It should be acknowledged that researchers as a rule overestimate the meaning of traditional social structures in the development of the CA countries. The slow rate of transition to democracy, which was accompanied by such “surprises” as the establishment of “personal dictatorship,” “patronal presidentialism,” “Sultanism,” “neopatrimonialism” etc., has forced researchers and analysts to concentrate on studying the factors that hinder democratization and the carrying out of market reforms. The project to study the political transit and formation of autocratic regimes in CA pursued in 2010-2011 by a group of experts from Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Russia, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, and Germany,7 as well as the works by M. Laruelle on the hybrid nature of neopatrimonial regimes in the Central Asian countries8 are worth particular mention. At the same time as the discussions on the hybrid nature of transit regimes, works appeared that examined the place and significance of geopolitical reality during the transit processes. When analyzing how democratization is unfolding in Central Asia, Martha Olcott comes to the conclusion in her rather comprehensive book called Central Asia’s Second Chance that the failure of democratization is not only a result of the action of the ruling elites, but also of the inaction on the part of U.S. foreign policy.9 Since that time an increasing number of researchers have begun examining the development of the CA countries in the context of the so-called New Great Game. They began turning to different approaches in order to advance democracy abroad, as well as to the methods and instruments of external actors (including international organizations). They analyzed the pluses and minuses of the democratization methods, beginning with compulsory and ending with enlightening and convincing. Works have appeared in recent years that examine the processes leading to autocracy. They include a study written by E. Freedman and R. Shafer10 that relates the establishment of various authoritarian regimes in the CA countries to development of the media. M. Omelicheva’s11 works are also interesting, coming to the general conclusion that the results of U.S. and EU efforts to create democratic governments in the CA countries are doomed to failure.

6 See, for example: K. Collins, Clan Politics and Regime Transition in Central Asia, Cambridge University Press, 2006. The following passage is typical of the Western discussion: “The strong tradition of family or ‘clan’ ties and community structures … became more important during transition. …They also contributed to the non-transparent capture of political and economic power by various clans. Appointments to positions of political and economic responsibility tend to be allocated on the basis of trust and patronage, rather than through competitive selection… Power structures are based on a delicate balancing of the allocation of privileges and power between clan structures to maintain political and social stability and the lack of dissent by rival clans. Apart from contributing to political exclusion, this balancing arguably contributes to the inability of economies to benefit from the efficiencies of market systems. It also encourages a preference for economic growth models that guarantee rents (unearned income) and control over rent allocation to people in privileged positions” (UNDP Regional Bureau for Europe and the CIS, Beyond Transition. Towards Inclusive Societies, Regional Human Development Report, Bratislava, 2011, p. 50, available at [http://europeandcis.undp.org/home/show/BCD10F8F-F203-1EE9-BB28DEE6D70B52E1]). 7 See: Politicheskii protsess v Tsentralnoi Azii: rezultaty, problemy, perspektivy, Institute of Oriental Studies of the Academy of Sciences—Center of Strategic and Political Research, Moscow, 2011; A. Seifert, “Der politische Prozess in Zentralasien und die Systemfrage,” in: OSZE-Yearbook 2011, Vol. 17-2011, Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft, Baden-Baden, 2013, S. 205-206. 8 See: M. Laruelle, “Discussing Neopatrimonialism and Patronal Presidentialism in the Central Asian Context,” De- mokratizatsiya, The Journal of Post-Soviet Democratization, Vol. 20, No. 4, 2012, pp. 301-324; M. Laruelle, “Vneshniaia politika i identichnost v Tsentralnoi Azii.” 9 See: M.B. Olcott, Central Asia’s Second Chance, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Washington, D.C., 2005. 10 See: After the Czars and Commissars: Journalism in Authoritarian Post-Soviet Central Asia, ed. by E. Freedman, R. Shafer, Michigan State University Press, East Lansing, 2011. 11 See: M. Omelicheva, “Democracy and Dictatorship in Central Asia in Political Science,” Published online February 2013, available at [http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/obo/9780199756223-0060], 26 November, 2013.

145 Volume 15 Issue 2 2014 CENTRAL ASIA AND THE CAUCASUS

In the context of our topic, particular attention should go to the role that the interaction among society, state institutions, and elites is playing in the establishment of political regimes in the CA countries. While much research has been done on the transformation of state institutions, the game rules formed by elites for the authoritative regimes and for the political orientations and views of the population (which in fact ensured the development of the latter) are still very unclear.

Elites and Authoritarianism

Researchers admit that so-called clan-bureaucratic capitalism has taken shape in the CA countries, aimed mainly at taking hold of political power as quickly as possible. The groups that came to power used bureaucratic and political power to take control over the key economic resources the government acquired during the collapse of the Soviet Union in the process of privatization of state and collective property. The collaboration between political structures and economic interest groups and military structures not only determined the specifics of the new political elites, but also created a new bourgeoisie within the framework of clan-bureaucratic capitalism.12 During social stratification, small groups of large property-owners and middle class appeared, as well as a large stratum of poor people. This stratification, inequality, and social exclusion in CA formed in conditions of state-building, the appearance of new civic identities, and ethnic transformations. This led to the need to review history and create new mythologies in the spirit of ethno-nationalism. The tempestuous religious revival, particularly of Islam, was a kind of response to what was going on. The above-mentioned processes are developing in the CA countries at different rates; new political and economic systems are being formed at the regional level in many different ways (explosive and evolutionary, destructive and peaceful). In hydrocarbon-rich states, such as Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan, natural rent has provided the elites with the opportunity to benefit from privatization and strengthen their supremacy through unofficial institutions and the strong bureaucracy inherited from the Soviet Union. After consolidating their power, the elites of Kazakhstan chose regulated democracy; first the economy was liberalized and then certain political reforms were carried out. As for Turkmenistan, it is reminiscent of a typical petroleum monarchy. Its development strategy is based both on receiving income from the sale of oil and gas and on deification of the state leader. Despite the fact that the Constitution of Turkmenistan includes a provision on plurality, there is only one party in the country: the government approves the candidates allowed to participate in elections ahead of time. The media are under state control, while courts are used to carry out political repression of dissidents. There is no freedom of confession, association, or movement in the country. Uzbekistan’s experience is very interesting,13 where the local Soviet elite (nomenklatura) was much stronger than in the other Central Asian countries. The former capitals of all the three pre- Russian states are found in Uzbekistan—Bukhara, Kokand, and Khiva. At one time, the old elites partially blended into the party Soviet nomenklatura and ensured its stability. During Soviet times, the Uzbek nomenklatura (cotton and gas) was sufficiently wealthy and influential.14

12 See: A. Seifert, op. cit. 13 See: A. Ilkhamov, “Neopatrimonialism, Patronage and Factionalism in Post-Soviet Uzbekistan,” in: D. Bach, M. Gazi- bo, Neopatrimonialism in Africa and Beyond, Routledge, 2012, p. 189. 14 See: E. Trifonov, “Uzbekistan: portret v sredneaziatskom inter’ere,” available at [http://www.index.org.ru/others/ trifonov.html], 12 December, 2013.

146 CENTRAL ASIA AND THE CAUCASUS Volume 15 Issue 2 2014

After it gained its independence, Uzbekistan chose its own development path, which included creating a secular national state, building a regulated market economy, exercising control over financial, commodity, and human resources, investing the assembly industry, and supervising the activity of religious organizations. What is more, there were plans to exercise strict control over society by joining traditional social institutions (makhallia) with the state. The Uzbek elites, which had no trouble dealing with small groups of oppositionists, consolidated and legitimized their power. Present-day Uzbekistan is an authoritarian state based on a consensus of social and political groups. Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan, which are periphery countries that do not have rich hydrocarbon resources, have chosen different development paths. According to the estimates of Freedom House (2007), Kyrgyzstan is the only “partly free” country in the region, while the others are recognized as “not free” (that is, in these countries the political rights and freedoms of citizens are controlled by the government). Kyrgyzstan’s democratization was largely related to the weakness of the elites and the shortage of resources. In Soviet times, the Kyrgyz nomenklatura was weak and not wealthy, since there was no major industry or high-income agricultural branches in the republic. For this reason, Kyrgyzstan’s Soviet leaders immediately conceded power to the newly born democrats. The country’s new elite, which did not have enough resources to consolidate its power, asked for international assistance. After receiving Western funding, Kyrgyzstan carried out the most extensive democratic reforms in the region. Due to the fact that democracy was planted in the country under the pressure of donors, foreign partners, and advisors, it was and remains unstable, which is clearly shown by the revolutions (2005 and 2010) and ethnic clashes that broke out between the Kyr- gyz and Uzbeks on 10-13 June, 2013 in Osh. In Tajikistan, new state-building began accompanied by armed seizure of power by the regional elites and division of Soviet property, for which there were many reasons. The most important of them was the ideological standoff, one side of which was the Islamic political movement, and the existence of several rival local elites controlled from Moscow. After the civil war, militarized regional elites came to power that recognized Russia as the sovereign. Tajikistan carried out market reforms a little later than its neighbors and an open economy was created. Real plurality existed in the republic and a constructive and non-constructive opposition functioned, some representatives of which published their own newspapers. The traditional institutions restored their influence at the same time; they helped the country to survive and were pivotal in the full-fledged functioning of its economic, social, and political systems. On the other hand, the traditional social institutions promoted, to a certain extent, the formation of a stricter authoritarian neopatrimonial regime (but in no way all aspects of the evolution of the country’s political regime). Tajikistan’s experience shows that a tough regime does not necessarily mean a strong state. The power of the traditional patrimonial institutions, fear of war, the departure of a large number of male heads of households to earn money abroad, and limited access to information (because the population does not have electricity for six months of the year) have given Tajikistan’s ruling elite the opportunity to consolidate the country without high expenditures and intensified democratization. Labor migration had and is continuing to have a strong influence on the country’s social and political life. It is shaking confidence in the responsibility the government, elite, and leaders are taking for their citizens and causing people to doubt the legitimacy of the current authorities. State policy and migration are having a significant influence on each other. This is changing the areas of traditional responsibility and cutting back on the state’s social services. Households are using the remittances of labor migrants to compensate for the lack of government services, but are not putting pressure on the government to raise the efficiency of its activity. This is making it possible to 147 Volume 15 Issue 2 2014 CENTRAL ASIA AND THE CAUCASUS reduce state expenditures on public health, education, and social security, while stabilizing the political situation in the country and so retaining poor governance and clearly weak state institutions. The existing regime concedes a certain level of redistribution and increase in state power, as well as retention of elements of democracy. The instability of democracy in Kyrgyzstan and of its elements in Tajikistan is largely related to the fact that these countries depend to a certain extent on foreign donors who demand policy adjust- ments relating to neoliberal governance and adherence to human rights. Foreign pressure is retaining a certain level of democratization, on the one hand, while it is leading to the privatization of state services, on the other. This is destroying the state service systems, including in education and public health. On the other hand, the independent structures, foreign funds, and NGOs taking over services in education, public health, and social security cannot replace the state. The other side of such decentralization is fragmentation of the social sphere, which is becoming all the less comprehensive, since reforms are being carried out on the basis of different market models.15 The development of a civil society is advancing lobbying, but in no way political competition. This could result in delegitimization of the government and lead to less citizen participation in the activity of the depoliticized state institutions. A stronger civil society goes hand in hand with weaker political parties. This means that the opposition is frequently moving beyond politics into the sphere of civil society or religion.16 A brief review of the development of the CA countries during the transit shows that despite the differences in their traditional social institutions and the different paths they have chosen, things are progressing along the same lines. In so doing, the evolution of the post-Soviet regimes in CA is showing stronger authoritarian trends while preserving formal signs of democracy.17 Why is this happening? There is a variety of objective and subjective reasons for this, which have been analyzed in many works on the post-Soviet transit.18 However, the most important internal problems of the CA countries include difficulties in forming ruling elites and institutional innovations, as well as the in- determinate and contradictory positions of their societies regarding future development.

Difficulties in Forming the Ruling Elites

The Central Asian elites, which come from the party-Soviet nomenklatura, are still at the transformation stage and are having difficulty managing the transit.

15 See: S. Closson, “State Weakness in Perspective: Strong Politico-Economic Networks in Georgia’s Energy Sector,” Europe-Asia Studies, Vol. 61/5, 2009, pp. 759-778; B. Christophe, “From Hybrid Regime to Hybrid Capitalism? The Political Economy of Georgia under Eduard Shevardnadze,” in: Potentials of Disorder, ed. by J. Koehler, C. Zürcher, Manchester University Press, Manchester, 2003. 16 See: I. Ohayon, S. Serrano, “The Post-Soviet Caucasus and Central Asia: Another South?” in: Back to the South? Sovereignty and Development in Central Asia and the Caucasus, Paris, 2014, p. 16. 17 See: M. Ottaway, Democracy Challenged: The Rise of Semi-Authoritarianism, Carnegie Endowment for Interna- tional Peace, Washington D.C., 2003. 18 A. Fisun, Demokratiia, neopatrimonialism i globalnye transformatsii, Konstanta, Kharkov, 2006; M. Laruelle, “Vneshniaia politika i identichnost v Tsentralnoi Azii.”

148 CENTRAL ASIA AND THE CAUCASUS Volume 15 Issue 2 2014

Institutional Difficulties of the Transit

During the transit, old state and social institutions were discredited and abolished. At the same time, social stratification led to fragmentation and politicization of society in the CA states; new rich and poor strata appeared, statuses intermingled, and the social capital accumulated by different groups of the population became depreciated. The unsuccessful attempts to import Western mechanisms for regulating the social processes led to stronger influence of the old social institutions (particularly unofficial ones). Systems gradually formed that united official and unofficial institutions and practices; as a barrier of vertical mobility, they developed strictly defined rules of the game. At present, society in all the CA states depends to one extent or another on paternal structures with their inherent management methods; they are social pyramids headed by strong individuals. In each of the countries, these pyramids consist not of individual players (such as political parties, businessmen, trade unions, and so on), but of several subnational subsystems19 that might be different in character (local, branch, or ethnic) and incorporate both new democratic institutions and organized crime. In turn, subnational subsystems are in difficult and often conflict-prone relations. The entire structure is managed using hierarchal ties based on traditional institutions, loyalty, and material interests. This kind of system of relations legitimizes the current government, but prevents the development of a free market and the creation of independent civil and political institutions in society. Further democratization implies dismantling the transition structures that have developed, which could lead to destabilization of the CA countries. This is where the contradiction among the existing conceptions of their democratization lies. Whereas the action of the Central Asian elites is based on convictions about the need to “approach democracy through stabilization,” Western democrats are coming from the opposite side (they think that stabilization is achieved through democratization). In other words, while the ruling elites of Central Asia are willing to sacrifice democracy for the sake of preserving their power, Western politicians are calling for realizing democratic ideals by sacrificing stability.20

Hybridism and Fragmentation of Views on the Relations between the State and Society

There is a wide range of views on the role of the state. However, an opinion prevails in the CA countries that democratization and reform as a whole are only possible when the state plays a key role in these processes. Broad public consensus on this issue is easing the development of patrimonialism and is making it possible to for the state to put greater pressure on society year after year and interfere in the private lives of its citizens.

Political Views and Preferences of Society

In order to understand the nature of the Central Asian regimes, it would be worth taking a look at the political views and orientations of society over time.

19 See: “Transformatsiia v Tsentralnoi Azii: stolknovenie protivopolozhnykh kontseptsii?” available at [http://www. postsoviet.ru/print.php?pid=88], 19 December, 2013. 20 See: Ibidem.

149 Volume 15 Issue 2 2014 CENTRAL ASIA AND THE CAUCASUS

The public opinion monitoring carried out in Tajikistan between 1996 and 2013 shows that society has largely been liberated from the influence of extremely leftist ideologies (including communist). At the same time, the number of liberals has significantly shrunk21; extreme right-wing ideologies have not become widespread either. On the whole, society’s orientations vary widely within the centrist non- liberal range, whereby interest in politics and the level of participation in it have dropped. In 2013, the respondents interested in politics to one extent or another constituted only 39.3%; 56% said they were not interested in politics. In 1996, 42% of the respondents constantly followed the political situation, 33% followed it now and then, while 22% were not interested at all. As for political views, two major groups can be singled out among the respondents in Tajikistan, as in the other CA countries. One of them supports democracy, which presumes the existence of a parliament and holding free and fair elections. The other believes that the most suitable form of rule is an authoritarian state headed by a strong leader/“sultan,” while the parliament and elections should at best play an instrumental or decorative role. There is also a third group, which is becoming increasingly larger. The matter concerns disillusioned sociopolitical marginals who are indifferent about the political structure of their country and feel they have little influence on the situation. The polls show that during the years of independence, the population of Tajikistan has been unable to overcome the fragmentation and inconsistency of its political views. Moreover, the number of supporters of democracy has perceptibly dropped, although they continue to comprise the largest group. When analyzing the public opinion polls for 1996, S. Wagner noted that support for democracy in Tajikistan has no analogy in CA. He presumed that the popularity of democratic ideas was not related to support of a pro-democratic government, rather it was more of a spontaneous nature that did not depend on the existing government.22 Meanwhile, over the past 17 years, the number of supporters of democratic ideas has perceptibly increased. While in 1996, 79% of the respondents upheld democratic and pro-democratic views,23 in 2010, their number dropped to 63%, and in 2013 to 57.7%. The percentage of convicted anti-democrats remained essentially the same: in both 1996 and 2013, it amounted to 14%. Over the past years, there are fewer “confused” people, i.e. those who are poorly informed and cannot determine their political views. It should be noted that in 1996, this group, mainly consisting of women, was the largest; 33% of the polled belonged to it.24 In 2013, the number of “confused,” the majority of whom were still women, had dropped to a little more than 7%. By 2013, this group was replaced by “disillusioned” sociopolitical marginals who believe that “the form of government does not matter for the likes of them” since their opinion is not important anyway. In the 2013 poll, they amounted to around 25% of the respondents.

Preferred Political System

In order to shed light on what the population of Tajikistan thinks about the preferred political system, we asked a series of questions about the extent to which a parliamentary form of rule, dicta-

21 16% in 1996 (see: S. Wagner, “Public Opinion in Tajikistan,” in: Voices of the Electorate Series, Washington, 1997, p. 4). 22 See: Ibid., p. 10. 23 See: Ibid., p. 6. 24 See: Ibid., p. 3. It should be kept in mind, that some of the pro-democratic respondents were part of this group, who responded most frequently with “I am undecided” to questions about political orientations and preferred political system.

150 CENTRAL ASIA AND THE CAUCASUS Volume 15 Issue 2 2014 torship, theocracy, or military rule would be suitable for Tajikistan. The questions we asked did not call for choosing one of the four systems of government. We were more interested in evaluating the extent to which the people accepted, approved, or rejected a particular political system. The responses confirmed the conclusion that the political consciousness of Tajikistan’s population is fragmented and inconsistent and that the personal factor prevails over the institutional. Many respondents thought that both a parliamentary system and the rule of a strong leader were best suited to Tajikistan. Nevertheless, despite the stronger authoritative trends, the most acceptable political system for the population of Tajikistan is still the parliamentary form of rule with general, honest, and transparent elections. A total of 41.9% of the respondents believe this system is good, 35.7% think it is probably good, and only 16.6% think it is unsuitable or not very suitable for the country. A total of 31.4% of the respondents are supporters of an authoritarian system or dictatorship. They note that the rule of a strong leader without a parliament or elections is a very good form of governance for Tajikistan, while 24.3% think it is probably good. In so doing, almost half of the respondents think that this system is unsuitable or not very suitable for Tajikistan. Quite a lot of people think a group of religious leaders who would take charge of all political and legislative issues would be a good form of rule: 11.8% think this would be very good for Tajiki- stan, while 31.5% think it would probably be good. A form of rule in which the state is run directly by the military is the least popular: 6.1% of the respondents considered it very good, while 21.8% said it would probably be good (see Table 1).

Table 1

Preferred Political Systems, % of cases (2013, N = 2,000)

Very Probably Probably Very Undecided/ No. Total Good Good Bad Bad Refuse to Answer

Rule of a strong leader without 1 31.4 24.3 27.4 14.7 2.2 100.0 parliament or elections

2 Military rule 6.1 21.8 30.8 35.4 5.9 100.0

Rule of a parliament that makes decisions 3 about state policy 41.9 35.7 12.9 3.7 5.8 100.0 and is elected on the basis of regular elections

Rule of a group of religious leaders who are 4 11.8 31.5 34.4 16.8 5.4 100.0 responsible for all political and legislative issues

The respondents’ responses reflected both inclinations toward democratization and their recognition of the possibility to limit citizens’ political and other rights in order to maintain public order. For example, 87.9% agreed with the need for the indicated limitations, a little more than 9% were against, and the other 2.6% had no opinion. 151 Volume 15 Issue 2 2014 CENTRAL ASIA AND THE CAUCASUS What is Democracy Tajik-Style?

The contradiction in the political views and orientations of the Tajik population seen in the responses to the public opinion polls make one wonder what the country’s residents actually believe democracy to be. The polls of 1996, 2004, and 2010 held with the support of the International Foun- dation of Electoral Systems (IFES) show that in these fifteen years ideas about democracy have not changed much, which apparently indicates their stable nature. A total of 61% of the respondents mainly associate democracy with human rights, 55% with the freedom of religion, and 53% with freedom of speech. Only a small number of respondents mentioned its institutional support. No one pointed out citizen obligations or the rights of minorities, only 38% of respondents mentioned freedom of choice, 26% freedom of association, and 13% division of power and the system of checks and balances (see Table 2).

Table 2

What is Democracy? (2010, N = 1,500)

Definition of Democracy % of cases

Human rights 61

Freedom of religion 55

Freedom of speech 53

Freedom of choice 38

Total employment 37

State support of pensioners 32

Honest bureaucrats 29

State support of vulnerable groups of the population 28

Freedom of association 26

Satisfactory and comprehensive observance of the law 24

Equal access to education 17

System of checks and balances in the power system 13

Rating of Value Judgments in the Mass Consciousness and How to Implement Them

In order to better understand the political orientation of the Tajik population, we compared the ideas of the respondents about “how things should be” (value judgments) with how these “shoulds” are being implemented in real life. The most important value judgments on the list were as follows: (1) Economic prosperity (97.8% of the respondents). (2) Freedom of religious convictions (96.6%). 152 CENTRAL ASIA AND THE CAUCASUS Volume 15 Issue 2 2014

(3) Law and independent court: “a judicial system that judges everyone equally” (96%). (4) Prospects for young people: “opportunity for young people to find work” (91.4%). Freedom of speech, fair elections, and civilian control over the military proved to be in the background (see Table 3).

Table 3

Rating of Sociopolitical Value Judgments, % of cases (2013, N = 2,000)

How Important Probably Not Undecided/ Very Probably No. Is It for You to Live not Important Refuse Total Important Important in a Country Where: Important at All to Answer

Economic prosperity 1 71.3 26.5 1.9 0.2 0.1 100.0 has been reached

Religious convictions 2 can be freely 68.9 27.7 3.0 0.1 0.2 100.0 confessed

Young people have 3 good opportunities 74.1 24.0 1.4 0.5 0 100.0 for finding a job

The judicial system 4 judges everyone 71.0 25.0 3.1 0.7 0.2 100.0 equally

People can openly express their 5 54.5 36.9 8.1 0.4 0.1 100.0 thoughts and discuss state affairs

There are no 6 restrictions on the 56.0 36.2 6.7 0.3 0.7 100.0 media

Fair elections in which at least two 7 political parties 50.0 40.5 8.3 0.6 0.6 100.0 participate are regularly held

The military is 8 controlled by civilian 39.1 46.2 9.0 2.2 0.2 100.0 leaders

Assessment of how efficiently these values are being put into practice in present-day Tajikistan shows that only the level of religious freedom most satisfies public hopes (93.8% of the respondents assessed the situation with freedom of religion as good and very good). A perceptibly smaller number of respondents assessed the situation with elections and freedom of speech as good (50.3% and 49.6%, respectively). The highest dissatisfaction was expressed in relation to the state of the judicial system (only 27.4% considered it good) and the economy (33.9%). The respondents were not satisfied at all with the prospects for young people; only 11.8% of those polled think that they have a good chance of finding a job in Tajikistan (see Table 4).

153 Volume 15 Issue 2 2014 CENTRAL ASIA AND THE CAUCASUS

Table 4

Assessment of the Implementation of Value Judgments in Present-Day Tajikistan, % of cases (2013, N = 2,000)

Undecided/ Very Probably Not very Very No. Value Judgments Refuse Total Good Good Good Bad to Answer

People can openly express their 1 10.2 39.4 42.2 6.1 1.7 100.0 views and discuss state affairs

Fair elections in which at least two political 2 9.7 40.6 34.7 10.5 4.3 100.0 parties participate are regularly held

The judicial 3 system judges 6.1 21.3 48.3 21.8 2.5 100.0 everyone equally

The military 4 is controlled 14.6 48.1 25 7.1 5 100.0 by civilian leaders

There are no 5 restrictions on 9.6 40 39.5 9.6 1 100.0 the media

Religious 6 convictions can be 54.5 39.3 4.9 1.1 0.2 100.0 freely confessed

Economic 7 prosperity has 12.7 21.2 45.4 19.8 0.9 100.0 been reached

Young people have 8 good opportunities 4.1 7.9 46.3 41.5 0.2 100.0 for finding a job

Tables 3 and 4 show a lack of correspondence between the perception of values, including democratic, and their implementation in real political and social practice. On the one hand, democratic values are still quite popular, while on the other, in the context of lack of prospects for young people, unfair courts, and the difficult economic position of the population, their “nominal” implementation does not seem like such a bad thing. Nevertheless, the Tajik population positively assesses the political situation in the country and is looking optimistically to the future. For example, 73.1% of the respondents noted that the political situation has improved over the past year, 21.8% believe that it has not changed, 3.3% are certain that it has become worse, and 1.8% are undecided. These data correlate with the ideas about how Tajiki- stan is developing as a whole: 82.7% of the polled think that “the country is moving in the right direction,” 11.2% believe it is going in the wrong direction, and 6% are undecided.

154 CENTRAL ASIA AND THE CAUCASUS Volume 15 Issue 2 2014

It appears that the positive assessments of the political situation and development of the country are largely related to the high economic growth seen in the past 15 years,25 as well as to the improvement in the prosperity of households in 2012. When answering the question about the financial state of their households, 56.5% of the respondents said that it had improved in the past year (2012), 33.5% noted that it had remained the same, and 10% said it had deteriorated.

Attitude toward Elections26

Over the past decades, the Tajik population’s positive attitude toward elections has increased. A total of 73% believe that voting at elections makes it possible for ordinary citizens to have an influence on the decisions made in the country (in 1996, 64% of the respondents were of this opinion); 24% (26% in 1996) do not agree with this statement, and 3% (10% in 1996) are undecided. When expounding on how acceptable elections are for building an ideal model of political system in Tajikistan, 62.9% of the respondents noted that holding them corresponds to one extent or another with local traditions and the political culture, so could be successfully implemented. A total of 25.6% of the polled believe that elections do not entirely correspond to local traditions and culture, which could easily make them a parody of democracy. In turn, 6.4% are categorically against elections, believing that they do not correspond to local traditions and cannot be realistically implemented in Tajikistan. Despite the largely positive attitude of Tajikistan residents to elections, the level of expectations about the fairness of the real electoral process is not very high. Only 25% of the polled expects that elections will be fair, while 40% think they will be to some extent fair; however, despite the existing doubts, most of the respondents believe participation in them to be their civic duty. In the West, the Internet and media are important factors influencing voters’ choice and supporting political competition. In Tajikistan, on the other hand, access to sources of information is extremely limited; this often plays a greater role than the state’s prohibitory measures. The following examples are sufficient to shed light on the situation: only 29% of households have satellite antennas, while only 5% have a working Internet. Only 15% of the respondents periodically used the Internet (at home, at work, or from their cell phone) during the six months before the poll was conducted. It should be noted that the development of such new technology as the Internet and mobile communication (83% of the respondents have cell phones) will increase access to information, particularly for young people.

Attitude toward the Government and Political Institutions

The overwhelming majority of respondents feel extremely kindly toward the government (as an institution in general and toward the individuals who personify its structures, in particular). The Tajik population particularly appreciates the country’s president Emomali Rakhmon; 94% of the respondents have a positive attitude toward him, and only 4.9% have a negative attitude, while 1.1% did not answer this question.

25 In 2000-2008, Tajikistan’s economy grew at a rate of approximately 8% every year. After the crisis, the growth rates dropped to 3.4% in 2009, but then recovered to almost the precrisis values. In 2012 and 2013, economic growth amounted to 7.5% (see: [http://www.worldbank.org/ru/country/tajikistan], 31 January, 2014). 26 Questions about attitude toward political parties and the opposition, as well as about the Tajik population’s political preferences were not included in this analysis since they require separate examination.

155 Volume 15 Issue 2 2014 CENTRAL ASIA AND THE CAUCASUS

Public opinion is a little more critical toward the national government in general: 82% have a positive attitude, 14.6% are negative, and 3% did not answer. The armed forces and law-enforcement structures arouse an even more negative attitude: 67% of the respondents are positive about them, while 30.9% (almost one third) are negative. As for religious leaders and the media (such as television, radio, newspapers, and magazines), 83.5% and 64.3% of the respondents have a positive attitude toward them, respectively.

Assessment of Government Activity

A total of 76.8% of the respondents positively asses the activity of the Tajik government in general and with respect to economic prosperity and ensuring stability in the country, in particular; 66.2% of citizens support the statement that “the Tajik leadership is creating conditions for the country’s development,” while 53.1% share the opinion that the government is fighting corruption (see Table 5). Table 5

Assessment of Government Activity, % of cases (2010, N = 1,000) Agree Agree Answer Refuse to Refuse to Undecided Undecided Agreement Agreement In complete In complete In Complete In Complete Disagreement Disagreement Largely Agree Largely Agree Largely Do Not Largely Do Not

The Tajik government is protecting the economic prosperity of its citizens 24.1 52.7 15.2 5.4 2.0 0.6 and supporting stability in the country

The Tajik leadership is creating every 22.4 43.8 26.0 5.7 2.1 0.9 condition for developing our state

The Tajik government is fighting 15.3 37.8 31.8 8.0 7.0 0.3 corruption in our country

Assessment of the Political Regime in Tajikistan and Mechanisms of Political Participation

When describing the existing political system, 26.8% of the respondents indicated that Tajiki- stan is an entirely democratic state, while 47.8% thought that is was probably democratic. At the same time, 44% (compared to 14.1% in 1996) think that Tajikistan is a non-democratic state. The large percentage of those who refused to respond or were undecided draws attention to itself; it amounted to 11.1% (compared to 19% in 1996). A comparison of the data for the 1996 and 2013 polls shows that the number of people who think that Tajikistan is to some extent a democratic state has increased from 37% to 74.6%. This makes one wonder not only about how the existing regime is evolving and what the people think about democracy in Tajikistan, but also about the mechanisms of citizen participation in the 156 CENTRAL ASIA AND THE CAUCASUS Volume 15 Issue 2 2014 country’s political life. In order to identify these mechanisms, the respondents were asked questions regarding the opportunities of ordinary citizens to influence the government, as well as the forms and efficiency of their engagement (see Table 6). Table 6

Opinion of Ordinary Citizens about the Opportunity to Influence the Government and Governance in Tajikistan, % of the number of respondents (2010, N = 1,500)

Possible Responses

They have sufficient opportunities 29.0

They probably have opportunities 51.0

They probably do not have 10.5 opportunities

They do not have opportunities 4.3

Undecided 5.0

Refuse to answer 0.2

Total 100.0

According to the data of Table 6, 80% of the respondents think that Tajik citizens have some opportunity to influence the government and governance of the country, while according to 20% of the polled, there are no such opportunities. During the 2013 poll, the respondents were asked what they had done in the last twelve months to resolve the political problems concerning society. The polled stated the following: 43% had discussed political issues with friends and neighbors; 41% had discussed them in their family; 18% had discussed them at meetings (official, party, NGO, community, etc.), 33% had addressed the head of the avlod/makhallia, 14% had addressed different levels of government representatives, while 8% had participated in the election campaign of a deputy or party they supported. As we know, the political participation of citizens is ensured by formal democratic institutions (participation in the election campaign, direct appeal to the government, open discussions at meetings, and so on). However, along with them, informal and traditional institutions that are much more popular among the population are used—kindred groups (avlod), neighbor communities (makhallia), and other community and kinship networks. For example, 33% of the Tajik population appealed to the leader of a neighbor or kindred community in the twelve months before the poll, whereby half of them discussed political issues before this with friends, relatives, and neighbors. It should be noted that informal and traditional institutions that represent a substratum of the local authorities are the most influential in rural areas where more than 73% of the Tajik population lives. They are the second most influential state power structure after the Tajik president and actively participate in governing society and the country. According to the data of the Society and Islam poll held in 2010, the president of Tajikistan holds first place among those figures who are having the most influence on citizen life; this is what 43.7% think. Second place, with 11% of the votes, goes to the local authorities; the other state structures do not have a significant influence on the life of ordinary citizens. 157 Volume 15 Issue 2 2014 CENTRAL ASIA AND THE CAUCASUS

Many researchers indicate the close cooperation between formal political institutions and traditional informal structures as a special feature of the political organization of society in Ta- jikistan.27 For example, when analyzing the activity of the local power structures of Southern Ta- jikistan, H. Boboyorov notes that they are a political organization of social order acting in the local context and reflecting coherent interaction among various entities through historically and culturally related structures/government and governance networks.28 All decisions are made by means of negotiations between state institutions and key actors, such as heads of clans, authoritative religious leaders, influential businessmen, NGO representatives, and so on. A very important role in the country’s political life is played by mediation and strict adherence to the current rules of the game. According to the poll data, 44.2% of the respondents think the heads/ elders of families/clans/avlods are the most influential people in Tajik society. Cooperation between formal political institutions and traditional informal structures is based on patron-clientele networks that, encompassing rural communities, reach the highest levels of state governance and form the base for neopatrimonialism. The existence of extremely influential informal institutions in Tajikistan explains the low level of protest activity of the country’s population. During the poll held in 2013, 30.2% of the respondents said that peaceful demonstrations/protest campaigns were the most efficient tool for achieving political goals, but only 6.6% expressed a willingness to participate in them; 15.2% thought it might be possible, and 20.7% thought it unlikely. A total of 52% of the polled said that they would not participate in protest campaigns under any circumstances, 1.8% refused to respond, and 3.8% were undecided.

Table 7

Efficiency of Types of Citizen Engagement in Tajikistan, % of cases (2013, N = 2,000)

Quite Quite Highly Highly Refuse Refuse Effective Effective Effective to Answer to Answer Ineffective Ineffective Ineffective Absolutely Absolutely Undecided/

Participation in elections 43.6 34.8 11.0 8.8 1.7

Letters, petitions to the government 28.8 41.5 18.9 9.0 1.8

Statements in the media 22.5 38.6 23.6 12.6 2.7

Posting opinions and assessments on 10.2 23.0 28.2 26.3 12.2 the Internet

Participation in peaceful demonstrations/protest 10.2 20.0 26.2 36.5 7.2 campaigns

27 See: B. Hierman, “What Use was the Election to Us? Clientelism and Political Trust amongst Ethnic Uzbeks in Kyr- gyzstan and Tajikistan,” Nationalities Papers, Vol. 38 (2), 2010; İ. Tunçer-Kılavuz, “Political and Social Networks in Tajiki- stan and Uzbekistan: ‘Clan’, Region and Beyond,” Central Asian Survey, Vol. 28, No. 3, 2009; A. Seifert, op.cit. 28 See: H. Boboyorov, “The Role of Collective Identities in Shaping Local Governance Institutions in Southern Khatlon of Tajikistan,” in: ESCAS XI Conference 2009 on “Studying Central Asia: In Quest for New Paths and Concepts?” Budapest, Hungary, 2009.

158 CENTRAL ASIA AND THE CAUCASUS Volume 15 Issue 2 2014

As for other forms of citizen participation, attention is drawn to the low evaluation of the possibilities of the Internet; only 33.2% of the polled thought it was effective.29 The most widespread forms of citizen engagement are participating in elections (78.4% of the respondents), writing letters and petitions to the government (70.3%), and making statements in the media (61.1%) (see Table 7). So, on the one hand, the poll data confirm the positive attitude of the Tajik population to such forms of citizen engagement as elections, the right to send letters to the government (individual and collective), and use of the media, while, on the other, they show that a large number of people find participation in peaceful demonstrations and protest campaigns unacceptable. It can be presumed that these data in no way show social apathy or non-acceptance of collective forms of struggle, but are a reflection of the strategies of political participation that have formed. Only serious infringement of citizen rights and economic difficulties could lead to spontaneous protests; the population of Tajikistan prefers to resolve all other political problems peacefully with the use of formal democratic institutions and procedures (with the leading role played by informal institutions and practices) (see Table 8). Table 8

Reasons for Protest Campaigns (2013, N = 2,000)

Which of the Listed Reasons might Cause You to Participate in % of cases Demonstrations/Protest Campaigns?

Violation of human rights 51.5

Economic problems 45.9

Corruption and nepotism 38.1

Electricity shortage 37.0

Restrictions on religious freedom 32.8

Unfair elections 22.6

Insufficient political freedoms 17.0

Restricted access to the Internet 12.0

Conclusion

The inverse development of the post-Soviet political systems in Central Asia has led to the establishment of patrimonial supremacy based not on traditional and/or ideological motives for the actors’ behavior, but on material rent-oriented stimuli.30 In so doing, the personal regimes in CA are hybrid in nature; they unite the logic of patrimonialism and legitimacy of legal-rational bureaucratic power, which is very well noted in the works of M. Laruelle.31 The political regimes in CA are sufficiently stable. Their stability is based on a consensus between society and the state ensured both by economic factors, the strength of client-paternal networks,

29 No electricity and access to the Internet. 30 See: A. Seifert, op. cit., p. 206. 31 See: M. Laruelle, “Discussing Neopatrimonialism and Patronal Presidentialism in the Central Asian Context.”

159 Volume 15 Issue 2 2014 CENTRAL ASIA AND THE CAUCASUS and the absence of circulating migrants (who are the most politically active part of society), and by the political convictions, values, and preferences of citizens. Using Tajikistan as an example, we can see that despite the formation of neopatrimonialism, the democratic values and orientations of citizens have been significantly retained. Government support of particular elements of democracy is generated not so much by necessitated concessions to foreign donors or the international community, as by social pressure. On the other hand, the political views and preferences of society are fragmented, inconsistent, and full of contradictions. Poll data show that along with the Tajik population’s mass support of the course toward democracy, there is public consensus about recognizing the right of the leaders to patrimonial supremacy. Thus, a large part of the population supports Sultanism, which it considers to be a guarantor of peace and stability. Population groups that do not accept this form of rule are in blatant or latent opposition to the regime. At the same time, “sterilization” of the oppositionist forces is pushing their representatives into the religious sphere, NGOs, journalism, or the cultural sphere. A study of public opinion also shows that, despite the end of the transit period, the political regimes are continuing to develop. In this regard, how CA’s political development will progress is acquiring particular urgency. When analyzing the course of the reforms in Eastern Europe and Latin America, Adam Prze- worski pointed to the possibility of rejecting democratization or the development of cyclical reform. He noted that the side who wins the transitional conflict will prefer to introduce elements of democracy, but in no way a dictatorship, in order to avoid the outcomes of a forceful solution and to retain control over politics without the use of corresponding institutions. He wrote the following in particular: “The most likely path is one of radical programs that are eventually slowed or partly reversed, initiated again in a more gradual form with less popular confidence, and again slowed or reversed, until a new government comes in and promises a clean break, and the cycle starts again.”32 Examining the dynamics of the evolution of the political regimes in CA from this viewpoint, it can be presumed that the current toughening of authoritarianism is a transitory phenomenon. The public opinion poll data in Tajikistan show that the state’s interference in the economy and private life of citizens is constantly rising. For example, whereas in 1996 almost 50% of the polled said that no state structures influenced their lives, in 2010, this number amounted to 29.4% and in 2013 to 25%. This trend will go on until the traditional institutions fed by the migrant economy and interact- ing with the patron-clientele networks and local authorities stop supporting the consensus between society and the government and so ensure stability of the political regime in Tajikistan. In the event of “external shocks” caused by an unfavorable foreign political and/or economic situation, a neopatrimonial regime could encounter serious difficulties relating to the impossibility of fulfilling its obligations to society, which threatens a possible aggravation of the transformation conflict. The sterilization of the secular oppositional forces that took place during functioning of the clientele-patron neopatrimonial system established in Tajikistan led to the Islamic political movement becoming the only real opposition force in the country. In this respect, it is highly likely that further democratization in Tajikistan will be related to Islam.

32 A. Przeworski, Democracy and the Market: Political and Economic Reforms in Eastern Europe and Latin America, Cambridge University Press, 1991, p. 179.

160 CENTRAL ASIA AND THE CAUCASUS Volume 15 Issue 2 2014 THE 2013 PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION: LEGITIMACY AND THE ISLAMIC REVIVAL PARTY OF TAJIKISTAN

Rashid Gani ABDULLO Ph.D. (Hist.), Independent Expert (Dushanbe, Tajikistan)

ABSTRACT

he author looks at the problem of the realize the idea of an Alliance of the Reform- legitimacy of the 2013 presidential elec- ist Forces of Tajikistan (ORST), which nom- T tion in Tajikistan as a sine qua non of inated human rights activist Oinihol Bobon- social and political stability and, consequently, azarova as its joint presidential candidate. of the country’s security and territorial integrity. She did not run because, after failing to In Tajikistan’s specific case, the election could present the necessary number of signatures only be legitimate if the opposition forces, pri- gathered in her support to the Central Elec- marily the Islamic Revival Party of Tajikistan tion Commission, she was not registered as (IRP), which comes second after the institution a candidate. The IRP leaders abstained of presidential power as the most influential from voting, but denied all accusations of political force, did not boycott it. boycotting the election. Despite the easily predicted results President Rakhmon, who won the elec- (another term for President Rakhmon), the tion, and the IRP, which stuck resolutely to its IRP leaders decided to take part in the pro- course and was able to keep the Islamic re- cess: an Islamic revival could only take vival going, were both winners. The country place in a politically stable Tajikistan. To benefited the most—the election did not gain public legitimacy for their decision, they shake the frail stability, while Tajikistan’s en- organized a series of consultations with rep- emies lost another chance to interfere in its resentatives of the public to formulate and domestic affairs with destructive intentions.

KEYWORDS: Tajikistan, presidential election, the president, parties, the opposition, Islamic revival, Islamic Revival Party of Tajikistan.

Introduction

The 2013 presidential election was devoid of all intrigue: everyone knew that the incumbent would be re-elected for another term. This was ensured by the votes of the generation that, after surviving the Soviet Union’s disintegration, total collapse, and a civil war, remains dominant in the republic’s political, economic, and 161 Volume 15 Issue 2 2014 CENTRAL ASIA AND THE CAUCASUS social life. These people value political stability, economic growth, conditions for self-realization, the opportunity to enjoy greater freedom than in some of the other neighboring post-Soviet republics, free access to the world, etc. more than anything else. These values are sill associated (at least partially) with President Rakhmon. During the country’s twenty-two years of independence, a new generation with no painful experience caused by the disintegration of the U.S.S.R. and the hardships that accompanied the development of statehood and the market economy has come to the fore. The younger people, therefore, do not treat political and economic stability as an obvious and important value. The post-Soviet generation (those born in the 1980s and later) believes that stability limits their political, economic, and other ambitions. In 2013, the new generation outnumbered the older people. On 23 May, 2013, the head of state deemed it necessary to stress at a meeting with young people that 70 percent of the republic’s population were barely over 30; those between 14 and 30 comprised 34 percent, while the average age of the country’s population was 25.1 Despite its numerical domination, the post-Soviet generation has not developed into a dominant social group. The youth does not side with the opposition, which mainly belongs to the previous generations; the younger people do not have their own political leaders or activists and functionaries. This explains why they did not and could not play an important role in the election campaign.

Elections as a Conflict Trigger

In Tajikistan, the presidential election, a key political event in any country, were devoid of intrigue and consequence because a large part of its population supported Rakhmon as the future president; the traditional opposition was too small to compete with the acting head of state, while the post-Soviet generation remained passive. The two main questions were whether or not the opposition parties would refuse to accept the election results and whether or not the election would be recognized as legitimate in the country and abroad. In countries where modern election procedures are a natural product of their economic, political, social, and cultural development, they serve as a problem-solving tool. In countries where these procedures are not accompanied by political and constitutional progress, they degenerate into their opposite; they may cause tension or even trigger sharp conflicts. The opposition and the West habitually shift the blame onto the regime and quite rightly point to violations of the election law, falsifications, and other “sins,” which could trigger a conflict. These methods are especially handy in cases when the opposition could have counted on success. On the other hand, this can be used to ignite massive public protests which almost always go beyond the constitutional framework. Other factors, such as widespread popular discontent with the people at the top and the readiness of influential forces and groups in the ruling elite to support the opposition, make conflicts practically inevitable. Election results that the opposition refuses to accept as legitimate are the first step along this bumpy road. This happened in Georgia after the parliamentary elections of November 2003, in Ukraine after the presidential election of 2004, and in Kyrgyzstan after the parliamentary elections in February-March 2005. In some cases, the opposition, fully aware of its inevitable defeat at an election (referendum), ignores it to later dismiss the results as illegitimate. Fanned from abroad, the tension promptly degen-

1 See: Asia Plus, Information bulletin, 24 May, 2013, available at [http://news.tj/ru/node/145777], 12 December, 2013.

162 CENTRAL ASIA AND THE CAUCASUS Volume 15 Issue 2 2014 erates into a crisis spearheaded against the regime. This happened in Egypt after the December 2012 referendum on the new constitution. Peace and stability are inevitably destroyed. The events triggered by the 2003 parliamentary elections in Georgia led to a 5-day war that cost the country its territorial integrity. In November 2004, the presidential election in Ukraine developed into “Maidan,” which split the country and pushed it into a never-ending political and economic crisis. The opposition, which refused to accept the results of the February-March 2005 parliamentary elections in Kyrgyzstan, pushed the country into the abyss of the Tulip Revolution that removed the Akaev regime. The country found itself in a quagmire of political instability and rivalry between the central and regional authorities. Egypt has offered the most typical example of the developments of this kind. Late in Novem- ber 2012, the leaders of the opposition National Salvation Front (NSF), which under different pretexts refused to take part in the preparations for the referendum on the new constitution, called on its supporters to boycott it. A large part of the country’s voting population came to the polls on 15 and 22 December, 2012 (the dates of the referendum’s two stages). The NSF leaders dismissed the results of the public vote and the Constitution (approved by 74 percent of voters) as illegitimate. They brought their supporters out onto Cairo’s At Tahrir Square to demand the removal of legally elected President Mohammed Morsi. State offices were attacked by crowds armed with stones and fire-bombs. Defense Minister of Egypt Field Marshal Abdel Fattah El-Sisi, posing as a guarantor of the country’s integrity, called this confrontation a step toward disintegration. Supported from abroad, the opposition was building up tension; the Egyptian military came into play: on 3 July, 2013, they removed democratically elected Morsi from power and, some time later, arrested him. For the first time in over 200 years, the country found itself on the threshold of a civil war.

Elections as a Conflict Trigger: The Tajik Experience

Tajikistan has had its share of post-election troubles. By the time it acquired its independence, the republic was divided; it was expected that the first democratic presidential elections of 24 Novem- ber, 1991would bridge the gap. The results proved to be different. Former First Secretary of the Communist Party of Tajikistan Rakhmon Nabiev won the first presidential election with a huge margin. Under the pressure of the opposition and the new rulers of Russia, he had to leave the post of speaker of the Supreme Soviet of Tajikistan (which he had held from 23 September to 7 October, 1991) until the presidential election. Formally, the opponents of the first democratically elected president of Tajikistan agreed with the voting results, but later developments proved the opposite. Those who refused to accept the results took schoolchildren of one the Dushanbe schools hostages and announced that they were prepared to take up arms. On 23 March, 1992, the conflict developed into street riots and anti- and pro-government demonstrations that went on for many weeks. In May, the street riots developed into armed clashes and, later, into a full-scale civil war. By late 1992, the country was de facto disunited and came close to losing its statehood. A peace agreement that ended the confrontation was signed on 27 June, 1997 after five years of civil war and numerous rounds of talks. It took the country 15 more years to implement the post-conflict agreements and programs and restore the republic’s political and legal space; sometimes disagreements were resolved with the use of arms. The well-known events in Khorugh in the summer of 2012 ac- 163 Volume 15 Issue 2 2014 CENTRAL ASIA AND THE CAUCASUS companied by bouts of fighting between the law and order structures and illegal armed groups were the final act that completed restoration of uncontestable sovereignty across the republic. Tajikistan’s neighbors are far from friendly; not all of them have accepted the fact that there is a legal Islamic political party in the country, which shows that the republic is gradually restoring its ties with the Islamic world. Its openness to the world, rather than to parts of it, also causes displeasure in certain capitals, as well as its multivectoral foreign policy. It should be said that Ta- jikistan treats integration projects that might deprive it of part of its sovereignty with a great deal of caution. To survive in these unfavorable conditions, Tajikistan should not give external forces any chance to put pressure on it, let alone allow them to directly meddle in its domestic affairs. Refusal by external forces to accept the results of presidential and parliamentary elections in any country that has become an object of their scrutiny may lead to pressure or even direct interference, while its authorities might be dismissed as illegal.

The Opposition and the Government in the Political Process

In Tajikistan, the decision to accept or reject the results of parliamentary or presidential elections is directly related to whether the parties that call themselves oppositional and accepted by the government as operating in the constitutional field take part in the process. Today, there are two such parties—the IRP and the Communist Party of Tajikistan (CPT), the leaders of which sit in the parliament. The IRP is the second, after the ruling People’s Democratic Party of Tajikistan (PDPT), mass political party with tens of thousands of members; it is widely represented in the media (it prints the Najot newspaper and several magazines) and on the Internet. Set up in April 1973, it comes second after the Communist Party as the republic’s oldest party; it is part of the rapidly accelerating process of bringing the Tajiks back to the fold of Islamic civilization, from which Soviet power detached them. It is still hard to say how influential the CPT is or identify its place and importance in Tajikistan today; it has no money to publish periodicals, however it is represented in the parliament, which means that it should not be ignored. Unlike in Russia, the people in Tajikistan were never absolutely negative about the Commu- nists: their party is associated with economic stability, equal access to social boons, and the law and order of Soviet times. In contrast to the older generation, the youth thinks of the Soviet past as a “paradise lost.” All Tajik leaders over 40 were members of the Community Party of Soviet Tajikistan; many of them are still devoted to the political, ideological and axiological attitudes of the Communist Party of Soviet times, which makes the CPT near and dear to their hearts. Its continued solidarity with the Communist parties in the post-Soviet space and beyond is one of its advantages. In this respect, it is wondered whether this resource can be ignored if in Russia, Tajikistan’s strategic partner and the country where hundreds of thousands of Tajik guest workers earn money, the Communist Party is the second influential political force (after the president); in China, Tajikistan’s closest neighbor and its biggest economic partner the Communist Party is the ruling party. “No, we can’t” is the obvious answer. We should not forget another very important fact: Tajikistan, a far from rich country, is seeking political independence and closer relations with the West. The fairly strong opposition represented in 164 CENTRAL ASIA AND THE CAUCASUS Volume 15 Issue 2 2014 the parliament and state structures plays an important role in creating and maintaining relations with the West. This is a reality to be accepted: opposition parties in the Tajik political landscape should be at least tolerated. In fact, Dushanbe considers its opposition parties and their presence in the parliament and state structures to be one of its main strategic resources (in Turkmenistan and Kazakhstan this role belongs to oil and gas; in Uzbekistan, its geostrategic situation) indispensable for its relations with the world. We should point out that no one doubted that the CPT would take part in the 2013 presidential election; the IRP, on the other hand, remained in two minds about its participation. Late in 2012, its chairman, Muhiddin Kabiri, informed the journalists who wanted to learn the name of the party’s presidential candidate that the final decision belonged to the party’s congress and that the congress might nominate either one of its members, or any other person. This vagueness2 spoke not only of his personal vacillations but also of disagreements in the party. His comments prompted two conclusions. As the IRP leader, he was inclined to involve the party in the election campaign. At the same time, he was convinced that neither he himself nor any other party member should be nominated: the practically guaranteed re-election of President Rakh- mon would have crippled his own political reputation or that of any other nominee. Kabiri’s political behavior was affected by one of the main principles of the IRP, which keeps it apart from all other parties both in Tajikistan and elsewhere. They were formulated by Said Ab- dullo Nuri, who founded the party and remained its leader until his death in August 2006. In 1997, upon returning home from emigration, Nuri announced that the IRP was geared toward the Islamic revival of Tajikistan even if the party did not come to power. He pointed out that the results, rather than the leader, were important. This meant that if the people in power helped achieve this aim, even if this took more time than the IRP would have liked, the party would be on the side of the government. This position was rooted in the movement’s rationale: it was born as a response to the totalitarian ideology of the Soviet state based on atheism and was intended to ensure Tajikistan’s Islamic revival through a state-of-the-art system of Islamic education and enlightenment. In Soviet times, Islamic education inevitably acquired political dimensions since it rejected the Soviet ideological doctrine. At the same time, Nuri’s ideas were never isolated from the context of a gradually unfolding movement for national revival started by the unceremonious replacement of First Secretary of the Communist Party of Tajikistan T. Uljabaev from his post on 12 April, 1961 and stronger Russification trends. Different sections of the public differently responded to what the government was doing. The creative intelligentsia (writers, actors and artists, academics, lecturers at higher educational establishments, students and post-graduate students) turned to the national roots and sources of national culture and started talking about the current linguistic situation and the future of the Tajik language. These concerns were shared by at least some members of the establishment. Abdullah Kakhkharov, Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the Tajik S.S.R. in 1961-1973 who appreciated classical Tajik and Persian poetry, was one of them. Young people became interested in Islam and religious education under the guidance of famous and respected spiritual authorities, as well as in classical Tajik and Arab literature.

2 In September 2013 at the IRP congress he said that in December 2012 the Political Council had decided to take part in the elections (see: M. Kabiri’s Speech at the Congress of the IRP on 17 September, 2013,” Najot, No. 38, 19 September, 2013, available at [http://www.nahzat.tj/haftanomai-najot/item/10127-najot-38-2013], 5 December, 2014).

165 Volume 15 Issue 2 2014 CENTRAL ASIA AND THE CAUCASUS

In 1972, in Moscow there appeared a fundamental work by Academician Bobojan Gafurov The Tajiks which offered the Soviet revival advocates what they wanted to find, i.e. a substantiatedschol - arly thesis according to which the history of the Tajiks and Central Asia were absolutely identical. The book became the bible of the Tajik educated community. In 1973, the Islamic revival in the republic acquired organizational and political features: Said Abdullo Nuri set up the first cell of the future Islamic political party. According to those who were close to him—well-known journalist and Nuri’s press secretary S. Khamad and Kh. Saifullozoda, one of the IRP leaders—Nuri liked to stress that the Islamic enlightenment activities of Sadriddin Aini3 and Gafurov’s The Tajiks4 were factors that made him determined to organize the still amorphous movement of Islamic enlightenment, which started gaining momentum in the latter half of the 1960s. These people and many others testify to the fact that from the very beginning there were no obstacles between the secular and religious revival movements. Later, this helped Rakhmon and Nuri and their followers to reach an agreement and end the civil war. It is thanks to this consensus that the national revival process is steadily going on with hardly any conflict. It should be said that the IRP is not the only vehicle of the Islamic revival: there are traditional and highly respected Muslim religious figures, there is an official Islamic center, there are supporters of the Salafi, and there are other new movements independent of the IRP, the government, and each other. The people in power are an important (although not always consistent) entity of the Islamic revival process; they build large mosques and do not interfere with the people, who want to do the same; and they are helping to build a contemporary system of Islamic education similar to that functioning in Egypt, Jordan, Syria, and Turkey. It was back in 2008, at a round table in Dushanbe organized by the Dialog NGO, that prominent sociologist Saodat Olimova first spoke about the government as one of the vehicles of the Islamic revival in Tajikistan.

The IRP and the Presidential Election

In the final analysis, the disagreements between the people at the top and the other entities of the national revival process (Islamic forces among them) are caused not so much by ideological as by purely political factors, the main being the question of power. We all know that the political field is highly competitive, which means that the opposition between the government and the IRP is caused not so much by the party’s Islamic nature as by its real political weight. The IRP has never treated power as its main goal; this means that it could have participated in the 2013 presidential election (despite its obvious outcome). It seems, however, that Kabiri was fully aware of the fact that any decision would have affected not only the party and its supporters. In view

3 Sadriddin Aini (1878-1954), writer and first president of the Academy of Sciences of the Tajik S.S.R., one of the greatest figures in the public, literary, and cultural life of the Tajiks in the 20th century. 4 B.G. Gafurov (1909-1977), author of The Tajiks, First Secretary of the C.C. Communist Party of the Tajik S.S.R in 1946-1956 and Director of the Institute of Oriental Studies, U.S.S.R. Academy of Sciences, and Academician of the U.S.S.R. Academy of Sciences.

166 CENTRAL ASIA AND THE CAUCASUS Volume 15 Issue 2 2014 of the disagreements on the election issue among the party leaders, he tried to achieve a compromise that would suit both the party leaders and the public. Late in February 2013, at a round table organized with support of IWPR and attended by practically all the officially registered parties and deputies, including members of the ruling PDPT, representatives of state structures, prominent public figures, and the media, Muhiddin Kabiri, after listen- ing to the arguments in favor and against the IRP’s participation in the election, announced that the party would be involved if its congress agreed. He formulated three possible variants of such involvement: (1) The IRP would support President Rakhmon if he guaranteed continued adherence to the spirit of the 1997 peace agreements, under which the party and government worked side by side. (2) The IRP would nominate an independent candidate from among well-known people unrelated to any of the political parties. (3) If none of the above proved tenable, the IRP would nominate its own candidate at the next party congress. This meant that the IRP was ready to be involved, which made the upcoming election legitimate and created a new question about its candidate. In March-April 2012, the party leaders organized several events of different scopes to celebrate the 40th anniversary of the party and add an international dimension to its activities. The presidential election was inevitably pushed aside for a while. In May, the revived issue became particularly topi- cal and even developed into a challenge. Early in May 2013, the IRP leaders invited representatives of the public (I was among them) to the party’s premises where Muhiddin Kabiri pointed out that, before taking any specific steps, the party wanted to hear what the public thought about possible forms of the party’s involvement in the election and its program. Opinions differed: some people wanted the party to take part in the election, others insisted on a boycott. To sum up, Kabiri said that the party planned to make such meetings regular. The second meeting took place on 25 May, 2013; its results transformed these consultations into a special type of political activity. These developments were indirectly prompted by the case of Zayd Saidov, a big businessman, Chairman of the Coordinating Council of Business Associations, the Association of Businessmen and Suppliers, Federation of Table Tennis of Tajikistan, and deputy of the Dushanbe majilis, who in 1999- 2006 filled the post, under a quota, of Chairman of the Committee for Industry and later Minister for Industry of Tajikistan. On 6 April, 2013, he announced that he intended to set up a political party he would call New Tajikistan; his declaration said that Tajik society was unsure of its future and needed a new idea, new message, new initiative, and new actions. He visualized the new party as a platform on which pragmatic-minded people, technocrats, and professionals could bring together their ideas, personalities, and potentials for the sake of national rebuilding. The founders pointed out that due to lack of time (they still had to register the party and complete all necessary preliminaries), they would not take part in the upcoming election.5 At first, the people in the corridors of power remained indifferent; Sukhrob Sharipov, one of the PDPT deputies, pointed out that this would positively affect the republic’s party system. He also

5 See: R. Mirzobekova, “V Tadzhikistane obiavleno o sozdanii novoy politicheskoy partii,”Asia Plus, 6 April, 2013, available at [http://www.news.tj/ru/node/140847], 19 January, 2013.

167 Volume 15 Issue 2 2014 CENTRAL ASIA AND THE CAUCASUS warned that a new party meant another political rival at the election and that when challenged in this way the people in power would defend their positions. He added that a duel of nerves would be accompanied by rumors that might tarnish the party’s image (he probably meant the New Tajikistan party).6 He proved right: by the end of April, the government retreated, for reasons unknown, from its previously favorable opinion: the people at the top probably started doubting (on their own initiative or at the instigation of people or forces acting in their own interests) that the initiators (all of them fairly rich people) had no presidential ambitions. On 10 May, Saidov was summoned to the law and order structures7 (no one explained why); he was allowed to leave the country for France along with the national table tennis team. The next day, the Dushanbe public prosecutor’s office opened a criminal case against him under Art 170 of the Criminal Code of the RT, which envisaged punishment for polygamy. Later he was accused of numerous economic crimes; his house was searched.8 It seemed that the government would prefer him to stay abroad. After describing this in an interview with Radio Ozodi as political pressure, he returned on 19 May and was arrested at the airport. The next day, the deputies of the Dushanbe majilis deprived him of deputy immunity at the instigation of the prosecutor’s office; on 22 May, the court of the Firdavsi District of Dushanbe sanctioned his arrest.9 Until the spring of 2013, Zayd Saidov manifested no political ambitions, which explains why information about his “party-building” initiative at the worst possible time came like a bolt from the blue. Those who knew him well spoke of him as a pragmatic and rational person, while his intention to set up a party on the eve of the election could hardly be described as rational. It would have been wiser to wait for a year and start the process after the political storms had subsided. Why did he act in this way is anyone’s guess. At a meeting at the IRP headquarters that took place three days after Zayd Saidov’s arrest, passions flew high. After long discussions, it was decided that the country needed a Coalition for De- mocracy and Civil Society; it was set up on the spot out of representatives of the SDPT, IRP, initiative groups of the New Tajikistan and Vakhdat parties, independent public figures, human rights activists, journalists, etc. The new coalition elected a board under the chairmanship of R. Zoyirov, Chairman of the Legal Consortium and SDPT leader, IRP Deputy Chairman M. Hayt, representative of the New Tajikistan initiative group M. Kosymov, political scientist A. Mamadazimov, member of the SDPT Political Council Sh. Shonysayriev, Chairman of the NANSMIT (the National Association of Inde- pendent Media) N. Karshiboev, journalist R. Mirzobekova, M. Odinaev (father of S. Rizoev),10 and K. Kanunov, who represented the youth.11

6 See: M. Tursunzoda, “‘Novy Tadzhikistan’ mozhet stat konkurentom dlia sushchestvuiushchikh partiy,” Asia Plus, 8 April, 2013, available at [http://www.news.tj/ru/node/140968], 20 January, 2013. 7 See: S. Karaev, “‘Novy Tadzhikistan’ zaiavliaet ob ugrozakh v adres Zayda Saidova,” Asia Plus, 10 May, 2013, available at [http://www.news.tj/ru/node/143928], 14 January, 2014. 8 See: Kh. Shodiev, “V dome Zayda Saidova proizveden obysk,” Asia Plus, 11 May, 2013, available at [http://www. news.tj/ru/node/144093], 16 January, 2014. 9 See: “Zayd Saidov arestovan,” Asia Plus, 22 May, 2013, available at [http://www.news.tj/ru/news/zaid-saidov- arestovan],16 January, 2014. 10 Sunnatulo Rizoev was held in Khujand prison. Along with Toshev and other prisoners, formerly warlords of the opposition, he leaked information about tortures. In October 2013, Toshev and Rizoev were accused of “spreading false and offensive information,” found guilty, and sentenced to eight and nine years in prison, respectively. 11 See: “V Tadzhikistane sozdana Koalitisia za demokratiiu i grazhdanskoe obshchestvo,” Asia Plus, 25 May, 2013, available at [http://www.news.tj/ru/node/146181], 17 January, 2014.

168 CENTRAL ASIA AND THE CAUCASUS Volume 15 Issue 2 2014 The IRP and a Single Presidential Candidate

The coalition insisted on a single presidential candidate to represent its program. This was a mission impossible because the two main political forces—the IRP headed by Kabiri, on the one hand, and a political patchwork headed by SDPT Chairman Zoyirov, on the other—could not coordinate their approaches. The IRP took part in the election to make it legitimate in order to exclude external interference, avoid destabilization, and keep the Islamic revival going. At the same time, fully aware of the election results, its rank-and-file members, the party leaders, to say nothing of the party chairman, agreed that the IRP should not choose a presidential candidate from among its ranks. Those who closed ranks around the SDPT and Zoyirov looked forward to a victory as a sine qua none of democratic changes in the country and were unanimous in their opinion that the SDPT leader should be nominated. Rakhmatillo Zoyirov did not object; he was glad to accept this variant. On 20 June, the media reported that in an interview with Group 24 in the social network Od- noklassniki (Classmates) Zoyirov had said: “I will run at the upcoming presidential election; more than that—I want to be the only candidate not only from the opposition parties or forces, but also from the democratic forces… I nominate myself and announce that I am ready to shoulder the responsibility for the country and people!”12 It was not easy to find a mutually acceptable candidate and to harmonize the very different approaches to the problem of taking part in/staying away from the elections. The coalition, later transformed into the Alliance of Reforming Forces of Tajikistan (ORST), was torn apart by the struggle for domination. A paradox was inevitable: the IRP was the strongest among the ORST members; all meetings and discussions were held in its office. At the early stages, the representatives of the ORST liberal democratic wing dominated; their emotional rhetoric found a response among at least some of the IRP members. The IRP chairman refused to be moved aside; at some point the IRP leaders guessed that the ORST was trying to rely on external forces. Kh. Sayfullozoda, editor of Najot, offered the following comment in the corridors of a conference: “We disrupted two attempts by external forces to stage a coup in Tajikistan.” He never specified which attempts he meant and who was behind them: the time has not come to reveal all the details was his only comment. The IRP leadership and Kabiri stepped up their activity and coordinated the balance of power within the ORST and outside it. On 9 September, the struggle reached its peak: that day the ORST discussed its single presidential candidate—either IRP Chairman M. Kabiri or SDPT Chair- man R. Zoyirov, M. Kasymov,13 Kh. Umarov,14 Kh.A. Turajonzoda,15 or O. Bobonazarova.16 The Social-Democratic Party wanted to nominate its leader; the IRP was looking for a suitable person outside the party whose nomination would be least damaging to the prospects for the Islamic revival. Oinihol Bobonazarova looked like the best option. Judging by the fairly passionate comments

12 See: “Lider sotsial-demokratov zaiavil, chto gotov stat edinym kandidatom na vyborakh prezidenta,” Asia Plus, 20 June, 2013, available at [http://www.news.tj/ru/node/153121], 17 January, 2014. 13 Makhmujon Kasymov, member of the initiative group of New Tajikistan. 14 Khojimuhammad Umarov, Doctor of Economic Sciences, member of the initiative group of New Tajikistan, in the past, one of the leaders of the Democratic Party of Tajikistan (DPT). 15 Hoji Akbar Turajonzoda, one of the famous religious figures of Tajikistan, in the past head of the Kaziat of Tajikistan, first deputy of the head of the United Tajik Opposition, first deputy prime minister and deputy of the upper chamber of the Tajik parliament. 16 Oinihol Bobonazarova, human rights activist, leader of the public association called Perspektiva+, one of the leaders of democratic movement, in the past one of the active founders of the DPT, head of the office of the Soros Foundation in Dushanbe, advisor of the OSCE office and other international organizations represented in Tajikistan.

169 Volume 15 Issue 2 2014 CENTRAL ASIA AND THE CAUCASUS of those who took part in the discussion, the process was far from simple. The IRP leaders won the battle: all those seeking nomination withdrew their candidatures in favor of Bobonazarova.17 This did nothing to pacify the public; passions started spreading far and wide to the independent media, social nets, blogs, forums, etc. Disappointed by the ORST choice, those who wanted a regime change criticized or even slandered the IRP and its leader: he was accused of putting the party and personal interests above the common cause of moving toward democracy, as well as of even worse sins, of which collaboration with the government was the most neutral. The critics and their political mentors had no electoral support; they counted on the IRP and its electorate to achieve the aims they believed to be important for the country and society. They refused to take into account that the IRP had its own interests related to the country’s Islamic revival, a task that, in the Tajik context, tolerated no haste and no political speculations. Wisely, the IRP kept away from media polemics. It answered all the critics at the party congress convened on 17 September, 2013 to approve Oinihol Bobonazarova as the single ORST candidate. Speaking at the congress, Muhiddin Kabiri dotted all the “i’s” by reminding the country that in the past the party had twice sided with other political forces: in 1991, it supported D. Khudonazarov as presidential candidate and the following spring sided with other political forces when rallies and demonstrations shook the country.18 He also told the audience that the party was still suffering from the negative effects of that period and pointed out that the party had become a people’s party, more experienced and much wiser; it would never allow other political forces to gamble with the country’s future to the accompaniment of talks about the interests and hopes of the people. He informed the meeting that the time had gone when other parties regarded the IRP as a source of human potential to be used in their own interests.19 The congress approved the nomination of O. Bobonazarova as the ORST’s single presidential candidate. This ended the political process and ensured the legitimacy of the presidential election very much needed to prevent possible destabilization by internal or external forces. All other steps (transfer of documents to the Central Election Commission, collection of signatures) were technical rather than political tasks, yet they took an unexpected turn.

The IRP and Election Results: Success or Failure?

By the evening of 10 October (the last day of signature gathering), Oinihol Bobonazarova, having gathered about 202 thousand signatures out of the required 210 thousand, refused to submit them to the Central Election Commission and, as could be expected, was not registered for technical reasons. The presidential nominee blamed the republican authorities for the failure: they had launched a widescale campaign of slander against the IRP (which initiated the nomination in the first place), while the CEC deprived labor migrants (with the right to vote) of the right to sign.20 On 12 October,

17 See: M. Tursunzoda, “Oinihol Bobonazarova stala edinym kandidatom ot oppozitsii,” Asia Plus, 10 September 2013, available at [http://www.news.tj/ru/node/170381], 19 January, 2014. 18 In coalition with the Democratic Party, the National Democratic Movement Rastokhez, and the La’li Badakhshon National Movement, the IRP organized huge rallies, the prologue to a full-scale civil war. 19 See: M. Kabiri’s Speech at the Congress of the IRP on 17 September, 2013. 20 See: “Bobonazarova schitaet, chto antireklama protiv IRP ne pozvolila sobrat nuzhnoe kolichestvo podpisey,” Asia Plus, 19 October, 2013, available at [http://www.news.tj/ru/node/174087], 16 January, 2014.

170 CENTRAL ASIA AND THE CAUCASUS Volume 15 Issue 2 2014

Central Election Commission Chairman Shermuhammad Shokhien informed his colleagues that if O. Bobonazarova had presented the signatures, they “would be able to help her somehow.”21 On 19 October, it became known that the CEC had ignored the arguments Kabiri offered in his letter to Sh. Shokhien (which could have made it possible to register Bobonazarova as a candidate) and refused to satisfy the IRP request. Muhiddin Kabiri offered the following arguments: (a) The CEC has decided that each of the candidates should collect the signatures of 5% of the total number of voters, that is, 210 thousand signatures. At the same time, according to the CEC, there were 4,220,000 voters (later it quoted the figure of 4,340,000); this meant that 5% of the total number of voters was slightly over 200 thousand; (b) The CEC should have registered Oinihol Bobonazarova, who had collected over 202 thousand signatures, that is, over 5% of the total number of voters; (с) The CEC extended the time of signature gathering to 6 p.m. of the final day (10 October), but the day after the decision had been passed, Head of the CEC Administration A. Dodoev announced via the Asia Plus Information Agency at 08:02 a.m. on 10 October that Oinihol Bobonazarova had failed to gather the necessary number of signatures and had dropped out of the race. In his interview with Asia Plus, Kabiri stated that the ORST would discuss its future steps at its next meeting: “we will probably stay away from the election and we will discuss how we will do this.”22 On 21 October, in reference to the IRP Supreme Political Council’s statement, many Tajik newspapers reported that the party would not participate in the election because the CEC had refused to register O. Bobonazarova. At the same time, member of the IRP Supreme Political Council Mahmadali Hayt deemed it necessary to specify: “This should not be taken to mean that the party, which decided to refrain from participating in the election, will boycott it.”23 This meant that the party leaders would not go to the polls, while the party members, as citizens of Tajikistan, were free to vote or not to vote. The words we “would be able to help her somehow” meant that the refusal to be registered as a candidate provoked by what the government was doing took the CEC members by surprise. The truth is that Oinihol Bobonazarova, who is well-known outside the country as a human rights activist with long experience of political struggle in the late1980s-early 1990s and prison terms, could not permit herself to beg for registration. The CEC and the influential political forces behind it interpreted what she had done as a challenge and took the defensive. If they had demonstrated any flexibility (because it was clear to each and everyone that she had no chance of winning the election), the authorities could have earned more political and image points at home and abroad. On the other hand, by reducing their displeasure and disagreement from the political to the personal level, the IRP leaders demonstrated pragmatism.

Conclusion

On election day, President Emomali Rakhmon received 84.32% of the votes and was reelected president. Observers from the OSCE, EU, Western embassies in Dushanbe, and Western journalists

21 Ozodagon, 12 October, 2013. 22 “Tsentrizbirkom otkazal v registratsii O. Bobonazarovoy,” Asia Plus, 19 October, 2013, available at [http://www. news.tj/ru/node/174083], 2 February, 2014. 23 “IRP vozderzhivaetsia ot uchastiia v prezidentskikh vyborakh,” Asia Plus, 21 October, 2013, available at [http:// www.news.tj/ru/node/174254], 1 February, 2014.

171 Volume 15 Issue 2 2014 CENTRAL ASIA AND THE CAUCASUS were very critical, but never doubted the legitimacy of the election and its results. The CIS observers agreed that the election met all the democratic regulations. The government did a lot to add legitimacy to the election and its results: it never objected to the ORST and its activities and it allowed all the independent media to cover the ups and downs of the election process up to and including the Saidov case. Emomali Rakhmon carried the day, while the IRP behaved with dignity. It stuck to its course, avoided the rather unenviable fate of becoming a lever for those who wanted to ensure their interests outside the IRP, and preserved the Islamic revival in Tajikistan. Strange as it may seem, its far from straightforward relations with the powers that be helped it to a great extent. The fact that the government regarded the IRP as a political rival consolidated the party’s relations with the traditional Muslim figures: Salafis were released from prison under the pretext of improving relations with Saudi Arabia. The government started paying more attention to factors conducive to the Islamic revival in Tajikistan. The country and its people reaped even greater benefit, at least for the time being: the election did not destabilize the country and deprived external forces of the chance to interfere in the country’s internal affairs.

172