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Decriminalization of Domestic Violence in Russia

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Decriminalization of Domestic Violence in Russia ISSN 2455-4782 DECRIMINALIZATION OF DOMESTIC VIOLENCE IN RUSSIA Authored by: Shaili Shah* * 3rd Year BLS LLB Student, Pravin Gandhi College of Law ______________________________________________________________________________ Russia decriminalized non-aggravated battery during July of 2016 and it was made an administrative offense being punishable by a fine or detention. However, incessant battery and battery-committed offences against close relatives or family members remained punishable under the Criminal Code. Russia amended the Criminal Code once again in February 2017 and eliminated the provision with respect to assaulting close relatives on non-aggravated battery. As a result, violence perpetrated against family members has further been made an administrative offense when committed for the first time. Only persistent instances of battery would now be prosecuted as criminal offenses and thus, punishable by criminal law. DOMESTIC VIOLENCE Domestic violence is a pattern of abusive behavior in a personal relationship used by one to maintain and establish dominance or control over the other. It has been prevalent since the beginning of time, as it is natural for an individual to want to manifest power and a sense of authority over another. Domestic Violence can be classified into various forms and degrees of abuse such as physical, emotional, psychological, sexual, economical, and verbal. The intensity of each abuse could vary from subtle, coercive forms to violent, brutal abuse including acid- throwing, beating, choking, rape, and so on. It leads to the victim enduring severe psychological traumas and unable to lead a normal, dignified life. The victims of domestic violence could be women, children, the elderly or anyone in a position of insubordination. Domestic violence is one of the most underreported crimes globally. Due to social stigmas and victim blaming, several crucial cases are neglected. In quite a few cases, domestic violence is assumed to be justified by the victim or the society in general. When domestic violence is afflicted with children, it is seen as the parents’ right in order to discipline 1 | P a g e JOURNAL ON CONTEMPORARY ISSUES OF LAW [JCIL] VOLUME 6 ISSUE 7 ISSN 2455-4782 the child and corporal punishment is seen as an effective tool to mold the child. Moreover, the abusers believe that the abuse inflicted is justified and entitled and accept it as a way of life. This leads to the vicious cycle of abuse where such violence may be condoned. This cycle does not end because when acts of violence are committed along with an increase in friction, they are usually followed by a placid atmosphere and reconciliation. This gives the victim a sense of an infrequent act, which is dismissed as just another harmless, inconsequent fight. INTRODUCTION In February 2017, Russian President Vladimir Putin ratified a law decriminalizing any violence that does not lead to any such alarming injury, defined as that requiring a visit to the hospital. Beatings and acts that left scratches, bruises, or bleeding but did not cause broken bones or a concussion were not to be reported or further investigated. With an overwhelming statistic, it is proved that upto 75% of women are victims of assault in their families and when it is a matter of spousal violence, their share reaches about a 91%. Domestic Violence takes place in approximately every one out of ten Russian families. 70% of a surveyed report have experienced or are experiencing Domestic Violence: 80% are women, with children and elderly people. More than 35% of victims did not go to the police for assistance, on the pretext of shame, fear and mistrust. This data is presented by an expert analytical study conducted by St. Petersburg State University as ordered by State Duma.1 AN OVERVIEW In September 2019, Galina Karelova, Vice-Speaker of Russia’s Federation Council, insinuated reviewing a law banning domestic violence, on the pretext of the fact that “existing legislation does not provide protection from family violence.” 1Research: about 75% of victims of domestic violence are women, TACC (Oct. 21, 2019), https://tass.ru/obschestvo/7025013 2 | P a g e JOURNAL ON CONTEMPORARY ISSUES OF LAW [JCIL] VOLUME 6 ISSUE 7 ISSN 2455-4782 This was not the first attempt to introduce a similar bill in Russia. In 1993, a draft was assembled by a fraction of the Women of Russia political party. After a year, the bill appeared but it was vehemently criticised. It was then sent in for a redraft and was rewritten about 40 times. The final version of the draft was so different from the initial draft that its original editors didn’t recognise it. After much deliberation, the last draft was tabled and so were the hopes of making a difference. Between 2012 and 2016, there was another sanctioned attempt at the domestic violence legislation. The civil society members led a coordination groups that drafted a legislation which purported the introduction of restraining orders, which would ban abusers from any sort of close contact with their victims, build shelter homes and refuges for victims and further facilitate judicial and psychological help for any experience that they had undergone. This bill, however, was rejected. In 2017, the statute on battery was repealed from the Russian Criminal Code, and administrative penalties for domestic violence were introduced instead. The following year, Human Rights Watch acknowledged that the decriminalisation had undermined guarantees of protection from violence and further complicated the prosecution of abusers. The latest attempt to pass a law against domestic violence came in September 2019. It was carried out by a group of activists: lawyer Maria Davtyan- director of the ‘No to Violence’ Centre, Anna Rivina and Alyona Popova- founder of ‘Project W’, a women’s mutual aid network. The bill was actively advocated by MP Oksana Pushkina. On 29 November 2019, Russia’s Federation Council published a draft on the prevention of domestic violence, however its co-authors reported that it differed considerably from the original version. The co-authors from the Russian civil society then concluded that the final draft law was futile in its present form and christened it “the result of pandering to radical conservative groups”.2 LEGAL IMPLICATIONS The bill had several legal defects, which would make its ratification unacceptable. It contradicts the extensively recognized legal principles of justice, rationality, and equality. It contravenes the 2Draft Law on Prevention of Domestic Violence, Council of the Federation (Nov. 29, 2019),http://council.gov.ru/services/discussions/themes/110611/ 3 | P a g e JOURNAL ON CONTEMPORARY ISSUES OF LAW [JCIL] VOLUME 6 ISSUE 7 ISSN 2455-4782 constitutional requirement of legal certainty, which creates "the possibility of unlimited discretion in the process of law enforcement and inevitably leads to arbitrariness, which means - to a violation of the principles of equality and the rule of law." When applied practically, the law will grossly violate the rights of citizens and Russian families protected under the Russian Federation Constitution, the norms of Russian Law, such as: • The exercise of freedom and rights of one person shall not infringe the freedom and rights of others;3 • The State must protect the human dignity of a citizen;4 • The right to inviolability of life, personal and family secrets;5 • The right to protect information about the private life of citizens (and families);6 • The right to housing, including the right not to be subjected to arbitrary deprivation of home;7 • The right to the constitutional presumption of innocence;8 and • The right to constitutional protection of the family, motherhood and fatherhood, including the constitutional presumption of the good faith of parents.9 Failure to appropriately protect the victims of domestic violence and safeguard access to justice transgresses Russia’s international human rights obligations. Russia has ratified the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW)10, which disallows violence inflicted upon women, whether in public or in private, and denotes such violence as a form of discrimination. In a 2015 review of Russia, the CEDAW committee noted “the high 3Article 17(3) of the Constitution of the Russian Federation 4Article 21 of the Constitution of the Russian Federation 5Article 23(1) of the Constitution of the Russian Federation 6Article 24(1) of the Constitution of the Russian Federation 7Article 40(1) of the Constitution of the Russian Federation 8Article 49(1) of the Constitution of the Russian Federation 9Art. 38(1) and (2) of the Constitution of the Russian Federation in connection with Article 2 and 17 of the Constitution of the Russian Federation (in their binding interpretation by the Constitutional Court of the Russian Federation) 10UNTC, Treaties.un.org, https://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=IV- 8&chapter=4&lang=en 4 | P a g e JOURNAL ON CONTEMPORARY ISSUES OF LAW [JCIL] VOLUME 6 ISSUE 7 ISSN 2455-4782 prevalence of violence against women” and cast aspersions on the absence of legislation to prevent and sufficiently address the violence against women, especially domestic violence. Russia has severely failed to comply with its obligations towards the CEDAW. It has insufficiently addressed the ubiquitous acts of domestic violence, ineffectively failed to investigate, prosecute and punish those acts of violence which stem from intimate family ties and shown an outright disregard
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