State Spill in Modern Operating Systems
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Yutaka Oiwa. "Implementation of a Fail-Safe ANSI C Compiler"
Implementation of a Fail-Safe ANSI C Compiler 安全な ANSI C コンパイラの実装手法 Doctoral Dissertation 博士論文 Yutaka Oiwa 大岩 寛 Submitted to Department of Computer Science, Graduate School of Information Science and Technology, The University of Tokyo on December 16, 2004 in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy Abstract Programs written in the C language often suffer from nasty errors due to dangling pointers and buffer overflow. Such errors in Internet server programs are often ex- ploited by malicious attackers to “crack” an entire system, and this has become a problem affecting society as a whole. The root of these errors is usually corruption of on-memory data structures caused by out-of-bound array accesses. The C lan- guage does not provide any protection against such out-of-bound access, although recent languages such as Java, C#, Lisp and ML provide such protection. Never- theless, the C language itself should not be blamed for this shortcoming—it was designed to provide a replacement for assembly languages (i.e., to provide flexible direct memory access through a light-weight high-level language). In other words, lack of array boundary protection is “by design.” In addition, the C language was designed more than thirty years ago when there was not enough computer power to perform a memory boundary check for every memory access. The real prob- lem is the use of the C language for current casual programming, which does not usually require such direct memory accesses. We cannot realistically discard the C language right away, though, because there are many legacy programs written in the C language and many legacy programmers accustomed to the C language and its programming style. -
WWW-Based Collaboration Environments with Distributed Tool Services
WWWbased Collab oration Environments with Distributed To ol Services Gail E Kaiser Stephen E Dossick Wenyu Jiang Jack Jingshuang Yang SonnyXiYe Columbia University Department of Computer Science Amsterdam Avenue Mail Co de New York NY UNITED STATES fax kaisercscolumbiaedu CUCS February Abstract Wehave develop ed an architecture and realization of a framework for hyp ermedia collab oration environments that supp ort purp oseful work by orchestrated teams The hyp ermedia represents all plausible multimedia artifacts concerned with the collab orative tasks at hand that can b e placed or generated online from applicationsp ecic materials eg source co de chip layouts blueprints to formal do cumentation to digital library resources to informal email and chat transcripts The environment capabilities include b oth internal hyp ertext and external link server links among these artifacts which can b e added incrementally as useful connections are discovered pro jectsp ecic hyp ermedia search and browsing automated construction of artifacts and hyp erlinks according to the semantics of the group and individual tasks and the overall pro cess workow application of to ols to the artifacts and collab orativework for geographically disp ersed teams We present a general architecture for what wecallhyp ermedia subwebs and imp osition of groupspace services op erating on shared subwebs based on World Wide Web technology which could b e applied over the Internet andor within an organizational intranet We describ e our realization in OzWeb which -
Intra-Unikernel Isolation with Intel Memory Protection Keys
Intra-Unikernel Isolation with Intel Memory Protection Keys Mincheol Sung Pierre Olivier∗ Virginia Tech, USA The University of Manchester, United Kingdom [email protected] [email protected] Stefan Lankes Binoy Ravindran RWTH Aachen University, Germany Virginia Tech, USA [email protected] [email protected] Abstract ACM Reference Format: Mincheol Sung, Pierre Olivier, Stefan Lankes, and Binoy Ravin- Unikernels are minimal, single-purpose virtual machines. dran. 2020. Intra-Unikernel Isolation with Intel Memory Protec- This new operating system model promises numerous bene- tion Keys. In 16th ACM SIGPLAN/SIGOPS International Conference fits within many application domains in terms of lightweight- on Virtual Execution Environments (VEE ’20), March 17, 2020, Lau- ness, performance, and security. Although the isolation be- sanne, Switzerland. ACM, New York, NY, USA, 14 pages. https: tween unikernels is generally recognized as strong, there //doi.org/10.1145/3381052.3381326 is no isolation within a unikernel itself. This is due to the use of a single, unprotected address space, a basic principle 1 Introduction of unikernels that provide their lightweightness and perfor- Unikernels have gained attention in the academic research mance benefits. In this paper, we propose a new design that community, offering multiple benefits in terms of improved brings memory isolation inside a unikernel instance while performance, increased security, reduced costs, etc. As a keeping a single address space. We leverage Intel’s Memory result, -
A Linux in Unikernel Clothing Lupine
A Linux in Unikernel Clothing Hsuan-Chi Kuo+, Dan Williams*, Ricardo Koller* and Sibin Mohan+ +University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign *IBM Research Lupine Unikernels are great BUT: Unikernels lack full Linux Support App ● Hermitux: supports only 97 system calls Kernel LibOS + App ● OSv: ○ Fork() , execve() are not supported Hypervisor Hypervisor ○ Special files are not supported such as /proc ○ Signal mechanism is not complete ● Small kernel size ● Rumprun: only 37 curated applications ● Heavy ● Fast boot time ● Community is too small to keep it rolling ● Inefficient ● Improved performance ● Better security 2 Can Linux behave like a unikernel? 3 Lupine Linux 4 Lupine Linux ● Kernel mode Linux (KML) ○ Enables normal user process to run in kernel mode ○ Processes can still use system services such as paging and scheduling ○ App calls kernel routines directly without privilege transition costs ● Minimal patch to libc ○ Replace syscall instruction to call ○ The address of the called function is exported by the patched KML kernel using the vsyscall ○ No application changes/recompilation required 5 Boot time Evaluation Metrics Image size Based on: Unikernel benefits Memory footprint Application performance Syscall overhead 6 Configuration diversity ● 20 top apps on Docker hub (83% of all downloads) ● Only 19 configuration options required to run all 20 applications: lupine-general 7 Evaluation - Comparison configurations Lupine Cloud Operating Systems [Lupine-base + app-specific options] OSv general Linux-based Unikernels Kernel for 20 apps -
Unikernel Monitors: Extending Minimalism Outside of the Box
Unikernel Monitors: Extending Minimalism Outside of the Box Dan Williams Ricardo Koller IBM T.J. Watson Research Center Abstract Recently, unikernels have emerged as an exploration of minimalist software stacks to improve the security of ap- plications in the cloud. In this paper, we propose ex- tending the notion of minimalism beyond an individual virtual machine to include the underlying monitor and the interface it exposes. We propose unikernel monitors. Each unikernel is bundled with a tiny, specialized mon- itor that only contains what the unikernel needs both in terms of interface and implementation. Unikernel mon- itors improve isolation through minimal interfaces, re- Figure 1: The unit of execution in the cloud as (a) a duce complexity, and boot unikernels quickly. Our ini- unikernel, built from only what it needs, running on a tial prototype, ukvm, is less than 5% the code size of a VM abstraction; or (b) a unikernel running on a spe- traditional monitor, and boots MirageOS unikernels in as cialized unikernel monitor implementing only what the little as 10ms (8× faster than a traditional monitor). unikernel needs. 1 Introduction the application (unikernel) and the rest of the system, as defined by the virtual hardware abstraction, minimal? Minimal software stacks are changing the way we think Can application dependencies be tracked through the in- about assembling applications for the cloud. A minimal terface and even define a minimal virtual machine mon- amount of software implies a reduced attack surface and itor (or in this case a unikernel monitor) for the applica- a better understanding of the system, leading to increased tion, thus producing a maximally isolated, minimal exe- security. -
LISTSERV 16.0 Site Manager's Operations Manual
Information in this document is subject to change without notice. Companies, names, and data used in examples herein are fictitious unless otherwise noted. L-Soft does not endorse or approve the use of any of the product names or trademarks appearing in this document. Permission is granted to copy this document, at no charge and in its entirety, if the copies are not used for commercial advantage, the source is cited, and the present copyright notice is included in all copies. Recipients of such copies are equally bound to abide by the present conditions. Prior written permission is required for any commercial use of this document, in whole or in part, and for any partial reproduction of the contents of this document exceeding 50 lines of up to 80 characters, or equivalent. The title page, table of contents, and index, if any, are not considered to be part of the document for the purposes of this copyright notice, and can be freely removed if present. Copyright 2009 L-Soft international, Inc. All Rights Reserved Worldwide. LISTSERV is a registered trademark licensed to L-Soft international, Inc. ListPlex, CataList, and EASE are service marks of L-Soft international, Inc. LSMTP is a registered trademark of L-Soft international, Inc. The Open Group, Motif, OSF/1 UNIX and the “X” device are registered trademarks of The Open Group in the United State and other countries. Digital, Alpha AXP, AXP, Digital UNIX, OpenVMS, HP, and HP-UX are trademarks of Hewlett- Packard Company in the United States and other countries. Microsoft, Windows, Windows 2000, Windows XP, and Windows NT are registered trademarks of Microsoft Corporation in the United States and other countries. -
Microkernel Construction Introduction
Microkernel Construction Introduction Nils Asmussen 04/09/2020 1 / 32 Normal Organization Thursday, 4th DS, 2 SWS Slides: www.tudos.org ! Studies ! Lectures ! MKC Subscribe to our mailing list: www.tudos.org/mailman/listinfo/mkc2020 In winter term: Microkernel-based operating systems (MOS) Various labs 2 / 32 Organization due to COVID-19 Slides and video recordings of lectures will be published Questions can be asked on the mailing list Subscribe to the mailing list! Practical exercises are planed for the end of the semester Depending on how COVID-19 continues, exercises are in person or we use some video-conferencing tool 3 / 32 Goals 1 Provide deeper understanding of OS mechanisms 2 Look at the implementation details of microkernels 3 Make you become enthusiastic microkernel hackers 4 Propaganda for OS research done at TU Dresden and Barkhausen Institut 4 / 32 Outline Organization Monolithic vs. Microkernel Kernel design comparison Examples for microkernel-based systems Vision vs. Reality Challenges Overview About L4/NOVA 5 / 32 Monolithic Kernel System Design u s Application Application Application e r k Kernel e r File Network n e Systems Stacks l m Memory Process o Drivers Management Management d e Hardware 6 / 32 Monolithic Kernel OS (Propaganda) System components run in privileged mode No protection between system components Faulty driver can crash the whole system Malicious app could exploit bug in faulty driver More than 2=3 of today's OS code are drivers No need for good system design Direct access to data structures Undocumented -
Cognitive Abilities, Interfaces and Tasks: Effects on Prospective Information Handling in Email
Cognitive Abilities, Interfaces and Tasks: Effects on Prospective Information Handling in Email by Jacek Stanisław Gwizdka A thesis submitted in conformity with the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy Graduate Department of Mechanical and Industrial Engineering University of Toronto © Copyright by Jacek Gwizdka 2004 “Cognitive Abilities, Interfaces and Tasks: Effects on Prospective Information Handling in Email” Degree of Doctor of Philosophy, 2004 Jacek Stanisław Gwizdka Department of Mechanical and Industrial Engineering, University of Toronto Abstract This dissertation is focused on new email user interfaces that may improve awareness and handling of task-laden messages in the inbox. The practical motivation for this research was to help email users process messages more effectively. A field study was conducted to examine email practices related to handling messages that refer to pending tasks. Individual differences in message handling style were observed, with one group of users transferring such messages out of their email pro- grams to other applications (e.g., calendars), while the other group kept prospective messages in email and used the inbox as a reminder of future events. Two novel graphical user interfaces were designed to facilitate monitoring and retrieval of prospective information from email messages. The TaskView interface displayed task- laden messages on a two-dimensional grid (with time on the horizontal axis). The WebT- askMail interface retained the two-dimensional grid, but extended the representation of pending tasks (added distinction between events and to-do's with deadlines), a vertical date reading line, and more space for email message headers. ii Two user studies were conducted to test hypothesized benefits of the new visual repre- sentations and to examine the effects of different levels of selected cognitive abilities on task-laden message handling performance. -
Unix Quickref.Dvi
Summary of UNIX commands Table of Contents df [dirname] display free disk space. If dirname is omitted, 1. Directory and file commands 1994,1995,1996 Budi Rahardjo ([email protected]) display all available disks. The output maybe This is a summary of UNIX commands available 2. Print-related commands in blocks or in Kbytes. Use df -k in Solaris. on most UNIX systems. Depending on the config- uration, some of the commands may be unavailable 3. Miscellaneous commands du [dirname] on your site. These commands may be a commer- display disk usage. cial program, freeware or public domain program that 4. Process management must be installed separately, or probably just not in less filename your search path. Check your local documentation or 5. File archive and compression display filename one screenful. A pager similar manual pages for more details (e.g. man program- to (better than) more. 6. Text editors name). This reference card, obviously, cannot de- ls [dirname] scribe all UNIX commands in details, but instead I 7. Mail programs picked commands that are useful and interesting from list the content of directory dirname. Options: a user's point of view. 8. Usnet news -a display hidden files, -l display in long format 9. File transfer and remote access mkdir dirname Disclaimer make directory dirname The author makes no warranty of any kind, expressed 10. X window or implied, including the warranties of merchantabil- more filename 11. Graph, Plot, Image processing tools ity or fitness for a particular purpose, with regard to view file filename one screenfull at a time the use of commands contained in this reference card. -
Can Microkernels Mitigate Microarchitectural Attacks?⋆
Can Microkernels Mitigate Microarchitectural Attacks?? Gunnar Grimsdal1, Patrik Lundgren2, Christian Vestlund3, Felipe Boeira1, and Mikael Asplund1[0000−0003−1916−3398] 1 Department of Computer and Information Science, Link¨oping University, Sweden ffelipe.boeira,[email protected] 2 Westermo Network Technologies [email protected] 3 Sectra AB, Link¨oping,Sweden Abstract. Microarchitectural attacks such as Meltdown and Spectre have attracted much attention recently. In this paper we study how effec- tive these attacks are on the Genode microkernel framework using three different kernels, Okl4, Nova, and Linux. We try to answer the question whether the strict process separation provided by Genode combined with security-oriented kernels such as Okl4 and Nova can mitigate microar- chitectural attacks. We evaluate the attack effectiveness by measuring the throughput of data transfer that violates the security properties of the system. Our results show that the underlying side-channel attack Flush+Reload used in both Meltdown and Spectre, is effective on all in- vestigated platforms. We were also able to achieve high throughput using the Spectre attack, but we were not able to show any effective Meltdown attack on Okl4 or Nova. Keywords: Genode, Meltdown, Spectre, Flush+Reload, Okl4, Nova 1 Introduction It used to be the case that general-purpose operating systems were mostly found in desktop computers and servers. However, as IoT devices are becoming in- creasingly more sophisticated, they tend more and more to require a powerful operating system such as Linux, since otherwise all basic services must be im- plemented and maintained by the device developers. At the same time, security has become a prime concern both in IoT and in the cloud domain. -
Operating System Support for Run-Time Security with a Trusted Execution Environment
Operating System Support for Run-Time Security with a Trusted Execution Environment - Usage Control and Trusted Storage for Linux-based Systems - by Javier Gonz´alez Ph.D Thesis IT University of Copenhagen Advisor: Philippe Bonnet Submitted: January 31, 2015 Last Revision: May 30, 2015 ITU DS-nummer: D-2015-107 ISSN: 1602-3536 ISBN: 978-87-7949-302-5 1 Contents Preface8 1 Introduction 10 1.1 Context....................................... 10 1.2 Problem....................................... 12 1.3 Approach...................................... 14 1.4 Contribution.................................... 15 1.5 Thesis Structure.................................. 16 I State of the Art 18 2 Trusted Execution Environments 20 2.1 Smart Cards.................................... 21 2.1.1 Secure Element............................... 23 2.2 Trusted Platform Module (TPM)......................... 23 2.3 Intel Security Extensions.............................. 26 2.3.1 Intel TXT.................................. 26 2.3.2 Intel SGX.................................. 27 2.4 ARM TrustZone.................................. 29 2.5 Other Techniques.................................. 32 2.5.1 Hardware Replication........................... 32 2.5.2 Hardware Virtualization.......................... 33 2.5.3 Only Software............................... 33 2.6 Discussion...................................... 33 3 Run-Time Security 36 3.1 Access and Usage Control............................. 36 3.2 Data Protection................................... 39 3.3 Reference -
Site Manager's Operations Manual for LISTSERV®, Version 14.3
L-Soft international, Inc. Site Manager's Operations Manual for LISTSERV®, version 14.3 7 December 2004 LISTSERV 14.3 Release The reference number of this document is 0412-MD-01. Information in this document is subject to change without notice. Companies, names and data used in examples herein are fictitious unless otherwise noted. L-Soft international, Inc. does not endorse or approve the use of any of the product names or trademarks appearing in this document. Permission is granted to copy this document, at no charge and in its entirety, provided that the copies are not used for commercial advantage, that the source is cited and that the present copyright notice is included in all copies, so that the recipients of such copies are equally bound to abide by the present conditions. Prior written permission is required for any commercial use of this document, in whole or in part, and for any partial reproduction of the contents of this document exceeding 50 lines of up to 80 characters, or equivalent. The title page, table of contents and index, if any, are not considered to be part of the document for the purposes of this copyright notice, and can be freely removed if present. The purpose of this copyright is to protect your right to make free copies of this manual for your friends and colleagues, to prevent publishers from using it for commercial advantage, and to prevent ill-meaning people from altering the meaning of the document by changing or removing a few paragraphs. Copyright © 1996-2004 L-Soft international, Inc.