DOCSLIB.ORG

Right-Wing Extremism in Poland

Total Page：16

File Type：pdf, Size：1020Kb

Download full-text PDF Read full-text
Right-Wing Extremism in Poland INTERNATIONAL POLICY ANALYSIS Right-Wing Extremism in Poland RAFAL PANKOWSKI October 2012 n While the Polish extreme right does not have its own representation on the level of a parliamentary political party, the mainstream populist conservative party, Law and Justice (PiS) absorbed a big portion of the radical nationalist ideology and cadres during the last years. The far-right impact on mainstream politics could be recently observed in Warsaw, when in September 2012 a mass street demonstration was organized jointly by the PiS, Solidarity trade union and the far-right Radio Maryja movement. n The extreme right places decidedly more emphasis on symbolic and identity politics than on economic and social policy. Although issues such as unemployment provide an important context to extreme-right activities, cultural factors remain decisive for right-wing groups. n The majority of the Polish extreme-right groups subscribes to a Catholic fundamen- talist ideology combined with a strongly radical ethnic version of nationalism in- cluding antisemitism. Their ideology is accompanied by a very traditionalist view on family and gender roles and concerning foreign policy marked by an opposition to the EU. RAFAL PANKOWSKI | RIGHT-WING EXTREMISM IN POLAND Contents 1. Introductory Remarks ...................................................3 2. Main Extreme-Right Groups Today ........................................3 3. Orientations, Narratives and Influence of Polish Right-Wing Extremism .........6 4. Countermeasures .......................................................9 1 RAFAL PANKOWSKI | RIGHT-WING EXTREMISM IN POLAND List of Abbreviations and Acronyms FNS National Socialist Front (Front Narodowo-Socjalistyczny) HP The Polish Regiments (Hufce Polskie) INR National-Radical Institute (Instytut Narodowo-Radykalny) LPR League of Polish Families (Liga Polskich Rodzin) MW All-Polish Youth (Młodzież Wszechpolska) NOP National Rebirth of Poland (Narodowe Odrodzenie Polski) NSBM Polish National-Socialist Black Metal ONR National-Radical Camp (Obóz Narodowo-Radykalny) PiS Law and Justice (Prawo i Sprawiedliwość) PO Civic Platform (Platforma Obywatelska) PPP Polish Labour Party (Polska Partia Pracy) RSA Alternative Social Movement (Ruch Społeczny Alternatywa) SP Solidary Poland (Solidarna Polska) SN National Party (Stronnictwo Narodowe) SNS New Forces Alliance (Sojusz Nowych Sił) 2 RAFAL PANKOWSKI | RIGHT-WING EXTREMISM IN POLAND 1. Introductory Remarks viding into two rival factions, it continued its activity for several years in the mid- to late 1930s. Both ONR factions There is no clear demarcation line between the Polish ex- campaigned against Jews, socialists and democrats. treme right, the populist right and the mainstream right. They frequently engaged in violent actions, shoot-outs The notion of a cordon sanitaire against the far right does and street fights against members of »enemy« groups not seem to have been accepted in Polish politics and the and occasionally against each other. The ONR tradition media. In reality, there are many overlaps between ex- was directly inspired by the Italian and German fascist treme-right and mainstream right circles in terms of both movements in the mid-1930s. The 1930s ONR serves as ideas and organisational connections. This lack of clear an important model for contemporary extremist groups. boundaries makes research on the far right problematic and hinders practical steps to counter the influence of The present ONR was formed as a loose organisation extreme-right groups and ideologies in contemporary composed of racist skinheads active in several cities in Poland. There is no doubt, however, that the significance the south of Poland in the early 2000s. By the late 2000s of the extreme nationalist set of ideas spreads far beyond it had grown into a national youth movement, and it a narrow margin of the political spectrum. gained notoriety through organising provocative street marches using the original fascist-style uniforms and the While far-right groups occupied a generally marginal po- Nazi (»Roman«) salute. The ONR adopted a swastika- sition in Polish politics throughout the 1990s, their influ- style symbol, »the hand with the sword«, also known ence grew in the next decade. In 2006–2007 extremist as the »Phalange«. One of its branches – in the town groups gained direct access to the mainstream through of Brzeg – was banned by the local court in 2009, but the government formed by populist right-wing parties. the other branches have been allowed to operate un- Many members of extreme-right and racist skinhead hindered. groups were rewarded with high-level appointments in government-controlled institutions in that period. This For several years the ONR has organised marches in War- extraordinary situation ended with the 2007 general saw on Polish Independence Day (11 November). Initially, election, but the extreme right has retained some size- they attracted several hundred participants, mostly racist able pockets of influence in terms of its cultural and or- skinheads chanting anti-Semitic slogans. However, since ganisational resources. 2010 the marches have attracted a much bigger turnout through cooperation with other extreme-right and na- tionalist organisations gathered under the label of the 2. Main Extreme-Right Groups Today »March of Independence« Association (Stowarzyszenie Marsz Niepodległości). It is estimated that some 20,000 As of 2012, the extreme right no longer has its own rep- people took part in the march in 2011, many of them resentation on the level of a parliamentary political party, supporters of football clubs from across Poland. The which it did have in the form of the League of Polish Fam- march was accompanied by civil society protests and ilies (Liga Polskich Rodzin, LPR) and, to a degree, in Self- marred by violence (attacks by extreme-right marchers Defence (Samoobrona) until the autumn of 2007. How- on the police and journalists). ever, it is clear that the mainstream populist conservative party, Law and Justice (Prawo i Sprawiedliwość, PiS), Among the ONR allies engaged in co-organising the and its offshoot, Solidarity Poland (Solidarna Polska, SP) marches, All-Polish Youth (Młodzież Wszechpolska, MW) absorbed a big portion of the radical nationalist ideol- occupies a key position. Like the ONR, it also draws on ogy and cadres. a tradition of an extreme nationalist organisation of the same name active in the pre-war period. The original The National-Radical Camp (Obóz Narodowo-Radykalny, MW was responsible for numerous attacks on Jewish ONR) is arguably the most active right-wing extremist or- students in the years before the Second World War. It ganisation currently active at the street level and among was re-launched by Roman Giertych in December 1989 youth. Its name goes back to 1934 when a radical anti- and soon came to serve as a youth group for the re- Semitic movement was formed under the same name. formed National Party (Stronnictwo Narodowe, SN) and, The latter was banned after a few months but, after di- since 2001, for the LPR. 3 RAFAL PANKOWSKI | RIGHT-WING EXTREMISM IN POLAND The latter-day MW was composed largely of skinheads litical party since 1994. In the 1990s the NOP was argu- and also tended to use violence against political oppo- ably the most dynamic extreme-right organisation in the nents. Its websites and publications proudly featured country. It has received minimal electoral support (e. g. the historic anti-Semitic declarations of its pre-war pre- 0.06 percent of the national vote in the parliamentary decessors. The anti-Semitic culture was discernable in election of 2005) but it has made its mark by influencing MW ranks in the 2000s, too. For example, anti-Semitic a generation of extreme-right subculture. books, such as Henry Ford’s The International Jew, were used by the MW to educate its members. MW also or- In 1994 the party was officially reorganised along au- ganised white power concerts, such as that of the anti- thoritarian lines, granting supreme power to Adam Semitic skinhead band Twierdza (The Fortress), and skin- Gmurczyk as its chairman. NOP leaders took over a head cultural codes permeated the ranks. It also tended nationalist journal Szczerbiec and transformed it into a to use violence against political opponents and minori- radical party organ. In the course of the early 1990s the ties. MW strong-arm squads intimidated opponents and NOP underwent a process of rapid radicalisation, earn- sought to physically dominate public spaces. ing it a reputation as one of the most extreme nationalist and neo-fascist groups in Europe, despite its legal status. By 2005, the MW clearly dominated the spectrum of At that time it began to infiltrate skinhead groups, en- youth-oriented right-wing extremist organisations. In couraging them to attack political enemies. The notori- the mid-2000s, through its involvement with the LPR, ous attack of an NOP skinhead squad on the Warsaw it gained temporary access to the political mainstream, office of a Polish Socialist Party faction in 1989 is fre- and several of its members were appointed to high- quently quoted as the first instance of extreme right- level government posts, with the MW founder and LPR wing political terror in post-communist Poland. leader Roman Giertych becoming minister of education and deputy prime minister, which provoked a series of The NOP recruited several hundred activists nationally, protests by civil society. mostly from the neo-Nazi skinhead scene. The major- ity of
Load more

Recommended publications
  • Assumptions of Law and Justice Party Foreign Policy
    Warsaw, May 2016 Change in Poland, but what change? Assumptions of Law and Justice party foreign policy Adam Balcer – WiseEuropa Institute Piotr Buras – European Council on Foreign Relations Grzegorz Gromadzki – Stefan Batory Foundation Eugeniusz Smolar – Centre for International Relations The deep reform of the state announced by Law and Justice party (PiS) and its unquestioned leader, Jarosław Kaczyński, and presented as the “Good Change”, to a great extent also influences foreign, especially European, policy. Though PiS’s political project has been usually analysed in terms of its relation to the post 1989, so called 3rd Republic institutional-political model and the results of the socio-economic transformation of the last 25 years, there is no doubt that in its alternative concept for Poland, the perception of the world, Europe and Poland’s place in it, plays a vital role. The “Good Change” concept implies the most far-reaching reorientation in foreign policy in the last quarter of a century, which, at the level of policy declarations made by representatives of the government circles and their intellectual supporters implies the abandonment of a number of key assumptions that shaped not only policy but also the imagination of the Polish political elite and broad society as a whole after 1989. The generally accepted strategic aim after 1989 was to avoid the “twilight zone” of uncertainty and to anchor Poland permanently in the western security system – i.e. NATO, and European political, legal and economic structures, in other words the European Union. “Europeanisation” was the doctrine of Stefan Batory Foundation Polish transformation after 1989.
    [Show full text]
  • Party Polarization and Campaign Finance
    July 2014 Party Polarization and Campaign Finance Thomas E. Mann and Anthony Corrado INTRODUCTION he intense debate these days about the shortcomings of American democ- racy and how best to deal with them often features assertions about parties, Tpolarization, and campaign finance that appear puzzling if not downright con- Thomas E. Mann tradictory. For example, some analysts argue that campaign finance reforms have is the W. Averell Harriman reduced the role of political parties in campaigns and thereby weakened the ability Chair and senior fellow in 1 Governance Studies at The of party leaders to commandeer their members on behalf of achievable policy goals. Brookings Institution. Between 1987 and 1999, he was Director This seems an odd argument to make in an era of historically high levels of party loy- of Governmental Studies at alty—on roll calls in Congress and voting in the electorate. Are parties too strong and Brookings. He is co-author, with Norman J. Ornstein, of It's Even unified or too weak and fragmented? Have they been marginalized in the financing of Worse Than It Looks: How the elections or is their role at least as strong as it has ever been? Does the party role in American Constitutional System Collided With the New Politics of campaign finance (weak or strong) materially shape our capacity to govern? Extremism. A second example involves the mix of small and large individual donors and its connection to polarization. The increasing involvement in presidential and congressional campaigns of large donors—especially through Super PACs and politically-active nonprofit organizations—has raised serious concerns about whether the super-wealthy are buying American democracy.
    [Show full text]
  • Ideology, Social Basis, Prospects REPORT 2018
    European Centre for Democracy Development Center for Monitoring and Comparative Analysis of Intercultural Communications CONTEMPORARY FAR-RIGHTS Right radicalism in Europe: ideology, social basis, prospects REPORT 2018 Athens-London-Berlin-Paris-Moscow-Krakow-Budapest-Kiev-Amsterdam-Roma 1 Editor in Chief and Project Head: Dr. Valery Engel, Chairman of the Expert Council of the European Centre for Tolerance, principal of the Center for Monitoring and Comparative Analysis of Intercultural Communications Authors: Dr. Valery Engel (general analytics), Dr. Jean-Yves Camus (France), Dr. Anna Castriota (Italy), Dr. Ildikó Barna (Hungary), Bulcsú Hunyadi (Hungary), Dr. Vanja Ljujic (Netherlands), Tika Pranvera (Greece), Katarzyna du Val (Poland), Dr. Semen Charny (Russia), Dr. Dmitry Stratievsky (Germany), Ruslan Bortnik (Ukraine), Dr. Alex Carter (UK) Authors thank the Chairman of the European Centre for Tolerance, Mr. Vladimir Sternfeld, for his financial support of the project CONTEMPORARY FAR-RIGHTS Right radicalism in Europe: ideology, social basis, prospects Report “Contemporary far-rights. Right-wing radicalism in Europe: ideology, social base, prospects" is the result of the work of an international team of experts from 10 European countries. The report answers the question of what is the social basis of European right- wing radicalism and what are the objective prerequisites and possible directions for its development. In addition, the authors answer the question of what stays behind the ideology of modern radicalism, what the sources of funding for right-wing radical organizations are, and who their leaders are. Significant part of information is introduced for the first time. © European Center for Democracy Development, 2018 © Center for Monitoring and Comparative Analysis of Intercultural Communications, 2018 © Institute for Ethnic Policy and Inter-Ethnic Relations Studies, 2018 2 Introduction Radicalism is a commitment to the extreme views and concepts of the social order associated with the possibility of its radical transformation.
    [Show full text]
  • A Synthetic Analysis of the Polish Solidarity Movement Stephen W
    Marshall University Marshall Digital Scholar Theses, Dissertations and Capstones 1-1-2011 A Synthetic Analysis of the Polish Solidarity Movement Stephen W. Mays [email protected] Follow this and additional works at: http://mds.marshall.edu/etd Part of the Other Political Science Commons, and the Politics and Social Change Commons Recommended Citation Mays, Stephen W., "A Synthetic Analysis of the Polish Solidarity Movement" (2011). Theses, Dissertations and Capstones. Paper 73. This Thesis is brought to you for free and open access by Marshall Digital Scholar. It has been accepted for inclusion in Theses, Dissertations and Capstones by an authorized administrator of Marshall Digital Scholar. For more information, please contact [email protected]. A SYNTHETIC ANALYSIS OF THE POLISH SOLIDARITY MOVEMENT A thesis submitted to the Graduate College of Marshall University In partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Arts Sociology by Stephen W. Mays Approved by Dr. Richard Garnett, Committee Chairman Dr. Marty Laubach Dr. Brian Hoey Marshall University Huntington, West Virginia December 2011 Table Of Contents Page Acknowledgements ................................................................................ iii Abstract .................................................................................................. v Chapter I. Introduction ................................................................................... 1 II. Methodology ..................................................................................
    [Show full text]
  • Between Denial and "Comparative Trivialization": Holocaust Negationism in Post-Communist East Central Europe
    Between Denial and "Comparative Trivialization": Holocaust Negationism in Post-Communist East Central Europe Michael Shafir Motto: They used to pour millet on graves or poppy seeds To feed the dead who would come disguised as birds. I put this book here for you, who once lived So that you should visit us no more Czeslaw Milosz Introduction* Holocaust denial in post-Communist East Central Europe is a fact. And, like most facts, its shades are many. Sometimes, denial comes in explicit forms – visible and universally-aggressive. At other times, however, it is implicit rather than explicit, particularistic rather than universal, defensive rather than aggressive. And between these two poles, the spectrum is large enough to allow for a large variety of forms, some of which may escape the eye of all but the most versatile connoisseurs of country-specific history, culture, or immediate political environment. In other words, Holocaust denial in the region ranges from sheer emulation of negationism elsewhere in the world to regional-specific forms of collective defense of national "historic memory" and to merely banal, indeed sometime cynical, attempts at the utilitarian exploitation of an immediate political context.1 The paradox of Holocaust negation in East Central Europe is that, alas, this is neither "good" nor "bad" for the Jews.2 But it is an important part of the * I would like to acknowledge the support of the J. and O. Winter Fund of the Graduate Center of the City University of New York for research conducted in connection with this project. I am indebted to friends and colleagues who read manuscripts of earlier versions and provided comments and corrections.
    [Show full text]
  • ESS9 Appendix A3 Political Parties Ed
    APPENDIX A3 POLITICAL PARTIES, ESS9 - 2018 ed. 3.0 Austria 2 Belgium 4 Bulgaria 7 Croatia 8 Cyprus 10 Czechia 12 Denmark 14 Estonia 15 Finland 17 France 19 Germany 20 Hungary 21 Iceland 23 Ireland 25 Italy 26 Latvia 28 Lithuania 31 Montenegro 34 Netherlands 36 Norway 38 Poland 40 Portugal 44 Serbia 47 Slovakia 52 Slovenia 53 Spain 54 Sweden 57 Switzerland 58 United Kingdom 61 Version Notes, ESS9 Appendix A3 POLITICAL PARTIES ESS9 edition 3.0 (published 10.12.20): Changes from previous edition: Additional countries: Denmark, Iceland. ESS9 edition 2.0 (published 15.06.20): Changes from previous edition: Additional countries: Croatia, Latvia, Lithuania, Montenegro, Portugal, Slovakia, Spain, Sweden. Austria 1. Political parties Language used in data file: German Year of last election: 2017 Official party names, English 1. Sozialdemokratische Partei Österreichs (SPÖ) - Social Democratic Party of Austria - 26.9 % names/translation, and size in last 2. Österreichische Volkspartei (ÖVP) - Austrian People's Party - 31.5 % election: 3. Freiheitliche Partei Österreichs (FPÖ) - Freedom Party of Austria - 26.0 % 4. Liste Peter Pilz (PILZ) - PILZ - 4.4 % 5. Die Grünen – Die Grüne Alternative (Grüne) - The Greens – The Green Alternative - 3.8 % 6. Kommunistische Partei Österreichs (KPÖ) - Communist Party of Austria - 0.8 % 7. NEOS – Das Neue Österreich und Liberales Forum (NEOS) - NEOS – The New Austria and Liberal Forum - 5.3 % 8. G!LT - Verein zur Förderung der Offenen Demokratie (GILT) - My Vote Counts! - 1.0 % Description of political parties listed 1. The Social Democratic Party (Sozialdemokratische Partei Österreichs, or SPÖ) is a social above democratic/center-left political party that was founded in 1888 as the Social Democratic Worker's Party (Sozialdemokratische Arbeiterpartei, or SDAP), when Victor Adler managed to unite the various opposing factions.
    [Show full text]
  • The Infirmity of Social Democracy in Postcommunist Poland a Cultural History of the Socialist Discourse, 1970-1991
    The Infirmity of Social Democracy in Postcommunist Poland A cultural history of the socialist discourse, 1970-1991 by Jan Kubik Assistant Professor of Political Science, Rutgers University American Society of Learned Societies Fellow, 1990-91 Program on Central and Eastem Europe Working Paper Series #20 January 1992 2 The relative weakness of social democracy in postcommunist Eastern Europe and the poor showing of social democratic parties in the 1990-91 Polish and Hungarian elections are intriguing phenom­ ena. In countries where economic reforms have resulted in increasing poverty, job loss, and nagging insecurity, it could be expected that social democrats would have a considerable follOwing. Also, the presence of relatively large working class populations and a tradition of left-inclined intellec­ tual opposition movements would suggest that the social democratic option should be popular. Yet, in the March-April 1990 Hungarian parliamentary elections, "the political forces ready to use the 'socialist' or the 'social democratic' label in the elections received less than 16 percent of the popular vote, although the class-analytic approach predicted that at least 20-30 percent of the working population ... could have voted for them" (Szelenyi and Szelenyi 1992:120). Simi­ larly, in the October 1991 Polish parliamentary elections, the Democratic Left Alliance (an elec­ toral coalition of reformed communists) received almost 12% of the vote. Social democratic parties (explicitly using this label) that emerged from Solidarity won less than 3% of the popular vote. The Szelenyis concluded in their study of social democracy in postcommunist Hungary that, "the major opposition parties all posited themselves on the political Right (in the Western sense of the term), but public opinion was overwhelmingly in favor of social democratic measures" (1992:125).
    [Show full text]
  • February 21, 1948 Report of the Special Action of the Polish Socialist Party in Prague, 21-25 February 1948
    Digital Archive digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org International History Declassified February 21, 1948 Report of the Special Action of the Polish Socialist Party in Prague, 21-25 February 1948 Citation: “Report of the Special Action of the Polish Socialist Party in Prague, 21-25 February 1948,” February 21, 1948, History and Public Policy Program Digital Archive, Archive of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Warsaw), file 217, packet 16, pp. 1-11. Translated by Anna Elliot-Zielinska. http://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/117117 Summary: In the midst of a cabinet crisis in Czechoslovakia that would lead to the February Communist coup, several delegates from the Polish Socialist Party were sent to Prague to spread socialist influence. The crisis is outlined, as well as a thorough report of the conference in Prague. Credits: This document was made possible with support from the Leon Levy Foundation. Original Language: Polish Contents: English Translation In accordance with the resolution of the Political Commission and General Secretariat of the Central Executive Committee (CKW) of the Polish Socialist Party (PPS), made late on the night of 20 February 1948, Com. Kazimierz Rusinek, Adam Rapacki, Henryk Jablonski, and Stefan Arski were delegated to go to Prague. This decision was made after a thorough analysis of the political situation in Czechoslovakia brought on by a cabinet crisis there. The goal of the delegation was to inform the Central Committee of the Czechoslovak Social Democratic Party (SD) about the basic stance of the PPS and possibly to influence the SD Central Committee in the spirit of leftist-socialist and revolutionary politics. The motive behind the decision of the Political Commission and General Secretariat was the fear that, from the leftist socialist point of view, the situation at the heart of SD after the Brno Congress was taking an unfavorable shape.
    [Show full text]
  • Dictionnaire Des Épées Célèbres
    Dictionnaire des épées célèbres Laurent BONNOT, V3d 2016 'épée est un symbole de pouvoir, auquel on confère souvent une âme et donne un Lnom. e livret vous permettra peut-être de compléter vos savoirs sur l'histoire de célèbres épées (pas toujours) légendaires, telles que les indestructibles Durandal ou Excalibur, et de faire connaissance avec d'autres lames moins connues telles que Courtain, Flamberge ou l'imprononçable mais réelle Szczerbiec. vertissement: deux erreurs (enfin … au moins deux) se sont glissées parmi Aces définitions. Un grand merci à Caroline pour sa relecture et ses corrections éclairées. Publié sur http://bonnot.laurent.free.fr Un commentaire ? Une suggestion ? [email protected] ‹‹ Dictionnaire des épées célèbres – édition 3d déc. 2016 © LB - page 1 / 33 Le catalogue du râ telier 1ère partie : épées de légendes historiques............................................................................4 Le nom de certaines épées est suivi d'un code de trois caractères placé entre crochets: [ART] pour les épées citées dans le mythe arthurien [CEL] pour les épées citées dans la mythologie celtique [HIS] pour les épées ayant réellement existé [MAS] pour les épées citées dans la mythologie anglo-saxonne [MGE] pour la mythologie germanique [MNO] pour la mythologie nordique [ROL] pour les épées citées dans la chanson de Roland Al-Adb, Al-Battar, Al-Ma'thur, Al-Mikhdham, Al-Rasub, Al-Qadib [HIS].................................--)------- 4 Almace [ROL]...............................................................................................................................--)-------
    [Show full text]
  • The Piast Horseman)
    Coins issued in 2006 Coins issued in 2006 National Bank of Poland Below the eagle, on the right, an inscription: 10 Z¸, on the left, images of two spearheads on poles. Under the Eagle’s left leg, m the mint’s mark –– w . CoinsCoins Reverse: In the centre, a stylised image of an armoured mounted sergeant with a bared sword. In the background, the shadow of an armoured mounted sergeant holding a spear. On the top right, a diagonal inscription: JEèDZIEC PIASTOWSKI face value 200 z∏ (the Piast Horseman). The Piast Horseman metal 900/1000Au finish proof – History of the Polish Cavalry – diameter 27.00 mm weight 15.50 g mintage 10,000 pcs Obverse: On the left, an image of the Eagle established as the state Emblem of the Republic of Poland. On the right, an image of Szczerbiec (lit. notched sword), the sword that was traditionally used in the coronation ceremony of Polish kings. In the background, a motive from the sword’s hilt. On the right, face value 2 z∏ the notation of the year of issue: 2006. On the top right, a semicircular inscription: RZECZPOSPOLITA POLSKA (the metal CuAl5Zn5Sn1 alloy Republic of Poland). At the bottom, an inscription: 200 Z¸. finish standard m Under the Eagle’s left leg, the mint’s mark:––w . diameter 27.00 mm Reverse: In the centre, a stylised image of an armoured weight 8.15 g mounted sergeant with a bared sword. In the background, the mintage 1,000,000 pcs sergeant’s shadow. On the left, a semicircular inscription: JEèDZIEC PIASTOWSKI (the Piast Horseman).
    [Show full text]
  • Review of European and National Election Results Update: September 2019
    REVIEW OF EUROPEAN AND NATIONAL ELECTION RESULTS UPDATE: SEPTEMBER 2019 A Public Opinion Monitoring Publication REVIEW OF EUROPEAN AND NATIONAL ELECTION RESULTS UPDATE: SEPTEMBER 2019 Directorate-General for Communication Public Opinion Monitoring Unit May 2019 - PE 640.149 IMPRESSUM AUTHORS Philipp SCHULMEISTER, Head of Unit (Editor) Alice CHIESA, Marc FRIEDLI, Dimitra TSOULOU MALAKOUDI, Matthias BÜTTNER Special thanks to EP Liaison Offices and Members’ Administration Unit PRODUCTION Katarzyna ONISZK Manuscript completed in September 2019 Brussels, © European Union, 2019 Cover photo: © Andrey Kuzmin, Shutterstock.com ABOUT THE PUBLISHER This paper has been drawn up by the Public Opinion Monitoring Unit within the Directorate–General for Communication (DG COMM) of the European Parliament. To contact the Public Opinion Monitoring Unit please write to: [email protected] LINGUISTIC VERSION Original: EN DISCLAIMER This document is prepared for, and primarily addressed to, the Members and staff of the European Parliament to assist them in their parliamentary work. The content of the document is the sole responsibility of its author(s) and any opinions expressed herein should not be taken to represent an official position of the Parliament. TABLE OF CONTENTS EDITORIAL 1 1. COMPOSITION OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT 5 DISTRIBUTION OF SEATS OVERVIEW 1979 - 2019 6 COMPOSITION OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT LAST UPDATE (31/07/2019) 7 CONSTITUTIVE SESSION (02/07/2019) AND OUTGOING EP SINCE 1979 8 PROPORTION OF WOMEN AND MEN PROPORTION - LAST UPDATE 02/07/2019 28 PROPORTIONS IN POLITICAL GROUPS - LAST UPDATE 02/07/2019 29 PROPORTION OF WOMEN IN POLITICAL GROUPS - SINCE 1979 30 2. NUMBER OF NATIONAL PARTIES IN THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT CONSTITUTIVE SESSION 31 3.
    [Show full text]
  • EUROPEAN ELECTIONS in the V4 from Disinformation Campaigns to Narrative Amplification
    Strategic Communication Programme EUROPEAN ELECTIONS IN THE V4 From disinformation campaigns to narrative amplification 1 AUTHORS Miroslava Sawiris, Research Fellow, StratCom Programme, GLOBSEC, Slovakia Lenka Dušková, Project Assistant, PSSI, Czech Republic Jonáš Syrovátka, Programme Manager, PSSI, Czech Republic Lóránt Győri, Geopolitical Analyst, Political Capital, Hungary Antoni Wierzejski, Member of the Board, Euro-Atlantic Association, Poland GLOBSEC and National Endowment for Democracy assume no responsibility for the facts or opinions expressed in this publication or their subsequent use. The sole responsibility lies with the authors of this report. METHODOLOGY Data were collected between 10.4.2019 and 29.5.2019 from 15 relevant Facebook pages in each V4 country based on the following criteria: local experts and publicly available sources (such as blbec.online) identified Facebook channels that often publish disinformation content. In the selection of Facebook pages, those openly affiliated with a specific political party were omitted, including the Facebook pages of individual candidates. The data were filtered using different forms of the term “election” in local languages and the term “euro”, and then labelled based on the sentiment toward relevant political parties and the most prevalent narratives identified. © GLOBSEC GLOBSEC, Bratislava, Slovakia June 2019 2 TABLE OF CONTENTS EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 4 Czechia 4 Hungary 4 Poland 4 Slovakia 4 ACTIVITY OF THE MONITORED CHANNELS ACROSS THE V4 REGION 6 Intensity of the campaigns 6
    [Show full text]