View metadata, citation and similar papers at core.ac.uk brought to you by CORE provided by Kosmopolis University of Pennsylvania ScholarlyCommons Finance Papers Wharton Faculty Research 2-2009 Merger Negotiations and the Toehold Puzzle Sandra Betton B. Espen Eckbo Karin S. Thorburn Follow this and additional works at: http://repository.upenn.edu/fnce_papers Part of the Finance Commons, and the Finance and Financial Management Commons Recommended Citation Betton, S., Eckbo, B. E., & Thorburn, K. S. (2009). Merger Negotiations and the Toehold Puzzle. Journal of Financial Economics, 91 (2), 158-178. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jfineco.2008.02.004 Author Karin S.Thorburn is a full time faculty member of Norwegian School of Economics. She is a visiting professor in the Finance Department of the Wharton School at the University of Pennsylvania. This paper is posted at ScholarlyCommons. http://repository.upenn.edu/fnce_papers/202 For more information, please contact
[email protected]. Merger Negotiations and the Toehold Puzzle Abstract The ubss tantial control premium typically observed in corporate takeovers makes a compelling case for acquiring target shares (a toehold) in the market prior to launching a bid. Moreover, auction theory suggests that toehold bidding may yield a competitive advantage over rival bidders. Nevertheless, with a sample exceeding 10,000 initial control bids for US public targets, we show that toehold bidding has declined steadily since the early 1980s and is now surprisingly rare. At the same time, the average toehold is large when it occurs (20%), and toeholds are the norm in hostile bids. To explain these puzzling observations, we develop and test a two-stage takeover model where attempted merger negotiations are followed by open auction.