Monetary Union Begets Fiscal Union Adrien Auclert Matthew Rognlie∗
[email protected] [email protected] August 2014 Abstract We propose a mechanism through which monetary union between countries leads to a stronger fiscal union. Although fiscal risk-sharing is valuable under any monetary regime, given nominal rigidities it is more important within a monetary union, when exchange rates can no longer adjust to offset shocks. As a result, countries in a monetary union are capable of achieving better risk-sharing, partly overcoming their lack of commitment. Still, equilibria without fiscal cooperation remain possible and imply inefficient cross-country dispersion in output. A proactive central bank can encourage transfers by providing extra accommodation when fiscal union is under stress. Transfer criterion Countries that agree to compensate each other for adverse shocks form an optimum currency area. Baldwin and Wyplosz(2012), Chapter 15 1 Introduction A simplified narrative of the recent crisis in the Eurozone can be given as follows. Following the adoption of the single currency, a number of “periphery” countries progressively lost competitive- ness as their real unit labor costs grew faster than the union average. When the global financial crisis hit in 2008, the accumulated internal imbalances came into sharp focus. Given their fixed nominal exchange rate vis-à-vis other Eurozone members, the only way periphery countries could achieve the real depreciation needed to regain competitiveness was through a painful process of economic contraction bringing about falls in domestic prices. Indeed, this adjustment process was so damaging to periphery economies that there was mounting speculation that some of them might leave the Euro.