Going Forward: Improving the Legal Advice of National Security Lawyers William J
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Boston College International and Comparative Law Review Volume 32 Issue 2 The Pen, the Sword, and the Waterboard: Article 7 Ethical Lawyering in the “Global War on Terroism” 5-1-2009 Going Forward: Improving the Legal Advice of National Security Lawyers William J. Dunn Follow this and additional works at: http://lawdigitalcommons.bc.edu/iclr Part of the Legal Profession Commons Recommended Citation William J. Dunn, Going Forward: Improving the Legal Advice of National Security Lawyers, 32 B.C. Int'l & Comp. L. Rev. 241 (2009), http://lawdigitalcommons.bc.edu/iclr/vol32/iss2/7 This Symposium Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at Digital Commons @ Boston College Law School. It has been accepted for inclusion in Boston College International and Comparative Law Review by an authorized editor of Digital Commons @ Boston College Law School. For more information, please contact [email protected]. GOING FORWARD: IMPROVING THE LEGAL ADVICE OF NATIONAL SECURITY LAWYERS William J. Dunn* Abstract: Attorney General Mukasey was correct when he noted that na- tional security lawyers traditionally oscillate between aggression and timid- ity. Debates about which extreme is “better,” however, miss the larger point; namely, that these cycles are driven by factors that the competent national security lawyer has a duty to understand. Such a thorough knowl- edge allows lawyers in this field to dampen the harmful oscillation and render the best legal advice possible. After identifying factors that affect the rendering of such counsel, the author makes several specific policy rec- ommendations that will assist lawyers—who are “uniquely suited to bear this responsibility” —in this critical task. Introduction The commencement remarks of Attorney General Michael Mu- kasey at Boston College Law School stirred debate about the proper role of a government lawyer in providing legal advice regarding com- plex, challenging, and gravely important issues of national security.1 Attorney General Mukasey provided his vision of how lawyers should “do law” in this environment.2 The premise underlying his vision is that lawyers partake in and contribute to “cycles of timidity and aggression,” where the national security community oscillates between periods of controversial, aggressive energy and risk-averse retrenchment.3 The lesson drawn by the Attorney General and the advice he imparted on * Attorney at the law firm Ropes & Gray, LLP. The author graduated from Boston Col- lege Law School in 2006. Prior to law school, he worked as an intelligence analyst for the Department of the Navy and the Department of Defense, where he focused on issues of military strategy and doctrine; he served as a crisis analyst and briefer at the National Mili- tary Joint Intelligence Center in the Pentagon. 1 See, e.g., Peter Schworm, Some at BC Seek to Uninvite Mukasey from Commencement, Bos- ton Globe, Mar. 23, 2008, at B5. 2 See Michael B. Mukasey, The Role of Lawyers in the Global War on Terrorism, 32 B.C. Int’l & Comp. L. Rev. 179, 184 (2009). 3 Id. The Attorney General referenced that term as used by former head of the Office of Legal Counsel, Jack Goldsmith. See Jack Goldsmith, The Terror Presidency 163 (2007). 241 242 Boston College International & Comparative Law Review [Vol. 32:241 the graduating class is that the threat posed by terrorism today raises the stakes too high for national security lawyers to fall back into the role of risk-averse and obstructionist actors.4 The Attorney General provides a valid lesson to aspiring lawyers. Lawyers in all capacities must counsel clients, and the indispensable in- gredient of sound counsel is the ability to render a judgment that not only sets out, but seeks to resolve the balance between the costs and benefits of a particular action.5 A lawyer who advises a client solely based on a worst case scenario does not achieve this balance. In the context of national security issues, the failure to provide sound counsel leads un- necessarily to constraints on governmental actors in the pursuit of le- gitimate and necessary aims.6 These constraints carry costs, as demonstrated by the tragically flawed legal opinions rendered by the Federal Bureau of Investigation’s (FBI) National Security Law Unit. In these opinions, FBI lawyers pre- vented an investigation into Khalid al-Mihdhar by relying on a fictional legal wall between intelligence and criminal agencies that purportedly did not allow the sharing of information.7 Mihdhar had connections with the terrorist bombings of the U.S. embassies in Africa and the at- tack against the U.S.S. Cole.8 He later assisted in the hijacking of American Airlines Flight 77 that was flown into the Pentagon.9 The problem with the Attorney General’s analysis lies not with his description of the proper role of a lawyer as counselor, or even his con- clusion that lawyers cannot recoil in the face of public scrutiny or legal uncertainty into an obstructionist, ultra-conservative position regarding national security law. The Attorney General errs by not looking criti- cally at both the crests and troughs of the “cycles of timidity and aggres- sion.”10 More specifically, the Attorney General myopically focuses on the reactive, dependent side of that historical pendulum without con- sidering the equally—if not more—important lessons that must be drawn from the independent, causation side of governmental over- 4 See generally Mukasey, supra note 2. 5 See Lorie M. Graham, Aristotle’s Ethics and the Virtuous Lawyer: Part One of a Study on Le- gal Ethics and Clinical Legal Education, 20 J. Legal Prof. 5, 31–34 (1996). 6 See Goldsmith, supra note 3, at 163. 7 See The 9/11 Commission Report, Final Report of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States 181–82, 231–39, 270–72 (2004). 8 Id. at 151. 9 Id. at 231–40. 10 In his remarks, the Attorney General focuses almost exclusively on the risk-averse side of the “pendulum.” See Mukasey, supra note 2, at 184. 2009] Improving the Legal Advice of National Security Lawyers 243 reaching.11 He errs because he sees the retrenchment of the intelli- gence community and presumably the growth of risk-averse counsel as a choice, rather than an atmosphere forced upon them by a public seeking to right a listing governmental vessel and to recapture rights ceded to claims of necessity.12 When considering both sides of this cycle together, governmental overreaching to achieve temporal objectives reveals itself as short- sighted. By overreaching, the government may address a risk it per- ceives to be genuine.13 If it is accomplished, however, through the use of illegal or unduly aggressive means, the resulting public backlash may not only strip away the excess but also incapacitate the agency or agent.14 In that resulting anemic atmosphere, national security threats continue, but the government is less capable of addressing them.15 As a result, by taking a comprehensive view of this cycle of action and reac- 11 “We cannot afford to invite another ‘cycle of timidity’ in the intelligence commu- nity; the stakes are simply too high.” Id. at 185. 12 In fact, the Attorney General advises that a good lawyer should “tune out all this white noise” and does not address the fact that the public, in response to egregious over- reaching asserts its constitutional voice through demands on its representatives. Id. at 185. 13 Furthermore, history often demonstrates that such risks were not as dire as per- ceived. “After each perceived security crisis ended, the United States has remorsefully real- ized that the abrogation of civil liberties was unnecessary. But it has proven unable to pre- vent itself from repeating the error when the next crisis came along.” William J. Brennan, Jr., The Quest to Develop a Jurisprudence of Civil Liberties in Times of Security Crisis, 18 Isr. Y.B. Hum. Rts. 11, 11 (1988). Some noteworthy examples of perceived risks that, with the benefit of hindsight, may be viewed as overreactions include Andrew Jackson’s suspension of habeas corpus and the arrest of Federal District Judge Dominick Hall after the Battle of New Orleans, President Abraham Lincoln’s suspension of habeas corpus on April 27, 1861, despite little actual threat to Washington D.C., and the now infamous internment of Japa- nese-Americans after Pearl Harbor where the government argued, among other reasons, that the Japanese-Americans were sending signals to Japanese submarines. See Matthew Warshauer, Andrew Jackson and the Politics of Martial Law 35–36 (2006) (describ- ing circumstances surrounding the arrest of Judge Hall); Malick W. Ghachem & Daniel Gordon, From Emergency Law to Legal Process: Herbert Wechsler and the Second World War, 40 Suff. U. L. Rev. 333, 340 (2007) (discussing military justifications for internment of Japa- nese-Americans); David Greenberg, Lincoln’s Crackdown, Slate, Nov. 30, 2001, http://www. slate.com/id/2059132 (detailing Abraham Lincoln’s suspension of habeas corpus). 14 See Goldsmith, supra note 3, at 163. The risk-averse nature of legal advice criticized by the 9/11 Commission was, in many respects, a reaction to the aggressive posturing of William J. Casey—lawyer and President Ronald Reagan’s first Director of the CIA—who went so far as to literally move the Office of the General Counsel for the CIA outside of the headquarters. He followed up this symbolic move with a philosophical and practical shift in President Carter’s anemic intelligence policy. See Dorian D. Greene, Ethical Dilemmas Confronting Intelligence Agency Counsel, 2 Tulsa J. Comp. & Int’l L. 91, 105–06 (1994). 15 See Goldsmith, supra note 3, at 163–64. 244 Boston College International & Comparative Law Review [Vol.