Consociationalism and Multi-Ethnic States: Post-1971 Pakistan—A Case Study
By
MUHAMMAD MUSHTAQ (HEC Scholar)
Supervised By
DR. SYED KHAWAJA ALQAMA DR. AYAZ MUHAMMAD
A thesis submitted in fulfillment of the requirement for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy in Political Science
Department of Political Science & International Relations
Bahauddin Zakariya University Multan, Pakistan Abstract
This study aims to enhance our understanding relating the utility of consociational democracy for multiethnic states, analyzing the Pakistani case. So, the central concern of this dissertation is whether or not consociationalism is a viable solution for the multiethnic society of Pakistan.
To address this concern, three arguments have been presented in the thesis: First, the political mobilization and ethnic strife in Pakistan is not caused by non-consociational features of the federation but because of its relatively centralized settings. Second, consociationalism is not a realistic option for Pakistan to manage ethnic diversity.
This conclusion is based on three observations: (a) with some exceptions, favorable conditions for the establishment and maintenance of consociational democracy are missing in the case of Pakistan, (b) the evaluation of Pakistani society illustrates that it is not a case of deeply divided society, (c) and the past experiences of power- sharing arrangements in Pakistan demonstrate the inaptness of these arrangements for this case. Conversely, the study explores the underlying relevancy of federalism with the Pakistani society. Third, the plurality of Pakistanis seems unconvinced by the consociational arguments. A majority of interviewees demonstrated more support for the decentralized federalism than the consociationalism.
The irrelevancy of consociationalism with the Pakistani case seems to suggest that consociational democracy’s utility varies across case studies. Hence, it is not, necessarily, a viable solution for all multiethnic societies. In addition, the thesis argues that Pakistan needs a relatively more decentralized federal design to manage ethnic diversity.
i Acknowledgement
My foremost praise goes to Almighty Allah, my Lord and Creator who empowered and enabled me to complete this research. All my respect goes to the Holy Prophet Muhammad
(Peace be upon Him), who emphasized the significance of knowledge and research.
I am greatly obliged to my supervisors, Dr. Syed Khawja Alqama and Dr. Ayaz Muhammad
Rana for their support, guidance and feedbacks through out my PhD research work. I have been exceptionally fortunate to work under their supervision. I appreciate Higher Education
Commission Islamabad for sponsoring my PhD studies. I am equally grateful to the teachers and staff of the Political Science & International Relations, Bahauddin Zakariya University
Multan for their support. Particularly, Dr. Shahnaz Tariq and Fayyaz Ahmad Hussain from whom I benefited a lot during my course work. I am thankful to Frances Stewart (QEH,
Oxford), Nancy Bermeo (Nuffield College, Oxford), Yunas Samad, Iftikhar H. Malik, and
Pritam Singh for their valuable academic support during my stay at Oxford University. I am also obliged to the examiners of my thesis, Subrata K. Mitra (Heidelberg), Mathew Nelson
(SOAS), and Tahir Amin (QUA), for their helpful suggestions and comments. I am indebted to Ian Talbot for reading the first draft of the thesis. I acknowledge the support provided by the participants and teachers in Summer University (2008) at University of Fribourg,
Switzerland. I am thankful to all my friends at BZU who have been helpful and kind throughout my stay at Multan. Particularly, Shahzad Hussain (Economics), Zamir Hussain
(Statistics), and Mehmood-ul-Hassan (Statistics) deserve appreciation for their support. I would like to thank Obaid-ur-Rehman, Zafar Hussain Harral, and Malik Javed Iqbal Wains whom have made, in their own way, my time at the campus enjoyable. My deepest gratitude goes to my parents and family members; I could not have completed my work without their love and encouragement. Finally, I would like to thanks Shagufta who shared the all sufferings that I bear while completing this thesis.
ii TABLE OF CONTENTS Abstract i Acknowledgements ii Table of Contents iii List of Figures viii
Chapter No. 1: Introduction
1.1 Prologue 1 1.2 Objectives and Scope of study 4 1.3 Research Questions 6 1.4 Research Methodology 8 1.5 Structure of the Thesis 8
Chapter No. 2: Consociationalism: A Review and Critique
2.1 Introduction 14 2.2 Consociationalism 15 2.3 Development of the Consociational Theory 16 2.4 The Growth and Expansion of Consociational Democracy 18 2.5 Characteristics of Consociationalism 20 2.5.1 Grand Coalition or Executive Power sharing 20 2.5.2 Segmental Autonomy 23 2.5.3 Proportionality 25 2.5.4 Mutual Veto 26 2.6 Examples of Consociational Arrangements 27 2.7 The Favorable Factors for Consociational Democracy 33 2.8 Collected Critique 36 2.9 Consociationalism and Pakistan 41
Chapter No. 3: Ethnic Diversity: A Problem in Pakistan
3.1 Introduction 47 3.2 Movement of Indian Muslims for a Separate Homeland 47 3.3 Pre-1971 Pakistan: Constitutional and Political Development 50 3.4 Post-1971 Pakistan: an Overview of Ethnic Groups and their Locations 53 3.4.1 Punjab 54 3.4.1.1 Punjabi Speaking Region of Punjab 55 3.4.1.2 Siraiki Speaking Areas of Punjab 55 3.4.2 Sindh 55
iii 3.4.3 North-Western Frontier Province (NWFP) 56 3.4.4 Balochistan 56 3.5 Grievances of Smaller Communities 59 3.5.1 Lack of Power-sharing 59 3.5.1.1 Distribution of Political Positions 60 3.5.1.2 Civil Bureaucracy 62 3.5.1.3 Distribution of Diplomatic Positions 65 3.5.2. Militarization 66 3.5.3 Uneven Development and Regional Disparities 69 3.5.4 Distributive issues 75 3.5.4.1 Allocation of Funds: NFC Award 75 3.5.4.2 Water Resources 75 3.5.4.2.1 Apprehensions of smaller units against the construction of Kalabagh Dam 76 3.5.4.2.2 Responses to Kalabagh Dam campaign 78 3.6 Some Substantial Protests and Autonomy Demands of Political Parties 81
Chapter No. 4: Managing Ethnic Diversity and Federalism in Pakistan
4.1 Introduction 93 4.2 Historical Background 93 4.3 Federal Settings in the 1973 Constitution: Theory and Practice 95 4.3.1 Legislative Distribution between Federation and Provinces 95 4.3.2 Administrative Relations between Federation and Provinces 100 4.3.2.1 Emergency powers 102 4.3.2.2 Central Governments Intervention to Federating Units 103 4.3.3 Distribution of Revenues between Federation and Provinces 105 4.3.3.1 Fiscal Decentralization in Pakistan (1971-2006) 107 4.3.3.2. Comparative Fiscal Decentralization in Selected Federations 108 4.4 Politics of Identity in Pakistan 110 4.4.1 Pashtuns’ Separatism 110 4.4.2 Baloch Nationalism 113 4.4.3 Sindhi Regionalism 116 4.4.4 Mohajir Identity Politics 119 4.4.5 Siraiki Movement 124 4.5 Alternative Explanations of Ethnic Mobilization: A Matter of Non-consociational Mechanisms or a Case of Centralized Federal Settings? 126 4.5.1 Pashtuns 128
iv 4.5.2 Balochs 130 4.5.3 Sindhis 132 4.5.4 Mohajirs 135 4.5.5 Siraikis 138 4.6 Conclusion 139 Chapter No. 5: Consociationalism as a Realistic Option for Pakistan: an Assessment
5.1 Introduction 149 5.2 Favorable Factors for Consociational Democracy and the Multiethnic Society of Pakistan 150 5.2.1 No Majority Segment 150 5.2.2 Segments of Equal Size 152 5.2.3 Small Number of Segments 152 5.2.4 Small Population Size 153 5.2.5 External Threats 154 5.2.6 Overarching Loyalties 155 5.2.7 Socio-economic Equality 156 5.2.8 Geographical Concentration of Segments 157 5.2.9 Tradition of Compromise and Accommodation 160 5.2.10 Comparative Analysis of Favorable Conditions in Selected Countries 161 5.3 Politics of Accommodation in Pakistan (1971-2008) 163 5.3.1 Power-sharing Arrangements under the Tripartite Accord 166 5.3.2 Coalition Politics of Post-Zia Era 168 5.3.3 Politics of Accommodation in Post-Musharraf Period 174 5.4 The Degree of Pluralism in Pakistani Case and Consociational Democracy 177 5.4.1 Identification of the Segments and Measurement of their Sizes 179 5.4.2 Composition of Political and Socio-economic Organizations 183 5.4.2.1 Awami National Party (ANP) 185 5.4.2.2 Mohajir Quami Movement (MQM) 187 5.4.2.3 Pashtun Khawa Milli Awami Party (PKMAP) 189 5.4.2.4 Baloch Nationalist Groups 190 5.4.3 Stability in Electoral Support 194 5.4.3.1 Index of Electoral Success (IES) 194 5.4.3.2 Electoral Stability: Coefficient of Variance 196 5.5 Conclusion 198
v Chapter No.6: Consociationalism as a Policy Recommendation for Pakistan: A Survey of Public Opinion
6.1 Introduction 211 6.2 Methodology 212 6.2.1 Sampling 212 6.2.2 Questionnaire 213 6.3 Findings of the Survey 214 6.3.1 Findings concerning Existing Federal Settings 214 6.3.1.1 Perception about the Domination of Certain Ethno-linguistic Groups 214 6.3.1.2 Findings about the two most Privileged Ethno-linguistic Groups 215 6.3.1.3 Findings about the two most Marginalized Ethno-linguistic Groups 216 6.3.1.4 Power-sharing Arrangements in Exiting Federal Settings 217 6.3.1.5 Alienation of Smaller Communities during Military Rule 217 6.3.1.6 Punjab as a Blockage in Smooth Running of Federalism 218 6.3.1.7 Recapitulation 219 6.3.2 Findings concerning the Proposed Consociational Governance 220 6.3.2.1 Level of Fragmentation in Pakistani Society 221 6.3.2.1.1 Pride for Ethnic Identity 222 6.3.2.1.2 Dislike the Settlement of other groups in Regional Base 222 6.3.2.1.3 Cultural grievances and survival of language 222 6.3.2.1.4 Exclusive Political, Social and Economic Organizations 223 6.3.2.1.5 Recapitulation 223 6.3.2.2 Support for Consociational Devices 225 6.3.2.2.1 Grand Coalition or Executive Power sharing 225 6.3.2.2.2 Proportionality 226 6.3.2.2.2.1 Proportional Voting System 228 6.3.2.2.2.2 Proportionality in Armed Forces 228 6.3.2.2.3 Minority Rights Protection 229 6.3.2.2.4 Segmental Autonomy 229 6.3.2.2.4.1 Right to Design Educational System 230 6.3.2.2.4.2 Homogenous Constituent Units 230 6.3.2.2.5 Recapitulation 232 6.3.3 Findings concerning Decentralized Federal Design 235 6.3.3.1 Provincial Autonomy 235 6.3.3.2 Extended Role for the Senate 236 6.3.3.3 Provincial Legislatures’ Role in Amending Constitution 236
vi 6.3.3.4 Equitable Formula for National Finance Commission Award 237 6.3.3.5 Recapitulation 237 6.3.4 Comparison of Support for Consociationalism and (Decentralized) Federalism 240 6.4 Interviews of some Experts and Political Leaders 240 6.5 Conclusion 242
Chapter No.7: Findings and Conclusion
Findings and Conclusion 248
Bibliography 258
Appendix 1: Summary of Interviews 272 Appendix 2: Acronyms 278
vii LIST OF FIGURES Figure 2-1: Expansion of Consociational Democracy 19 Figure 2-2: Lijphart’s List of Favorable Factors 35 Figure 3-1: Pakistan by Mother Language 54 Figure 3-2: Ethno-linguistic Groups in Pakistan: Some Comparative Observation 58 Figure 3-3: Distribution of Political Positions across ethno-linguistic Groups (Ethnic Origins of Prime Ministers of Post-1971 Pakistan) 61 Figure 3-4: Distribution of Political Positions across ethno-linguistic Groups (Ethnic Origins of Presidents of Post-1971 Pakistan) 62 Figure 3-5: Distribution of Political Positions in Various Groups: A Summary 62 Figure 3-6: Regional Representation of Federal Bureaucracy (1973-83) 64 Figure 3-7: Distribution of Diplomatic Positions 66 Figure 3-8: Administrative Division of Military Pensioners 68 Figure 3-9: Uneven Development (I) 72 Figure 3-10: Uneven Development (II) 74 Figure 3-11: Allocation Shares to Provinces under Various NFC Awards 75 Figure 3-12: Map of Kalabagh Dam 79 Figure 3-13: Some Instances of Substantial protest (1947-2006) 82 Figure 3-14: Political Parties’ Stand over Provincial Autonomy 83 Figure 4-1: Comparative Legislative Decentralization in selected Federal Countries 98 Figure 4-2: Hierarchical Cluster Analysis 99 Figure 4-3: Central Governments Intervention to Federating Units 105 Figure 4-4: Fiscal Decentralization (I) 108 Figure 4-5: Fiscal Decentralization (II) 108 Figure 4-6: Fiscal Decentralization in Selected Federations 109 Figure 5-1: Numerical Strength (%) of Ethno-linguistic Groups in Pakistan (1998) 151 Figure 5-2: Uneven size of ethno-linguistic groups in Pakistan 152 Figure 5-3: Population Size of Some Countries (2008) 154 Figure 5-4: Comparison of Population Size of Selected Countries 154 Figure 5-5: Socio-economic Inequality in Pakistan 157 Figure 5-6: Geographical Distribution of Ethno-linguistic Groups in Pakistan 158 Figure 5-7: Ethno-linguistic Composition of Pakistan 160 Figure 5-8: Rating Based on the Favorable Factors for Selected Countries 162 Figure 5-9: Favorable Factors and Pakistan 162 Figure 5-10: Degree of Pluralism and the Probability of Success for British and 178 Consociational Model of Democracy Figure 5-11: Fragmentation Index for Selected Cases 183
viii Figure 5-12: National Assembly Elections (1988-2008) in Pashtun Majority Region 186 Figure 5-13: National Assembly Elections (1988-2008) in Mohajir Constituency 188 Figure 5-14: Baloch Nationalist Parties: Percentage votes in National Assembly 190 (Baloch Majority Region: 1988-2008) Figure 5-15: Electoral Performance of Ethno-regional Parties in Federal Elections 193 (% Vote at Regional Base: 1988-2008) Figure 5-16: Descriptive Statistics: Federal Election in Pakistan (1988-2008) 193 (Electoral Support for Ethno-regional Parties in their Respective Regional Base) Figure 5-17: Index of Electoral Success (IES): Federal and Provincial Elections 195 (1997-2002) Figure 5-18: Descriptive Statistics: Federal Election in Pakistan (1988-2008) 196 Figure 5-19: Comparative Study of the Stability of Electoral Support 197 (The Netherlands, Switzerland, Austria, Belgium, and Pakistan) Figure 6-1: Ethno-linguistic Break-up of Respondents 213 Figure 6-2: Perceptions about the Domination of Certain Groups 216 Figure 6-3: Perceptions about the Existing Federal Settings 219 Figure 6-4: Level of Fragmentation in Pakistani Society 221 Figure 6-5: Level of fragmentation in Pakistani society 224 Figure 6-6: Responses about the consociational devices 227 Figure 6-7: Responses about Consociational Devices 231 Figure 6-8: Responses about the homogenous constituent units 232 Figure 6-9: Support for consociational arrangements 234 Figure 6-10: Responses about the Proposals of (Decentralized) Federalism 238 Figure 6-11: Support for (Decentralized) Federalism 239 Figure 6-12: Comparison of Support for (Decentralized) Federalism and 241 Consociationalism
ix Chapter No. 1
INTRODUCTION
1.1 Prologue
Management of ethnic diversity has remained problematic in Pakistan. It became the first post-colonial state that suffered a successful secessionist movement that resulted in the creation of Bangladesh, in 1971. The Post-1971 Pakistan has witnessed Baloch insurgencies (1973-77; and 2002-to date); Pashtun separatism (1970s); Sindhi regionalism (1980s); and Mohajir‟s mobilization along ethnic lines (1990s).
Since, political violence and mobilization along ethnic lines has resulted in political instability, a number of remedies have been suggested for the Pakistani federation to manage diversity. Samad (2007, p.128) has argued that “throughout Pakistan‟s sixty- year-old history, Islamabad‟s approach to diversity has been cynically to co-opt or coerce groups that have not been accommodative. This approach has often resulted in considerable violence and sown deep distrust between the centre and the country‟s ethnic groups”. He has suggested that Pakistan “needs to adopt accommodative strategies that incorporate all groups”. According to him, this requires “the refinement and enrichment of the concept and practice of federalism and a move away from the present system”.
Malik (1997, p.168) has noticed that “the most serious threat to Pakistan since its inception has been from the ethnic front, which is still in official parlance referred to as provincialism or regionalism”. He argued that “the ruling elite have sought refuge in administrative, ad hoc measures and no comprehensive plan has been undertaken to co-opt such plural forces through bargaining and appropriate politico-economic
1 measures”. He opined that “there are strong prospects for a positive pluralism leading to national integration and acculturation in Pakistan but only if unevenness in state-led policies is removed and fully empowered democratic institutions are allowed to function in the country” (Malik, 1997, p.171).
According to Feroz Ahmad (1998,pp. 271-72) , “the separation of East Bengal, the repeated armed resistance in Balochistan, the upsurge in the interior Sindh, and the recurrent violence in Karachi underline the explosive nature of Pakistan‟s ethnic problems and the failure of the state to come to terms with the fact of ethnic diversity and conflict”. He has suggested „modifications‟ in the federal structure of the Pakistan to ensure „rights of the provinces‟.
Kennedy (1993) has also suggested substational changes in federal design to accommodate various identities. Cohen (1987, p.327) has advised the Pakistani elites to recognize the necessity of power sharing for effective institutions to manage ethnic imbalances and diversity. Alqama (1997) has suggested a six-point strategy to strengthen the federation. The crux of this strategy is the need of social and political inclusion. Amin (1988, p. 255) has argued that „if the Pakistani state elite had pursued a policy of sharing power, they could have been successful in containing the ethno- national movements‟.
Briefly speaking, nearly all studies related to political mobilization and ethnic strife in
Pakistan have stressed the need for power sharing and political inclusion of excluded communities in the power structures of Pakistan. Despite their explicit arguments for power sharing, these studies have remained unable to offer any particular form or mechanism of power-sharing for the case of Pakistan.
2 Power-sharing is a broad concept and it covers different approaches1. One of these approaches is the consociational strategy of power sharing developed and advocated by Arend Lijphart. Political scientists, since 1960s, have been arguing that a particular form of government2 can help to stabilize democracy in multi-ethnic states. Lorwin
(1971) labeled this approach as „segmented pluralism‟, Lehmbruch (1974) tagged it as a „concordant democracy‟ and Lijphart called it a „consociational democracy‟. The consociational model of democracy was developed by examining the smaller
European countries – the Netherlands, Belgium, Switzerland, and Austria. Outside the
Europe, the model was extended to Lebanon, Malaysia, South Africa, Ghana and
India. Consociational democracy aims at power sharing. Lijphart has argued that consociational democracy is the only possible solution for deeply divided societies to practice democracy. He suggested that the constitutional engineers of developing countries need to adopt the mechanism of consociational democracy to meet the challenges of ethnic conflicts.
In this context, (a) power sharing was suggested as a remedy for Pakistan but no particular form or mechanism of power sharing was specified and (b) consociationalism was identified as a prominent mechanism of power sharing for multiethnic states. So, there was a need for examining the relevancy of consociational model of power sharing with the multiethnic society of Pakistan.
When this research proposal was approved for PhD dissertation in early 2006, there was no systematic study available to examine the relevancy of consociationalism to the multiethnic society of Pakistan. Lijphart acknowledged that he knew very little about the Pakistan3. However, a year earlier the leading consociationalists McGarry and O‟Leary had suggested that Pakistan “will need to adopt and maintain
3 consociational governance at federal centre” to “practice democracy 4 . Afterward,
Adeney (2007) coupled the relative political stability of India with its consociational practices and the relative instability of Pakistan with the nonconsociational features of polity. Subsequently, she asserted that Pakistani federation‟s incapacity to manage ethnic diversity is the consequence of its nonconsociational features (Adeney, 2009).
It is pertinent to point out that these „parallel‟ studies are limited in their scope and strength. McGarry & O‟Leary have neither focused exclusively on the case of
Pakistan nor have they substantiated their argument with empirical evidence.
Additionally, Adeney is selective in her approach. In her research article, she
„concentrates on the proportionality element of consociationalism, in particular representation in the core institutions of state – namely, the bureaucracy and the army‟
(Adeney, 2009). She has not examined the relevancy of consociational devices in totality. She has neither bothered about the absence of favorable factors for consociationalism nor considered the relatively lesser degree of pluralism in Pakistani society. This narration seems to suggest that this project is the only thorough study that exclusively focuses on the relevancy of consociational democracy with the multiethnic society of Pakistan.
1.2 Objectives and Scope of Study
At the outset, it is important to determine the scope and objectives of this study. The study has explicit objectives and specified time period. The central objective of this empirical investigation is to contribute an original analysis to the study of ethnic conflict management in Pakistan. It is pertinent to point out that this research work is not intended to falsify or validate the theory but aims to enhance our understanding relating to the utility of consociational democracy for multiethnic states analyzing the
4 Pakistani case. Subsequently, the study seeks to explore the underlying relevancy of an alternative option of consociationalism, namely the decentralized federalism.
Though it has been argued that a „single case can constitute neither the basis for a valid generalization nor the grounds for disapproving an established generalization‟
(Lijphart, 1971), the findings of this project will be useful for policy makers and constitutional engineers in Pakistan and elsewhere. This is because if the study suggests consociationalism as a viable solution for the case of Pakistan, it can be argued that consociational democracy is relevant to remote cases; out side its empirical region of origin. Alternatively, if the case suggests that consociational democracy is irrelevant to the Pakistani case, it will demonstrate that consociational democracy‟s utility varies across case studies and it is not, necessarily, a viable solution for all multiethnic societies. Therefore, in both ways, the study will contribute to our understanding of the effectiveness or otherwise of consociational democracy as a conflict resolution measure in plural societies like Pakistan.
The study covers a specified time period. It covers the time period between 1971 and
2009. Pre-1971 period has been excluded from this study because the existing state structure of Pakistan differs significantly from that period. Post-1971 Pakistan exhibits a different political scenario as well. The ethno-linguistic composition of the state has been changed and a new constitution was enacted in 1973. The study has been concluded in 2009; therefore, it is the closing point.
Religion matters and religious divisions5 are important in Pakistan but this study is limited to ethnic diversity. Furthermore, this study acknowledges six ethno-linguistic groups6 i.e. Punjabi, Siraiki, Sindhi, mohajir, Pashtun, and Balochs. Additionally, the study is limited to the four provinces of Pakistan, namely, Punjab, Sindh, NWFP, and
5 Balochistan. The federal capital, Islamabad, and federally administered tribal areas have been excluded from this study because of their minimal relevancy.
1.3 Research Questions
The central concern of this dissertation is whether or not consociationalism is a viable solution for the multiethnic society of Pakistan. To answer this question, three secondary questions have been designed. These questions provide the immediate focus of the thesis and are discussed in the three core chapters of this work. The questions are:
1. Why has federalism remained unable to manage ethnic diversity in Pakistan?
2. Whether or not consociationalism is a realistic option for Pakistan to manage
ethnic diversity?
3. Whether or not the majority of Pakistanis prefer consociational arrangements
for sharing power at the federal level?
I have presented three arguments in the thesis that are outcome of these questions.
First, the Pakistani federation fulfils minimum criteria of a federation but it operates more like a unitary system. Therefore, the relative centralization of political power and the discrepancy in theory and practice lessens its capacity to manage ethnic diversity. This argument is based on the examination of federal settings and the evaluation of ethnic mobilization in Pakistan. The evidence suggests that ethno- nationalistic movements were protests against the centralizing policies of Islamabad.
It has also been observed that ethnic mobilization in Pakistan is not due to non- consociational features of the federation but because of its relatively centralized settings.
6 Second, the empirical evidence seems to suggest that consociationalism is not a realistic option for Pakistan. The proponents of consociationalism have recognized certain favorable conditions for the establishment and maintenance of consociational democracy. With some exceptions, these factors are missing in the case of Pakistan.
In addition, the evaluation of Pakistani society illustrates that it is not a case of deeply divided society. Mutual hostility of certain groups is of the lower degree. These groups are not organized on mutually exclusive social, political, and economic lines.
Multiethnic mainstream parties are overriding and enjoying popular electoral support in all ethno-linguistic groups. Besides, the past experiences of power-sharing arrangements in Pakistan demonstrate the inaptness of these arrangements for
Pakistan.
Third, the majority of Pakistanis seems unconvinced by the consociational argument and do not prefer consociational arrangements in Pakistan. This argument is based on the findings of a public opinion survey stratified by ethno-linguistic group, class, and regional association. The people from different walks of life expressed their reluctance to prefer consociational arrangements for Pakistan. The interviews of a small group of experts on Pakistani politics and few political leaders also validate the results of our survey and did not approve of the case of consociationalism for Pakistan.
As a result, the core work of this thesis seems to suggest that consociationalism is neither a requirement nor a viable option for Pakistan. The majority of Pakistanis have not lost their trust in federalism. However, Pakistan needs a relatively more decentralized federal design that demonstrates the essence of federalism. That is the combination of Self-rule and shared-rule.
7 1.4 Research Methodology
This thesis relies on a mix of primary and secondary sources of material. At its beginnings, the author made careful readings of the published work on consociationalism by Arend Lijphart and other academic proponents and opponents of the theory. Secondary sources of material such as books, research articles published in reputable journals, reviews, online published material, magazines, gazetteers, newspaper, official websites, election results, and political parties‟ election manifestos etc. were used for the study of Pakistani case. Some confidential reports of British
High Commission that were released after due time were accessed at National
Archive Center, London. These reports proved very useful.
The secondary sources were supplemented by some primary sources such as a survey of public opinion, and some interviews of experts and political leaders. The methodology adopted for the public opinion survey and the techniques used for sampling have been discussed in the relevant chapter, the sixth chapter. The thesis is a synthesis of qualitative and quantitative research. The qualitative analyses are corroborated by quantification and analysis of data by the application of statistical tools such as SPSS and Minitab software.
1.5 Structure of the Thesis
The second chapter of the thesis reviews the theory of consociationalism. It briefly surveys the development of theory discussing the original cases of consociational democracy – the Netherlands, Austria, Belgium, and Switzerland. The characteristics of consociational democracy i.e. grand coalition, segmental autonomy, proportionality, and mutual veto power have been also discussed in this chapter. As
8 consociational theory has attracted a variety of criticism and objections, a section of this chapter is reserved for the collected critique. This section accentuates the flaws and gaps in the consociational literature. The final section, briefly, reviews the recommendations for the multiethnic society of Pakistan to practice consociational democracy.
The third chapter is a scene setting chapter. After introductory paragraph, it starts with a brief survey of the movement of Indian Muslims for a separate homeland - Pakistan.
The subsequent section is reserved for an overview of political and constitutional developments in pre-1971 Pakistan. The next section illustrates the ethno-linguistic composition of post-1971 Pakistan. Then the grievances and demands of smaller communities have been discussed in some detail. The final section presents a brief summary of some substational political mobilizations and the stands of various political parties on autonomy issues.
The fourth chapter examines the role of federalism in managing ethnic diversity in
Pakistan. After a very brief historical background of federalism in subcontinent, this chapter illustrates the federal design of Pakistan under the 1973 constitution. To measure the relative centralization, a comparison with the other federations has been provided in this chapter. The next section evaluates the ethnic mobilization in
Pakistan. Then it has been attempted to investigate the two alternative explanations for this regional/ethnic/linguistic opposition in Pakistan. This section reveals that centralization of political power is a key factor in the rise and fall of ethno- nationalistic movements in Pakistan. The final section is reserved for some concluding comments.
9 The fifth chapter attempts to answer whether or not consociationalism is a realistic choice for Pakistan. This assessment is based on three variables: the presence of favorable factors for consociationalism, the role of political leadership, and the degree of pluralism in Pakistani society. These variables are discussed in three subsequent sections. Then the chapter is concluded finally.
The sixth chapter attempts to gauge the public support for consociationalism as a policy recommendation. This chapter is based on the findings of a public opinion survey. After introduction, second section of this chapter describes the methodology adopted to conduct the survey. Third section has detailed discussion of survey results.
Some important interviews and comments have been discussed in the fourth section.
The chapter has been concluded in the last section.
The seventh chapter summarizes the findings of the thesis. It reviews the relevancy of consociational democracy with the multiethnic society of Pakistan. It also offers some insights into the utility of consociationalism as a conflict management tool for plural societies.
10 Endnotes
1 The two most prominent approaches of power sharing are consociationalism and centripetalism. Consociationalism is developed and defended by Lijphart and centripetalism is advocated by Horowitz. The next chapter presents a detailed discussion about the consociationalism. The literature on centripetalism suggests four institutions to improve the chances for political stability in multiethnic states. These institutions include the alternative vote electoral system, the formation of centrist coalitions, the office of a president elected by regional distribution requirements, and administrative federalism. 2 This form of government has been discussed in detail in the next chapter. 3 The author has frequently communicated with Arend Lijphart electronically. Lijphart reviewed my synopsis and on the basis of his comments, Board of Research and Advanced Studies had approved my case of PhD registration.
4 For detail of this point of view see, McGarry, J. & O‟Leary, B. (2005) Federation as a Method of Ethnic Conflict Regulation. In S. Noel (Eds.), From Power-sharing to Democracy: Post Conflict Institutions in Ethnically Divided Societies (pp. 263–296). Montreal: McGill Queens University Press.
5 There are religious divisions, even, among Muslims in Pakistan. For example Shi‟a, Sunni; Deobandi, Barelwi, Ahl-e-Hadith. 6 Government of Pakistan has recognized six languages in its census reports as separate languages. These languages include Punjabi, Siraiki, Sindhi, Urdu, Pashto, and Balochi. Therefore this study is limited to the six ethno-linguistic groups that speak these languages.
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12. Samad, Y. (2007). Pakistan: from minority rights to majoritarian. In Gyanendra, P.
and Y. Samad (Eds.), Fault lines of Nationhood (pp.67-138). New Delhi: Roli
Books Pvt. Ltd.
13 Chapter No. 2
CONSOCIATIONALISM: A REVIEW AND CRITIQUE
2.1 Introduction
Ethnic mobilization and conflicts are not a new phenomena but their contemporary global manifestation in frequency and intensity is a development which needs careful reflection and detailed examination. Since a large majority of the nation states are heterogeneous and this heterogeneity is likely to increase as a result of global migration patterns, ethnic conflicts and the resultant political tensions are likely to accentuate in the coming years. The global manifestation of ethnicity has attracted significant attention from the social scientists. The management of diversity in multi- ethnic, multi-lingual and multi-faith societies is of a great interest – both from the view point of theory as well as practice – in the current global situation.
The problem of political instability caused by ethnic conflicts seems to be more acute in the developing countries. Empirical studies of these states suggest some connections between political institutions and the proliferation of ethnic mobilization.
For management of diversity in these multiethnic states, policy recommendations suggest a variety of federal and power-sharing arrangements.
Different areas of the world have approached the issue of diversity in different ways.
Certain European countries have managed diversity through consociationalism but overall performance of such consociational arrangements remained mixed. An attempt has been made in this chapter to review the concept of consociational democracy. The development of consociational theory by Arend Lijphart and other political scientists has been described in some detail. Furthermore, the characteristics of consociational
14 democracy i.e. grand coalition, segmental autonomy, proportionality, and mutual veto power have been discussed. These features of consociational democracy take different forms in different case studies of consociational democracy. The original cases of consociational democracy – the Netherlands, Austria, Belgium, and Switzerland – are discussed and analyzed. As consociational theory has attracted a variety of criticism and objections, a section of this chapter is reserved for the collected critique. The final section, briefly surveys the recommendations for the multiethnic society of Pakistan to practice consociational democracy.
2.2 Consociationalism
The term of consociation or consociationalism is derived from the word “consociatio” that was used by Johannes Althusius in 1603 to „denote a form of political union‟.
Then, the term of consociationalism, in late 1960s, was used by political scientists, especially by Arend Lijphart, that identified a particular form of power sharing in smaller Western European democracies that exhibit political stability despite their highly fragmented societies (Clark & Foweraker, 2001, pp.91-92). Consociationalism literally means “association between equals”. Despite having distinct cultures, institutions and identities, ethnic groups in consociations evolve a system in which they interact politically equally. They feel autonomous in their respective ethnic groups and have feelings that they are enjoying equal partnership in the system. They are politically organized, and a mechanism for their proportional representation is set- up. Their elites that join together to form the national elite are intensively engaged in the politics of accommodation and bargaining (Kuper, 1985, p. 270).
15 2.3 Development of the Consociational Theory
There has been a consensus that “the division of society into different ethnic groups constitutes a formidable obstacle to stable and viable democracy” (Lijphart, 1995, p.854). Some political scientists seem even more pessimistic about the democracy in multiethnic societies and argue that “free institutions are next to impossible in a country composed of different nationalities” (Mill, 1958, p. 230).
In this given situation, political scientists remained curious to find out a democratic model to ensure stability in divided societies. This curiosity resulted into a number of theories and writings that redefined the conventional connotations of democracy and
„system typologies‟.
Lijphart‟s “typologies of democratic system” in late 1960s was a sign of theoretical independence from the prevailing political theories: “overlapping membership theory”, the “numbers of parties” theories, and the “functionalist model of Almond and Powel”. Each of these theories postulates a cause for stable democracy (Halpern,
1984).
The overlapping membership theory was articulated by, among others, Rousseau,
Tocqueville, Truman, Bentley and Lipset. This theory considers stability to be the product of a nexus of crosscutting affiliations and interests in a population. On the other hand, the “numbers of parties‟ theories”, articulated by Duverger, Neumann, and Sartori, designates party system as the contributing agent of stability. According to this theory, two-party systems are viewed as stable, and multiparty systems are considered as unstable (Halpern, 1984). Then, Almond (1956) asserted that the political stability and effectiveness of a particular political system is linked with its
16 political culture and the role structure. Based on this proposition, he presented his
„typology of political systems‟. Almond classified the political systems into three broad categories:
1. Anglo-American systems: Almond attached the relative high stability and
effectiveness of the Anglo-American systems (Britain and United States) with
their homogenous secular political culture and highly differentiated role
structure.
2. Continental European systems: Almond linked the relative political instability
of Continental European democracies (Germany, France and Italy) to their
fragmented political culture, and separate sub-cultures.
3. Scandinavian and Low countries: Almond did not describe the Scandinavia
and Low Countries in detail. He contended only with the statement that “the
Scandinavian and Low Countries combine some of the features of the Anglo-
American and the Continental European types and stand somewhere in
between the two types”.
Lijphart (1969) challenged this typology of political systems presented by Almond, and identified its limitation to not “deal satisfactory with the smaller European democracies”. He asserted that “the political stability of a system can apparently not be predicted solely on the basis of two variables of political culture and role structure”. He challenged the theory of crosscutting cleavages. He asserted that despite their subcultures, divided from each other by mutually reinforcing cleavages,
Switzerland and Austria display political stability. Though, according to the theory, they should exhibit great immobilism.
17 Lijphart focused on the „Low Countries‟ to find out how do these plural societies manage to operate as stable democracies despite having fragmented political culture .
During this study, he discovered that it was another variable (the behavior of political elites) that accounted for the stability in these countries. He concluded that it was the coalescent behavior of political elites that resulted into political stability despite the presence of subcultures. He termed this particular form of government as a consociational democracy; and these fragmented but stable cases as consociational democracies. Lijphart described consociational democracy as, “a government by elite cartel designed to turn a democracy with a fragmented political culture into a stable democracy” (Lijphart, 1969, p. 216). He presented this theory in a research article, in
1969. The theory evolved through its application to the case of the Netherlands in
„Politics of Accommodation’ and its expansion in „Democracy in Plural Societies’.
Lijphart expanded the empirical cases beyond the Western European democracies, and introduced some consociational, semi-consociational and few failed consociational democracies. He advised the political leaders of plural societies to become „consociational engineers‟ if they wish to establish or strengthen democratic institutions in their countries. He argued that “for many plural societies of the non- western world, the realistic choice is not between the British normative model of democracy and the consociational democracy, but between consociational democracy and no democracy at all” (Lijphart, 1977, p. 238).
2.4 The Growth and Expansion of Consociational Democracy
The consociational theory originated from the four copybook cases of Western
Europe, namely the Netherlands, Austria, Belgium, and Switzerland. Beyond Europe, the countries like Lebanon, Malaysia, Suriname, Cyprus and India were categorized
18 as consociations. The figure 2-1 shows that between 1980 to mid-1990s, the consociational theory was at a stake. There was a clear-cut trend of its decline and the number of consociations had fallen significantly. Africa, particularly, proved a
“graveyard” for consociational experiments and in country after country consociationalism was pushed off the political agenda. The political scientists had begun to express distrust in consociational theory and termed it as a „degenerative program‟. But, recently, as the figure shows, consociational theory has been regenerated. New consociational cases such as Macedonia, Afghanistan, Iraq and
Kenya have been identified. Therefore, it has been argued that though consociational democracy has moved away “from its empirical region of origin”, but it has been enjoying a high point of its development at the moment (Taylor, 2009, pp. 5-6).
Figure 2-1: Expansion of Consociational Democracy
Classic cases Past cases Contemporary cases
Netherlands (1917-67) Lebanon ( 1943-75) Malaysia (1971 – ) Belgium (1918 – ) India (1947-64) South Tyrol (1972 – ) Switzerland (1943 – ) Netherlands Antilles (1950-85) Lebanon (1989 – ) Austria (1945-66) Suriname (1950-85) Luxemburg Malaysia (1955-69) New wave
Liechtensten Nigeria (1957-66) Bosnia-Herzegovina (1995– ) Columbia (1958-74) Burundi (1998 – ) Cyprus (1960-63) Fiji (1970-87) Northern Ireland (1998 – )
Northern Ireland (1973-74) Macedonia (2000 – ) Zimbabwe (1980-87) Afghanistan ( 2004 – ) Czechoslovakia (1989-93) South Africa (1993-96) Iraq ( 2005 – )
Kenya (2008 – )
Source: (Taylor, 2009, p. 6
19 2.5 Characteristics of Consociationalism
Lijphart (1977, p. 25) has defined consociational democracy in terms of four characteristics:
(a) A grand coalition of the political leaders of all significant segments of the
plural society;
(b) The mutual veto or „concurrent majority‟ rule as an additional protection of
minority interests;
(c) Proportionality as the principal standard of political representations, civil
service appointments, and allocation of public funds;
(d) And a high degree of autonomy for each segment to run its own internal
affairs.
These characteristics of consociationalism are described in following paragraphs.
2.5.1 Grand Coalition or Executive Power sharing
The first and the foremost characteristic of consociational democracy is a grand coalition comprising the political leaders of all significant political parties. Grand coalition is a device that provides „executive power-sharing‟ to various segments of a society. Therefore, Lijphart has used the terms of „grand coalition‟ and executive power-sharing‟ interchangeably.
Lijphart has used the term „grand coalition‟ loosely and not specified any particular form of grand coalition or power-sharing. His grand coalition takes different forms in various cases of consociational democracy. Consequently, the critics have termed the
Lijphart‟s concept of grand coalition as a „catch-all concept‟ (Halpern, 1986, p.190)
20 The rationale behind vagueness of this concept is understandable. The basic concern of Lijphart (1977, p. 31) has remained „participation of the segmental leaders in governing a plural society‟ and he has not focused on any „particular institutional arrangements‟. During the exploration of various consociational cases, he has identified a variety of institutional designs of grand coalitions.
The simplest form of grand coalition is the „cabinet of all significant ethnic, linguistic or religious groups in a parliamentary system‟. Belgium and Malaysia were examples of parliamentary grand coalition cabinets during their respective consociational regimes. More or less, the Netherlands had experienced the similar coalitions between
1917 and 1967 – its multiparty cabinets remained representative of all segmental parties. All segments in the Netherlands i.e. Catholics, Calvinists, Socialists and
Liberals had their representative political parties during the said period. In addition to multiparty cabinets, some permanent or ad hoc councils or committees representing all segments served the purpose of power-sharing in Dutch polity. Austrian grand coalition of major parties (during 1945 and 1966) is another prime example of grand coalition.
Power-sharing arrangements in consociational democracy are not limited to the parliamentary systems; they can be found in the separation of powers systems as well.
The Swiss federal executive body is a classic example of executive power-sharing.
The federal council ensures the representation of all major linguistic and religious groups and the major political parties. The distribution of government offices among the significant groups on the pattern of Lebanon can also serve the purpose: in
Lebanon during the consociational governance (1943-75), presidency was reserved for Christians, Prime Minister Ship for Sunni Muslims, and speaker ship of the
21 parliament for, Shi‟a Muslims and deputy speaker ship for the Greek Orthodox community. Three-person presidency was set up in Bosnia and Herzegovina to accommodate all the three communities (Bosnian Serbs, Bosniaks and Croats): one seat for every community was reserved in this power-sharing arrangement.
The criteria for sharing power vary in various cases. In Belgium, equal representation in executive has been granted constitutionally to Dutch and French-speakers. In
Cyprus, during a brief period of consociational arrangement (1960-1963), the representation formula for Greeks and Turks, followed their numerical strength (7:3).
In Post-apartheid South Africa, the requirement to join cabinet was five percent of the parliamentary seats. On the other hand, the requirement in Fiji to join the cabinet was at least 10 percent of the seats (McCulloch, 2009).
Though, grand coalitions, normally, represent different political parties, Indian power- sharing case provided an opportunity to various segments to share power within the single party government: the Congress Party. According to Lijphart (1996, p. 260), parliamentary cabinets in consociational India (in early decades) provided power- sharing to all sections of society through “broadly representative and inclusive nature of a single, dominant party, the Congress Party”.
The „anti competitive nature‟ of the grand coalition or executive power-sharing in consociationalism raised the question: is consociational democracy sufficiently democratic? O‟Leary (2005, pp.12-15) has responded to this question and has reviewed the concept of grand coalition presented by Lijphart. O‟ Leary has asserted that the „consociational executives need not to be all inclusive grand coalitions‟. He has classified the consociational executives into three broad categories: the complete, the concurrent and the weak democratic consociational executive.
22 O‟Leary‟s complete consociational executive is quite similar to the Lijphart‟s notion of grand coalition composed of all significant political parties, even if voters of particular groups split their votes among various parties. In concurrent consociation
“each significant segment has representation in the executive and that executive has at least majority support in each significant segment. Unlike a complete consociational executives, a concurrent consociational executive is one in which each significant segment has over half of its voters supporting parties in the government”. In a weak consociation, “one or more segment merely gives its plurality assent while other segments give majority or higher level of support to the government”
2.5.2 Segmental Autonomy
The second primary characteristic of consociational governance is the segmental or group autonomy. The group autonomy refers to the “group‟s authority to run its own internal affairs, especially in the areas of education and culture” (Lijphart, 2002, p.
39). The concept of autonomy has been loosely defined by Lijphart. In various consociational cases, autonomy has taken different forms.
Three types of arrangements for providing autonomy to religious and linguistic groups in power-sharing democracies are more prevalent: these arrangements include
(1) a considerable autonomy to homogenous constituent units in a federal settings like the linguistic autonomy provided in Switzerland, Belgium, and Czechoslovakia; (2) a provision for minorities to establish and run their autonomous schools fully sponsored by the government as in Belgium and the Netherlands; and (3) a provision of separate personal laws for minorities related to family matters such as marriage, divorce, inheritance etc. as were provided in Lebanon, Cyprus, and Indian case.
23 Segmental or group autonomy can take two forms: territorial and non-territorial form
(Lijphart, 1977, p. 43). According to Lijphart (2004, pp.104-105), federalism is the best way to provide territorial autonomy if the various groups are geographically concentrated and the groups‟ boundaries coincide with the boundaries of constituent units. However, if the ethnic groups are dispersed and geographically intermixed, autonomy must assume a non-territorial form‟. Cypriot consociational arrangements provided this kind of autonomy to Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots. The 1960 constitution of Cyprus set up separate Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot communal chambers with exclusive legislative powers over religious, cultural and educational matters (Lijphart, 2002, p. 856).
A combination of territorial and non-territorial autonomy has been used in the case of
Belgium. Belgian constitution has delegated political authority both to geographically defined areas that are ethnically homogenous (Dutch-speaking Flanders and French- speaking Wallonia) and to communities defined in non-territorial terms (French speakers and Dutch speakers in bilingual Brussels).
The Canadian case reveals that segmental autonomy can be provided to selective groups in special cases. In Canada, some linguistic and religious groups benefit from autonomy in the area of education. McCulloch (2009, p. 41) has observed that the certain linguistic groups (francophone communities) can set up their language schools if necessitated and religious groups can set up religious schools (for example Catholic in Ontario) with „public assistance‟.
Assaf (2004, p.14) has pointed out the “vagueness” of the concept of segmental autonomy. He observed that Lijphart has not „made a clear distinction between issues that are of common interest and issues that lie in the community domain‟. He
24 maintained that there is “imprecision” about the locus of decision making. That is, it is not clear in Lijphart‟s concept of segmental or cultural autonomy “where decision- making lies, or should lie, at the group level or at the elite cartel level concerning some domestic issues, as well as regional and international matters”.
2.5.3 Proportionality
Proportionality is another key institutional feature of the consociational democracy. It involves allocation of representation in political institutions and the distribution of resources and jobs. The rationale behind proportional representation is to ensure the
„just representation‟ and „inclusion‟ of all segments of society in the power structure of state.
Electoral system of proportional representation (PR), as Lijphart suggests, facilitates the parliamentary proportionality in divided or plural societies. PR is an attractive choice in plural societies, according to Lijphart (2004, p.100), because “in addition to producing proportionality and minority representation, it treats all groups – ethnic, racial, religious, or even non-communal groups – in a completely equal and evenhanded fashion”.
Belgium and Switzerland use proportional electoral system to ensure proportional representation. Sometimes, however, minority protection measures result into overrepresentation. For example, the Belgian constitution provides equal representation to the Dutch-speaking majority and the French speaking minority in the national cabinet (Lijphart, 1995a, p. 857). In the same way, Turkish minority that was less than 20 percent of the total population was granted 30 percent of the total seats in the national legislature allotment in Cyprus‟s 1960 constitution.
25 It has been argued that Proportionality is a useful consociational device. Being “a neutral and impartial standard of allocation, it removes a large number of potentially divisive problems from the decision making process and thus lightens the burdens of consociational government” (Lijphart, 1977, p. 39).
2.5.4 Mutual Veto
Consociationalists believe that the mutual or minority veto provides shelter to minorities and guarantees that „it will not be out-voted by the majority when its vital interests are at stake‟ (Lijphart, 1977, p.119). A grand coalition offers important political protection for minority segments in consociational arrangements but it does not provide reliable protection. Decisions, in the grand coalitions, are normally, reached by majority vote; though the minority‟s presence in the coalition does give it a chance to present its case as forcefully as possible to its coalition partners, it may, nevertheless, be out-voted by the majority.
Lijphart is not precise, as usual, in defining the concept of mutual veto. He is reluctant to „specify the form and forum mutual veto should take‟ (Halpern, 1986, p.190). It may take different forms i.e. absolute veto or suspensive veto and informal veto or formal veto. It may also be a general or a specific: it may be applied either to all decisions or occasionally to only certain specified kinds of decisions, such as matters of culture and education (Lijphart, 1995b, p. 279).
Practically, however, this device is usually restricted to the most vital and fundamental matters and it is usually based on informal understandings rather than formal legal or constitutional rules (Lijphart, 1995a, pp. 856-57)
26 Belgium, during its consociational arrangements, had provided veto powers to linguistic groups regarding educational and cultural issues and also informally guaranteed autonomy for the „familles spirituelles’. Dayton Peace Accord, in Bosnia, devised a formula that at least one-third support from each of the three constituent groups will be required for all decisions in House of Representatives.
Though Lijphart has argued elsewhere that a consociation conform to above- mentioned four features, it has been asserted that a „government can have consociational elements even if it does not conform to all Lijphart‟s stipulations‟
(Adeney, 2009).
2.6 Examples of Consociational Arrangements:
Lijphart has identified consociational regimes all over the world. He started from
Western Europe, with the case of Netherlands. He observed that the Netherlands has, despite its deep social cleavages, experienced stable democracy more or less for a half century (1917-1967). The two basic cleavages that divided the Dutch society in that period were class and religion. In 1960, there were Roman Catholics, 40.4%, Dutch
Reformed, 28.3%, Orthodox Reformed, 9.3% and other minorities, 3.6%. The remaining 18.6% had no religious affiliation. On the basis of a formal affiliation and the degree of religious commitment, Lijphart has identified threefold division in
Dutch society: Roman Catholic, Orthodox Calvinist, and Secular. Regarding the class cleavages, the Netherlands had three clearly identifiable classes – upper middle, lower middle, and lower classes. The two cleavages partly intersect each other. The deep class cleavage cuts through the Catholic, Calvinist, and Secular blocs. The intersection had more impact on the secular bloc due to the absence of religious cohesion in the bloc. So, the Secular bloc was divided into Liberal block (secular
27 upper middle and middle class) and Socialist bloc (secular middle and lower classes).
Hence, the Dutch society had fourfold division: Catholics, Calvinists, Socialists, and
Liberals (Lijphart, 1975, pp. 16-23). This fourfold division was evident in political and social organizations and group affiliations. Each bloc had its own political party.
Socialists had the Labor Party, Liberals had the Liberal Party, Roman Catholic had
Catholic People‟s Party, and Calvinists had two representative parties i.e. the Anti
Revolutionary Party and the Christian Historical Union. The relative strength of five parties, more or less, remained stable since 1918 and they received, together, nearly
90 % seats in the lower chamber during 1918-67 period. The dominant labor union federations also represent the relevant bloc: the Socialist Labor Union, Catholic
Labor-union, Protestant Labor-union, and Netherlands Trade Association (dominated by Liberals). Furthermore, the four-bloc model was apparent in organizational memberships of newspaper and radio, in voluntary associations, and in educational institutions also (Lijphart, 1975, p. 23). Around 1917, the relationships between the four pillars came under pressure by three issues, (social issue, universal suffrage, and schools issue). Concerning schooling, the issue was that the Catholics and the
Calvinists, together, demanded that they should be free to have their own schools which, however, were to be paid mainly by the state. The social issue refers to the serious social problems in the beginning of the twentieth century (poverty, unemployment, disablement), problems that were mainly a lower-class affair. Since suffrage had up to then been income and wealth related, the suffrage issue partly coincided with the social issue. The three issues together not only widened the gaps between the four pillars, dividing the nation even more than before, but also created tensions within the Catholic pillar where the class cleavage had up to then been least prominent.
28 Lijphart (1975) maintained that the Netherlands, in 1917, managed this religious- communal conflict through the „politics of accommodation‟. The politics of accommodation in Netherlands were characterized by the proportional electoral system, comprehensive group autonomy concerning education, informal accords to follow government by broadly representative coalitions, and by providing veto rights to minorities on related sensitive political issues. This exploration led Lijphart to examine the other Western European cases of consociational democracy.
Austria is another original case of consociationalism. After the First World War,
Austrian first republic was set up. However, extreme divisions within the Austrian society resulted in a brief civil war, in 1934. This followed an authoritarian Catholic regime, and eventually, an annexation into Nazi Germany in 1938. The second
Austrian republic was set up in 1945. Some lessons were learnt from the past experiences and the political elite of Austria decided to adopt „the politics of accommodation‟, despite the deep divisions within Austrian society. In April 1945, a grand coalition government composed of the three parties (SPO, a Socialist party;
OVP, a Catholic party; and KPO, a Communist party) was set-up. However, KPO left the coalition in 1947. The Catholics and Socialists decided to adopt power-sharing arrangements. Hence, the SPO-OVP grand coalition lasted until1966.
Austria, between 1945 and 1966, has been considered as the copybook example of consociational democracy. The consociational arrangements in Austria included grand coalition, the proportionality, respect for group autonomy and informal accords to guarantee mutual veto power. During this period, Austrian political system was characterized by the perseverance of „encapsulated subcultures‟ that ensured very stable and predictable voting behavior. While the political system became
29 consociational, Austria became known for its strong corporatism and labor peace, institutionalized in various commissions and bodies.
Belgium is another example of consociational democracy. It seceded in 1931 from the
Netherlands. Linguistically, it was divided into Dutch speaking Flemish region,
French speaking Walloon region, and a bilingual Brussels. French, in the constitution of 1831, was declared an official language. Soon, in reaction, the Flemish region witnessed a political mobilization to advance language grievances. Despite a series of language laws, linguistic concerns remained alive. Readjustment of territorial boundaries by the parliament on the basis of population census transformed the linguistic grievances into territorial claims (Hooghe, 2004).
“The Flemish movement was primarily concerned with cultural equality within the existing institution, but it became gradually more nationalist and autonomist in response to the slow adaptation of the Belgian-francophone institutions and growing anti-Flemish sentiments among French-speaking politicians (Hooghe, 2004). Belgian society was divided into three „families’ spirtuells’: Catholics, socialists, and liberals.
Despite these divisions, however, Belgium experienced political stability.
In the postwar period, the Belgian political settings were characterized by proportional electoral system, separation of powers at national level, and widely representative governments representing two or more pillars till 1950. This period followed a majority government of Catholics. The Catholic regime adopted conflicting policies that resulted in unrest and demands for autonomy. However, in the coming years political leadership of Belgium managed to settle the issues concerning the state financing of the religious schools etc (Jones, 2002).
30 The major political parties in Belgium finally replaced consociationalism with federal rules because it “offered them an opportunity to curb the creeping separatism embedded in consociational politics” and “traditional consociational devices appear less effective in dealing with territorial conflict than federalism” (Hooghe , 2004, p.80).
Switzerland is another West European country, which was classified as a consociation by Lijphart. He asserted that power-sharing arrangements in Switzerland have been exercised since 1943. A grand coalition, federal executive, of the four leading political parties of Switzerland that represent all the linguistic and religious groups was set-up. This executive power-sharing was added to the existing proportional electoral system and decentralized federal settings providing strong segmental autonomy (Lijphart, 1977).
Outside the Western Europe, Lebanon was identified by Lijphart as a case of consociationalism. Lebanon is a plural society: a home country of Sunni Muslims,
Shia Muslims and Greek orthodox, along other minorities. This country remained consociational since its independence in 1943 to 1975, when a war ended the politics of accommodation. At the time of independence, an unwritten and informal agreement designed a mechanism of executive power sharing. This consociational arrangement provided: a Maronite president, a Sunni prime minister, a Shi‟a chairmen of the parliament, and a Greek orthodox deputy chairman and deputy prime minister
(Lijphart, 1977, pp. 147-150). The electoral system was so designed as to ensure proportional share of seats to every religious group. Segmental autonomy was another feature of Lebanese case. Each religious group had its own educational system, schools, social and welfare organizations. Mutual veto, unwritten, was another feature
31 of the Lebanese case. In short, Lebanon had all the four consociational features of consociationalism. The system survived and overcame various outbreaks of civil war until 1975.
Malaysia (Lijphart, 1977, pp. 150-153) had, during the period of 1955 and 1969, experienced consociational governance. It is a plural society with a majority of Malay
53% population, Chinese 30%, and Indian and Pakistanis 11%. In 1950, Malay and
Chinese leaders formed a coalition that was soon joined in by the Indians. This alliance of Malay, Chinese and Indian political parties got more than eighty percent votes polled in the general elections of 1955 and managed to get all but one seat in national assembly. Cabinet positions were also distributed among the three groups
(Malay, Chinese, and Indian). The autonomy concerning internal, social and cultural affairs was granted to all segments. This arrangement continued after independence in
1957. It also sustained after the „addition of the Bornean states of Sabah and Sarawak
(and briefly, Singapore) to the federation‟, renamed Malaysia, in 1963. Afterward, the alliance was renamed national front when additional parties joined the coalition
(Lijphart, 1995a, p. 858).
Cyprus has been considered as a failure case of consociationalism. During the brief
Cyprus consociational period, Cypriot constitution provided power-sharing arrangements to Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots. The „Cypriot constitution of
1960 provided for Greek Cypriot president and a Turkish Cypriot vice president with virtually equivalent powers, far reaching educational and cultural autonomy for the two groups, a strong veto power for the Turkish Cypriot minority, and over representation of this minority in the legislature and the cabinet‟. However, these arrangements proved short-lived (Lijphart, 1995a, p. 858).
32 India was recognized as a case of consociationalism by Lijphart in 1996. Lijphart has argued that India, especially during early decades, has displayed all four features of consociational democracy. Lijphart has associated the success of electoral politics of this period with power-sharing arrangements in India. However, in the post-Nehru period, the power-sharing arrangements became less strong (Lijphart, 1996).
Moreover, the consociational democracy examples include Luxemburg , the
Netherlands Antilles , Suriname, Nigeria ,Columbia , Fiji , Northern Ireland ,
Zimbabwe , Czechoslovakia , South Africa , South Tyrol, Bosnia-Herzegovina,
Burundi , Macedonia , Afghanistan , Iraq , and Kenya.
2.7 The Favorable Factors for Consociational Democracy
The favorable factors for consociational democracy have been developed over time.
For the first time, the favorable factors appeared in Lijphart‟s comparative work in
1969. Then after a comparative study of four European cases of consociational democracy and other western countries, Lijphart revised the favorable factors for the establishment and maintenance of consociational democracy in 1977. Though he admitted that favorable conditions for consociational democracy are „neither indispensable nor sufficient in and of themselves to account for the success of consociational democracy‟, they can improve the „explanatory and predictive power of the consociational model‟ (Lijphart, 1977, p. 54). Lijphart assessed the probability of success for consociational democracy in South Africa by quantifying the favorable factors present in the South African society in 1985. The results of quantification led
Lijphart to argue that consociational democracy is a realistic option for south Africa because the favorable condition for consociational democracy are not unusually unfavorable in South Africa.
33 Favorable factors are important because they can help to determine how much consociational democracy is suitable for a given society. As it has been mentioned earlier, the favorable factors were not derived deductively but inductively after a comparative study of consociational regimes. Therefore, with the expansion of consociational universe, the favorable factors underwent significant modifications in number and content over time. The following table has summarized four different lists of favorable factors presented by Lijphart at different times.
34 Figure 2-2: Lijphart’s List of Favorable Factors
Lijphart Lijphart Lijphart Lijphart (1969, pp. 216-22) (1977, pp. 53-101) (1985, pp. 119-28) (1996, pp. 262-63) Multiple balance of power among the Multiple balance of power among the No majority segment No solid majority subcultures segments of plural society A relatively low total load on the Small country size Small population size Small population size decision-making apparatus Distinct lines of cleavage Segmental isolation Geographical concentration of Geographical concentration of between subcultures segments segments External threats to the country Multiparty system External threats External threat Internal political cohesion of the Tradition of elite accommodation Segments of equal size Segments of roughly equal size subcultures The length of time a consociational Overarching loyalties Small number of segments Small number of groups democracy has been in operation Widespread approval of the principle Crosscutting cleavages Tradition of elite accommodation Tradition of compromise and of government by elite cartel accommodation Representative party system Overarching loyalties Overarching loyalties Socio-economic equality Absence of large socioeconomic differences
Source: (Lijphart, 1969; 1977; 1985; 1996)
35 2.8 Collected Critique
Consociationalism has attracted a lot of criticism from many quarters. Van
Schendelen (1984) has argued that Lijphart‟s work about consociationalism is not based on empirical research. He maintains that Lijphart‟s definitions of key concepts like consociational democracy and plural society are fuzzy and not precisely measurable. Therefore consociational theory violates common norms of scientific research.
Halpern Sue is another harsh critic of the consociational theory. She argues that consociational theory is composed of „imprecise, imperfect, and informal‟ concepts that invite the researcher to engage in „creative stretching‟ to verify correspondence of a case to the models. She maintains that the concepts of consociationalism seem too stretchy to perform their necessary discriminating role. This flexibility of concepts permits the „inclusion of diverse and disputable cases in the consociational universe‟.
Subsequently, these elastic concepts promote disorder rather than ordering the consociational universe (Halpern, 1984).
Barry (1975, pp. 502-03) argued that consociationalism is not a panacea for every divided society. It may work in societies divided along religious or ideological lines but not in the ethnically divided societies. He continued that in the former case the conflict is a conflict of organizations and in the latter situations conflict is a conflict of solid groups. He concluded that consociationalism may resolve the conflict of organizations but it may hardly be helpful in the conflict of solid groups.
Lijphart argues that consociational democracy is a viable solution for divided societies. He maintains that the empirical cases of consociational democracy, namely,
36 the Netherlands, Switzerland, Belgium, and Austria have experienced sub-cultural hostility and democratic stability due to consociational governance. But, the critics have challenged this argument and asserted that the consociational cases have not experienced „sub-cultural hostility‟ in the sense in which the concepts of „fragmented political culture‟ and „plural society‟ are employed (Halpern, 1984).
Another prominent critic, Horowitz (2002, pp. 19-23) objects that „consociational approach is motivationally inadequate‟. He seems least impressed by the Lijphart‟s argument that in consociational arrangements „leaders are motivated by a desire to avert the danger of mutual destruction‟. He wonders how leaders of a majority group would prefer consociational democracy to a majoritarian democracy. He maintains that there are „some examples of motivation to accept consociational democracy but these are idiosyncratic and can not be assumed to be widely distributed‟. He continued that „ the assumption that elites in divided societies are likely to be more tolerant of other groups or less inclined to pursue advantage for their own group is extremely dubious‟.
Lijphart argues that a consociational model must entertain all four consociational components, namely grand coalition or executive power sharing, segmental autonomy, proportionality, and mutual veto. However, the consociational cases do not demonstrate all the consociational features. There is no definite form of grand coalition presented in the theory. He has „given no particular locus to grand coalition in the theory and has left it open to interpret. The case of segmental autonomy is no more different. Its presence is determined by a „solipsistic standard which is no standard at all since segmental autonomy must be evinced only to the extent the system will bear‟. „The confusion of segmental proportionality with the more
37 common electoral proportional representation leads to the erroneous classification of multi-party system as consociational democracies‟. „The passing nature of mutual veto, which according to consociational theory need not be codified in the daily life of political system, enables its presence to be glossed over and its absence to be disregarded‟ (Halpern, 1984).
Despite its theoretical application to numerous cases, the consociational model has not been deployed successfully. Controversy surrounds the labeling of particular cases as consociational democracies. Furthermore, the proper scope of the consociational universe is subject to debate. Under the terms of this model, „virtually every case that can be located within the consociational universe can also be located out of it‟.
Indeed, the „consociational literature is a compendium of such disputes‟ (Halpern,
1984)
The Netherlands case has been contested by Schendelen (1984) and Andeweg (2000).
It has been put forward that the Dutch society was not as fragmented as it has been painted by Lijphart. The subcultures were cross-cutting, and there was relatively low level of risk for political stability. Moreover, all inclusive grand coalition never existed in Dutch politics. It has been stressed that Lijphart overstated the tripartite
Social Economic Council when he regarded it as a grand coalition.
The Lijphart‟s argument that Switzerland is a case of consociational democracy has been challenged by his critics. Barry maintains that the Swiss case fails to fit in the consociational model at every point. He also challenges Lijphart‟s argument that federal council is a grand coalition, and representative of all linguistic and religious groups. He maintains that the council‟s members are „thought of as individuals administering departments rather than as party oligarchs reaching concordats binding
38 on their followers‟. Barry adds that referendum is a majoritarian rather than consociational device, and hence the Swiss case lacks a pure case of consociational institutions (Barry, 1975).
Barry has challenged the argument of Lijphart that conflicts are usually resolved by cooperation in the federal council, in Switzerland. He has presented data concerning the decision making process in expert committees, committees appointed by the federal council, and the data does not support the argument presented by Lijphart. He suggested that the decision making pattern, however, seems closer to majoritarian pattern than consociational pattern (Steiner, 1987).
Though Barry acknowledges Austria as a case of consociational democracy in the period of 1945 to 1966 „in the purely descriptive or non-theoretical sense‟ yet he questions the „consociational democracies thesis in that the consociational devices may have been necessary to keep conflict down to a manageable level‟ (Barry, 1975).
To sum up, Barry (1) asserts that the case of Switzerland does not offer any support for the theory of consociationalism,(2) that the case of Austrian‟s consociationalism is not so straightforward as it is generally assumed,(3) that the cases of Belgium and the
Netherlands as a consociational democracies , despite the reality that they are reasonable supporting cases, „still fall short of fully bearing out the theory‟, and (4) that the relevancy of the consociational democracy for the other plural societies is logically uncertain than it is usually supposed (Barry , 1975).
Horowitz (2002, p. 21) challenges the optimism of Lijphart about the politics of accommodation. He asserts that it is not easy for group leaders to make concessions across ethnic lines in divided societies. The counter-elites emerge who challenge the
39 legitimacy of compromise. Horowitz presents the examples of Lebanon, Malaysia,
Surinam, and the Netherlands Antilles, the consociational cases of developing world, which experienced interethnic coalitions rather than grand coalitions in their respective consociational regimes. Some of these cases, according to Horowitz, also violated other core conditions of consociational theory, such as proportionality, executive power sharing, and segmental autonomy.
Horowitz has analyzed the consociational experiences in Europe and beyond in a recent paper. He categorized Belgium as a „fragile regime‟ because its federal center is becoming weaker by the efforts to delegate more and more powers to its „ethnically differentiated regions, in which ethnic outbidding proceeds with little restraint‟. The case of Northern Ireland is also not a successful story. „Moderates‟ in Ireland are gradually losing their support and the extremist parties are becoming stronger. At the maximum, with some exceptions, violence has been controlled. The Bosnian power-sharing arrangements have also made little advancement towards „conflict amelioration‟ thus reducing the „influence of extremists‟ (Horowitz, 2008).
The role of consociational democracy in Africa is also not promising either.
Power-sharing arrangements in South Africa proved transitory. Both attempts of
Burundi, first in 1992 and second in 2000, at consociational democracy remained unrewarding. Burundi on consociational arrangements lacked some consociational elements but „Sudan‟s Comprehensive Peace Agreement of 2005‟ fulfilled all requirements of consociational arrangements: the agreement contained a grand coalition, minority rights protection, proportionality in the cabinet and substantial autonomy for the south. However, there are serious doubts about the execution of these arrangements. Horowitz asserts that in the Indian case there is sufficient
40 evidence to suggest that consociational devices did not contain violence. Even, the period in which Indian political system experienced consociational devices witnessed higher level of violence than the periods in which consociational elements were missing. According to Horowitz, therefore, “the recent record of consociational constitutions in divided societies is, at best, debatable” (Horowitz, 2008).
2.9 Consociationalism and Pakistan
Expansion in the consociational universe led Arend Lijphart to explore the Indian case. Lijphart found out that „India is not a deviant case for consociational theory but instead, an impressive confirming case‟ (Lijphart, 1996). However, the Pakistani case appeared in consociational debates not before 2002. It remained overlooked in the previous literature on consociationalism due to its chequred domestic history.
Adeney (2002) argued that the constitutional preferences of Indian National Congress and All India Muslim League before partition were quite different. The Muslim
League was asserting for consociational devices to protect Muslim minority rights but the approach of Congress was more majoritarian. However, after the creation of
Pakistan, the Muslim League changed its preferences and adopted majoritarian constitutional formulas. While India reorganized its states boundaries along linguistic boundaries, Pakistan amalgamated the provinces and states in the western wing into the province of West Pakistan. It has been argued that the political instability in
Pakistan is the result of majoritarian design of its federal settings. Minorities are excluded from the power structure and this exclusion creates a sense of alienation and deprivation. This observation has led consociationalists to recommend that Pakistan
“will need to adopt and maintain consociational governance at federal centre” to
“practice democracy (McGarry & O‟Leary, 2005).
41 Adeney (2007) has analyzed the ethnic conflict regulation strategies of Indian and
Pakistan federations. She has concluded that the approach of Indian federation is relatively more accommodative than the Pakistani federation. She has associated the relative political stability of India with its relatively consociational leanings and the relative political instability of Pakistan with its non-consociational governance.
In a recent paper in 2009, she reiterated that „it is the absence of consociational mechanisms that has caused much of the conflict in Pakistan‟. She has suggested
„radical changes along the consociational lines‟ for Pakistani federation to manage ethnic diversity and ensure political stability in Pakistan (Adeney, 2009).
This study attempts to analyze whether consociationalism can play any role in managing ethnic diversity in Pakistan. The subsequent chapters have been reserved for this purpose.
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46 Chapter No. 3
ETHNIC DIVERSITY: A PROBLEM IN PAKISTAN
3.1 Introduction
This chapter attempts to introduce the problem of ethnic diversity in Pakistan. The second section of this chapter briefly introduces the movement of Indian Muslims for a separate homeland. The third section overviews the history of a state formation.
Primarily, it surveys the constitutional and political developments in pre-1971
Pakistan. The fourth section reveals the ethno-linguistic composition of post-1971
Pakistan. The fifth section explores the grievances of smaller communities that underpin the perception of Punjabisation of Pakistan. The sixth section summarizes the substantial protests of smaller communities against the federal authorities. The dissatisfaction of political parties toward the existing federal settings is exposed in the next section by examining autonomy demands of various political parties in their electoral manifestoes.
3.2 Movement of Indian Muslims for a Separate Homeland
Nationalist historiography lacks consensus about the development of Muslim identity in the subcontinent. There is a variety of opinion on this issue. One school of thought considers the emergence of Muslim nationalism as the result of British‟s policy of divide and rule1; others argue that Islam was the single explanatory variable behind this development2; some others maintain that the emergence of Muslim identity was,
„both a consequence of British policies toward Indian society and fears of the North
Indian Muslim elite‟3. Actually, India experienced a great deal of nationalisms at the
47 same time and some of those nationalisms worked in opposition to others (Malik,
(1963).
Muslims entered in Indian subcontinent between seventh and eighth centaury. Slowly but surely, they strengthened their rule in various parts of India. By 1290, almost all of India was “under the loose domination of Muslim rulers”. Of the Muslim rulers,
Mughals were the most prominent. They “established an empire in early sixteenth century that lasted until 1858” (Cohen, 2005, pp.15-16).
Religion‟s role as a symbol of identity remained limited during Mughals rule. There were divisions within the courts of Mughals, but “this division was between Turkish and Persian factions rather than between Hindus and Muslims”. Family was an important source of identity during this period. Shi‟a and Sunni divisions were visible and the “category of Muslim was not of overriding importance”. The Muslims who were descended from converts to Islam, the vast majority of Muslims in India, expressed themselves through the regional cultures and languages of India. However, some Muslims, like Shah Wali Ullah, had a cultural and imaginative reach that went well beyond the borders of south Asia (Robinson, 1974, pp.271-72).
The Muslim rule in India was finally eliminated in 1858. After having control of
India, British government introduced various constitutional formulas in India to provide some space to Indians in government machinery. Though a limited access was provided to the power and authority in theses constitutional proposals, they proved of a great significance for the future of India. Muslims, a minority, were worried about the majoritarian form of democracy. They began to defend their interests. They were provided reserved seats in the parliament and the Muslim leadership had to appeal only Muslim voters. Similarly, non-Muslim politicians did
48 not have to appeal to Muslims. These developments resulted in the consolidation of political interests around communal lines. Therefore, the political environment was no more conducive for the emergence of a genuine Indian nationalism.
In the late 1920s, All India National Congress and All India Muslim League offered different constitutional proposals in their meetings for the prospective constitution of
British India. While Congress emphasized on a centralized federation, the League stressed for a decentralized federation with a substantial minority rights protection.
Meanwhile, in 1930, an idea of a separate homeland for Indian Muslims was presented by Iqbal, a famous poet-philosopher of India. The idea of a separate homeland provided “a more potent objective to Muslim community of India than constitutional rights and representation in the civil services” (Islam, 1981).
In the subsequent years, Jinnah emerged as a spokesman of Muslim nationalism. He advocated the theory of two-nations, in India, based on religion. He stressed that
Muslims are a separate nation, and therefore they require a separate homeland. In his speech at All India Muslim League‟s annual meeting, held in Lahore in 1940, he reiterated that “the Hindus and Muslims belong to two different religious philosophies, social customs, and literatures. They neither intermarry, nor dine together and they belong to two different civilizations which are based mainly on conflicting ideas and conceptions” (Malik, 1990).
It was this point of time when “the political and religious themes of modern Pakistan found together”. At the start, the Pakistan movement was more popular in the Muslim minority provinces of India. But the Pakistan became a possibility only when the
Muslim League had captured Bengal and Punjab, Muslim majority provinces.
Therefore, when “the lines of partition were drawn and the imperial power withdrew,
49 it was chiefly the Muslims of Bengal and Punjab who found themselves on Pakistan side of the line” (Page, 1974, p. 262).
3.3 Pre-1971 Pakistan: Constitutional and Political Development
While the Muslim League demanded a decentralized federal system in pre-partition
India, it adopted the policy of centralization in the newly established state of Pakistan.
Between 1947 and 1958, the system of government was set-up first under the
Independence Act of 1947 (an interim constitution) and then under the constitution of
1956. Under the interim constitution, a federal system of government was adopted.
Governor General had been provided extraordinary constitutional powers. Governor
General was granted the power to amend the constitution; to appoint and discharge the council of ministers; and to look after the matters regarding Defense,
Ecclesiastical, External Affairs, Tribal Areas, maintenance of law and order, minority rights etc (Sayeed, 1967, pp. 233-57).
The central government did not pay any respect to the constitutional norms of a federation. It “very frequently dismissed and reformed the ministries in the provinces playing off the differences between different rival groups which constituted those provincial legislatures. Many times the central government appointed such persons as chief ministers in various provinces who did not enjoy the support of the simple majority in their respective legislatures” (Hussain, 1989, p.77).
Various provincial ministries were sacked by the central government in consequence of political disputes. The Congress ministry of Dr. Khan Sahib in NWFP was dismissed on 22 August 1947 by the Governor of the NWFP on direction of the
Governor General of Pakistan. Abdul Qaiyum Khan, who had not a majority in the
50 house, was installed as Chief Minister of NWFP. M. A. Khuhro, the Chief Minister of Sindh, had support of majority in the house in 1948. But his ministry was discharged, in April 1948, on the charges of “maladministration, gross misconduct and corruption” (Hussain, 1989, pp.77-80). In the same manner, the Governors under section 92-A of Provisional Constitution Order assumed powers in other provinces:
Punjab in1949, Sindh in 1951, and East Bengal in 1954.
The first major step towards constitution-making in Pakistan was the passing of the
Objective Resolution in 1949. The resolution laid down the principles that were to guide the constitutional process in Pakistan. One of the key principles agreed was that the system of the government in Pakistan would be federal.
However, there was disagreement among various constituent units over the nature and kind of the federal design for Pakistan. The main issues included the nature and composition of legislature, division of powers between the federation and the units, and the role of Islam in the polity of Pakistan.
The constituent assembly appointed a Basic Principles Committee to work out a federal constitution. The committee in its first report, in 1950, suggested a bicameral legislature, more or less similar to U.S.A. model: the representation in lower house was provided on the basis of population and an equal representation for all constituent units was suggested in the upper chamber. Nearly, equal powers were suggested for the both houses: cabinet was held responsible to both houses and in the case of a dispute; a joint session of the Houses was to be summoned. It was a preliminary report and the committee had not outlined the details. While the “report had a favorable reaction in the Western Zone of the country, the East Bengal did not
51 approve the proposals”. Therefore, Committee was asked to reconsider its recommendations (Hussain, 1989).
The Committee presented the revised report. This time the problem of representation in parliament was attempted to solve through the distribution of equal membership to both wings in both houses of the parliament: in the lower house of 400 members, the allocation of 200 seats was suggested for Bengal and 200 seats were to be distributed among the units and princely states of western wing. Similarly, a house of 120 members, 60 each from the two wings, was recommended as a federal chamber. The spirit of a parliamentary system was apparent in the proposals as the upper house had been provided minimal powers.
These proposals were also not approved by the members of various groups. It has been argued that these proposals denied the smaller identities of western zone by
“ignoring the historical facts that they had differences and grievances in the past and were apprehensive of domination by each other”. The Punjabis and Pashtuns had mutual hostility; the “Sindhis had sought British help against the Punjab to save their territory from the latter”; and “Balochistan had always been apprehensive of any domination or subjugation from Sindh and Punjab” (Hussain, 1989, p.91).
The proposals of parity between eastern wing and the western wing led to the unification of western wing into one province. Under the One-unit scheme, all provinces and princely states of the western wing were amalgamated into one province – the West Pakistan. The ministries that resisted unification in NWFP and
Sindh were dismissed. The states of Bahawalpur and Khairpur along the Balochistan
States union were forced to amalgamate their territories into a single province of West
52 Pakistan. This scheme resulted in Punjab‟s hegemony over the smaller identities of the western zone within a unified West Pakistan4.
Finally, the constituent assembly passed the first constitution of the Islamic republic of Pakistan in 1956 in the course of nine years. According to Chaudhry (1956), the constitution had all the normal features of a federation: a written constitution, a dual polity, distribution of powers between the federation and federating units, and a supreme court. However, the constitution proved short-lived and martial law was imposed in October 1958. Ayub Khan5, then chief martial law administrator, framed the second constitution in 1962. A highly centralized system of government was set up under this constitution (Khan, 2005). This constitution was abrogated with the end of Ayub rule in 1969.
Pakistan experienced another Martial Law in post-Ayub era. Yahya Khan, the army chief, remained in power until the break up of Pakistan in 1971. It is not within the domain of this study to discuss the separation of East Pakistan in detail. However, it is pertinent to point out that Bengalis were the opinion that they remained marginalized and excluded from the power structure of Pakistan. This exclusion and inequitable distribution underpinned the political mobilization that led to separation of Bengal from Pakistan (Alqama, 1997). After partition, Bhutto replaced Yahya Khan, and became civil martial law administrator. Martial law was lifted in 1972. Subsequently, the National Assembly of Pakistan passed the constitution that was enforced on
August 14, 1973. The federal features of this constitution have been discussed in the next chapter.
53 3.4 Post-1971 Pakistan: an Overview of Ethnic Groups and their Locations
Pakistan is one of the world‟s most ethnically complex states. Generally, each of it‟s provinces is coupled with a certain linguistic group6; Punjab with Punjabis (75.2%);
Sindh with Sindhis (59.7%); Balochistan with Balochs (58.5%); and NWFP with
Pashtuns (73.9%).While ethno-linguistic boundaries do not coincide strictly with the administrative boundaries, the bordering areas of each province of Pakistan have significant minorities. The huge influx of migrants (Muhajireen), in 1947, restructured the ethno-linguistic composition of the region. In addition, in-country migration and the arrival of Afghan refugees in great number have turned Pakistan into a more ethnically diverse state. A complete description of ethno-linguist composition of
Pakistan is given in the following table.
Figure 3-1: Pakistan by Mother Language
Language Punjab Sindh NWFP Balochistan Pakistan
All Urban All Urban All Urban All Urban All Urban Urdu 4.5 10.1 21.1 41.5 0.8 3.5 1.6 5.9 7.8 20.5 Punjabi 75.2 78.8 7.0 11.5 1.0 4.6 2.9 10.6 45.4 47.6 Pashto 1.2 1.8 4.2 11.5 73.9 73.5 23.0 19.7 13.0 9.6 Sindhi 0.1 0.1 59.7 25.8 - 0.1 6.8 6.9 14.6 9.3 Balochi 0.7 0.1 2.1 2.7 - - 58.5 46.7 3.5 2.6 Siraiki 17.4 8.4 1.0 1.7 3.9 3.1 2.6 4.1 10.9 5.5 Others 0.9 0.8 4.9 8.8 20.4 15.1 5.1 6.1 4.8 4.8 Total 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 Source: (Kennedy, 2002)
An overview of ethno-linguistic composition of various provinces of Pakistan has been illustrated in the following sections.
3.4.1 Punjab
Punjab is the largest province of Pakistan in terms of population. It can be divided in three well-known groups/regions on the linguistic/geographical basis – the Punjabi
54 speaking, central Punjab; the Pothowhari speaking, northern Punjab; and the Siraiki speaking, southern Punjab. Officially, Pothowhari has been considered a dialect of
Punjabi. So, apart from Siraiki region, the Punjab is an overwhelmingly a Punjabi speaking region. The detail of Punjabi and Siraiki speaking regions is provided in the following sections.
3.4.1.1 Punjabi Speaking Region of Punjab
The central and northern parts of Punjab are entirely Punjabi speaking regions. Only the neighboring districts to the province of NWFP – Mianwali (10%), Rawalpindi
(5.3%) and Attock (8.28%) – have some Pashtuns population. Some Urdu-speaking population has presence in the urban centers like Lahore (10.2%) and Rawalpindi
(7.5%). Furthermore, few Siraikis reside in the nearby areas to Siraiki speaking region
– Mianwali (12%), Vehari (11.4%) and Khanewal (5.8%). The Balochs and the
Sindhis have no occurrence in this region (Census Reports, 1998).
3.4.1.2 Siraiki Speaking Areas of Punjab
Southern Punjab is a Siraiki speaking region. However, a considerable number of
Punjabis live in this region. The adjoining districts to the province of Balochistan –
Rajanpur (17%) and Dera Ghazi Khan (14.3%) – have some Balochi-speaking population. Urdu-speaking population has quite significant presence in the urban centers of the region. However, Pashtuns and Sindhis are in nominal numbers in this region (Census Reports, 1998).
55 3.4.2 Sindh
Sindh is the most ethnically diverse province of Pakistan. In addition to the huge influx of refugees in 1947, from northern and central India, plenty of Punjabis,
Pashtuns, and Balochs have also settled in Sindh. Karachi, the provincial capital, and the largest city of the Pakistan is popularly called “Mini Pakistan” because of its diverse ethnic composition. Sindhis are in majority in the rural Sindh. However, the rural Sindh has absorbed a considerable number of Balochs, even ruling dynasties, who adopted Sindhi language and culture. In addition, a considerable number of
Punjabis are residing in the districts of Mirpur Khas (10.73%), Umerkot (5.08%),
Badin (5.6%), and Sukkar (6.63%). Mohajirs are, generally, concentrated at district headquarters of Sukkar (13.82%), Mirpur Khas (18.34), Sanghar (10.08), Thatta
(12%), Hyderabad (29.61%), Nawab Shah (8.72%), and Nausharo Feroz (5.69%). A considerable number of Pashtuns live in Karachi but the number of Pashtun residing in rural Sindh is very small (Census Reports, 1998). The ethnic division, mainly, coincides with rural-urban division in Sindh. On the whole, Mohajirs are the largest group in urban centers of Sindh; and Sindhis are the overwhelming majority in rural
Sindh.
3.4.3 North-Western Frontier Province (NWFP)
Generally, NWFP is considered as an overwhelmingly Pashtun dominated province.
However, the census reports of NWFP reveal that Pashtuns are a minority in the districts of Haripur, Abbotabad, Dera Ismael Khan, Mansehra, Kohistan, and Chitral.
While Siraikis make up majority in the district of Dera Ismael Khan, smaller linguistic groups (mainly Hindko-speaking population) dominate in the non-Pashtun belt of the
NWFP (Census Reports, 1998).
56 3.4.4 Balochistan
Balochistan is a multiethnic province with a few significant minorities. Pashtuns have majority in the districts of Pishin, Killa Abdullah, Loralai, Killa Saifullah, Musakhel,
Zhob, and Ziarat. A considerable number of Sindhis and Siraikis are residing in the districts of Jhal Magsi, Lasbella, Jaffar Abad, Nasir Abad, and Bolan. The Balochs are a majority in remaining areas. This remaining region includes the districts of Chagi,
Kohlu, Dera Bugti, Kalat, Khuzdar, Awaran, Kharan, Kech, Gawader, and Panjgur
(Census Reports, 1998).
The following table presents a comparative analysis of various ethno-linguistic groups of Pakistan. The table explores some key features of various groups that will be helpful for our understandings toward the multiethnic society of Pakistan.
57 Figure 3-2: Ethno-linguistic Groups in Pakistan: Some Comparative Observation
Enumeration Punjabis Siraikis Balochs Pashtuns Sindhis Mohajirs Language(s) Punjabi Siraiki Balochi, Brahvi Pashto Sindhi Urdu Religion Islam Islam Islam Islam Islam Islam Customs (with respect to majority) Majority group same Different Different Different Different Regional base of groups Punjab Southern Punjab Balochistan NWFP Rural Sindh Urban Sindh % of members in regional base >75% >75% 50-75% 50-75% >75% >75% Urban/Rural distribution Mixed Mainly rural Mostly rural Mostly rural Mainly rural Mainly urban Highest level of political grievance No political Separate province Autonomy status Autonomy status Autonomy status Autonomy status grievances Highest level of cultural grievance: No cultural Remedial Policies No cultural No cultural Remedial Policies No cultural grievances grievances grievances grievances Political Representation Adequate Under Under- Adequate Adequate Adequate representation representation representation representation representation representation Representation in civil bureaucracy Over Under Under- Adequate Under- Over representation representation representation representation representation representation Representation in military Over Under Under- Overrepresentation Under Adequate representation representation representation representation representation Representation in diplomatic positions Over Under Under- Under- Under- Over representation representation representation representation representation representation
Sources: (Minorities at Risk Project, 2008; Mushtaq & Alqama, 2009)
58 3.5 Grievances of Smaller Communities
The Punjab‟s dominance over smaller constituent units of Pakistan is multidimensional.
It contains more than half population of the Pakistan; enjoys overrepresentation in national institutions; and has relatively better socio-economic conditions. This relatively advantageous position of the Punjabis has annoyed the people of deprived regions and the marginalized communities (Mushtaq & Alqama, 2009). They argue that their resources are being utilized for the development of the Punjab. Consequently, this relative deprivation of the smaller units and predominance of the Punjab has been perceived by the smaller units as the „Punjabisation’ of Pakistan (Talbot, 2000, p. 215).
Evidence suggests that the pre-dominance of the Punjabis in the civil-military bureaucracy, the comparative development level of the Punjab, the „contentious‟ formula that regulates the distribution of funds to provinces, and disagreement between
Punjab and the smaller units over water issues underpins the perception of the
Punjabisation of Pakistan by the smaller units. Therefore, this section attempts to evaluate these grievances of smaller units and marginalized communities, mainly, against the Punjab.
3.5.1 Lack of Power-sharing
The basic grievance of smaller communities is about the lack of power-sharing. They argue that they are not provided their due share in political, diplomatic and bureaucratic positions. They also resent their under-representation in armed forces. These issues are discussed in the following sections.
59 3.5.1.1 Distribution of Political Positions
One of the primary concerns of smaller communities is that they are excluded from the power structure of Pakistan. Under the original 1973 constitution, Pakistan had a parliamentary system of government. However, the constitution was amended by the military rulers (Zia-ul-Haq and Pervez Musharraf introduced 8th and 14th amendments respectively) to shift the power from the office of prime minister to the president.
Consequently, in practice, the parliamentary system has operated more like a semi- parliamentary system in Pakistan. Nonetheless, the ethno-linguistic groups believe that larger share of political positions is advantageous for the concerned group. The evidence does not, seemingly, corroborate the argument of the smaller communities. The distribution of political positions (the offices of President and Prime Minister) among various ethno linguistic groups, in post-1971 Pakistan, seems to suggest that there is no single group that dominated this period. Sindhis are relatively overrepresented. Zulfiqar
Ali Bhutto became civilian chief martial law administrator after the separation of East
Pakistan in 1971. He occupied the office of presidency until August 14, 1973 when he became prime minister of Pakistan. He remained prime minister up to 1977.
Subsequently, Muhammad Khan Junejo, another Sindhi, was elected as prime minister by the National Assembly of Pakistan after the party-less elections of 1985. Yet again,
Benazir Bhutto, a Sindhi, became prime minister in 1988. She was replaced by Ghulam
Mustafa Jatoi, a caretaker prime minister from Sindh. Therefore, the all four prime ministers were Sindhis. Meantime, Zia-ul-Haq, a Punjabi military officer, ruled the country for a more than decade (1977-1988). Nawaz Sharif was the first Punjabi prime minister elected in 1990, in the post-1971 Pakistan. He was replaced by Benazir Bhutto in 1993. The two caretaker prime ministers, during this period, were from Siraiki and
Punjabi groups. Musharraf, a Mohajir military officer, exercised powers of the state,
60 exclusively, during the period of 1999 and 2008. Zafarullah Khan Jamali, Shujaat
Hussain and Shaukat Aziz were his nominees. Equally, Ghulam Ishaq Khan, a Pashtun, remained a powerful president during the period of 1988 to 1993 and removed elected prime ministers from their offices. Another, Pashtun, General Muhammad Ayub Khan, ruled the country form 1958 to 1969. Siraiki speaking Yousaf Raza Gillani and Farooq
Ahmad Khan Leghari have enjoyed the offices of prime minister and president respectively. In 2009, when this study is concluding, Asif Ali Zardari, a Sindhi, has all the presidential powers that Musharraf enjoyed during his rule. The figures 3-3 and 3-4 display that Punjabis have not overrepresentation; their share in key political positions vis-à-vis their share in population is not shocking.
Figure 3-3: Distribution of Political Positions across ethno-linguistic Groups (Ethnic Origins of Prime Ministers of Post-1971 Pakistan) S. Name Duration Period Group Elected or No Y- M- D Caretaker
1 Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto August 14, 1973 to July 5, 1977 03-10-22 Sindhi Elected 2 Muhammad Khan Junejo March 24, 1985 to May 29, 1988 03-02-05 Sindhi Elected 3 Benazir Bhutto December 2,1988 to August 6, 1990 01-08-04 Sindhi Elected 4 Ghulam Mustafa Jatoi August 6, 1990 to November 6, 1990 00-03-00 Sindhi Caretaker 5 Nawaz Sharif November 6, 1990 to April 18, 1993 02-05-12 Punjabi Elected 6 Balakh Sher Mazari April 18, 1993 to May 26, 1993 00-01-22 Siraiki Caretaker 7 Nawaz Sharif May 26, 1993 to July 18, 1993 00-01-08 Punjabi Elected 8 Moeenuddin Ahmad July 18, 1993 to October 19, 1993 00-03-01 Punjabi Caretaker 9 Benazir Bhutto October19, 1993 to November 5, 1996 03-00-16 Sindhi Elected 10 Miraj Khalid November 5, 1996 to February 17, 1997 00-03-12 Punjabi Caretaker 11 Nawaz Sharif February 17, 1997 to October 12, 1999 02-07-25 Punjabi Elected 12 Zafarullah Khan Jamali November 21, 2002 to June 26, 2004 01-07-05 Baloch Elected 13 Shujaat Hussain June 30, 2004 to August 28, 2004 00-01-28 Punjabi Elected 14 Shaukat Aziz August 28, 2004 to November 15, 2007 03-02-17 Punjabi Elected 15 M. Mian Somoro November 15, 2007 to march 25, 2008 00-04-10 Sindhi Caretaker 16 Yousaf Raza Gillani March 25, 2008 to present* 01-09-06 Siraiki Elected
*Period has been calculated up to December 31, 2009. Note: Y = Years, M = Months, D = Days
61 Figure 3-4: Distribution of Political Positions across ethno-linguistic Groups (Ethnic Origins of Presidents of Post-1971 Pakistan) S. Name Duration Period Group Elected or No Y- M- D Caretaker
1 Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto December 20,1971-- August 13, 1973 01-08-23 Sindhi Non- elected 2 Fazal Ilahi Chaudhry August 13, 1973 – September 16, 1978 05-01-03 Punjabi Elected 3 Zia-ul-Haq September 16, 1978 – August 17, 1988 09-11-01 Punjabi Non- elected 4 Ghulam Ishaq Khan August 17, 1988 – July 18, 1993 04-11-01 Pashtun Elected 5 Farooq Ahmad Khan November 14, 1993 – December 2, 1997 04-00-18 Siraiki Elected 6 Muhammad Rafiq 01January, 1998 to June 20, 2001 03-05-19 Punjabi Elected 7 Pervez Musharraf June 20, 2001 to August 18, 2008 07-01-28 Mohajir Non- elected 8 Asif Ali Zardari September 9, 2008 to present* 01-03-22 Sindhi Elected
* Period has been calculated up to December, 31, 2009. Note: (1). Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto, first took charge as civilian chief martial law administrator and the as president under the interim constitution of 1972. (2). During the Zia-ul-Haq, Ghulam Ishaq Khan and Farooq Leghari periods, the institution of presidency had vital powers. They had the powers under article 58(2) B, to dismiss the government, and they exercised this power. Conversely, Fazal Ilahi Chaudhry and Muhammad Rafiq Tarar were ceremonial head of states. Pervez Musharraf took over the charge of chief executive and then became president through referendum. He was also a powerful president and during his rule the prime ministers ha nominal role in politics.
A summary of the distribution of political positions in various groups has been given in the following table.
Figure 3-5: Distribution of Political Positions in Various Groups: A Summary
Serial Number Ethnic group President ship Prim minister ship Y- M-D Y- M- D 1 Sindhi 03-00-15 11-04-27 2 Punjabi 18-05-23 08-10-12 3 Mohajir 07-01-28 Nil 4 Pashtun 04-11-01 Nil 5 Siraiki 04-00-18 01-10-28 6 Baloch Nil 01-07-05 Note: Y = Years, M = Months, D = Days
3.5.1.2 Civil Bureaucracy
Civil bureaucracy has a vital role in the politics of Pakistan. Weak political organizations and turbulent situation of early years provided civil-bureaucracy a greater role in the state-building process of Pakistan. Jinnah, the founding father and the first governor general of the Pakistan, heavily relied on the bureaucracy. Equally, Liaquat Ali
62 Khan, the first prime minister of Pakistan (1947-51), did not demonstrate any distaste towards increasing influence of bureaucracy in the state affairs.7
Consequently, these early years designed a role of the bureaucracy for the subsequent years. Although, in the coming years, the fairly increased role of military in the
Pakistani politics challenged this pattern, the bureaucracy had shown its potential to deal with the changing circumstances. Nevertheless, the role of civil bureaucracy in the
Pakistani politics remained intact.
Before the separation of eastern wing in 1971, East-West dimension engaged the studies of distribution and inequality in Pakistan. Despite their numerical strength, Bengalis had meager representation in civil-military bureaucracy. In 1956, „only 51 out of total 741 top level policy-making positions were occupied by the Bengalis in the central secretariat; and more or less „98 percent of the officer corps of the army, navy, and air force was composed of West Pakistanis‟ (Islam ,1981). British recruitment policies and the relative development of certain regions of British India were equally responsible for this disproportion: out of “133 Muslims from the top layer of the bureaucracy who opted for Pakistan, only one was Bengali and the rest were mainly the Mohajirs and the
Punjabis” (Samad, 1995, p.128).
Mohajirs and Punjabis retained their dominance in the early decades. Nevertheless, in post-1971 Pakistan, the Punjab has emerged as the single leading group with overrepresentation in civil-military bureaucracy. Perhaps, the Mohajirs are still slightly overrepresented but since 1980s it seems that they are „no more in commanding position in the higher echelons of the civil bureaucracy in Pakistan‟ (Rahman, 1995). Conversely,
“the Punjabi salariat tenaciously [has] asserted its dominance in the federation,
63 demanding that the interests of the majority should be a primary consideration for state policy” (Samad, 2007, p.105).
Although, the quota system has made the Pakistani bureaucracy relatively more representative, „the following table suggests that the urban Sindh and the Punjab has continued to be over-represented in the federal bureaucracy.
Figure 3-6: Regional Representation of Federal Bureaucracy (1973-83)
Region Quota All Gazetted All Gazetted (1983) (1973) (1973) (1983) Punjab 50.00 49.20 53.5 54.9 55.80 Urban Sindh 7.60 30.10 33.50 17.4 20.20 Rural Sindh 11.40 3.01 2.70 5.4 5.10 NWFP 11.50 10.50 7.00 13.4 11.60 Balochistan 3.50 2.50 1.50 3.4 3.10 Northern areas 4.00 2.60 1.30 3.6 3.40 Azad Kashmir 2.00 1.80 0.50 1.9 0.90 Total 100 84,749 6,011 134,310 11, 816 Source: ( Kennedy, 1987) Note: Quota roughly represents the %share of population8
General Zia‟s era (1977-88) not only „solidified Punjabi dominance‟ but also witnessed a gradual emergence of Pashtuns as „the junior partners of the Punjabis in the civil- military bureaucracy‟ (Ahmed, 1988). Nevertheless, the Balochs and the Sindhis remained marginalized from the machinery of the state.
Apparently, the above-mentioned table shows that the Balochistan has obtained a reasonable representation of 3.40% and 3.10% in the category of „all‟ and „gazetted‟ federal jobs against its quota of 3.50% in federal jobs. But it is worth mentioning that it is the representation of Balochistan rather than the Balochs. To substantiate, of the civil employees in Balochistan in 1972, only 5 per cent were Baloch. And they, usually, occupied the lower positions in the state bureaucracy‟ (Ali, 1983, p. 117). The Sindhis –
64 based in rural Sindh – are improving their strength in the civil bureaucracy but at a snail‟s pace.
To be brief, throughout Pakistan‟s history, the army and bureaucracy has played vital role in the politics of Pakistan.
3.5.1.3 Distribution of Diplomatic Positions
The posts of senior diplomats are considered as privileges. The smaller ethno-linguistic groups argue that they are not provided their due share in these key posts. A study reveals that out of the total 72 ambassadors posted in 8 countries9 during the period of
1971-97, 45 were Punjabis, 11were Mohajirs, 14 were Pashtuns, and 2 were Sindhis.
Siraikis and Balochs have no representation in these diplomatic positions in the
„selected‟ countries (Mushtaq & Alqama, 2009). The following graph demonstrates that while three relatively dominant communities – Punjabis, Mohajirs, and Pashtuns – have overrepresentation, the relatively marginalized communities – Sindhis, Balochs, and
Siraikis – have least representation in diplomatic positions in the selected countries.
Nevertheless, the study seems to approve the dominance of the Punjab in the diplomatic positions, and this „dominance‟ of the Punjab strengthens the perception of the
„Punjabisation’ of Pakistan‟.
65 Figure 3-7: Distribution of Diplomatic Positions
Ethnic Origins of Senior Diplomats posted abroad (1971-1997)
70
60
50
40
% Share in Positions %Share in Population 30
20
10
0 Punjabi Siraiki Mohajir Sindhi Pashtun Baloch Ethnic/Linguistic Groups Source: (Mushtaq, 2009)
3.5.2. Militarization
Military is the most powerful, influential and prominent intuition in Pakistan. Therefore,
„the significance of Punjab‟s multiple relationships with the army is crucial to the understanding of the Punjabisation process‟ (Samad, 2007, p. 113).
During the British rule, the recruitment policy for armed forces was rationalized by the so-called theory of „martial races‟. South Indians and Bengalis were considered unsuitable for the job, and it was „the politically backward rural hinterlands of the
Punjab and the NWFP which were to be the catchments area for the new-style army‟
(Ali, 1983, p. 63). This policy resulted in the overrepresentation of the Punjabis in military and „by the beginning of World War II the largest single class in the Indian army was Punjabi Muslims‟ (Cohen, 1987, p.316).
This recruitment pattern continued after independence and the Pakistani armed personnel “continued to be largely recruited from those sections of the Punjab peasantry that had traditionally provided artillery fodder for the British” (Ali, 1983, p.65).
66 Nonetheless, the Pashtuns of NWFP gained reasonable share and emerged as the second largest group in the armed forces of Pakistan. A study reveals that almost „seventy–five percent of all ex-servicemen come from only three districts of the Punjab (Rawalpindi,
Jehlum, and Attack (Cambellpur), and two adjacent districts of the NWFP (Kohat and
Mardan)‟ (Cohen, 1987, p. 318). This concentration of military personnel in a few districts of the Punjab and the NWFP, substantiate the argument that „the military is ethnically unrepresentative in Pakistan‟; and even some sections – the Siraikis of southern Punjab and the Non-Pashtun communities of NWFP – within Punjab and
NWFP have least representation.
Although, there is no data available about the ethnic composition of the Pakistan army, it is most likely that „the Balochs and especially the Sindhis have under-representation‟ in the military services (Cohen, 1987, p. 318). Consequently, the military rule in
Pakistan is equated with the Punjabisation of Pakistan by the smaller units and the marginalized groups.
Pakistan repeatedly experienced direct military rules; and military periods10 are imperative because of their significant impact on the relationship between the state and the army11. Ayub‟s period is important because it provided to the military „political and financial autonomy which gives it the confidence to retain its hold over the state‟
(Siddiqa, 2007, p. 72). Zia-ul-Haq remained more „dependent on the military‟ than Ayub
Khan and granted more benefits to the armed forces. During his rule, due to the consistent and extensive distribution of rewards, the higher echelons of the military
„emerged as the most privileged caste in Pakistan‟. He raised the budgetary allocation for the defense services, provided prized jobs to the retired armed personnel, strengthened the Fauji Foundation12, extended assignments to serving and retired
67 military officers in Gulf States, and provided precious land for houses in cantonments and urban centers to the military officers13.
Musharraf‟s regime is also „known for providing greater opportunities to the military through inducting serving and retired members of the armed forces into significant public-sector positions‟ (Siddiqa, 2007, p. 110). He assigned the positions to military personnel in „the Prime Minister‟s Secretariat, Civil Service Training Institutions, the
Ministry of Interior, the Establishment Division, Federal Public Service Commission, the National Accountability Bureau, and Ministry of Information Technology‟.
Furthermore, „official state organizations such as the Pakistan Olympic Association,
Athletic Association of Pakistan, Pakistan Cricket Board, Pakistan Hockey Federation and some universities have also had senior military officers running them‟(Samad ,
2007).
In addition, Musharraf has also provided military a „permanent role in decision making and governance‟. The National Security Council Act14, passed in April 2004, has enabled the military to find a permanent role in issues ranging from „national security and sovereignty to the crises management‟. The act also ensures „the continued protection of the defense forces interests and participation in molding the socioeconomic and political future of the state‟ (Siddiqa, 2007, p.107).
Since military is a vital institution and it provides a welfare system for its serving and retired personnel, the overrepresentation of the Punjab in this organization frustrates the smaller units.
68 Figure 3-8: Administrative Division of Military Pensioners
Administrative Division of Militrary pensioners
1.4 1.2 1
0.8 Officer Cadre
Ratio 0.6 JCOs & Other ranks
0.4 0.2 0 Punjab Source: AyeshaSindh Siddiqa, 2007:NWFP 216(9) Balochistan
According to Ayesha Siddiqa (2007, 216), „Approximately 72% of the military welfare budget is invested in the Punjab, 13.21% in the NWFP, 2.64% in Sindh, 1.8% in
Balochistan, 8.92% in Azad Kashmir and 2.87%t in the Northern Areas‟. This uneven distribution promotes a sense a marginalization and strengthens the perception of the
Punjabisation of Pakistan among smaller units and the deprived communities.
3.5.3 Uneven Development and Regional Disparities
The disparity across regions and communities in Pakistan is evident in the variation of human development index of various provinces, the difference in the real GDP per capita of different communities, dissimilarity in the unemployment and literacy rates, disparity in health facilities, and variation in exposure of media to housing units of certain regions.
The data shows the inequality in distribution of some aspects related to social life such as the availability of better sources of drinking water, availability of electricity to housing units, by the type of available residence, and exposure of media to housing units. Whilst nearly 80% of the housing units of Pakistan have access to the relatively
69 healthier sources of drinking water – pipe and hand-pump – the remaining 20% uses relatively primitive – well and other means – sources to meet their requirement of drinking water. The figure illustrates the dissimilarity in available sources of drinking water across regions. While more than 90% of the housing units in the Punjab have access to relatively healthier sources of water, nearly one-half of the housing units of
NWFP and two-third of the Balochistan meet their requirement of drinking water through relatively less healthy sources of drinking water. Overall, Sindh seems in a better position. However, it is the urban Sindh, particularly Karachi, the provincial capital of Sindh and the biggest city of the Pakistan which makes possible for Sindh to be placed in a relatively better position. In terms of rural-urban, one-third housing units of the rural Sindh are deprived of better sources of drinking water (Mushtaq & Alqama,
2009).
The variation in availability of electricity to housing units in various regions is another indicator that illustrates the uneven distribution in Pakistan. The most terrible situation is in the Balochistan where more than half housing units have no access to electricity.
Rural Sindh is equally backward with only 52.6% of the housing units‟ access to the electricity (Mushtaq & Alqama, 2009).
The type of material used for the residence – pucca (house built with cement and bricks), semi pucca (house built with bricks and mud), and kucha (house built with mud)
– suggests the status of the owner. More than 70% of the housing units of Balochistan are Kucha. These numbers substantiate the underdevelopment of the Balochistan. On the other hand, the Punjab is relatively in better position than the Sindh and the NWFP.
Exposure of media to housing units in a certain region is important for the judgment of development level. „Its coverage determines the number of people exposed to new and
70 innovative ideas come through both print and electronic media. Balochistan is lagging behind with smaller number of „housing units with exposure of media‟ (Mushtaq &
Alqama, 2009).
The disparity in availability of gas facilities is more evident in rural-urban dimension – rural areas of all provinces have very limited access to the gas facilities. However, it is most striking that despite providing gas for the whole country; Balochistan is lagging behind in terms of percentage of housing units with gas facilities (Mushtaq & Alqama,
2009).
Education is the core and the development whether it is economic, social, or political revolves around it. Evidence suggests the superiority of the Punjab in terms of literacy rate and enrolment ratio. The provinces of NWFP and Balochistan are lagging far behind in terms of educational facilities. Sindh is performing well, but it seems due to its relative urbanization: Karachi, the provincial capital of the Sindh is the biggest and the most developed city of Pakistan.
Measurement of health facilities, in this study, involves variables such as the number of hospitals, the number of dispensaries, the number of maternity and child welfare centers, and the numbers of beds in hospitals and dispensaries in public sector. The ratio of a facility to the population of a certain province is calculated by dividing the percentage share of the particular facility in Pakistan by the percentage share of population of concerned province in
Pakistan.
The graph shows that the Balochistan has the greatest value and the Punjab has the least value in terms of health facilities. But it is imperative to note down the limitation of this study: Punjab is the host of very well-established private sector hospitals that are out of the jurisdiction of this study.
71 Figure 3-9: Uneven Development (I)
Population by source of drinking water Population by source of lighting
Pipe (Nul) Hand Pump Well Other Electricity Kerosene Other
70 100
90 60 80
50 70
60 40
50 30 40
Percentage of Percentage Housing Units 20 Percentage of Percentage Housing Units 30
20 10
10
0 0
Punjab Sindh NWFP Pakistan Sindh NWFP Islamabad Punjab Balochistan Pakistan Islamabad Balochistan
Population by type of Residence Population by Exposure to Media
Pucca ( bricks Semi.Pucca Kucha Television Radio New spaper
100 70
90 60 80
50 70
60 40
50
30
40 Percentage of Percentage Housing Units 30 of Percentage Housing Units 20
20 10 10
0 0
Punjab Sindh NWFP Punjab Sindh NWFP Pakistan Pakistan Islamabad Islamabad Balochistan Balochistan
72 Moreover, Balochistan is the largest province in terms of area and the least populace, the relative dispersion of population is equally responsible for the greater numbers of hospitals and dispensaries in the Balochistan. Nonetheless, the Punjab and urban centers of Sindh have relative better health facilities.
Unemployment is a common problem in developing world. Like many other developing countries, the unemployment rate in Pakistan is unevenly distributed across regions and communities. Nearly one-thirds of the Balochistan‟s labor force is suffering unemployment. The unemployment rate is also relatively higher in NWFP. Sindh has relatively performed well with the unemployment rate of only 14.43 %15. However, another study explores that Sindh has the larger percentage of population below poverty line than Punjab and NWFP (Jamal, 2005). Nevertheless, the two studies seem to suggest that the Punjab has relatively better position with low unemployment rate (19.1%) and lesser percentage of population (26%) below poverty line.
Ghaus (1996) has classified the 94 districts of Pakistan (1990-91) according to the level of development using some twenty-seven variables16. Seven out of ten top districts with respect to development level are located in the Punjab; the remaining three are the provincial capitals of the smaller provinces. The „second quartile of the population with regard to development level resides in twenty districts‟; and the Punjab dominates by sharing „eleven out of these twenty districts‟. This seems to suggest that „Punjab is ahead of the other provinces in terms of social development‟ (Ghaus, 1996).
The majority of NWFP‟s districts are ranked in 2nd and 3rd quartile, and majority of Sindh‟s districts in 3rd and 4th quartile. This ranking suggests that „NWFP has an intermediate level of development‟ and „Sindh has the lower-middle to low level of social development in the province‟. The majority of Balochistan„s districts (22 out of 25) are placed in the bottom quartile that verifies that Balochistan is „the most backward province in terms of social development in the country‟17 (Ghaus, 1996). Overall, this section confirms that there is uneven development in Pakistan. This uneven distribution underpins the political mobilization in deprived regions.
73 Figure 3-10: Uneven Development (II)
Population by Educational Attainment Ratio of Health Facilities (Ratio=% share in total No./% Share in total Population)
Literacy Ratio% Enrolment Ratio% Hospitals Dispenseries Materinity and Child w elfare Centers 80 Beds in Hospitals and Dispenaries
70
3
60
2.5 50
40 2
30
1.5 Percentage of Percentage population
20 of Value Ratio 1
10
0.5
0
Punjab Sindh NWFP 0 Pakistan Islamabad Balochistan Punjab Sindh NWFP Balochistan
Population by Unemployment Social Development Ranking of Districts
40 Top Q Second Q Third Q Bottom Q
25 35
30 20
25
15
20 %of Population 15
10 Numberof Districts
10
5 5
0 0 Pakistan Punjab Sindh NWFP Balochistan Punjab Sindh NWFP Balochistan
74 3.5.4 Distributive issues
The smaller units have been resenting against the inequitable distribution in Pakistan.
They have certain reservations against the formula of distribution of funds between center and provinces and among provinces. They also have reservation against the establishment of certain dams and the distribution of water. These reservations have been discussed in the following sections.
3.5.4.1 Allocation of Funds: NFC Award
In Pakistan, the smaller units have been arguing that the formula of NFC Award benefits the Punjab. NFC Award has remained a bone of contention among provinces and it was only three times since 1973 that National Finance Commission announced its recommendations (NFC Award has been discussed in detail in the fourth chapter).
Figure 3-11: Allocation Shares to Provinces under Various NFC Awards Province NFC 1974 NFC 1990 NFC 1997 Punjab 60.25 (60.10) 57.87 (57.87) 57.88 (57.88) Sindh 22.50 (22.62) 23.29 (23.29) 23.28 (23.28) NWFP 13.39 (13.40) 13.54 (13.54) 13.54 (13.54) Balochistan 3.86 (3.88) 5.30 (5.30) 5.3 (5.3) Total 100 100 100
Source: (Jaffery & Sadaqat, 2006)18. Note: Figures in brackets are population shares according to the last Census conducted prior to the Award
3.5.4.2 Water Resources
The disagreement over distribution of water is another bone of contention between the constituent units of Pakistan. The difference of opinion lies over the construction of
Kalabagh Dam, Greater Thal Canal and the distribution of Indus water between upper riparian and lower riparian.
75 Earlier, the dispute over water distribution was settled down between India and Pakistan through the Indus Basin Water Treaty in 1960. This treaty gave exclusive right to use the water of three eastern rivers (the Beas, the Sutlej, and the Ravi) to India and three western rivers (the Chenab, the Jehlum, and the Indus) to Pakistan. However, the distribution of water within Pakistan remained problematic. Various committees and commission were constituted but „ad hoc sharing arrangements was followed up to
1990‟ due to lack of consensus19 . Finally, during Nawaz Sharif‟s premiership, in 1991, a
„unanimous Water Apportionment Accord (Rajput, 2005, p. 13) was signed by the four provinces‟ and ratified by the Council of Common Interests (CCI)20.
Another water issue among the provinces is the Greater Thal Canal. The Indus River
System Authority Accord (Irsa) had provided the certification to the Greater Thal Canal project with a 3-2 majority. This canal would irrigate some „1530000 acres in four southern districts of Punjab, including Bhakar, Jhang, Layyah and Khushab, and would have a total capacity of carrying 8,500 cusecs‟21.The Sindh has objected to the plan and
Sindh Assembly has „passed a resolution to stop the on-going construction of the Thal
Canal‟.22
3.5.4.2.1 Apprehensions of smaller units against the construction of Kalabagh Dam
The most prominent water issue in Pakistan is the construction of Kalabagh dam.
Excluding Punjab, all the smaller units have certain reservations over the construction of
Kalabagh dam. The Pashtuns of NWFP believes that the „dam would benefit only
Punjab‟ and it „would submerge Peshawar, Nowshera, Mardan, Swabi and Charsadda districts and thus ruin the economy of the entire province‟.23 The Pashtuns believes that the construction of Kalabagh Dam will result into , (a) a displacement of considerable number of its people ; (b) a submergence of its huge area of land under the reservoir or
76 rendered waterlogged; (c) a permanent threat of flooding to the Nowshera City, ( the town will stand 24 feet below on the height of Kalabagh dam storage); (d) a certain threat of failure to the Mardan and Swabi SCARP projects; (e) a more salinity and infertility in Mardan and Charsadda areas; (f) and a threat of salinity and water logging in the areas of Pabbi and Swabi24.
Equally, the Sindhis resent construction of Kalabagh dam and assert that „there is not enough water in the Indus River System to justify a big dam‟. They are also suspicious about the fair treatment of regulatory system in the post- Kalabagh dam scenario. They argue that federation and the Punjab – the upper riparian – should respect the established norms and should not interfere with the flow of river without the consent of the Sindh – the lower riparian25. Sindhis also argue that due to the reduction in water flow, the cultivation in Sindh will be affected, fish and shrimps production will be reduced, and the live stock in Indus delta will be destroyed. Furthermore, drinking water supply to area below Kotri will be reduced, forests in riverain area will be destroyed, and sea intrusion will increase further (Rajput, 2005).
Though Balochistan is not a riparian in the strictest sense, it receives a considerable amount of irrigation water through the Pat Feeder canal at Guddu Barrage. Balochistan visualizes that in the post Kalabagh dam scenario, „its requests for more water from
River Indus will meet little successes‟ and even could result in a „further reduction in its share of irrigation water usage‟.26
Conversely, there is a strong argument in favor of dam. The Punjab has been continuously demanding for the construction of dam. Additionally, various technical and parliamentary committees recommended its feasibility and viability. It is also argued that the reservations of smaller units are mere exaggeration. The Water Accord of 1991,
77 evidently, acknowledges the need for storages, where ever possible on the Indus and other rivers. While this accord favored Sindh, and the province of Sindh received a larger share of water for cultivation, it seems that Punjab sacrificed to get favor for
Kalabagh dam in return.
3.5.4.2.2 Responses to Kalabagh Dam campaign
It is interesting to note that all civilian and military leaders who came into power in
Islamabad were „fully convinced of the usefulness of the project for the national economy, and remained interested to ahead with the project but couldn‟t do so mainly because of the severe opposition from the smaller provinces‟ (Ahmad, 2004, p.149).
The „debate‟ concerning Kalabagh dam remained the central point in the early 1988; „as many as seven alternatives sets of modifications to the design of the dam‟ were suggested to meet the raised objections of the smaller provinces. Since, the chief ministers of Sindh and NWFP complained that they were not consulted and declared that they will prefer to step-down rather than accept the plan. Balochistan agreed with the argument of Sindh and NWFP against the construction of Kalabagh dam. The issue came across the masses and the people with different backgrounds participated in the anti Kalabagh dam conventions in Hyderabad (Sindh) and, Peshawar (NWFP). On the contrary, the federal government and the Punjabi leadership continued their supportive argument and considered the project as „vital for future energy needs of the country‟
(Ahmad, 2004, pp.151-56). During the 1st term of Benazir Bhutto as prime minister
(1988-90), a committee of foreign and national experts considered the project feasible and recommended an early construction. While Benazir government was busy in focusing the project, the provincial assembly of Sindh passed a resolution against the construction of the dam.27
78 Figure 3-12: Map of Kalabagh Dam
79 Meanwhile, as the Punjab assembly28 unanimously insisted for construction of the dam, the provincial assemblies of the Sindh, the NWFP, and the Balochistan passed resolutions against the construction of Kalabagh dam.29
Shortly, after the Water Apportionment Accord (1991), another series of arguments in favor of dam started in the Punjab, but the smaller provinces were not ready for any compromise. PPP, the major opposition party, withdrew its earlier stand over the construction of Kalabagh Dam30 and this move made more difficult for the government to move ahead. In the following years, Benazir Bhutto (1993-96), Nawaz Sharif (1997-
1999, and Pervez Musharraf (1999-2007) remained unable to develop a consensus among provinces over the construction of Kalabagh dam.
Recently, Musharraf‟s declaration about the construction of Kalabagh Dam received an angry response by the smaller units again. The „nationalists‟ reiterated that „the construction of Kalabagh Dam and Greater Thal Canal posed a threat to the integrity of the federation‟.31
Mr. Asfandyar, head of the Awami National Party (ANP) warned that „the project could spell doom for the country‟. He argued for the removal of „controversial projects‟ and assumed that „the announcement to build the controversial dam would amount to waging war against the three federating units‟.32 Equally, Arbab Ghulam Rahim, the Sindh Chief
Minister disapproved the Kalabagh dam and announced that he will never do anything against the interests of Sindh‟ (Ghori , 2005). Altaf Hussain, the chief of Muttahida
Qaumi Movement, also discarded the project.33 Even so, the protest rallies were held against the proposed construction of the Kalabagh dam in the districts of Hyderabad,
Sukkar, Nausharo Feroz, Khairpur, and Mirpur Khan.34 It appears that there is a
80 consensus among Sindhis over the issue of Kalabagh dam35. Pir Pagara, the chief of
Pakistan Muslim League (Functional), was the only exception. He assured his support for the dam.36 Despite all this demonstration against the Kalabagh dam, President
General Pervez Musharraf reaffirmed that „Kalabagh dam would be constructed at all costs because of the acute shortage of water in the country‟.37
Musharraf government was replaced by PPP government. Contrary to earlier campaigns, the current government has announced to abandon the construction of the Kalabagh dam.
3.6 Some Substantial Protests and Autonomy Demands of Political Parties
The previous section has analyzed various grievances of smaller communities that underpin a sense of marginalization and deprivation in these groups. The resentment caused by this sense of marginalization and deprivation turned into political violence and protests when the central authorities intervened in provincial or regional affairs at various junctures of Pakistan‟s history. This section has summarized some substational protests of these communities. Bengalis waged a successful secessionist war and were separated in 1971. After that, Balochs have protested more frequently and markedly than the other groups in post-1971 Pakistan. Sindhis have protested intermittently but less violently. Pashtuns seem satisfied since Zia era (1977-88). However, Mohajirs are mobilizing along ethnic lines since mid-1980s for the benefits of their community. The ethno-nationalist movements are discussed in the fourth chapter in detail. The purpose of providing this summary of some substational protests is to assist the reader to determine the significance of the problem of ethnic diversity in Pakistan.
81 Figure 3-13: Some Instances of Substantial protest (1947-2006)
Time Group Location Description 1947-48 Baloch Kalat and surroundings First Baloch insurgency of Abdul Karim Khan against annexation of Kalat state into Pakistan 1947-48 Bengali Educational institutions Language riots : Bengalis asserted for Bengali as of Bengal a lingua franca 1947-48 Sindhi Rural Sindh Protest against separation of Karachi from Sindh, son of the soil movement against Mohajirs. 1947-48 Pashtun NWFP Reaction to dismissal of Dr. Khan‟s nationalist government 1958-63 Baloch Baloch countryside Resistance against one-unit scheme, distant identity 1950s Pashtun NWFP Resistance against one-unit scheme 1950s Sindhi Rural Sindh Resentment against one-unit scheme and upcountry migration in Sindh 1950-70 Bengali Bengal Agitation against unfair distribution of resources, representation, and opportunities. 1972-73 Mohajir Urban Sindh (Karachi Language controversy, resistance against Sindhi and Hyderabad) language bill 1973-74 Pashtun NWFP Resignation of elected government as a protest against central governments interference in provincial matters of Balochistan and NWFP 1973-77 Baloch Baloch tribal areas of Baloch insurgency against central government on Marri-Mengal the dismissal of nationalist regime 1980s Sindhi interior of Sindh Movement for restoration of Democracy During Zia period in which at least 300 Sindhis were killed 1980s, Mohajir Hyderabad, Karachi Ethnic clashes between Mohajirs and other 90s (urban Sindh) communities in urban Sindh 2002-? Baloch Baloch countryside Baloch resistance movement: a response to marginalization, demands for distributive justice
Various political parties of Pakistan have recognized the problem of ethnic diversity. In their electoral manifestoes, these parties have undertaken to address the grievances and demands of marginalized communities and minority provinces. The political parties have agreed to enhance the role of Senate, the upper chamber of legislature, to provide more space to smaller units at federal center. Equally, they have agreed to abolish the concurrent list to devolve more powers and to ensure self-rule at provincial level.
Almost, all parties have agreed to revise the formula for distribution of funds between federation and provinces and among provinces to make it more acceptable for smaller units. However, the ethno-regional parties of minority provinces are more vocal in their demands than the mainstream parties. The autonomy demands of regional parties
82 suggest substational changes in the federal structure of Pakistan. Therefore, there is a difference of opinion among the people of various regions about the constitutional proposals and federal design of Pakistan. People of various provinces have different opinion concerning the construction of Kalabagh dam, NFW Award, provincial autonomy, and royalty issues.
Figure 3-14: Political Parties’ Stand over Provincial Autonomy Political Party Stand Party PML To raise the degree of self-rule, PML suggested certain measures: Maximum provincial autonomy within the framework of the 1973 constitution: functional autonomy to the provinces i.e. the right to regulate and control the provincial natural resources, and to decentralize the administrative and financial powers to provincial and lower levels. It also recommended minimizing the central interference in the provincial matters. PML also suggested measures to ensure shared-rule – an essence of the federal polity. It recommended the Strengthening of the federal chamber (the Senate), abolition of concurrent list, and a consensus based formula (NFC Award) for horizontal and vertical allocation of funds. PPP The PPP has outlined more or less same provisions, as the PML, in its manifesto concerning the Provincial autonomy and intergovernmental relations. It has also stressed on the abolishment of the Concurrent list, multiple criteria for distribution through NFC award, strengthening the Senate and a just Share for Provinces in their natural resources. It also recommended an establishment of a federal Constitutional Court with equal representation of federating units to resolve constitutional issues. MMA MMA‟s program mainly focuses on the Islamization of society through Islamization of laws and enforcement of Shari'ah. Having the support base in minority provinces, it has also concerns regarding NFC Award, Gas royalty issue for Balochistan etc. MQM MQM has introduced a bill in National Assembly of Pakistan that suggests more autonomy for the provinces. It meant to confine the federation to three subjects namely defense, foreign affairs, and currency. It also demands financial autonomy: Assignment of General Sales Tax and Excise Tax to the provinces. Like other regional parties, it suggests a multiple formula for allocation of funds in NFC Award. For promotion of harmony between federation and provinces, MQM has suggested for the creation of an inter-provincial council. ANP ANP stands for the right to preserve and promote culture and language for all identities and the right for the federating units to reorganize on the basis of cultural, linguistic and geographical similarities. It is asserting for renaming the NWFP as Pukhtunkhwa. It demands maximum autonomy and suggests that Federation should retain only the control of
83 Political Party Stand Party defense, foreign affairs, and currency. It intends to strengthen the senate, the federal chamber, with the power to initiate the money bills and to approve the higher appointments. PKMAP PKMAP insists for the recognition of Pashtuns as a separate nationality and that the Pashtuns should form a separate province or be merged with Pashtun majority in NWFP. Within the framework of 1973 constitution, and being a regional party of Balochistan it demands that the decision making power regarding the Mega Project in Balochistan should rest within province. It also demands that all income from the Mega Project in Balochistan should go to the Provincial Pool. Like Baloch nationalist parties, it advocates the reversal of the proposed new cantonments in Balochistan. Baloch The Baloch nationalist parties resent Balochs under representation and interventionist Nationalist policies of central government. They opposed the establishment of new cantonments in Parties Balochistan and land allotments to outsiders near Gwadar port. Balochs resist against the induction/settlement of outsiders on Mega Projects and assert for employment of locals in all Mega Projects and Gas Fields. They recommend due representation in all the Federal Government Departments for Balochs.
(1) All India Muslim League was founded in 1906 in Dhaka. It demanded a separate homeland for the Muslims of India in 1940s. Its demand was fulfilled; and it was renamed as Pakistan Muslim League. Then it was divided into various factions. Currently, three factions are notable: PML-N, PML-Q, and PML-F. All factions have similar stands on various issues regarding the center-province relationships. Therefore, they are treated as a single party: Pakistan Muslim League. (2) MMA includes: Jamaat-e-Islami (JI), Jamiat Ulema-e-Islam Fazlur Rehman faction (JUI-F), Jamiat Ulema-e-Islam Sami ul-Haq faction (JUI-S), Jamiat Ulema-e-Pakistan (JUP), Jamiat Ahl-e-Hadith (JAH), and Tehrik-e-Jafaria Pakistan (TJP) (3) Manifestos are available at: www.pml.org.pk, www.mqm.org, www.ppp.org.pk, www.awaminationalparty.org, www.pmln.org.pk
In this given situation, according to Samad (2007, p. 128), “alternative strategies need to be considered that incorporate all groups and increase cohesion and affinity with the centre”. He asserts that there is a “pressing need for the refinement and enrichment of the concept and practice of federalism and a move away from the present system”. This requires that academicians should examine the relevancy of various power-sharing arrangements (including different variants of federalism and, even, beyond the federalism) with the multiethnic society of Pakistan. This project is a humble effort in this regard. Consociationalism has remained an influential theory of comparative politics
84 in the recent decades. It has been suggested and practiced in various parts of the world including Northern Ireland, South Africa, Bosnia Herzegovina, Burundi, Malaysia,
South Tyrol, Lebanon, Nigeria, Columbia, Cyprus, Fiji, Macedonia, Afghanistan, Iraq and Kenya etc. Keeping in view the popularity and utility of consociationalism in such diverse societies, the author has attempted to examine whether consociationalism is a viable solution or otherwise in the case of Pakistan.
85 Endnotes
1 For this point of view see: Seal, A. & Jalal, A. (1981). Alternative to Partition: Muslim Politics between the Wars. Modern Asian Studies. 15(3), 415-54. 2 For this point of view see: Malik, H. (1963). Moslem Nationalism in India and Pakistan. Washington: Public Affairs Press. ; Qureshi, I.H. (1965). The Struggle for Pakistan. Karachi : University of Karachi Publications.; and Riaz-ul-Islam. (1976). the Religious Factor in the Pakistan Movement: A Study in Motivation. Proceedings of the First Congress on the History and Culture of Pakistan, vol. 3 Islamabad: National Commission on Historical and Cultural Research.
3 See for this point of view: Robinson, F. (1974). Separatism among Indian Muslims: The Politics of the United Provinces Muslims 1860-1923. London: Cambridge.
4 While analyzing why one unit scheme was introduced in West Pakistan, Fayaz Ahmad Hussain (1989, p. 99-100) comes to the following conclusions. “Firstly, that East Bengal was not prepared to accept the principle of equal representation for all the units in the Upper House which should have actual powers and effective control of the federal government. In 1953 as has been explained earlier, East Bengal accepted the parity of representation between the rest of the federating units and itself, and made sure that its total representation in the Lower and the Upper House must be equal to that of the representation of the rest of the units in the two houses. In such a case, they denied the federal principle and insisted on treating the units of the western zone as one block. The other alternative the Bengalis offered was that the different units of the western zone should form a sub-zonal federation and should come as a single entity at the federal level. This sub-zonal federation was by no means in the interest of the Punjab as it had 63% of the population as against 37% of the rest of the three units in the western zone and would have to share the seats on sub-zonal federation level equally with the other units. Moreover, what would have been the share of seats for this sub-zonal federation at the zonal federation level would have been divided equally among the different units of the West Pakistan sub- zonal federation? So the Punjab would have suffered at both levels of such a federation. It appears that there was some compromise between the Punjab and East Bengal and the latter agreed that the provinces of the western zone should be done away with as it was none else but Suhrawardy himself who introduced the One Unit Bill in the federal legislature and it was not possible that having a majority in the Constituent Assembly any bill could get through without the blessing and support of the Bengali Parliamentary group. The logical conclusion from the acceptance of equal representation by East Pakistan and unified West Pakistan was the adoption of a unicameral legislature, a system in which the smaller units of the western zone had lost their existence as well as their voice in the new structure as West Pakistan had become one administrative district”. 5 Fayaz Ahmad Hussain has elaborated the 1962 constitution of Pakistan. He wrote that “Ayub governed under Martial law for four years and in 1962 he gave his own constitution which introduced a quasi- constitutional. Under the 1962 constitution, there was an indirect system of election. All the powers were vested in the President. He was to be elected by an electoral college which was elected by the people. The President and his ministers were not responsible to the legislature. The President could
86
dissolve the legislature, could veto any bill passed by it and if the assembly would not approve the annual budget presented by the government, the President had the power to validate the last year's budget without the approval of the legislature. The legislature could not remove the President except on the serious charges of treason or physical and mental incapacity. In the Provinces, the Governors were appointed by the President without the approval of any elected body. The Governor worked as an agent of the President and served during his pleasure. In spite of the fact that he was just a personal servant of the President, he had the same powers in the province as the President had at the centre, nevertheless, he had to exercise those powers with his approval and under his instructions. There is hardly any need to go into the details that under the 1962 constitution whatever subjects belonged to the provinces and the centre, the composition of the provincial government was such that whatsoever its jurisdiction, if was subservient to the President. The provincial governors and their ministers were responsible to the President and not to the provincial assemblies. Thus, it would be difficult to describe Ayub's system as, even, quasi-federal” (Hussain, 1989, pp.105-106). 6 Officially, the government of Pakistan identified six linguistic groups in the 1998 census. These include Punjabi, Siraiki, Sindhi, Pashto, Balochi, and Urdu .The remaining languages/dialects were categorized as „other‟. The common source to locate ethnic groups in Pakistan is to use data about language in census reports. The recent census report asked about the language usually spoken in household rather than the mother tongue. Although, it seems tricky to equate language recorded with ethnicity but there is no other data available. 7 Liaquat Ali Khan was a Mohajir, and it seems that the extraordinary representation of Mohajirs in the higher echelons of civil bureaucracy was a source of contentment for him. 8 Islamabad is included in Punjab; urban Sindh is composed of Karachi, Hyderabad, and Sukkar. 9 The selected countries include USA, UK, USSR/Russia, China, India, Iran, Afghanistan, and Saudi Arabia. 10 These periods include Ayub Khan 1958-69, Zia-ul-Haq 1977-88, and Musharraf 1999-2007. 11 Ayub‟s regime was „marked by two distinct phases. The first period (1958-62) was dominated by the army: generals were the senior partners in the dictatorship, ably backed by the civil service. The years that followed (1962-69), however, saw the bureaucracy reasserting its dominant role in the country‟s politics‟ (Tariq Ali, 1983,p. 62). 12 This foundation was established in 1954. Currently its declared assets amount to Rs. 9.8 billions (US$169 millions), with a total of 25 independent projects. Employing about 6000-7000 retired military personnel, the foundation is run by a governing board that is predominantly controlled by the army( Siddiqa, 2007, pp.119-20). 13 See for detail: Hasan-Askari Rizvi, H.A. (1984). The Paradox of Military Rule in Pakistan. Asian Survey. 24(5).534-555.). 14 NSC is a consultative body comprising of thirteen members including the president, the prime minister, the chairman of the senate, the speaker of the national assembly, the opposition leader in national assembly, the chief ministers of four provinces, joint chief of staffs committee, the chiefs of army staff, the navel staff, and the air force.
87
15 For detail see: Government of Pakistan, National Human Development Report, 2003. 16 Ghaus drew on „the principal components analysis (weighted factor score) and the Z-sum technique to generate ranking‟. He classified relatively developed districts in which the top quartile of the population lives. „Districts at the intermediate level are those in which the second and third quartile lives while the relatively underdeveloped districts account for the bottom 25 percent of the population‟. 17 This study involves twenty seven development indicators including crop cash value per capita, industrial value added per capita , number of commercial bank branches, number of live stock units, percentage of cultivated area irrigated, percentage of cropped area fertilized, percentage of farmers using tractors, extent of commercialization of agriculture, percentage of the urban labor force in industry, percentage of industrial employment in intermediate and capital goods industries, percentage of dwelling units which are pucca, with inside water connections, with electricity, and with gas connections, literacy rate, enrolment rate at primary , secondary and college level, doctors per 10,000 population, hospitals per 10,000 population, metalled road mileage per 100sq. miles of geographical area , unmetalled road mileage per 100sq. miles of geographical area, railway mileage per 100sq. miles of geographical area, passenger load carrying capacity per capita, telephone per 1000 population, female to male literacy rate, and female to male primary and secondary enrolment rate. 18 See Jaffery, N.B. & Sadaqat, M. (2006). NFC Awards: Commentary and Agenda. Pakistan Economic and Social Review. 44( 2), 209-234. 19 Rajput, M.I. (2005), Kalabagh Dam and Sindh: A View point. Karachi: Wahid Art Press, Karachi. (For example: I. Akhtar Hussain Committee, in 1968, ii. Fazale Akbar Committee in October 1970, iii. Halim Commission, in 1977 etc). 20 Under the article of 153 of the constitution of Pakistan, CCI is constitutional body comprising of the Chief Ministers of the provinces and an equal number of members from the federal government to be nominated by the Prime Minister from time to time. Under the article 155 of the construction of Pakistan, the CCI may receive any complaint by the federation or any province regarding any executive act or legislation taken or passed or proposed to be taken or passed, or the failure of any authority to exercise any of its power with respect to the use and distribution or control of water. On receiving a complaint, The CCI will consider the matter and shall give its decision or request the president to appoint a commission. Notwithstanding any law to the contrary , but subject to the provisions of clause(5) of article 154, it shall be the duty of the Federal Government and the Provincial Government concerned in the matter in issue to give effect to the decision of the council faithfully according to its terms and tenor. 21 For detail see: Faraz Hashmi, Irsa Okays Thal canal project: Decision taken on split vote, daily Dawn May 8, 2002. 22Syed Shahid Hussain, Standoff between Sindh and Punjab: Greater Thal Canal, daily Dawn April 7, 2003. 23 Zakir Hassnain, ANP blasts Kalabagh dam' Daily Times, December 02, 2005.
88
24 Visit for detail: (http://www.geocities.com/athens/forum/4147/Res-NWFP.htm; and also (Ahmad, S. 2004,pp. 96-111) 25Visit for detail: see (http://www.geocities.com/athens/forum/4147/Rs-Sindh.htm 26 Visit for detail: see (http://www.geocities.com/athens/forum/4147/Balchstn.htm; and Ahmad, S. 2004, 134-137) 27 At that moment, Pakistan People‟s Party (PPP) had majority in the Sindh assembly. Sindh is the home province of Benazir Bhutto and her party (PPP) mainly derives its support from this province. 28 For detail see: daily Dawn, January 4, 1989. 29 See for example (a) Resolution No.50, put by Akhtar Mengal and passed on 6-10-1994 2 by Balochistan Assembly, (b) Resolution No 04, put by Begum Nasim Wali Khan and Passed Unanimously in the Provincial Assembly of NWFP in the meeting held on 20-12.1988, (c) Resolution No 251, put by Abdul Akbar Khan and Passed Unanimously in the Provincial Assembly of NWFP in the meeting held on 30-5-1991, (d) Resolution No 26, put by Haji Muhammad Adeel and others and Passed Unanimously in the Provincial Assembly of NWFP, in the meeting held on 18-11-1993, (e) Resolution No 409, Put by Dr.Abdul Wahid Somoro, and Passed Unanimously in the Provincial Assembly of Sindh, in the meeting held on 14-6-1994. The resolutions shared the text and demanded to abandon the project of Kala Bagh Dam to „remove the misgivings‟ of the people of Pakistan. 30 See the statement of Nusrut Bhutto in National Assembly reported in Pakistan times, 8 June 1991. 31 For detail see: „Kalabagh dam a threat to national unity‟, daily Dawn June 24, 2005. 32 For detail see: ANP warns against Kalabagh dam, daily Dawn, August 8, 2005. 33For detail see: Altaf reiterates stand on Kalabagh dam, daily Dawn May 4, 2006. 34 For detail see the report (Protest rallies held in districts of Sindh: Kalabagh dam) of daily Dawn , December 16 ,2005. 35 author‟s interviews with members of Rabta committee of MQM i.e. Mr. Aamer, Mustafa Aziz Abadi at International secretariat of MQM, London, interview with Ghous Ali shah ex-chief minister of Sindh, London, president of PML(N) Sindh ( for his views over the issue see also "The Exit of a Chief Minister," Dawn Overseas Weekly, Apr.14, 1988. in addition, See also the Official Newsletter of the World Sindhi Congress, the Sindh Perchar, December 2000, Vol.9, issue 3 36 Habib Khan Ghori , Pagara supports Kalabagh dam, Daily Dawn, December 23, 2005 37 For detail see: Kalabagh dam at all costs: President, a report of Dawn April 23, 2006.
89 References
1. Ahmad, S. (2004).Water resources of Indus: Case study of Kalabagh Dam
(unpublished PhD’s thesis). Quaid-I- Azam University Islamabad, Pakistan.
2. Ali, T. (1983). Can Pakistan survive? : The death of a state. Harmondsworth:
Penguin Books.
3. Alqama, K. (1997). Bengali Elite Perception of Pakistan, the Road to
Disillusionment: Uneven Development or Ethnicity. Karachi: Royal Book
Company.
4. Chaudhry, G.W. (1956). The Constitution of Pakistan. Pacific Affairs. Vol. 29(3),
243-252.
5. Cohen, S.P. (1987). State Building in Pakistan. In A. Banuazizi & M. Weiner
(Eds.), The State, Religion, and Ethnic Politics: Pakistan, Iran, and Afghanistan
(pp.299-332). Lahore: Vanguard
6. Cohen, S.P. (2005). The Idea of Pakistan. New Delhi: Oxford University press.
7. Ghaus, A. (1996). Social Development Ranking of Districts of Pakistan. SPDC
Research Report No. 12.
8. Ghori, H.K. Pagara supports Kalabagh dam, Daily Dawn, December 23, 2005.
9. Government of Pakistan. (1998). Census Reports of Various districts.
10. Hussain, F.A. (1989). The Problem of Federalism and Regional Autonomy in
Pakistan (Unpublished M. Phil’s Thesis). LSE, University of London, London.
11. Islam, N. (1981). Islam and National Identity: The Case of Pakistan and
Bangladesh. International Journal of Middle East Studies. 13(1), 55-72.
90 12. Jaffery, N.B & Sadaqat, M. (2006). NFC Awards: Commentary and Agenda.
Pakistan Economic and Social Review. 44(2), 209-234.
13. Jamal, H. (2005). In search of poverty predictors: the case of urban and rural
Pakistan. The Pakistan Development Review. 44 (1), 37–55.
14. Kennedy, C. H. (1987). Bureaucracy in Pakistan. Karachi: Oxford University
press.
15. Kennedy, C.H. (2002). Pakistan: Ethnic Diversity and Colonial Legacy. In J.
Coakley (Eds.), The Territorial Management of Ethnic Conflict (pp 143-172).
London: Frank Cass.
16. Khan, H. (2005). Constitutional and Political History of Pakistan. Karachi:
Oxford University Press.
17. Minorities at Risk Project. (2008). Minorities at Risk Organizational Behavior
Dataset. College Park, MD: Center for International Development and Conflict
Management. Retrieved from http://www.cidcm.umd.edu/mar on [July 27, 2009].
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Pakistan. European Journal of Social Science. 8(3), 459-468.
19. Page, D. (1974). Prelude to partition: All India Muslim Politics 1920-1932
(Unpublished D. Phil. Thesis). University of Oxford, U.K.
20. Rahman, T. (1995). Language and Politics in a Pakistan Province. Asian Survey.
35(11), 1005-1016.
21. Rajput, M.I. (2005). Kalabagh Dam and Sindh: A View point. Karachi: Wahid Art
Press.
91 22. Robinson, F. (1974). Separatism among Indian Muslims: The Politics of the
United Provinces Muslims 1860-1923. London: Cambridge
23. Samad, Y. (1995). Nation in Turmoil: Nationalism and Ethnicity in Pakistan
1937-58. New Delhi: Sage.
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P. and Y. Samad (Eds.), Fault lines of Nationhood (pp.67-138). Roli Books Pvt.
Ltd. New Delhi.
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University Press.
26. Siddiqa, A. (2007). Military Inc. Inside Pakistan’s Military Economy. London:
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(Eds.), Pakistan: Nationalism without a Nation (pp.51-62). London: Zed Books
Ltd.
92 Chapter No. 4
MANAGING ETHNIC DIVERSITY AND FEDERALISM
IN PAKISTAN
4.1 Introduction
Federations may vary at the level of centralization, and in the forms of governance.
On the basis of distinctive features, these can be categorized as centralized or decentralized, and consociational or majoritarian federations. Some federations may adopt multi-level system of authority and governance; and others may incline toward centralized governance.
It is believed that federation‟s capacity to manage ethnic diversity varies across its functions and distinct features. Few political scientists are of the opinion that „the more a formal federal system operates as a unitary system; the less is system capacity to accommodate territorial cleavages‟ (Kohli, 2004). The Pakistani case suggests that constitutionally it is a federal state in all respects but practically it has operated like a unitary system. The issue needs to be probed that despite having all constitutional arrangements, one can find dissatisfaction between center and provinces and among provinces. In the following chapter, this problem has been discussed.
The next section presents historical background of federalism in Pakistan. The subsequent sections, in turn, would discuss the ethno-linguistic mobilization, and the role of centralized federalism in the rise and fall of ethno-national movements in
Pakistan. The final section is reserved for some concluding comments.
4.2 Historical Background
Territorial autonomy has its roots in the governmental system of Mughal Empire; even one can find it in the Arian period, in India. The British administration in India
93 followed this political norm of sub-continent and allocated a considerable autonomy to the provincial governments. Adeney (2007) has rightly observed that „all the constitutional plans proposed between 1916 and 1946 were drafted under the assumption that there would be provincial governments with a certain amount of autonomy‟.
More or less a formal federal system was introduced in the Government of India Act
1935. Legislative, administrative and financial powers were divided between the center and provinces. However, the center had a commanding position vis-à-vis the provinces. Governor General was a custodian of the imperial interests and had extraordinary powers to regulate the British India. Provincial Governors, the agents of
Governor General in the provinces had also vital powers to dominate in the provinces1.
Muslims of India demanded a separate homeland. Eventually, India was divided, and the Muslims of India were granted a separate homeland - Pakistan, in 1947. Pakistan inherited the colonial institutions and political practices. The new state adopted the
Government of India Act 1935 with certain amendments as interim constitution. The constitution was repealed by the first constitution of Islamic Republic of Pakistan on
March 23, 1956. This constitution proved short-lived and was abrogated as a result of martial law in 1958. Ayub introduced his constitution in 1962. He stepped down in
1969. He abrogated the constitution of 1962 and handed over the government to
Yahya, the then Commander-in Chief of the army. After the separation of East
Pakistan in 1971, the National Assembly of Pakistan enacted the 1973 constitution of
Pakistan. This constitution has been discussed in detail in the following sections.
94 4.3 Federal Settings in the 1973 Constitution: Theory and Practice
It has been argued that “constitutional distribution of the legislative and executive powers and of financial resources between two orders of the government” is the key feature of every federation in modern world (Watts, 1996, p.155). Thus, this section will, primarily, focus on „the distribution of legislative powers, the administrative relations between federation and provinces, and the distribution of financial resources between federation and provinces of Pakistan.
4.3.1 Distribution of Legislative Powers between Federation and Provinces
The Distribution of legislative powers in the 1973 constitution is enumerated in two lists: a. The Federal Legislative List b. The Concurrent Legislative List2
There is no provincial legislative list. The parliament, as the federal legislature, has a very vast legislative power. It can legislate with respect to any matters in the federal and concurrent lists.
A close look at the Fourth Schedule seems to suggest imbalances in the distribution of power between the federation and the provinces in Pakistan. The federal list includes some 59 items ranging from defense and external affairs to the taxation and state lotteries. In addition, the second part of the federal list has eight items like railways, mineral oil and natural gas, and council of common interests etc. The content of the concurrent legislative list is so detailed that the provinces are left with very little power and not independent of the federal government. The concurrent list consists of
47 items including matters, which had conventionally been in the provincial realm,
95 such as the maintenance of public order, enforcement of criminal law, police forces and education. The formal allocation by the constitution of legislative powers to each level of government gives an indication of the scope of decentralized jurisdiction
(Watts, 1999). The constitution of Pakistan provides exclusive power to parliament to make laws concerning federal legislative list3. Furthermore, in case of inconsistency between the federal and provincial laws related to the concurrent list, pre-eminence has been provided to the federal law over provincial law4. Therefore, the parliament has exclusive jurisdiction in federal list and shared jurisdiction in the concurrent list.
This „exclusive jurisdiction‟ and „the extent of concurrent or shared responsibilities‟ set out in the constitution is significant (Watts, 1999).
The abolition of the concurrent list was promised after ten years by the authors of the
1973 constitution. But, it exists even now. The continuation of this list is an adverse indication for the state‟s federal character. Therefore, all prominent parties have included the cancellation of concurrent list in their party manifestos to promote provincial autonomy.
Pumphrey (1972) has noted that when the constitutional formula was under debate in the National Assembly, Bhutto, then the president and leader of the leading party in
National Assembly, was aiming a strong centre and to limit the autonomy of provinces. Wali Khan, then the opposition leader, and his friends knew that a strong centre would be dominated by the Punjab, and so for the time being by Bhutto.
Therefore, they wanted to avoid this domination either by diminishing central power or by ensuring that its exercise will be inhibited by a second chamber weighted in favor of the smaller provinces5.
96 Finally, the National Assembly of Pakistan adopted the 1973 constitution with no opposing vote and with the support of all but three of the members of the opposition group. Then, the opposition had contested nearly every clause of the constitution in its passage through the Assembly. Amendments that were introduced, as a result of the talks between the opposition and the Government, satisfied enough of opposition‟s demands to enable them to vote almost unanimously in favor of the constitution6. But this unanimity is missing today. Various regional parties, for example MQM, ANP, and Baloch Nationalist Parties, are demanding to confine the federation to three subjects namely defense, foreign affairs, and currency. Some other groups, for example Sind-Baluch-Pakhtoon Front (SBPF), have been demanding for confederation (Richter, 1986). Still, the Pakistan‟s Oppressed Nations Movement
(PONM) – a mixture of 28 ethno-nationalist groups and parties set up in 1990s – had been criticizing the federal design and demanding the establishment of a decentralized polity (Rizvi, 2000).
The review of constitutional provisions and the demands of some regional parties seem to suggest that Pakistan is a highly centralized federation. But a comparative study of the legislative decentralization in selected federations reveals that Pakistan is not a deviant case. A cluster analysis has been used to classify the selected federations in three groups on the basis of their distinctive features. The cluster analysis is based on thirty variables in eleven federations. The scope of powers concerning thirty items is given in figure 4-1. The author has classified these federations into three broad clusters. Pakistan stands in the first cluster with Canada, USA, Australia, Germany,
India, Malaysia, and Belgium. The clusters are summarized in the figure 4-2.The comparative results seems to suggest that Pakistan fulfills minimum criteria of legislative decentralization.
97 Figure 4-1: Comparative Legislative Decentralization in selected Federal Countries Scope of powers Canada U.S.1789 Switzerland Australia Germany Austria India Malaysia Belgium Spain Pakistan 1867 1848/1999 1901 1949 1929 1950 1963 1993 1978 1973 Defense F FS F FS F F F F F F F Treaty implementation F F FS F FS F F F F F F Citizenship F F F F F FS F F F F F Immigration C C C C F F F F F F F Taxation: custom/excise F F/C F F F F FS F C F F Taxation: corporate FS C F C C F F F C F F Foreign borrowing FS FS FS C FS F F F FS FS F Currency F F F F F F F F F F F Banking FS C F C C F F F F F F Bankruptcy F FS - C - F C F N - C Insurance FS FS FS C C F F F F F FS External trade F F F C F N F F S F F Inter-state trade F F F C C N F F N - F Roads & bridges S FS FS FS C FS FS FS S S F Railways FS FS F FS FC F F F F S F Air F F F FS F F F F S SF F Telecommunications FS FS F C F F F F F F F Postal services F F F C F F F F F F F broadcasting F F F C SC N F F S F F Agriculture C S F SC C F SC SC N S S Fisheries FS S F FS C - FS FS S SF F Nuclear energies F FS F C C F F - F F F Education S S CS S S FS CS F S N S Research & development N FS F FS SC FS FCS F FS N FS Hospitals SF SF S FS C C S F S FS S Unemployment insurance F FS C C C F S F F F C Social services SF SF C C C S CS C S FS C Pensions C C C C CS F C FS - F FS Civil law S S F FS C FS C FS F F N Criminal law F S F S C FS C F N N C Source: Watts, RL. (1999)Comparing Federal Systems (2nd Ed.). London: McGill Queen‟s University Press. pp. 126-130. (ii).Constitution of 1973 of Pakistan. Note: F = federal powers, S = state (provincial/ canton) power, C = concurrent power (but federal paramountcy), CS= concurrent power (but provincial paramountcy), C= “community” power, R= “regional power”
98 Figure 4-2: Hierarchical Cluster Analysis
Cluster 1: Similarity 1. Canada 2. U.S. 29.53 3. Australia 4. Germany 5. India 53.02 6. Malaysia 7. Belgium
8. Spain 76.51 9. Pakistan Cluster 2: 1. Switzerland 100.00
Cluster 3: US In dia S pa in A ustria S witzerl A ustra li Ca na da 1. Austria Ge rm a ny M alaysia P akistan B elgium
Variables Note: Minitab software has been used for cluster analysis.
99 4.3.2 Administrative Relations between Federation and Provinces
The federal settings can take different forms. While „the combination of shared-rule and self-rule in a single polity represents the essence of federalism‟ these two elements may take different forms in different settings. Federations may differ from each other by the „kind and degree‟ of self-rule they assign to the constituent units.
Similarly, the „structures and processes‟ of shared rule varies across the federations.
The degree of emphasis on a particular element (self-rule or shared-rule) may also differ from federation to federation. For example, the more emphasis on provincial self-rule is placed in Canada, and more emphasis is on shared federal decision making in Germany (Watts, 2000).
All India Muslim League, in British India, demanded maximum autonomy for Muslim majority provinces (self-rule), and substational representation (Muslims were almost
¼th of the Indian population and demanded for 1/3rd representation in central legislature) at the federal level to ensure power-sharing (shared-rule). But, after the accomplishment of Pakistan, the centralization of political power remained the anecdote throughout Pakistan political history. Minority provinces, in Pakistan, have continuously been demanding provincial autonomy and power-sharing at federal level
(Adeney, 2002).
“The right of the provinces to constitutionally guaranteed self-rule or autonomy is key stone of the federal-type of dispensation. This autonomy relates to (a) the right of provinces to take and administer decisions without undue interference by the national parliament, on those matters allocated to the provinces by the constitution; (b) the right to have their institutional integrity respected, including their constitutional and
100 political structures, and government departments; and the right to have their territorial integrity respected”( Villiers, 1996) .
The provisions regarding administrative relations between federation and provinces in the 1973 constitution of Pakistan seem to pledge the pre-eminence of federation.
Article 149(1) states that “the executive authority of every province shall be so exercised as not to impede or prejudice the exercise of the executive authority of the federation, and the executive authority of the federation shall extend to the giving of such directions to a province as may appear to the federal government to be necessary for that purpose.” This article of the constitution also authorizes federation to intervene and extend directions to a province to a. implement any federal law relating to the concurrent legislative list; b. proceed regarding the „construction and maintenance of means of
communication‟; c. prevent „any grave menace to the peace or tranquility or economic life of
Pakistan or any part thereof‟ (constitution of Pakistan, 1973).
Ethno-regional political parties object to these constitutional provisions. For example,
MQM has proposed omitting of the clauses of article 149 and recommended supremacy of federal executive over executive authority of province only in the case of preventing external aggression against Pakistan or any part thereof.7
Moreover, the constitution of Pakistan grants right to the federation for the acquisition of land for federal purposes. This constitutional provision is also contentious. The minority provinces in Pakistan have been disapproving the allotment of land to retired military personnel and the acquisition of land for army cantonments8.
101 MQM has recommended substituting this clause and in its proposed substituted clause has tied acquisition of land for federal purposes with the consent of the Provincial
Assembly or the District or City District Government9.
4.3.2.1 Emergency powers
Emergency powers granted to the federation in the constitution of 1973 are imperative to the intergovernmental relations in Pakistan. Various provincial governments have been sacked by the federation using these emergency provisions. Voices have been raised by the smaller units and marginalized communities to restrict the federal government to intervene in provinces.
Part X of the 1973 constitution contains the emergency provisions. These provisions authorize the president to issue the proclamation in case of a. war or internal disturbance; b. failure of constitutional machinery in a province; c. and/or financial instability.
The emergency powers, however, remained a tool for federation to intervene in provinces. Article 234 of the 1973 constitution authorizes the president to issue proclamation of emergency in case of failure of constitutional machinery in a province10.
This provision indicates that during the emergency period, the federation operates more likely a unitary system. The smaller units, particularly has reservation about the emergency powers of federal government and they have been arguing for constitutional amendments. MQM, a regional party of Sindh, has proposed a
102 National Emergency Council – a body consisting of prime minister, federal ministers and chief ministers – and has suggested that the Proclamation of emergency should be subject to the recommendation of this body. These suggestions seem to suggest distrust in federation.
Earlier, MRD (Movement for the Restoration of Democracy) in its declaration concerning provincial autonomy suggested that „only in the event of an extraordinary situation developing in a province would the federal authorities be allowed to intervene, but if the Senate failed to endorse this intervention within thirty days it would cease to have legal effect. Similarly, a state of emergency in a province would be valid for only three months, unless the Senate approved its extension for another three months‟. It also suggested that „during the state of emergency, legislative authority for the province would be the responsibility of a committee of senators from that province‟ (Rakisits, 1988).
4.3.2.2 Central Governments Intervention to Federating Units
In Pakistan, „the central government very frequently dismissed and reformed the ministries in the provinces‟. In 1947, the Congress ministry in NWFP had „the support of 33 members out of 50‟. But Despite the assurance of cooperation, it was replaced by a Muslim League ministry (Hussain, 1989). The Sindh assembly opposed the decision of central government to take Karachi out of the control of Sindh and passed a resolution unanimously. The chief minister of Sindh had to pay for this resolution and was dismissed soon.
During Ayub era (1962-69), the federal spirit was missing in Pakistan. All powers were vested in the president. In provinces, governors were appointed by the president
103 without any approval or consultation by any other organ of the government. So they worked as agents of the president and served during his pleasures. In practice, federation operated as a unitary system in his period (Hussain, 1989).
This centralization alienated the Bengalis. Eventually, they broke away from the
Pakistan in 1971. The constitution of 1973 was introduced on August 14, 1973 in the new Pakistan.
Bhutto (1973-77), dismissed Balochistan‟s provincial government and provincial government of NWFP resigned as protest. Still, Bhutto managed to capture all political power in the provinces of Punjab and Sindh. He had overwhelming majority in these provinces and did not assign any responsibility to local leadership at provincial level. He replaced favorable ministries in Punjab. So under his rule, the
Sindh and the Punjab province were also denied their autonomy just like NWFP and
Balochistan (Hussain, 1989).
Zia removed Bhutto government in 1977. During his regime (1977-88), various constitutional amendments changed the nature of the constitution. The amendments resulted into a substantial departure from the parliamentary and federal principles laid down in the 1973 constitution. To sum up, presidential unitary form of government operated instead of the parliamentary federal form of government during this era
(Hussain, 1989).
In post-Zia era (1988-99), central interventions in provincial matters remained intact.
Various provinces experienced governor rule and replacement of ministries by central authorities. The figure 4-3 shows some detail in this regard.
104 Figure 4-3: Central Governments’ interference in Federating Units
Year Description 1947 Congress ministry in NWFP had „the support of 33 members out of 50‟. But it was replaced by a Muslim League ministry. 1947 Despite of his majority in assembly, the Chief Minister of Sindh was dismissed. 1955 One-unit Scheme (amalgamation of provinces and states into the province of West Pakistan.) 1962-69 During the Ayub‟s Presidential period, the federal system operated more like a unitary system with a meager provincial autonomy. 1970-71 Military action in East Pakistan and its separation 1972-73 PPP government did not respect the tripartite accord. The central government dissolved the Balochistan government. The government of NWFP resigned as a protest. 1977-88 Martial rule during this period undermined the spirit of a federal design. 1988-93 Dissolution of provincial assemblies ( 1988, 90, 93) 1994 Governor Rule in NWFP and installation of favorable government 1995 Governor rule in Punjab and installation of new government 1999 Removal of Nawaz Sharif government along provincial government
4.3.3 Distribution of Revenues between Federation and Provinces
In countries having federal structure, distribution involves vertical and horizontal allocation of funds to make possible the state/provincial governments to carry out their constitutional function. Since the promulgation of the constitution of 1973 in
Pakistan, National Finance Commission (NFC hereafter) has remained in charge to make recommendations for the allocation of prescribed taxes between federation and provinces and among provinces.
NFC, a constitutional body, under Article 160 of the constitution is required to make recommendations to the president on the matter of distribution of tax revenues between the federation and the provinces and amongst provinces after every five years. It comprises the minister of finance of the federal government, the ministers of finance of the provincial governments, and such other persons as may be appointed by the president after consultation with the governors of the provinces.
105 NFC award has remained a challenging job for the members of National Finance
Commission. The difference of opinion remained at two levels; (a) share of federal government in divisible pool; and (b) the criteria of distribution among the provinces.
The last NFC award was adopted in 1997, and it was valid for five years term.
However, this award is still operating due to the disagreement between federation and provinces and among provinces.
Although, federal government has agreed to raise the provinces‟ share from 37.5 per cent under the fifth award to 47.5 per cent, and eventually to 50 per cent gradually, this still falls short of the demand of the provinces that their share be increased to 50 per cent in the sixth NFC award11.
Distribution of revenues by the federation – the divisible pool – to provinces is the major source of provincial revenues in Pakistan. Constitutionally, the federation must announce the formula after every five years. But in practice, National Finance
Commission announced its recommendations only three times: 1974, 1990, and 1997.
NFC remained unable to find agreement among provinces over formula in 1979,
1985, 2000, and 2005.
There is no provision in the constitution about the distribution of divisible pool between federal government and provinces, and the criteria of distribution among provinces. Hence, the provinces have been arguing for favorable criteria.
Since 1974, population has been remained the only yardstick for distribution among provinces. Being the populous, Punjab benefits and insists to carry out this criterion.
Sindh provides bulk of revenue collection and hence wants the revenue collection to
106 be the key factor. However, being the poorer, NWFP and Balochistan argue for the backwardness and underdevelopment to be considered in the distributive formula12.
The disagreement of provinces on the criterion of distribution underpins the suspicion of smaller units against Punjab and the federal government. The lack of consensus among provinces has caused a „four-year delay in the announcement of sixth NFC
Award‟. The decision that has to be taken in 2002 lingered on till 2006 when
President General Musharraf announced an interim arrangement. Under the
“Makeshift Award”, the provincial shares in the divisible pool were raised to 41.5% in fiscal 2006/07 and a gradual increase to 46.25% will be up to 2010/11.
4.3.3.1 Fiscal Decentralization in Pakistan (1971-2006)
The study of fiscal decentralization during 1971-2006 seems to suggest a gradual trend towards fiscal decentralization. The author has attempted to quantify the fiscal decentralization. Two variables have been used: ratio of provincial revenues to central revenues and the ratio of provincial expenditures to central expenditures. The figures
4-4 and 4-5 show the gradual trends toward fiscal decentralization for these two variables respectively.
107 Figure 4-4: Fiscal Decentralization (I)
Fiscal Decentralization
2001-02 1995-96 1989-90
Years 1983-84 1977-78 1971-72 0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 Value
Ratio of Prov. Rev. to central Source: (Mushtaq, 2009)
Figure 4-5: Fiscal Decentralization (II)
Fiscal Decentralization
2001-02 1995-96 1989-90
Years 1983-84 1977-78 1971-72 0 0.05 0.1 0.15 0.2 0.25 0.3 0.35 0.4 0.45 0.5 Value
Ratio of Prov. Exp. To central Source: (Mushtaq, 2009)
4.3.3.2. Comparative Fiscal Decentralization in Selected Federations
A comparative study of fiscal decentralization in selected federations seems to suggest that Pakistan is not an unusual case with respect to fiscal decentralization. Though it is relatively fiscally centralized, it is more decentralized than few other federations. In
108 the ranking of total nineteen selected federations, it falls at number eight. The following figure shows the degree of decentralization in selected federations.
Figure 4-6: Fiscal Decentralization in Selected Federations
Fiscal Decentrlisation in Selected Federations
Ethiopia Venezuela Belgium Malaysia Spain Mexico South Africa Pakistan Austria Brazil Series1
Argentina Federations Federations Russia Australia Germany United states India Switzerland Canada Yugoslavia
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 Value (Mean) of Fiscal Decentrlisation for Selected Years
Source: (Mushtaq, 2009) Note: Data for 1972-2000 has been taken from World Bank website: http://www.worldbank.org/
The analysis of constitutional provisions and political developments in Pakistan seems to suggest that although Pakistan is a formal federal system and fulfills minimum requirements of the federalism, it operates more like a unitary system.
109 4.4 Politics of Identity in Pakistan
Pakistan has been experiencing ethno-national movements since its inception in 1947.
Bengali nationalism, Pashtun separatism, Sindhi regionalism, and Baloch nationalism have challenged federal character of state at various junctures of Pakistani history.
Since 1980s, the Mohajirs have been mobilizing along ethnic lines to protect their interests. A modest assertion is also seen in the Southern Punjab.
Excluding Punjabis, the dominant group, all sub-national groups felt a certain sense of marginalization and have been asserting against the centralization of political power.
Punjab is the most populous and relatively developed and prosperous region of country. It has predominance in armed forces and to a lesser extent in the civil bureaucracy. At the core of ethno-regional sentiments in Pakistan, there is perception that „Punjabi community dominates the politics and society of the state‟ (Kennedy,
1993). As a result, they never feel the need to press for greater autonomy (Jones,
2002). The remaining groups have been involved in politics of identity that has been described in the following sections.
4.4.1 Pashtuns’ Separatism
The Pashtuns of NWFP had a strong sense of distinctiveness. The „Khudai
Khidmatgar’ (servants of God) movement of Pashtun nationalists had a popular rural base in predominantly Pashtun districts of the province of British India. It won both the provincial elections of 1937 and 1946 and formed the provincial governments.
When the British decided to divide India into Pakistan and India, in 1947, the Pashtun nationalists resisted against their inclusion in Pakistan and demanded an autonomous
Pakhtun (Pashtun) state. However, it was decided that the people of NWFP will
110 decide through a referendum whether to join India or Pakistan. The Pashtuns tried to persuade Lord Mountbatten, the then Governor General of India, to include a third option in the referendum: a right to opt for Pashtunistan, a state for their own, next to the options to join either Pakistan or India. On having a negative response from
Mountbatten, Abdul Ghaffar Khan made an appeal to the Congress working committee for support (Azad, 1998). But Khan‟s demand was not considered by the
British government. Consequently, Khan and his followers boycotted the referendum.
In the meantime, Muslim League worked hard and managed to get 99% of the polled votes.
„Pashtunistan (Pakhtunistan) means different things to different people, ranging from demand for the formation of a new state incorporating Pathan ( Pashtun) areas on both sides of Pakistan-Afghanistan border to mere change of nomenclature for the NWFP‟
(Kennedy, 1993). The Pashtuns stressed in early years (1947-55) that by
„Pashtunistan‟ they meant no more than regional autonomy for the NWFP (Amin,
1988). Furthermore, the temporal (April 1972- February 1973) sharing of power – under the tripartite accord – directed Pashtun nationalist to leave the Pashtunistan issue. Abdul Ghaffar Khan declared, „our demand for Pashtunistan has been fulfilled‟
(Amin, 1988). However, the Pashtun nationalism resurfaced when Islamabad dismissed the NAP (National Awami Party) government in Balochistan. The coalition government of NWFP resigned as a protest against the dismissal of Balochistan government. The centre banned the NAP alleging that it was working against the integrity of the country. Pashtuns pursued ban on NAP by challenging the decision in the Supreme Court. In the meantime, the Pashtun identity remained intact. On a question whether he was, „a Muslim, a Pakistani or a Pashtun first‟, Wali Khan
111 claimed that he was, “a six thousand years old Pashtun, a thousand years old Muslim and 27 years old Pakistani”13.
Meanwhile, the gradual migration of Pashtuns into Karachi and urban centers of
Punjab has resulted in their „dominance in privately owned transport sector‟ and larger share in employment. Despite the fact that the Pashtuns did not receive the proportionate share in the industrial development‟, they „had their own industrial capital class‟. This class has invested capital in „the sugar, textile, engineering, pharmaceuticals and other industries in other provinces‟. As, they are more integrated than Balochs and Sindhis with the national capitalists, they are less inclined towards nationalist demands (Ahmad, 1998).
The Pashtuns have acquired share in the Pakistani power-structure and the „primary source of incorporation is the army‟ (Noman, 1988). The majority of Pashtun soldiers and officials, who got jobs, belong to the areas that had traditionally been „stronghold of the Pashtunistan movement‟ (Jaffrelot, 2002). This incorporation and accommodation of the Pashtuns in the power-structure has resulted in decline of the
Pashtunistan movement.
Recently, in the general election 2008, the Pashtun nationalist party (ANP) has improved its electoral support in the NWFP and has set up its government in the province. The Pashtun nationalists seem determined to rename their province as
„Pakhtunkhwa‟14: they regard it as a tribute for the Pashtun identity. All the same, the
Pashtun nationalists give the more impression of satisfaction over the removal of
Kalabagh dam project and the support for renaming the NWFP as „Pakhtunkhwa‟ by the present governing coalition at Islamabad – it is the first time in Pakistan history that a sitting government at Islamabad made such announcements.
112 It has been concluded that “the Pashtun leadership that was initially reluctant to accept
Pakistan and among whom a vibrant Pashtunistan movement existed is today most successfully integrated” (Ahmad, 1998, p. 278). This integration of the Pashtuns led to the argument that „Pashtun movement had died down‟ (Amin, 1988). However, this observation should not overlook the caution that “the Pashtunistan movement is dormant, but not dead, and its re-emergence cannot be ruled out in the context of the growing instability and disintegrative tendencies in both Pakistan and Afghanistan”
(Harrison, 2007).
4.4.2 Baloch Nationalism
The Colonial period Balochistan includes British Balochistan (Pashtun majority areas and the Bugti-Marri tribal areas), Kalat state and the states of Kharan, Makran and
Lasbella. The British Balochistan joined Pakistan but the ruler of Kalat state, Mir
Ahmad Yar Khan, declared independence, on August 15, 1947, a day after Pakistan was formally established. Both houses of the Kalat Assembly had approved this decision and discarded accession with Pakistan. But, ultimately Khan had to signed accession papers to join Pakistan15. The Baloch nationalists resisted against the decision, and Prince Abdul Karim, younger brother of Khan started an armed movement in the Jhalawan area as a protest (Breseeg, 2004). However, the government of Pakistan overcame this rebellion soon.
Then, under the one-unit scheme, the government of Pakistan amalgamated Punjab,
Sindh, NWFP, and Balochistan into one province. The second Baloch insurgency started against this centralizing policy of the government. Mir Noroz Khan Zahri led this resistance vigorously but finally agreed to surrender on an offer of safe conduct
113 by the army. However, he was arrested with his colleagues and died in jail (Harrison,
1981).
Afterward, with the dissolution of one-unit scheme in 1970, Balochistan got the status of a province. The Baloch and Pashtun nationalists contested in the first general elections of the Pakistani history in 1970, under the banner of NAP. The Baloch nationalists performed well and managed to install their government in Balochistan.
However, Attaullah Mengal‟s government was dismissed in February 1973 on the grounds of lawlessness and failure to comply with central government directives. This dismissal sparked a sharper confrontation with the centre and led to an insurgency that remained at its peak from 1973 to 1977 (Jetly, 2004). According to Harrison (1981, p.
36), „there were around 55,000 Baloch fighters, including 11,500 organized combatants, fighting against the over 80,000-strong military force that was called out to quell the resistance‟.
After the removal of Bhutto government in 1977, Zia-ul-Haq adopted a relatively softer approach by releasing the detained Baloch leaders. He extended positive gestures toward nationalists by announcing a general amnesty for the guerrillas.
However, he did not fulfill the demands for the withdrawal of the troops from
Balochistan and the compensation for the victims of military action in Balochistan
(Shah, 1997).
During the interlude (1988-99) between Zia-ul-Haq and Musharraf‟s military rule, the nationalist feelings, to some extent, were subsided because of the „participatory‟ democracy. However, since the military coup of 1999, a low-level insurgency again challenges central control over the province. Although regional parties and leaders are
114 still struggling to obtain political, economic and social rights within a democratic, federal, parliamentary framework, militants have picked up the gun16.
Harrison (2007) has narrated that the recent Baloch uprising „still persisted‟ even with the efforts to suppress it by “formidable Pakistani forces consisting of six army brigades, plus paramilitary forces totaling some 25,000 men and air power that included twenty U.S.-supplied Cobra helicopter gunships and four squadrons of U.S.- supplied fighter planes”.
The account of four armed Baloch uprisings seems to suggest that the Balochs have spearheaded the resistance by the minorities against the central government in
Pakistan. There is a sufficient evidence to substantiate the argument that the centralization of political power and exclusion is the key to the Baloch uprisings.
Prior to 1970s only one Baloch tribesmen got a cabinet position at the centre17, and from 1971-2007, of the 60 people who got „important‟ political positions only one was Baloch. Balochs have enjoyed hardly any diplomatic position. They also have the slightest representation in civil-military bureaucracy (Mushtaq & Alqama, 2009).
Within Balochistan, despite some mutual distrust, the Balochs and the Pashtuns have agreement over the grievances and demands of Balochistan. More or less, they share the demand that Balochistan should have the decisive role in decision making regarding Gawader Mega Project – it is noteworthy that of the total eleven members of the Board of Directors, only two belong to Balochistan in 2005-0618 . Moreover, the Baloch leaders assumed that „Big Port and export processing zone at Gawader shall attract people from up-country‟ and the influx of settlers shall „affect local demographic structure‟19. Beyond the Gawader port, the leadership of Balochistan demands that (a) the proposals for establishment of new cantonments in Balochistan
115 should be withdrawn; (b) „gas royalty at par with the other provinces‟ should be specified and the entire sum due, already, on the gas royalty must be given away to the province; (c) the people of Balochistan should be given proper representation in all the federal government departments; (d) only locals be offered jobs in all mega projects and gas fields; (f) and the criteria of NFC Award relating to the distribution of resources should not be based exclusively on population; and other parameters like
„area‟ and „level of development‟ must also be considered20. To sum up, nearly all the reservations and demands of Balochistan relate to the „inequitable‟ distribution of resources and centralization of political power.
4.4.3 Sindhi Regionalism
Sindh restored its provincial status in 1936, after its separation from Bombay. The All
India Muslim league, champion of the Muslim nationalism in British India, had a limited support in this Muslim majority province. It did not find any candidate to contest in the 1937 elections. However, G. M. Sayeed and Sheikh Abdul Majeed members of the Sindh Assembly joined the party in 1938 and managed to pass a resolution for a separate homeland for Muslims of sub-continent in the same year.
Finally, Muslim League succeeded to govern the Sindh in 1942 and Sindh Assembly passed a resolution on March 3, 1943 favoring the Lahore Resolution 1940.
Subsequently, Sindh Assembly decided to join Pakistan by 33 votes to 20 (Chandio,
2007).
In 1947, the partition of India resulted in a huge transfer of population across the borders. While Muslims from the East-Punjab (Indian Punjab) settled in the West-
Punjab (Pakistani Punjab), the migrants of Muslim minority provinces (Mohajirs), mainly, entered into Sindh. Sindhis were reluctant to welcome Mohajirs in their
116 homeland and resisted against the influx of „millions of well-educated, mobile and resourceful Mohajirs‟ (Malik, 1997).
This settlement of Mohajirs in urban Sindh changed the „demographic, political and economic contours of Pakistani Sindh‟ in Mohajirs‟ favors (Malik, 1997). Although the pre-partition Sindh was not an „ethnically pure region‟, there was no substantial antagonism by Sindhis against Baloch and Punjabi population. These people adopted
Sindhi language and were „assimilated into the Sindhi culture‟ (Cohen, 2005). On the other hand, the Mohajirs remained determined to preserve their identity and did not intend to learn Sindhi language. The rejection of Mohajirs to adopt Sindhi culture and their relative dominant position in Sindh caused resentment in Sindhis toward
Mohajirs.
Moreover, the Sindhis resentment against the central government remained due to the
„inadequate representation in the legislature and government‟. In the early years, out of the total 69 members of the Constituent Assembly, only 04 were from Sindh‟; and the „province went unrepresented in Liaquat AIi‟s cabinet‟. In 1954, „Sindhis took a common stand against the central government for the reunification of Karachi with
Sindh‟. Sindhis again remained united and „nearly three-quarters of the members of
Sindh Assembly opposed one-unit scheme‟ of central government (Samad, 1995, p.150).
During one-unit period (1955-69), the Sindhis were further marginalized. The Sindhi language was suppressed and many Sindhi medium schools were closed (Rahman,
1995). Chandio (2007) argues that, „the ignoring policy of the central authority toward the Sindhi language created resentment among the people of Sindh‟. According to him, „Sindhi writers were discouraged and Sindhi newspapers were denied to
117 advertisements. Sindhi publications were suppressed and widely censored‟. Bhutto used the „slogans chanted by Sindhi nationalists‟ in the election campaign of 1970 and got land slide victory in Sindh.
While „exclusion from power fostered separatist tendencies‟ in the Bengalis, symmetrically, „access to power made the national integration of Sindhis easier in
1970s‟ (Jaffrelot, 2002). Bhutto‟s PPP (Pakistan Peoples Party) managed to form its governments at the center and in province of Sindh. Bhutto took up many Sindhis grievances and his policies favored Sindhis substantially.
The Removal of Bhutto‟s government in 1977 rematerialized the nationalist feelings in Sindh. These feelings gained momentum during the MRD‟s national campaign against the military dictatorship of Zia-ul-Haq (the then president and chief marshal law administrator) in 198321. The unrest spread at a wider scale and ferocity in the interior Sindh. Soon, „radical students and groups of peasants and workers‟ joined the movement and it „took the army four months to quell‟ (Noman, 1988). It is argued that this struggle in Sindh was essentially for „the participation in government and more equitable share in the economic progress of the province‟. The removal of the first government favorable to Sindhis, and its replacement by Punjabi-Pashtun dominated army, fuelled ethnic antagonism in the province. The articulation of regional aspirations was formulated in the demand for a confederation, outlined by the ex-governor of Sindh, Mumtaz Bhutto (Noman, 1988, p. 184).
In the Post-Zia democratic period (1988-99), Pakistan Peoples Party carried on its political character again and Benazir Bhutto managed to defuse the nationalist feelings in the wounded Sindhi community. While PPP dominated rural Sindh,
Sindh‟s nationalist parties remained unable to challenge its support. These parties
118 „never attracted the support of more than 5-6% of the electorate nor have they ever won any directly elected National Assembly seat‟ (Jones, 2002). Nevertheless, „the
PPP always espoused the cause of Sindhi nationalism at the provincial level,
(Waseem, 2006) and „many PPP candidates in Sindh appeared as nationalistic as their counterparts in the parties devoted to Sindhi issues‟ (Jones, 2002). Despite their weak organization, Sindhi nationalists have not given up their struggle and they have continued to express resentment about Punjab‟s role in their affairs (Jones, 2002). The
Sindhis have resented once again at the murder of Ms Bhutto during election campaign at Rawalpindi, a Punjabi town near Islamabad. But, Asif Ali Zardari (the widower of Benazir Bhutto, and the president of Pakistan at the moment) and Nawaz
Sharif (the most popular leader in Punjab) managed the issue successfully.
Because of relatively underdevelopment and lack of distributive justice, the nationalist feelings are always present in Sindh. Sindhis demand the withdrawal of Kalabagh dam and a multiple criteria for NFC Award. They also resent their lesser representation in civil-military bureaucracy. However, since the controversy over
Sindhi language in early 1970s, Sindhis had never prioritized the Sindhi language and culture in their directory of grievances and demands. Equally, the sporadic political incorporation and the relative accommodation of Sindhis in the power structure of
Pakistan is responsible for the lesser violent expression of the nationalist feelings of the Sindhis vis-à-vis the Balochs.
4.4.4 Mohajir Identity Politics
The „ruling oligarchy‟ of Pakistan in 1947, very craftily, directed the refugees from
Northern and Central India on the way to Sindh. Additionally, the Sindhi Hindus, the overwhelming majority of the urban population, were driven out by „deliberately
119 instigated communal riots‟. In this manner, the population of Sindh was „radically and irrevocably restructured‟ (Alavi, 1989, p. 240).
The new Sindhis – the Mohajirs – settled in the urban centers of Sindh: mostly in
Karachi, Hyderabad, and Sukkar. They remained „ardent supporter of state nationalism until 1970s‟ and voted for Islamic parties. When Bhutto (1971-77) came in power, he benefited Sindhis vis-à-vis Mohajirs. Consequently, Mohajirs began to protest against the discriminatory policies of Bhutto. In 1984, they formed their own political party – Mohajir Quami Movement (MQM) – to assert Mohajir identity
(Khan, 2004). And since 1980s, MQM has remained successful to maintain its electoral support in Mohajir constituency.
Previously, Punjabis and Mohajirs had dominated the politics of Pakistan. While
Punjabis remained over-represented in the army and administration, Mohajirs dominated the civil bureaucracy and political decision making centers (Jaffrelot,
2002). This relative privileged position of Mohajirs led them to identify themselves with Pakistani state and Islamic ideology‟. They remained hostile toward regional ethnic movements (Alavi, 1989). However, „gradually they lost grounds to Punjabis‟.
In addition, the military coup of Ayub Khan in 1958 „initiated a new Pathan-Punjabi axis‟ and the Mohajirs retreated to the background (Jaffrelot, 2002). Once their supremacy was challenged by the other communities, they withdrew their earlier support for Pakistani nationalism and began to assert for Mohajir identity (Samad,
2002).
Mohajirs opposed the discriminatory policies in Sindh during Bhutto era. Contrary to the provincial assemblies of Balochistan and NWFP, the Sindh Assembly passed a
Language Bill in 1972. Under the law, learning of Sindhi language was mandatory for
120 the provincial officials. The Mohajirs saw this discriminatory move as a denial of their right to employment. Consequently, Karachi witnessed massive demonstrations.
Introduction of quota system to distribute government jobs and placement in educational institutions in urban-rural (40%-60%) areas was also limited to the province of Sindh. It has been argued that Sindhis benefited from this scheme at the expense of Mohajirs.
During the period of 1973-86, Mohajirs‟ representations in civil bureaucracy declined from 33.5% to 18.3% in senior positions and from 30.1% to 18.2% in overall official positions. Still, the „ethnic composition of the military–bureaucratic oligarchy‟ gradually shifted even further in favor of Punjabis and Pashtuns at the expenses of
Mohajirs. This development „exacerbated age-old dissatisfaction‟ and consequently the „sense of relative deprivation‟ set the stage for Mohajir identity politics (Samad,
2002).
At the outset, in 1980s, Mohajirs entered into an alliance with Sindhis against the
„outsiders‟ – the Pashtun, Baloch and Punjabi settlers. The aversion between Mohajirs and Pashtuns turned into a series of ethnic clashes over the death of a Mohajir school girl in an accident with a Pashtun-driven mini-bus. The Pashtuns collaborated with
Punjabis and the „Punjabi-Pashtun Ittehad‟ (Union) emerged in response to the
Mohajir politics, in March 1987 (Talbot, 2000).
The leadership of Mohajir Qaumi Movement (Mohajir National Movement) – „an urban, youthful and organizationally well-knit party‟ – and its activists represent the lower middle class who have experienced unemployment (Malik, 1997). The MQM‟s
„Charter of Resolutions‟ (Qarardad-i-Maqasid), mainly expressed the Mohajir grievances against the outsiders. The „Charter‟ suggested that twenty years permanent
121 residence must be the requirement to get Sindhi domicile – a certificate that classify an individual as Sindh‟s resident to get the federal/provincial job on the basis of prescribed quota; all non-Sindhi police officers serving in Sindh must be transferred to their home provinces and only the people of Sindh should be recruited in future ; the influx of workforce in Sindh must be blocked ; the local bus services in the urban centers of Sindh should be given away to the concerned metro/municipal/city corporations, and licenses should be issued to only literate drivers; Afghans refugees must be constrained to the refugee camps in the NWFP and Balochistan; Biharis must be allowed to settle in Pakistan; a revised federal quota, based on a fresh census, should be executed in Sindh ; and the „outsiders‟ must not be allowed to buy property in Sindh (Ather, 2006,pp. 107-121). The „Charter‟ suggests that the Mohajirs were more worried about the „outsiders‟ than the Sindhis at that moment. However, by
1988, with the entrance into participatory politics, Mohajirs encountered with Sindhis; and the Pashtun-Mohajir violence was largely replaced with Sindhi-Mohajir conflict
(Talbot, 2000, pp.233-34).
MQM achieved a remarkable electoral support in Karachi and Hyderabad and emerged as a sole representative of urban Sindh. It entered into alliances and then left alliances with governments of Ms Bhutto and Nawaz Sharif at federal level and in the province of Sindh. Equally, Karachi witnessed the most terrible period in1990s when its „level of violence invited comparison to Beirut and Mogadishu‟ (Christine, 2005).
The violence reached at its peak in the 1994-96 periods, claiming over 5,000 lives according to official figures‟. Repeatedly22, successive governments were forced to call army to maintain law and order situation in the city (Kennedy, 2003, pp. 154-55).
In short, the political violence in Karachi swallowed some 9000 lives during the 1985-
98 periods23. MQM resented against the alleged maltreatment of Mohajirs during
122 military operations and their under-representation in national and provincial institutions. In 1994, MQM devised another list of demands to guarantee Mohajirs‟ rights: Muhajireen Kay Ainein Aur Buniadi Huquq (the constitutional and fundamental rights of Mohajirs). MQM demands included the termination of the operation clean up initiated by the military in Karachi; the proportional representation for Mohajirs in federal and provincial parliaments; an increase in the urban quota from 7.6% to 9.5% and from 40% to 60% for federal and provincial jobs respectively; the rotation of the posts of governor and chief minister of Sindh province between
Mohajirs and Sindhis; proportional share for urban Sindh in federal and provincial development funds; settlement of Biharis in Pakistan ; the proportional share in police jobs; an adequate share of admissions in educational and professional institutions; an autonomy for Karachi metropolitan and Hyderabad municipal corporation; the withdrawal of decisions regarding the division of Hyderabad municipal corporation and the establishment of Malir district in Karachi and Liayri development authority; and the rehabilitation and compensation for the affected populace of Karachi (Nusrut, 1994, pp. 77-93).
Gradually Mohajirs distanced themselves from the earlier demand of being recognized as the „fifth nationality‟ of Pakistan, along with Punjabis, Sindhis,
Pashtuns, and Balochs. Subsequently, Mohajir Qaumi Movement (Mohajir National
Movement) was renamed as Muttahida Qaumi Movement (Joint National Movement) in 1997 ; and since then its leadership has „adopted a more inclusive outlook away from Mohajirism‟ yet the voting pattern in Sindh suggests that „it relies essentially on the Mohajir vote‟(Waseem , 2006).
123 Regardless of its distinctive nature and tactics, the political violence in the urban
Sindh, seems to suggest – likewise its counterparts in rural Sindh and Baloch countryside – that it is the quest for sharing power that underpins the political mobilization along ethnic lines.
4.4.5 Siraiki Movement
Punjab is the largest province of Pakistan in terms of population (73.6 millions in
1998); and the internal differences in such enormous population are inevitable. Within
Punjab, three well-known groups/regions may be recognized on the linguistic and geographical basis – the Punjabi speaking, Central Punjab; the Pothowhari speaking,
Northern Punjab; and the Siraiki speaking, Southern Punjab.
Central Punjab is the most developed region of Pakistan. It is the host of provincial capital (Lahore) and is the most developed industrial zone in the country. It is the
„heart of Pakistan‟s agrarian economy, and its educational institutions produce
Pakistan‟s bureaucrats‟ (Shah, 1997, pp. 124-125). On the other hand, the Northern
Punjab has remained the „principal recruiting ground‟ of the Pakistan army. Thus, „the civil-military officers, administrators and businessmen from the Central and the
Northern Punjab, together make „the Punjabi ruling group‟ (Shackle, 1977). And the
Siraikis of the Southern Punjab – a relatively poorer and marginalized region – popularly term the Central and Northern Punjab “jointly” as the „Upper Punjab‟. The term, perhaps, denotes the deprivation and marginality of Southern Punjab vis-à-vis
Upper Punjab. Samad (2007, p. 116) has rightly observed that „the Siraiki-speaking areas have made a conscious and explicit attempt to distance themselves from the dominant groups in Punjab‟.
124 Siraiki identity is „still very new‟ phenomenon, and the people who are „deemed to be
Siraiki-speaking‟ had different history. The people of Bahawalpur belonged to a princely state that became a part of Punjab in 1970. „Riyasti‟ remained the language of majority in this region. Multan remained a part of earlier Sindh and „Multani‟ was the language of the area. The people of Dera Ghazi Khan and the surroundings had a language variety called „Derewal‟ and have historically „tended toward Baloch identity‟ (Ahmed, 1998).
For a longer period, the demand for improved recognition of the Siraiki language remained a vehicle for Siraikis to express their desire for a more equitable treatment.
And it was only in 1990s that they tied themselves with other „oppressed communities‟ of smaller units and entered into an alliance called the Pakistan
Oppressed Nations Movement (PONM). This alliance supported the demand of
Siraikis for a separate province i.e. Siraikistan. Siraikis, with allies, demanded for autonomy, adequate representation in defense forces, equivalence and parity in representation for the people of all the federating units in the federal bodies, services and other institutions24.
Siraiki political parties had no appeal for the majority of Siraiki speaking people.
Despite their efforts to build up support for Siraiki movement by stressing the marginalization of Siraiki speaking community, they lacked electoral support and performed badly in various general and local elections. Nevertheless, the Siraiki issue is an important factor in the politics of region. In many areas there is tension between local Siraiki speakers and Punjabi settlers. By comparing poling station results from
Punjabi settler villages with those from local Siraiki villages, it becomes obvious that the former tend to support the PML-N and the latter the PPP (wilder, 1995).
125 The local aristocracy of Siraiki region had prominent position in the mainstream parties, and is well incorporated into Punjabi ruling class. This incorporation has led to argument that Siraikis will become more and more amenable to resolving their problems in multi-ethnic contexts (Ahmed, 1998, P. 276).
4.5 Alternative Explanations of Ethnic Mobilization: A Matter of Non- consociational Mechanisms or a Case of Centralized Federal Settings?
After an overview of the ethno-nationalistic movements of Pakistan in the previous section, it has been attempted here to investigate the two alternative explanations for this regional/ ethnic/linguistic opposition in Pakistan. As it has been mentioned earlier in this chapter, federations may vary at the level of centralization, and in the forms of governance. On the basis of their distinctive features, federations can be branded as centralized or decentralized, and consociational or majoritarian federations. It has been argued that the “institutions matter” and “federations in ethnically divided societies can either exacerbate or contain conflict” (Adeney, 2009). Hence, this section evaluates two25 explanations of the ethnic mobilization in Pakistan. These alternative explanations link ethnic mobilization with the federal structure of Pakistan.
The substitute explanations are that:
A. The absence of consociational mechanisms has caused much of the conflict in
Pakistan (Adeney, 2009).
B. A relatively centralized federal design undermines the capacity of Pakistani
federation to manage ethnic diversity (Mushtaq, 2009).
Both explanations are not, necessarily, mutually exclusive. But, the constitutional features of a consociational federation differ from a majoritarian decentralized federation. Adeney (2009) has argued that non-consociational features of a federation
126 have greatly “influenced the identity formation and articulation in Pakistan”.
Consociational elements, as it has been already discussed in detail, include grand coalition, proportionality, segmental autonomy, and mutual veto over vital issues. She has asserted that the “tensions between different groups in Pakistan would be lessened” by applying proportionality element of consociationalism. She has substantiated this argument by narrating that “Pashtuns in NWFP possess a strong sense of identity, but they have not seen this as incompatible with their membership of
Pakistan. One reason for this is their co-option in the core institutions of state”.
However, she acknowledges that “proportionality, on its own, would not solve all conflicts” because some communities have tiny population. She maintains that
Sindhis and Mohajirs are more concerned about the “recognition of language and education rights”. She concludes that the absence of consociational mechanisms has caused much of the conflict. On the other hand, Mushtaq (2009) has argued that though it has a formal federal system, the Pakistani federation operates relatively in a unitary fashion. The centralization of power and intervention of central authorities in provincial matters has been remained a norm of the polity. He maintained that the
Pakistan‟s history depicts centralization similarities between civilian regimes and dictatorial periods. He asserts that “this political centralization caused a sense of marginalization and alienation in smaller units”. Consequently, this sense of marginality “set the stage for political violence and mobilization along ethnic lines”.
The following paragraphs attempt to investigate the relevancy of two explanations with various ethno-nationalistic movements of Pakistan. In turn, this analysis will expose the strengths and weaknesses of the proposals for consociational mechanisms and decentralization.
127 4.5.1 Pashtuns
Despite having a strong sense of distinctiveness, Pashtuns are not a cohesive group.
They are internally divided by religious factions, ideology, and political objectives.
The Pashtuns of NWFP and Balochistan have different representative political parties.
While, ANP is a popular Pashtun party in NWFP, PKMAP dominates in the Pashtun belt of Balochistan. Furthermore, the evidence suggests that more Pashtuns polled their votes for mainstream parties in various general elections of Pakistan (1988-2008) than the Pashtun parties for federal and provincial assemblies26. This pattern of electoral support suggests that the Pashtun identity does not imply identity with the
ANP. ANP has some important contenders in the Pashtun constituency of NWFP. If
ANP is not a sole spokesman of Pashtuns, it would be unrealistic to stress over the inclusion of ANP in every grand coalition at provincial and federal level. Same is the case of PKMAP in Balochistan. Therefore, the grand coalition element of consociationalism is not relevant to the representation issues of Pashtuns.
Adeney (2009) has observed that Pashtuns have overrepresented in military and due to this overrepresentation; they have not “pursued a secessionist agenda despite their strong sense of identity”. The available data on military confirms the relative overrepresentation of Pashtuns in armed forces. But the representation of military is unevenly distributed among various regions of Pashtuns. Cohen (1987, p.318) has observed that almost “75% of all military ex-servicemen come from only three districts of the Punjab (Rawalpindi, Jehlum, and Attack (Cambellpur), and two adjacent districts of the NWFP (Kohat and Mardan)”. This evidence suggests that
Pashtuns of various regions have been unevenly represented in armed forces. Overall,
Pashtuns constitute absolute majority in eighteen districts of NWFP27. Therefore,
128 overrepresentation of only two districts of NWFP in armed forces can‟t be justified as a single explanatory factor for the fall down of Pashtunistan movement.
Pashtuns have been remained least concerned about the recognition of their language and culture than Sindhis and Mohajirs. Coalition government of NAP-JUI in NWFP, in 1972, did not propose any substantial change in language and/or educational policies. Similarly, the present ANP‟s government is also quiescent on these matters.
This reality indicates the irrelevancy of segmental autonomy for Pashtuns. Territorial grievances of NWFP or Pashtun region, like NFC Award and Kalabagh dam project, have been, more or less, met through inter-provincial dialogue. This development makes the veto power element of consociationalism irrelevant for Pashtuns, at least, at the moment. In this way, the all four elements of consociational mechanism seem least relevant to the identity politics of Pashtuns. It is also important to mention that
ANP has not proposed proportional electoral system, a key element of consociationalism, in its electoral manifesto.
Subsequently, it is important to note why the Pashtuns associated with Khudai
Khidmatgar Tehrik in 1947 and then with National Awami Party (NAP) in 1970s resisted against the central authorities. Why Dr. Khan Sahib, the younger brother of
Ghaffar Khan and ex-chief minister of NWFP whose government was dismissed in
1947, agreed to become the chief minister of the West Pakistan after the introduction of one-unit scheme in 1950s. Why Ghaffar Khan declared in early 1970s that their demand for Pashtunistan has been fulfilled. The straight forward answer to these questions is that this political group was driven out from office of the government in
1947 and 1973 by the central authorities but was provided an opportunity to join government in 1955 and 1972. It was the installation of NAP-JUI government in
129 NWFP that led Ghaffar Khan to declare that Pashtunistan issue has been ended. This account seems to suggest that it is the interference of central authorities in provincial or regional matters that influence the identity formation and articulation among various groups of Pakistan.
ANP is asserting for greater autonomy28. It suggests that federation should retain only the control of defense, foreign affairs, and currency. It intends to strengthen the
Senate, the federal chamber, with the power to initiate the money bills and to approve the higher appointments. These proposals seem to suggest the trust of ANP in federalism. ANP‟s demand for renaming the NWFP as Pukhtunkhwa has been fulfilled. Thus, a relatively decentralized federal design can meet the requirements of
Pashtuns.
4.5.2 Balochs
Discussing the internal conflicts of various groups of Pakistan, Siddiqi (2010) has observed that “though members of a single ethnic group have a common language, culture, religion or other features, this is not necessarily a sign of unity and commonness of purpose”. This notion is empirically verifiable in the case of Baloch nationalism. Balochs are a tiny minority that constitutes 3.5% of the total population of Pakistan (Census Report, 1998). Despite their small size of population, Balochs have several political parties and groups29. In addition, more Balochs polled votes for mainstream parties than the Baloch parties30. The Baloch groups have different objectives and goals over how to best achieve the goals of Baloch community.
Furthermore, various factions have joined coalition governments in Islamabad and
Quetta in recent past. In this given situation, it is hardly possible to determine which
130 group should be provided compulsory membership of grand coalition at federal and provincial level to ensure Baloch representation.
Adeney (2009) has admitted that proportionality is least concerned with Balochs because they are a very small section of the population. The reserved quota of federal jobs for Balochistan is 3.5%. The quota system worked well for Balochistan as its representation in federal bureaucracy rose from 2.5% in 1973 to 3.1% in 1983. But, it is noteworthy that it is the representation of Balochistan and not the Balochs. Pashtuns of Balochistan dominates in the bureaucracy of Balochistan. Still, proportionality seems misfit for up lift the Baloch representation in bureaucracy. However, the distribution of Balochistan quota31 between Pashtun belt and Baloch countryside could work.
Balochs are very touchy about their language and culture. But, the Balochi language is a relatively less developed language yet. Consequently, various governments of
Baloch nationalists like Attaullah Mengal (1972), Akbar Bugti (1988), and Akhtar
Mengal (1997) did not introduce any substantial shift in their policies concerning language and educational policies. Baloch‟s territorial grievances can also be met within the framework of federal design. Therefore, consociationalism is not a requirement to address the Baloch question.
Balochs have mobilized more frequently and more markedly against the central authorities in post-1971 Pakistan. The most famous uprising of 1970s was a consequence of central authorities‟ interference into the provincial matters. Mengal‟s government in Balochistan was dismissed in February 1973 on the grounds of lawlessness and failure to comply with central government directives. His removal from the office resulted in a conflict between his supporters and the centre. This
131 confrontation continued up to 1977. It is imperative to note the timings and geographical scope of this conflict. This conflict started aftermath the removal of provincial government and the Baloch tribal areas of Marri-Mengal tribes were the real battle grounds. However, Akbar Bugti32agreed to hold the office of governor of
Balochistan during this conflict. This displays the internal divisions of Balochs. The evidence shows that the Balochs entered into tripartite accord in 1972 and installed their government at Quetta, but they entered into an armed conflict with the central authorities after the removal of their government from office. Therefore, centralization of political power is the key explanatory variable of this conflict. The same is the case with other Baloch conflicts. Balochs have been remained quiescent and had joined various coalition cabinets at Islamabad and Quetta during the civilian period (1988-99) in post-Zia era. Balochs were marginalized during the Musharraf period as a consequence of a coalition between MMA and PML-Q in Balochistan.
This marginality resulted in another armed conflict of Balochs with the central authorities. This account seems to suggest that decentralization of political power rather than consociational mechanisms have more relevancy and potential to manage the Baloch issues.
4.5. 3 Sindhis
Sindhis are the second largest ethno-linguistic group of Pakistan that constitutes
14.6% population of Pakistan (Census Report, 1998). Despite the common language and culture, Sindhis are a diverse society. Many settlers, particularly Balochs, have been assimilated in the Sindhi culture. It has been argued that Sindhis are internally divided, a division which is caused primarily by political differences (Siddiqi, 2010).
A large majority of Sindhis have supported the ideology and vision of PPP, one of the
132 mainstream parties of Pakistan that believe in a federal Pakistan. Still, various factions of PML have considerable electoral support in Sindhi-speaking regions. The hardliners, like Jeay Sindh and Awami Tehrik, have very limited support. Although,
Sindhis are members of a single ethnic group, they have different political objectives and goals over how best to achieve the goals of the Sindhi community. For example, difference of opinion can be seen between Jeay Sindh33 and Awami Tehrik. In fact, the Jeay Sindh has also now splintered into more than half a dozen different factions
(Siddiqi, 2010). Nevertheless, Sindhis have been remained overrepresented in high echelon of the state. Since 1971, Sindhis occupied the office of prime minister for more than eleven years and the office of president for three years. PPP has remained the vehicle of this inclusion of Sindhis at the federal centre. As Sindhis are majority in the province of Sindh, they do not require any grand coalition to share power at provincial level. Therefore, grand coalition element of consociationalism has no relevancy with the case of Sindhis.
Sindhis have under-representation in civil military bureaucracy. However, they have benefited from the rural-urban (60-40%) quota system introduced by Zulfiqar Ali
Bhutto in Sindh. Their ratio in federal bureaucracy had risen from 3.01% in 1973 to 5.
4% in 1983 against their specified quota of 11.4% 34. This trend shows that they are gradually acquiring their share in civil bureaucracy. It is pertinent to mention that
Sindh is the only province of Pakistan that divides its quota of federal jobs between rural Sindh and urban Sindh. It has been discussed that Mohajirs are the largest group in urban centers of Sindh; and Sindhis are the overwhelming majority in rural Sindh.
Therefore, the quota of federal jobs for rural Sindh, 11.4%, is in effect quota for the
Sindhis. For this reason, Mohajirs have been advocating for the removal of this quota system. Furthermore, it has been reported that Pakistan army has decided to
133 encourage Baloch and Sindhi youth to join the armed forces35. Hence, it is hoped that the current arrangements to strengthen the Sindhis‟ representation in civil military bureaucracy will work and the disparity would be lessened with the passage of time.
Adeney (2009) has rightly observed that Sindhis are more concerned about the issues of the recognition of language and education rights. Sindhi is the most advanced regional language of Pakistan. In fact, it had been remained a medium of instruction in Sindh during British rule. The provincial government of Mumtaz Ali Bhutto, a
Sindhi landlord, made an unsuccessful attempt to revive its earlier status. However,
Sindhis say that their language and culture is so rich that they are not worried about its survival36. The territorial grievances of Sindhis such as NFC Award and Kalabagh dam project have been met, recently. Thus, the mutual veto element of consociational democracy is least concerned to the Sindhis case.
To sum up, this story seems to suggest that Sindhis have some concerns about their representation and segmental autonomy. But, PPP has been, very successfully, involved Sindhis in national politics. Therefore, the absence of segmental autonomy or under-representation in military will not cause any horrible threat to the survival of the federation.
Moreover, in post-1971 Pakistan, Sindhis have protested sporadically and mildly than
Balochs but strongly than Pashtuns. The substantial protest took place after the removal of Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto from government in 1977, by the military establishment. While, Bhutto had violated the federal norms of polity during his rule by intervening in Balochistan and NWFP, the formal federal parliamentary system of
Pakistan operated more likely a presidential unitary system during Zia regime
(Mushtaq, 2009). In 1983, PPP and allies launched the movement for restoration of
134 democracy (MRD) all over the country. However, interior Sindh revolted vigorously.
It has been argued that MRD aimed at strengthening the federation by preserving and protecting the genuine interests of four federating units.37 MRD agreed that “after the restoration of democracy, the 1973 constitution should be amended to effect that it provided a four subject center leaving behind all the residuary powers for the provinces” (Hussain, 1989, p.191). Hence, it can be argued that the popularity of
MRD movement in Sindh was underpinned by the Sindhis‟ desires for greater autonomy. Finally, the Sindhi resentment subsided with the restoration of civilian rule at the end of Zia regime in 1988. Since then, Sindhis have not challenged writ of the state. It is important to note that Sindhis are more concerned about the provincial autonomy. The evidence shows that PPP leadership from Sindh is more vocal over autonomy issues than the Punjabi leaders of PPP38.
Therefore, it can be argued that centralization of political power is a key concern of
Sindhis. So, relatively decentralized governance would manage the Sindhis grievances.
4.5.4 Mohajirs
Mohajirs are also not a monolithic group. Siddiqi (2010) has elaborated the inter- ethnic competition and ethnic conflict in Mohajir community in detail. He has recognized three smaller parties of Mohajirs that are competing with the dominant
Mohajir party, MQM. These parties include Mohajir Qaumi Movement (Haqiqi) or
Mohajir National Movement, Mohajir Ittehad Tehrik (MIT) or Mohajir Unity
Movement, and Mohajir Rabita Council (MRC) or Mohajir Linkage Council.
135 MQM-H is a splinter group of MQM. It resulted from the differences within MQM in
1990s when a debate started within MQM over the renaming of MQM from Mohajir
Qaumi Movement to Muttahida Qaumi Moment. The leadership of MQM was making efforts to transform MQM from an ethnic to a multiethnic party. They intend to broaden their constituency beyond the urban centers of Sindh, namely Karachi and
Hyderabad. There were also some personnel clashes among the various factions of the party. Both groups, MQM and MQM-H, remained very hostile towards each other and
Karachi witnessed political violence in 1990s. During the Operation Clean Up, in
1990s, MQM-H‟s “youths were responsible for carrying out raids against the MQM most often than not supported by the Army itself” (Siddiqi, 2010).
Though, Mohajirs are mainly settled in Karachi and Hyderabad, a considerable number of Mohajirs is also settled in smaller urban centers and towns of Sindh. They have a different state of affairs and vision. It has been argued that MIT has remained more popular than MQM in these smaller urban centers when the “latter was allied with Syed‟s Jeay Sindh” in 1980s. MRC is another competitor of MQM in Mohajir constituency. Some Mohajir elders, in 1988, formed MRC to counter MQM‟s inclinations toward ethnic identity. This group prefers the term “community” than
“nationality” for Mohajirs. It welcomed the army operation against MQM in 1990s and “praised the army for its role and stated that the operation was indeed in the benefit of the Mohajirs” (Siddiqi, 2010).
This account of internal divisions of Mohajirs seems to suggest that Mohajir identity does not, necessarily, imply identity with the Muttahida Qaumi Movement. Siddiqi
(2010) asserts that “many Mohajirs do not identify with the politics of MQM and
Altaf Hussain and chose to remain neutral. Some of them are still drawn towards the
136 politics of Haqiqi and MIT which implies the fact that MQM might be the most dominant of Mohajir parties but it does not command the support and allegiance of all
Mohajirs”. This description challenges the argument that MQM should be provided space in grand coalition at provincial and national level as a representative of
Mohajirs.
Mohajirs have been remained over represented in vital national institutions. Though the introduction of rural-urban quota system in Sindh has undermined their earlier position, they are still overrepresented in civil bureaucracy. They have reasonable representation in military as well. They have benefited from the high echelon of politics. For example, Musharraf (1999-2008) was himself a Mohajir and was criticized for his ties with MQM. It is pertinent to not that Karachi that witnessed the most terrible period in1990s have been remained remarkably quiescent in Musharraf period. Therefore, representation is not vital issue for Mohajir case. Consequently, proportionality element of consociationalism has no relevancy with the case of
Mohajirs.
Mohajirs are Urdu-speaking community and Urdu is the lingua franca of Pakistan.
Therefore, Mohajirs are not worried about the Urdu. However, their interests were threatened when Sindh Assembly passed a Language Bill in 1972 stating that the learning of Sindhi language would be compulsory for provincial officials. The
Mohajirs agitated against this move and the government had to withdraw this rule.
Therefore, currently Mohajirs have no linguistic or cultural concerns. So, segmental autonomy is not a requirement of Mohajirs. Similarly, since 1990s, MQM is advocating the territorial grievances attached with the province of Sindh and the
137 Karachi. Most of the territorial issues have been already settled down. Thus, consociational elements are extraneous to the Mohajirs.
It is noteworthy that MQM is asserting for its multiethnic outlook since 1990s. It has been renamed to incorporate other communities. It has been advancing territorial grievances of its province, Sindh, more vigorously. This suggests MQM‟s inclinations to become a mainstream party of federal character39. MQM believes in federalism and has been asserting for provincial autonomy40. Nevertheless, MQM has not suggested any consociational element like proportional electoral system or segmental autonomy in its proposed autonomy bill.
Therefore, it seems to suggest that a relatively decartelized federal set-up will satisfy the Mohajir demands. Hence, decentralized federalism rather than consociationalism is the best option for Mohajir case.
4.5.5 Siraikis
As it has been discussed in previous section of this chapter, the movement of Siraikis‟ is at its infancy stage and no substantial protest has been seen in the southern Punjab, the Siraiki-speaking region. The main issue of this region, currently, is the demand for a separate province. However, there is disagreement over the name and boundaries of the proposed province. Some are arguing for a Siraiki province based on Siraiki identity, namely Siraikistan. Others suggest a province on administrative basis, namely Southern Punjab. Still, the people of Bahawalpur41 are asserting for
Bahawalpur province outside the proposed Siraiki province. Siraiki demands and grievances are completely compatible with the federal design and require no consociational mechanisms for their fulfillment.
138 4.6 Conclusion
This chapter seems to suggest that Pakistan fulfills minimum requirements of a federation. The 1973 constitution of Pakistan distributes legislative, administrative, and financial powers between federation and federating units. The degree of legislative and fiscal decentralization in Pakistani case, in comparison with the contemporary federations, reveals that it is not a deviant case. However, it appears a relatively centralized on the continuum. But, it is political centralization rather than legislative or fiscal that matters in the Pakistani case. This chapter contends that ethnic mobilization and political instability in Pakistan is the result of discrepancy in the theory and practice of federal arrangements. Though, the Pakistani federation fulfils minimum criteria of federalism but it operates more likely as a unitary system.
Various central governments intervened in provincial affairs, and these interventions were justified by the Article 149 of the constitution that “authorizes the federal government to intervene in a province to protect it from internal disturbance and to ensure that its government is carried on in accordance with the constitution”.
Furthermore, the survey of the politics of identity in Pakistan suggests that centralization of political power is the key factor connected with the political mobilization in Pakistan. More mobilizations are protests against central interventions in provincial or regional matters. But, these mobilizations were limited to the groups that thought they were deprived of their right of self-rule. These protests were prominent in particular regions. It has been also explored that these groups remained internally divided.
Finally, it has been observed that it is not the absence of consociational features but the centralization of political power that limits the capacity of Pakistani federation to
139 manage ethnic diversity. However, the argument that Pakistan „need to adopt and maintain consociational governance to practice democracy‟ needs a careful examination. The next chapter will explore, whether or not consociationalism is a realistic option for Pakistan to manage ethnic diversity.
140 Endnotes
1 British introduced various constitutional formulas in India. These constitutional formulas include the Indian Councils Act 1861, India Councils Act 1892, The Government of India Act 1909, India Act of 1919, and Government of India Act 1935. 2 The concurrent list has been abolished through the eighteenth amendment of the constitution in 2010 after the submission of this thesis. 3 The article 142 states that “(a) Parliament shall have exclusive power to make laws with respect to any matter in the Federal Legislative List; and (b) Parliament, and a Provincial assembly shall have power to make laws with respect to any matter in the Concurrent Legislative List; and (c) Provincial Assembly shall have and parliament shall not, have power to make laws with respect to any matter not enumerated in either the Federal Legislative List or the Concurrent Legislative List”(Constitution of Pakistan, 1973) . 4 The article 143 illustrate that in case of inconsistency between federal and provincial laws with respect to any matter enumerated in the concurrent legislative list, the act of parliament, whether passed before or after the act of the provincial assembly shall prevail and the act of the provincial assembly shall, to the extent of the repugnancy, be void” (Constitution of Pakistan, 1973). 5 J L Pumphrey to Sir Alec Douglas (Annual review of 1972). FCO 37/1332 .File was accessed at National Achieve Center, London. 6 William Crawley (Constitution of Pakistan). FCO 37/1333. File was accessed at National Achieve Center, London. 7 The autonomy bill proposed by MQM is available at its official webpage at www.mqm.org 8 the Federation may, if it deems necessary to acquire any land situate in a Province for any purpose connected with a matter with respect to which Parliament has power to make laws, require the Province to acquire the land on behalf and at the expense, of the Federation or, if the land belongs to the Province, to transfer it to the Federation on such terms as may be agreed or, in default of agreement, as may be determined by an arbitrator appointed by the Chief Justice of Pakistan”. 9 See autonomy bill at www.mqm.org 10 The article states that “If the President, on receipt of report from the Governor of a Province or otherwise, is satisfied that a situation has arisen in which the Government of the Province can not be carried on in accordance with the provisions of the Constitution, the President may, or if a resolution in this behalf is passed at a joint sitting shall, by Proclamation, (a) assume to himself , or direct the Governor of the Province to assume on behalf of the President, all or any of the functions of the Government of the Province, and all or any of the powers vested in, or exercisable by, any body or authority in the Province, other than the Provincial Assembly; (b) declare that the powers of the Provincial Assembly shall exercisable by, or under the authority of, [Majlis-e-Shoora (Parliament)]; and (c) make such incidental and consequential provisions as appear to the President to be necessary or desirable for giving effect to the objects of the Proclamation, including provisions for suspending in whole or in part the operation of any provisions of the Constitution relating to any body or authority in the Province.”
141
11 For detail see: Editorial of the Daily Dawn, International Edition, May 2, 2005. 12For detail see: Editorial of the Daily Dawn, International Edition, May 2, 2005. 13 For detail see: Government of Pakistan, (1975). Supreme Court judgment on dissolution of NAP. 14 The province of NWFP is renamed as Khyber Pakhtunkhwa through the eighteenth amendment in the constitution of Pakistan in 2010 after the submission of this thesis. 15 The states of Kharan, Makran and Lasbella had already joined Pakistan. 16For detail see: International Crisis Group, Asia Report, 2006. 17 Shaheen Mozaffar, „The Politics of Cabinet Formation in Pakistan: A study of Recruitment to the Central Cabinets, 1947–1977‟, Ph.D. dissertation, Miami University, Ohio, 1980. Cited in Robert G. Wirsing, The Baluchis and Pathans, Minority Rights Group Report no. 48 (Minority Rights Group, London, 1981), p. 9. 18 Government of Pakistan, Report of Committee on Balochistan, November 2005.(Report no.7). 19 Government of Pakistan, Report of Committee on Balochistan, November 2005,.(Report no.7). 20 See views of the political parties on current issue of Balochistan in „Government of Pakistan, Committee on Balochistan, November 2005, Report no.7 21 The MRD was composed of the following parties: the Pakistan People's Party, the Pakistan National Party, the Pakistan Democratic Party, the Jamiat Ulema-i-Islam (Fazlur Rehman group), the Qaumi Mahaz-i-Azadi, the Khaksar Tehrik, the Muslim League (Malik Qasim group), the Awami National Party and the Pakhtoonkhtva NAP 22 military was called in Karachi to maintain law and order in1992; again in 1994 to 1996, ; and again in 2000. 23 Zaffar Abbas cited in, Samad, Y. (2002). In and Out of Power but not down and Out: Mohajir Identity Politics, In C. Jaffrelot, (Eds.), Pakistan: Nationalism without a Nation (pp.63-84). London: Zed Books Ltd. 24 Declaration of Oppressed Nations Movement. Adopted on 2 October 1998 at Islamabad Hotel, Islamabad. 25 Only two explanations have been discussed here. It is partially for the reason of space and partially because these are more relevant to this work. 26 Election results are available at the official website of Election commission of Pakistan and also have been discussed in detail in the next chapter. 27 Ethno-linguistic composition of NWFP has been given in the figure 5-7 titled, “Ethno-linguistic composition of Pakistan” in the next chapter. 28 ANP autonomy demands have been summarized in the figure 3-12 of the third chapter in this thesis. 29 For detail of Baloch parties see the figure 5-14 in the fifth chapter of this thesis. 30 For detail see the figure 5-14 in the fifth chapter of this thesis. 31 The quota of Sindh province has been distributed between rural and urban Sindh. Similarly, the distribution of quota in Balochistan between Balochs and Pashtuns will lessened the disparity between two dominant communities of Balochistan. 32 Recently, Akbar Bugti had led the Baloch rebellion during Musharraf period.
142
33 Jeay Sindh and Awami Tahreek are hardliner Sindhi nationalist parties that „never attracted the support of more than 5-6% of the electorate nor have they ever won any directly elected National Assembly seat‟ (Jones, 2002). 34 See figure 3-4 in the third chapter of this thesis. 35 This observation is based on the various statements published in daily news papers of Pakistan. 36 Interview of Ghous Ali Shah (November 2007), ex-chief minister of Sindh, at Pakistan Muslim League office, London. 37 The member parties of MRD signed a four point declaration to cooperate with each other for the achievement of (1) Lifting of the martial law immediately, (2) Restoration of the unanimously passed 1973 constitution with the amendments which had been made unanimously, (3) Holding of elections according to the above constitution, (4) Guarantees to preserve and protect the genuine interests of the four federating units of Pakistan (Hussain, 1989. p. 190). 38 This observation is based on the statements of various leaders of PPP from Sindh and Punjab, published in daily newspapers. 39 However, despite its all efforts, MQM has remained unable to get some support outside the Mohajir constituency of urban Sindh. 40 MQM‟s autonomy demands are available in the figure 3-12 of the third chapter in this thesis. 41 Bahawalpur had a provincial status before the one-unit scheme of 1955.
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148 Chapter No. 5
CONSOCIATIONALISM AS A REALISTIC OPTION FOR PAKISTAN: AN ASSESSMENT
5.1 Introduction:
Despite the fact that the Pakistani nation is netted and bounded by the strong sentiment of Islam, Pakistan has experienced numerous ethno-nationalist movements.
Soon after its creation, the nascent state had to face challenges of political mobilization and ethnic strife. There are various explanations for this development.
Some experts have associated the rise and fall of ethno-nationalist movements with the power sharing1. Others have tied it with exclusion, and suggested inclusion as a remedy2. It is discussed in previous chapter that the management of ethnic diversity has remained problematic in Pakistan because of the centralized federal system. It has been asserted that though the Pakistani federation fulfills minimum criteria of a federal system, it operates more like a unitary system. Conversely, some political scientists have linked the inability of Pakistani federation to manage diversity to the limitation of non-consociational federalism. These experts have suggested consociational mechanism of power sharing to manage ethnic diversity in Pakistan.
Keeping in view the recommendation of consociationalists, this chapter attempts to assess the relevancy of consociational democracy to the multiethnic society of
Pakistan. This assessment will enable us to learn whether or not consociationalism is a realistic option for Pakistan to manage ethnic diversity.
Obviously, the central question of this chapter is: whether or not consociationalism is a realistic option for the multiethnic society of Pakistan to manage diversity? To address this question, author has applied the methodology used by Arend Lijphart
149 (1985) in case of South Africa. Inferring from the Lijphart‘s methodology, the broader question of this chapter has been divided into three sub questions:
(a) Does Pakistani society encompass the favorable factors3 for consociational
democracy?
(b) Does the political leadership4 of Pakistan seem capable of practicing power-
sharing arrangements?
(c) Is the degree of pluralism5 in the Pakistani case compatible with the
consociational arrangements?
These three sub-questions have been addressed in the subsequent three sections of this chapter. The final section is reserved for some concluding comments.
5.2 Favorable Factors for Consociational Democracy and the Multiethnic Society of Pakistan
The probability of an unstable democracy to become stable by adopting consociational governance in a particular plural society can be estimated by identifying the conditions that are conducive to the establishment and the maintenance of consociational democracy. The author has attempted in this section to explore whether or not favorable factors for consociational democracy are present in the multiethnic society of Pakistan. Lijphart has included nine conditions in his revised list of favorable factors for consociational democracy. These conditions are discussed one by one in this section.
5.2.1 No Majority Segment
The first condition for establishment and maintenance of consociational democracy is that there should not be any group having a dominant majority. The failure cases of
150 consociationalism like Cypriot (1963) and Ireland (1972) seem to suggest that Greek
Cypriots majority in Cypriot and the protestant majority in Ireland were responsible for the breakdown of consociational arrangements. One can argue that Belgium and
Switzerland, the two original cases of consociationalism, have experienced consociational democracy successfully despite substantial majorities: Flemish in
Belgium and German-speaking in Switzerland make clear majorities. However, it should be noted that these segments remained ‗internally divided by religion and ideology‘ (Lijphart, 1985, p. 120). Similarly, Hindus are in absolute majority in India but they are ‗internally divided to such an extent that the country consists of minorities only‘ (Lijphart, 1996). Therefore, according to Lijphart, India experienced consociational democracy successfully in early ears. In the Pakistani case, Punjabis make, nearly, a majority6. They have not been divided by religion, as Islam is the dominant religion of the Punjabis. The class and ideology plays nominal role in the political culture of Pakistan. Therefore, it can be argued safely that the relatively dominant position of Punjabis in Pakistan is an obstacle for the establishment and maintenance of consociational democracy. The figure 5-1 illustrates that the sizes of various ethno-linguistic groups of Pakistan are dissimilar. The small sizes of minorities make no match with the large size of Punjabis. This finding seems to suggest that consociational democracy is not a viable solution for Pakistan.
Figure 5-1: Numerical Strength (%) of Ethno-linguistic Groups in Pakistan (1998) Language Punjabi Siraiki Sindhi Urdu(Mohajirs) Pashto Balochi Others Overall 45.4 10.9 14.6 7.8 13.0 3.5 4.8 Urban 47.6 5.5 9.3 20.5 9.6 2.6 4.8 Source: (Kennedy, 2002)
151 5.2.2 Segments of Equal Size
Groups with roughly equal size are more likely to cooperate during the negotiations for the establishment and maintenance of consociational democracy (Lijphart, 1985).
Again, Pakistan does not fulfill this requirement. Pakistan is unevenly divided among ethno-linguistic groups. It has a dominant Punjabi community on one hand and a small minority of Balochs on the other. So this factor, also, suggests that the ethno- linguistic composition of Pakistan is no more favorable for consociationalism.
Figure 5-2: Uneven size of ethno-linguistic groups in Pakistan
Urdu Punjabi Sindhi Pashto Balochi Siraiki Others
5.2.3 Small Number of Segments
The number of segments in a plural society is important for the establishment and maintenance of consociationalism. According to Lijphart (1977, pp. 56-57), a society with relatively few segments constitutes a more favorable base for consociational democracy than the one with relatively few segments. He suggests that ‗cooperation among groups becomes more difficult as the number of those participating in negotiations increases‘. In previous work, he suggested that the presence of three or
152 four segments is conducive for consociational democracy (Lijphart, 1977). However, in subsequent work, Lijphart (1985) suggested the number of segments from three to five7. For the Pakistani case, as we have argued in the coming section, it is difficult to discover the exact number of segments. However, the Government of Pakistan has identified six ethno-linguistic groups in its census reports. As the number of segments
(ethno-linguistic groups) is close to the most favorable number, it seems to suggest that the number of segments is not unfavorable for consociationalism.
5.2.4 Small Population Size
Modest and small size of population is always considered as a favorable condition for consociational democracy. Lijphart (1977, p. 65) points out that all the European consociational democracies are small countries. He argues that ‗small size has both direct and indirect effects on the probability that consociational democracy will be established and successful: it directly enhances the spirit of cooperativeness and accommodation, and it indirectly increases the chances of consociational democracy by reducing the burdens of decision making thus rendering the country easier to govern‘. Moreover, he maintains that ‗ in small countries political leaders are more likely to know each other personally than in larger countries, the decision making process is less complex, and such countries generally do not conduct a very active foreign policy‘ (Lijphart , 1985, p.123). These conditions facilitate power-sharing process and ensure the successful operation of consociational democracy. Contrary to smaller Western European consociational democracies, Pakistan is one of the world‘s most populous states. Therefore, Pakistani case does not fulfill this requirement of consociational democracy. Figures 5-3 and 5-4 demonstrate that Pakistani case has no match, in terms of population size, with consociational democracies of the world.
153 Figure 5-3: Population Size of Some Countries (2008)
S. No. World Ranking Country Population 1 6 Pakistan 171,852,793 2 25 South Africa 48,782,755 3 46 Malaysia 25,274,133 4 59 Netherlands 16,645,313 5 77 Belgium 10,403,951 6 91 Austria 8,205,533 7 94 Switzerland 7,581,520 8 126 Lebanon 4,038,024 9 157 Cyprus 1,066,817
Source: U.S. Census Bureau, International Data Base available at: http://www.census.gov/cgi- bin/broker accessed on August 2009
Figure 5-4: Comparison of Population Size of Consociational cases with Pakistan
Pakistan South Africa Malaysia Netherlands Belgium Austria Switzerland Lebanon Cyprus
5.2.5 External Threats
Lijphart (1996, p. 263) has argued that external threats to a state create cohesiveness in the nation. Consequently, this cohesiveness promotes the prospects for a successful consociational democracy. The development of consociational democracy in Holland,
Belgium, Austria and Switzerland during the First and Second World Wars seem to suggest that the external threats in these countries strengthened the ties among the subcultures at mass level and the ties between leaders and followers within the
154 subcultures. Experiences of these cases led the argument that ‗external dangers promote internal unity‘.
Historically looking in Pakistan‘s case, the Muslims of India demanded a separate homeland to escape Hindu domination. Therefore, during Pakistan movement, the argument that ‗Islam is in danger‘ united the Muslims of majority provinces overlooking regional tendencies. After partition, the Indian threat led Pakistan to spend a lot on defense. Still, fear of Indian domination is a binding force within the country.
According to Javed (2007), ―since its inception, Pakistan has been facing the challenge of national security. Traditionally, the threat to Pakistan‘s security has been external. However, today, it can be arguably asserted that the major threat to national security in Pakistan emanates more from internal sources rather than external‖.
Currently, Pakistan is facing ‗the most unique, difficult and dreadful faces of terrorism‘. Therefore, in given circumstances, Pakistan8 seems to be getting more favorable position for consociationalism on this account.
5.2.6 Overarching Loyalties
The presence of overarching loyalties is crucial for consociationalism. ―The divisive and cohesive forces – cleavages and overarching loyalties – may operate simultaneously, and the conflict potential of cleavages depends on the combined effect of the two forces‖. Overarching loyalties may ―produce cohesion for the entire society or for particular segments‖ (Lijphart, 1977, pp. 81-82). It has been argued that overarching loyalties are supportive ‗for consociationalism if the divisions among the
155 segments are counterbalanced to some extent by an overarching sense of belonging together‘ (Lijphart, 1985, p. 124).
Nationalism and religion may prove potentially cohesive forces. Pakistani nationalism, based on Islam and Urdu langue, proved a unifying force after the partition. Nonetheless, the common faith is a potential binding force for majority of
Pakistanis9.
Pakistanis believes that ‗Islam is more vital to their identity than ethnicity or nationality‘. A recent survey in Pakistan asked the respondents to choose which of five identities –Pakistani, Muslim, individual, citizen of the world, and member of your ethnic group – was ―most central to their sense of self or identity.‖ Some 61% said that being a Muslim was the most central (another 31% said this was their second choice.) The next most popular was, being Pakistani, which was the first choice of
29% (56% second choice). These findings substantiate the argument that Islam is a binding force in Pakistani society (Fair et. al., 2008).
5.2.7 Socio-economic Equality
Socio-economic equality among individuals and groups has been considered essential for the establishment and maintenance of consociational democracy. Lijphart (1996, p. 262) has considered it the second major factor for establishment and maintenance of consociational democracy. It has been argued that relatively deprived segments in a society may assert for ‗redistribution which constitutes the kind of zero-sum game that is severe challenge for elite cooperation‘ (Andeweg, 2000, p. 522). Hence, the grave disparities among segments may endanger the viability of consociation.
156 Although, socioeconomic differences within the all segments of Pakistani society are evident, some poorer segments may easily be distinguished from the richer ones.
Greater regional disparities in Pakistan are no more conducive for the consociational governance. The figure 5-5 shows regional disparities in Pakistan. Whereas, more or less, the regional boundaries coincide with the boundaries of ethno-linguistic groups in Pakistan, it is safe to say that socio-economic inequality lies among the various groups.
Figure 5-5: Socio-economic Inequality in Pakistan
Indicator Pakistan Punjab Sindh NWFP Balochistan HDI 0.541 0.557 0.540 0.510 0.499 Health Index 0.82 0.83 0.78 0.84 0.78 Educational Attainment Index 0.537 0.557 0.553 0.480 0.453 Literacy Ratio (% 1998) 45 46 51 37 36 Unemployment (% 1998) 19.68 19.1 14.43 26.83 33.48 Calculated and Compiled by Pakistan Statistical Year Book 2005, Census of Population 1998, and Report of National Human Development 2003.
5.2.8 Geographical Concentration of Segments
Geographical concentration of segments is vital for the viability of consociation. It has been argued that ―the clear boundaries between the segments of a plural society have the advantage of limiting mutual contacts and consequently of limiting the chances of ever-present potential antagonisms to erupt into actual hostility‖ (Lijphart,
1977, p.88). In the Pakistani case, apart from some dispersion of Punjabis and
Pashtuns, all ethno-linguistic groups are, more or less, geographically concentrated.
So, this relatively geographical concentration of segments suggests the compatibility of consociational democracy with the multiethnic society of Pakistan. A complete ethno-linguistic composition of Pakistan has been enumerated in the figure 5-6.
Figure 5-7 shows Regional bases of various ethno-linguistic groups of Pakistan.
157 Figure 5-6: Geographical Distribution of Ethno-linguistic Groups in Pakistan
158 Figure 5-7: Ethno-linguistic Composition of Pakistan Punjab NWFP Balochistan Sindh District Punjabi Siraiki District Pashto Others District Balochi Pashto District Sindhi Urdu Attack 87.2 0.1 Bannu 98.3 0.05 Kohlu 91.2 6.6 Jacobabad 94.1 0.5 Rawalpindi 83.9 0.4 Upper Dir 92.5 7.3 Chagi 93.7 3.1 Shikarpur 95.8 1.8 Jehlum 96.6 0.1 Lower Dir 99.4 0.5 Dera Bugti 95.9 0.7 Larkana 98.1 0.6 Chakwal 97.7 0.2 Swat 92.9 6.6 Barkhan 74.8 0.7 Sukkar 74.04 13.9 Sargodha 93.3 0.1 Shangla 95.4 4.3 Jaffar Abad 62.3 0.4 Ghotki 92.3 3.1 Khushab 96.8 0.6 Buner 96.6 3.1 Nasir Abad 54.9 0.2 Khairpur 93.9 1.4 Mianwali 74.2 12 Malakand 98.2 1.2 Bolan 58.0 1.0 N. Feroz 88.4 5.7 Faisalabad 97.5 0.6 Luki Marwat 99.3 0.0 Kalat 98.6 0.4 N. Shah 79.5 8.7 Jhang 95.9 0.1 Hangu 98.8 0.2 Mastung 80.1 5.9 Dadu 93.3 2.6 T.T.Singh 98.9 0.2 Karak 97.7 0.0 Khuzdar 96.7 0.4 Hyderabad 59.6 29.6 Gujranwala 97.3 0.1 Charsadda 99.4 0.1 Awaran 99.7 0.03 Badin 89.8 1.2 Hafizabad 98.7 0.1 Nowshera 91.0 3.7 Kharan 98.9 0.2 Thatta 95.7 12.0 Gujarat 98.0 0.0 Mardan 98.4 0.7 Lasbella 64.9 2.6 Sanghar 77.1 10.1 M.Bahudin 97.0 0.5 Swabi 96.4 2.8 Kech 99.2 0.1 M. P. Khass 61.7 18.3 Sialkot 97.1 0.1 Batgram 81.7 18.0 Gwadar 97.8 0.3 Umerkot 89.7 3.05 Norowal 98.0 0.1 Peshawar 85.6 8.8 Panjgur 99.6 0.04 Tharparker 99.0 0.09 Lahore 86.2 0.4 Tank 80.3 0.3 J. Magsi 68.8 0.06 Karachi-E 3.8 60.8 Kasur 88.2 0.7 Kohat 77.5 17.3 Quetta 27.6 29.9 Karachi-W 6.0 39.7 Okara 95.7 0.1 Haripur 8.9 88.5 Pishin 0.2 99.2 Karachi-S 11.4 25.7 Sheikhupura 98.0 0.3 Abbotabad 2.2 94.3 K. Abdullah 1.6 97.5 Karachi-C 1.6 73.6 Vehari 82.9 11.4 D.I. Khan 22.0 1.23 K. Saifullah 0.04 99.2 Malir 25.1 15.9 Sahiwal 98.1 0.1 Mansehra 26.6 72.9 Zhob 0.1 96.8 * * * Pakpattan 95.9 0.0 Kohistan 3.9 95.9 Ziarat 0.07 99.5 * * * Khanewal 81.2 5.8 Chitral 3.1 96.0 Loralai 3.4 92.1 8 * * Bahawalnagar 94.6 1.2 * * * Musakhel 13.6 78.9 * * * Multan 21.6 60.7 * * * Sibi 28.7 44.3 * * * Lodhran 18.6 69.6 * * * * * * * * * M.Garh 7.4 86.3 * * * * * * * * * Bahawalpur 28.4 64.3 * * * * * * * * * R. Y. Khan 27.3 62.6 * * * * * * * * * D.G.Khan 1.3 80.3 * * * * * * * * * Rajanpur 3.3 75.8 * * * * * * * * * Layyah 32.6 62.3 * * * * * * * * * Bhakar 17.5 73 * * * * * * * * * Source: Collected & Calculated from District Census Reports of 1998. Note: Italics and Bold differentiates regions with different linguistic groups in a province.
159 5.2.9 Tradition of Compromise and Accommodation
Traditions of compromise and accommodation foster consociationalism (Lijphart,
1996, p. 263). It has been asserted that ‗plural societies may enjoy stable democratic government if the political leaders engage in coalescent rather than adversarial decision-making‘ (Lijphart, 1977, pp. 99-100).
A careful examination reveals that the traditions of compromise and accommodation seem missing in political culture of south Asia. In 1947, India was divided partly due to the failure of conflict resolution and disagreement over constitutional issues. Again
East Pakistan was separated in 1971 due to disagreement over the transfer of power and autonomy issues. In post-1971 Pakistan, power-sharing arrangements through tripartite accord between ruling party and opposition proved only short-lived in early
1970s. The post-Zia era (1988-99) also witnessed power politics and opportunism.
Only during Musharraf period, when it became evident that the military was not inclined to surrender power to civilian leadership, the latter (especially the popular leadership: Benazir Bhutto and Nawaz Sharif) found themselves excluded from the power-structure, and entered into an alliance (Mesaq-e-Jumhoriat).
We can even more strongly argue with supporting empirical evidence that Pakistan lacks a tradition of compromise and political accommodation. But to avoid repetition, we have to brief here because more attention has been devoted to this discussion in another section of this chapter titled, ―Politics of Accommodation in Pakistan (1971-
2008)‖.
160 Overall, evidence seems to suggest that compromise and accommodation is no more an ingredient of Pakistani political culture. Therefore, Pakistan does not have favorable settings for consociational governance.
5.2.10 Comparative Analysis of Favorable Conditions in Selected Countries
Lijphart has quantified the favorable conditions for consociational democracy in the case of South Africa. Through a comparative judgment of selected cases, he argued that favorable conditions are not unfavorable for South Africa. In this study, we have expanded the comparison by including the cases of India and Pakistan in the comparative analysis. The scores for the cases of South Africa, Belgium, Cyprus,
Lebanon, Malaysia, and Switzerland are borrowed from the Lijphart. The Indian case has been assigned score in the light of Lijphart‘s notes on Indian case10. For the
Pakistani case, scores for various favorable conditions have been assigned on the findings of previous section. The comparative analysis reveals that Pakistan is at the rear. Overall, it has scored - 3 (minus three); and only Cyprus, a famous failure case of consociationalism, has more unfavorable rating than Pakistan. A complete account of analysis is given in figure 5-8. Consociational arrangements were broken down in
Lebanon, though its score is + 2. Switzerland has the most favorable conditions and its score is +8. South Africa and Belgium have the equal score of + 1. Consociational arrangements proved short-lived in South Africa. Belgium has also experienced tough times in the recent past. Majoritarian system of government is operating in India at the moment. So, it seems not reasonable to suggest consociational arrangements for the
Pakistani case. In the next section, the selected cases have been classified on the basis of their score in comparative analysis.
161 Figure 5-8: Rating Based on the Favorable Factors for Selected Countries
S. Conditions South Belgium Cyprus Lebanon Malaysia Switzerland India Pakistan11 No. Africa 1 No majority segment +2 -1 -2 +2 -1 -1 +1 -1 2 Segments of equal size +1 +1 -2 +1 -1 -2 +1 -2 3 Small number of segments -1 0 0 -1 +2 +2 -2 0 4 Small population size +1 +2 0 +2 +2 +2 -2 -2 5 External threats 0 0 -2 -2 0 0 0 +1 6 Overarching loyalties +1 0 -1 0 0 +2 1 +1 7 Socioeconomic equality -2 -1 -1 -1 -2 +1 0 -1 8 Geographical concentration of segments -1 -1 +1 -1 -1 +2 +1 +1 9 Traditions of accommodation 0 +1 0 +2 +1 +2 0 0 Total score +1 +1 -7 +2 0 +8 0 -3
Source: (Lijphart, 1985). Note: scores for the various favorable factors in cases of India and Pakistan have been assigned by the author
Figure 5-9: Favorable Factors and Pakistan Hierarchical Clustering: Dendrogram
South Africa Lebanon Belgium Malaysia Cyprus Pakistan India Sw itzer land Note: this classification is based on the values of various cases in Figure 5-8
162 Using the Minitab software, it has been attempted to classify the selected cases on the basis of favorable conditions for consociational democracy. The software distributed the eight cases into three clusters:
(a) South Africa, Lebanon, Belgium, and Malaysia are placed in the first cluster.
All cases of this cluster experienced consociational arrangements at some time
in their national history.
(b) Cyprus, Pakistan, and India are placed in the second cluster. Cyprus is a failed
case of consociational democracy; India experienced consociationalism but it
opted for some selective consociational measures in 1960s, and then turned to
the majoritarian democracy.
(c) Switzerland is the only case placed in third cluster. Switzerland has been
considered as a success story of consociational democracy.
This classification suggests that Pakistan is not coupled with a successful case of
Switzerland nor with the clear past cases of consociationalism. It has been placed with a failed case of Cyprus and a ‗borderline‘ case of Consociationalism— India.
In brief, this section seems to suggest that Pakistan lacks favorable conditions for establishment and maintenance of consociational democracy. Therefore, consociationalism does not seem a realistic option for Pakistan to manage ethnic diversity. The next section is reserved to explore whether or not the political leadership of Pakistan is too accommodative to practice consociational democracy.
5.3 Politics of Accommodation in Pakistan (1971-2008)
Consociationalism challenges the widely accepted proposition that it is difficult to
‗achieve and maintain stable democratic government in plural society‘. It asserts that
163 ‗the centrifugal tendencies inherent in plural society can be countered by the cooperative attitude and behavior of the political leadership of different segments of a society. Through this cooperative attitude, it is believed that democratic stability can be achieved (Lijphart, 1977, p. 1). Lijphart (1985, p. 130) examined through the study of South Africa that ―there are some hopeful signs that South Africa may have the kind of strong and rational leadership required for consociational democracy‖. This observation, along other favorable conditions, led Lijphart to suggest that
―consociationalism is a realistic option‖ for South Africa to experience stable democratic governance. This argument demonstrates that the probability of success or failure of consociational arrangements in plural societies may be assessed through investigative ‗role of political leadership‘. The assessment of the attitude of political elites towards power sharing-arrangements (their behavior with coalition partners and respect for the mutual agreements) can establish a base for any policy recommendation about consociational democracy.
Consociationalism is an empirical as well as a normative model. The empirical cases of the Netherlands, Austria, Belgium, and Switzerland witnessed ‗coalescent rather than adversarial decision making‘ by the rational and cooperative leadership of those countries (Lijphart, 1977, pp. 99-100).
The spirit of accommodation was an integral part of the Dutch politics and Lijphart
(1975, p. 103) has regarded it as ‗the secret of success of the Dutch politics‘. He has used the term of accommodation in the ‗sense of settlement of decisive issues and conflicts where only a minimal consensus exists‘. Dutch leadership successfully managed to resolve conflictive issues and it was their desirability to preserve the system. Catholic-Liberal coalition in Belgium and the post civil war grand coalition in
164 Austria demonstrate the accommodative attitude of political leadership in these countries.
That is the evidence of empirical cases that led Lijphart to predict that consociationalism is a viable solution for plural societies having ‗rational and cooperative leadership‘. The answer to the question whether consociationalism is a viable solution for the multiethnic society of Pakistan, depends, along other favorable requirements, on the role of political leadership. If the political leadership behaves rationally and demonstrates accommodative attitude toward each other, it seems to suggest that Pakistan can experience consociational governance. Though, it is not an easier task to foresee the prospective behavior of human beings (behavior studies are outside the scope of this study), the study of the past behaviors can help to trace the leanings that might prevail in future. In this section, the author does not intend to have an exhaustive analysis of the behavior of political leadership of Pakistan. At the best, the purpose is to answer the question: is the political leadership of Pakistan so accommodative to practice consociational arrangements?
To answer this question, the author has evaluated the responses of political leadership toward power-sharing arrangement in the post-1971 Pakistan. To examine the role of leadership toward power-sharing arrangements, three case studies12 have been selected for analysis: (1) the tripartite accord of 1972; (2) the coalition politics of
1988-99; (3) and the post-Musharraf power sharing arrangements between the two leading political parties, namely, PML-N and PPP13. The case studies have been discussed in the following sections.
165 5.3.1 Power-sharing Arrangements under the Tripartite Accord
The first general elections of 1970 proved disastrous for Pakistan. Awami League of
Sheikh Mujib won almost all seats in East Pakistan and this landslide victory enabled it to get an overall majority in the National Assembly. Bhutto‘s Pakistan People‘s
Party (PPP) emerged as a leading party in West Pakistan winning 85 out of 144 seats.
However, Bhutto‘s success in West Pakistan was almost completely confined to the two majority provinces of the Punjab and Sindh. National Awami Party (NAP: mainly composed of Pashtun and Baloch nationalists) and Jamiat-ul-Ulama Islam (JUI) got victory in minority provinces of NWFP and Balochistan14. After the separation of
East Pakistan, however, Bhutto became the only elected choice for the people of what was left of Pakistan. He took over the office of the President on 20 December 1971 and became the civilian martial law administrator.
Soon the opposition began to stress Bhutto to end martial law and transfer power to elected governments. Bhutto responded to the mounting pressure and met the opposition parties, NAP and JUI, on March 5 and 6, 1972. The meeting resulted in a
12-point tripartite accord. The important points of these were: (1) the President will announce that Martial Law would be lifted on August14; (2) the governments both at center and in the provinces to be formed on the basis of parliamentary majority; (3) and till the forming of permanent constitution, the right to appoint provincial governors to remain with the center, though governors of Balochistan and NWFP would be appointed in consultation with the majority parties in the provinces concerned.15
Despite of this agreement, there were doubts concerning center-province relationship and delegation of authority. Bhutto and Wali Khan (a Pashtun nationalist and leader
166 of the NAP), soon started their own interpretations of the most important clauses. A second round of the meetings was held on April 8, 1972 at Peshawar to resolve the issue. However, the meeting proved fruitless. Bhutto discarded the agreement and formed an alliance with Qaiyum Muslim League in the NWFP16.
Subsequently, after several meetings, a new agreement was signed on April 27, 1972.
Two ministries at the centre were offered to NAP/JUI, and center agreed to appoint governors on the recommendation of the NAP/JUI. The majority parties in NWFP and
Balochistan were invited to form governments in their respective provinces. Bhutto appointed governors in NWFP and Balochistan on the recommendation of NAP/JUI.
But, Bhutto wrote letters to governors to ensure fair treatment for all inhabitants of province, to preserve integrity of the state, to maintain law and order situation, and not to interfere with the jurisdiction of the central government. Both governors acknowledged the letters and accepted the content. The agreement and the letters to governors were published expecting that it will endure the agreement. But, to
Paterson (1972) , ―whatever the reasons, the publication of these letters and the general tone of the press conference do not contribute very much friendly relations between the centre and provinces in the future‖.
The tripartite accord worked but for a brief period. The ‗politics of accommodation‘ was broken down soon. NAP‘s government in Balochistan was sacked by federation on the grounds that it was working against the integrity of the state. The NAP/JUI coalition government of NWFP resigned as a protest against this dismissal of
Balochistan government (Mushtaq, 2009).
Neutral observers, however, discarded the allegations of central government related to anti state activities in minority provinces. Imray (1976) wrote that ―on Balochistan
167 there was unanimous opinion that even the most extreme opponents of the government were not separatists. They wanted to remain part of Pakistan but with greater autonomy. The alternatives - joining Iran or Afghanistan or becoming independent were never seriously considered‖.17
Similarly, there was no reality in the Pashtunistan issue in the province of NWFP. In his annual report defense attaché of British embassy in Pakistan wrote,‖ the
Pashtunistan issue has caused no real difficulty. While it is always easy to find
Pathans (Pashtuns) who will decry Pakistan and the government, they are not so ready to offer any real alternative and seem content to get as much as they can for their people without sacrificing their traditional feelings for independence‖18.
In short, the tripartite accord came to an end, NAP was banned and Wali Khan was jailed. Balochistan operation continued for years (1973-77), and no lessons were learnt from the separation of East Pakistan. The mutual hostility of government and opposition provided the military another opportunity to take over19. In July 1977, the
Bhutto regime was ousted by a military coup, led by Zia-ul-Haq, the then chief of army staff. The assemblies were dissolved, political parties were banned and the 1973 constitution was suspended.
5.3.2 Coalition Politics of Post-Zia Era
The political developments during Zia regime20 fostered the polarization among political elite that led to the demands of maximum autonomy by a small group of
Sindhi, Baloch and Pashtun nationalists. Many nationalists expressed that Zia has widened the gulf between Punjab and the smaller provinces. It has aggravated the suspicion, distrust and fear of domination among them. So, it is argued that Zia era
168 has failed to advance the process of nation building, rather it seems to have reversed it
(Hussain, 1989, p.208).
The post-Zia era witnessed a variety of coalition governments. However, these coalitions or alliances proved short-lived. Political parties with different backgrounds entered into alliances for benefits and bounties skipping over their ideologies and programs. The leading parties, however, remained unenthusiastic to share power with the junior partners. Hence, the essence of accommodation remained missing throughout this period.
Pakistan People‘s Party emerged as a leading party at federal level by securing 92 seats out of 207 (seats for Muslims) in the national assembly in general elections of
1988. Its leader, Benazir Bhutto ‗initiated conciliation with all the important political groups in the country‘ (Rais, 1989). The PPP entered into an alliance with Mohajir
Qaumi Movement (MQM) at federal and provincial level in Sindh. This alliance was imperative as the political and ethnic boundaries coincide strictly in the province of
Sindh. The PPP dominated in the Sindhi speaking rural Sindh by winning every
National Assembly seat in this region and the MQM won all but one seat in Mohajir constituencies of Karachi. In Hyderabad the former won three and the latter won two.
This trend prevailed in the provincial results of Sindh as well (Kennedy, 1991). So the cooperation between PPP and MQM was viewed as a success story of mediation concerning the conflict of interests between urban and rural Sindh‘ (Rais, 1989). PPP also managed to have a coalition government with ANP21 in NWFP. However, IJI22 succeeded to install its government in vital province of Punjab. Initially, some gracious gestures were exchanged between Benazir Bhutto (prime minister) and
169 Nawaz Sharif (the then chief minister of Punjab) but soon this gesticulation turned into inhospitable relations.
The 59-point MQM-PPP accord (also known as Karachi Declaration) that was signed on December 2, 1988 proved short-lived. MQM alleged that PPP government had dishonored the accord and had instituted pro-Sindhi and anti-Mohajir policies.
Eventually, MQM withdrew from the coalition and supported the IJI-led no- confidence motion against Benazir Bhutto in October 1989. Though Benazir survived,
MQM‘s voting in favor of no-confidence motion added fuel to flames in Sindh. Then
MQM and IJI signed an accord. This accord had more or less similar clauses that had its predecessor (Kennedy, 1991).
Nawaz Sharif not only drew support from both the Mohajir Qaumi Movement
(MQM) and the Awami National Party (ANP) but also won the mid-term elections held in October 1990 from the IJI‘s platform.23 IJI, a nine-party coalition, installed its governments at center and in the province of Punjab. ANP and MQM decided to join
IJI-led coalition governments in NWFP and Sindh respectively. A plethora of regional parties joined IJI-led government in Balochistan. IJI had to install coalition governments because it had won only a minority of seats in Sindh, NWFP, and
Balochistan. It has been observed that the regional parties24 joined different alliances at different times. Nevertheless, their decision to support a particular alliance/ party remained ‗always qualified and based on self-interest‘ (Ziring, 1990).
Nawaz Sharif‘s period saw autonomist demands in smaller units of the federation. G.
M. Syed, a veteran Sindhi nationalist, reiterated his ‗call for Sindhu Desh‘: a homeland for the Sindhis. The government arrested him when his ‗supporters took over the Sukkar airport and burned the Pakistani flag‘. Mumtaz Ali Bhutto, cousin of
170 Z.A Bhutto and the leader of Sindh National Front, demanded more autonomy and presented a 15-point formula that was closer to a confederal than federal set-up. More or less in the same tune, Nawab Akbar Bugti, ex-governor and ex-chief minister of
Balochistan, stressed for the ‗need to establish Balochistan for the Balochs‘. Within
Punjab, a newly formed political party, the Siraiki Qaumi Movement, demanded a separate province for the Siraiki speaking people of Southern Punjab (Ziring, 1990).
However, currently, by considering the complications of ethnic composition, the
Siraiki leadership has modified the demand from Siraiki province to the province of
Southern Punjab.
It was a difficult task to keep mutually hostile parties together as coalition partners for
Nawaz Sharif. Therefore, the IJI-led coalition government began to disintegrate and
Nawaz Sharif suffered the same fate of dismissal as his predecessor, Benazir Bhutto.
PML and ANP were strange bedfellows. JI and MQM were hostile to each other and members of both parties were involved in mutual violent attacks in Karachi. Still, JI and ANP had different vision over issues like foreign policy, Kashmir dispute, and
Pak-Afghan relationships (Waseem, 1992; Talbot, 2005). PML and PPP, the parties that fought election in 1990 under the banners of IJI and PDF, emerged as the mainstream parties in general elections of 1993 by winning 72 and 86 seats respectively in the National Assembly of 207 seats. MQM boycotted the elections and the remaining ethno-regional parties of Balochistan and NWFP suffered defeats in these elections. The Islamic parties also suffered a humiliating defeat and managed to capture only 9 seats in the National Assembly. Apparently, Pakistan was moving toward a two-party system and PPP and PML-N made notable inroads into the provinces (Amin, 1994).
171 PPP succeeded in setting-up a coalition government at Islamabad and in the province of Punjab with PML-J. PPP also installed its government in Sindh. PML-N and ANP, on the other hand, succeeded in setting-up a coalition government in NWFP. While
MQM boycotted the National Assembly elections, it participated in provincial assembly elections. It continued to maintain its electoral support in Karachi by winning 22 of the 28 Sindh Assembly seats.
MQM was a coalition partner of PPP in Sindh during PPP‘s first government but this time it was ‗waging an urban guerilla war‘ against the government. The political violence in Karachi resulted in more than 6000 deaths between in two years prior to
1995(Shafqat, 1996). The relations between coalition partners in Punjab remained problematic. PPP had to offer the office of chief minister to its junior partner, PML-J.
Later, however PPP attempted to install its own chief minister but could only manage to replace Manzoor Watto by a much weaker figure of the same party, Sardar Arif
Nakai (Talbot, 2005). Meanwhile, Benazir government was discharge again but this time by the president of her party, Farooq Leghari.
In the general elections of 1997, PML-N had a ‗crushing victory‘. Since 1985, it was for the first time that a party possessed an absolute majority in the National
Assembly25. It was also for the first time that a Punjab based party made significant inroads in rural Sindh - the stronghold of PPP. Ethno-regional parties‘ performance remained mixed: ANP and MQM captured 9 and 12 seats respectively in the National
Assembly. BNP and JWP, the two Baloch nationalist parties, won 3 and 2 seats respectively. The JUI-F was the only religious party with two members in the
National Assembly (Talbot, 2005). PML-N entered into alliance with MQM and ANP at center and in the provinces of Sindh and NWFP respectively. PPP was the largest
172 party in the Sindh Assembly but MQM and PML-N coalition managed to keep it out of the game. However, the coalition failed to work and did not provide ‗effective governance‘ (Syed, 1998). Even, MQM occasionally ‗organized protest marches and strikes to press the government for the implementation of the agreement of cooperation they had signed in February 1997‘. Afterwards, MQM‘s ministers resigned from the central and provincial cabinets (Rizvi, 1999).
ANP also withdrew its support and left the coalition as a protest against the PML-N‘s refusal to rename NWFP as Pakhtunkhwa. Both parties, ANP and MQM, accused
―Nawaz Sharif of establishing Punjab‘s hegemony over the smaller provinces and violating the latter‘s rights and interests‖ (Rizvi, 2000). This perception was underpinned by the central government‘s unilateral decision to revive the Kalabagh dam project. The provincial assemblies of Sindh, NWFP, and Balochistan had passed resolution against this project already.
The nationalist groups and parties from the smaller provinces vowed to defend their right of self-rule. Some suggested a new constitution framed by a constituent assembly with equivalent representation of all provinces (Rizvi: 1999).
Pakistan‘s Oppressed Nations Movement (PONM), a group of 28 ethno-regional parties was launched during 1998 and this association continued to protest against allegedly authoritarian rule and for ‗the establishment of a decentralized polity‘(Rizvi , 2000).
Afterwards, Nawaz Sharif was removed by the military and Pervez Musharraf took over the charge in October 1999.
173 5.3.3 Politics of Accommodation in Post-Musharraf Period
After the general elections of 2002, the political parties were divided between two camps: pro-Musharraf and anti-Musharraf camp. A pro-Musharraf coalition government (PML-Q, National Alliance and MQM) was installed after the elections in Islamabad. PML-Q installed its government in Punjab, and managed to form coalition governments in Sindh and Balochistan with MQM and MMA respectively.
MMA, the leading party, formed its government in the province of NWFP. It was for the first time in recent history of Pakistan that coalition governments completed their specified parliamentary tenure. However, the regime‘s stability was possible because of the Musharraf‘s active contribution in keeping the coalition intact.
Musharraf did not allow Benazir Bhutto and Nawaz Sharif to play any role in
Pakistani politics. This attempt led the rivals of the past to come close to each other.
Benazir Bhutto and Nawaz Sharif signed the ―Charter of Democracy‖ in London on
May14, 2006. It was a spectacular moment because leaders of the two most popular mainstream parties agreed to join hands with each other for the promotion of democratic rule in Pakistan. They aimed to struggle for the restoration of democracy and proposed a number of modifications in the constitution.
Meanwhile, in a very controversial presidential election of October 2007, Musharraf was reelected for second five-year presidential term. His election followed general elections for the national assembly and the four provincial assemblies in February
2008. PPP and PML-N performed well in the general elections of 2008 by winning
88 and 67 seats respectively in the national assembly. The number rose up to 122 for
PPP and 91 for PML (N) after the allocation of reserved seats for women and joining of independents to these parties. PPP won a clear majority in Sindh, and PML-N
174 emerged as the leading party in Punjab. PML-Q, a pro-Musharraf party, appeared as a largest party in Balochistan. ANP was the leading party in NWFP. MQM performed well and won 25 seats of the national assembly. At the center, PPP-led coalition government included PML-N, ANP, MQM, and MMA. This coalition was only one of its kinds in Pakistan as it was ‗the broadest-ever coalition of political parties‘ in the
Pakistan‘s history (Rizvi, 2008).
PPP and PML-N decided to share power. Bhurban declaration was considered as a great move towards conciliatory politics in Pakistan26. However, the analysts had real doubts about the durability of these arrangements. The history of mutual party animosity of PML-N and PPP in 1990s made the analysts ‗pessimistic that a PPP-
PML-N accommodation can last‘. Yousuf Raza Gillani, a PPP leader from Southern
Punjab, was the candidate for prime minister ship of the coalition partners. He became prime minister on March 24, securing 264 of 306 votes polled for this election. The cabinet ministries were distributed among the coalition partners. Of the total 24 cabinet ministries, 11 were given to the PPP, 9 to the PML-N, 3 to the junior coalition partners (ANP and JUI-F), and 1 to an independent candidate (Kronstadt, 2008).
The rationale behind this coalition-building was that the mutual cooperation of the leading parties will refurbish the civilian political rule in Pakistan. Apparently, the political leadership seemed convinced that their split will benefit the non-democratic powers (Rizvi, 2008).
It was a unique experience that the two mainstream political parties (PPP and PML-
N), two regional political parties (ANP and MQM), and an Islamic party (JUI-F) entered into an alliance. Moreover, coalition governments were installed in all provinces: in Punjab (PML-N and PPP along some independent members of Punjab
175 assembly), in Sindh (PPP, MQM, and ANP), in NWFP (ANP and PPP and some independent members), and in Balochistan (PPP, PML-Q (forward block), ANP and
MMA, and independent MPA‘s)27.
However, over the dispute of reinstatement of the deposed judges, PML-N ministers quit the six-week old coalition cabinet on May 12, 2008 and submitted their resignation letters to the Prime Minister, Yousaf Raza Gillani.28
Nevertheless, PML-N announced that the party will continue its ‗issue-based support‘ to the government29. Finally, PML-N decided to leave the governing coalition completely and sat in the opposition.
At provincial level, it was reported that the ANP Sindh leadership was not contented with the dealing of major coalition partners - PPP and MQM. ANP‘s provincial leadership informed its central leadership about the PPP‘s policy of ignoring ANP in
Sindh while taking decisions30. In addition, PPP and MQM had also difference of opinion concerning the future of existing local government system in Sindh.
Analysis of the power-sharing arrangements, in the above three case studies, seem to suggest that political culture of Pakistan is no more conducive for such arrangements.
The failure of tripartite agreement in 1970s, the disappointing outcomes of coalition cabinets in 1990s, and the collapse of PPP-PML-N alliance in the last year provide sufficient evidence to conclude that politics of accommodation is not a political norm in Pakistan. Political leadership is not too accommodative to practice consociational democracy in Pakistan. Though there are some positive signs31, overall situation is not conducive. Political accommodation like the Netherlands, Austria, Belgium, and
Switzerland is not a norm in the political culture of Pakistan. The next section of this
176 chapter has been reserved to investigate whether or not the degree of pluralism in the
Pakistani case is compatible with consociational democracy.
5.4 The Degree of Pluralism in Pakistani Case and Consociational Democracy
Lijphart (1977, p. 238) has treated the degree of pluralism as a variable. He asserted that consociationalism is a panacea for societies having greater degree of pluralism.
He warned the plural societies of the third world that the ‗realistic choice for such societies is not between the British normative model of democracy and the consociational model, but between consociational democracy and no democracy at all‘. Though not precisely, he has described the probability of success of the two normative democratic models (the consociational model and the majoritarian model) in plural states with a varying degree of pluralism. He asserted that the probability of success is greater for the British model in lesser plural societies. Whereas, the prospects for the success of British model gradually decreases as the degree of pluralism in that particular society increases. Therefore, according to Lijphart, in semi-plural cases, the consociational democracy has greater probability of success than the British model. He maintained that in greatly plural societies, ‗consociational model is the only choice‘ even with a lesser chances of success. Finally, in the ‗most extreme plural societies neither model offers any hope‘ (Lijphart, 1977, pp. 237-38).
177 Figure 5-10: Degree of Pluralism and the Probability of Success for British and Consociational Model of Democracy
Note: In this figure, Lijphart has divided the plural societies into four categories with subject to their degree of pluralism: homogenous or lesser plural societies (the area between points A and B), societies with medium degree of pluralism (the area between points B and C), the societies with high degree of pluralism (the area between points C and D), and the extreme plural societies (the area between points D and E).
Though Lijphart has attached the probability of success of the consociational and majoritarian models of democracy with the degree of pluralism, he did not offer any standard formula for the measurement of the degree of pluralism. He confessed that
‗the concept of pluralism is difficult to define precisely‘. However, he suggested four principles to establish whether a society is completely plural or departs ‗greatly or mildly from perfect pluralism‘. The four criteria ―include:
(a) Can the segments into which the society is divided be clearly identified?
(b) Can the size of each segment be exactly determined?
178 (c) Do the segmental boundaries and the boundaries between the different
political, social, and economic organizations coincide?
(d) Do the segmental parties receive the stable elected support of their respective
segments (Lijphart, 1985, pp. 86-87)‖?
Though these criteria define the concept of plural society, it is still difficult to measure the exact degree of pluralism in a particular society. However, using these criteria it has been attempted to assess the degree of pluralism in Pakistani case. This assessment in turn will enable us to judge the probability of success of consociationalism in Pakistani society.
The assessment of the degree of pluralism in Pakistani case is based on criteria suggested by Arend Lijphart. Three questions have been designed to estimate the degree of pluralism in Pakistani society.
(a) Whether or not the identification and the exact measurement of the sizes of the
segments of society are possible in Pakistani case?
(b) Whether or not the segmental boundaries in Pakistani society coincide with
the boundaries of political parties, and the boundaries of socio- economic
organizations?
(c) Whether or not the electoral support of ethno-regional political parties of
Pakistan remained stable in their regional bases in recent general elections?
These questions have been dealt with one at a time in the following sections.
5.4.1 Identification of the Segments and Measurement of their Sizes
Language is major marker of identity and it plays key role in the ‗self-definition of the ethnic groups in Pakistan‘ (Hurst, 1996). As earlier has been mentioned, the
179 government of Pakistan has documented six languages as a distinct language: Urdu,
Punjabi, Siraiki, Pashto, Sindhi, and Balochi (Census Report, 1998). The remaining, relatively minor languages have been enlisted in the category of ‗others‘. The census reports illustrate the number of speakers of each language. Usually, the statistics of census reports are used for the numerical strength of each group. However, certain groups have critical reservations regarding the statistics of the census reports32.
Though language has been considered as a key marker of ethnic identity in Pakistan, it should not be overlooked that ethnicity is fluid in Pakistan as elsewhere. Identities in Pakistan are more or less ‗compound‘. These are constructed and reconstructed at different times. A primary example is the case of ‗Brahvi‘ identity in Balochistan.
Brahvi, a Dravidian language, has been dealt with as a separate language from
Balochi, an Indo-Iranian language. But gradually, the Brahvi speaking people seem tending towards integration into Baloch identity by settling in ‗clan organization, with those speaking Balochi alone, and have considered them nothing but Baloch‘
(Ahmed, 1998, p. 234). On the other hand, a considerable number of Balochs have been assimilated in Southern Punjab and Northern Sindh (Cohen, 2005, p. 220). A large number of Baloch in Pakistan live outside Balochistan itself. The Talpurs, former rulers of Sindh and Mirs of Khairpur, who are still politically influential, are
Baloch. They have been assimilated in Sindhi culture and speak Sindhi language. In
Punjab, the Baloch families of Dastis, Gurmanis (Muzaffar Garh), and Jatois (Multan) speak Siraiki. The Dera Ghazi Khan area is largely inhabited by the settled Baloch of whom the Mazaris and Legharis are important tribes. The Khosas in Dera Ghazi Khan and in Jacobabad are influential. The Baloch have, in fact, spread themselves in various parts of Sindh and Punjab all the way up the Indus as far as Mianwali. And there are plenty of them, of course, in Karachi33.
180 Balochs origins and affinities are still a matter of dispute about which few authorities are in agreement, but it seems safe to say that they are people of extremely mixed antecedents in whom it is possible to detect numerous parental strains - Dravidian,
Arab, Rajput, Iranian (including a number of Kurds), Turkomen and Mongol. This racial diversity is the result of successive invasions and settlements from very early times - coming mainly from the north-west and including successive waves of
Scythians, Mongols, Arabs and Persians34.
A very similar case is about the Sindhi identity. Earlier, the population census reports treated Brahvi, Balochi, Siraiki, and Rajhistani as dialects, in addition to Sindhi, being spoken in Sindh. But with some exception in Karachi, now all these groups ‗identify themselves as Sindhi‘. Development of Siraiki identity in Southern Punjab is a similar case as well. Before its recognition as a separate language in the census reports of
1981, Siraiki was classified as a dialect of Punjabi in Punjab. And previously, during
British period, it was classified as a dialect of Sindhi in Sindh (Ahmed, 1998, p. 234).
The Pashtun identity in the NWFP seems a similar case. Though the people of Hazara division and Kohat district have shared biological ancestry and history of economic ties with Pashtuns, they have distant identity and speak Hindko. In the 1981 census, it was reported that 18.1% of the provincial population speak Hindko that makes some
2.4 % of the overall Pakistan population. Still, there are Kohistani who assert a distant identity. Kalash and Khowar (Dardic languages) speaking people of Chitral are ‗both distinct ethnic communities. In addition, there are quite a few linguistic groups who have ‗either not asserted their separate identity or whose presence has not received much public attention‘ (Ahmed, 1998, p. 234).
181 Mohajir identity is also an interesting case. Indian partition, in 1947, resulted in a huge migration of population on both sides of the borders. The Muslim refugees who arrived in Pakistan were labeled as Mohajirs. Almost 70% of these migrants came from Indian Punjab and settled into Pakistani Punjab. As the migrant Punjabis shared language and culture with the indigenous Punjabis, they were successfully assimilated. Therefore, they shunned the Mohajir label. Contrary to Punjabi refugees, the migrants from the other parts of India, mainly Urdu speaking, who settled mostly in urban Sindh have ‗continued to maintain the Mohajir label for their group identification‘ (Ahmed, 1998, p. 234).
Though Pakistan is ―essentially a plural and multi-ethnic society‖ (Ahmed et al.,
1989), it is difficult to identify all the ethno-linguistic groups. The measurement of their size is also unworkable. For example, Dr. Amir Chandio, a professor of political science, speaks Siraiki, he is Baloch by race, and he has been assimilated in Sindhi culture. He is Baloch when he travels to Balochistan, in Khairpur he is Sindhi, and in
Multan he introduces himself as a Siraiki. Therefore, this compound nature of identities in Pakistani case hinders the accurate measurement of various ethno- linguistic groups.
However, using the census statistics religious and linguistic fragmentation of the
Pakistani society has been calculated by the author to assess the degree of pluralism.
The table demonstrates that in terms of religious fragmentation, the Pakistani society is quite homogenous. A great majority (96.28%) of the population is Muslim. The minorities include Christians 1.59%, Hindus 1.6%, and Qadianis .22% (Census
Report, 1998). The comparison of the Pakistani case with Western European
182 consociational cases reveals that the value of linguistic fragmentation index is quite higher.
Figure 5-11: Fragmentation Index for Selected Cases35
Enumeration Austria Belgium Netherlands Switzerland Pakistan Religious fragmentation .19 .06 .64 .50 .072 Linguistic fragmentation .03 .48 .02 .40 .73 (Lijphart, 1977, p. 72) and for Pakistan calculated with the help of Lijphart Note: (1).The index of fragmentation for Austria, Belgium, Netherlands, and Switzerland is borrowed by Lijphart. (2). For the Pakistani case index of fragmentation is calculated by the author using the data of the census report of 1998.
It is important to note that the index of linguistic fragmentation only illustrates the numerical strength of the linguistic groups but it provides no information how language divides the Pakistani society. This evidence seems to suggest that Pakistani society does not fulfill the criteria of a ‗completely plural society‘; it is difficult to discover precisely the segments into which the Pakistani society is divided and also to state accurately how many people originate from each of the segments. Nevertheless,
Pakistani society is not a homogenous society. But the Pakistani society is not a fragmented society like post-war Austria, the Netherlands, and Belgium. Therefore, it seems safe to categorize the Pakistani society as a case of moderately divided society than a deeply divided society.
5.4.2 Composition of Political and Socio-economic Organizations
This section attempts to investigate whether the ethno-linguistic boundaries of various groups in Pakistan coincide with the political boundaries and the boundaries of socio- economic organizations. It is important to remember that the traditional societies of developing world differ significantly from the societies of the developed world. The social and economic organizations in the developing world are not completely based on class or ideological lines. But ethnicity, language and religion plays a vital role in
183 mobilization in the developing world. These organizations also play lesser role in the politics than in the developed world. Workers‘ organizations in south Asia have been provided but a limited role in the game of politics. These workers‘ organizations enter in alliances with governments and some times are ‗incorporated into sate consultancy machinery‘. But the Pakistani case is a different story. Despite a ‗considerable influence through street and factory protest‘, the Pakistani workers have a meager role in formal politics. The workers‘ representatives have remained members of parliament and cabinet ministers in south Asia but not in Pakistan. The only cabinets to include pro-working class politicians were the 1973–1975 cabinet, which included
Tariq Aziz, Mubashir Hasan, Miraj Khalid, and Miraj Mohammad Khan, and the
1999–2002 cabinet, which included Omar Asgar Khan. These were not representatives of workers‘ organizations but did defend workers‘ rights (Candland,
2007). However, some trade unions are affiliated to political parties36. Lawyers‘ organizations, however, have close connections with the political parties.
Nevertheless, generally, lawyers‘ associations do not tend to mobilize on the basis of ethnicity, language, and religion. Teachers and professor associations are also not based on ethnicity and linguistic bases. Same is the case with chambers of commerce.
Therefore, the focus in this section will be on the political parties. To deal with this question, the author has attempted to trace whether ethno-regional parties of Pakistan fulfill the established criteria in literature of ethno-regional parties.
In Pakistan, more than one hundred political parties have been registered by the
Election Commission of Pakistan (ECP). But only a limited number of political parties have parliamentary representation. Broadly speaking, political parties in
Pakistan can be classified into four groups: Mainstream parties (PPP and PML); offshoots of the PPP (PPP-Sherpao, PPP-Shahid Bhutto and NPP), and factions of
184 PML (PML-Q, PML-F); Islamic parties (JI, JUI, JUP); and ethno-regional parties, such as, ANP, PKMAP, MQM, and Baloch nationalist parties. This plurality of political parties displays the ideological difference and divergence of opinion in
Pakistani society.
Pakistan is a multiethnic state and it has experienced political violence and ethnic strife in the past. Horowitz (1985, p. 291) argues that ‗the main element that ethnic conflict introduces into party politics is ethnically based party‘. While, more or less, ethnic boundaries coincide with the geographical boundaries in Pakistan, the ethnically based parties dominate only in the regional base of their related ethnic group. So, for this study, it seems more sensible to use the term of ‗ethno-regional party, than ‗ethnic party‘ for the parties that represent the regionally based ethnic groups of Pakistan.
Horowitz (1985, p. 291) suggests that an ethnic party ‗derives its support overwhelmingly from an identifiable ethnic group (or cluster of ethnic groups) and serves the interests of that group‘. Therefore, the author has attempted in this section to examine whether ethno-regional parties of Pakistan fulfill the criteria of being an ethnic party.
5.4.2.1 Awami National Party (ANP)
Awami National Party (ANP) is a successor of NAP (National Awami Party) that was banned by Bhutto regime (1971-77) due to its allegedly secessionist tendencies. It is a
Pashtun party with left-leanings. It derives its electoral support exclusively from
Pashtuns. Though the party has membership countrywide, its stronghold is the Pashto- speaking region of NWFP.
185 During the last six general elections of national assembly (1988-2008), it has touched around 20-30% of the votes in Pashtun belt of NWFP37. However, in non-Pashto speaking region of the NWFP, its support remained marginal. This trend of electoral support for ANP was repeated in provincial elections (1988-2008): ANP received around 21-29% of the all votes polled in the Pashtun belt of NWFP. This seems to suggest that the Pashtuns did not exclusively support the ANP; PPP‘s vote share in
Pashtun belt revolved around 10-27% in the national assembly elections (1988-2008).
PPP secured 28%, 25%, 19%, 14 %, 9% and 29% and ANP got 26%, 20%, 22%,
32%, 14%, and 27% in national assembly elections of 1988, 1990, 1993, 1997, 2002, and 2008 respectively.
Figure 5-12: National Assembly Elections (1988-2008) in Pashtun Majority Region (Vote percentages)
Party 1988 1990 1993 1997 2002 2008 ANP 26 20 22 32 14 27 PPP 28 25 19 14 9 29
Source: calculated by the author using results available at ECP
The evidence suggests that PPP got more support than ANP in the elections of 1988 and1990. The decline in its vote bank is the result of its split in NWFP (Sherpao, ex- chief minister of PPP in NWFP broke away and formed PPP-Sherpao). PML is another dominant competitor with ANP in Pashtun constituency; PML‘s vote share rotated around 10-19% in provincial elections (1988-2008) and 10-26% in national election (1988-2008). Still, Islamic parties are well-known for their roots in the
Pashtun constituencies, and MMA (an alliance of Islamic parties) scored more than
50% votes in Pashtun belt and left no room for ANP to enter national assembly in
2002. This account shows that ANP is not the only representative of Pashtuns; PPP,
PML, and Islamic parties did get substantial support from the Pashtun belt of NWFP.
186 But this support to mainstream or Islamic parties in Pashtun region does not discard the ANP‘s status of a Pashtun Party. In Horowitz‘s words, ―an ethnic party does not have to command an exclusive hold on the allegiance of group members‘. And, the key is ‗how a party‘s support is distributed‘ and not ‗how an ethnic group‘s support is distributed‘ (Horowitz, 1985, p. 293).
It is important to note that ANP‘s boundaries stop at Pashtun constituency and this reality that Pashtuns are represented by more than one party does not deny ANP from being an ethno-regional party of Pashtuns.
5.4.2.2 Mohajir Qaumi Movement (MQM)
Mohajir Qaumi Movement (MQM) was founded in Karachi, mainly a Mohajir constituency, to represent the Mohajirs – Urdu-speaking community, who migrated from India in 1947 and mostly settled in urban centers of Sindh. It was renamed as
Muttahida Qaumi Movement (MQM) and since then it has been asserting for being more inclusive and its multiethnic character. However, despite the change of its name and some efforts to expand its support across Mohajir community, it remained an influential party only in urban Sindh, namely, Karachi and Hyderabad. Horowitz
(1985, p. 292) has identified the problem of such parties by narrating that ‗it is difficult for an ethnic party, once established, to become multiethnic‘. An ethnic party may get, he asserted, a ‗small fraction of support from another ethnic group‘ but this little support can‘t divert a party from the interests of the group that provides it overwhelmingly support‘. Horowitz‘s observation is relevant to MQM as its politics revolves around the issues relevant to Karachi.
187 Since its foundation in 1980s, Karachi and urban constituencies of Hyderabad have remained a stronghold of MQM. Mohajir constituency (Karachi and Urban electorate of Hyderabad) has voted overwhelmingly for MQM in national, provincial, and local bodies‘ election since 1980s. Its voting share in Mohajir constituency remained remarkable: during the last six general elections, its vote share in Mohajir constituency remained between 40-70% in national and provincial elections. When it boycotted the national assembly elections in 1993, the turn out in urban Sindh remained substantially lower.
Prior to 1980s, Karachi was well-known for its support to Islamic parties. Even in
1971, the first general election of the Pakistan history, when PPP swept in Punjab and
Sindh, Karachi mainly voted (40-45%) for Islamic parties. But since 1980s, Islamic parties are no more considered as a potential threat for the MQM‘s established support. PPP and PML managed to get only 19%, 16%, 36%, 11%, 13%, 21% and
11%, 41%, 26%, 6%, and 5% in the general elections of national assembly in 1988,
1990, 1993, 1997, 2002, and 2008 respectively. Both parties, PPP (36%) and PML
(41%), performed well in 1993 election due to the boycott of the MQM.
Figure 5-13: National Assembly Elections (1988-2008) in Mohajir Constituency (Vote percentages)
Party 1988 1990 1993 1997 2002 2008 MQM Not 68.95 Boycotted 43.03 40.30 70.94 applicable PPP/ PDA 19.72 15.92 36.43 11.09 13.15 21.92
PLM/ IJI 10.71 6.21 41.22 26.47 2.311 2.38
Source: Calculated by the author using results available at ECP
Though MQM remained unchallenged in Mohajir constituency, its electoral support in rest of the country remained meager: for example, its vote share in Sindhi-speaking
188 region remained 5%, 4.5%, 3%, 3.4%, 2.2% contrary to 67.5%, 64.6%, 56.7%,
40.14%, 70.7% in Mohajir constituency in provincial elections of 1990, 1993, 1996,
2002, and 2008 respectively. This evidence indicates that MQM‘s boundaries stop at group boundaries, the Mohajir constituency. Nevertheless, contrary to Pashtun constituency of NWFP that was consistently represented by mainstream and Islamic parties, along ANP, MQM is the sole representative of Mohajir constituency.
After NWFP and Sindh, let‘s turn to Balochistan, a home province of PKMAP (a nationalist party of Pashtun belt) and a plethora of Baloch nationalist parties of
Baloch countryside.
5.4.2.3 Pashtun Khawa Milli Awami Party (PKMAP)
The Pashtun Khawa Milli Awami Party (PKMAP) was formed in 1987 by Khan
Abdul Samad Khan. The party strives for Pashtun interests and it demands for a separate province for the Pashtuns of Balochistan or the merger of Pashtun region of
Balochistan into the province of NWFP, a Pashtun majority province.
PKMAP has its roots in Pashtun belt of Balochistan. Its support remained considerable in general elections of national and provincial assemblies during 1988-
2008 periods. It gained 11%, 16%, 26%, 13%, 19% and 6%, 18%, 20%, 16%, 18% votes in Pashtun constituencies of Balochistan in national and provincial elections of
1988, 1990, 1993, 1997, and 2002 respectively. Outside the Pashtun belt, however, its support shrunk markedly: it obtained 2.13%, 1.15%, 1.34%, 2.45, and 0.8% votes in general elections of 1988, 1990, 1993, 1997, and 2002 respectively in non-Pashtun region. Its electoral support in provincial elections was very similar to the national assembly elections. Like Baloch nationalist parties, it boycotted the general elections of 2008. Islamic parties, particularly JUI-F, are crucial competitors for PKMAP in its
189 regional camp. JUI-F/MMA has performed well in this region and its vote bank remained 15-25% (but 37% in 2002) in national assembly election and 15-29% in provincial assembly elections during 1988-2008 period. Mainstream parties, PML and
PPP, at the best, have modest support in Pashtun constituency of Balochistan. While, on the whole, PPP has upper hand in Pashtun belt of NWFP, PML has performed slightly better in the Pashtun belt of Balochistan. As the electoral support of PKMAP suggests, it is a regional party of Pashtun belt in Balochistan.
5.4.2.4 Baloch Nationalist Groups
Baloch and Pashtuns, mainly, participated in the first general elections of Pakistan, in
1970, under the banner of NAP. Baloch nationalists performed well and installed the first provincial government of Balochistan (Balochistan got the status of a province after the dissolution of one-unit scheme in 1969). Soon, NAP‘s government was removed by central authorities and the party was banned. The general elections of
1977 remained controversial, and Balochs boycotted the elections. The third general elections, in 1985, were party-less. So after 1970, Baloch factions contested the national and provincial elections in 1988.
Figure 5-14: Baloch Nationalist Parties: Percentage votes in National Assembly (Baloch Majority Region: 1988-2008)
General Election 1988 PNP (10) BNA (19) - - General Election 1990 PNP (16) JWP (25) BNM (10.3) General Election 1993 PNP (9) JWP (38.5) BNM-M (20) BNM-H (12.35) General Election 1997 - JWP (15) BNP (27) BNM (17.5) General Election 2002 BNDP (.80) JWP (14) BNP (6.91) BNM(15.4) General Election 2008 BNP-A(9.55) Boycotted Boycotted NP
Source: calculated by the author using results available at ECP
Two Baloch nationalist parties participated in the elections of 1988: PNP of Ghous
Bakhsh Bizenjo and the Balochistan National Alliance of Atta Ullah Mengal (ex-chief minister of Balochistan), Nawab Akbar Bugti (Ex-governor of Balochistan) and Dr.
190 Abdul Hayee. The alliance managed to form a coalition government in the province.
However, the alliance proved short-lived; Mengal founded BNM and Bugti formed
JWP. Both participated in the general elections of 1990 under the banners of newly founded parties along PNP. BNM was further divided into BNM-M (Mengal group) and BNM-H (Hayee group) before the next general elections of 1993. Therefore, totally, four parties of Balochs participated in these elections. Then, Bizenjo and
Mengal amalgamated PNP and BNM-M and founded Balochistan National Party
(BNP). Then before the elections of 2002, a new political organization, BNDP, surfaced. Later, BNDP and BNM were merged into National Party (NP). Therefore,
Baloch remained divided throughout the recent history of Pakistan. Due to the ‗first- past-the-post‘ electoral system, this division proved very disadvantageous for
Balochs.
This polarization of Balochs makes it more difficult to analyze the electoral support of
Baloch nationalist parties. PNP secured 10%, 16%, and 9% in national assembly and
9%, 14%, and 11% in provincial assembly elections of 1988, 1990, and 1993 respectively. BNA received 19%, in national assembly and 15%, in provincial assembly elections in 1988. Its offshoots, JWP and BNM scored 25% and 10.3% votes in national assembly and 20% and 11.5% votes in provincial assembly in the general elections of 1990 respectively. JWP scored 11%, 15%, and 14% votes in national assembly and 15.6%, 13%, and 8.7% votes in provincial assembly in 1993,
1997, 2002 elections respectively. Mengal under the banner of BNM-M in 1993, and under the banner of BNP in 1997 and 2002 scored 20%, 27%, 6.91% in national assembly and 10%, 25%, and 3% votes in provincial assembly respectively in Baloch region. Dr. Hayee under the banner of BNM in 1993, 1997, and 2002 scored 12.35%,
191 17.5%, 15.4% votes in national and 9.3%, 16.5%, and 6.5% votes in provincial assembly elections respectively.
At the best, the Baloch factions‘ boundaries coincide with Baloch constituency.
Nevertheless, the Baloch factions cannot claim that they are the sole heir of the
Baloch constituency. Mainstream parties, PML and PPP, along Islamic parties have successfully made inroads in the Baloch constituency. PPP and PML, jointly, scored
23%, 19%, 26%, 16%, 28%, and 46% votes in national and 28%, 22%, 26%, 13%,
20%, 57% votes in provincial assembly elections during 1988-2008 period respectively. Islamic parties have lesser support in Baloch constituency than Pashtun belt of the Balochistan.
The case of Punjab, the dominant province that makes up nearly 55% of the
Pakistan‘s electorates, is a different story. It is a battlefield for the mainstream parties and there is no room for any regional or ethnic group. Together, the mainstream parties have scored between 65-90% votes in various elections between 1988 and
2008. However, the PML and PPP have their own strongholds: PPP has better performed in southern Punjab; and PML in the central and northern parts of the province. Similarly, PPP is more popular in rural areas and PML has an advantage in the urban region.
A summary of the electoral performance of ethno-regional parties, in their regional base, during federal elections of 1988-2008 has been presented in the following table.
192 Figure 5-15: Electoral Performance of Ethno-regional Parties in Federal Elections (% Vote at Regional Base: 1988-2008)
Party 1988 1990 1993 1997 2002 2008 ANP 26.26 20.15 21.75 31.63 14.00 26.56 PKMAP 11.23 16.46 26.26 13.03 19.37 Boycotted MQM * 71.88 Boycotted 43.04 40.31 70.94 BNP * * * 27.43 6.91 Boycotted JWP * 24.68 38.53 15.20 13.86 Boycotted BNM * 10.35 20.19 17.48 15.40 Boycotted BNA 18.52 * * * * * BNDP * * * * 0.80 Boycotted PNP 9.92 16.70 8.59 * * * BNM-H * * 12.36 * * * BNP-A * * * * * 9.55 Source: calculated by the author using results available at official website of ECP
A descriptive statistics of the electoral performance of ethno-regional parties at their respective regional base have been presented in the following table. The table provides basic information about how many times a party participated in federal election. It also shows the information about minimum and maximum score of a party. The value of coefficient of variance shows the level of consistency of various parties.
Figure 5-16: Descriptive Statistics: Federal Election in Pakistan (1988-2008) (Electoral Support for Ethno-regional Parties in their Respective Regional Base)
Parties N Minimum Maximum Mean Median S. D C.V JWP 4 13.86 38.53 23.07 19.94 11.38 49.33% BNM-M/BNP 4 10.35 20.19 15.85 16.44 4.16 26.25% PNP 3 8.59 16.70 11.73 9.91 4.35 37.08% BNM-H 2 6.9 27.4 17.2 17.2 14.5 84.30% BNA 1 18.52 18.52 18.52 18.52 * * BNDP 1 0.79 0.79 0.79 0.79 * * PKMAP 5 11.22 26.26 17.27 16.46 5.92 34.28% ANP 6 14.00 31.63 23.39 24.00 6.12 26.17% MQM 4 40.31 71.88 56.54 56.99 17.21 30.44%
Source: calculated by the author using Minitab software. The results are available at official website of ECP
193 5.4.3 Stability in Electoral Support
After having categorized the political parties of Pakistan, attempt has been made to examine the ‗stability of electoral support‘ of ethno-regional parties. Two measurements have been used to discover the level of electoral stability of various parties: the index of electoral success; and the coefficient of variance. Statistical measurements have simplified the description; and it will enable the author to draw some conclusion by comparative analysis. The comparison has been made at two levels: first, at the national level, and second, at international level. At international level, the comparison of Pakistan‘s political parties has been made with the political parties of four original cases of consociationalism, namely, the Netherlands, Austria,
Belgium, and Switzerland. Comparison with consociational cases will permit us to see whether ethno-regional parties have the same level of support, strength, and stability that pillarised parties of Western European consociational cases had during their respective consociational periods. This comparison will determine whether or not
Pakistan has the same level of segmentation and polarization that consociational regimes experienced earlier. The author will assess the degree of pluralism that will in turn lead to answer whether or not consociationalism is a viable option to manage diversity in Pakistan.
5.4.3.1 Index of Electoral Success (IES)
Gordin (2001) has used the ‗Index of Electoral Success‘ for assessment of the performance of Ethno-regionalist Parties in Western Europe. He asserts that whereas
‗ethno-regional parties focus on a particular ethnic group or region, their performance should be assessed within that particular ethnic group or region rather than at the
194 national level‘. The author has used IES to measure electoral strength and stability of ethno-regional parties of Pakistan. The less prominent Baloch factions have been excluded from the analysis. In the targeted electorate, IES weights ethno-regional party‘s vote proportion against the size of the ethno-regional group.
% vote of ethno - regional partyin targeted electorate IES = % vote of leading partyin targeted electorate
Figure 5-17: Index of Electoral Success (IES): Federal and Provincial Elections (1997-2002)
S. No Party Name Federal Provincial Federal Provincial Election 2002 Elections 2002 Elections 1997 Elections 1997 1 MQM 1 1 1 1 2 ANP 0.26 0.51 1 1 3 PKMAP 0.52 0.72 0.65 0.68 4 BNP 0.40 0.20 1 1 5 JWP 0.80 0.61 0.56 0.53 Source: Data was retrieved from ECP. IES: % Votes scored by an ethno-regional party in its regional base/ % Votes scored by the leading party in that region. IES score has been calculated for two last elections. General elections of 2008 have been excluded from the analysis due to the boycott of three regional parties listed at serial No. 3-5.
The maximum value for this index is on 1. The maximum index value (1) of a party indicates that it is the leading party within a targeted electorate (related ethnic group is a targeted electorate for an ethnically based party). The table illustrates that MQM is the leading party within Mohajir constituency. The consistency of its index value shows the stability of its electoral support. ANP remained a leading party in 1997, but its electoral support is inconsistent markedly. BNP is a very similar case to the ANP.
Although JWP and PKMAP are not leading parties within their related constituencies, their electoral support shows more consistency than ANP and BNP. Nevertheless,
MQM is the most dominant ethno-regional party of Pakistan. The remaining ethno- regional parties have mixed results.
195 5.4.3.2 Electoral Stability: Coefficient of Variance
Coefficient of variance is a useful technique that statisticians use to measure consistency. The table shows that, overall, mainstream parties (PMLs & PPPs) are more consistent than the ethno-regional political parties or Islamic parties. This finding indicates the tendency of political system towards a two-party system. It also confirms that Pakistan is a less segmented society. The statistics reveal that both parties have remarkable support, more than 70%. Interestingly, ANP is showing more consistency than MQM in this table
Figure 5-18: Descriptive Statistics: Federal Election in Pakistan38 (1988-2008) Parties N Minimum Maximum Mean Median S. D C.V JWP 4 0.021 0.612 0.313 0.310 0.243 77.63% BNM-M/ BNP 4 0.190 0.654 0.328 0.234 0.219 66.76% PNP 3 0.164 0.601 0.433 0.533 0.235 54.27% BNM 2 0.238 0.379 0.308 0.308 0.100 32.46% BNA 1 0.302 * * * * * BNDP 1 0.0528 * * * * * PKMAP/PM 5 0.121 0.487 0.300 0.307 0.135 45.00% ANP 6 1.030 2.091 1.725 1.778 0.379 21.97% MQM 4 3.182 7.400 5.032 4.774 1.856 36.88% PMLs 6 30.16 49.37 40.47 40.60 6.83 16.87% PPPs 6 23.75 38.52 32.34 34.02 6.42 19.85% Islamists 6 1.97 11.00 4.76 3.35 3.56 74.78% Independents 6 9.84 19.55 13.57 11.32 4.50 33.16% Sources: ECP Note: (a) PMLs include PML-N, PML-Q, PML-J, PML-F, PML-Z and IJI (1988 and 1990) (b) PPPs include PPPP, PPP-Sherpao, PPP-Shahid Bhutto, and PDA (1990) (c) Islamists include (Parties and Alliances between 1988-2008) JUI-F, JUI-D, JUI-S, JI, JUP, PIF, IJM, TNFJ, MDM, and MMA. (d) Italics= ethno-regional parties. (e) Bold= Multiethnic/ Mainstream Parties (f) Coefficient of variance has been used to assess the electoral stability: lesser the score a political party has, the more its electoral support is consistent.
Comparison at the international level has been summarized in the figure 5-19. This figure provides us an opportunity to compare the stability of electoral support of
Pakistan‘s political parties with political parties of consociational regimes of Western
Europe.
196 Figure 5-19: Comparative Study of the Stability of Electoral Support39 (The Netherlands, Switzerland, Austria, Belgium, and Pakistan) S. No. Country Party C.V 1 The Netherlands CHU 5.02% 2 The Netherlands SGP 6.63% 3 The Netherlands KVP 7.20% 4 Switzerland FDP 8.85% 5 The Netherlands ARP 10.10% 6 Belgium PSB/BSP 10.62% 7 Switzerland SP 11.17% 8 The Netherlands PvdA 11.63% 9 Austria SPO 12.87% 10 Belgium PSC/CVP 13.17% 11 Switzerland CVP 13.52% 12 Switzerland EVP 14.06% 13 The Netherlands VVD 16.03% 14 Pakistan PMLs 16.87% 15 Austria OVP 19.29% 16 Pakistan PPPs 19.85% 17 Pakistan ANP 21.97% 18 Austria Green 22.04% 19 Austria LF 27.67% 20 Pakistan BNM 32.46% 21 Pakistan MQM 36.88% 22 Switzerland SVP 38.41 23 Belgium PLP/PVV 39.27% 24 Pakistan PKMAP/PM 45.00% 25 Austria KPO 50.52% 26 Austria VDU 53.68% 27 Pakistan PNP 54.27% 28 Pakistan BNM-M/ BNP 66.76% 29 Belgium PCB/KPB 69.37% 30 Pakistan JWP 77.63% 31 Pakistan Islamists 74.78%
Source: Election results for Austria, the Netherlands, Belgium, and Switzerland is available in ―Siaroff, A. (2000). Comparative European Party Systems: An Analysis of Parliamentary Elections since 1945. London: Garland Science‖. Data was calculated and tabulated by the author.
197 A careful examination reveals that, at the minimum, the comparison confirms that:
(a) Pakistan‘s political parties have lesser consistency in their electoral support
than the Western political parties;
(b) In the western case, the pillarised parties are more consistent in their
electoral support than the non-pillarised political parties ;
(c) In the Pakistani case, mainstream parties are more consistent in their electoral
support than the ethno-regional parties;
(d) Pakistani mainstream parties are nearer to pillarised parties in terms of their
electoral support than the non-pillarised parties;
(e) Pakistan‘s ethno-regional parties are nearer to non-pillarised western parties
than the pillarised parties.
This analysis shows that the cases, Pakistan and the western consociational regimes have different set-ups. It is established that both have different nature of society and political culture. While the western consociational regimes were segmented, divided, and markedly plural societies, Pakistan is not a segmented, not so divided, and not a markedly plural society. While the Western cases have managed to experience stable democracy under consociational arrangements, Pakistan needs no special power- sharing arrangements to practice democracy. It can achieve stable democratic governance through other measure.
5.5 Conclusion
It seems quite difficult to find even a single plural society that accomplishes the four criteria of an ideal plural society presented by Arend Lijphart. The societies deviate from the ideal type, and the degree to which they deviate can be used as an indication of their degree of pluralism (Steiner, 1987).
198 The first criterion that the segments into which the society is divided be clearly identified seems quite easy test for the seemingly plural societies. But most of these societies do not pass it. Though Pakistan is a plural society, there is a considerable ambiguity about the number of segments into which it should be divided. For example, is there one Baloch segment or it should be broken down into Baloch and
Brahvi segments? Is the Balochs who have been assimilated in the Sindhi or Siraiki culture and speak Sindhi or Siraiki should be considered a part of Baloch segment or otherwise? Similarly, is the Pothowhari or Hindko speaking segment, a variant of
Punjabi, should be considered a separate segment or a part of Punjabi segment? For instance, if the segments of the Pakistani society have been identified, even then it is difficult to determine precisely the size of each segment to pass the second criterion of a plural society presented by Lijphart. Still, if we take the census reports‘ figures for granted, the Pakistani case seems reluctant to pass the remaining two criteria.
The situation is even more ambivalent with reference to the third criterion. There is hardly any social or economic organization whose boundary coincides with the linguistic boundaries in Pakistan. Some political organizations of Pashtuns and
Balochs may be regarded as ethnically exclusive, but largely there are no linguistically based parties in Pakistan. All the efforts of Sindhi and Siraiki nationalists in this direction have been complete failures. Punjabi segment overwhelmingly votes for the mainstream parties. MQM has changed its name from
Mohajir Qaumi Movement (Mohajir National Movement) to Muttahida Qaumi
Movement (United National Movement) and its leadership has adopted a more inclusive outlook away from Mohajirism.
199 As earlier mentioned, there are no numerous linguistically-based parties; therefore the fourth criterion is not relevant to the Pakistani case.
The stable electoral support for the ethno-regional parties can provide evidence of the degree of pluralism only if parties are linguistically based and the suffrage is free and universal.
When the findings are mixed for a case, it depends on everyone‘s impression to categorize a society as a plural or a homogenous one (Steiner, 1987). The same is the case with Pakistan. This ambiguity may lead different authors to different conclusions. However, it is safe to say that the Pakistani society has lesser degree of pluralism than the Western European cases of consociational democracy. It is neither a deeply divided nor a fragmented society. Ethnic and linguistic loyalties exist but are not too strong. Mainly, political parties, trade unions, bar councils, professors and teachers associations, chambers of commerce, and other social and economic organization are not sufficiently ethnically or linguistically exclusive.
To sum up, (a) Pakistan lacks favorable conditions for establishment and maintenance of consociational democracy; (b) the political leadership is not too accommodative to practice consociational democracy in Pakistan; (c) and the Pakistani society is neither a deeply divided nor a fragmented society. Therefore, consociationalism is not a realistic option for Pakistan to practice democracy.
While the evidence shows that consociationalism is not a good match for Pakistan, it would be interesting to use the same evidence to test the ‗fit‘ for decentralized federalism. It has been argued in this chapter that Pakistan has a large population and ethno-linguistic groups are, more or less, geographically concentrated. In this given
200 situation, federalism is the best option to provide autonomy to geographically concentrated communities. Similarly, the evidence revealed that mainstream parties like PML and PPP have received considerable electoral support from all ethno- linguistic groups in the recent past. Contrary, the ethno-regional parties‘ have displayed very limited and wavering electoral support. This pattern of support for mainstream and ethno-regional parties seems to suggest that ‗majoritarian‘ rather than
‗consociational‘ system of government is the best option for Pakistan. While it has been argued that Pakistan is not a case of deeply divided society, federal settings under the British model of democracy are more relevant than the consociational model of democracy. A relatively decentralized federal system can address the grievances of smaller communities like autonomy, representation in jobs, more funds for development, allocations of funds in NFC Award, and water issues. These grievances have ‗territorial‘ character and are not community or group concerns.
Federalism is the best option to manage grievances of territorial character.
Furthermore, the rights of minority provinces have been respected in the recent past in
Pakistan. A revised NFC Award for distribution of funds has been approved with a complete consensus. The project of Kalabagh dam has been abandoned due to the reservations of smaller provinces. A huge fund has been allocated for the development of Balochistan. Army has relaxed some requirement to incorporate
Balochs in armed forces. The concurrent list of 1973 constitution has been abolished to provide more autonomy to the provinces. In short, Pakistan seems moving toward a decentralization and devolved governance. Therefore, at this point of time, consociationalism it is not a realistic choice for Pakistan.
201 Endnotes:
1 Tahir Amin has argued that the groups that were excluded from the power structure mobilized along ethnic lines; and the groups that were provided power-sharing left the secessionist leanings. For detail see: Amin, T. (1988). Ethno-national Movements in Pakistan: Domestic and International Factor. Islamabad: Institute of Policy Studies. 2 For this point of view see Alqama, K. (1997). Bengali Elite Perception of Pakistan, the Road to Disillusionment: Uneven Development or Ethnicity. Karachi: Royal Book Company. 3 Favorable factors for the establishment and maintenance of consociational democracy have been discussed in the second chapter of thesis. The favorable factors were not derived deductively but inductively after a comparative study of consociational regimes. Therefore, with the expansion of consociational universe, the favorable factors underwent significant modifications in number and content over time. In this study, the list of favorable factors has been used that was presented by Lijphart in 1985 in the case of South Africa. 4 The concept of ‗leadership‘ is not clearly defined by Lijphart. However, the survey of literature on consociationalism reveals that Lijphart has used this term for ‗political elites‘ of various states who mattered in the politics of respective societies. Therefore, for the purpose of this chapter, we have used the term of ‗political leadership‘ for the ‗political elite‘ of Pakistan who joined various power- sharing arrangements and coalition cabinets in the post-1971 Pakistan. 5 As we have discussed in the second chapter, one the primary challenges to consociationalism lies in defining the underlying meanings of core concepts. Lijphart has acknowledged this problem in setting the basic standard of measurement for the concept of ‗Degree of Pluralism‘. This analysis does not intend to present an additional clarity of the concepts presented by Lijphart. But, it will follow the criteria for the measurement of degree of pluralism used by Lijphart. 6Punjabis and Siraikis are viewed as Punjabis by the smaller communities of minority provinces. Siraiki was considered as a dialect of Punjabi until 1981. Both communities share social norms and cultural activities. Zulfiqar Khosa, ex-governor of Punjab, has asserted that Siraiki is a language and not a nation. He disapproved the division of Punjab and the suggestion of a Siraiki province. (Daily Jang, April 20, 2010.) 7 Two segments are unfavorable for consociationalism, according to Lijphart (1977) because it would result into minority-majority split. 8 See also for detail: K. Alan Kronstadt, Pakistan and Terrorism: A summary, CRS Report for congress .specialist in Asian affairs 9 See also: Smruti S. Pattanaik, Islam and the Ideology of Pakistan, strategic analysis, Vol. 22, Issue 9, December 1998, pp: 1273-1295. 10 See for detail: Lijphart, A. (1996). The Puzzle of Indian Democracy: A Consociational Interpretation. American Political Science Review. 90, pp. 258-268. 11 On the first factor, Pakistan receives most unfavorable rating because it has a dominant Punjabi community. On the second factor, it also receives most unfavorable rating due to unequal size of its segments. On the third factor, it gets neither favorable nor unfavorable scores because it has six
202
segments. On the fourth factor, it gets most unfavorable rating because it is one of the world‘s most populous countries. On the fifth factor, it receives a favorable rating because of its security concerns. On of the sixth factor, it receives a favorable rating because Islam is a unifying force in Pakistan. On the seventh factor, it receives an unfavorable rating due to huge regional disparities. On the eighth factor, it gets a favorable rating because more or less ethno-linguistic groups are geographically concentrated. On the ninth factor, it obtains neither favorable nor unfavorable scores 12 It is important to note that these three cases are not simply selected because they failed to show a ‗consociationalism-friendly‘ type leadership and would provide the author an easy evidence for argument. But, these are the only democratic /civilian periods available for the analysis of post- 1971 Pakistan: Bhutto‘s civilian rule (1972-77), post-Zia civilian period (1988-99), and post- Musharraf civilian period (2008-09). During their rule, Zia-ul-Haq (1977-88) and Pervez Musharraf (1999-2007) remained in military uniform. 13Three cases are selected from the periods when the Pakistan was experiencing a participatory civilian rule after military regimes of Ayub Khan [Ayub period (1958-69) and then Yahya Khan (1969-71), Zia-ul-Haq (1977-88), and Musharraf (1999-2007) respectively. 14 Results are available at the website of election commission of Pakistan 15 Memorandum: J L Pumphrey (British ambassador at Islamabad) to secretary of state for foreign and commonwealth affairs, (diplomatic report number 282/72), April 24, 1972. FCO 37/1136, File No p ¼. File was accessed at National Achieve Center, London. 16 Khan Abdul Qaiyum Khan was a harsh critic of Wali Khan. 17 Report sent to A R Murray (Islamabad) by Mr. Imray about his visit of Karachi 16-24 February, dated February 23, 1976: File: FCO 37/1772. File was accessed at National Achieve Center, London. 18 FCO 37/1790, file No P 062/548/2 Annual Report: Defense Attaché‘s Report (31 December 1974 to 31 December 1975) Titled ‗Internal situation‘. File was accessed at National Achieve Center, London. 19 Note on Bhutto‘s personality: Laurence Pumphrey, a British ambassador, analysis Bhutto‘s personality and asserts that ―His weakest suit, perhaps, is the delegation. He is a remarkable man. I am not sure that there is a single Pakistani outside his immediate family that actually likes him. Few would deny his energy-, his courage, his tenacity. Many would give him exceptionally high, marks for intelligence and far-sightedness. But almost all would agree that his qualities, as opposed to his abilities, are a bewildering mixture. His two (or more) personalities do not operate alternately but rather concurrently. He can be attractive and repulsive, tolerant and vindictive, democrat and fascist, all in the same breath. He reacts on at least three levels - those of emotion, of reason and of expediency - in the same split second. His weakest suit, perhaps, is delegation, using other men's talents: he is jealous and authoritarian and wants no one to approach him in public esteem or to be in a position to ignore or question his wishes. This may be seen to be his greatest disservice to. Pakistan - and particularly when it comes to the succession. It detracts of course, to put it mildly, from the reality of Pakistan's democratic institutions - the Constitution, Parliament, some would say
203
the Courts, the Cabinet. He has expended enormous effort on establishing or reasserting these bulwarks of democracy: even if there may be at present some lack of substance in some of them he is deeply committed to their continuance. But they must, please, work according to his pleasure. Where he has failed, and shows no signs of succeeding, is in finding an acceptable way to handle the opposition in a multi-party system. It is hard to be sure whether the opposition in Pakistan is so hopeless because Bhutto is so beastly to it or whether he is so beastly to it because it is so hopeless. It will be most interesting to see how he proceeds after (and indeed during) the imminent general elections: most observers agree that he could, if he wished, with support from the section of the Muslim League allied to him, win practically every seat; but this would surely be an embarrassment to him. In spite of his tendency towards overkill, quite probably he would like to see a moderately coherent opposition, pursuing a rational, constructive role in debate and committee: with his experience and intellect and with the backing of the intelligence and security forces he could run rings round it in any probable circumstances. But moderation, coherence, reason and constructiveness are hard to find in this violent, factious, bigoted and inward-looking people‖. A letter to Rt Hon Anthony Crosland LLP Secretary of State for Foreign & Commonwealth Affairs by Laurence Pumphrey dated June 11, 1976 .British embassy. File: FCO 37/1772, File was accessed at National Achieve Center, London. 20 The Pakistan was governed by military rule until December 1985. But before lifting the martial law, Zia had managed to hold a referendum for his election as president, and amended the constitution through its new elected national assembly in party less election of 1985. 21 ANP is a successor of NAP that was ‗on a collision course‘ with PPP during Z.A. Bhutto period and was banned because of it‘s allegedly secessionist leanings. 22 Islami Jamhoori Ittehad (Islamic Democratic Alliance) was a nine-party alliance comprising Pakistan Muslim League , Jamaat-e-Islami Pakistan (Pakistan Islamic Party), Jamiat-e-Ulema-e-Islam (Darkhasti Group) (Party of the Scholars of Islam), Khakshar Party, Markazi Jamiat Ahle-Hadith, Azad Group, Nizami-i-Mustafa Group, Hizbe Jihad, and Jamiah Masheikh. 23 Benazir government was dismissed in August 1990 by the president on the charges of corruption and maladministration. The communal violence and unrest in her home province, Sindh, was the leading contributing factor in president‘s decision to remove her government (Kennedy, 1991). 24 for example ANP, MQM, and BNA. 25 It won 135 of the 204 seats contested in the elections. Election was postponed in three constituencies for certain reasons. 26 Note on Bhurban Declaration: ―PML (N) leader Mian Nawaz Sharif and co-chairman PPP Asif Ali Zardari signed a declaration in Bhurban. The declaration states that (a) Allied parties, the Pakistan People‘s Party and the Pakistan Muslim League (N) resolve to form a coalition government for giving a practical shape to the mandate, which was given to the democratic forces by the people of Pakistan on February 18, 2008; (b)This has been decided in today‘s summit between the PPP and the PML (N) that the deposed judges would be restored, on the position as they were on November 2, 2007, within 30 days of the formation of the federal government through a parliamentary
204
resolution; (c) The parties agreed that all allied parties would fully support the candidate for the position of the prime minister, nominated by the PPP. The PML (N) suggested that the candidate for prime minister should be such person who can take ahead the common agenda of the allied parties; (d) The parties agreed that the speaker and the deputy speaker of the national assembly would be from the PPP while the speaker and the deputy speaker of the Punjab assembly would be from the PML (N) ; (e) Both the parties agreed that the PML (N) would be a part of the federal government while the PPP would be a part of the Punjab government. 6-This is the solid opinion of the leaderships of both the parties that the allied parties are ready for forming the governments and the sessions of the national and provincial assemblies be summoned immediately‖ (The News International, Sunday, March 09, 2008). 27 Baloch nationalist parties and PKMAP, a Pashtun Nationalist party boycotted the election. These parties have sound support in Balochistan. The boycott of these parties enabled PPP and PML-Q to extend their support. The grand coalition in Balochistan has the support of 64 out of 65 members in the provincial assembly. Only Yar Mohammad Rind, a PML-Q leader, is out of this PPP-led coalition government of Aslam Raisani. It is the mutual hostility of the Rind and Raisani tribes that has led Yar Mohammad Rind to not support Raisani‘s government. 28 The PPP and the PML-N has signed an agreement to reinstate the sacked judges on the position of November 2, 2007, within thirty days of the formation of the federal government through a parliamentary resolution. Musharraf has removed these judges on November 2, 2007 from the courts. 29 For detail see: The Daily Dawn, May 13, 2008. 30 For detail see: The Nation, October 23, 2009. 31 For example, the conflictive issue of NFC Award has been resolved now. 32 Even, the census was delayed in 1991(due date as per fixed interval of ten years) and it was only possible in 1998 to have census. 33 N J Barrington: 1967, letter of British embassy. A memorandum by Middle East Section: 1967, FCO 37/ 784. File was accessed at National Achieve Center, London. 34N J Barrington: 1967, letter of British embassy. A memorandum by Middle East Section: 1967, FCO 37/ 784. File was accessed at National Achieve Center, London. 35The index defines fragmentation as the probability that a randomly selected pair of individuals in a society will belong to different groups. The index can vary between 0 and 1. The value is zero for a complete homogenous society and the other extreme is the hypothetical case of a society where each individual belongs to a different group. 36 Pakistan‘s union landscape features trade unions that are affiliated to political parties as well as traditional, autonomous, centrist union organizations. The most prominent of the former class is the right-wing National Labor Federation (NLF) which is allied with the conservative Jamaat-e-Islami (JI) political party. The NLF‘s power base is the steel and railroad industries, Pakistan International Airlines (PIA) and the Karachi port. The other politically connected trade unions are the NWFP- based Democratic Labor Federation (DLF) affiliated to the Awami National Party (ANP), the
205
Pakistan People‘s Party (PPP)‘s People's Labor Bureau (PLB), and the labor wing of the Mohajir Qaumi Movement 37 The vote percentages for different parties in various elections are calculated by the author. The all constituencies of Pakistan for national and provincial elections were divided along ethno-linguistic lines: the Pashto speaking belt, the Baloch countryside, Urdu speaking Mohajir constituency, Sindhi-speaking region, Siraiki belt and Punjabi speaking region. The boundaries of various ethno- linguistic groups were drawn using the information available in 1998 census report about the language composition of Pakistan. The detailed election results of each constituency are available at website of election commission of Pakistan. The vote percentages for different political parties in particular region were calculated by dividing the total votes of a particular party by the total valid votes of that particular region. The percentages were calculated for the national assembly and provincial assemblies‘ elections for the period of 1988-2008. 38 The analysis is limited to election results of parliamentary parties only. 39 The data used in this analysis is from 1950s and 1960s, instead of the most recent available. The Netherlands (1948-67), Austria (1945-94), Belgium (1946-65), and Switzerland (1960-2003) when these countries were at their high point of consociationalism around 1970, the significant national Belgian political parties have split into distinct representations for each community‘s interests besides defenders of their ideologies. Therefore data here has been selected before 1970 to avoid ambiguity. The high point of consociationalism began to shatter and since late 1960s; the process of depillarization was started.
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210 Chapter No.6
CONSOCIATIONALISM AS A POLICY RECOMMENDATION FOR PAKISTAN: A SURVEY OF PUBLIC OPINION
6.1 Introduction
In the previous chapter, we have examined the compatibility of consociational democracy with the multi-ethnic society of Pakistan. The findings revealed that consociationalism is not a realistic option for Pakistan to manage ethnic diversity. In addition, this chapter attempts to explore the support for consociational devices in the multiethnic society of Pakistan through a public opinion survey of the members of various ethno-linguistic groups. The survey draws on a sample of 1013 people from every walk of life. Such surveys have certain limitations in the developing states like
Pakistan due to meager resources, poor literacy rates, and unfortunate law and order situations. . It is quite possible that the results from this sample might differ, slightly, from a larger sample. The author has also no hesitation to acknowledge that the survey is capturing a moment in time. The results of this survey may differ if it had been taken at a different time1. But, the survey is still important. Despite the shortage of resources and uncomfortable situation during 2008-09 in Pakistan, it is more or less, a nationally representative sample. Ethnicity, language, class and region have been accorded importance in the stratification. At the minimum, as a part of this project, the survey has accomplished its goal. It has substantiated the argument that consociationalism is not relevant to the multiethnic society of Pakistan by exploring that majority of Pakistanis are not inclined toward the consociational arrangements.
The central question to be answered in this chapter is that whether or not a plurality of Pakistanis prefers to add in consociational devices in political system of Pakistan.
211 Three secondary questions have been designed to address this central question. The secondary questions include:
(a) Whether the majority of Pakistanis seem satisfied with the existing federal settings? (b) Does the plurality of Pakistanis favors consociational arrangements in Pakistan? (c) Does the majority of Pakistanis prefer consociational arrangements to decentralized federalism?
Second section of this chapter describes the methodology adopted to analyze the public opinion. Third section is reserved for detailed discussion of survey results.
Some important interviews and comments have been discussed in the fourth section.
The chapter has been concluded in the last section.
6.2 Methodology
This section describes briefly about methods and procedures used for sampling the population and construction of questionnaire for survey of public opinion to determine the support for consociationalism as a policy recommendation.
6.2.1 Sampling
This opinion survey was conducted during 2008-09 in different areas of Pakistan. The sample was stratified by ethno-linguistic representation and provincial distribution of population. People from every walk of life were interviewed. The survey strata included various regions of Punjab, Sindh, NWFP, and Balochistan. The minimum number of respondents for each ethno-linguistic group was 100. However, for larger ethno-linguistic groups, the numbers of interviewees were extended to make the survey more representative. Similarly, the number of respondents for Balochs and
212 Pashtuns were relatively higher relating to their share in population of Pakistan because the both communities are well-known for their autonomy demands and nationalistic feelings. Punjabis constitute the largest group. Therefore, a sizeable number of Punjabis were interviewed to make the survey representative. The smaller groups (4.8%) that are not recognized by the government of Pakistan as a separate group were excluded from the study. The breakup of respondents was as under:
Figure 6-1: Ethno-linguistic Breakup of Respondents2
S. No. Ethno-linguistic group Population percentage (1998) Number of Respondents 1 Baloch 3.5 107 2 Mohajir 7.8 100 3 Pashtun 13.0 171 4 Punjabi 45.4 372 5 Sindhi 14.6 150 6 Siraiki 10.9 113 7 Other groups 4.8 Excluded from the survey 8 Overall --- 1013
The survey covered various regions of Pakistan. A total of 1013 interviews were conducted throughout the country, in Urdu and English. Some interviews were carried out electronically, the rest were conducted face-to-face by the author or on author‟s behalf by the interviewers. The questionnaire was codified and SPSS software was used for the statistical analysis of data.
6.2.2 Questionnaire
A questionnaire was designed to gather public opinion regarding the central question that whether or not consociational devices should be introduced in the political system of Pakistan. It was composed of two sections:
(a) The first section of the questionnaire aimed to collect some basic information
of the respondents. The required information of respondents included their
213 names, qualifications, professional affiliations (if any), household languages,
home district and province.
(b) The second section of the questionnaire was comprised of a three sets of close-
ended questions, endeavors to get respondents‟ opinion related to the existing
federal settings of Pakistan and the support for proposed solutions to manage
ethnic diversity i.e. consociationalism and (decentralized) federalism.
The findings of three sets of questions designed to address the central question have been enumerated in the following section.
6.3 Findings of the survey
Findings of the each set of questions have been discussed in the three subsequent sections.
6.3.1 Findings concerning Existing Federal Settings
This section deals with a set of six questions that aim to evaluate the perceptions of various ethno-linguistic groups related to the current federal design of Pakistan. The findings of the first three questions are tabulated in the figure 6-2. These questions intend to discover the perceptions of various ethno-linguistic groups about the domination of certain groups; and to determine the dominant and dominated groups.
The next three questions are related to the perceptions about existing federal settings.
Findings of these questions are summarized in the figure 6-3.
6.3.1.1 Perception about the Domination of Certain Ethno-linguistic Groups
It has been argued that certain communities dominate in the politics and society of
Pakistan and this domination causes a sense of alienation and resentment in the
214 marginalized communities. This resentment in turn underpins the political mobilization in Pakistan (Mushtaq & Alqama, 2009). To assess the public opinion about this argument, the respondents were asked whether or not certain ethno linguistic groups dominate in the multiethnic society of Pakistan.
The results show that a large majority of Baloch (93.5%), Mohajir (95%), Pashtun
(89.5%), Punjabi (89.2%), Sindhi (88%), and Siraiki (96.5%) respondents have agreed that certain ethno-linguistic groups dominate in the politicos and society of Pakistan.
The detailed findings are presented in the figure 6-2.
6.3.1.2 Findings about the two most Privileged Ethno-linguistic Groups
After the findings established that certain groups dominate in the politics and society of Pakistan, the survey attempts to find out the two most privileged ethno-linguistic groups. The interviewees were asked whether or not their group is one of the two most privileged groups. With the exception of Punjabis, majority of the respondents of all ethno-linguistic groups asserted that their group is not one of the two relatively privileged groups. A large majority of Punjabis (83.9%), however, agreed that they belong to the privileged group. Two-third respondents of Mohajir (66%) and Sindhis
(67.3%) communities do not agree to be a part of privileged groups. A vast majority of Siraikis (78%), Pashtuns (88%), and Balochs (98%) respondents also do not agree that they belong to a privileged group.
215 Figure 6-2: Perceptions about the Domination of Certain Groups
The domination of certain The two most privileged The two most marginalized ethno-linguistic Groups ethno-linguistic Groups ethno-linguistic groups Group Frequency Percent Frequency Percent Frequency Percent Baloch No 7 6.5 105 98.1 11 10.3 Yes 100 93.5 2 1.9 96 89.7 Total 107 100.0 107 100.0 107 100.0 Mohajir No 5 5.0 66 66.0 69 69.0 Yes 95 95.0 34 34.0 31 31.0 Total 100 100.0 100 100.0 100 100.0 Pashtun No 18 10.5 150 87.7 52 30.4 Yes 153 89.5 21 12.3 119 69.6 Total 171 100.0 171 100.0 171 100.0 Punjabi No 40 10.8 60 16.1 336 90.3 Yes 332 89.2 312 83.9 36 9.7 Total 372 100.0 372 100.0 372 100.0 Sindhi No 18 12.0 101 67.3 98 65.3 Yes 132 88.0 49 32.7 52 34.7 Total 150 100.0 150 100.0 150 100.0 Siraiki No 4 3.5 88 77.9 40 35.4 Yes 109 96.5 25 22.1 73 64.6 Total 113 100.0 113 100.0 113 100.0
1. The domination of certain ethno-linguistic Groups: Do you think that certain ethno- linguistic groups dominate in the multiethnic society of Pakistan? 2. The two most privileged ethno-linguistic Groups: Do you think that your group is one of the two most privileged groups of Pakistan? 3. The two most marginalized ethno-linguistic groups: Do you think that your group is one of the two most marginalized groups of Pakistan?
6.3.1.3 Findings about the two most Marginalized Ethno-linguistic Groups
The next question aims to find out the two most marginalized ethno-linguistic groups of Pakistan. The interviewees were asked whether or not their group was one of the two most marginalized groups. Majority of the Baloch (90%), Pashtun (70%), and
Siraikis (65%) respondents asserted that they belonged to relatively most marginalized communities. A considerable number of Sindhis (35%) and Mohajirs
(31%) also enlisted their community in the two most marginalized communities.
216 Surprisingly, nearly 10% Punjabi respondents insisted that they belong to one of the two most marginalized communities.
The results of first three questions reveal that the smaller communities feel themselves at a disadvantageous position vis-à-vis Punjabis. However, Balochs, Pashtuns, and
Siraikis seem more discontented than Mohajirs and Sindhis.
6.3.1.4 Power-sharing Arrangements in Exiting Federal Settings
The findings of previous sections reveal that certain communities of Pakistan perceived themselves as deprived and marginalized groups. The resentment of these communities is also linked to their exclusion from power structure of federal center.
To discover public opinion about this perception, the interviewees were asked whether or not they agree that ethno-linguistic groups based in smaller provinces have been provided sufficient power-sharing in the current federal settings of Pakistan. The findings seem to suggest a consensus among various groups that the ethno-linguistic groups based in smaller provinces have not been provided sufficient powers sharing.
A majority of Baloch (77.6%), Mohajir (66.0%), Pashtun (60.2%), Punjabi (58.3%),
Sindhi (66.0%), and Siraiki (61.1%) respondents agreed that ethnic minorities are not provided sufficient power sharing in Pakistan.
6.3.1.5 Alienation of Smaller Communities during Military Rule
One of the key factors for deficient power sharing in Pakistan is the vital role of military in the politics. It has been argued that Punjabis dominate in military; and the military rule has been equated with Punjabi rule by the smaller communities of
Pakistan (Talbot, 2002; Samad, 2007).
217 To find out public opinion about this observation, the interviewees were asked whether or not their respective ethno-linguistic group feels more alienation during military rule than the participatory politics in Pakistan. Surprisingly, the results show that majority of the respondents from each ethno-linguistic group do not approve this observation. A majority of Baloch (56.1%), Mohajir (81.0%), Pashtun (59.1%),
Punjabi (91.7%), Sindhi (66.7%), and Siraiki (67.3%) respondents do not agree that they feel more alienation during military rule than the participatory politics in
Pakistan.
6.3.1.6 Punjab as a Blockage in Smooth Running of Federalism
The relative size of the Punjab has been considered as a blockage for the smooth running of federalism by the ethnic minorities of Pakistan (Adeney, 2007). To gauge the public opinion about this perception, the interviewees were asked whether or not they think that the relative size of one province (Punjab) is blockage in smooth running of federalism in Pakistan.
The results of survey suggest that majority of all ethno-linguistic groups agreed with this observation. A majority of Baloch (92.5%), Mohajir (57.0%), Pashtun (80.7%),
Punjabi (50.0%), Sindhi (68.0%), and Siraiki (58.4%) respondents seem convinced that the relative size of the Punjab is an obstacle in smooth running of federalism in
Pakistan.
218 Figure 6-3: Perceptions about the Existing Federal Settings
Power-sharing Arrangements More Alienation during Punjab as a Blockage in in Exiting Federal Settings Military Rule smooth running of Federalism Group Frequency Percent Frequency Percent Frequency Percent Baloch No 83 77.6 60 56.1 8 7.5 Yes 24 22.4 47 43.9 99 92.5 Total 107 100.0 107 100.0 107 100.0 Mohajir No 66 66.0 81 81.0 43 43.0 Yes 34 34.0 19 19.0 57 57.0 Total 100 100.0 100 100.0 100 100.0 Pashtun No 103 60.2 101 59.1 33 19.3 Yes 68 39.8 70 40.9 138 80.7 Total 171 100.0 171 100.0 171 100.0 Punjabi No 217 58.3 341 91.7 186 50.0 Yes 155 41.7 31 8.3 186 50.0 Total 372 100.0 372 100.0 372 100.0 Sindhi No 99 66.0 100 66.7 48 32.0 Yes 51 34.0 50 33.3 102 68.0 Total 150 100.0 150 100.0 150 100.0 Siraiki No 69 61.1 76 67.3 47 41.6 Yes 44 38.9 37 32.7 66 58.4 Total 113 100.0 113 100.0 113 100.0 Overall No 61.63 39.31 Yes 38.37 60.69 Total 100.0 100.0
1. Power-sharing Arrangements in Exiting Federal Settings: Do you think that that ethno- linguistic groups based in smaller provinces have been provided sufficient powers sharing in the current federal settings of Pakistan? 2. More Alienation during Military Rule: Do you think that your ethno-linguistic group feels more alienation during military rule than the participatory politics in Pakistan? 3. Punjab as a Blockage in smooth running of Federalism: Do you think that the relative size of the Punjab is an obstacle in smooth running of federalism in Pakistan?
6.3.1.7 Recapitulation
The findings of this section seem to suggest that Punjabis are a relatively advantageous community. As a result, the remaining communities assert that they belong to the marginalized communities. The survey shows that smaller communities of minority provinces assert that they are not provided sufficient power sharing in the existing federal settings. However, the majority of smaller communities do not feel
219 more deprivation during military rule than the participatory democracy. Furthermore, the smaller communities view the relative size of Punjab as an obstruction in the smooth running of federalism in contemporary Pakistan.
6.3.2 Findings concerning the Proposed Consociational Governance
Consociational democracy has been prescribed for divided societies to ensure political stability and to avoid inter-group conflict. Consociational theory assumes that each group, in deeply divide societies, has its exclusive political party, student union, trade union voluntary association, and educational institutions. Therefore, it suggests a grand coalition of all political parties and leaves no space for opposition in the government. It recommends proportional electoral system to ensure proportional representation in parliament and coalition cabinets. It also proposes proportional distribution of resources and jobs. For non-federal societies, segmental autonomy is an optimal solution presented by the consociationalism. In federal settings, territorial autonomy is a choice for geographically concentrated communities. Consociationalism, essentially, suggests homogeneous constituent units. It advocates division of boundaries on linguistic rather than administrative basis. It recommends constitutional safeguards where minorities are worried about the survival of their language and culture. This survey aims to evaluate the public support in Pakistan for the above-mentioned consociational devices.
This section has been divided into two parts. The first part attempts to determine the level of fragmentation in Pakistani society by analyzing the results of the survey. This estimation, in turn, will reveal whether or not the Pakistani society is a deeply divided one and requires consociational arrangements to practice democracy. The second part assesses the support for proposed consociational devices.
220 6.3.2.1 Level of Fragmentation in Pakistani Society
The findings reveal that multiethnic society of Pakistan is not as fragmented as were the consociational cases of Western Europe. The centripetal feelings seem dominating over centrifugal feelings: majority of people feel more pride for national rather than ethnic identity; they do not dislike settlement of other groups in their regional base; they suggest that they have not exclusive political, social, and economic organizations; and they propose that they have no cultural and linguistic grievances.
However, majority of some ethno-linguistic groups deviate from the overall perception of Pakistanis. A detail of perception regarding each dimension has been elaborated in the figure 6-4.
Figure 6-4: Level of Fragmentation in Pakistani Society Group Response Feel more pride for Dislike settlement Cultural grievances Exclusive ethnic identity in regional base organizations Frequency % Frequency % Frequency % Frequency % Baloch No 24 22.4 28 26.2 61 57.0 31 29.0 Yes 83 77.6 79 73.8 46 43.0 76 71.0 Total 107 100.0 107 100.0 107 100.0 107 100.0 Mohajir No 73 73.0 75 75.0 85 85.0 42 42.0 Yes 27 27.0 25 25.0 15 15.0 58 58.0 Total 100 100.0 100 100.0 100 100.0 100 100.0 Pashtun No 107 62.6 142 83.0 77 45.0 104 60.8 Yes 64 37.4 29 17.0 94 55.0 67 39.2 Total 171 100.0 171 100.0 171 100.0 171 100.0 Punjabi No 322 86.6 355 95.4 330 88.7 329 88.4 Yes 50 13.4 17 4.6 42 11.3 43 11.6 Total 372 100.0 372 100.0 372 100.0 372 100.0 Sindhi No 104 69.3 98 65.3 66 44.0 81 54.0 Yes 46 30.7 52 34.7 84 56.0 69 46.0 Total 150 100.0 150 100.0 150 100.0 150 100.0 Siraiki No 104 92.0 106 93.8 75 66.4 109 96.5 Yes 9 8.0 7 6.2 38 33.6 4 3.5 Total 113 100.0 113 100.0 113 100.0 113 100.0 1. Feel more pride for ethnic identity: Do you think that the members of your group feel more pride for their ethnic identity than the Pakistani identity? 2. Dislike settlement in regional base: Do you think that the members of your group dislike the settlement of members of other groups in the regional base of your group? 3. Cultural grievances: Do you think that the members of your group have cultural grievances and are worried about the survival of their language and culture? 4. Exclusive organizations: Do you think that the members of your group have exclusive political party, student union, trade union voluntary association, and educational institutions?
221 6.3.2.1.1 Pride for Ethnic Identity
To determine the level of fragmentation in Pakistani society, the interviewees were asked whether or not they feel more pride for their ethnic identity than Pakistani identity. The results show that only a majority of Balochs (77.6%) acknowledged that they feel more pride for Baloch identity than the Pakistani identity. One-third of
Sindhi (30.7%) and Pashtun (37.4%) interviewees declared that they feel more pride for their respective ethnic identity than the Pakistani identity. The percentage of interviewees from Mohajir (27.0%), Punjabi (13.4%) and Siraiki (8.0%) communities who prefer ethnic identity to national identity are lower.
6.3.2.1.2 Dislike the Settlement of other groups in Regional Base
Another indication of fragmented societies is that the people of certain group dislike the settlement of other groups in their regional base. To assess the level of fragmentation in Pakistani society, the respondents are asked whether or not they dislike settlement of members of other groups in the regional base of their group. The findings reveal that majority of Baloch (71.0%) respondents acknowledged that
Balochs dislike the settlement of other groups in their regional base. One-third of
Sindhi (34.7%) respondents also agreed that Sindhis dislike the settlement of outsiders in interior Sindh. However, only a small number of Mohajirs (25%), Punjabis (4.6 %),
Siraikis (6.2 %), and Pashtun (17.0 %) respondents agreed that their respective groups dislike the settlement of other groups in their particular regional bases.
6.3.2.1.3 Cultural grievances and survival of language
To judge the level of fragmentation, the interviewees are, further, asked whether or not they have cultural grievances and are worried about the survival of their language and culture. The findings show that a majority of Sindhis (56 %) and Pashtuns (55%)
222 interviewees seem worried about the survival of their language and culture. A considerable number of Balochs (43%) and Siraikis (33.6 %) also shared this perception with the Sindhis and Pashtuns. Mohajirs (15%) and Punjabis (11.3 %), however, seem satisfied to having no cultural grievances.
6.3.2.1.4 Exclusive Political, Social and Economic Organizations
In fragmented societies, normally, each group organizes its exclusive political, social and economic organizations. To explore the Pakistani society, interviewees were asked whether or not their groups have exclusive political party, student union, trade union voluntary association, and educational institutions etc.
A majority of Baloch (71%) and Mohajir (58%) respondents declared that they have exclusive political, social and economic organizations. A considerable number of
Sindhis (46%) and Pashtuns (39.2%) also claim that they have exclusive organizations. However, a small number of Punjabi (11.6%) and Siraiki (3.5%) respondents asserted that their communities have exclusive political organizations.
6.3.2.1.5 Recapitulation
The findings of this section seem to suggest that Pakistani society is not a fragmented society. A plurality of Pakistanis, and a considerable number of all groups, affirms that ethnic identity has no more primacy; no exclusive political, social and economic organization of ethno-linguistic groups exists; and there is no more aversion among the members of different ethno-linguistic groups. However, some cultural grievances exist in smaller communities. Level of fragmentation has been summarized in the following figure. The figure 6-5 reveals that Balochs, tiny minority, are relatively more discontented. On the other hand, Punjabis, the largest group, seems quite satisfied. The remaining groups fall, somewhere, in the middle.
223 Figure 6-5: Level of Fragmentation in Pakistani Society
Level of Fragmentation in Pakistani Society 80 60 (%) Respondents 40 agreed 20
0 Baloch Pashtun Mohajir Sindhi Siraiki Punjabi Ethno-linguistic Groups
Feel more pride for ethnic than National Identity Exclusive Political, Social and Economic organizations Dislike settlement of other groups in regional base Cultural Grievances
224 6.3.2.2 Support for Consociational Devices
This part attempts to assess the support for the proposals of consociational arrangements in Pakistan. To gauge the public support, the relevant responses have been grouped under respective four elements of consociational democracy – grand coalition or executive power-sharing, proportionality, autonomy, and minority rights protection. The findings related to each element have been discussed in the subsequent sections.
6.3.2.2.1 Grand Coalition or Executive Power-sharing
The most famous form of executive power-sharing in consociational regimes has been remained a „grand coalition‟ of all significant political parties. Consociationalists believe that grand coalition ensures political participation of all groups in multiethnic states. Even, beyond consociationalism, the need for power-sharing in multiethnic states has been recognized.
Horowitz ( 1985, p.365) asserts that when a party of one group retains power for an indefinite period and the party of other group remains in opposition indefinitely, this situation promotes the „feelings of exclusion‟ in the latter group. He has maintained that the violence in Pakistan, Guyana, Congo, Sierra Leone, Zanzibar, and Guinea, among others, can be traced as the consequence of dominance of one ethnic party over others. However, Horowitz suggests multiethnic coalitions rather than grand coalitions. Multiethnicity that Horowitz refers to as ties across ethnic lines requires moderation and mutual accommodation. In divided societies, conciliatory governance
225 and the politics of compromise may emerge and the „feelings of exclusion may give way to a sense of power-sharing‟. In this survey, the interviewees were asked whether or not they suggest a grand coalition at the federal and provincial level to ensure power-sharing in Pakistan.
The results of the survey suggest that majority of Pakistanis (55.96%) do not approve of the suggestion of grand coalition at federal and provincial levels. However, a majority of Mohajir (58.0%) respondents approved the suggestion for coalition cabinets at central and provincial level. Sindhis were equally divided and there was equivalent support for and against this suggestion. Though, a majority of the respondents of other groups do not approve this suggestion, a considerable support is available for this proposal among Baloch (44.9%), Pashtun (42.7%), Punjabi (40.6%), and Siraiki (41.6%) respondents. The findings are summarized in the figure 6-6.
6.3.2.2.2 Proportionality
Proportionality is the primary characteristic of consociational democracy.
Consociationalism, through proportionality, guarantees proportional representation in parliament, cabinets, jobs, and resources. It has been argued that consociationalism
“accommodates groups by promoting proportionality throughout public administration, including the electoral system, security systems, and the courts”
(McGarry & O‟Leary, 2009). In this survey, two questions were asked by the interviewees to assess their support for proportionality. The first question is related to the proportional electoral system that ensures proportional representation and the
226 second question is related to the proportional representation in the vital institution of armed forces. The results of these questions are discussed in the following paragraphs.
Figure 6-6: Responses about the consociational devices
Grand coalition or Proportional Electoral Just Representation in Executive Power sharing System military Group Frequency Percent Frequency Percent Frequency Percent Baloch No 59 55.1 62 57.9 23 21.5 Yes 48 44.9 45 42.1 84 78.5 Total 107 100.0 107 100.0 107 100.0 Mohajir No 42 42.0 51 51.0 41 41.0 Yes 58 58.0 49 49.0 59 59.0 Total 100 100.0 100 100.0 100 100.0 Pashtun No 98 57.3 98 57.3 54 31.6 Yes 73 42.7 73 42.7 117 68.4 Total 171 100.0 171 100.0 171 100.0 Punjabi No 221 59.4 286 76.9 291 78.2 Yes 151 40.6 86 23.1 81 21.8 Total 372 100.0 372 100.0 372 100.0 Sindhi No 75 50.0 85 56.7 53 35.3 Yes 75 50.0 65 43.3 97 64.7 Total 150 100.0 150 100.0 150 100.0 Siraiki No 66 58.4 68 60.2 36 31.9 Yes 47 41.6 45 39.8 77 68.1 Total 113 100.0 113 100.0 113 100.0 Overall No - 55.96 66.10 - 53.87 Yes - 44.04 33.90 - 46.13 Total - 100.0 100.0 - 100.0
1. Grand coalition or Executive Power sharing: Do you suggest a grand coalition at the federal and provincial level to ensure power-sharing in Pakistan? 2. Proportional Electoral System: Do you prefer proportional electoral system to the first-past- the-post electoral system for Pakistan? 3. Just Representation in military: Do suggest substantial remedial policy to ensure just representation of all ethno-linguistic groups in military?
227 6.3.2.2.2.1 Proportional Voting System
Electoral systems are important because they “provide the means by which votes cast by people are translated into the offices won by the politicians” (Schneider, 2006).
Currently, first-past-the-post electoral system is operating in Pakistan. The interviewees were asked whether or not they prefer proportional electoral system to the first-past-the-post electoral system for Pakistan. The findings unveil that a majority of Pakistanis (66.10%) do not prefer proportional electoral system to the first-past-the-post electoral system. However, a considerable number of Mohajir
(49.0%), Baloch (42.1%), Pashtun (42.7%), and Sindhi (43.3%) respondents favor proportional electoral system to first-past-the-post electoral system. The proportional electoral system has lesser appeal in Punjabi (23.1%) and Siraiki (39.8%) respondents.
6.3.2.2.2.2 Proportionality in Armed Forces
In addition to proportional electoral system, proportionality involves allocation of representation in vital institutions and distribution of resources and jobs. The rationale behind proportional representation is to ensure the „just representation‟ and
„inclusion‟ of all segments of society into the power structure of the state. Military is the most powerful, influential and prominent intuition in Pakistan. Punjabis dominate this vital institution and the remaining communities resent Punjabis‟ overrepresentation. The smaller communities of Pakistan assert for their „just‟ representation in the armed forces. To gauge the public opinion for this assertion, the interviewees were asked whether or not they suggest substantial remedial policy to ensure just representation of all ethno-linguistic groups in military .The results show
228 that majority of Baloch (78.5%), Pashtun (68.4%), Sindhi (64.7%), Mohajir (59.0%), and Siraiki (68.1%) respondents approved of this suggestion. Conversely, a majority of Punjabi (78.2%) respondents do not agree with this suggestion. Overall, a majority of Pakistanis do not approve this proposal.
6.3.2.2.3 Minority Rights Protection
Consociationalism aims to protect minority rights through veto power concerning the vital issues. Responding to the question whether or not minorities should be provided minority rights protection, a majority of Pakistanis (53.84%) agreed that minorities‟ rights should be protected by the constitutional safeguards. A majority of Baloch
(58.9%), Pashtun (60.8%), Mohajir (54.0%), and Sindhi (72.0%) respondents agreed that minorities should be provided protection. Conversely, a majority of Punjabi
(51.6%) and Siraiki (58.4%) respondents do not agree with this suggestion. The results are summarized in the figure 6-7.
6.3.2.2.4 Segmental Autonomy
This section endeavors to judge public support for two proposals: (1) the right for every ethno-linguistic group to design its educational system and (2) the re- demarcation of provincial boundaries along linguistic borders. The results of the survey for these proposals are discussed in the subsequent sections respectively.
229 6.3.2.2.4.1 Right to Design Educational System
Segmental autonomy is one of the primary characteristics of consociationalism.
According to Lijphart (2002, p.39), the group autonomy refers to the “group‟s authority to run their own internal affairs, especially in the areas of education and culture”. To measure the public support, the interviewees were asked whether or not they approve the case that every ethno-linguistic group should have right to design its educational system and to decide the medium of instruction in educational institutions. A plurality of Pakistanis (71.78%) does not approve this proposal. A majority of Mohajir (69.0%), Sindhi (58.0%), Siraiki (61.1%), Pashtun (59.1%) and
Punjabi (86.0%) respondents rejected the suggestion. Only a modest majority of
Baloch (52.3%) respondents approved this suggestion. The results are summarized in the figure 6-7.
6.3.2.2.4.2 Homogenous Constituent Units
The design of constituent units „fits into the category of segmental autonomy through creating an institutional space for territorially concentrated groups. Within this territorial space the group‟s leaders control decisions relating to their community‟s well-being, such as education or the language of the state‟ (Adeney, 2002).
There is no consensus among the constitutional engineers about the principle of demarcation of constituent units in a federal polity. Some argue for homogeneous units (Watts, 2000, pp. 32-34; Adeney, 2007) and others for heterogeneous constituent units (Vile, 1982, p. 222; Horowitz, 1985). While consociationalism
230 suggests homogenous units, the centripetalism stresses for heterogeneous units. Some experts have suggested homogenous constituent units for Pakistan (Adeney, 2007).
Figure 6-7: Responses about Consociational Devices
Minority rights protection Segmental autonomy
Group Frequency Percent Frequency Percent
Baloch No 44 41.1 51 47.7 Yes 63 58.9 56 52.3 Total 107 100.0 107 100.0 Mohajir No 46 46.0 69 69.0 Yes 54 54.0 31 31.0 Total 100 100.0 100 100.0 Pashtun No 67 39.2 101 59.1 Yes 104 60.8 70 40.9 Total 171 100.0 171 100.0 Punjabi No 192 51.6 320 86.0 Yes 180 48.4 52 14.0 Total 372 100.0 372 100.0 Sindhi No 42 28.0 87 58.0 Yes 108 72.0 63 42.0 Total 150 100.0 150 100.0 Siraiki No 66 58.4 69 61.1 Yes 47 41.6 44 38.9 Total 113 100.0 113 100.0 Overall No - 46.16 - 71.78 Yes - 53.84 - 28.22 Total - 100.0 - 100.0
1. Minority Rights protection: Do you suggest that ethnic minorities should be provided rights protection in Pakistan? 2. Segmental autonomy: Do you suggest that every ethno-linguistic group should have right to design its educational system and to decide the medium of instruction in educational institutions?
This survey has attempted to evaluate the public support for this proposal. The interviewees were asked whether or not they suggest division of provinces; and if they agreed with the division what should be the principle of division i.e. division on administrative basis or division on linguistic basis. The results seem to suggest that a
231 majority of Baloch (92.6%), Mohajir (61%), Pashtun (84.2%), Punjabi (64%), and
Siraiki (83.2%) respondents agreed with the argument of division of province(s).
However, a majority of Sindhi (51.3%) respondents rejected the division of provinces
as a mean to strengthen federation. The striking finding, however, is that a majority of
Mohajir, Pashtun, Siraiki, and Punjabi respondents proposed division of the provinces
on administrative basis. Only, Baloch respondents prefer division of provinces on
linguistic basis. A complete description of findings has been presented in the
figure 6-8.
Figure 6-8: Responses about the homogenous constituent units Enumeration Baloch Mohajir Pashtun Punjabi Sindhi Siraiki
Responses Freq. % Freq % Freq % Freq % Freq % Freq %
No Division 8 7.5 39 39.0 27 15.8 134 36.0 77 51.3 19 16.8
Division on 51 47.7 12 12.0 35 20.5 49 13.2 27 18.0 14 12.4 linguistic basis Division on administrative 48 44.9 49 49.0 109 63.7 189 50.8 46 30.7 80 70.8 basis Total 107 100 100 100 171 100 372 100 150 100 113 100
Note: Freq. denotes frequency in this table
6.3.2.2.5 Recapitulation
The findings of this section seem to suggest that the support for consociational
proposals varies across ethno-linguistic groups. Punjabis, the largest group, appear
more reluctant to propose consociational democracy. Even the majority of smaller
groups do not approve the all proposed devices. The proposals of proportional
electoral system, segmental autonomy, and division of provinces on linguistic basis
do not receive approval of the various ethno-linguistic groups. However, the
suggestions for minority rights protection and „just‟ representation of all ethno-
232 linguistic groups in armed forces get substantial support. The support for the proposal of grand coalition remained mixed. Therefore, the findings demonstrate that there is an appeal for some consociational devices in Pakistan, but the majority of the population does not wish to incorporate these devices in the constitution of Pakistan.
In the next section, it has been attempted to measure the public support for decentralized federalism.
233 Figure 6-9: Support for consociational arrangements
Support for Consocitional Arrangements
100 80 60 40 20 0 Pakistan Punjabi Siraiki Mohajir Sindhi Pashtun Baloch
Proportional Electoral System Grand Coalition Military Representation Division of Provinces on Linguistic Bases Segmental Autonomy Minority Rights Protection
234 6.3.3 Findings concerning Decentralized Federal Design
Federalism believes in the combination of „self-rule‟ and „shared-rule‟. It provides power-sharing at the federal center and offers autonomy to constituent units in regional matters. Whereas the federal chamber provides adequate representation and executive power-sharing to smaller constituent units at the federal level, the legislative and administrative decentralization ensures provincial or state autonomy.
Many federations, in addition, provide a role to regional assemblies in the constitutional amendments.
Consociationalism, as we have discussed in the earlier section, believes in homogenous constituent units. However, the centripetalism3 suggests administrative boundaries of the constituent units and does not assert for homogenous constituent units.
In Pakistani case, the political parties are demanding for a more decentralized federal design. An overview of parties‟ stand over provincial autonomy illustrates that the political parties are asserting for a more autonomous provinces, an extended role of
Senate, a multiple formula for distributing funds, and a federal constitutional court.
Some are arguing for revising provincial boundaries also. Therefore, this section attempts to measure public support for these proposals.
6.3.3.1 Provincial Autonomy
The smaller provinces of Pakistan are asserting for provincial autonomy. Therefore, the first question of this section asked the interviewees whether or not provinces should be provided more autonomy. A large majority of Baloch (95.3%), Mohajir
(79.0%), Sindhi (96.0%), Pashtun (88.3%), Punjabi (74.7%), and Siraiki (85.0%)
235 respondents agreed that provinces should be provided more autonomy. This finding seems to suggest a complete consensus among various ethno-linguistic groups over the issue of provincial autonomy. A summary of findings is given in the figure 6-10.
6.3.3.2 Extended Role for the Senate
More than one-third (36%) of the world legislatures are reported as bicameral, in
2003. In these bicameral legislatures, majority of the „upper‟ houses are symbolic and only a handful of constitutions provide equal powers to the both chambers. In comparison, lower houses, usually popularly elected, have been provided stronger roles (Schneider, 2006, p. 160). However, federations provide an important role to the upper chambers. For example, American Senate has been provided a key role in the governmental affairs. Irrespective of their size of population, all provinces of Pakistan are provided equal representation in the Senate. Therefore, the smaller units have been asserting for a more vital role of Senate to ensure power-sharing at federal level. To quantify the public support for this proposal, the interviewees were asked whether or not they approve the suggestion for an extended role of senate in Pakistan.
A large majority of Baloch (67.3%), Mohajir (73.0%), Pashtun (83.6%), Punjabi
(69.9%), Sindhi (82.0%), and Siraiki (72.6%) respondents approved the proposal that the Senate should be provided more active role in legislative and administrative sphere. A summary of findings is given the figure 6-10.
6.3.3.3 Provincial Legislatures’ Role in Amending Constitution
Some federations have provided a role to the provincial or state legislatures for the constitutional amendments. The interviewees were asked whether or not they approve this proposal for Pakistani case. A majority of Baloch (86.0%), Mohajir (69.0%),
236 Pashtun (80.7%), Punjabi (71.2%), Sindhi (83.3%), and Siraiki (69.9%) respondents approved the proposal that provincial legislatures should have some role in constitutional amendments. The results are summarized in the figure 6-10.
6.3.3.4 Equitable Formula for National Finance Commission Award
Distribution of funds has been a bone of contention between the center and provinces and among provinces in Pakistan. The minority provinces have been arguing for a multiple formula for distribution of funds between center and provinces and among provinces. To gauge the public support for this suggestion, the interviewees were asked whether or not they suggest a multiple criteria for the formula of distribution of funds between center and provinces and among provinces. A majority of Baloch
(92.5%), Mohajir (72.0%), Pashtun (80.7%), Punjabi (59.4%), Sindhi (80.7%), and
Siraiki (63.7%) respondents approved the proposal that there should be a multiple criteria for the formula of distribution of funds between center and provinces and among provinces. A summary of findings is available in figure 6-10.
6.3.3.5 Recapitulation
The findings of this section seem to suggest a consistency in support for
(decentralized) federalism across ethno-linguistic groups. The majority of all ethno- linguistic groups approve the all proposed devices for decentralization. The findings reveal that there is a great appeal for decentralized federalism in Pakistan.
237 Figure 6-10: Responses about the Proposals of (Decentralized) Federalism
More autonomy Extended role for Senate Provincial assemblies role NFC Award Group Frequency Percent Frequency Frequency Percent Percent Frequency Percent Baloch No 5 4.7 35 8 7.5 32.7 15 14.0 Yes 102 95.3 72 99 92.5 67.3 92 86.0 Total 107 100.0 107 107 100.0 100.0 107 100.0 Mohajir No 21 21.0 27 28 28.0 27.0 31 31.0 Yes 79 79.0 73 72 72.0 73.0 69 69.0 Total 100 100.0 100 100 100.0 100.0 100 100.0 Pashtun No 20 11.7 28 33 19.3 16.4 33 19.3 Yes 151 88.3 143 138 80.7 83.6 138 80.7 Total 171 100.0 171 171 100 100.0 171 100.0 Punjabi No 94 25.3 112 151 40.6 30.1 107 28.8 Yes 278 74.7 260 221 59.4 69.9 265 71.2 Total 372 100.0 372 372 100.0 100.0 372 100.0 Sindhi No 6 4.0 27 29 19.3 18.0 25 16.7 Yes 144 96.0 123 121 80.7 82.0 125 83.3 Total 150 100.0 150 150 100.0 100.0 150 100.0 Siraiki No 17 15.0 31 41 36.3 27.4 34 30.1 Yes 96 85.0 82 72 63.7 72.6 79 69.9 Total 113 100.0 113 113 100.0 100.0 113 100.0
1. More autonomy: Do you agree that provinces should be provided more autonomy? 2. Extended role of Senate: Do you suggest an extended role for the Senate to play in the legislative and administrative affairs of Pakistan? 3. Provincial assemblies’ role: Do you suggest some role for the provincial assemblies in the process of constitutional amendments? 4. NFC Award: Do you suggest a multiple criteria for the formula of distribution of funds between center and provinces and among provinces?
238 Figure 6-11: Support for (Decentralized) Federalism
120
100 More Autonomy for Provinces
80 Extended Role for Senate
60 Provincial Legislatures Role in Constitutional Amendments Support (%) 40 Multiple Formula for NFC Award 20
0 Division of Provinces on Administrative Bases
Siraiki Sindhi Punjabi Mohajir Baloch Pakistan Pashtun Ethno-linguistic Groups
239 6.3.4 Comparison of Support for Consociationalism and (Decentralized) Federalism
The comparative analysis of support for the two proposed solutions i.e. consociationalism and decentralized federalism seems to suggest that the majority of interviewees demonstrated more support for the decentralized federalism than the consociationalism. The support for proposals related to the decentralized federalism range from 60% to 80% in all ethno-linguistic groups. But, the support for proposals related to consociationalism range from 40% to 50% percent. As the support for proposals related to decentralized federalism manifests in all ethno-linguistic groups, it is safe say that the majority of Pakistanis prefer decentralized federalism to the consociational arrangements. A comparative exploration has been enumerated in the figure 6-12.
6.4 Interviews of some Experts and Political Leaders: A summary of Results
Interviews are a primary source of research. Therefore, in addition to the survey of public opinion, interviews of some experts 4 and political leaders 5 have been conducted to substantiate the survey results. The interviews aim to evaluate the opinion of experts and political elite of various ethno-linguistic groups related to the proposed solutions i.e. consociationalism and decentralized federation. The results of interviews 6 suggest that majority of the interviewees do not propose proportional electoral system for Pakistan. However, majority of the interviewees recommended coalition cabinets at national and provincial levels to share power with substantial ethnic minorities. Similarly, a majority of the interviewees suggested division of provinces on administrative grounds rather than division on the linguistic bases.
240 Figure 6-12: Comparison of Support for (Decentralized) Federalism and Consociationalism
120 MAP 100 ERS PLR 80 RNFC DOA 60 MRP
Support (%) 40 PR GC 20 MR DOL 0 SA Pakistan Punjabi Siraiki Mohajir Sindhi Pashtun Baloch Ethno-linguistic Groups
Decentralized Federalism Consociational Arrangements 1. MAP: More Autonomy for Provinces 1. MRP: Minority Rights Protection 2. ERS: Extended Role for Senate 2. PR: Proportional Electoral System 3. PLR: Provincial Legislatures Role in Constitutional 3. GC: Grand Coalition Amendments 4. MR: Military Representation 4. RNFC: Multiple Formula for NFC Award 5. DOL: Division of Provinces on Linguistic Bases 5. DOA: Division of Provinces on Administrative Bases 6. SA: Segmental Autonomy
241 Nevertheless, more or less a complete consensus lies among the interviewees about the proposal of constitutional safeguards to protect ethnic minority rights and the suggestion for a remedial policy to ensure just representation of all groups in armed forces. Therefore, the support of interviewees for consociationalism, at the best, remained mixed.
Quite the opposite, the results of interviews seem to suggest a consensus among interviewees related to the constitutional proposals for a decentralized federalism in
Pakistan. A majority of respondents approved the suggestions for provincial autonomy, extended role for the Senate, provincial legislature role in constitutional amendments, and for a multiple formula of distribution in NFC Award.
The comparison of support for consociational devices and decentralized federalism proposes that the interviewees display more keenness for decentralized federalism than the consociational arrangements in Pakistan.
6.5 Conclusion
The results of public opinion survey and the findings of interviews seem to suggest that some consociational proposals get considerable support of the respondents. A majority of interviewees approved the proposal of remedial policies to ensure just representation of all ethno-linguistic groups in armed forces. The interviewees also acknowledged the need of constitutional safeguards for minority rights protection.
The idea of a grand coalition, also, seems getting some acceptance in minorities. But, a large majority of the respondents disapproved the proposals of proportional electoral system, homogenous constituent units and the segmental autonomy. In addition, the survey suggests that Pakistan is not too fragmented to shift from majoritarian model of democracy to consociational democracy. Though the findings reveal that there is a
242 sense of discomfort toward existing federal settings, it appears that people desire autonomy and power-sharing within the framework of federalism. To sum up, the all- embracing support for the proposals of decentralized federalism shows the trust of people in federalism. This trust in federalism, in turn, leads to the argument that a plurality of Pakistanis does not recommend consociationalism as a policy recommendation.
243 Endnotes:
1 For example, the developments in Balochistan during Musharraf period have exceedingly annoyed the Balochs. Conversely, Mohajirs may have seen military rule in a different light, if this survey had been taken in a different circumstances. Musharraf, himself a mohajir, was criticized for his ties with MQM. Furthermore, the government of ANP in NWFP was more concerned than the previous governments of NWFP about the issues around provincial autonomy. 2 Note: Overall opinion was calculated by adding wait-age of each community. The formula for the purpose of this study is designed as under: Overall Pakistan: 100 (Baloch = 5% + Mohajir = 8% + Pashtun = 14% + Punjabi = 46% + Sindhis = 15% + Siraiki = 12%) 3Centripetalism is a power sharing approach presented by Horowitz to bring stability in deeply divided societies. It is based on the design of political institutions. Centripetal institutions include the adoption of an executive coalition restricted to moderate parties; a model of decentralized government that disperses power to multiple points, but that does not focus on promoting ethnically-based autonomy; and a stress on majoritarian electoral system to reward moderates (McCulloch, 2009). 4It was planned to get a representative academic opinion on issues raised in the public opinion survey. Therefore, more than fifty national and international experts on Pakistani politics were contacted electronically for interviews. However, only seven experts provided their responses. Though, the number of experts is very small but they are prominent due to their scholarly work on Pakistan. They include (1) Ayesha Jalal, a Director of Center for South Asian and Indian Ocean Studies at Tufts University , (2) Professor Ishtiaq Ahmed is, a Visiting Research Professor at the Institute of South Asian Studies (ISAS), National University of Singapore and a Professor of Political Science at Stockholm University, (3)Dr. Claude Rakisits, a Senior Lecture at School of International and Political Studies, Deakin University, Australia [His principal research interest is Pakistan], (4) Theodore P. Wright, Jr. , a Professor Emeritus at Department of Political Science, University at Albany [He has published more than 80 journal articles on various aspects of Indian and Pakistani politics], (5) Dr. Moonis Ahmer, chairman of the Department of International Relations, university of Karachi, (6) and Mansoor Akbar, the Vice Chancellor of the Gomal University Dera Ismael Khan, Pakistan. 5 It was intended to incorporate the opinion of all parliamentary parties in this section. Therefore, representatives of all parliamentary political parties were contacted for their parties‟ stand on various issues raised in the questionnaire. A number of political parties were reluctant to express their opinion on paper. Most of the parties advised to consult their parties‟ opinion in their parties‟ electoral manifestoes. The situation of law and order in Islamabad and surroundings was not good in those days as well. Only six political figures were available for interviews. These political leaders followed their parties‟ line strictly. The leaders include (1) Sana Ullah Baloch, a former Member of Parliament of Pakistan who served as the Member Senate of Pakistan (2003-2008) and as Member National Assembly (1997-1999) [He is a leader of Baloch Nationalist Party], (2) Naveed Qamer , a federal minister and key leader of PPP, (3) Ghous Ali Shah, the ex-Chief Minster
244
of Sindh and the president of PML-N Sindh, (4) Mr. Aamer , a member of the Rabta committee of MQM, (5) Mr. Mustafa Aziz Abadi, a member of the Rabta committee of MQM, (6) and Dr. Nasir Dushti, a UK-based Baloch Nationalist. 6 Detailed results of the interviews are provided in the Appendix.
245 References
1. Adeney, K. (2002) Constitutional centering: Nation formation and consociational
federalism in India and Pakistan. Commonwealth and Comparative Politics. 40 (3),
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2. Adeney, K. (2007). Federalism and Ethnic Conflict Regulation in India and
Pakistan. New York: Pal grave.
3. Horowitz, D. (1985). Ethnic Groups in Conflict. Berkeley: University of
California Press.
4. Lijphart, A. (2002).The Wave of Power-Sharing Democracy. In A. Reynolds
(Eds.), The Architecture of Democracy: Constitutional Design, Conflict
Management and Democracy (pp. 37-54). Oxford: Oxford University Press.
5. McGarry J. & O’Leary. (2009). Power shared after the deaths of thousands. In R.
Taylor (Eds.), Consociational Theory: McGarry & O’ Leary and Northern Ireland
Conflict (pp. 15-85).London: Rout ledge.
6. Mushtaq, M. & Alqama, K. (2009). Poverty Alleviation through Power-sharing in
Pakistan. European Journal of Social Science. 8(3), 459-468.
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and Y. Samad (Eds.), Fault lines of Nationhood (pp.67-138). New Delhi: Roli
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246 9. Talbot, I. (2002). The Punjabisation of Pakistan: Myth or Reality? In C. Jaffrelot,
(Eds.), Pakistan: Nationalism without a Nation (pp.51-62). London: Zed Books
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and the British Commonwealth .In P. Rea (Eds.), Political Cooperation in Divided
Societies(pp. 216-28). Dublin: Gill and Macmillan.
11. Watts, R.L. (2000). Federalism in Asia: The potential and limits. L. R. Basta
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multicultural Challenge (pp.01-04). Geneva: Helbring.
247 Chapter No.7
FINDINGS AND CONCLUSION
The review of consociational theory suggests that it has attracted a lot of criticism from elsewhere. There are flaws and gaps in the consociational literature. The review explores that the proper scope of the consociational universe is subject to debate.
Additionally, the results of consociational experiences, since late 1960s, have been remained mixed. Hence, its recommendation for the multiethnic society of Pakistan requires an exhaustive scrutiny.
The creation of Pakistan was a result of Indian Muslims‟ demand for a separate homeland skipping over their ethnic identities and cultural differences. But, after independence, they were engaged in the politics of identity. The difference of opinion that surfaced during the constitution making process in early years, eventually, resulted in the break-up of the country. The post-1971 Pakistan differs considerably from the Jinnah‟s Pakistan. But, despite the significant change in its ethno-linguistic composition, still it is an interesting case of multiethnic states. Though, apparently, each of its provinces is associated with a certain ethno-linguistic group, the evidence shows that there are significant minorities in every constituent unit. Another notable feature of the Pakistani society is that, almost, every ethno-linguistic group has its own regional base. Besides, thanks to colonial legacy, Pakistan is a classic example of uneven-development. There is a great disparity, in terms of socio-economic development, among various regions of Pakistan. The socio-economic indicators seem to suggest that Punjab is ahead of the other provinces in terms of social development. But the Southern Punjab is much poorer than the Central Punjab.
NWFP has an intermediate level of development. Sindh has the lower-middle to low
248 level of social development. Balochistan is the most backward province of Pakistan in terms of social development. The evidence shows that boundaries of certain communities and deprived regions coincide in the case of Pakistan. Balochs, Sindhis, and Siraikis reside in relatively less developed regions contrary to Punjabis, Mohajirs, and Pashtuns that reside in relatively developed areas. In addition, the former communities remained relatively marginalized and underdeveloped and the latter remained over represented in national institutions. These circumstances are at the core of the resentment of deprived groups. But, it is the province of Punjab that has been perceived by smaller units as a dominant contender. This perception is, partly, because of Punjab‟s huge population; and, partly, on account of its overrepresentation in national institutions and relatively better socio-economic conditions. It has been argued that this relative advantageous position of the Punjabis has annoyed the people of deprived regions and the marginalized communities.
The grievances of smaller communities are of the two kinds: group concerns and the territorial grievances. Some groups resent their inadequate representation in national institutions. Similarly, the groups based in smaller units advocate the interests of their respective units. The grievances of ethnic minorities and/or smaller units include the pre-dominance of Punjabis in the civil-military bureaucracy, the comparative development level of Punjab, the „contentious‟ formula that regulates the distribution of funds to provinces, and distribution of water between Punjab (upper riparian ) and the smaller units. The ethnic minorities and/or smaller units insist that these grievances are caused by the centralization of political power in Pakistan. Therefore, the ethno-regional parties of smaller units such as ANP, MQM, PKMAP, and Baloch factions are asserting for more autonomy. The mainstream parties have also acknowledged the requirement of decentralization and have adopted various demands
249 of ethnic minorities in their programs. The proposals to strengthening the federal chamber (the Senate), abolition of concurrent list, and a consensus based formula
(NFC Award) for horizontal and vertical allocation of funds are part of their electoral manifestoes. However, the regional parties are more vocal in their demands than the mainstream political parties. This evidence seems to suggest that there is some resentment against the existing federal settings of Pakistan.
The constitutional provisions of the 1973 constitution reveal that Pakistan fulfills the requirements of a federation. The legislative, administrative and financial powers have been distributed between the center and provinces. However, the Pakistani federation vis-à-vis the contemporary federations appears a relatively centralized.
The evidence shows that it operates relatively in a unitary fashion. The central authorities have been remained involved in the provincial affairs. The experience displays centralization similarities in democratic/civilian and dictatorial/military regimes. It has been argued in this thesis that it was the centralization of political power that, in turn, led the federal authorities to intervene in provincial matters. They often destabilized the rival provincial governments. Even, some times, they managed to install their own favorable governments by removing the elected cabinets that were enjoying majority in the respective houses. The evidence suggests that more of the political mobilizations in the post-1971 Pakistan were protests against these interventions and the centralization of political power.
This thesis has, empirically, challenged the argument of Adeney (2009) that “the absence of consociational mechanisms has caused much of the conflict in Pakistan”.
The irrelevancy of consociationalism with the politics of identity in Pakistan has been established through the rigorous analysis of various ethno-nationalist movements.
250 The analysis argues that the ethno-linguistic groups of Pakistan are internally divided. Though, they have a have a common language, culture, religion or other features, this is not necessarily a sign of unity and commonness of the purpose. It has been argued that the Pashtun identity does not imply identity with the ANP or
Mohajir identity with MQM. The results of federal and provincial general elections in
Pakistan disclose that the ethnic minorities polled more votes in favor of mainstream parties than the ethno-regional parties. Thus, there is no single representative party of any ethno-linguistic group of Pakistan. So, it does not seem reasonable to reserve membership of a grand coalition for the ethno-regional parties having a limited electoral support. In addition, the ethno-regional parties of Pakistan had never demanded the proportional electoral system for representation. Similarly, the nationalist regimes in smaller units did not demonstrate their concerns relating to segmental autonomy. The provincial governments of nationalist parties have never seen the requirement to shift their policies concerning the recognition of language and the educational policies. The mainstream parties of Pakistan have a considerable electoral support in all ethno-linguistic groups. The reason behind this support is that they respect the interests of ethnic minorities and smaller units. Despite its great importance, the civilian as well as military regimes in Islamabad did not ignore the objections of smaller units over Kalabagh dam. This reality shows that ethnic minorities are not threatened by the Punjabi majority. Therefore, there is no requirement for the provision of mutual veto. This account seems to suggest that the political mobilization and ethnic strife in Pakistan is least concerned with the non- consociational mechanisms of Pakistani federation.
Then, this thesis attempts to find out whether or not consociationalism is a realistic option for Pakistan to manage ethnic diversity. The empirical evidence seems to
251 suggest that consociationalism is not a realistic option for Pakistan. This conclusion is based on three observations.
First, the proponents of consociationalism have recognized certain favorable conditions for the establishment and maintenance of consociational democracy. With some exceptions, these factors are missing in the case of Pakistan. Consociationalists believe that the absence of a solid majority, the small population size of a country, roughly equal size of the segments, and a small number of ethno-linguistic groups facilitates the execution of consociational arrangements. These all factors are absent in the case of Pakistan. The sizes of various ethno-linguistic groups of Pakistan are dissimilar. It has a dominant Punjabi community on one hand and a small minority of
Balochs at the other. Contrary to smaller Western European consociational democracies, Pakistan is one of the world‟s most populous states. The case of
Pakistan also does not fulfill the requirement of the absence of large socio-economic differences and the presence of traditions of compromise and accommodation.
However, it can be argued that some factors that might be supportive for consociational mechanisms, such as the geographical concentration of the segments, overarching loyalties and external threats to the stability of the state, are present in the case of Pakistan. Consociationalists have quantified the favorable conditions and on the basis of this quantification have predicted about the success or failure of consociationalism in particular cases. In this study, through a comparative judgment of selected cases, the author has found that the favorable conditions are absent for the case of Pakistan. The selected cases of consociationalism have been classified on the basis of favorable conditions for consociational democracy in this thesis using the statistical tools. This classification suggests that Pakistan is not coupled with a successful case of Switzerland nor with the clear past cases of consociationalism. It
252 has been positioned with a failed case of Cyprus and a „borderline‟ case of consociationalism, India.
Second, the analysis of power-sharing arrangements in Pakistan seems to suggest that political culture of Pakistan is no more conducive for such arrangements. The failure of tripartite agreement in 1970s, the disappointing outcomes of coalition cabinets in
1990s, and the collapse of PPP-PML-N alliance recently provides sufficient evidence to conclude that politics of accommodation is not a political norm in politics of Pakistan. The political leadership of Pakistan is not too accommodative to practice consociational democracy in Pakistan. Though, there are some positive signs, overall situation is not conducive. Political accommodation like the Netherlands, Austria,
Belgium, and Switzerland is not very common in Pakistan.
Third, the evaluation of Pakistani society illustrates that it is not a case of deeply divided society. The degree of pluralism has been assessed using the criteria suggested by Arend Lijphart.
It quite understandable that it is difficult to locate a plural society that carries out the four criteria of an ideal plural society that is mentioned by Arend Lijphart. But, the
Pakistani case seems reluctant to fulfill, even, the first criteria. The first criterion that the segments into which the society is divided be clearly identified does not seem easy test for the case. Though, Pakistan is a plural society, there is a considerable ambiguity about the number of segments into which it should be divided. For instance, if the segments of the Pakistani society have been identified whether it is possible to determine precisely the size of each segment to pass the second criterion of a plural society presented by Lijphart? Even, if we take the census reports‟ figures for granted, the Pakistani case seems reluctant to pass the remaining two criteria. The
253 situation is even more ambivalent with reference to the third criterion. There is hardly any social or economic organization whose boundary coincides with the linguistic boundaries in Pakistan. Some political organizations of Pashtuns and Balochs may be regarded as ethnically exclusive, but largely there are no linguistically based parties in Pakistan. All the efforts of Sindhi and Siraiki nationalists in this direction have been complete failures. Punjabi segment overwhelmingly votes for the mainstream parties and MQM has changed its name from Mohajir Quami Movement (Mohajir
National Movement) to Muttahida Quami Movement (Joint National Movement) and its leadership has adopted a more inclusive outlook away from Mohajirism. Again, the elections results show inconsistency in the electoral support of ethnic parties.
Conversely, the evidence shows that mainstream parties are more consistent in terms of their electoral support. In this situation, it is very difficult to determine the degree of pluralism in Pakistani society. The vagueness of the criteria suggested by Lijphart to determine the degree of pluralism may lead different authors to different conclusions. However, it is safe to say that the Pakistani society has lesser degree of pluralism than the Western European cases of consociational democracy. It is neither a deeply divided nor a fragmented society. Though, ethnic and linguistic loyalties exist but are not too strong.
Since, it has been observed that (a) Pakistani society lacks favorable conditions for the establishment and maintenance of consociational democracy; (b) the political leadership is not too accommodative to practice consociational democracy; (c) and the Pakistani society is neither a deeply divided nor a fragmented society and is incompatible with the consociational democracy, therefore consociationalism is not a realistic option for Pakistan to practice democracy. Conversely, these findings display the underlying relevancy of federalism with the Pakistani case. The features
254 of Pakistani society concerning the geographical concentration of ethno-linguistic and large population size are compatible with the federal theory. In addition, the stability in electoral support of mainstream parties suggests majoritarian rather than consociational governance.
Once, the empirical analysis, using the secondary sources, established that (a) it is not the absence of consociational mechanisms that have caused much of the conflict in
Pakistan but relatively centralized federal settings and (b) consociationalism is not a realistic option for Pakistan, the author has attempted to use primary sources by consulting the people of Pakistan. The thrust behind this attempt was to find out whether or not a majority of Pakistanis prefer consociational devices. It was not an easy task to consult the people for such a survey. However, despite the all limitations and terrible situation of law and order, a sample of 1013 people stratified by language, race, region, and class was conducted.
The survey explored that the ethnic minorities perceive Punjabis as the dominant group. They believe that relative size of the Punjab province is an obstacle in the smooth running of federalism in Pakistan. They insist that the existing federal settings are inadequate to provide them power-sharing in the existing power structure of Pakistan. However, the findings concerning the inter-ethnic tensions and pluralism are hopeful for the Pakistani society. The survey explore that Pakistan is not a fragmented society. A plurality of Pakistanis, and a considerable number of all groups, affirms that ethnic identity has no more primacy; no exclusive political, social and economic organization of ethno-linguistic groups exists; and there is no more aversion among the members of different ethno-linguistic groups. However, some cultural grievances exist in smaller communities. These findings suggest the
255 irrelevancy of consociational mechanism for Pakistan because consociationalism is a therapy for the fragmented and deeply divided societies. Though, there is some variation in support for consociational devices among various groups of Pakistan, the majority of Pakistanis have disapproved these proposals. Punjabis, the largest group, appears more reluctant to propose consociational democracy. Even, the majority of smaller groups do not approve the all proposed devices. The proposals of proportional electoral system, segmental autonomy, and division of provinces on linguistic basis do not receive approval of the various ethno-linguistic groups.
However, the suggestions for minority rights protection and „just‟ representation of all ethno-linguistic groups in armed forces get substantial support. The support for the proposal of grand coalition has remained mixed. Therefore, the findings demonstrate that there is an appeal for some consociational devices in Pakistan, but the majority of the population does not wish to incorporate these devices in the constitution of Pakistan.
Conversely, the findings of the survey seem to suggest a consistency in support for a
(decentralized) federalism across ethno-linguistic groups. The majority of all ethno- linguistic groups approved the all proposed devices for decentralization. The comparative analysis of support for the two proposed solutions i.e. consociationalism and decentralized federalism seems to suggest that the majority of interviewees demonstrated more support for the decentralized federalism than the consociationalism. The support for proposals related to the decentralized federalism range from 60% to 80% in all ethno-linguistic groups. Contrary, the support for proposals related to consociationalism range from 40% to 50% percent. As the support for proposals related to decentralized federalism manifests in all ethno- linguistic groups, it is safe to say that the majority of Pakistanis prefer decentralized
256 federalism to the consociational arrangements. The interviews of a small group of experts on Pakistani politics and few political leaders also validate the results of survey and did not approve the case of consociationalism for Pakistan.
Though, some findings reveal that there is a sense of discomfort toward existing federal settings, it appears that people desire autonomy and power-sharing within the framework of federalism. To sum up, the all-embracing support for the proposals of decentralized federalism shows the trust of people in federalism. This trust in federalism, in turn, leads to the argument that a plurality of Pakistanis does not recommend consociationalism as a policy recommendation.
As a result, the core work of this thesis seems to suggest that consociationalism is neither a requirement nor a viable option for Pakistan. The majority of Pakistanis have not lost their trust in federalism. However, Pakistan needs a relatively more decentralized federal design that demonstrates the essence of federalism. That is the combination of self-rule and shared-rule. This deserves an additional study to outline the design of such federal settings for Pakistan.
As, the basic objective of this empirical investigation was to contribute an original analysis to the study of ethnic conflict regulation in Pakistan, it is up to the reader to decided whether or not the author remained successful in this attempt. It was clarified in the start that this research work does not intend to falsify or validate the theory but aims to enhance our understanding relating the utility of consociational democracy in diverse societies. As, the case suggests that consociational democracy is irrelevant to the Pakistani case, it demonstrates that consociational democracy‟s utility varies across case studies and it is not, necessarily, a viable solution for all multiethnic societies.
257
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271 Appendix 1: Results of Interviews
Q.1: Proportional Electoral System: Do you suggest a proportional electoral system for Pakistan?
Opinion of the Interviewees
S. No. Expert/ Political Leader Opinion 1 Ayesha Jalal1 No 2 Ishtiaq Ahmad2 No 3 Rakisits3 Yes 4 Wright4 Proportional representation tends to fragment the parties and give disproportionate power to small but disciplined minorities. It also weakens responsibility of legislators to their constituencies if a party list system is used. 5 Anonymous No comments 6 Monis Ahmer5 No, because such an option may open a Pandora box in the country's political scenario 7 Mansoor Akbar6 It will disturb the status quo and setting based on 1973 Constitution. Only fair elections and continuity is needed which will make us democratic and satisfied. 8 Sana Baloch7 No comments 9 Naveed Qamer8 No. people need greater direct access to their representatives 10 Ghous Ali shah9 No 11 Mr. Aamer 10 No comments 12 Mustafa Aziz Abadi11 No comments 13 Dr. Nasir Dushti12 No comments 14 No comments
Summary of Answers: It appears that majority of the experts do not recommend proportional electoral system for Pakistan. Only one expert suggests proportional electoral system and another does not reply the answer. However, majority of the politicians do not answer the question. The representative of the two leading parties, PPP and PML-N, do not approve the suggestion. Overall, with the exception of one expert, interviewees do not approve the suggestion of proportional electoral system for Pakistan.
Q. 2: Segmental Autonomy: Do you suggest that every ethno-linguistic group should have right to design its educational system and to decide the medium of instruction in educational institutions?
Opinion of the Interviewees S. No. Expert/ Political Leader Opinion 1 Ayesha Jalal No 2 Ishtiaq Ahmad No 3 Rakisits No 4 Wright Yes 5 Anonymous Yes 6 Monis Ahmer No comments 7 Mansoor Akbar Kundi No 8 Sana Baloch Yes 9 Naveed Qamer No 10 Ghous Ali shah No 11 Mr. Aamer (MQM) No 12 Mustafa Aziz Abadi (MQM) No 13 Dr. Nasir Dushti (Baloch) No comments
272 Summary of Answers: The results reveal that two experts suggested that ethno- linguistic should have the right to devise their educational system. Four not agreed with this suggestion, and one does not answer the question. Majority of the politicians rejected this proposal. Overall, out of total thirteen interviewees, eight disapproved the suggestion.
Q.3: Minority Rights Protection: Do you suggest constitutional safeguards to protect (ethnic) minority rights in Pakistan?
Opinion of the Interviewees
S. No. Expert/ Political Leader Opinion 1 Ayesha Jalal Yes 2 Ishtiaq Ahmad Yes 3 Rakisits Yes 4 Wright Yes 5 Anonymous Yes 6 Monis Ahmer Yes, by providing equal opportunities to minorities and preventing a sense of sense among such groups 7 Mansoor Akbar Guarantee the rights in Constitution and Courts to protect it. Plus, Provincial Legislatures should not pass any law contrary to their rights. Minority rights are in large threatened at the hands of Islamist political Parties in government. 8 Sana Baloch Yes 9 Naveed Qamer Yes. All religious, ethnic minorities be given protection through special laws, more representation and more affirmative action 10 Ghous Ali Shah Yes 11 Mr. Aamer Yes 12 Mustafa Aziz Abadi Yes 13 Dr. Nasir Dushti Yes
Summary of Answers: the findings seem to suggest a complete consensus among the interviewees that constitutional safeguards are required to protect ethnic minority rights in Pakistan.
Q.4: Redesigning the Constituent Units: Do you suggest the division of province(s) for the smooth running of federalism; and if you suggest division, what should be the principle of division i.e. division on administrative basis or division on linguistic basis?
Opinion of the Interviewees S. No. Expert/ Political Leader Opinion 1 Ayesha Jalal No division 2 Ishtiaq Ahmad Division on administrative basis 3 Rakisits Division on administrative basis 4 Wright Division on linguistic basis 5 Anonymous Division on linguistic basis 6 Monis Ahmer Yes, I suggest that the divisions of Pakistan should be upgraded as provinces so as to provide administrative space to those divisions which feel marginalized. 7 Mansoor Akbar Division on administrative basis 8 Sana Baloch Division on linguistic basis 9 Naveed Qamer No division, tinkering with historical entities will create further tensions. No division 10 Ghous Ali Shah Division on administrative basis 11 Mr. Aamer Division on administrative basis 12 Mustafa Aziz Abadi Division on linguistic basis 13 Dr. Nasir Dushti
273 Summary of Answers: The results show that majority of the interviewees suggested division of provinces as a policy recommendation to strengthen the federation. However, the majority approved the case for the division on administrative grounds.
Q.5: Grand Coalition: Do you suggest grand coalition cabinets in Pakistan at federal and provincial levels?
Opinion of the Interviewees S. No. Expert/ Political Opinion Leader 1 Ayesha Jalal Yes 2 Ishtiaq Ahmad Yes 3 Rakisits Yes 4 Wright No 5 Anonymous Yes 6 Monis Ahmer No comments 7 Mansoor Akbar No comments 8 Sana Baloch Yes 9 Naveed Qamer No comments 10 Ghous Ali Shah No comments 11 Mr. Aamer Yes 12 Mustafa Aziz Abadi Yes 13 Dr. Nasir Dushti Yes
Summary of Answers: The results show that majority of the interviewees recommended coalition cabinets at national and provincial levels to share power with substational ethnic minorities.
Q.6: Remedial Policy to Ensure Just Representation in Military: Do you suggest substational remedial policy to ensure just representation of all ethno-linguistic groups in military?
Opinion of the Interviewees S. No. Expert/ Political Opinion Leader 1 Ayesha Jalal Yes 2 Ishtiaq Ahmad Yes 3 Rakisits No 4 Wright Yes 5 Anonymous Yes 6 Monis Ahmer No comments 7 Mansoor Akbar No comments 8 Sana Baloch Yes 9 Naveed Qamer No comments 10 Ghous Ali Shah Yes 11 Mr. Aamer Yes 12 Mustafa Aziz Abadi Yes 13 Dr. Nasir Dushti Yes
Summary of Answers: The results show that, overall, the interviewees seem approving this suggestion unanimously.
274 Q.7: Provincial Autonomy: Do you agree with the argument that the provinces in Pakistan must be ‘autonomous’ in line with the Lahore resolution?
Figure 6-21: Opinion of the Interviewees S. No. Expert/ Political Opinion Leader 1 Ayesha Jalal Yes 2 Ishtiaq Ahmad No 3 Rakisits Yes 4 Wright No 5 Anonymous Yes 6 Monis Ahmer No comments 7 Mansoor Akbar No comments 8 Sana Baloch Yes 9 Naveed Qamer No comments 10 Ghous Ali Shah No comments 11 Mr. Aamer Yes 12 Mustafa Aziz Abadi Yes 13 Dr. Nasir Dushti Yes
Summary of Answers: The results shows that majority of the interviewees suggest that the provinces in Pakistan should have been provided more autonomy and this autonomy should be in accordance with the suggested in the provisions of Lahore resolution.
Q.8: Extended Role for the Senate: Do you suggest more legislative and administrative functions for the Senate to provide more space to smaller provinces?
Opinion of the Interviewees S. No. Expert/ Political Opinion Leader 1 Ayesha Jalal Yes 2 Ishtiaq Ahmad Yes 3 Rakisits No 4 Wright No 5 Anonymous Yes 6 Monis Ahmer Yes, Senate's role should not be ceremonial but must encompass vital policy matters 7 Mansoor Akbar Yes 8 Sana Baloch Yes 9 Naveed Qamer Greater role in matters in part two of federal legislative list and concurrent list , if it survives 10 Ghous Ali Shah No comments 11 Mr. Aamer Yes 12 Mustafa Aziz Abadi Yes 13 Dr. Nasir Dushti Yes
Summary of Answers: The findings reveal that, with some exception, the respondents have unanimously suggested that the senate should have been provided more active role in functions of the government.
275 Q.9: Role of Provincial Legislature in Constitutional Amendments: Do you suggest that the provincial assemblies should have some role in constitutional amendments?
Opinion of the Interviewees
S. No. Expert/ Political Opinion Leader 1 Ayesha Jalal Yes 2 Ishtiaq Ahmad Yes 3 Rakisits Yes 4 Wright Yes 5 Anonymous Yes 6 Monis Ahmer No, only national assembly and senate because these two bodies represent the whole of Pakistan 7 Mansoor Akbar Yes, subject to simple approval of the bill by Provincial Assemblies. Plus, Senate to approve by 2/3 which already exists. 8 Sana Baloch Yes 9 Naveed Qamer No. that would be chaotic 10 Ghous Ali Shah No 11 Mr. Aamer No comments 12 Mustafa Aziz Abadi No comments 13 Dr. Nasir Dushti Yes
Summary of Answers: A plurality of the respondents approved the suggestion that provincial legislature should have been provided some role in the constitutional amendments.
Q.10: Multiple Formula of NFC to Distribute Funds: Do you suggest that the present formula of National Finance Commission for allocation of resources to provinces (that is solely based on population) should be changed?
Figure 6-24: Opinion of the Interviewees S. No. Expert/ Political Opinion Leader 1 Ayesha Jalal Yes 2 Ishtiaq Ahmad Yes 3 Rakisits Yes 4 Wright Yes 5 Anonymous Yes 6 Monis Ahmer Yes. It should be changed so to make it more rational 7 Mansoor Akbar Yes 8 Sana Baloch Yes 9 Naveed Qamer Yes. A consensus exists to include backwardness, inverse population density. collection should also be included 10 Ghous Ali Shah Yes 11 Mr. Aamer Yes 12 Mustafa Aziz Abadi Yes 13 Dr. Nasir Dushti Yes
Summary of Answers: The results suggest an absolute consensus among the interviewees that there should be a multiple formula for distribution in NFC Award.
276 Endnotes
1 Ayesha Jalal is Director of Center for South Asian and Indian Ocean Studies at Tufts University 2 Professor Ishtiaq Ahmed is a Visiting Research Professor at the Institute of South Asian Studies (ISAS), National University of Singapore and a Professor of Political Science at Stockholm University. 3 Dr. Claude Rakisits is Senior Lecture at School of International and Political Studies, Deakin University, Australia. His principal research interest is Pakistan. 4 Theodore P. Wright, Jr. is a Professor Emeritus at Department of Political Science, University at Albany (state university of New York). He has published more than 80 journal articles on various aspects of Indian and Pakistani politics. 5 Dr. Moonis Ahmer is chairman of the Department of International Relations, university of Karachi. 6 Mansoor Akbar is the Vice Chancellor of the Gomal University Dera Ismael Khan, Pakistan. 7 Sana Ullah Baloch is former Member of Parliament of Pakistan, served as the Member Senate of Pakistan (2003-2008) and as Member National Assembly (1997-1999). He is a leader of Baloch Nationalist Party. 8 Naveed Qamer is federal minister and key leader of PPP 9 Ghous Ali Shah is the ex-Chief Minster of Sindh and the president of PML-N Sindh. 10 Mr. Aamer is the member of the Rabta committee of MQM 11 Mr. Mustafa Aziz Abadi is a member of the Rabta committee of MQM 12 Dr. Nasir Dushti is a UK-based Baloch Nationalist.
277 Appendix 2: Political Parties (Acronyms)
Country Abbreviation Political Party Switzerland SVP Swiss People's Party Switzerland SP Social-Democratic Party Switzerland FDP Free Democratic Party Switzerland CVP Christian Democratic People's Party Switzerland EVP Evangelical People's Party Austria SPO Socialist democratic party Austria OVP Austrian people’s party Austria KPO Communist party Austria VDU League of independents Austria Green Green alternative Austria LF Liberal forum The Netherlands KVP Catholic people’s party The Netherlands PvdA Labour party The Netherlands VVD Liberal party The Netherlands ARP Anti revolutionary party (protestant) The Netherlands CHU Christian Historical union (protestant) The Netherlands SGP Political Reformed party Belgium PLP/PVV Belgian Christian democratic party (before 1972) Belgium PSC/CVP Christian people’s party(before 1968) Belgium PSB/BSP Belgian socialist party( until 1978) Belgium PCB/KPB Belgian communist party Pakistan JWP Jamhoori Wattan Party Pakistan BNP Balochistan National Party Pakistan PKMAP Pashtoonkhawa Milli Awami Party Pakistan ANP Awami National Party Pakistan MQM Muttahida Qaumi Movement Pakistan Pakistan PPP Pakistan Peoples Party Pakistan JUI Jamiat Ulama-e-Islam Pakistan JI Jamaat-e-Islami Pakistan Pakistan PML-N Pakistan's Muslim League-Nawaz Pakistan PML-Q Pakistan's Muslim League-Quaid-e-Azam Pakistan MMA Muttahida Majlis-e-Amal
278