Corporate Bonds and Debentures
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The TIPS-Treasury Bond Puzzle
The TIPS-Treasury Bond Puzzle Matthias Fleckenstein, Francis A. Longstaff and Hanno Lustig The Journal of Finance, October 2014 Presented By: Rafael A. Porsani The TIPS-Treasury Bond Puzzle 1 / 55 Introduction The TIPS-Treasury Bond Puzzle 2 / 55 Introduction (1) Treasury bond and the Treasury Inflation-Protected Securities (TIPS) markets: two of the largest and most actively traded fixed-income markets in the world. Find that there is persistent mispricing on a massive scale across them. Treasury bonds are consistently overpriced relative to TIPS. Price of a Treasury bond can exceed that of an inflation-swapped TIPS issue exactly matching the cash flows of the Treasury bond by more than $20 per $100 notional amount. One of the largest examples of arbitrage ever documented. The TIPS-Treasury Bond Puzzle 3 / 55 Introduction (2) Use TIPS plus inflation swaps to create synthetic Treasury bond. Price differences between the synthetic Treasury bond and the nominal Treasury bond: arbitrage opportunities. Average size of the mispricing: 54.5 basis points, but can exceed 200 basis points for some pairs. I The average size of this mispricing is orders of magnitude larger than transaction costs. The TIPS-Treasury Bond Puzzle 4 / 55 Introduction (3) What drives the mispricing? Slow-moving capital may help explain why mispricing persists. Is TIPS-Treasury mispricing related to changes in capital available to hedge funds? Answer: Yes. Mispricing gets smaller as more capital gets to the hedge fund sector. The TIPS-Treasury Bond Puzzle 5 / 55 Introduction (4) Also find that: Correlation in arbitrage strategies: size of TIPS-Treasury arbitrage is correlated with arbitrage mispricing in other markets. -
Understanding the Z-Spread Moorad Choudhry*
Learning Curve September 2005 Understanding the Z-Spread Moorad Choudhry* © YieldCurve.com 2005 A key measure of relative value of a corporate bond is its swap spread. This is the basis point spread over the interest-rate swap curve, and is a measure of the credit risk of the bond. In its simplest form, the swap spread can be measured as the difference between the yield-to-maturity of the bond and the interest rate given by a straight-line interpolation of the swap curve. In practice traders use the asset-swap spread and the Z- spread as the main measures of relative value. The government bond spread is also considered. We consider the two main spread measures in this paper. Asset-swap spread An asset swap is a package that combines an interest-rate swap with a cash bond, the effect of the combined package being to transform the interest-rate basis of the bond. Typically, a fixed-rate bond will be combined with an interest-rate swap in which the bond holder pays fixed coupon and received floating coupon. The floating-coupon will be a spread over Libor (see Choudhry et al 2001). This spread is the asset-swap spread and is a function of the credit risk of the bond over and above interbank credit risk.1 Asset swaps may be transacted at par or at the bond’s market price, usually par. This means that the asset swap value is made up of the difference between the bond’s market price and par, as well as the difference between the bond coupon and the swap fixed rate. -
Evidence from SME Bond Markets
Temi di discussione (Working Papers) Asymmetric information in corporate lending: evidence from SME bond markets by Alessandra Iannamorelli, Stefano Nobili, Antonio Scalia and Luana Zaccaria September 2020 September Number 1292 Temi di discussione (Working Papers) Asymmetric information in corporate lending: evidence from SME bond markets by Alessandra Iannamorelli, Stefano Nobili, Antonio Scalia and Luana Zaccaria Number 1292 - September 2020 The papers published in the Temi di discussione series describe preliminary results and are made available to the public to encourage discussion and elicit comments. The views expressed in the articles are those of the authors and do not involve the responsibility of the Bank. Editorial Board: Federico Cingano, Marianna Riggi, Monica Andini, Audinga Baltrunaite, Marco Bottone, Davide Delle Monache, Sara Formai, Francesco Franceschi, Salvatore Lo Bello, Juho Taneli Makinen, Luca Metelli, Mario Pietrunti, Marco Savegnago. Editorial Assistants: Alessandra Giammarco, Roberto Marano. ISSN 1594-7939 (print) ISSN 2281-3950 (online) Printed by the Printing and Publishing Division of the Bank of Italy ASYMMETRIC INFORMATION IN CORPORATE LENDING: EVIDENCE FROM SME BOND MARKETS by Alessandra Iannamorelli†, Stefano Nobili†, Antonio Scalia† and Luana Zaccaria‡ Abstract Using a comprehensive dataset of Italian SMEs, we find that differences between private and public information on creditworthiness affect firms’ decisions to issue debt securities. Surprisingly, our evidence supports positive (rather than adverse) selection. Holding public information constant, firms with better private fundamentals are more likely to access bond markets. Additionally, credit conditions improve for issuers following the bond placement, compared with a matched sample of non-issuers. These results are consistent with a model where banks offer more flexibility than markets during financial distress and firms may use market lending to signal credit quality to outside stakeholders. -
Bond Liquidity and Dealer Inventories: Insights from US and European Regulatory Data
52 Financial Conduct Authority Occasional Paper Securities and Exchange Commission DERA Working Paper February 2020 Bond liquidity and dealer inventories: Insights from US and European regulatory data Plamen Ivanov, Alexei Orlov and Michael Schihl Occasional Paper 52 / DERA Working Paper Bond liquidity and dealer inventories Occasional Paper 52 / DERA Working Paper Abstract Most corporate bond research on liquidity and dealer inventories is based on the USD- denominated bonds transactions in the US reported to TRACE. Some of these bonds, however, are also traded in Europe, and those trades are not subject to the TRACE reporting require- ments. Leveraging our access to both TRACE and ZEN, the UK's trade reporting system which is not publicly available, we find an overlap of about 30,000 bonds that are traded both in the US and in Europe. This paper examines how using the CUSIP-level information from TRACE and ZEN affects the computation of bond liquidity metrics, dealer inventories, and the relationship between the two. We find that in the combined dataset, the weekly volume traded and number of trades are significantly higher than in TRACE: e.g., the average unconditional number of trades in investment-grade (high-yield) bonds is 17% (20%) higher and the average uncondi- tional volume traded is 15% (17%) higher when we incorporate the information from ZEN. We find a strong positive relationship between inventories and liquidity, as proxied by the trading activity metrics (i.e., number of trades, zero trading days, or par value traded) in TRACE data, and this result carries over to the combined dataset. -
Mortgage-Backed Securities & Collateralized Mortgage Obligations
Mortgage-backed Securities & Collateralized Mortgage Obligations: Prudent CRA INVESTMENT Opportunities by Andrew Kelman,Director, National Business Development M Securities Sales and Trading Group, Freddie Mac Mortgage-backed securities (MBS) have Here is how MBSs work. Lenders because of their stronger guarantees, become a popular vehicle for finan- originate mortgages and provide better liquidity and more favorable cial institutions looking for investment groups of similar mortgage loans to capital treatment. Accordingly, this opportunities in their communities. organizations like Freddie Mac and article will focus on agency MBSs. CRA officers and bank investment of- Fannie Mae, which then securitize The agency MBS issuer or servicer ficers appreciate the return and safety them. Originators use the cash they collects monthly payments from that MBSs provide and they are widely receive to provide additional mort- homeowners and “passes through” the available compared to other qualified gages in their communities. The re- principal and interest to investors. investments. sulting MBSs carry a guarantee of Thus, these pools are known as mort- Mortgage securities play a crucial timely payment of principal and inter- gage pass-throughs or participation role in housing finance in the U.S., est to the investor and are further certificates (PCs). Most MBSs are making financing available to home backed by the mortgaged properties backed by 30-year fixed-rate mort- buyers at lower costs and ensuring that themselves. Ginnie Mae securities are gages, but they can also be backed by funds are available throughout the backed by the full faith and credit of shorter-term fixed-rate mortgages or country. The MBS market is enormous the U.S. -
Corporate Bond Market Dysfunction During COVID-19 and Lessons
Hutchins Center Working Paper # 69 O c t o b e r 2 0 2 0 Corporate Bond Market Dysfunction During COVID-19 and Lessons from the Fed’s Response J. Nellie Liang* October 1, 2020 Abstract: Changes in the financial sector since the global financial crisis appear to have increased dramatically the demand for liquidity by holders of corporate bonds beyond the ability of the markets to provide it in stress events. The March market turmoil revealed the costs of liquidity mismatch in open-end bond mutual funds. The surprisingly large redemptions of investment-grade corporate bond funds added to stresses in both the corporate bond and Treasury markets. These conditions led to unprecedented Fed interventions, which significantly reduced risk spreads and improved market functioning, with much of the improvements occurring right after the initial announcement. The improved conditions allowed companies to issue bonds, which helped them to maintain employees and investment spending. The episode suggests several areas for further study and possible reforms. * J. Nellie Liang, Hutchins Center on Fiscal and Monetary Policy, Brookings Institution ([email protected]). I would like to thank Darrell Duffie, Bill English, Anil Kashyap, Donald Kohn, Patrick Parkinson, Jeremy Stein, Adi Sunderam, David Wessel, and Alex Zhou for helpful comments and insights, and Manuel Alcalá Kovalski for excellent research assistance. THIS PAPER IS ONLINE AT https://www.brookings.edu/research/corporate- bond-market-dysfunction-during-covid-19-and- lessons-from-the-feds-response/ 1. Introduction As concerns about the pandemic’s effect on economic activity in early March escalated, asset prices began to move in unusual ways—including the prices of investment-grade corporate bonds. -
Interest-Rate-Growth Differentials and Government Debt Dynamics
From: OECD Journal: Economic Studies Access the journal at: http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/19952856 Interest-rate-growth differentials and government debt dynamics David Turner, Francesca Spinelli Please cite this article as: Turner, David and Francesca Spinelli (2012), “Interest-rate-growth differentials and government debt dynamics”, OECD Journal: Economic Studies, Vol. 2012/1. http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/eco_studies-2012-5k912k0zkhf8 This document and any map included herein are without prejudice to the status of or sovereignty over any territory, to the delimitation of international frontiers and boundaries and to the name of any territory, city or area. OECD Journal: Economic Studies Volume 2012 © OECD 2013 Interest-rate-growth differentials and government debt dynamics by David Turner and Francesca Spinelli* The differential between the interest rate paid to service government debt and the growth rate of the economy is a key concept in assessing fiscal sustainability. Among OECD economies, this differential was unusually low for much of the last decade compared with the 1980s and the first half of the 1990s. This article investigates the reasons behind this profile using panel estimation on selected OECD economies as means of providing some guidance as to its future development. The results suggest that the fall is partly explained by lower inflation volatility associated with the adoption of monetary policy regimes credibly targeting low inflation, which might be expected to continue. However, the low differential is also partly explained by factors which are likely to be reversed in the future, including very low policy rates, the “global savings glut” and the effect which the European Monetary Union had in reducing long-term interest differentials in the pre-crisis period. -
Four Decades of Change in the Commercial Paper Market
This PDF is a selection from an out-of-print volume from the National Bureau of Economic Research Volume Title: Trends and Cycles in the Commercial Paper Market Volume Author/Editor: Richard T. Selden Volume Publisher: NBER Volume ISBN: 0-87014-399-9 Volume URL: http://www.nber.org/books/seld63-1 Publication Date: 1963 Chapter Title: Four Decades of Change in the Commercial Paper Market Chapter Author: Richard T. Selden Chapter URL: http://www.nber.org/chapters/c1919 Chapter pages in book: (p. 6 - 30) 2 Four Decades of Change in the Commercial Paper Market The Market in 1920 The earliest available estimate of commercial paper outstanding is for July 1918, when the Federal Reserve Bank of New York began reporting end-of-month figures. At that time, outstanding paper of thirty dealers, who presumably handled virtually all commercial paper, was $874 million—probably a record level.' During the next year and a half, outstanding dealer paper grew by nearly 50 per cent, reaching a peak of $1,296 million in January 1920. There was no direct paper until later in that year, when General Motors Acceptance Corporation began borrowing on short-term notes without the assistance of a dealer.2 Table 1 provides perspective on the size of the market at the begin- fling of 1920. The figures show that commercial paper was a distinctly 'See Appendix A for a complete record' of monthly outstandings (without seasonal adjustment), July 1918 to December 1961. Note that before 1948 these data include only paper maturing within seven months. 2A number of other finance companies were borrowing short-term funds at this time through collateral trust notes, which in some cases were placed directly with banks (or possibly other lenders). -
Sample Debt Validation Letter (Send Via Certified Mail, Return Receipt Requested)
Sample Debt Validation Letter (Send via certified mail, return receipt requested) Date: Your Name Your Address Your City, State, Zip Collection Agency Name Collection Agency Address Collection Agency City, State, Zip RE: Account # (Fill in Account Number) To Whom It May Concern: Be advised this is not a refusal to pay, but a notice that your claim is disputed and validation is requested. Under the Fair Debt collection Practices Act (FDCPA), I have the right to request validation of the debt you say I owe you. I am requesting proof that I am indeed the party you are asking to pay this debt, and there is some contractual obligation that is binding on me to pay this debt. This is NOT a request for “verification” or proof of my mailing address, but a request for VALIDATION made pursuant to 15 USC 1692g Sec. 809 (b) of the FDCPA. I respectfully request that your offices provide me with competent evidence that I have any legal obligation to pay you. At this time I will also inform you that if your offices have or continue to report invalidated information to any of the three major credit bureaus (Equifax, Experian, Trans Union), this action might constitute fraud under both federal and state laws. Due to this fact, if any negative mark is found or continues to report on any of my credit reports by your company or the company you represent, I will not hesitate in bringing legal action against you and your client for the following: Violation of the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act and Defamation of Character. -
Nber Working Paper Series Facts and Fantasies About
NBER WORKING PAPER SERIES FACTS AND FANTASIES ABOUT COMMODITY FUTURES TEN YEARS LATER Geetesh Bhardwaj Gary Gorton Geert Rouwenhorst Working Paper 21243 http://www.nber.org/papers/w21243 NATIONAL BUREAU OF ECONOMIC RESEARCH 1050 Massachusetts Avenue Cambridge, MA 02138 June 2015 The paper has benefited from comments by seminar participants at the 2015 Bloomberg Global Commodity Investment Roundtable, the 2015 FTSE World Investment Forum, and from Rajkumar Janardanan, Kurt Nelson, Ashraf Rizvi, and Matthew Schwab. Gorton has nothing to currently disclose. He was a consultant to AIG Financial Products from 1996-2008. The views expressed herein are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the National Bureau of Economic Research. At least one co-author has disclosed a financial relationship of potential relevance for this research. Further information is available online at http://www.nber.org/papers/w21243.ack NBER working papers are circulated for discussion and comment purposes. They have not been peer- reviewed or been subject to the review by the NBER Board of Directors that accompanies official NBER publications. © 2015 by Geetesh Bhardwaj, Gary Gorton, and Geert Rouwenhorst. All rights reserved. Short sections of text, not to exceed two paragraphs, may be quoted without explicit permission provided that full credit, including © notice, is given to the source. Facts and Fantasies about Commodity Futures Ten Years Later Geetesh Bhardwaj, Gary Gorton, and Geert Rouwenhorst NBER Working Paper No. 21243 June 2015 JEL No. G1,G11,G12 ABSTRACT Gorton and Rouwenhorst (2006) examined commodity futures returns over the period July 1959 to December 2004 based on an equally-weighted index. -
Changing Definition of Debentures – Forcing Impasse for Commercial Papers in Times to Come?
Article Changing definition of Debentures – Forcing impasse for commercial papers in times to come? Nidhi Bothra [email protected] 13th May, 2014 Check at: http://india-financing.com/staff-publications.html for more write ups. Copyright: This write up is the property of Vinod Kothari Consultants P. Ltd. and no part of it can be copied, reproduced or distributed in any manner. Disclaimer: This write up is intended to initiate academic debate on a pertinent question. It is not intended to be a professional advice and should not be relied upon for real life facts. Changing definition of Debentures – Forcing impasse for commercial papers in times to come? Article The new Companies Act 2013 has changed the regulatory face of the corporate India; “raising the bar on Corporate Governance.” The new regulatory changes including need for CSR activities, increased investor protection, greater transparency in business and have been the larger issues of discussion with the elite section of the corporate sector. However smaller refinements in the new Act against the old one have also created quite a buzz. Recently an issue was raised by some members of the legal fraternity on an age old settled issue of the difference between negotiable instruments and transferable/ marketable instruments and whether the new definition of “debentures” u/s 2 (30) of the Companies Act, 2013 now includes instruments such as commercial paper as well. Some of the counsels are holding the view that commercial paper will now be included within the ambit of the definition of debentures forcing people to re-think on a question that must have been concluded some hundreds of years ago. -
Nber Working Papers Series
NBER WORKING PAPERS SERIES WAS THERE A BUBBLE IN THE 1929 STOCK MARKET? Peter Rappoport Eugene N. White Working Paper No. 3612 NATIONAL BUREAU OF ECONOMIC RESEARCH 1050 Massachusetts Avenue Cambridge, MA 02138 February 1991 We have benefitted from comments made on earlier drafts of this paper by seminar participants at the NEER Summer Institute and Rutgers University. We are particularly indebted to Charles Calomiris, Barry Eicherigreen, Gikas Hardouvelis and Frederic Mishkiri for their suggestions. This paper is part of NBER's research program in Financial Markets and Monetary Economics. Any opinions expressed are those of the authors and not those of the National Bureau of Economic Research. NBER Working Paper #3612 February 1991 WAS THERE A BUBBLE IN THE 1929 STOCK MARKET? ABSTRACT Standard tests find that no bubbles are present in the stock price data for the last one hundred years. In contrast., historical accounts, focusing on briefer periods, point to the stock market of 1928-1929 as a classic example of a bubble. While previous studies have restricted their attention to the joint behavior of stock prices and dividends over the course of a century, this paper uses the behavior of the premia demanded on loans collateralized by the purchase of stocks to evaluate the claim that the boom and crash of 1929 represented a bubble. We develop a model that permits us to extract an estimate of the path of the bubble and its probability of bursting in any period and demonstrate that the premium behaves as would be expected in the presence of a bubble in stock prices.