lslamists, Left and Right

condemn the status quo, and to con- lslom hgs posited potlr. polilicol often been os being the middle ln demn is to go into battle. terms this is token to rneon o medion role between lhe left ond the Whet lkhwan emerged onto the right Abdel Wohob El-Affiendi delves into this contenlion. political arena in the mid-thfuties they shared the enthusiasm'pf most Egypt- ians for the ascension of young King Faruq to the throne in 1936. For a[ IN one of those now-ubiquitous semi- struggle they were wagng was futile. Egyptians at the time Farouq's reign nars on "" Avenues were blocked after the two appeared to signal a new golden era. held recentli at the School of Oriental and their associates won the hostility But for lkhwan this was even more so and African Studies (SOAS), Frof- of most Muslim rulers and after the because the King had as one of his essor A.K. Lambton of SOAS put British banned their paper, al-Urwa closest advibers Shaikh Mustafa al- forward the opinion that Islamic fun- al-Wuth4a from India and before that Maraghi, former Shaikh of al-Azhar, damentalism, and itself for that Egypt, forcing it to cease publication. and Ali Mnher, who was later to matter, has a bias towards con- Abdu suggested that they take ten become prime minister. Both were servatism, lslnm, oS an "Ideology of young promising students, indoctrinate respectable personalities with known the Book" is per se fundamentalist, them with their way of thinking, and sympathy for the goals of the Islamic and it frowns on heterodoxy, creative hope that the group will multiply geo- movement. The King later disappoin- interpretation and new norms gener- metrically over the years. 'Afghani ted everybody, but the fact that the ally, and directs the people towards accused Abduh of being a defeatist Ikhwan feted and applauded him was the eternal infallible texts. There is and broke with him. The latter pro- later cited by opponents as evidence aething new in fact about the claim ceeded with his ov"n approach of edu- of the group's character. that Islam lavours conservatism. This cation in Syria and later in Egypt till This is a simplificatioR, not only be- allegation has been at the core of the he died in 1905. cause the accusation were made from debate that moved the whole.Muslim Abduh compromised even with the comfortable perspective of world relentlessly towards Lord Cromer, the effective ruler of Nasser's era. It is true in the last half cenhtry or so. The Egypt, but even then he earned the that Hassan al-Banna had kept hoping western-influenced elites bred under hostility of the Khedive because he the King will be saved one day and colonialism and the attendaot creeping refused to accommodate the latter's was until his last days pleading in vain westernisation have argued that tradit- desigls on Awqaf funds. His disciple for an audience with His Majesty. But 'ional Islamic authorities block their gave him the same it also remains true that the internal ppns for modernisation and develop- advice he heard him offer before to dynamics of the movement has made ment and succeeded to a large extent Afghani regarding the latter's re- it a revolutionary force in Faruq's in sweeping Islam aside. This has en- lations with Sultan Abdelhamid: why Egypt, perhaps the only genuinely re- sured that the current Islamist move- not compromise with the monarch on volutionary one there was. Banna ment was in fact a movement against, these trivial matters to gain his sup- himself was murdered in 1949 on dir- and not for, the status quo in the port for the far reaching reforms that ect orders from the King himself. lands of Islam. And here we have, if he planned in education and The movement suffered internal we accepted Lambton's thesis, the management? Abduh could no more tensions on the issue of revolution paradox of conservatism fighting accept this way of behaviour than his early in its history, when activists fiercgly to upset the status quo. The master could: apparently there is a from a rival group, (the Young Egypt issue, however, cannot be resolved limil feygpd which a "fundamentalist" party which later became the Socialist that easily. could not go. However, the argument party) went out smashing liquour It is true that the modern Islamic about where to draw the line still stores "to enforce " and defied movement, from its genesis in the remains a rich source of confusion. Ikhwan to emulate them. Banna cauti- activism of Sayed Jamal ad-Din al- The two major Islamic inovements oned his followers about the futility of Afghani in the 1870's was in ess€noe which emerged this century (Iamont this approach, but the debate ended in anti-establishment. It opposed in- Islami n India and the Ikhwan al- a split by the radical group which cumbent Muslim rulers as well as the Muslimoon in Egypt) inherited this formed the Shabab western.dominated international ambivalent legacy. They shared with (Muhammad's Youth). That was back order. But even in that phase its atti- AMuh the belief that the in 1937 but the radical group, far from tude was ambivalent. Afghani co- have to be educated before they can creating a revolution lapsed into obli- operated with several Muslim rulers be made to change their political en- vion. However, the radicalisation of and even wanted a deal with Britain. vironment, but also inherited the mainstream mov€ment itself took His disciple Abduh, through whom Afghani's funpatience with this en- place as the Palestinian issue prom- the movement was perpetuated, broke vironment. The matter was complica- pted it to form a secret military wing with the master earlier precisely over ted even further by the fact you could which was then tempted to use its the latter's revolutionary approach. not always separate. education from force against local Jewish and foreign Abduh told the master that the subversion. To educate you have to targets in Egypt as well as against the

u lnquiry, April 1988 -ffi$ f#;.r T- -: El+s !.+]4i* H+t*il;l oqry

under Tllmlsanl (lelt) the movement crated by Hassan AFBanna (left) has movcd declrlvely to tl€ rlght

British and those accused of support,, were backed by comrpt cliques, as ing them. who quit the party after being The outcome of thii un- long as he payed lip-service to Fytrt planned this or informed that to be a Communisi confrontation was defeat for that Islamic goal and promised a hard- meant not to believe in God. The the movement and suppression. It was line stance on the British occupation. mov€ment was thus radical from also the catalyst that hastened the But the if this wils so in Egypi, things start. The group, which was founded 1952 revolution of which Ikhwan wete were different with the branch in in 1949, suffered a split in 1953-4 and active backers and ardent supporters. Syria. There lkhwan took a very mili- the radicals were ousted year. Up to the time of the revolition the that tant socialist stanc€ from the late Babikir Karrar, the actual Ikhwan appeared hardly conscious of founder, 194O's. They attisd lfosmselves with lcd the radicals out to form aLfana'a social issues, apart from decrying the populists and left-wing goup6 op al-Islamiyya (the Islamic group). In decline of morals and foreign control to co-operation 'posed with the West. 1965 the group formed the Islamic of the eoonomy. They based their One the of Syrian lkhwan leaders, , which made [ttle isr- alliances with other forces in societv Muhammad al-Mubarak, even went so pact on Sudanese politics. In the Z0's on the sole criterion of their Islamil as far to say that his movement was memben of the group, including pronounc€ments. They supported the Kar- offering " in the Islamic cup." rar, left for Libya where unpopular regime of Ismael Sidqi in they are said In 1949 the lkhwan formed in" to have played an important 1945 because he promised some role in Islamic Socialist Front as their political formulating Qadhafi's brand Islamic reforms, while they fought the forum, of and continued to spearhead Islamic . The main group of very popular Wafd party for no the fight against apparent western influence. Sudanese Ikhwan drifted gaOualy reason other than the This culminated in the publication reasons in away from its radical socialist pasi, for which rival football sup- 1959 of the book by Musrafa porters champion al-Siba,i, embracing what it thought to be the their respective leader of the Syrian lkhwbn, entitled teams. Thus they did truly Islamic middle ground. not seem part- Islamic Socialism, which continued to icularly concerned about In Jordan, the lkhwan who started the dynamics be an influential work in the Islamic of social identification as anti-royalist rebels soon made a or political movement for quite a time. choice. reapproachment with the Hashemite It did not matter whether the In Sudan the founder of the group , to the extent that the move- regime or individual they supported which eventually dominated the move-- ment's leader was offered the pre- were popular, lacked or ment was actually a former Com- miership in 1957. A similar ac@rnmo- lnquiry, April 1988 dation was reached between Ikhwan squabble. As it happened, it was indelible mark on the subconscious of groups and monarchies in the Gulf, Nasser who ingeniously lumped his the movement. giving radical opponents ammunition two bitterest enemies together into a In the democratic Sudan of mid- to rail at the reactionary conservative conveniently alleged plot, and got rid sixties, one of lkhwan's then rare out- nature of the lslamists. Yet to under- of both of them. That fateful moment lets of expression, one started to hear stand this situation in perspective one in October 1954 announced the the eulogies of liberal , and must analyse the protracted process Ikhwan's long years in the wilderness. the praise of King Faisal of Saudi which led to it. What happened after was largely Arabia's pan-, simultaneous It all started with the 1952 revolu- shaped by the encounter with Nasser. with the condemnation of pro- tion in Egypt. This represented the Ikhwan initially took refuge in Jordan, Communist military dictatorships. climax of Ikhwan radicalism. Before Syria and the Gulf states. As Syria Gone were the earlier references to that the Ikhwan were actively in- first came under Nasser (1958) and Islamic socialism. The process was volved in support for the short-lived later the Ba'athist radicals (1953), given a push by Sayyed Qutb's radical February 1948 revolt in Yemen, and Ikhwan's existence there became pre- rejection of any dilution of the Islamic the fighting in Palestine to which carious. Under the leadership of message. We should not and need many lkhwan members volunteered. Issah al;Attar who succeeded Siba'i not, Qutb wrote, assimilate Islam to But in L952 came what seemed to n 1962, the Syrian Ikhwan moved any other worldly ideology. The lit- many lkhwan as their final vindication away from their radical socialism of erature of the movement was hen-

and the advent of the order they had yesteryear, and became oPPosed to ceforth dominated by this celebration worked for. The triumph was soon to the Ba'ath and other left-wing groups' of the uniqueness of the Islamic mes- sour as the hostility of the young as well as to the swell of Nasserism sage. This helped the lkhwan escape officerc became more and more that challenged them in their verY what had seemed to be a choicp be- apparent. Even General Naguib, urban Sunni base. For them as for tween and socialism. In whose side lkhwan took, was not sym- Ikhwan elsewhere, the onlY oPen re- particular, it saved them from the pathetic to the lkhwaz programme, as fuge became the monarchies of the embarrassment of having to support he confessed later. Thus lkhwan wete Gulf or the of pro- Nasser's anti-c.olonialist pan-Arabist doomed no matter which side tri- western Lebanon. An alliance of con- stance, or to oppose it in spite of its umphed in the Nasser-Naguib venience first, but one that left its popularity.

36 lnquiry, April 1988 -:i: . ':.. .: t rl"l 1..r;;-11,4;.i;;, -1

'l:,.i.,!,;,ll!+,;.1.',:,.+ The Nasser era created a big only with the conservative mon- upheaval in the ranks of the Islamist archies. movement. To start with, the dif- The fall of 's radical regime ferences arose with Nasser mainly in Indonesia and the simultaneous de- over his allegedly mild approach to mise of the Communist party there the British occupation. The agreement gave Islamists a respite and cause to on troop withdrawal signed in 1954 rejoice and hope. The Islamic move- was comdemned by Hassan Hodaybi, ment internationally had become Ikhwan's new leader, for giving the deeply mistrustful of the left by then. British the right to reoccupy in case of The defeat of June 1967 which was war. But no sooner were the lkhwan endured mainly by the radical regimes locked up in 1954 than Nasser appea- of Syna and Egypt was also a red to be the anti-western hawk. This welcome relief. Now Nasser had fin- was more traumatic for lkhwan than ally been discredited at his own game, the crackdown on them. Many sent and the Ikhwan could comdemn and word from prison volunteering for the despise him in good conscience. But 1956 war against the French-British- the irrepressible Nasser countered by Israeli invasion. Nasser's secret police finally bringing Islamic themes into carried a ruthless psychological on- the political discourse, urging people slaught on Ikhwan prisoners from then to appeal to Islam for moral support. o0, putting pressure on them t0 But this only helped strengthen the pledge allegiance to Nasser's re- Islamist appeal. volutionary ains. The complicated Islamists still had a long way to go, trauma led to a three-way split. however. The consolidation of the Young radicals who questioned the Ba'athist regime in Syria was on .the wisdom of the leadership's opposition way, as was the Ba'athist takeover in to Nasser, pledged allegiance to . In Sudan a Moscow-supported Nasser and were. subsequently re- left-wing regime swept the lkhwan to leased, but like their predecessors of jail, and swelled the ranks of Islamist (above) of 1937 and later radicals they left hardly exiles in the Gulf and Europe. In l97l Nasser took up the call lglamlc eoclallsm, as dld Ghaddall (far a trace on the later development of in following the havoc left) and Bhutto. The lslamlsts w€rs, the movement. brought by the secession of East howeYer, unlmprcssod Influence was divided between two Pakistan, two left-wing regimes came currents, the older leaders who resis- to power in both parts. The Islamists ted any compromise and stuck to were unhappy with both, even though Hodaybi's line, and the ultra-radicals Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto, the new Pakistani influenced by Sayyed Qutb's writings. leader borrowed heavily from Islamic Assad showed signs of socialism- The latter comdemned not only the symbolism for his radical programme. weariness and was slowly but firmly repressive dictatorship of Nasser, but Thus the early seventies appeared for moving to liberalise the economy, a also the society that tolerated this the Isalmists as dark years where the path that was spearheaded by Egypt brutal regime and even applauded it. forces of evil were advancing every- and later was to attract Sudan, Iraq For them Islam has to be reintroduced where. and Algeria. In L977 Bhutto was topp- anew in this society totally devoid of But soon there was light at the end led by sustained agitation spearheaded it. For Qutb, the problematic of left- of the tunnel. In 197G1 after the by Jamaat Islami. The same year saw right, radical-conservative, pro- death of Nasser and the liquidation of .the National Reconciliation in Sudan, gressive-conservative, did not have most proponents of his legacy the with opposition leaders, including any meaning. He wanted people to Islamists found a breathing spaoe. Ikhwan, participating in the govern- reject the whole lot and start anew. Sadat, Nasser's successor, also made ment. In Egypt Ikhwan wete leading a With Qutb came a new era, where rapproachment with the oil rich Gulf cautious revival, while the f ama'at Islamists abandoned identification states. This enabled these countries, Islamiyya, the loosely associated Mus- with "Islamic socialism", which had become the patrons of the lim youth groups were moving to "democracy", etc., in favour of un- Islamists, to push Sadat and the Islam- dominate the univenities. adulterated Islam. But this was in ists towards each other. But Sadat's But soon things started to go sour theory. In practice this meant align- limited liberalism opened the arena again. Sadat put himself on a collision ment with the axis of the right in not for a monolithic Islamic move- course with the Islamists with his visit Arab and Muslim politics. In those ment, but a variety of groups not all to Jerusalem in 1977, and before that yean, the monarchies in the Arab of them prepared to deal with Sadat. by clashes with Muslim radicals in East were on the defensive, as the 1971 also saw the Communists lose a 1974 and early 1977. The alliance of relentless advance of socialism con- power struggle in neighbouring Sudan. Jamaat Islami with the military rule of tinued well into the early seventies. The seventies also saw the left re- President Zia ul-Haq in Pakistan was As Arab country after Arab country treat in the on all fro- soon running into problems. The fell under radicalism's seemingly in- nts. The October 1973 war and the oil movements themselves were starting vincible March, Islamists found thems- shock caused by it enhanced the pres- to face internal problems, as the rad- elves pushed into a tighter and tighter tige of Sadat and his conservative icals inside them challenged concilia- corner, and found refuge and support allies in the Gulf. Even Syria under tory positions of the leaders.

lnquiry, April 1988 Then came the 1979 Islamic revolu- tion in which changed the sur- roundings of the Islamic movennents radically. This together with the elim- ination of Sadat in 1981 at the hands of radical Islamists, changed the tenor of political discourse in the Muslin world irrevocably. The leftist re- volutionaries who dominated nationai discourse for three decades were fin- ally reduced to confess thefu impot- ence and failures and look up to the Muslim example. The revolution also introduced anti-imperialism and anti- West radical sentiments, previously the preserve of leftists, into reputable Islamic discourse. It also influenced the radical Islamic groups in Lebanon whose astounding victories against the Israelis and the Americans breathed new hopes in tbe utnma during very hard times. This has posed to the Islamists very important questions that have yet to Sayyld Qutb (&ot- be answered. The nature of the ques- rom) declared that tions and likely answers to them can solvlng the prob prc3ont be seen in the discourse of the lems ol day soclety Is Tunisian Islamist movement and also norur of our busl- in the debate that has been going on ness, but the lsl+ in Iran for years regarding the role of mlc revolutlon the state in the economy in an Islamic under lmam Khu- order. The Tunisian Islamic Trend maynl (rieh{ ls serlous Movement (ITM) has since 1978 paylng attentlon to the question of how to react Pr? addressed clsely these Prob to the conqete economic and social lems problems facing the community, and concluded that Muslims must take a and economic inequality, and they issues? And why not say with Qutb stance on issues such as exploitation did. They took a radical leftist stance that the problems of present societies in support of the economically dis- are none of our brisiness, since they advantaged classes. In lran a similar are problems of un-Islamic societies debate has finally been resolved by we might never have in the society we Imam Khomeini in favour of state are envisaging? But it is clear that interventionism in the economy and silence on these issues is a commit- elsewhere. For the Sudanese Islamist ment in itself. Can one be silent about nnovement, spearheaded by the Nat- the plight of the Palestinians and iatwl Islamic Front, now the biggest claim with the Palestinian branch of Islamic mass movement outside Iran Ikhwan that this is the business of a and the one with the most detailed set future while even non- of concrete.programmes, the issue was Muslims are standing up to be coun- also looked into, but the answere ted on this issue? How can the Islam- given was somewhat to the right of ists reconcile the recognised Islamic their Tunisian colleagues. For the rest duty of speaking out against evil with of the lslamists the question appears the silence some of them maintain not to have even been addressed, let regarding social injustice? Islamists, alone answered. after all, speak out on many issues. So Between the two extremes of the how can one decide what issue to be Tunisian position and the Qutbist re- silent about? jectionism there are many shades of If one looks at the history of the opinion. People speak of social just- Islamist movement we surveyed ice, of democracy, of equality, of op- sketchily aboyg, one finds that their position to tyranny and foreigr domin- silence (and even their pronounce- ation and of many other values applic- ments) has operated in favour of the able to the domain of the social and forces of conservatism. This is not a political. But the question arises, does condemnation, for one cannot sum- one have to be committed on these marily blame the lkhwan for support-

lnquiry, 1988 38 April ffi;;ffi iEl_Fi*B.Hl{{.81

hg Xi"g Faisal and opposing Nasser president. with their own That path Qadhafi, seems to have achieved when the latter persecuted them whrle has since been trodden by the Islamic reasonable success. Second, socialism the former gave them sanctuary. But Youth movement of Malaysia, the has been pushed into Muslim count- the question is: was this a conscious Kuwaiti, Qatari and other Gulf ries by Communists, by non-Muslimg choice or have they been pushed into goups. or by people whose commitment to it by circumstances? Have the Islam- The question still remains: is the Islam was dubious, to say the least. It ists sat down and outlined this policy Islamist movement inherently anti- was rlifficult (and still is) to separate or was it that they found themselves left? We do not purport to answer this socialism from its antireligious phil- between the devil and the deep sea question in this limited intervention, osophical grounrling. Third, while con- and made a choice of the least of two but a few remarks can point to an servative countries have evils? devoted a lot answer. Ffust the practical experiments of resources to support what were To come back to the question posed of the Synan, Tunisian and early perceived as lslamic causes and mn- by Professor Lambton,s claim ibout Sudanese Islamists point to a possible cerns, the leftists adopted an arrogant the conservative nature of Islamism, synthesis of left wing and Islamist anti-Islamic attitude. It took them one must answer that far from being themes, although no such synthesis, numerous and bitter and inherently conservative, defeats Islam hai including the one preached by failures to reconsider their misguided position. The advent of Iran did a lot to reverse this situation, but then Iran soon became absorbed in conflicts that limited its ability to make a significant impact dbroad. dnd even then Iran 196ains quite conservative on social issues in spite of its political rad- icalism. However, the ultimate question may not be the search for new conditions that will cause Islamists to change their stahce, but for a stance that Islamists should stick to in all con- ditions; a moral stance reflecting the true precepts of Islam, which will pro- tect them from having to be pushed around by considrrations arising from the whims of this dictator or that. And that is the question. t

Turabl and Ghannoushl: Anewsrs from lelt and rlght, but a]€ thcy ad€quato?

proved a very disruptive force to Western modernity But because mod- ern Islamic activism fought its main battles with its. rival reformers, the leftists, and had to make a tactical alliance with the conservative enemies of their enemies, this stance is not direcly related to Islam, but to potiti- cal conditions. The Syrian lkhwan who started as red socialists ended up engaged in a bitter fight for sundval with the mildly socialist regime of Hafez Asad. But then they made an alliance with the Ba'athist regime of Saddam Hussein of Iraq who was the enemy of Syrian Ba'athists. If the Jordanian Ikhwan fought their king they would probably have sought Syr- ian support. Instead they preferred their own devil as did the Sudanese Ikhwan who broke the alliance with Libya's Qadhafi in favour of a deal lnquiry, Apr:il 1988 39