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Download Thesis This electronic thesis or dissertation has been downloaded from the King’s Research Portal at https://kclpure.kcl.ac.uk/portal/ The Relationship Between Humanitarian International Non-governmental Organisations and States in Periods of Civil War Case Study of Médecins Sans Frontières-Holland and the Government of Sri Lanka Cunningham, Andrew John Awarding institution: King's College London The copyright of this thesis rests with the author and no quotation from it or information derived from it may be published without proper acknowledgement. END USER LICENCE AGREEMENT Unless another licence is stated on the immediately following page this work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International licence. https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/ You are free to copy, distribute and transmit the work Under the following conditions: Attribution: You must attribute the work in the manner specified by the author (but not in any way that suggests that they endorse you or your use of the work). Non Commercial: You may not use this work for commercial purposes. No Derivative Works - You may not alter, transform, or build upon this work. Any of these conditions can be waived if you receive permission from the author. Your fair dealings and other rights are in no way affected by the above. Take down policy If you believe that this document breaches copyright please contact [email protected] providing details, and we will remove access to the work immediately and investigate your claim. Download date: 07. Oct. 2021 The Relationship Between Humanitarian International Non-governmental Organisations and States in Periods of Civil War: Case Study of Médecins Sans Frontières-Holland and the Government of Sri Lanka Thesis submitted by Andrew J. Cunningham to The Department of War Studies In fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy King’s College London February 2016 1 Acknowledgments First, I wish to acknowledge all of the input and support I received from colleagues at MSF-Holland and to thank the organisation for allowing me complete and unhindered access to its Sri Lanka archives. Needless to say, my interpretation of MSF’s work in Sri Lanka is my own. Much appreciation of course goes to my thesis supervisor Prof Mats Berdal and my secondary advisor Dr Oisin Tansey. Thank you both for all of your kind comments, constructive input, and encouragement. I wish also to thank all of those who provided assistance with organising my aborted field research trip. Many people tried, but the government was stronger! The moral and practical support from the Sri Lanka Roundtable crowd was also invaluable. A mention should go to the Hackney library system for providing such wonderful spaces in which to work. Last, but certainly not least, a huge thank you to my wife, Clea Kahn, for her patience, understanding, and support. 2 Map of Sri Lanka 3 Abstract This research examines the relationship between a humanitarian international non-governmental organisation (INGO) and a state against the background of civil war. This relationship is established as two sets of norms in tension: The moral as represented and made operational by humanitarian INGOs and the political as articulated and practised by states, mediated through the discourse of identity. Specifically the study investigates the constructed relationship between the humanitarian INGO Médecins Sans Frontières-Holland (MSF-H) and the Government of Sri Lanka (GoSL) during two periods of the Sri Lankan civil war (2006 and 2008-2009). A negotiation structure is proposed where an external actor—a humanitarian INGO—attempts to operate within the internal environment of a state. For a state, civil war is a ‘state of exception’, where a government’s prerogative to act outside ‘normal’ legal and moral boundaries may be taken up and where international actors are securitised. For a humanitarian organisation a civil war is defined as a humanitarian crisis which must be responded to using humanitarian principles in a non-political manner. This case study relationship is viewed from both MSF-Holland’s and the GoSL’s perspectives. On the side of the GoSL the study describes and analyses the government’s decision-making when faced by international criticism, a humanitarian crisis, and international organisations attempting to work on its territory. The background for the GoSL’s actions is extensively explored. MSF-Holland’s response to the thinking and actions by the GoSL is also closely examined, as is its internal discussions concerning its role in the context as a humanitarian actor. A discourse analysis methodology is used to analyse the primary source material. It was found that when securitised MSF- H had various options in responding: Accommodation to the demands of the GoSL; withdrawal from the country; counter-attacking the government; or concealment—hiding itself from attention. Rejecting these MSF-H chose desecuritisation. In the 2006 period engagement between the actors was possible albeit difficult; the securitisation process was manageable through desecuritisation. However, in the 2008-2009 period securitisation prohibited action and speech, and desecuritisation was not effective. The thesis proposes a theoretical framework—a negotiation structure, within which to understand these interactions, based on the case study findings. The conclusion points to further research needs and discusses the usefulness of the proposed negotiation structure to other contexts. 4 Preface My interest in the theme of this research, the state–humanitarian international non-governmental organisation (INGO) relationship against the backdrop of civil conflict, was derived from my nearly 20 years of work with humanitarian organisations, including 14 years full-time work with Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF). Humanitarian organisations are faced with many challenges working in the midst of conflict, and the often difficult relationship with states has become one of the dominant themes over the last decade or so. In my MSF work, in the field and in headquarters, I dealt with many contexts where the relationship with states was tense and difficult, such as Sudan, Russia, Turkmenistan, Pakistan, Ethiopia, Eritrea, and China, amongst others. These experiences led to the development of a research theme within the organisation which began a process of reflection on this evolving relationship. This project included the co-editing of an MSF-sponsored special edition of the journal Disasters on the topic of state sovereignty and humanitarian action.1 However, I was aware that much more work needed to be done on the topic and I decided to dedicate my PhD thesis research to it, focusing on the humanitarian organisation I knew best, MSF. I was able to leverage my MSF connection to obtain complete and unhindered access to the MSF-Holland Sri Lanka archives which greatly enhanced the empirical depth to my research. The decision was made to focus on the Sri Lankan context partly because I had had no prior engagement with MSF’s work in that conflict (as I had with the other countries considered), and therefore could come to that humanitarian context with a relatively fresh and objective eye. This study should be seen as one component of a larger research project which aims to develop a more sophisticated and nuanced understanding of the relationship between states and INGOs in times of civil conflict. Although the often tense relationship with states is seen by INGOs as one of the dominant challenges facing humanitarian action, this thematic has lacked in-depth empirical research which has resulted in a lack of theoretical grounding for action, ill-informed policy formulation, and often unproductive interactions. This study initially aimed to research the state’s perspective directly through conducting field research in Sri Lanka. The goal was to interview government and civil society actors to better understand the thinking behind the government’s actions vis-à-vis INGOs, MSF in particular. Unfortunately, the necessary permissions were not granted by the Government of Sri Lanka (GoSL) to conduct the field research. In addition, access to GoSL officials was not 1 Clea Kahn and Andrew Cunningham (eds.), ‘Special Edition: State Sovereignty and Humanitarian Action’, Disasters, 37, Supplement 2 (2013). 5 forthcoming, severely limiting the potential value of the field research even if it had been possible to conduct it. This was in and of itself an interesting finding which reinforced the importance of the central problematic, and in many ways the lack of direct access to GoSL authorities put me as a researcher into the shoes of humanitarian actors who often only have a government’s discourse to go by in interpreting the rationale for government decision-making. Discourse, accessible from a distance, then became the lens through which the Sri Lankan government’s side of the story was established. Rather than weakening the research project, in the end it was methodologically strengthened, as the discursive environment within which both actors worked is rich in explanatory potential and forms a firm basis for theory development. As this thesis’s research process mirrors that of the actors themselves, hopefully the research findings will be useful in practice as well. Sri Lanka was again the land of serendipity.2 2 Horace Walpole coined the term serendipity in 1754 as an allusion to the old name for Sri Lanka, ‘Serendip’. 6 Table of Contents Acknowledgements 2
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