The Political Status of Nonhuman Animals
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The Political Status of Nonhuman Animals by Daniel Hooley A thesis submitted in conformity with the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy Department of Philosophy University of Toronto © Copyright by Daniel Hooley (2018) The Political Status of Nonhuman Animals Daniel Hooley Doctor of Philosophy Department of Philosophy University of Toronto 2018 Abstract In this dissertation, I make the case that other animals are political subjects and I offer new proposals for how we should understand the political statuses of different groups of animals. In part one I make the case that other animals should be seen as having full political standing. First, I argue that all conscious individuals have certain basic moral rights and I defend this position against various objections. Once we recognize these rights, I argue that protecting and upholding them requires extending to all conscious animals full political standing, which involves legal rights, legal standing, and some form of institutionalized political representation. In part two of my dissertation, I argue that adequately understanding our collective obligations to different groups of animals (wild, liminal, and domesticated) requires that we think about these groups as having different political statuses. I argue that political categories commonly used in the human case are a poor fit for the interests and unique relations humans have with different groups of animals. For wild and liminal animals, I argue that we need new political ii statuses that uniquely capture their interests and our relation to them. I argue that domesticated animals should be seen as our fellow citizens but that their citizenship differs in some important ways from paradigmatic human beings. I close with two important chapters that push discussion of animals in the political sphere to new areas. I consider how the citizenship of domesticated animals relates to that of humans and to claims of equality, and I defend the view that in some public policy areas the state is justified in giving limited priority to humans, while in others it is not. In the concluding chapter, I put forward detailed proposals for how human states might represent the interests of other animals in our political institutions. iii Acknowledgements I would like to thank the members of my dissertation committee – Amy Mullin, Wayne Sumner, and my supervisor Tom Hurka – for their detailed feedback and guidance on this project. Special thanks are also owed to Sue Donaldson and Will Kymlicka, who read and provided feedback on several chapters of my dissertation. I would not have completed my dissertation were it not for the encouragement, support, and love of my family and friends. Thank you all for the numerous ways you have given me assistance and support as I worked on and completed my dissertation. iv Table of Contents 1 INTRODUCTION 1 2 THE MORAL RIGHTS OF ANIMALS 9 2.1 THE CASE FOR ANIMAL RIGHTS 9 2.1.1 Conscious Individuality and Moral Rights 10 2.1.2 The Argument from Human Diversity 12 2.2 ARGUMENTS AGAINST ANIMAL RIGHTS 13 2.2.1 Attempts to Secure Rights for All Humans While Excluding Animals 13 2.2.2 Denying Rights to Non-Persons 21 2.3 OTHER OBJECTIONS TO ANIMAL RIGHTS 22 2.3.1 The Will Theory of Rights 22 2.3.2 Lifeboat Cases 24 2.3.3 Is Conscious Individuality Sufficient for Basic Moral Rights? 25 2.3.4 Is Conscious Individuality Too Low a Threshold for A Right to Life? 27 2.3.5 Rights and Thresholds 30 2.3.6 Medical Experimentation 33 2.3.7 Rights and Personhood 34 2.4 IMPLICATIONS OF THE MORAL RIGHTS OF ANIMALS 40 2.5 OBLIGATIONS NOT TO HARM ANIMALS 41 2.5.1 Experimenting on Animals 44 2.5.2 Against the Superiority Argument 44 2.5.3 Against the Consequentialist Argument 46 2.6 CONCLUSION 47 3 POLITICAL INCLUSION FOR NONHUMAN ANIMALS 49 3.1 WHAT IS POLITICAL STANDING? 50 3.2 ARGUING FOR FULL POLITICAL STANDING 53 3.2.1 Animal Property: A Brief Overview 54 3.2.2 Legal Rights and Legal Standing 55 3.2.3 Political Representation 59 3.3 OBJECTIONS TO GRANTING ANIMALS FULL POLITICAL STANDING 65 3.3.1 The Political Sphere as the Realm of Equality 70 3.3.2 Reciprocity and Moral Agency 74 3.3.3 Other Animals Are Not Part of Our Societies or Communities 79 3.3.4 Obligations to Other Animals Concern Private Morality 82 3.3.5 Pluralism and Legitimacy 83 v 3.3.6 Political Inclusion and Distributive Justice 89 3.3.7 Political Inclusion for Animals is Utopian 91 3.4 CONCLUSION 93 4 INTRODUCTION TO PART II 95 4.1 A GROUP-DIFFERENTIATED APPROACH TO THE POLITICAL STATUS OF ANIMALS 100 4.2 WILD AND LIMINAL ANIMALS 103 4.3 DOMESTICATED ANIMALS 104 4.4 POLITICAL REPRESENTATION 105 5 WILD AND LIMINAL ANIMALS 107 5.1 LIVING IN THE WILD 107 5.2 THE POLITICAL STATUS OF WILD ANIMALS 110 5.2.1 The Traditional Animal Rights Approach 112 5.3 CLARE PALMER AND THE LAISSEZ-FAIRE INTUITION 114 5.3.1 Relations as Grounds for Special Obligations 115 5.3.2 Evaluating Palmer’s Approach 117 5.4 WILD ANIMAL SOVEREIGNTY 122 5.4.1 Implications of a Sovereignty Model 125 5.5 AGAINST THE SOVEREIGNTY MODEL 127 5.5.1 Animal Communities? 127 5.5.2 Are Wild Animals Competent to Handle Their Own Affairs? 131 5.5.3 Sovereignty & Protection from Human-caused Harms 135 5.6 WILD ANIMAL PROTECTED TERRITORIES 138 5.6.1 Borders and Territories 141 5.6.2 Political Representation 143 5.6.3 International Protection 144 5.6.4 Intervening in the Wild 145 5.7 THE PROBLEM OF PREDATION 148 5.7.1 Contraception and Sterilization 155 5.7.2 Genetic Alteration 159 5.7.3 The End of Nature: Separating Predators from Prey 161 5.8 LIMINAL ANIMALS 165 5.8.1 Liminal Denizens? 169 5.8.2 Protected Residents 174 5.8.3 Liminal Animals and Predation 179 5.9 CONCLUSION 181 6 DOMESTICATED ANIMALS AND CITIZENSHIP 182 6.1 FEATURES OF DOMESTICATION 182 6.1.1 Domesticated Animals are Kept in Captivity 183 vi 6.1.2 Domesticated Animals are Dependent on Human Beings 184 6.1.3 Domesticated are Social Towards Human Beings 185 6.1.4 Domesticated Animals Breed in Captivity 186 6.2 THE POLITICAL STATUS OF DOMESTICATED ANIMALS 188 6.3 DOMESTICATED ANIMAL CITIZENS 189 6.4 TWO TYPES OF CITIZENS 197 6.4.1 Citizenship-as-Membership 197 6.4.2 Citizenship-as-Responsible-Political-Agency 198 6.5 OBJECTIONS 203 6.5.1 Domesticated Animals as Responsible Political Agents? 203 6.5.2 The Extent of Animal Agency 211 6.5.3 Political Participation and Political Agency 215 6.5.4 Animal Preferences 219 6.5.5 Responsibility 225 6.5.6 Stretching Citizenship Too Far? 230 6.6 CONCLUSION 234 7 CITIZENSHIP AND EQUALITY 235 7.1 IMPLICATIONS OF CITIZENSHIP 235 7.1.1 Protection 236 7.1.2 Domesticated Animals and Property 239 7.1.3 Animal Guardianship 243 7.1.4 Animal Labor 248 7.1.5 Healthcare 256 7.1.6 Public Space and Mobility 257 7.1.7 Sex and Reproduction 263 7.2 CITIZENSHIP AND EQUALITY 269 7.2.1 Three Categories of Interests 274 7.2.2 The Comparative Harm of Death 278 7.3 OBJECTIONS 282 7.3.1 Equal Citizenship or Bust! 282 7.3.2 Too Many Dependents 283 7.3.3 A Cosmopolitan Challenge to Group-Differentiated Political Status 286 7.4 CONCLUSION 289 8 POLITICAL REPRESENTATION FOR NONHUMAN ANIMALS 290 8.1 THE GROUNDS AND GOALS OF REPRESENTATION 291 8.2 WHERE ANIMALS SHOULD BE REPRESENTED 294 8.3 APPOINTED OFFICIALS AND ANIMAL DEPARTMENTS 294 8.4 POLITICAL REPRESENTATION IN LEGISLATURES 299 8.4.1 Electoral Reform 299 vii 8.4.2 Surrogate Voting 303 8.5 DESIGNATED ANIMAL REPRESENTATIVES 308 8.5.1 Legislative Scope 314 8.5.2 Number of Legislative Seats 318 8.5.3 Counter-majoritarian Powers 325 8.6 OBJECTIONS 328 8.6.1 Will Animal Representatives Represent the Interests of Animals? 328 8.6.2 An Epistocratic Amendment? 329 8.6.3 Representation for Citizens Only 336 8.6.4 Other Underrepresented Groups 338 8.6.5 A Fragmented Legislature? 339 8.6.6 Enlightened Future Representatives? 342 8.6.7 Animal Parties Would Reduce Influence on Mainstream Parties 343 8.7 CONCLUSION 345 9 BIBLIOGRAPHY 346 viii 1 Introduction Political philosophy and political theory have been virtually silent on the topic of nonhuman animals and their place in the political sphere. These fields have had so little to say on the topic that if an extraterrestrial intelligence’s only knowledge of life on earth came from reading political philosophy and political theory, they might very well conclude that human beings are the only conscious beings who live on this planet. Simply put, until very recently,1 nonhuman animals have not been on the radar of political theorists. This absence of any significant discussion of nonhuman animals in political theory is striking for a couple of reasons. First, the absence of any sustained discussion of nonhuman animals by political theorists has occurred despite the burgeoning field of animal ethics. In the last 40 years, following work by notable philosophers such as Peter Singer and Tom Regan, there has been an explosion of work on the moral status of other animals, the nature and extent of the obligations humans have to other animals, and our moral relations with them.