UNICEF SOMALIA
EMERGENCY COUNTRY PROFILE
May 1999 TABLE OF CONTENTS
SUMMARY OF BASIC DATA...... 1
PART 1: BACKGROUND...... 4
A) SOCIO-POLITICAL CONTEXT...... 4
B) CURRENT SITUATION...... 9
C) SECURITY...... 11
D) SITUATION OF WOMEN AND CHILDREN...... 13
PART II: UNICEF EMERGENCY PROGRAMME IN SOMALIA...... 16
HEALTH ...... 16
WATER AND SANITATION...... 17
BASIC EDUCATION...... 18
COORDINATION, COMMUNICATION AND ADVOCACY ...... 20
EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS AND RESPONSE ...... 21
STAFF...... 23
FUNDING ...... 24
COOPERATION WITH UN/NGOs/ INTERNATIONAL ORGANISATIONS ...... 24
SOMALIA=S COMMITMENT TO CHILDREN ...... 24 SOMALIA EMERGENCY COUNTRY PROFILE, May 1999 PAGE 1
SOMALIA COUNTRY PROFILE (MAY 1999)
SUMMARY OF BASIC DATA
Population: Estimates range from 5.4m to 6.6m
Population Under 5: Approximately 0.92m
Female Population: 3.27 million (US Bureau of Census, 1997)
Main towns: Mogadishu, Hargeisa, Bossaso, Kismayo, Berbera, Baidoa, Galkaio.
Climate: Hot, dry with average temperature of 27C.
Land area (sq km): 637,657
Languages: Af-Somali.
Average life expectancy: 48 years
% of urban/rural population below poverty 40/70 line (1980-89):
GNP/1993 (US$ per capita): Low income 110 (1990) Education Net primary school enrolment (%gross, male/female/total):
Northwest Zone - >Somaliland> - (NWZ), 1996: 23/12/17% Northeast Zone (NEZ), 1998: 18/14/16%
Children 9 - 14 years currently enrolled who reached at least grade 4: NWZ: 22% NEZ: 20%
Children 6 - 14 years enrolled in Koranic school: NEZ: 37%
$613 operating schools exist in Somalia. This equals 80% of the total number of 773 primary schools that were found. $about 153,000 pupils are enrolled in primary schools. About two fifths (38%) of them are girls. $ only a quarter of schools (24%) have grades 1 - 4 and at least some of them grades 5 - 8. A mere 3% of schools have a full primary school repertoire with all grades 1 - 8. Male: 36% Female: 14% Adult literacy rate SOMALIA EMERGENCY COUNTRY PROFILE, May 1999 PAGE 2
Economy Heavily dependent on livestock, remittances and cash crops - mostly bananas. Over the last decade production (mainly cereals) has declined in Bay and Bakool regions due to prolonged warfare. From November 1998, drought has adversely affected food and livestock production in parts of North, Central and Southern Somalia.
Administration Somalia has been without a government since the fall of the Siad Barre.
Culture The population of Somalia shares the same language, religion and culture, but it is sharply divided along clan/tribal lines. The five principle clans are: Dir, Isaaq, Hawiye, Darod and Rahanweyn/Digil. Besides that, there are some non clan-based, ethnic minority groups such as Bantus.
Children=s Rights Somalia is the only country in the world, together with the United States of America, which never ratified the Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC). Children's rights to basic services, including adequate health care, nutrition, water and sanitation, and basic education, are very far from being met. The same is true for rights to protection and participation. It has no government or legislative body to follow up and enforce issues related to the CRC. This complicates rights-based interventions and requires a very localised approach which brings in religious leaders, local authorities and influential and respected personalities.
Infant Mortality Rate - IMR - (per 1,000 births): 125 Under Five Mortality Rate - U5MR - (per 1,000 births) 211 Major immediate causes: diarrhoea, acute respiratory infections (ARI includes pneumonia), measles, malaria and neonatal tetanus. Major underlying causes: Malnutrition, anaemia, unattended births, female genital mutilation. Basic causes: Low status of women, high illiteracy, poverty, civil unrest and lack of government.
Maternal Mortality Rate - MMR- 1,600 (per 100,000 births)
Child immunisation (% children 12 - 23 NWZ NEZ months) DPT/OPV3 20% 27%
Measles 45% 40% BCG 37% 49%
Mothers with children 0 - 11 months immunised 10% (NWZ) with TT2+ 39% (NEZ) Malnutrition % of children under five years malnourished:
NEZ: SOMALIA EMERGENCY COUNTRY PROFILE, May 1999 PAGE 3
weight-for-height (wasting): 12% height-for-age (stunting): 14% weight-for-age (underweight): 18% (all above moderate + severe)
weight-for-height (severe): 2%
NWZ: weight-for-height (moderate + severe): 8% weight-for-height (severe): 2%
Breastfeeding NWZ NEZ % received colostrum 89 95 % children 0 - 4 months exclusively breastfed 7 1 % children received timely complementary feeding 38 11 % children with continued breastfeeding at 20-23 months 9 7 % children < 1 yr bottlefed 38 34
Diarrhoea management % of cases where ORT (new definition) used: NWZ: 11% NEZ: 4%
Access to safe water: NWZ: 31% NEZ: 19%
Access to adequate sanitation: NWZ: 43% NEZ: 34%
Human Development Index Somalia is one of the poorest countries in the world. In 1996, Somalia ranked number 172 out of 174 countries on UNDP's Human Development Index (HDI), thus falling into the category of Least Developed Country. In 1997, the country was excluded from ranking on the HDI due to lack of data, but there is little reason to believe that the rating got any better. Latest Update: May 1999 Unless otherwise stated, statistics have been derived from the following sources: For Northwest Zone - NWZ - (>Somaliland=): Multiple Indicator Cluster Survey, Northwest Zone (>Somaliland); UNICEF, August, 1996 For Northeast Zone (NEZ): Multiple Indicator Cluster Survey, Northeast Zone Somalia; UNICEF Somalia, April 1998. Education data for whole of Somalia: Survey of Primary Schools in Somalia; UNICEF Somalia, September 1998. SOMALIA EMERGENCY COUNTRY PROFILE, May 1999 PAGE 4
PART I: BACKGROUND
A. Socio-Political Context
In 1969, the president of Somalia was assassinated and the army seized power under General Mohamed Siad Barre. As the president's popular support began to wane in the late 1970s, the government gave support to the Western Somalia Liberation Front (WSLF), which was carrying out a guerrilla war in the Ogaden region of eastern Ethiopia to divert attention from issues at home. In 1977 the Somali Army launched an offensive into the Ogaden region, but after losing the support of the then Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR), the Somali forces withdrew from Ethiopia in March 1978 with heavy losses. However, guerrilla war in the Ogaden continued until 1979-80 when huge numbers of WSLF fighters and ethnic Somalis in the Ogaden region crossed the border into Somalia fleeing from fighting and drought.
Several opposition groups to the Somali government were formed in the 1980s, each based on a particular clan or sub-clan. As the president's support further deteriorated in late 1989, riots began in Mogadishu and, in late 1990, fighting against government forces intensified as opposition groups formed alliances. President Siad Barre fled south from the capital on 26 January 1991. Since then, Somalia has been without a government. After Barre’s flight, one of the opposition groups, the United Somali Congress (USC), swore in Mr Ali Mahdi as an interim president for Somalia. This was rejected by other opposition groups, the Somalia National Movement (SNM) and the Somali Patriotic Movement (SPM). As armed clan groups fought for control of territory, food production and distribution systems collapsed. The resulting anarchy forced an estimated 800,000 Somalis into exile in neighbouring countries, while more than one million displaced persons swarmed into urban areas where non-governmental organisations (NGOs) struggled to provide food and other humanitarian assistance. An estimated 4.5 million Somalis were in need of external food aid, including approximately 1.5 million at severe risk of starvation.
The UN Operation in Somalia (UNOSOM) began in early 1992 with the appointment of the Special Representative of the Secretary General to coordinate UN political and humanitarian activities. In mid- 1992, UNOSOM was strengthened by a group of unarmed military observers, followed by a small force of lightly-armed peacekeepers to protect humanitarian installations. At about this time, UNICEF extended operations to Baidoa in the centre of the famine-affected area. In August 1992, the US government launched a military airlift to deliver food to Somalia. Various other donors followed suit. Then, in early December 1992, the United Nations Security Council gave its approval to military intervention by the US-led Unified Task Force (UNITAF) to secure the delivery of humanitarian supplies. On May 4, 1993, UNITAF officially transferred its authority to the UN Operations for Somalia - II (UNOSOM II). But the takeover of UNOSOM II from UNITAF was to be a failure. In June, just two months after the UN-brokered and widely celebrated Addis Ababa meeting in which Somali warlords and faction politicians agreed to the formation of a transitional national government, fighting broke out between UNOSOM II forces and those of General Mohammed Farah Aideed's Somali National Alliance (SNA) who killed 24 Pakistani UN peacekeepers. The fighting turned into urban guerrilla warfare and culminated in the death of 18 American soldiers and hundreds of Somalis in the streets of Mogadishu on 3rd October 1993. In response, the US government redefined its policy on Somalia and announced the intention to withdraw its soldiers. UN troops followed suit on the grounds that Somali factions were not making progress towards a peaceful settlement of the country's political and humanitarian problems. The clashes also resulted in the temporary evacuation of most of the international staff of humanitarian agencies and NGOs and severely curtailed the delivery of humanitarian assistance.
The absence of progress toward political reconciliation and the danger and cost of working in Somalia led to the withdrawal of US forces from Somalia in March 1994. A reduction in UNOSOM II contingents from other countries began in October 1994 and the final withdrawal was completed on March 2, 1995. SOMALIA EMERGENCY COUNTRY PROFILE, May 1999 PAGE 5
UNOSOM II's departure was soon reflected in mass unemployment, empty marketplaces and a sharp increase in destitution, begging and child malnutrition. It also marked the end of a number of logistical and other support services previously available to relief and rehabilitation organisations in Somalia.
Prior to UNOSOM's departure, UN agencies and organisations, recognising the need for an effective coordination mechanism for the post-UNOSOM period, established a United Nations Coordination Team (UNCT) in October 1994, composed of senior representatives of UN agencies working in Somalia, as well as the International Committee of the Red Cross. The UNCT is chaired by the UNDP Resident Representative for Somalia who is also UN Humanitarian Coordinator for Somalia. The UNCT provides a regular forum for information exchange, as well as guidance on achieving greater coherence in policies and approaches in order to maximise efficiency in the implementation of agency mandates and avoid duplication. The UNCT also cooperates with both international and Somali NGO consortia, and works in close collaboration with the Somali Aid Coordination Body (SACB). The SACB, established by the Fourth Coordination Meeting on Humanitarian Assistance for Somalia, includes the main multilateral and bilateral donors, UN agencies and NGO consortia.
In 1995 and 1996, increasing conflict and insecurity in Central and Southern Somalia threatened whatever advances had been made in 1994 when improved rainfall and the absence of large scale conflict contributed to better economic conditions and decreased vulnerability to malnutrition and famine. The insecurity was mainly concentrated in central and southern Somalia, and was linked to rivalry between the two main clan-based factional alliances led by General Aideed and self-declared interim President of Somalia, Ali Mahdi Mohamed.
On 1 August, 1996, General Mohammed Farah Aideed died of wounds sustained in bitter fighting in Mogadishu giving rise to hopes of a shift in the political-military gridlock which have not yet been realised. Hussein Aideed who took over his father’s faction pledged to pursue his policies.
Peace Initiatives
By November 1996, no end was seen to the civil war. Peace talks among many of the main faction leaders had begun in Sodere, Ethiopia, which closely followed Kenyan President Moi=s mid-October initiative in Nairobi attended by all the main faction leaders. On 3 January, 1997, the Somali political leaders meeting in Ethiopia signed a declaration to work for the restoration of peace, stability and law and order in Somalia. The leaders formed a National Salvation Council comprising five leaders. The council comprised Ali Mahdi Mohammed of the USC/SSA; Osman Ali Hassan >Atto >of the United Somali Congress/Somali National Alliance (USC/SNA); Colonel Abdullahi Yussuf of Somali Salvation Democratic Front (SSDF); General Abdullahi Noor Gabiyow of Somali Patriotic Movement/Somali Salvation Alliance (SPM/SSA) and Abdulkadir Mohammed Aden Zoppe of Somali Democratic Movement/Somali Salvation Alliance (SDM/SSA). Hussein Aideed and Mohammed Egal of ‘Somaliland’ ( ‘Somaliland’is not recognised by any member of the international community) did not attend the talks.
Then Italian Special Envoy to Somalia, Giuseppe Casini, also attempted to mediate between Hussein Aideed and Ali Mahdi. On January 20, 1997 as part of Casini=s initiative, Hussein Aideed and Ali Mahdi met at the Ramadan Hotel in Mogadishu and agreed to dismantle the green line dividing Mogadishu and to cease hostilities. Later, the two leaders issued a joint appeal for humanitarian assistance for Somalia amid signs of drought.
In early May, 1997, Osman Ali Hassan ‘Atto’met Hussein Aideed in Sana‘a, Yemen as part of efforts to achieve reconciliation. They agreed to follow-up on the implementation of the agreement reached in Nairobi in late 1996. SOMALIA EMERGENCY COUNTRY PROFILE, May 1999 PAGE 6
Later, an initiative led by Egypt culminated in the signing of the Cairo Agreement on 22 December, 1997. All major faction leaders including Hussein Aideed, Ali Mahdi and Osman ‘Atto’, but with the exception of President Egal, participated in the signing of the agreement. The agreement stipulated that a National Reconciliation Conference be held in Baidoa in mid-February 1998. Since then, numerous dates have been set for the meeting in Baidoa, but with no success. The leaders had initially indicated that Mogadishu’s sea and airports would be reopened, but this is yet to take place. In mid-March, the Inter- governmental Authority on Development (IGAD) member states met in Djibouti and criticised the proliferation of initiatives to solve the Somali problem and the lack of determination by the heads of the Somali factions. On March 24, 1998, Hussein Aideed, Ali Mahdi and Osman ‘Atto’ met in Mogadishu in a bid to resurrect the stalled peace process and renewed their appeal for financial support from the Arab League.
On 15 May, 1998, a meeting opened in Garowe, Nugal region of Northeast Somalia. Present were Col Abdullahi Yusuf Ahmed and General Mohammed Abshir Muse, leaders of the Somali Salvation Democratic Front (SSDF). The meeting was the first major move towards establishing a regional state for Northeast Zone of Somalia. Over 300 delegates attended the meeting and agreed to establish ‘ Puntland’ state. Col Abdullahi said the establishment of ‘Puntland’ state would not mean seccession, but would enable the local people to run their affairs and get support from the international community. Towards the end of June 1998, the Garowe conference discussed the powers of a future head of government of the proposed autonomous state of ‘Puntland’.
In late May, Egyptian envoy to Somalia Mahamud Mustafa met Ali Mahdi and Aideed separately and conveyed a message to them from the Egyptian government. In early June, Mustafa and Aideed denied claims by ‘Atto’that the Cairo peace deal was dead. Atto had also accused Mahdi and Aideed of proclaiming themselves co-chairmen of the National Coordination Committee (NCC), which was meant to oversee preparations for the National Reconciliation Conference, without his knowledge.
In June, Somali intellectuals appealed to the UN, Organisation of African Unity (OAU), European Union, the Inter-Governmental Authority on Development (IGAD), the Arab League and Islamic countries to intervene in Somalia.
In late June 1998, ‘Somaliland’ President Egal raised concern over an import ban imposed by Saudi Arabia on livestock products from ‘Somaliland’ following reports of an outbreak of Rift Valley fever in southern Somalia after heavy flooding in late 1997. The ban also affected Bossaso in Northwest Somalia.
On 6 July, 1998, a French diplomat from Djibouti visited Bossaso to meet with the leadership of the Somali Salvation Democratic Front (SSDF) to discuss the issue of two French nationals who had been held in Bari region since June.
On 18 July, Mogadishu faction leaders Ali Mahdi, Hussein Aideed, Osman Atto and Mohammed Qanyare Afrah met at the residence of another faction leader, Muse Sudi Yalahow, to try and resolve differences with Yalahow who controls the Medina enclave and the south end of the main Mogadishu airport. The leaders signed an agreement with Yalahow who had previoulsy opposed them. According to the agreement, Yalahow would support a joint administrative body for Benadir region. On 23 July, 1998, the Garowe conference elected Col Abdullahi Yusuf Ahmed as President of the proposed 'Puntland' state comprising regions of Northeast Somalia. Mohamed Abdi Hashi was elected vice-president. The Somali Salvation Democratic Front (SSDF) chairman, General Mohammed Abshir Musse and Majertein traditional leader, Boqor Abdullahi Boqor Musse rejected the outcome of the conference. 'Somaliland' President Mohamed Ibrahim Egal criticised the formation of 'Puntland' and urged those at the Garowe conference to refrain from interfering with 'Somaliland'. Later, Hussein Aideed condemned the formation of ‘ Puntland’ state. SOMALIA EMERGENCY COUNTRY PROFILE, May 1999 PAGE 7
On 27 July, the new 'President' of 'Puntland' Col Abdullahi Yusuf welcomed the release of two French hostages who had been held in Bossaso district of Bari region for 45 days.
On 29 July, President Mohamed Ibrahim Egal of 'Somaliland' issued an administrative order barring UNDP Resident Representative for Somalia, Dominik Langenbacher, from entering 'Somaliland'. Egal also ordered Paul Enright, the UNDP field officer to leave the country. The two were accused of overstepping their mandate. The UNDP head said the organisation's assistance to Somalia would continue.
On 1 August, the second anniversary of his father, Mohammed Farah Aideed's death, Hussein Aideed urged the Ethiopian government to stop interfering in Somali affairs. Later Ali Mahdi also urged the Ethiopian government to stop supporting initiatives that could create enmity between Somalis.
On 30 August, Hussein Aideed said he had resolved his differences with Ethiopia after meeting Ethiopian Prime Minister Meles Zenawi. On 3 September, the recently appointed governor of Benadir region, Hussein Ali Mohammed, was welcomed in Mogadishu. He urged inhabitants of Benadir region to prepare themselves for rehabilitation and said he would initiate meetings between opposing groups in the region with a view to reconciling them.
On September 4, General Mohamed Said Hersi Morgan said he would soon establish a regional state of 'Jubaland' in southern Somalia in the area he controls.
In November, United Nations Agencies in Somalia appealed for $ 18 million to provide emergency assistance in food, nutrition and health to over 300,000 persons in extremely precarious conditions in southern and central Somalia. These regions have been affected by Somalia's fifth consecutive crop failure in three years, the worst since 1995.
In mid-December 1998, Libyan leader, Mu'ammar al-Qadhafi, met Col Abdullahi Yusuf, the President of 'Puntland' in Tripoli. A 13-member mission from the UN, Arab League, Organisation of African Unity (OAU), Inter-Governmental Authority on Development (IGAD), European Union (EU) and diplomats from Egypt, Ethiopia, Eritrea and Italy visited Somalia in December. The aim of the mission was to assess the situation in Somalia as part of efforts aimed at achieving national reconciliation in Somalia.
In January 1999, four Tajikistan seamen, arrested by militia while salvaging sea-wrecks along the ‘Puntland’ coast, were released and handed over to the administration’s Minister of Fisheries. Their boat was however detained. An Italian fishing boat captured at Eil was detained over non-payment of a fine imposed for illegally fishing for lobsters in Somali territorial waters.
A cholera outbreak in February in Bardera, Gedo region, (southwestern Somalia), that claimed an estimated 240 lives, was brought under control by mid-March. The epidemic resulted in the hospitalisation of an estimated 2,000 people. In March 1999, a joint FAO/WHO statement said the risk of infection to both humans and animals from the Rift Valley Fever virus had been reduced to minimal or negligible proportions in countries of the Horn of Africa.
At the end of March, residents of ‘Somaliland’ protested against the presence of some Qatari visitors whom they accused of degrading the environment. The visitors included a royal prince. Demonstrations against the visitors were staged in Burao and Oodwyne, with the group being accused of poaching.
UN agencies and partner organisations warned that the humanitarian crisis was worsening in many areas of Somalia and expressed growing concern over "increasingly critical humanitarian relief situations" in SOMALIA EMERGENCY COUNTRY PROFILE, May 1999 PAGE 8 the country. They made an appeal for $9.6 million in urgent funding in order to respond to the emergency. In Northeast Somalia, a prolonged and severe water shortage continued, with approximately 150,000 nomadic people and their livestock affected.
Later in April, Ethiopia denied allegations of incursions and torture in Somalia by a group of Somali faction leaders. Somali faction leaders Ali Mahdi Mohamed, Hussein Mohamed Aidid and Omar Haji Masale presented a united front by sending a protest letter to the UN Security Council, asking that action be taken against the Ethiopian government for its "unprovoked incursions into Somalia".
In late April, the President of ‘Puntland’, Col Abdullahi Yusuf Ahmed, said severe drought in ‘Puntland’ had adversely affected residents and devastated livestock. He also directed the police ‘to take action against those dealing in the new currency imported recently’. ‘ Somaliland’ President Mohammed Ibrahim Egal, also issued a directive banning the use of the new currency which had been introduced in Mogadishu some weeks previously. In early April 1999, Hussein Aideed and Mogadishu traders who had started using the new Somali currency held a meeting to resolve differences over its introduction.
Refugees
Approximately 500,000 Somalis remain outside their country, mainly in Ethiopia, Kenya, Yemen and Djibouti. In early May, Kenyan President Daniel arap Moi requested the UNHCR to relocate refugee camps in Kenya which harbour Somalis to Somalia. He attributed an increase in crime in Kenya to the refugees who brought arms into the country. SOMALIA EMERGENCY COUNTRY PROFILE, May 1999 PAGE 9
B. Current Situation
The key political, military and economic trend within Somalia continues to be divergence, with some areas of the country, notably ‘Somaliland’ and the newly established non-secessionist State of ‘Puntland’, experiencing impressive political development and economic recovery, especially the former. Other areas continue to be plagued by many of the characteristics of crisis and complex emergencies. As a result, Somalia defies easy generalisation. An accurate situation analysis must account for three broad categories of political and economic realities in Somalia: zones in crisis, zones of recovery and zones in transition.
Zones in crisis: Much of central/southern Somalia falls under this category. Throughout central/southern Somalia, what once appeared to be promising local initiatives by businessmen, elders, and community leaders since 1995 for reimposition of basic law and order (usually through Sharia courts), the collection of taxes, the defusing of clan conflicts, and containment of disruptive behaviour of factions and militiamen have been undermined either by said militiamen or by the forces of clannism. This has created a political vacuum in most of southern Somalia and has robbed the international agencies of legitimate, authoritative local counterparts through which to work. Sizable conflicts have broken out in Kismayo/Lower Jubba, Saakow/Dinsoor, and Bay/Bakool. The result is that the region is now experiencing its worst level of insecurity since 19921.
Security problems in these regions have led to numerous instances of deaths kidnapping and other kinds of violence against both international and national officers of humanitarian agencies. This on-going security problem either prevents or delays emergency response and hampers transport of relief items.
Zones of Recovery: In a number of areas within Somalia, nascent regional and inter-regional authorities continue to provide their communities with a modicum of stability, security, basic services, and governance, while the private sector and civil society are vibrant. These areas within which recovery is taking place include most of ‘Somaliland’ (Northwest Somalia) and parts of the newly-formed state of ‘Puntland’ (Northeast Somalia).
Politically, these zones have been relatively stable, are often remarkably safe and secure, and in some instances – mainly in ‘Somaliland’ - boast regional or municipal governmental structures and local NGOs that, against tremendous odds, perform as well or better than their counterparts in many least developed countries.
Zones in Transition: These zones are experiencing levels of governance, security and economic activity that fall somewhere between crisis and recovery. Transition towards a more stable environment is occurring, but is fragile and reversible. Political authority in these zones is typically highly localised and economic activity stunted; yet militia activity is minimal, settlement patterns and property ownership are relatively stable and some level of rehabilitation and reintegration work is possible. These zones include Hiran, the Middle Jubba, the Middle and Lower Shabelle and parts of Gedo. Isolated pockets of ‘Somaliland’ – Togdheer, Sool, Sanaag, and Mudug in ‘Puntland’ are also included.
Social Dynamics: Paradoxically, many of the most powerful social and economic forces at play in contemporary Somalia are simultaneously sources of both stability and insecurity. First,clannism continues to provide an essential level of physical and social security to Somali households, and in some instances has been called upon to secure regional reconciliation. Yet it is also a powerful centrifugal force contributing to unstable alliances, the diffusion of power and communal conflict over scarce resources.
1 Ken Menkhaus, Political and Security Assessement of Southern Somalia: Implications of Emergency Response, December 1998 SOMALIA EMERGENCY COUNTRY PROFILE, May 1999 PAGE 10
In Somali society, and particularly its dominant pastoral/nomadic elements, the clan is the individual's main guarantee of survival, prestige, and well-being. The clan is committed to its members and its members to it. In the male-dominated society of Somalia, the individual is committed to support his/her clan against the outside world and is entitled to call upon his clan or sub-clan for help. The relationship between the individual and the clan helps to ensure the primacy of clan relationships in Somali politics. Hence, clan allegiance is stronger than the concept of nation-state.
A second force, economic and business interests, at times promotes inter-clan and inter-factional accords for the sake of improved market conditions, but also resorts to mafia tactics and armed conflict in pursuit of market control and price fixing. In the northeast, for instance, commerce has been a powerful catalyst for reconciliation and political accommodation; but in central/southern Somalia, the windfall profits from certain import export activities, especially bananas, narcotics, charcoal and weaponry, have played a destabilising and unproductive role.
A third social factor is fundamentalist Islamist movements, which are enjoying a significant revival in pockets of Somalia. In those areas where these movements have succeeded in establishing Sharia law, they have brought notable improvements in law and order, but have also added a new dimension of conflict as they compete for power, constituencies and resources with factions, secular leaders and traditional Muslim clergy.
Clan militia and irregular armed forces in central/southern Somalia remain powerful political actors, often independent of clan elders and faction leaders. Though they lack the capacity to govern, they possess the power to disrupt, and hence hold implicit veto power over clan and factional policies. The imperative to feed and pay clan militia continues to drive many political decisions in Somalia. Meanwhile, throughout the country at the grass-roots level, clan elders and other community leaders continue to provide most of the day- to-day ‘governance’ in the absence of formal state authority.
The current political impasse in central/southern Somalia is both cause and function of the shrunken economy in the region. Local efforts to improve security and foster inter-clan reconciliation are stymied by the absence of economic alternatives to soldiering and banditry for young militiamen. Improvements in economic opportunities, in turn, are difficult to generate in an environment of high risk, intermittent warfare and lawlessness. Transforming this vicious cycle into a virtuous one, in which improved peace and security and economic revival mutually reinforce one another, remains the fundamental challenge facing Somali society and the international donor community. Experience in the Northeast and Northwest of Somalia suggests that this transformation will be incremental in nature. Patience and sustained commitment are vital elements to enable central/southern Somalia to ‘ exit’ the ongoing crisis. SOMALIA EMERGENCY COUNTRY PROFILE, May 1999 PAGE 11
C. Security
During 1997 and the first half of 1998, most of central and southern Somalia remained in a state of flux with continued and, in some cases, intensified civil strife and insecurity. On 20 June, 1997, a medical doctor with Medecins Sans Frontieres, Ricardo Marques, was killed by gunmen in Baidoa, the capital of the Bay region. His death remains unresolved. Also in late June, fighting was reported in Gedo region between forces of Al- Itihad Islamic Organisation and Ethiopian forces. Later in June and August 1997, fighting was reported in Kismayo between Majertein and Marehan clans.
On August 20, 1997, two Somali employees of World Concern, an international NGO, were killed at the NGO=s clinic in Kismayo. The killings were believed to be linked to clan conflict. Two acute emergencies in Somalia worsened the situation in the central and southern areas. The emergencies were a drought during the first part of 1997 and massive floods from October 1997 to early January 1998.
On 29 March, 1998, Somali National Front militia attacked Kismayo which is controlled by Somali Patriotic Movement (SPM) forces loyal to General Said Hersi Morgan. On 15 April, 1998, eight staff members of the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC)/Somali Red Crescent Society (SRCS) were abducted by militiamen at Isaley Airport in North Mogadishu. The kidnappers took the personnel to Karan district where they were kept until their release on 24 April, 1998.
In early May, attacks on Kismayo by Somali National Front militia continued. As a result of the fighting between the SNF and Somali Patriotic Movement (SPM), some forces cut off and destroyed Kamsuma bridge which links Kismayo to Mogadishu in the north.
In early June 1998, fighting between forces loyal to Aideed and those of the Rahanweyn Resistance Army (RRA) took place in Baidoa, capital of Bay region. Later, Ali Mahdi called for an end to the fighting in Baidoa saying it had jeopardised implementation of the Cairo Agreement. The Dr Ismail Jumale Human Rights Organisation expressed concern over the spate of abductions of Somalis in Mogadishu South since 31 May. On 1 June, a Malaysian businessman was killed near his residence in South Mogadishu. Relief organisations and the local administration in Merca, 160 km southeast of Mogadishu, expressed concern over the deteriorating conditions in Mogadishu and the possible spillover of insecurity to the Lower Shabelle region. Merca became a refuelling point for both European Community Humanitarian Organisation (ECHO) and the United Nations Common Air Services (UNCAS) aircraft since the closure of North Mogadishu=s Isaley airstrip following the kidnapping of ICRC staff.
In early June, two Frenchmen, who were sailing to Madagascar from the French port of Marseilles through the Suez Canal and the Red Sea, were seized off Allula town on the Gulf of Aden coast, near the tip of the Horn of Africa (Northeast Somalia).
On 24 June, a Taiwanese trawler held by Somali gunmen in the northeast coast of Jerriban, about 640 km north of Mogadishu, was released after paying a fine imposed by a local Sharia court on grounds of illegal fishing in Somali waters.
On 1 July, unidentified gunmen in Mogadishu killed a cameraman working with a civic organisation in Mogadishu, the Elman Peace Foundation, and wounded two other people in an apparent car-jacking shortly after a peace rally marking 1 July, Independence Day in Somalia.
On 10 August, 1998, the Belet Weyn Islamic Court Deputy Chairman was killed. A prominent Somali Muslim cleric, Sheikh Sharif Ali Dhagey, was shot dead in North Mogadishu in late August. Sheikh Dhegay was an advocate of strong application of Islamic Sharia laws.
In December 1998, Gen Mohammad Said Hersi Morgan whose SPM faction controls Kismayo in southern SOMALIA EMERGENCY COUNTRY PROFILE, May 1999 PAGE 12
Somalia called for a peaceful resolution to the fighting around Kismayo between the SPM and the Somalia National Front (SNF).
In early January 1999, 26 people were killed and 10 wounded when a bus they were travelling in was hit by a rocket propelled grenade (RPG) fired by RRA militiamen at a place called Maayafuulka in southwestern Somalia.
Also in January, a Kenyan veterinary doctor with Terra Nuova NGO, Manmohan Singh Bhogal, who had been working in the Gedo region, which borders Lower Jubba, was killed by unidentified gunmen.
In March, Some 100 militiamen from ‘ Puntland’ raided the police station in Las Anod town which is under the jurisdiction of the ‘Somaliland’ administration. The ‘Somaliland’ administration repulsed the attackers and President Mohammed Ibrahim Egal criticised the ‘Puntland’ administration alleging that it was behind the attack. The ‘ Puntland’ administration for its part claimed that the militiamen were returnees whose area of origin was Las Anod.
Ms Deena Umbarger, a consultant for the United Methodist Committee on Relief (UMCOR), was shot and killed on March 20 in the small town of Ras Kiamboni on the border between Kenya and Somalia. She was having tea with town elders when a gunman opened fire on the group. Ms. Umbarger was 36 years old and a US citizen. UMCOR is a member of the ACT emergency network.
An Italian aid worker with Terra Nuova NGO, Stefano Sotgia, was abducted by Somali gunmen in mid- April in Hagar district in southern Somalia's Lower Jubba region during a trip from the neighbouring Afmadow district. Sotgia, a veterinarian, was later released on May 9. SOMALIA EMERGENCY COUNTRY PROFILE, May 1999 PAGE 13
D. Situation of Women and Children
Due to four consecutive poor harvests and the failure of the secondary harvest in January 1999, attributable to alternating flood and drought, and ongoing fighting in some regions, food security has been deteriorating in Bay, Bakool, Gedo, and Hiran and in parts of Lower and Middle Shabelle regions. Nearly one million people are affected of whom at least 300,000 are currently at high risk. A Donor Alert and Appeal for $18 million was lauched by the UN in November 1998 and an inter-agency response is on-going. Similarly drought and water shortages in Northeast Somalia have adversely affected area residents and the livestock population. Livestock losses due to the drought are estimated at between 30 to 70%. In early May, UNICEF sent out an appeal for $1.3m to mitigate the situation in the Northeast.
The complexity of the present situation in Somalia, notably the absence of a government and a legislative body, and the fact that Somalia remains the only country in the world, other than the United States of America, that has not ratified the Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC), pose formidable challenges to ensuring the respect, protection and fulfilment of the basic rights of children and women. In the absence of a government to sign for Somalia, Somali society and the world community have the moral obligation to take up the challenge and act as guardians and promoters of these rights. The existence of a well-established authority with a constitution and judicial system in Northwest Somalia (‘Somaliland’) provides a unique opportunity to enforce the fulfilment of children and women’s rights. Already, children’s rights are beginning to generate discussions and debates among politicians and other policy-makers. The excerpts from the speech of a Parliamentarian made during the launching of the State of the World’s Children Report 1999 in Hargeisa, Northwest Somalia (‘Somaliland’) (below) stand as testimony to the increased public awareness of rights issues:
“As Parliamentarian, I consider the constitution and constitutional instruments, the most appropriate public safeguard of children’s rights and interests… But a mere recitation of rights, including children’s rights, will not help unless rights are made enforceable and justifiable… In our constitution, we have incorporated the direction which the state is expected to take … These include the right to an adequate means of livelihood, children being given an opportunity of healthy development, protection against exploitation, free legal aid, free and compulsory education….”
Excerpt from speech delivered by the Deputy speaker of the House of Parliament of ‘Somaliland’, Mr. Abdilqadir H. Ismael, during the Launch of the 1999 State of the World’s Children Report held in Hargeisa in December 1998.
Diarrhoeal disease-related dehydration, respiratory infections and malaria, account for more than one half of all child deaths. Neonatal tetanus and other birth-related problems also contribute significantly to infant mortality, while measles and its complications result in many deaths during outbreaks. Children's vulnerability to infectious diseases is aggravated by their poor nutritional status. Maternal mortality is estimated to be the third highest in the world. The immediate causes are haemorrhage, eclampsia, infection and anaemia, compounded by the effects of female genital mutilation (infibulation), a practice which is virtually universal. The underlying causes include limited availability of trained midwives and referral services for emergency obstetric care.
Malnutrition is a chronic problem in all areas, and appears in acute form in areas of drought, flood or localised conflict. Poor infant feeding practices and infectious diseases are the main causes of malnutrition.
There are good reasons to believe that iron-deficiency anaemia is a serious problem and that clinical and sub- clinical vitamin A deficiency may contribute to both child and maternal morbidity and mortality. Public health services are inadequate in terms of coverage and the quality of care mainly as a result of severe limitations in management and financial resources. This has led to a large unregulated private sector offering services which, in many cases, are of dubious quality. The health sector operates without a policy framework or regulations, thus without safeguards for patients. Public services are heavily dependent on donor funding. SOMALIA EMERGENCY COUNTRY PROFILE, May 1999 PAGE 14
Poor hygiene and environmental sanitation are major causes of disease among children, including the transmission of cholera, which is endemic. General standards of personal food and water hygiene are observed to be very poor, as are urban sanitation and refuse management. Natural water scarcity has been aggravated by the destruction of water supply installations and by inadequate maintenance. Less than 30 per cent of the population have access to safe water. The low access to safe water for most families in Somalia, combined with inappropriate personal and household hygiene leads to a high incidence of diarrhoeal disease. Access to safe water will be essential to prevent cholera, which is an annual emergency claiming hundreds of lives, particularly in the densely populated areas. Transporting water for the family costs girls and women much time and energy.
Less than 20 per cent of school-age children are enrolled in primary schools. Of the approximately 150,000 children attending primary schools in 1997, 91 per cent were in grades 1 to 4. Girls represent 38 per cent of pupils in these lower grades, but only 28 per cent of those in grades 5 to 8. The quality of education is very poor, with only 56 per cent of primary school teachers being trained. The sector suffers from severe limitations of managerial, technical and financial resources, and a lack of consistency in standards.
There are substantial numbers of children and women living in camps in extreme poverty; children living on the streets; orphans; physically and mentally disabled and handicapped children; and children attached to militia groups. Few data are available on their conditions.
Gender discrimination is deeply rooted in the traditional socio-cultural structures of Somali society and remains a formidable barrier to women's participation in decision-making and access to resources. Violence against women and girls, resulting either from tradition or the civil war, includes the almost universal practice of female genital mutilation and sexual violence against the displaced, particularly against members of rival clans and minority groups.
Children's basic rights to health, education, water and environmental sanitation and harmonious development are essentially denied. With relatively small investments, the international community can provide essential life-saving and development and rehabilitation services and support while the Somalis struggle to find solutions to their own crises. Neglecting Somalia will not strengthen efforts to find a solution to this civil conflict; neither will neglect lessen the forces militating against compromise and peace.
UNICEF Somalia has adopted a rights-based approach in programming. The Situation Analysis of Children and Women in Somalia provides a conceptual framework emphasising children's and women's rights. A draft of the Situation Analysis has been prepared. After the final version is complete, this will have an important bearing on the degree to which the new Country Programme strategy for 1999-2000 will address issues of child rights.
Prior to the civil war, access to, and the quality of basic social services in Somalia was generally poor and worse than in neighbouring countries. The civil war destroyed what services there had been. During the past five years, however, international agencies, including UNICEF, have established health, nutrition, water supply and educational services which, in certain parts of the country, are of better quality than those managed under the former government. The condition of those children and women who have access to these services has significantly improved. An increasing number of primary school teachers are receiving training and schools are being rehabilitated. Yet, with the continuing widespread, uncontrolled lawlessness and banditry in parts of the country, these gains remain fragile, and continue to require external support and maintenance.
For UNICEF and other agencies to continue to work with Somali communities in improving social services, strong donor support is required. Due to the very limited infrastructure in Somalia and virtually no financial support from local governments, operational costs are high and social sector investments have high per capita SOMALIA EMERGENCY COUNTRY PROFILE, May 1999 PAGE 15 costs. Nevertheless, continued investment by donors is fully justified. The modest successes that have been achieved in recent years by the humanitarian agencies working patiently in Somalia are in sharp contrast to failures of the prior, very large politically-oriented investments. With donor support, much good work has been accomplished by the humanitarian agencies in Somalia. A fragile but real foundation has been laid for promoting local, community-based services that have the potential to increase the quality of life of Somali families, strengthen their capacity to cope and promote the basic rights of children and women. SOMALIA EMERGENCY COUNTRY PROFILE, May 1999 PAGE 16
PART II: UNICEF EMERGENCY PROGRAMME IN SOMALIA
HEALTH
UNICEF has continued to ensure access to and utilisation of a package of essential preventive, curative and promotive services to children and women. Based on an estimated target population (under one year of age) of 120,000, the immunisation coverage (DPT3) was 34 percent for all zones in 1998.
In areas of relative peace and stability, the programme works with local health authorities to develop a systems approach to improving the quality and sustainability of basic health care through the introduction of agreed standards and procedures, more accountable management systems, and the participation of users in the management and financing of services. The approach was introduced in selected facilities on a pilot basis and specific policies drafted. Implementation of some of the planned activities was delayed, however, due to acute shortage of funding.
In the health sector, UNICEF currently provides essential support to nearly 600 health facilities throughout the country. Assistance consists mainly of supplying essential drugs and equipment, training health professionals and traditional birth attendants, and developing standards and operational guidelines. In the area of nutrition, UNICEF has shifted its main focus from direct support to supplementary feeding centres to the promotion of improved infant and young child feeding and caring practices.
Expanded Programme of Immunisation
Immunisation services are currently available at all MCH centres and increasingly at health posts as part of mobile supervisory services by implementing partners. The same mobile teams also provide immunisation services periodically at the main gathering points for nomadic people.
In November 1998, UNICEF initiated measles immunization and provision of Vitamin A in Bay and Bakool, and special attention was given to children in the areas receiving IDPs. An estimated 200,000 children needed to be reached to enhance immunity against other diseases and to improve their chances of survival. By the end of April 1999, UNICEF had surpassed its initial target of 60,000 children with more than 90,000 children immunised against measles and having received Vitamin A. Local partners with financial and managerial assistance from UNICEF continued to implement activities.
Sub-national {polio} immunization days (SNIDs) were carried out successfully in August and September 1998 in southern Somalia and in November and December in northern Somalia. A total of 1,443,695 children under five years of age were vaccinated during the campaign.
Cholera
Cholera is endemic in Somalia with outbreaks occurring annually from December to May. These outbreaks tend to be concentrated in main cities, but population movements and the concentration of people in IDP camps also pose great risk of morbidity and death. The combination of malnutrition and communicable diseases further increases mortality. Cholera supplies and chlorine for water purification have been made available by UNICEF to all health centres treating cholera patients. UNICEF prepositioned 400 drums of chlorine prior to the latest cholera season.
Characteristically in the dry season, cholera broke out in early December 1998. By the end of April, the various treatment centres had recorded over 7,000 cases and 300 deaths (in Bay region, Kismayo, Merka and Bardera). The Cholera Task Force was activated in Mogadishu and Merka to address the situation in terms SOMALIA EMERGENCY COUNTRY PROFILE, May 1999 PAGE 17 of case management, cholera prevention and control with emphasis on the disinfection of water sources with chlorine and raising awareness through mosques, schools, plays, poems and radio messages. Health workers also attended diarrhoea/cholera-training workshops.
Malaria
Malaria is mesoendemic in most of the rain-fed areas and since the 1997/98 floods there has been a large increase in malaria cases, accompanied by chloroquine resistance. UNICEF distributed malaria kits (drugs, mosquito nets etc) in December 1998 and January 1999 to combat the disease. UNICEF also provided technical assistance by supporting on-going malaria training workshops for different cadres of health workers in Central/Southern Somalia.
Nutrition: Close to one-and-a half million children between the ages of six months to five years were provided with vitamin A supplements during the 1998 Sub-National Immunisation Days against Polio. The immediate determinants of malnutrition continue to be inadequate diet and infectious diseases with the children of internally displaced families, female-headed households, and returnees, the most vulnerable. UNICEF continues to provide assistance in areas chronically afflicted by drought, flood or civil conflict.
WATER AND SANITATION
The priority in the water sector is to sustain and restore past investments in piped water facilities/systems, through the building of local capacity in maintenance of water systems, the improvement of management systems and the introduction of cost-sharing schemes to recover some of the related recurrent expenses. Building on existing private initiatives, the programme has continued to promote and support a mix of public- private approach to the management of water systems. A major endeavour of the programme this year was the development of common policy frameworks for the sector at both national and sub-national levels.
During 1998, a total of 212 water points were rehabilitated and/or constructed, bringing the total number of water points supported by UNICEF since 1993 to 1,055, including 6 urban water systems, 81 bore wells and piped mini-systems and 968 dug wells. As part of efforts to build local capacity, the programme supported the training of over 100 WES management committees; 339 hand-pump mechanics of whom 25 percent are women; and the establishment of semi-private sales’ centres for spare parts. In sanitation, the focus remained the construction of school sanitation facilities and support to school health and hygiene programmes. Some 25 sanitarians were trained; and 19 twin latrines constructed, including seven in IDP camps.
UNICEF’s priority in this sector is to sustain and restore past investments in water supply systems through the building of local capacity for system maintenance, improved management practices and the introduction of cost-sharing schemes to recover part of the recurrent expenses. The programme aims to extend access to safe water to an estimated 200,000 people each year. In collaboration with other programmes, behavioural change is promoted for improved personal hygiene and environmental sanitation.
The WES sector has in 1998/99 been involved in drought mitigation, cholera response and flood emergency response. Perhaps only one-third of the people in Somalia have access to safe drinking water sources, year-round. Most of the water systems, pumps and generators in large towns were destroyed or looted during the civil war. The lack of safe water, inadequate sanitation and poor hygiene practices contribute very significantly to child illness and death from diarrhoeal disease. In a country which is generally dry and arid, water is an expensive commodity, both for nomadic and farming communities which rely on unsafe water from rivers or shallow water catchments. These problems have a direct impact on economic productivity, and limit the time and energy of the population, particularly of women. SOMALIA EMERGENCY COUNTRY PROFILE, May 1999 PAGE 18
Programme highlights
Some of the major water projects and initiatives carried out since 1998 have been the following:
! Completion of the Jowhar town water supply system in the Central Zone. ! Establishing cost-sharing arrangements with several communities in the Northeast Zone and completion of the final phase of the water supply project in Bossaso town, Northeast Zone. ! Rehabilitation/repair of boreholes in North, Central and Southern Somalia for drought mitigation and the carrying out of chlorination for treatment of drinking water and cholera control.
At the end of January 1999, an acute lack of water became a new element of the drought crisis. Wells and ponds, which normally provided water year-round, were drying up, due to the dramatic reduction in rainfall over the past six months. UNICEF is currently rehabilitating water sources such as boreholes and hand-dug wells to counter the problem.
UNICEF is also undertaking the rehabilitation of 11 boreholes in Western Bay. The boreholes serve 55,000 beneficiaries. UNICEF has, since the onset of the drought crisis in November 1998, completed four borehole wells in Hiran Region benefiting 32,000 people and two bore-wells in Middle Shabelle serving 16,000 people through partnership with the Adventist Development Relief Agency (ADRA)
In addition to chlorinated water trucking to 11 IDP camps in Bardera (Gedo Region), UNICEF has built 11 concrete storage tanks and eight berkeds for 4,000 internally displaced persons, mainly comprising women and children.
BASIC EDUCATION
Major efforts were made during 1998 to improve the quality of learning through the renewal and development of curricula, syllabi and textbooks for lower primary education. The programme also initiated activities to improve the physical environments of schools and classrooms. In-service training was provided to 1,495 teachers and head teachers in all four zones of Somalia. UNICEF played a key role in the formulation, under the aegis of the Somalia Aid Coordination Body, of a common strategic framework to guide interventions in basic education. The framework aims to harmonise among local educational authorities, NGOs, UN agencies and donors, approaches to the financing and management of schools. Forging partnership with parents and communities to ensure quality and sustainability of schools is a central feature of the framework.
The youth project initiated in 1997 to help meet the educational, recreational and psychosocial needs of young people began to take shape in 1998. Nine introductory sensitisation and programme development workshops were organised in three zones for representatives of grassroots organizations, school teachers and other service providers. A total of 10 youth clubs were formed. During the year, training workshops in psychosocial care were organised in Jowhar, Bossaso and Hargeisa and support networks formed and action plan developed in each location.
UNICEF support to the Basic Education sector continues to focus on the rehabilitation and revitalisation of primary schools in a situation where lack of governance and continuing insecurity in many areas pose a major programming challenge. Thus, along with UNESCO, UNICEF has supported capacity building initiatives for teachers/head-teachers through a cadre of master trainers and trainers.
Substantial progress is being made in the following areas.
a. Curriculum/syllabus/materials renewal and development SOMALIA EMERGENCY COUNTRY PROFILE, May 1999 PAGE 19
b. Establishment of a learner assessment and certification system
c. Teacher training and renewal and development of more effective professional development/education training programmes
d. Forging partnerships with communities and other stakeholders
e. Learning environment
f. Fundraising
During 1998 substantial funds were mobilised for the primary education sector mostly from the Danish International Development Development Agency (DANIDA), German, Dutch and Swedish UNICEF National Committees and additional funding from the government of Netherlands and European Union.
Youth, Education and Development
Given the importance of the role of young people in national development and reconstruction of Somalia, an action research programme for the provision of comprehensive youth education and development activities has been initiated in the Northwest, Northeast and Central Zones of Somalia. This is designed to provide a catch-up opportunity to illiterate/out-of-school youth, not only to acquire requisite numeracy, literacy and life-skills but also opportunities for psycho-social development and the acquisition of vocational skills (through collaboration with other partners).
Networking and coordination
Networking and coordination among various partners at all levels (international, national, zonal, regional, district, community) has been substantially accelerated and strengthened mainly through the modality of the Educational Sectoral Committee (ESC) of the SACB involving essentially all external partners at international and national levels. UNICEF has now taken an active co-leadership role with UNESCO (which is the official chair in this coordinating body) and invested considerable technical and human resources in this area.
Primary education in Koranic schools
A far higher proportion of children in Somalia are enrolled in Koranic school than in primary school. In order to scientifically investigate the potential of integrating some elements of primary education in Koranic schools while preserving their strong identity, UNICEF has continued on its pilot research programme in the Northwest Zone. This should begin soon in the Northeast zone.
UNICEF field staff development
Considerable resources (human, technical, time and financial) were invested in building an effective field-level team of UNICEF staff to better plan and manage resources and efficiently mobilise and network with all partners. Upgrading of technical knowledge and skills in the field of primary education pedagogy and educational management resulted in improved staff morale, motivation, quality, enhanced credibility, expansion and consolidation of UNICEF's position as a lead UN agency along with UNESCO for the education sector. SOMALIA EMERGENCY COUNTRY PROFILE, May 1999 PAGE 20
COORDINATION, COMMUNICATION AND ADVOCACY
This programme consists of four cross-cutting projects designed to support the other programme components as well as to promote programme objectives in their own right. They comprise: Information and Programme Communication; Gender and Advancement of Women; Support to Children In Need of Special Protection; and Monitoring, Evaluation and Research.
The Information and Programme Communication section continues to implement a research-based programme communication and social mobilisation strategy for the promotion of behavioural change. Increased understanding of, and respect for, the rights of children and women continue to be promoted. he sector also organises media trips for international journalists to Somalia to raise awareness about UNICEF’s activities as part of advocacy work. Various occasions are marked through activities organised by the sector. On June 16, 1998 UNICEF Somalia marked the Day of the African Child with activities organised in various places in Somalia. The Day was set aside by the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) in 1991 in memory of the children who were killed during the Soweto uprising which began in 1976 in South Africa. It is celebrated annually.
Strategies developed over the past two years are now taking on real form. Building on the action plans flowing from zonal communication workshops last year, the programme was able to address some priority behaviour change issues including breastfeeding practices and cholera prevention. Support was also provided to the Polio Eradication campaigns and the fight against vitamin A deficiency.
As part of efforts to increase public awareness on rights’ issues, a children’s workbook on the Convention of the Rights of the Child was developed. Some 15,000 copies of the interactive workbook with colour photos have been printed in Somali and are now being piloted in all zones. Workshops on the use of the workbook were held in Northwest, Northeast and Central Somalia. Participants included teachers, religious leaders and women.
During the period November 1998 - April 1999, efforts were undertaken to bring the nutrition emergency to the attention of the international media. Information for the Somali public was dependent primarily on international media and the Somali service of the British Broadcasting Corporation. Operational agencies provided the Somali public with more information concerning the humanitarian situation in an effort to enhance mutual understanding and cooperation in overcoming some of the chronic obstacles.
Representatives of the media have been willing to visit Somalia and have done a good job in portraying the emergency operation there. Undoubtedly the media has helped to bring world attention to the problems in Somalia. UNICEF regularly prepared and dispatched press releases on the situation.
The Gender and Advancement of Women project aims to ensure that gender issues are addressed as an integral part of all programmes. Emphasis is placed on promoting the eradication of female genital mutilation through the mobilisation of community and religious leaders, and on the protection of women and girls in camps against sexual violence.
Efforts have been made since 1998 to promote gender responsiveness of programmes but for the most part, women remain passive recipient of services. In 1998, UNIFEM and UNICEF started a joint project aimed at promoting women’s participation in civil governance and other decision-making bodies. An assessment was conducted and contact with potential allies established. A series of gender training/sensitisation workshops are underway. The project also organised, in December 1998, a gender sensitisation workshop for UN Heads of Agencies. UNICEF Somalia participated in the Inter-Agency Campaign to Eliminate All Forms of Violence Against Women and Girls launched in Somalia on 31 July, SOMALIA EMERGENCY COUNTRY PROFILE, May 1999 PAGE 21
1998.
The Monitoring, Evaluation and Research section of UNICEF Somalia has supported assessments of children in need of special protection and will use the analysis to develop appropriate and cost-effective interventions. Research, monitoring and evaluation activities aim to improve strategy formulation and monitoring progress made towards programme objectives in terms of coverage, access, utilisation, impact and cost-effectiveness. While efforts continue to establish baseline data against which progress can be measured, more emphasis is to be placed on the evaluation of programmes and the documentation and dissemination of best practices. In addition, simple education and health management information systems are to be established to provide local managers with data for decision-making.
A number of important studies have been conducted. The second annual Survey of Primary Schools (South and Central zones is expected to be completed in 1999).
EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS AND RESPONSE
While emergency preparedness is built into each programme component, the scale of support required during acute emergencies increases rapidly. This programme aims to provide back-up support to all sectoral programmes by ensuring overall preparedness and rapid and efficient response during humanitarian crises. The southern and central zones are generally more prone to man-made and natural crises and require particular attention.
Droughts, floods and epidemics
UNICEF=s emergency responses can take the form of intensified campaigns on prevention and cure (measles, cholera) at the first sign of an unanticipated outbreak. Affected communities may receive, depending on the nature of the emergency, medicines, vaccines, chlorine for drinking water purification, resettlement kits (utensils for cooking), seeds, tools, tarpaulins, and Supermix for supplementary feeding of malnourished children.
Conflict and insecurity can trigger any or several of the above situations at a given time. UNICEF=s communications systems provide essential support to partners in such eventualities. Shared security information and air operations also facilitate a coordinated and tailored response to prevailing conditions. Fostering local capacity through participation in management, preparedness and surveillance are an integral part of emergency programming for sustainability and institution building. Where and whenever possible, structures of local governance, community and voluntary bodies are part of the emergency programme planning process. In the first week of June 1998, movement of hundreds of people from farming villages in Bay region into Baidoa, Lower Shabelle and Mogadishu was reported because of partial failure of the ‘Gu’ (long rains season) and continued fighting between rival militia. Initial surveys by the Food Security Assesment Unit/WFP in late May indicated that areas under sorghum decreased by 31 percent in 1998 compared to 1997.The area under maize decreased by 46 percent.
Beginning in October 1998, UNICEF acted to assist vulnerable communities with food and non-food assistance. It was fervently hoped that a reasonably good secondary (deyr) harvest would come in January/February, thereby ending the need for an emergency operation. In mid-February, it appeared that the harvest had failed and that there was even greater need for emergency food, water, seed and health assistance.
Farming families were particularly affected by severe shortages of food. Geographically, the regions most affected were the hard-hit “bread basket” areas of Bay, Bakool, Gedo and parts of Hiran. The shortages are SOMALIA EMERGENCY COUNTRY PROFILE, May 1999 PAGE 22 attributed to many factors, including floods in later 1997/early 1998, drought, run-down irrigation infrastructure and the lack of inputs in irrigated and rain-fed farming areas. Each year, the July/August main (gu) harvest normally provides the bulk of annual cereal production in Somalia. last year, it provided only one-quarter of the historical average.
The number or Internally Displaced People (IDPs) was alarming. It was estimated, by end of January, that over 45,000 people had left their homes in Bay and Bakool in search of food and water, mainly to Gedo and areas close to the Jubba river. The nutritional status of the population in Bay and Bakool and of the IDP population was reported to be poor. The malnourished population was seriously vulnerable to health hazards, especially the outbreak of communicable diseases, notably measles, malaria and diarrhoeal diseases, and particularly cholera. The first cases of cholera were confirmed in early December in Mogadishu. Since then, outbreaks were reported in Burhakaba and Baidoa, Kismayo, Merka and Bardera. By April 1999, 7,000 cases and 300 deaths were reported, giving an overall case fatality rate (CFR) of 4.2 per cent, which was lower in comparison to previous years. SOMALIA EMERGENCY COUNTRY PROFILE, May 1999 PAGE 23
STAFFING
UNICEF has the widest reach of humanitarian agencies with field offices in Hargeisa, Northwest Somalia ('Somaliland'), Bossaso, Northeast Somalia ('Puntland') and Jowhar in Central Somalia. UNICEF has maintained a small field presence in Bardera, southern Somalia. Following restructuring of the UNICEF presence in Central and Southern Somalia in late 1998, the organisation's presence in the key cities of Mogadishu and Kismayo has been drastically reduced to liason offices. The reorganisation process was undertaken in consultation with the staff association at all levels.
In total, as of April 1999, there were 171 personnel - staff, consultants, volunteers and interns serving UNICEF Somalia. Of these 65 are based at the UNICEF Somalia Support Centre in Nairobi, Kenya. The Nairobi UNICEF office has 16 international personnel, 48 Kenyan personnel, and one intern. In Jowhar, Central Somalia, there are a total of 19 personnel. Of these, 16 are Somali nationals and 3 are international. In Kismayo there are 5 Somali personnel. In Mogadishu there are a total of 7 personnel. Of these, 5 are Somalis and two are international (these two internationals however do not operate from Mogadishu). Hargeisa, Northwest Somalia has 39 personnel. Of these 35 are Somali and 4 are international. In Bossaso, there are 27 personnel. Of these, 25 are Somalis and two are international personnel. In Baidoa, Central Somalia, there are 3 Somali personnel while in Bardera, southern Somalia there are 6 personnel of whom three are international and the rest Somalis. SOMALIA EMERGENCY COUNTRY PROFILE, May 1999 PAGE 24
FUNDING
Mobilising sufficient resources to maintain a strong field presence in Somalia constitutes a major challenge for UNICEF. Donor fatigue resulting from the protracted emergency in Somalia combined with the unusually high programme support costs (25%), arising from the lack of effective national structures and the insecure conditions in much of Somalia, make fundraising particularly difficult.
In 1998, the total programmable amount for both regular country programme and emergency was $17,012,405, including a total carry-over from the previous year of close to $5 million and General Resources (GR) allocation for 1998 of $2,335,758. The total supplementary funds raised during 1998 were $9,677,317. In addition, a total amount of US$1,278,600 was allocated to the Support budget.
The total amount spent in 1998 was $13,850,820. The financial implementation rate for the country programme was 81 percent. The implementation rate for the Support budget was 96 percent.
The total programmable amount available as of 20 April, 1999, was close to $12 million, including carry- overs from supplementary funds and a 1999 General Resources allocation of $2.9 million In addition, a total of US $1.3 million has been allocated to the 1999 Support budget.
The UNICEF Executive Board has approved a budget of a $20 million for the implementation of the 1999 Country Programme (excluding emergency programme). Hence, with $6,000,000 available, close to $14 million needs to be raised Given the downward funding trend, however, it is unlikely that such an amount will be raised in 1999.. In order to provide at least some of the most essential services and to respond to the on- going emergency in central Somalia, $9 to $10 million in supplementary funds will be required.
CO-OPERATION WITH UN, NGOS AND OTHER INTERNATIONAL ORGANISATIONS
To achieve the objectives of the programme, it is necessary to ensure that the limited resources available to UNICEF both complement and help to mobilise the resources of other key partners. UNICEF works closely with local civil society organisations and de facto local authorities, NGOs, United Nations agencies and donors and will ensure overall coordination through existing mechanisms, namely the Somalia Aid Coordination Body and the United Nations Coordination Unit based in Nairobi. Partnerships with NGOs will be central to effective implementation, particularly in the zones in transition and crisis. UNICEF continues to provide technical and policy guidance to NGOs where required.
Joint planning and coordination activities with other UN Agencies, NGO partners and donors are a hallmark of the UNICEF programme. UNICEF shares the results of its evaluations of health, nutrition and education and water and environmental sanitation programmes. Inter-agency sectoral committees were established in Nairobi and in the zones to address problems and weaknesses identified.
SOMALIA'S FORMAL COMMITMENT TO CHILDREN
Somalia, without a government since January 1991, is neither party, nor signatory of the Convention on the Rights of the Child.