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Crisis24 And/Or Its Parents and Subsidiaries ( Security Brief for Sweden prepared on: Jul 12, 2021 8:51:41 PM UTC Security Assessment Rating Security Rating for Sweden: 2 - Low Sub-Ratings 1 2 3 4 5 Crime 2 Overall Rating: Security Services 4 2 Civil Unrest 2 Low Terrorism 2 Kidnapping 3 Geopolitical 1 Security Overview : Overview of Sweden Sweden is generally considered a low-risk travel destination. Petty theft, which occasionally takes place in crowded downtown areas and near tourist attractions, is by far the most prominent concern to travelers in Sweden. Violent crime is rare; however, there has been a growth in criminal gangs and gang-related violence in the southern cities, which poses an incidental security threat. Since 2015, there have been heightened concerns over potential radical Islamist terrorist plots in the country. There are concerns that militants linked to extremist groups such as al-Qaeda or the Islamic State (IS) may carry out attacks in Sweden. Recent spikes in violent crime and targeted low-level bombings by improvised explosive devices (IEDs) have been attributed to both a growth in organized criminal gangs and deteriorating socioeconomic conditions, with over 200 explosions reported in 2019. Anti-migrant sentiment has been on the rise since 2015 and may lead to unrest and far-right terror attacks; Sweden accepted the most refugees per capita in Europe in 2018. Related Advice: General guidelines to protect yourself against terrorism. Related Advice: Tips and guidelines for surviving an airline hijacking Related Advice: Increasing your chances of survival in a kidnapping/hostage situation Related Advice: Recognizing suspicious objects and the threat of hidden explosives while traveling Security Alerts & Advisories Informational Alerts Civil Unrest: Protests denouncing COVID-19-related restrictions likely to continue in cities across Europe through July. Localized disruptions likely. Event: COVID-19 Protests Location(s): Urban centers (map) Time Frame: Through at least July Impact: Possible increased security, localized disruptions Summary Sporadic protests will likely continue in cities across Europe through at least the end of July as residents denounce restrictions imposed to combat COVID-19, as well as their economic consequences, particularly for the hospitality industry. Activists could demonstrate outside government offices or at prominent locations in city centers; vehicular go-slow protests are possible. Public transport workers may hold strikes or other forms of labor actions. The COVID-19 measures currently in place in most European cities restrict public gatherings to some extent. Local police will likely monitor protests and may attempt to disperse larger gatherings. Low-level skirmishes and, in some cases, wider confrontations, are possible. Localized traffic and transport disruptions are likely. In addition, though a large proportion of demonstrations involve hospitality workers, the adoption of the COVID- 19 issue as a rallying point by both far-left and far-right-wing groups means that some protests could also prompt counterdemonstrations, posing a potential for clashes between rival activists. Advice Avoid all protests as a standard security precaution. Monitor local media for updates on such gatherings, as organizers may not announce details in advance. If violence breaks out, leave the area immediately. Follow the instructions of security personnel. Allow additional time for travel near known or possible demonstration venues. Alert begins: 03/31/2021 Other Alerts & Advisories Critical Alerts Entry/Exit: European Council introduces EU Digital COVID Certificate in numerous EU countries as of July 2; travel restrictions remain. Incident: Travel restrictions Location(s): EU member states (except Ireland) and Iceland, Liechtenstein, Norway, and Switzerland (map) Time Frame: Indefinite Impact: Transport and business disruptions Summary Authorities in 21 EU member states have implemented the European Council's "EU Digital COVID Certificate" as of July 2. The certificate is a digital or physical QR code that acts as proof of whether a traveler has been vaccinated against COVID-19, recovered from COVID-19, or recently tested negative for COVID-19. Member states should in principle allow individuals possessing the certificate to enter the country without restriction. The certificate is currently being issued by Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Croatia, Cyprus, the Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Iceland, Italy, Latvia, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, and Spain. All remaining EU countries, as well as Switzerland, Liechtenstein, Iceland and Norway, are set to recognize and begin issuing the certificate by Aug. 12. The European Council (EC) previously added several more countries, including the US, to the list of countries with which it recommends member states relax entry restrictions due to positive data regarding the COVID-19 situation in those countries. As of July 2, the following countries are on the list: Albania, Australia, Israel, Japan, Lebanon, New Zealand, North Macedonia, Rwanda, Serbia, Singapore, South Korea, Thailand, the US, and China (provided it implements a reciprocal travel arrangement). The EC advises EU member states to restrict nonessential travel from all other countries outside the bloc as part of measures to combat the spread of COVID- 19. Countries participating in the measure include all EU Schengen Area member states; non-Schengen EU members Bulgaria, Croatia, Cyprus, and Romania; and the four non-EU Schengen-associated states of Iceland, Liechtenstein, Norway, and Switzerland. The EC's recommendation is advisory only; individual member states retain the authority to unilaterally deny travel from countries on the approved list or to permit travel with countries not on the approved list. Additionally, the EC previously issued advice for member states to implement additional COVID-19 measures, including mandatory testing before departure, stricter measures to address virus variants of concern, and a common European passenger locator form. Persons exempted from the recommendations include family members of EU nationals, diplomats, foreigners with legal residency permits, cross-border and healthcare workers, and truck drivers transporting freight. Following the end of the Brexit transition period, citizens of the UK are no longer being treated as EU citizens and are therefore subject to measures restricting travel to the EU from outside the bloc as per EC recommendations. The EC also issued advice May 20 recommending that member states begin lifting restrictions for vaccinated travelers from countries outside the bloc; most member states have not currently implemented this measure. Advice Prospective travelers from countries on the approved list should check for possible additional restrictions imposed by the destination country prior to booking travel. Persons from countries not on the approved list should postpone travel to the countries participating in the closure. Follow all official immigration and health screening instructions. Resources European Union Schengen Area countries Alert begins: 07/02/2021 Entry/Exit: Sweden maintains COVID-19 measure as of July 8; domestic and international entry restrictions remain in effect. Incident: COVID-19 restrictions Location(s): Nationwide (map) Date: Indefinite Impact: Travel and business disruptions Summary Authorities are maintaining measures imposed to combat the spread of COVID-19 as of July 8. Officials previously extended international entry restrictions until at least Sept. 1. Nonessential travel from outside the EU/EEA is prohibited; residents of Albania, Australia, Hong Kong, Israel, Japan, Lebanon, Macau, New Zealand, North Macedonia, Rwanda, Serbia, Singapore, South Korea, Taiwan, Thailand, and the US are exempt from the entry ban. Exemptions are also in place for EU/EEA citizens and residents, passengers in transit, students, and limited other essential purposes. There are no entry restrictions in place for travel from Denmark, Finland, Iceland, and Norway. Travelers from all other EU/EEA countries must present evidence of a negative COVID-19 test (PCR or antigen) taken within the 72 hours before arrival in Sweden, a certificate of vaccination no less than 14 days old, or a certificate of recovery from COVID-19 within the previous 11-180 days. Permitted travelers from all other locations must present a negative COVID-19 test (PCR or antigen) taken within 48 hours before arrival. Authorities also recommend that all travelers arriving from outside the EU/EEA should self-isolate for seven days on arrival and take a COVID-19 test on the day of arrival and five days later. Domestic Restrictions Most nonessential businesses and services are permitted to operate subject to hygiene, capacity, and social distancing requirements. Private indoor gatherings are limited to 50 people; outdoor events of up to 3,000 people are permitted. Authorities no longer recommend the use of masks on public transport. Authorities could reimpose, extend, further ease, or otherwise amend any restrictions with little-to-no notice depending on disease activity over the coming weeks. Advice Follow all official instructions. Abide by national health and safety measures. Reconfirm all travel arrangements. Consider delaying traveling if experiencing symptoms associated with COVID-19, as they may prompt increased scrutiny and delays. Liaise with trusted contacts for further updates
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