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POLICY BRIEFING 39

China in Project

November 2011

The Evolving Nature of

r e c o m m e n d a t i o n s Chinese • The DRC should permit Investment in the DRC international companies looking to invest in the country to implement business strategies that enable them to stick to and Gregory Mthembu-Salter 1 develop their core strengths, rather than obliging them to take on activities for which they E x e c u t i v e s u m m a r y are neither enthusiastic nor sufficiently skilled, for the sake TE was the first Chinese company to invest in the Democratic of politics and diplomacy. ZRepublic of Congo (DRC) telecommunications sector, acquiring a • Other African governments majority shareholding in operator, Congo Chine Télécoms seeking to encourage Chinese (CCT), in 2000. CCT is popular with low-income users for its inexpensive and other telecommunications call rates, but has not been profitable, and in 2011 both ZTE and the DRC companies to invest should learn government sold their shares to France Telecom-Orange. from the DRC’s experience. They and the International Construction should allow the companies (CITCC) arrived in the DRC several years after ZTE, and have to define the nature of their from the outset pursued entirely business-oriented strategies, apparently investment, as Huawei has unaffected by wider political considerations. The CITCC enjoyed initial done in the DRC, rather than success but has since fared less well, whereas Huawei has gained market shoulder them with business share steadily in the provision of telecommunications equipment to mobile obligations and/or phone service providers. with parastatals that sap their ZTE and Huawei are increasingly bitter rivals in international markets, profitability and commitment. and China’s government has declined to become involved in their disputes. • ZTE should take the This rivalry, however, appears not to have extended to the DRC. opportunity afforded by its China is becoming increasingly dominant in the provision of exit from CCT to reconsider telecommunications equipment to the DRC market. However, it is its DRC business strategy. It retreating from the country’s mobile phone operating business, which is should focus on the company’s controlled by Indian and European companies. core strength of supplying telecommunications equipment, Z t e a n d C o n g o C h i n e T é l é c o m s rather than on areas such as agriculture where the company Chinese investment in the DRC telecommunications sector began in 2000, has no relevant experience, when China’s state-owned ZTE acquired a 51% stake in a newly established particularly in such a company, CCT, with the balance held by the DRC government’s Office challenging environment Congolais des Postes et Télécommunications (OCPT). ZTE is one of China’s as the DRC’s. largest telecommunications companies and an important international player. In 2010 the company was ranked the sixth-largest global producer

A f r i ca n p e r s p e c tives. Glob a l i n s i g h t s . T h e e v o l v i n g n a t u r e o f c hinese tele c o m m u n i ca tions investment in the dr c

of telecommunications infrastructure.2 The state- In July 2011 France Telecom-Orange entered owned Export–Import (Exim Bank) into exclusive talks with ZTE to buy its stake provided CCT with a concessional loan of CNY3 in CCT, and also entered into discussions to 80 million ($12.5 million) to enable the company purchase the DRC government’s 49% stake. to start operations, most of which was spent on In a bid to diversify from European markets, purchasing all its equipment from ZTE. the French company had earlier agreed to Increasing Chinese investment in the DRC purchase 20% of Iraq’s Korek Telecom, and was an important policy objective for then- 40% of Morocco’s Méditel.6 On 20 October President Laurent Désiré Kabila, to counter 2011 France Telecom-Orange announced that what he regarded as excessive European and it had signed purchase agreements with ZTE American influence. Kabila made several appeals and the DRC government for just $17 million, for investment to the Chinese government, thereby acquiring 100% of the company. Of this, which eagerly took up the opportunity, as $10 million was for ZTE, with the balance going evidenced by ZTE’s with the OCPT to the DRC government. France Telecom-Orange and Exim Bank’s loan to CCT. For ZTE, whose also agreed to pay $71 million to the government core business is manufacturing and supplying for a new ten-year licence, but with improved telecommunications equipment, the arrangement conditions to CCT’s current licence, and a hefty of co-founding mobile phone operator, CCT, was $185 million to settle the company’s apparently not ideal. However, it seems that at the time, in extensive debts.7 It is not yet clear, however, why 2000, investing in operations was ZTE’s only and to whom CCT owes so much money, though means of accessing the DRC market. one Kinshasa-based banker with knowledge of By mid-2011 CCT had built its customer base the deal said that the bulk of the debt is owing to a little over one million subscribers, making to the DRC government. Should this be the case, it the fourth-largest mobile phone operator in it marks a sorry end to a poorly performing the DRC, after Airtel, and Tigo. CCT’s investment for ZTE. national network is less extensive than that of its In addition to its troubled CCT investment, competitors, and reputedly less reliable. However, ZTE recently established an independent its service is the least expensive, making it presence as a supplier of telecommunications attractive to low-income users. Competitors have equipment to mobile phone networks, although alleged that CCT is able to offer lower call rates on a smaller scale thus far than its Chinese rival, because it pays too little tax.4 CCT has strongly Huawei. Curiously, ZTE is also making tentative denied this, insisting that it receives no favours investments in the DRC’s commercial agricultural and pays the DRC state a hefty tax bill.5 sector. Claims that ZTE has acquired three million Although it has not been possible to obtain hectares of land in the DRC to grow palm oil have figures on CCT’s investment spending, CCT been used as evidence of a Chinese ‘land grab’ in concedes that the company has not received Africa. The DRC government reportedly approved anything like the level of investment spent on a 100 000-hectare allocation in principle to ZTE its rivals. India’s Bharti, for example, is on track in 2007.8 However, ZTE’s website states that its to invest $400 million over a two-year period in only land currently in production is a ten-hectare Airtel, and already has a network and marketing experimental farm for planting high-yield crops.9 presence in the country far exceeding that of CCT. In 2009 rumours emerged of ZTE’s intention H u a w e i to sell its stake in CCT. During 2010 ’s MTN was touted widely as a possible ZTE’s troubles stand in stark contrast to a far buyer. However, a sale never transpired, possibly smoother experience of the other main Chinese because of opposition from Vodacom and from telecommunications company in the DRC, Bharti, which had tried previously to buy MTN and ZTE’s bitter rival in international markets, without success. Huawei. In 2010 Huawei was ranked as the

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second-largest global provider of mobile phone – presumably in the hope that customers will view network infrastructure, with a 15.7% share their eventual settlement as fair and impartial. of the market’s $78.6 billion revenues.10 Like The Chinese government has neither commented ZTE, Huawei’s primary interest is in supplying publicly nor intervened in the two companies’ legal equipment to other service providers. However, battles, apparently content for them to battle the Huawei was a later entrant to the DRC market in matter out in international courts. This represents 2004, during the presidency of the more market- a significant departure from the government’s oriented Joseph Kabila. Consequently, unlike ZTE previous practice of intervening in disputes Huawei was never saddled with the obligation of between its prominent companies, particularly if running its own mobile phone network, and won they are state-owned. Analysts have interpreted its first major contract in the country in 2006. this as an indication that the government is The contract involved supplying equipment adopting a more laissez-faire approach. to Tigo – a mobile phone operator owned by By late 2011 ZTE and Huawei’s struggle Luxembourg-based Millicom – at a cost of over appeared not to have reached the DRC. Although $120 million, and was completed in 2009. both companies compete vigorously for the same In 2008 Huawei signed its second major contracts and appear to have little contact with contract with the OCPT to install code-division each other, neither has shown any overt signs of multiple-access technology for its network, firstly hostility to the other. in Kinshasa and then extending to the rest of the country. Work for the project commenced C h i n a I n t e r n a t i o n a l in 2010. In 2011 Huawei also began working T e l e c o m m u n i ca t i o n with Vodacom in supplying equipment to Airtel. C o n s t r u c t i o n C o r p o r a t i o n Huawei demonstrated its confidence in the DRC by purchasing prime real estate on Kinshasa’s The third prominent Chinese company involved Boulevard 30 Juin, where it is building in telecommunications in the DRC is the China an office, training centre, sports centre and International Telecommunication Construction apartment blocks for its staff. The buildings are Corporation (CITCC). The CITCC has been due to be completed at the end of 2011 at a cost present in the DRC since 2006, providing and of around $20 million. laying fibre-optic cables. In 2008 the CITCC won a contract in conjunction with France’s Alcatel- Z t e v e r s u s H u a w e i Lucent, which has a 50% stake in China-based Alcatel Shanghai Bell, to connect Kinshasa with Competition between ZTE and Huawei has fibre-optic cables to Moanda, on the Atlantic coast. been strong for many years. This intensified Alcatel-Lucent had previously connected Moanda after Huawei sued ZTE in April 2011 in several, to the South Atlantic 3/West Africa Submarine mostly European countries for allegedly infringing Cable (SAT-3/WASC). The SAT-3/WASC is a patents relating to data card technology and submarine communications cable running from long-term evolution (LTE), a new mobile phone Portugal and Spain to India and South East Asia, technology.11 ZTE rejected Huawei’s accusations, with connections to several African countries en filing motions a few days later, also in several route. The CITCC completed work in late 2009, countries, to invalidate various Huawei patents leaving it with little to do but maintenance on the and a Huawei trademark. ZTE also filed a lawsuit Kinshasa–Moanda line while it looks around – so against Huawei for alleged infringement in China far unsuccessfully – for other contracts. of LTE-related patents.12 Technology analysts considered it significant that the companies C o n c l u s i o n chose to fight their legal battles outside China – where any legal judgement could be construed Chinese companies have played a significant and as being influenced by political considerations growing role in the DRC’s telecommunications

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sector for over a decade, during which time the rivalry, the bigger picture is one of increasing nature of their presence has undergone profound dominance for Chinese companies in the DRC’s transformation. The role played by ZTE, the first telecommunications equipment sector, despite Chinese company to arrive, was shaped more a retreat, which may prove permanent, from by political factors than by the company’s own telecommunications service provision. wishes, which has proved deeply problematic for the company. Although Congolese consumers E n d n o t e s welcomed CCT’s low call charges, ZTE experienced financial losses in its investment. 1 Gregory Mthembu-Salter is a researcher and author ZTE has also failed to entrench itself as a market on Africa’s political economy. leader in its core business of manufacturing and 2 Fletcher O, ‘ZTE steps up patents battle with supplying telecommunications equipment. Huawei’, Wall Street Journal, 5 May 2011, http:// Huawei and the CITCC, however, were online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748703849 fortunate in being able to structure their 204576302623622429598.html#ixzz1YBG44pTd. operations according to their own preferences 3 Chinese renminbi. and strategy, and to avoid committing themselves 4 Personal interview, officials from several mobile to unwieldy and unprofitable joint ventures. phone operators, Kinshasa, May 2011. The CITCC enjoyed initial success with its 5 Personal interview, CCT official, Kinshasa, May Kinshasa–Moanda line contract, but has failed 2011. to secure significant work since and appears to 6 Campbell M & MJ Kavanagh, ‘France Telecom be languishing. Huawei, by contrast, has gone weighs deal to buy Congo Stake’, from strength to strength, supplying equipment Bloomberg Businessweek, 18 July 2011, http:// to all three of the main mobile phone operators www.businessweek.com/news/2011-07-18/france in the country. Officials from each have described -telecom-weighs-deal-to-buy-congo-china-telecom- Huawei’s product and service mix as world stake.html. class, competitive not just on price, but also on 7 ‘France Telecom-Orange to acquire 100% of quality. Huawei is building its presence steadily Congo Chine Télécom (CCT), a mobile operator in the country, and if not already the DRC’s in the Democratic Republic of the Congo’, France market leader in providing telecommunications Telecom-Orange press release, Paris, 20 October equipment, it is well on its way to becoming so. 2011. Huawei and ZTE are fierce competitors 8 Brautigam D, ‘China and the African “land grab”: internationally, but the former has become a The DRC oil palm deal’, 15 March 2010, http:// much larger player than the latter, ranking second www.chinaafricarealstory.com/2010/03/china-and- in the world after Siemens in 2010 compared with african-land-grab-drc-oil.html. ZTE’s relatively lowly sixth place. Similarly in 9 ZTE Energy Company Limited, ‘Congo (Kinshasa) the DRC, Huawei has won a far greater market agricultural experimental plot’, http://www.zte-e. share than ZTE. In contrast to Huawei’s focused com/en/prod_js.aspx?ID=738. approach in the DRC, ZTE appears uncertain 10 Fletcher O, op. cit. of how to proceed, with its unsuccessful CCT 11 Hille K, ‘Huawei sues ZTE over patents’, Financial investment now behind it, a small selection of Times, 28 April 2011, http://www.ft.com/cms/ telecommunications service provision projects s/2/13f61fde-71a9-11e0-9b7a-00144feabdc0.html and a tiny foothold in commercial agriculture. #ixzz1YBFpTtz8. Looking beyond ZTE and Huawei’s 12 Fletcher O, op. cit.

The China in Africa Project is funded by the United Kingdom’s Department for International Development and the Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency. SAIIA gratefully acknowledges this support. © SAIIA 2011 All rights reserved. Opinions expressed are the responsibility of the individual authors and not of SAIIA.

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