German and British Planning in Early March 1941 91 the Die Is Cast

german and british planning in early march 1941 91 Chapter Four the die is Cast: German and British planninG in early marCh 1941 in early march, while the Greeks combined ongoing operations in albania against the italians with preparing the doiran-nestos line, the ‘newcomers’ to the theatre, both German and British, were on the move. as the German 12th army pushed south from romania into Bulgaria and towards the Greek frontier, British and dominion troops began to arrive at the port of piraeus, athens, in a series of naval convoys from egypt. in the first half of the month such movements were accompanied on both sides by the rapid develop- ment of operational plans. in many ways, because of the much greater need for coordination and cooperation between the Greek and imperial forces, the evolution of allied preparations to counter the looming German invasion in this period were even more complex and than those of their adver- saries—and yet at the same time Field marshal list’s army was beset with its own set of problems. the period was a particularly hectic period for both sides. it was also a crucial phase insofar as the decisions made and plans set in train in this period shaped the course and conduct of what followed. With German plans for military action against Greece crystallising up to February 1941, the first practical operational step had was to move the 12th army through Bulgaria up to the Greek border. as noted in Chapter 2, a number of German air bases had already been constructed in semi-secret in Bulgaria by luftwaffe ground staff dressed as civilians. the move of such a large force, however, proved a much more difficult proposition. two ear- lier separate German reconnaissance missions into Bulgaria in november and december 1940 confirmed the difficulty in marching through the country before spring, given the winter weather and the state of the roads. as ordered by oKW, the 12th army then began to cross into Bulgaria on 2 march with instructions to occupy various assembly areas in the southwest part of the country, near the Greek frontier. even without enemy air inter- diction, however, this approach march of up to 640 kilometres was not without considerable problems which included the worst possible roads, terrible weather, poor accommodation, traversing mountain passes still 92 chapter four choked with snow, and the fact that only one reliable rail line was available to support the 12th army’s advance. according to list such conditions ‘highly taxed the strength of both commanding officers and men’.1 German horse-drawn columns, in particular, were badly broken up and only successful eventually due to Bulgarian oxen placed at the 12th army’s dis- posal along a string of relay stations. this system allowed the steepest gradients to be overcome without the loss of too many horses. in the end such measures, a strong force of military police for traffic control, the Bul- garian labour service, the active cooperation of Bulgarian officials ‘and the very friendly spirit of the Bulgarian population’, helped ensure a successful German transit.2 even once assembled in southern Bulgaria, however, poor local infrastructure meant list had considerable difficulty in adequately accommodating and supplying his formations, particularly with respect to food, fodder, and medical supplies. all of this was in addition to ongoing uncertainty regarding yugoslav intentions, the Greeks backed by the British, and the turkish divisions currently stationed in eastern thrace. on the other hand by 6 march hitler was confident that there was little danger of a turkish intervention and, at least according to list’s Chief of staff Gen- eral h. von Greiffenberg, there was still thought in some German military circles that an invasion may not be necessary. perhaps, even at this late stage the 12th army’s occupation of Bulgaria alone might be sufficient to achieve Germany’s political objectives of convincing the Greeks to seek an armistice in albania and declare their absolute neutrality. By then, however, the Greeks had cast in their lot with the allies. as list’s formations concentrated near the Greek border from 7 march the first British and dominion troops of W Force began to land in athens.3 1 ‘preliminary history of the Balkan campaign’, reviewed and edited by Field marshal s.W. list and General h. von Greiffenberg, 9 June 1947, aWm 54, 624/7/2. 2 major l. Glombik, intelligence officer, 12th army, ‘the German Balkan Campaign’, 23 June 1947, aWm 54, 624/7/2. ‘preliminary history of the Balkan campaign’, reviewed and edited by Field marshal s.W. list and General h. von Greiffenberg, 9 June 1947, aWm 54, 624/7/2; General h. von Greiffenberg, ‘answers to a questionnaire given by the australian historical section’, 4 July 1947, aWm 54, 624/7/2; hepp, ‘die 12. armee im Balkanfeldzug 1941’, pp. 203-4; d. Garnett, The Campaign in Greece and Crete, hmso, london, 1942, p. 11; m. van Creveld, Hitler’s Strategy 1940-1941: The Balkan Clue, Cambridge university press, london, 1973, pp. 99, 97, 102, 109. 3 hitler’s reichstag speech after the campaign on 4 may 1941 again emphasised he would have preferred a political rather than military solution to Greece, but nonetheless a friendly southern flank was a military necessity. oKW/WFst., ‘abt. l (i op.) 44274/.41 gK Chefs.’, 5 march 1941, Bundesarchiv militärarchiv (Ba ma), rW 4/588; ‘preliminary history of the Balkan campaign’, reviewed and edited by Field marshal s.W. list and General h. von Greiffenberg, 9 June 1947, aWm 54, 624/7/2; ‘a few war experiences’, reviewed and edited .

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