Household Waste Prevention Policy Side Research Programme

Final Report for Defra A National Resource and Waste Forum collaborative project funded by Defra through the Waste and Resources Evidence Programme.

Authors: Eunomia Research & Consulting The Environment Council Öko-Institut TNO Atlantic Consulting

May 2007

Report for: Gillian Neville, Defra

Prepared by: Dr Dominic Hogg, Duncan Wilson, Dr. Jessica North, Olivia Errey, Martin Astley, Matthias Buchert, Andreas Hermann, Dr Arnold Tukker, and Eric Johnson

Approved by

…………………………………………………. Dr Dominic Hogg Project Director, Technical

Contact Details Eunomia Research & Consulting Ltd 1 Kings Court Little King Street Bristol BS1 4HW United Kingdom Tel: +44 (0)117 9450100 Fax: +44 (0)8717 142942 Web: www.eunomia.co.uk

Acknowledgements Our thanks to the Project Steering Group, and to all the participants in the workshops for their valuable contributions.

Disclaimer Eunomia Research & Consulting and co-contractors have taken due care in the preparation of this report to ensure that all facts and analysis presented are as accurate as possible within the scope of the project. However no guarantee is provided in respect of the information presented, and Eunomia Research & Consulting is not responsible for decisions or actions taken on the basis of the content of this report.

Waste Prevention Policy Case Studies i EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The purpose of this research project was to identify and investigate waste prevention policies with the greatest potential for application in the UK, and to develop a clearer understanding of who currently has responsibility for waste prevention policy in the UK. A structured research programme was developed. In the first instance a framework was constructed to facilitate identification and analysis of waste prevention policies. This framework was used to undertake an analysis of who in the UK has responsibility for the various aspects of waste prevention policy, and to assist in identifying and reviewing waste prevention policies in place in the UK and in other countries. A series of workshops was conducted to identify policies not currently in use anywhere and to evaluate the potential application to the UK of all the policies to emerge from the research. The final phase of the research entailed undertaking more in-depth research in the form of case studies on the eleven most promising policies. Within the UK, the reality is that waste prevention has historically been accorded a low priority. This is reflected in the fact that the research uncovered very few policies designed to directly target household waste prevention. One exception is the Packaging Essential Requirements legislation - although its effectiveness has possibly been limited by the relatively low level of resourcing allocated to its enforcement, again perhaps indicative of the priority that has been attached to waste prevention. While there are few policies directed specifically at waste prevention, other waste management policies have in fact resulted in perverse incentives which have probably increased household waste arisings. The impact of these policies has tended to revolve around the management of bio-waste. In particular waste recycling targets have incentivised local authorities to provide free garden waste collections (despite the fact that much of the material that is collected was not previously in the household waste stream), and have reduced incentives to promote home composting. The administration of the Landfill Allowance Schemes, which use a mass balance approach and account for bio-waste as a constant fraction of the residual, similarly incentivise garden waste collections, and provide a reduced incentive to promote home composting (though this situation is under review). The analysis of responsibility for waste prevention policy in the UK showed that there is no shortage of organisations with responsibility for waste prevention policy, but that there is perhaps a lack of coordination and strategic focus in the delivery of policies and in the deployment of the necessary resources to follow through on their implementation. A review of waste prevention policies in other countries revealed that, although the UK has few policies targeted directly at waste prevention, the situation is not substantially better elsewhere in terms of polices that can be shown to have measurable household waste prevention impacts. One exception is variable charging for household collected waste, for which there is clear evidence that it incentivises households to reduce waste. Of key importance is that household variable charging also works in synergy with other policies, such as landfill bans, landfill taxes, and other waste prevention initiatives such as packaging take back and home composting promotions. In these instances charging works to support initiatives and enhance their impacts. Charging provides an economic incentive for behavioural change that is in line with other functions within a market-based economy. Direct and Variable Charging was however not considered further in this report as substantial work is already being done on this under the same Defra research programme. The policies examined as case studies in this research were: 1. Implementation Plans for Waste Prevention 2. Inclusion of Home Composting in LA(T)S

Waste Prevention Policy Case Studies ii 3. Waste Prevention Targets and Residual Waste Levy 4. Low Waste Schools / Charging for Schools Waste 5. Junk Mail Policies 6. Mandatory Use of Rechargeable Batteries 7. Deepening Producer Responsibility 8. Collaborative Procurement 9. Minimum Standards for Appliances 10. Stimulating Re-use of Durable Goods 11. Extended Product Warranties There is potential for a number of the policies examined to have strong effects and to embed waste prevention more fundamentally in the functioning of the UK economy and in society. Key policies in this context include: Implementation Plans for Waste Prevention; Waste Prevention Targets and Residual Waste Levy; and Extended Product Warranties. Also apparent from the research is that a number of policy mechanisms with the potential to have a positive impact already have substantial elements of the necessary structures in place. In such cases decisions required may simply include extending targets, improving resourcing, and enforcement of policy measures (for example Low Waste Schools / Charging for Schools Waste, Collaborative Procurement). A number of policy areas (e.g. Waste Prevention Targets/Residual Waste Levy, Extended Product Warranties) are likely to require further research to properly determine their potential impact. However, there are other policy areas that could be implemented with little further research. These include: Implementation Plans for Waste Prevention and Junk Mail initiatives. The research team believes there may be merit in establishing a waste prevention policy unit to coordinate the work on waste prevention across the organisations and institutions that currently deal with different aspects of waste prevention. Overall, waste prevention policy is an area that has received relatively little attention in policy terms – not just in the UK, but worldwide – and there remains significant scope for further innovation within this area.

Waste Prevention Policy Case Studies iii CONTENTS 111 INTRODUCTIONINTRODUCTION...... 1... 111 222 OBJECTIVESOBJECTIVES...... 3...... 333 333 SCOPESCOPE...... 4444 3.1 What is Household Waste?...... 4 3.2 What is Waste Prevention?...... 5 3.3 Definition of ‘a Policy’...... 6 444 FRAMEWORKFRAMEWORK...... 8...... 888 4.1 Background...... 8 4.1.1 Household Waste Arisings Growth ...... 8 4.1.2 Drivers for Waste Growth...... 9 4.1.3 Material Types ...... 14 4.1.4 Consumption Categories...... 18 4.1.5 Supply Chains ...... 19 4.1.6 Analysis Summary ...... 21 4.2 Waste Prevention Framework ...... 21 4.2.1 General Description...... 22 4.3 Application of the Framework...... 24 4.3.1 Overview Analysis ...... 25 4.3.2 Product/Material Analysis ...... 25 4.3.3 Analysis of Actors/Organisations ...... 25 4.3.4 Identification of Key Materials...... 25 555 WASTE POLICY IN THE UK AND EFFECTS ON WASTE PREVENTION...... 272727 5.1 Waste Prevention in England ...... 35 5.1.1 Analysis of Recent Growth Rates ...... 35 5.1.2 Policies in Place...... 38 5.1.3 Landfill Tax...... 40 5.1.4 Impact...... 41 5.1.5 Landfill Allowances Schemes ...... 43 5.1.6 Recycling Targets ...... 48 5.1.7 Recycling Credits ...... 49 5.1.8 Packaging...... 51 5.1.9 Essential Requirements...... 53 5.1.10 Voluntary Agreement Concerning Direct Mail...... 62 5.1.11 Voluntary Actions to Reduce Packaging – The Courtauld Commitment...... 65 5.1.12 Implementation of the WEEE Directive...... 66 5.2 Waste Prevention in Scotland ...... 66 5.2.1 Recent Consultation...... 67 5.3 Waste Prevention in Wales...... 69 5.4 Waste Prevention in Northern Ireland ...... 70 5.4.1 Northern Ireland Waste Prevention Framework...... 71 5.4.2 Northern Ireland Waste Management Strategy ...... 72 5.5 Locally Implemented Policies ...... 73 5.5.1 Blaby District Council ...... 73 5.6 Summary of UK Policy on Waste Prevention...... 83 666 RESPONSIBILITY ANALYSISANALYSIS...... 858585 Waste Prevention Policy Case Studies iv 6.1 Introduction...... 85 6.1.1 Current Waste Prevention Responsibility ...... 85 6.1.2 Areas of Potential for Waste Prevention...... 87 6.1.3 Responsibility Analysis...... 87 6.2 Increasing the Cost of Wastefulness ...... 88 6.2.1 Raw Material Taxes...... 88 6.2.2 Taxation on Disposable Products...... 89 6.2.3 Disposal Taxes...... 90 6.3 Producer Responsibility ...... 91 6.3.1 Legislative Policies ...... 91 6.3.2 Individual Producer Responsibility...... 92 6.3.3 Voluntary Policies ...... 93 6.4 Minimum Product Standards...... 94 6.4.1 Product Weight and Volume Minimisation ...... 94 6.4.2 Product Durability and Extended Life-spans ...... 95 6.5 Sustainable Procurement ...... 96 6.6 Consumer Market Stimulation or Suppression...... 99 6.6.1 Advertising ...... 99 6.6.2 Product Labelling...... 100 6.6.3 Product Information Services ...... 100 6.6.4 Retail Marketing Techniques...... 101 6.6.5 Sustainable procurement ...... 102 6.7 Education...... 102 6.7.1 School Curriculum ...... 102 6.7.2 Public Education...... 103 6.7.3 Work-based Training...... 104 6.8 Housing Planning and Design ...... 105 6.8.1 Waste Collection Planning ...... 105 6.8.2 Housing Design...... 106 6.9 Limiting, or Charging for, Household Waste Collection ...... 107 6.9.1 Limiting Waste Collection...... 108 6.9.2 Charging for Waste Collection ...... 109 6.10 Home and Community Composting ...... 109 6.10.1 Best Practice for Local Authorities...... 109 6.10.2 Inclusion of Home Composting in Landfill Allowances Schemes...... 110 6.10.3 Waste Management Licensing for (Community) Composting ...... 111 6.11 Waste Prevention Targets ...... 112 6.12 Conclusion...... 112 777 POLICIES FOR HWHWPP IN THE NETHERLANDS 19851985----200520052005...... 114 7.1 Introduction...... 114 7.2 Dutch Waste Prevention: a Short Background...... 114 7.2.1 Historical Perspective...... 114 7.2.2 Some Figures ...... 116 7.2.3 Classification of Prevention Policies ...... 118 7.3 ‘Diftar’ (Tariff Differentiation), or ‘Pay As You Throw’...... 120 7.3.1 Description...... 120 7.3.2 Policy Context and Reason for Introduction ...... 120 7.3.3 Date & Timetable of Introduction...... 120 7.3.4 Prerequisites for Introduction...... 120 7.3.5 Implementation Mechanisms...... 120 Waste Prevention Policy Case Studies v 7.3.6 Monitoring and Measurement Techniques Applied...... 121 7.3.7 Impact...... 121 7.3.8 Economic Implications...... 124 7.3.9 Social Implications ...... 124 7.3.10 Distributional Implications...... 124 7.3.11 Enforcement Issues ...... 125 7.3.12 Political and Public Response...... 125 7.3.13 Other Impacts...... 125 7.3.14 Key Success / Failure Factors...... 126 7.3.15 Future Changes / Modifications Planned ...... 127 7.3.16 Evaluations Undertaken ...... 127 7.4 Landfill Bans...... 127 7.4.1 Description...... 127 7.4.2 Policy Context and Reason for Introduction ...... 128 7.4.3 Date & Timetable of Introduction...... 128 7.4.4 Prerequisites for Introduction...... 129 7.4.5 Implementation Mechanisms...... 129 7.4.6 Monitoring and Measurement Techniques Applied...... 129 7.4.7 Impact...... 129 7.4.8 Economic Implications...... 129 7.4.9 Social Implications ...... 129 7.4.10 Distributional Implications...... 129 7.4.11 Enforcement Issues ...... 130 7.4.12 Political and Public Response...... 130 7.4.13 Other Impacts...... 130 7.4.14 Key Success/Failure Factors...... 130 7.4.15 Future Changes/Modifications Planned ...... 130 7.4.16 Evaluations Undertaken ...... 130 7.5 Landfill Tax...... 130 7.5.1 Description...... 130 7.5.2 Policy Context and Reason for Introduction ...... 130 7.5.3 Date & Timetable of Introduction...... 130 7.5.4 Prerequisites for Introduction...... 131 7.5.5 Implementation Mechanisms...... 131 7.5.6 Monitoring and Measurement Techniques Applied...... 131 7.5.7 Impact...... 131 7.5.8 Economic Implications...... 131 7.5.9 Social Implications ...... 131 7.5.10 Distributional Implications...... 131 7.5.11 Enforcement Issues ...... 131 7.5.12 Political and Public Response...... 131 7.5.13 Other Impacts...... 131 7.5.14 Key Success / Failure Factors...... 131 7.5.15 Future Changes / Modifications Planned ...... 132 7.5.16 Evaluations Undertaken ...... 132 7.6 Packaging Covenant, Underlying Measures and Subsequent Legislation ...... 132 7.6.1 Description...... 132 7.6.2 Policy Context and Reason for Introduction ...... 133 7.6.3 Date & Timetable of Introduction...... 133 7.6.4 Prerequisites for Introduction...... 133 7.6.5 Implementation Mechanisms...... 134 Waste Prevention Policy Case Studies vi 7.6.6 Monitoring and Measurement Techniques Applied...... 135 7.6.7 Impact...... 135 7.6.8 Economic Implications...... 135 7.6.9 Social Implications ...... 135 7.6.10 Distributional Implications...... 135 7.6.11 Enforcement Issues ...... 135 7.6.12 Political and Public Response...... 136 7.6.13 Other Impacts...... 136 7.6.14 Key Success/Failure Factors...... 136 7.6.15 Future Changes/Modifications Planned ...... 136 7.6.16 Evaluations Undertaken ...... 136 7.7 Producer Responsibility with Deposit system for Electrical and Electronic Products137 7.7.1 Description...... 137 7.7.2 Policy Context and Reason for Introduction ...... 137 7.7.3 Date & Timetable of Introduction...... 137 7.7.4 Prerequisites for Introduction...... 137 7.7.5 Implementation Mechanisms...... 138 7.7.6 Monitoring and Measurement Techniques Applied...... 138 7.7.7 Impact...... 138 7.7.8 Economic Implications...... 139 7.7.9 Social Implications ...... 139 7.7.10 Distributional Implications...... 139 7.7.11 Enforcement Issues ...... 139 7.7.12 Political and Public Response...... 139 7.7.13 Other Impacts...... 139 7.7.14 Key Success/Failure Factors...... 139 7.7.15 Future Changes/Modifications Planned ...... 140 7.7.16 Evaluations Undertaken ...... 140 7.8 Case B3: Stimulation of Home Composting (initiative)...... 140 7.8.1 Description...... 140 7.8.2 Policy Context and Reason for Introduction ...... 140 7.8.3 Date & Timetable of Introduction...... 140 7.8.4 Prerequisites for Introduction...... 140 7.8.5 Implementation Mechanisms...... 140 7.8.6 Monitoring and Measurement Techniques Applied...... 140 7.8.7 Impact...... 141 7.8.8 Economic and Social Implications ...... 141 7.8.9 Distributional Implications...... 141 7.8.10 Enforcement Issues ...... 141 7.8.11 Political and Public Response...... 141 7.8.12 Other Impacts...... 141 7.8.13 Key Success/Failure Factors...... 141 7.8.14 Future Changes/Modifications Planned ...... 141 7.8.15 Evaluations Undertaken ...... 142 7.9 Stimulation of Product Re-use via 2 nd Hand Shops (initiative) ...... 142 7.9.1 Description...... 142 7.9.2 Policy Context and Reason for Introduction ...... 142 7.9.3 Date & Timetable of Introduction...... 142 7.9.4 Prerequisites for Introduction...... 142 7.9.5 Implementation Mechanisms...... 142 7.9.6 Monitoring and Measurement Techniques Applied...... 142 Waste Prevention Policy Case Studies vii 7.9.7 Impact...... 142 7.9.8 Economic Implications...... 143 7.9.9 Social Implications ...... 143 7.9.10 Distributional Implications...... 143 7.9.11 Enforcement Issues ...... 143 7.9.12 Political and Public Response...... 143 7.9.13 Other Impacts...... 143 7.9.14 Key Success/Failure Factors...... 143 7.9.15 Future Changes/Modifications Planned ...... 143 7.9.16 Evaluations Undertaken ...... 143 7.10 Prevention Through ‘No Junk Mail’ stickers on post boxes (self-regulation/initiative) 143 7.10.1 Description...... 143 7.10.2 Policy Context and Reason for Introduction...... 144 7.10.3 Date & Timetable of Introduction...... 144 7.10.4 Prerequisites for Introduction...... 144 7.10.5 Implementation Mechanisms...... 144 7.10.6 Monitoring and Measurement Techniques Applied ...... 145 7.10.7 Impact ...... 145 7.10.8 Economic Implications...... 145 7.10.9 Social Implications ...... 145 7.10.10 Distributional Implications ...... 145 7.10.11 Enforcement Issues...... 145 7.10.12 Political and Public Response...... 145 7.10.13 Other Impacts...... 145 7.10.14 Key Success/Failure Factors ...... 146 7.10.15 Future Changes/Modifications Planned ...... 146 7.10.16 Evaluations Undertaken...... 146 7.11 Implementation Plan (Small) Batteries (Qualitative Prevention and Re-use)...... 146 7.11.1 Description...... 146 7.11.2 Policy Context and Reason for Introduction...... 146 7.11.3 Date & Timetable of Introduction...... 147 7.11.4 Prerequisites for Introduction...... 147 7.11.5 Implementation Mechanisms...... 147 7.11.6 Monitoring and Measurement Techniques Applied ...... 147 7.11.7 Impact ...... 147 7.11.8 Economic Implications...... 147 7.11.9 Social Implications ...... 148 7.11.10 Distributional Implications ...... 148 7.11.11 Enforcement Issues...... 148 7.11.12 Political and Public Response...... 148 7.11.13 Other Impacts...... 148 7.11.14 Key Success/Failure Factors ...... 148 7.11.15 Future Changes/Modifications Planned ...... 148 7.11.16 Evaluations Undertaken...... 148 7.12 Product Re-use and Material Re-use of Car Tyres...... 148 7.12.1 Description...... 148 7.12.2 Policy Context and Reason for Introduction...... 149 7.12.3 Date & Timetable of Introduction...... 149 7.12.4 Prerequisites for Introduction...... 149 7.12.5 Implementation Mechanisms...... 149 Waste Prevention Policy Case Studies viii 7.12.6 Monitoring and Measurement Techniques Applied ...... 149 7.12.7 Impact ...... 149 7.12.8 Economic Implications...... 150 7.12.9 Social Implications ...... 150 7.12.10 Distributional Implications ...... 150 7.12.11 Enforcement Issues...... 150 7.12.12 Political and Public Response...... 150 7.12.13 Other Impacts...... 150 7.12.14 Key Success/Failure Factors ...... 150 7.12.15 Future Changes/Modifications Planned ...... 150 7.12.16 Evaluations Undertaken...... 151 888 POLICIES FOR HWP IN USE IN GERMANY ...... 152 8.1 Introduction...... 152 8.2 Local Waste Statutes Regarding Waste Charges...... 152 8.2.1 Description (pay per volume model) ...... 152 8.2.2 Policy Context and Reason for Introduction ...... 155 8.2.3 Date & Timetable of Introduction...... 155 8.2.4 Prerequisites for Introduction...... 156 8.2.5 Implementation Mechanisms...... 156 8.2.6 Monitoring and Measurement Techniques Applied...... 156 8.2.7 Impact...... 156 8.2.8 Economic Implications...... 156 8.2.9 Social Implications ...... 157 8.2.10 Distributional Implications...... 157 8.2.11 Enforcement Issues ...... 157 8.2.12 Political and Public Response...... 157 8.2.13 Other Impacts...... 157 8.2.14 Key Success/Failure Factors...... 157 8.2.15 Future Changes/Modifications Planned ...... 158 8.2.16 Evaluations Undertaken ...... 158 8.3 Cost Effects of Disposal Ban ...... 158 8.3.1 Description...... 158 8.3.2 Policy Context and Reason for Introduction ...... 158 8.3.3 Date & Timetable of Introduction...... 158 8.3.4 Implementation Mechanisms...... 159 8.3.5 Impact...... 159 8.3.6 Economic Implications...... 160 8.3.7 Social Implications ...... 160 8.3.8 Distributional Implications...... 161 8.4 Duales System Deutschland (DSD –The Green Dot)...... 161 8.4.1 Description...... 161 8.4.2 Policy Context and Reason for Introduction ...... 161 8.4.3 Date & Timetable of Introduction...... 162 8.4.4 Prerequisites for Introduction...... 162 8.4.5 Implementation Mechanisms...... 163 8.4.6 Monitoring and Measurement Techniques Applied...... 163 8.4.7 Impact...... 163 8.4.8 Economic Implications...... 164 8.4.9 Social Implications ...... 164 8.4.10 Distributional Implications...... 164 Waste Prevention Policy Case Studies ix 8.4.11 Enforcement Issues ...... 165 8.4.12 Political and Public Response...... 165 8.4.13 Other Impacts...... 165 8.4.14 Key Success/Failure Factors...... 165 8.4.15 Future Changes/Modifications Planned ...... 165 8.5 Deposit on Cans and One-way Bottles (one-way deposits) ...... 166 8.5.1 Description...... 166 8.5.2 Policy Context and Reason for Introduction ...... 166 8.5.3 Date & Timetable of Introduction...... 167 8.5.4 Prerequisites for Introduction...... 167 8.5.5 Implementation Mechanisms...... 167 8.5.6 Monitoring and Measurement Techniques Applied...... 167 8.5.7 Impact...... 168 8.5.8 Economic Implications...... 168 8.5.9 Social Implications ...... 169 8.5.10 Distributional Implications...... 169 8.5.11 Enforcement Issues ...... 169 8.5.12 Political and Public Response...... 169 8.5.13 Other Impacts...... 170 8.5.14 Key Success/Failure Factors...... 170 8.5.15 Future Changes/Modifications Planned ...... 171 8.5.16 Evaluations Undertaken ...... 171 8.6 Electrical and Electronic Equipment Act – (ElektroG)...... 171 8.6.1 Description...... 171 8.6.2 Policy Context and Reason for Introduction ...... 172 8.6.3 Date & Timetable of Introduction...... 172 8.6.4 Prerequisites for Introduction...... 173 8.6.5 Existence of Central Institution Organizing Implementation Mechanisms ...... 173 8.6.6 Monitoring and Measurement Techniques Applied...... 174 8.6.7 Impact...... 174 8.6.8 Economic Implications...... 174 8.6.9 Social Implications ...... 174 8.6.10 Distributional Implications...... 175 8.6.11 Enforcement Issues ...... 175 8.6.12 Political and Public Response...... 176 8.6.13 Other Impacts...... 176 8.6.14 Key Success/Failure Factors...... 176 8.6.15 Future Changes/Modifications Planned ...... 176 8.6.16 Evaluations Undertaken ...... 176 8.7 Battery Decree (Household and car batteries)...... 177 8.7.1 Description...... 177 8.7.2 Policy Context and Reason for Introduction ...... 177 8.7.3 Date & Timetable of Introduction...... 178 8.7.4 Prerequisites for Introduction...... 178 8.7.5 Implementation Mechanisms...... 178 8.7.6 Monitoring and Measurement Techniques Applied...... 179 8.7.7 Impact...... 179 8.7.8 Economic Implications...... 180 8.7.9 Social Implications ...... 180 8.7.10 Distributional Implications...... 181 8.7.11 Enforcement Issues ...... 181 Waste Prevention Policy Case Studies x 8.7.12 Political and Public Response...... 181 8.7.13 Other Impacts...... 181 8.7.14 Key Success/Failure Factors...... 181 8.7.15 Future Changes/Modifications Planned ...... 182 8.7.16 Evaluations Undertaken ...... 182 999 POLICIES FOR HWP IN USE IN SWITZERLAND ...... 183 9.1 Residual Waste-sack Fee (Abfallsackgebühr) ...... 183 9.1.1 Description...... 183 9.1.2 Policy Context and Reason for Introduction ...... 183 9.1.3 Date & Timetable of Introduction...... 183 9.1.4 Prerequisites for Introduction...... 184 9.1.5 Implementation Mechanisms...... 184 9.1.6 Monitoring and Measurement Techniques Applied...... 184 9.1.7 Impact...... 184 9.1.8 Economic Implications...... 185 9.1.9 Social Implications ...... 185 9.1.10 Distributional Implications...... 185 9.1.11 Enforcement Issues ...... 185 9.1.12 Political and Public Response...... 185 9.1.13 Other Impacts...... 186 9.1.14 Key Success/Failure Factors...... 186 9.1.15 Future Changes/Modifications Planned ...... 186 9.1.16 Evaluations Undertaken ...... 186 9.2 Ban on Combustible Waste to Landfill (combined with separate collection mandates) 186 9.2.1 Description...... 186 9.2.2 Policy Context and Reason for Introduction ...... 186 9.2.3 Date & Timetable of Introduction...... 186 9.2.4 Prerequisites for Introduction...... 187 9.2.5 Implementation Mechanisms...... 187 9.2.6 Monitoring and Measurement Techniques Applied...... 187 9.2.7 Impact...... 187 9.2.8 Economic Implications...... 188 9.2.9 Social Implications ...... 188 9.2.10 Distributional Implications...... 188 9.2.11 Enforcement Issues ...... 188 9.2.12 Political and Public Response...... 188 9.2.13 Other Impacts...... 189 9.2.14 Key Success/Failure Factors...... 189 9.2.15 Future Changes/Modifications Planned ...... 189 9.2.16 Evaluations Undertaken ...... 189 9.3 Extended Producer Responsibility (EPR) ...... 189 9.3.1 Description...... 189 9.3.2 Policy Context and Reason for Introduction ...... 189 9.3.3 Date & Timetable of Introduction...... 190 9.3.4 Prerequisites for Introduction...... 190 9.3.5 Implementation Mechanisms...... 190 9.3.6 Monitoring and Measurement Techniques Applied...... 190 9.3.7 Impact...... 191 9.3.8 Economic Implications...... 191 Waste Prevention Policy Case Studies xi 9.3.9 Social Implications ...... 191 9.3.10 Distributional Implications...... 191 9.3.11 Enforcement Issues ...... 192 9.3.12 Political and Public Response...... 192 9.3.13 Other Impacts...... 192 9.3.14 Key Success/Failure Factors...... 192 9.3.15 Future Changes/Modifications Planned ...... 192 9.3.16 Evaluations Undertaken ...... 192 101010 POLICIES FOR HWP IN USE ELSEWHEREELSEWHERE...... 193 10.1 Irish Plastic Bags Levy (‘Plastax’)...... 193 10.1.1 Description...... 193 10.1.2 Policy Context and Reason for Introduction...... 193 10.1.3 Date & Timetable of Introduction...... 194 10.1.4 Prerequisites for Introduction...... 194 10.1.5 Implementation Mechanisms...... 194 10.1.6 Monitoring and Measurement Techniques Applied ...... 194 10.1.7 Impact ...... 195 10.1.8 Economic Implications...... 195 10.1.9 Social Implications ...... 195 10.1.10 Distributional Implications ...... 196 10.1.11 Enforcement Issues...... 196 10.1.12 Political and Public Response...... 196 10.1.13 Other Impacts...... 196 10.1.14 Key Success/Failure Factors ...... 196 10.1.15 Future Changes/Modifications Planned ...... 196 10.1.16 Evaluations Undertaken...... 197 10.2 Danish Waste Tax ...... 197 10.2.1 Description...... 197 10.2.2 Policy Context and Reason for Introduction...... 197 10.2.3 Date and Timetable of Introduction...... 197 10.2.4 Prerequisites for Introduction...... 197 10.2.5 Implementation Mechanisms...... 198 10.2.6 Monitoring and Measurement Techniques...... 198 10.2.7 Impact ...... 198 10.2.8 Economic Implications...... 199 10.2.9 Distributional Implications...... 199 10.2.10 Enforcement Issues...... 199 10.2.11 Political and Public Response...... 199 10.2.12 Other Impacts...... 200 10.2.13 Key Success / Failure Factors ...... 200 10.2.14 Future Changes / Modifications Planned ...... 200 10.2.15 Evaluations Undertaken...... 200 10.3 Danish Packaging Tax...... 200 10.3.1 Description...... 200 10.3.2 Policy Context and Reason for Introduction...... 201 10.3.3 Date and Timetable of Introduction...... 201 10.3.4 Prerequisites for Introduction...... 201 10.3.5 Implementation Mechanisms...... 201 10.3.6 Monitoring and Measurement Techniques Applied ...... 202 10.3.7 Impact ...... 202 Waste Prevention Policy Case Studies xii 10.3.8 Economic Implications...... 202 10.3.9 Social Implications ...... 203 10.3.10 Distributional Implications ...... 203 10.3.11 Enforcement Issues...... 203 10.3.12 Political and Public Response...... 203 10.3.13 Key Success/Failure Factors ...... 203 10.3.14 Future Changes/Modifications Planned ...... 203 10.3.15 Evaluations Undertaken...... 204 10.4 Raw Materials Taxes...... 204 10.4.1 Description...... 204 10.4.2 Policy Context and Reason for Introduction...... 204 10.4.3 Date & Timetable of Introduction...... 204 10.4.4 Prerequisites for Introduction...... 204 10.4.5 Implementation Mechanism ...... 205 10.4.6 Monitoring and Measurement Techniques Applied ...... 205 10.4.7 Impact ...... 205 10.4.8 Economic Implications...... 206 10.4.9 Social Implications ...... 206 10.4.10 Distributional Implications ...... 206 10.4.11 Enforcement Issues...... 207 10.4.12 Political and Public Response...... 207 10.4.13 Other Impacts...... 207 10.4.14 Key Success/Failure Factors ...... 207 10.4.15 Future Changes/Modifications Planned ...... 207 10.4.16 Evaluations Undertaken...... 208 10.5 French Unwanted Mail Decree...... 208 10.5.1 Description...... 208 10.5.2 Policy Context and Reason for Introduction...... 208 10.5.3 Date & Timetable of Introduction...... 208 10.5.4 Prerequisites for Introduction...... 208 10.5.5 Implementation Mechanisms...... 209 10.5.6 Monitoring and Measurement Techniques Applied ...... 209 10.5.7 Impact ...... 209 10.5.8 Economic Implications...... 209 10.5.9 Social Implications ...... 209 10.5.10 Distributional Implications ...... 209 10.5.11 Enforcement Issues...... 209 10.5.12 Political and Public Response...... 209 10.5.13 Other Impacts...... 210 10.6 Wallonia Residual Waste Levy ...... 210 10.6.1 Description...... 210 10.6.2 Policy Context and Reason for Introduction...... 210 10.6.3 Date and Timetable for Introduction...... 210 10.6.4 Prerequisites for Introduction...... 211 10.6.5 Implementation Mechanism ...... 211 10.6.6 Monitoring and Measurement Techniques Applied ...... 211 10.6.7 Impact ...... 211 10.6.8 Economic Implications...... 212 10.6.9 Social Implications ...... 212 10.6.10 Distributional Implications ...... 212 10.6.11 Enforcement Issues...... 212 Waste Prevention Policy Case Studies xiii 10.6.12 Political and Public Response...... 212 10.6.13 Other Impacts...... 212 10.6.14 Key Success/Failure Factors ...... 212 10.6.15 Future Changes/Modifications Planned ...... 212 10.6.16 Evaluations Undertaken...... 212 111111 POTENTIAL POLICY IDENTIFICATION ...... 213 11.1 Policy Scoping Stakeholder Workshop ...... 213 11.1.1 Workshop Objectives...... 213 11.1.2 Workshop Attendees and Representation ...... 213 11.1.3 Workshop Outputs...... 214 11.2 Policy synthesis and broad brush assessment...... 215 11.3 Short-listing Policy Workshop...... 221 11.3.1 Workshop Objectives...... 221 11.3.2 Workshop Attendees...... 221 11.3.3 Workshop Outputs...... 222 121212 INTRODUCTION TO CASE STUDY ANALYSIS ...... 225 131313 IMPLEMENTATION PLANS FOR WASTE PREVENTION AND RERE----USEUSEUSE...... 226 13.1 Description of Policy ...... 226 13.2 Rationale ...... 227 13.3 Scenario Development ...... 228 13.4 Environmental Impacts of the Policy ...... 228 13.5 Economic Impact of the Policy ...... 229 13.5.1 Government...... 229 13.5.2 Households...... 232 13.5.3 Business...... 232 13.6 Dynamic efficiency...... 233 13.7 Social Impacts...... 233 13.8 Implementation & Design Issues...... 233 13.9 Other Impacts...... 233 13.10 Summary & Conclusions ...... 234 141414 INCLUSION OF HOME COMPOSTING IN BVPI & LA(T)S CALCULATIONS ...... 235 14.1 Introduction ...... 235 14.2 Description of Policy ...... 235 14.3 Rationale ...... 236 14.4 Scenario Development ...... 237 14.5 Environmental Impacts of the Policy ...... 239 14.6 Economic Impact of the Policy ...... 241 14.6.1 LATS Implications...... 243 14.6.2 Impacts on Householders...... 245 14.6.3 Impacts upon Businesses...... 245 14.6.4 Distributional Consequences (local authorities)...... 245 14.6.5 Dynamic Efficiency...... 246 14.6.6 Additionality ...... 246 14.7 Social Impacts...... 246 14.8 Implementation & Design Issues...... 246 14.8.1 General...... 246 14.8.2 Monitoring and Regulation...... 247 14.8.3 Other Issues...... 248 Waste Prevention Policy Case Studies xiv 14.9 Other Impacts...... 248 14.10 Summary & Conclusions ...... 248 151515 WASTE PREVENTION TARGETS & RESIDUAL WASTE LEVYLEVY...... 250 15.1 Introduction ...... 250 15.2 Description of policy: Residual Waste Target...... 251 15.3 Scenario Development: Residual Waste Target ...... 254 15.4 Description of Policy: Residual Waste Levy...... 255 15.5 Scenario Development: Residual Waste Levy...... 256 15.5.1 Pre-determined Target...... 256 15.5.2 Levy Based on Average Residual Quantities...... 257 15.5.3 Scenario Examples...... 257 15.6 Environmental Impacts of the Policy ...... 259 15.6.1 Modelling Methodology...... 259 15.6.2 Key Parameters...... 260 15.6.3 Modelling Results...... 261 15.6.4 Changes Over Time ...... 263 15.7 Economic Impact of the Policy ...... 263 15.7.1 Cost to Business...... 265 15.7.2 Distributional Consequences ...... 265 15.7.3 Dynamic Efficiency...... 266 15.8 Social Impacts...... 266 15.9 Implementation & Design Issues...... 267 15.9.1 County-Level Levy System ...... 268 15.9.2 Nation-wide Levy Scheme ...... 270 15.10 Other Impacts ...... 271 15.11 Summary & Conclusions ...... 271 161616 ‘LOW WASTE SCHOOLS’: SEPARATE RECYCLABLE MATERIALS COLLECTIONS AND VARIABLE CHARGING FOR SCHOOLS’ WASTE COLLECTION ...... 273 16.1 Description of Policy ...... 273 16.2 Rationale ...... 273 16.3 Scenario Development ...... 275 16.3.1 Separate Collections...... 275 16.3.2 Variable Charging...... 278 16.4 Environmental Impacts of the Policy ...... 278 16.5 Economic Impact of the Policy ...... 282 16.6 Distributional Consequences ...... 283 16.7 Social Impacts...... 284 16.8 Implementation & Design Issues...... 284 16.9 Other Impacts...... 284 16.10 Summary & Conclusions ...... 285 171717 REDUCING QUANTITIES OF JUNK MAILMAIL...... 286 17.1 Description of Policy ...... 286 17.1.1 Direct Mail, Valuable Mail and Junk Mail – Is There a Difference?...... 287 17.1.2 The Freedom to Advertise...... 288 17.2 Rationale ...... 288 17.3 Scenario Development ...... 289 17.3.1 Activist Campaign...... 289 17.3.2 Opt-out ...... 290 Waste Prevention Policy Case Studies xv 17.3.3 Postage Increase / Waste Levy...... 290 17.3.4 Producer Responsibility Levy ...... 291 17.3.5 Suppression...... 291 17.3.6 Legally Binding ‘No Junk Mail’ Stickers...... 292 17.3.7 Promotion of the MPS on Direct Mail Material ...... 293 17.4 Environmental Impacts of the Policies...... 294 17.4.1 Impact of Promotion of Opt-outs (Promotion of the MPS on Direct Mail Material) 294 17.4.2 Impact of Postage Increase / Waste Levy...... 294 17.4.3 Impact of Producer Responsibility Levy...... 295 17.4.4 Impact of Suppression...... 296 17.4.5 Impact of Legally Binding ‘No Junk Mail’ Stickers...... 296 17.4.6 Impacts of Postal Commerce Versus Other Channels...... 297 17.4.7 Summary of Impacts...... 298 17.5 Potential Economic Impacts Associated with the the Policies...... 298 17.5.1 Direct Costs...... 298 17.5.2 Indirect Costs...... 299 17.6 Social Impacts...... 300 17.7 Implementation & Design Issues...... 300 17.8 Summary & Conclusions ...... 300 181818 MANDATORY USE OF RECHARGEABLE BATTERIES ...... 301 18.1 Description of Policy ...... 301 18.1.1 What is a Rechargeable?...... 302 18.1.2 Exemptions – Which and How Many? ...... 303 18.2 Rationale ...... 305 18.3 Scenario Development ...... 305 18.4 Environmental Impacts of the Policy ...... 308 18.4.1 A Decline in the Quantity of Battery Waste ...... 308 18.4.2 A Change in Hazardousness of the Battery Waste Stream...... 309 18.4.3 A Shift in Energy Delivery Associated with Battery Applications ...... 310 18.5 Economic Impact of the Policy ...... 311 18.5.1 Impact on Battery Producers...... 312 18.5.2 Impact on Producers of Appliances...... 313 18.5.3 Impact on Users / Consumers ...... 313 18.5.4 Government’s Role...... 314 18.5.5 Other Impacts...... 314 18.6 Social Impacts...... 314 18.7 Implementation & Design Issues...... 315 18.8 Summary & Conclusions ...... 315 191919 ‘DEEPENING’ PRODUCER RESPONSIBILITYRESPONSIBILITY...... 317 19.1 Description of Policy ...... 317 19.2 Rationale ...... 318 19.3 Scenario Development ...... 323 19.4 Environmental Impacts of the Policy ...... 324 19.4.1 Waste Prevention Effects...... 324 19.4.2 Waste Recycling Effects...... 325 19.4.3 Climate Change Impacts...... 325 19.5 Economic Impact of the Policy ...... 326 19.6 Social Impacts...... 326 Waste Prevention Policy Case Studies xvi 19.7 Implementation & Design Issues...... 326 19.8 Summary & Conclusions ...... 326 202020 COLLABORATICOLLABORATIVEVE PROCUREMENT ...... 328 20.1 Description of Policy ...... 328 20.2 Rationale ...... 329 20.3 Scenario Development ...... 329 20.3.1 UK Government Approach...... 331 20.3.2 Local Government Procurement...... 332 20.3.3 Local Government Act...... 332 20.3.4 Best Value...... 332 20.3.5 EC Public Procurement Regime ...... 333 20.3.6 Sustainable Procurement National Action Plan...... 333 20.3.7 : Market Transformation Programme & ‘Quick Wins’ List...... 334 20.3.8 The Charted Institute of Purchasing and Supply ...... 335 20.3.9 Waste Resources Action Programme (WRAP) ...... 335 20.3.10 Using Buying Power - Co-operative Procurement ...... 335 20.3.11 Using Buying Power - Influencing Purchasing Consortia ...... 335 20.4 Environmental Impacts of the Policy ...... 336 20.5 Economic Impact of the Policy ...... 336 20.6 Dynamic Effects of the Policy...... 337 20.7 Social Impacts...... 337 20.8 Implementation & Design Issues...... 337 20.9 Summary & Conclusions ...... 338 212121 MINIMUM STANDARDS FOR APPLIANCES / TRAINING FOR EFFICIENT PRODUCT DESIGN 339 21.1 Description of Policy ...... 339 21.1.1 Labels Addressing Minimum Standards for Weight and Durability...... 339 21.1.2 Legally Binding Minimum Standards...... 340 21.1.3 Eco-efficiency in Product Design Training...... 340 21.2 Rationale ...... 341 21.3 Scenario Development ...... 341 21.4 Environmental Impacts of the Policy ...... 341 21.5 Economic Impact of the Policy ...... 342 21.6 Social Impacts...... 343 21.7 Implementation & Design Issues...... 343 21.8 Other Impacts...... 345 21.9 Summary & Conclusions ...... 345 222222 STIMULATING THE RERE----USEUSE OF DURABLE GOODSGOODS...... 346 22.1 Description of Policy ...... 346 22.2 Rationale ...... 346 22.3 Scenario Development ...... 347 22.4 Environmental Impacts of the Policy ...... 349 22.5 Economic Impact of the Policy ...... 350 22.6 Social Impacts...... 350 22.7 Implementation & Design Issues...... 350 22.8 Other Impacts...... 351 22.9 Summary & Conclusions ...... 351 232323 EXTENDED PRODUCT WARRANTIES (CONSUMER GUARANTEE)GUARANTEE)...... 352 Waste Prevention Policy Case Studies xvii 23.1 Description of Policy ...... 352 23.2 Rationale ...... 353 23.3 Scenario Development ...... 353 23.4 Environmental Impacts of the Policy ...... 354 23.5 Economic Impact of the Policy ...... 354 23.6 Social Impacts...... 355 23.7 Implementation & Design Issues...... 355 23.8 Summary & Conclusions ...... 356 242424 SUMMARY OF CASE STUDIES ...... 357 252525 CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONSRECOMMENDATIONS...... 362 25.1 Recommendations...... 364 262626 Bibliography ...... 366 272727 Appendix I: Stakeholder workshop reportreport...... 375

Waste Prevention Policy Case Studies xviii 1 INTRODUCTION The project team, including The Environment Council, Eunomia Research & Consulting, the Oko Institut, TNO and Atlantic Consulting is pleased to present a Final Report for a research project concerning Waste Prevention Policies. The work has been funded by Defra and was undertaken on behalf of the National Resource & Waste Forum (NRWF). The work comes at an important time where the need to effectively restrain waste growth in order to meet Government and European targets is becoming more widely recognised. The European Commission, the European Environment Agency and the OECD have each highlighted the significance of household / municipal waste generation as a pressing environmental problem. 1 In the UK, household waste prevention has been a Cinderella service. Despite the introduction of the Waste Minimisation Act, and despite high reported growth rates in the early part of this decade, local authorities have been inclined to see waste reduction as something they cannot influence. It often falls between the cracks where waste contracts are concerned despite the potential savings to be made through successful initiatives. The work undertaken to develop a Framework for Household Waste Prevention under the sponsorship of the NRWF stands out as the major contribution thus far to understanding the potential for household waste prevention. 2 This has already been followed by further reports including the development of a toolkit for local authorities. SEPA has used the Framework to assist the preparation of a waste prevention strategy for Scotland (and Scotland is currently consulting on the matter) and Northern Ireland’s Environment and Heritage Service has built on this and worked with the NRWF in developing the waste prevention considerations in their revised Waste Strategy. The NRWF Phase 1 report identified a number of initiatives, but rather less by way of policy interventions / amendments to assist in the drive towards waste reduction. It is this gap that the research seeks to fill. The aim of this research report is to provide a thorough review of how both current policies (see Sections 5-10), and a selected list of potential policies (see Section 11) affect the amount of waste that ultimately finds its way into the household waste stream. In addition, the research aims to explore the applicability and practicality of these policies, including exploratory research into the responsibilities of different organisations with important roles to play in relation to waste prevention policy (See Section 6). See Section 2 for a detailed list of project objectives. The report is structured as follows: • Scope. The scope and definition of the work undertaken in the project is laid out in section 3, in particular the terms ‘household waste’, ‘waste prevention’ and ‘policies’ are defined.

1 See OECD (2001), OECD environmental outlook , Paris, France; European Commission (2001) Proposal for a Sixth Environmental Action Programme COM (2001) 31 Final; European Environment Agency (2004) EEA Signals 2004 – A European Environment Agency Update on Selected Issues, Copenhagen: EEA. 2 Enviros and Momenta (2005) Towards a UK Framework for Household Waste Prevention – Phase 1 Report.

Waste Prevention Policy Case Studies 1 • FrameworkFramework. This section examines the drivers behind household waste generation and develops a framework for the analysis to help ensure a consistent rigorous approach to identifying policies and actors and their importance in bringing about waste prevention outcomes, • UK Policies and ResponsibilitiesResponsibilities. This section looks at policies in place today in the UK. It examines their effects on waste prevention activities. The subsection on responsibilities looks at who could influence policy to make it more conducive to waste prevention. It then passes comment on the existence or otherwise of gaps in responsibilities / implementation. • Policies in Place in Other Countries. This section focuses on an overview of waste prevention policies in key European countries – Germany, The Netherlands and Switzerland – as well as some other policies used outside the UK. Each of the policy tools identified is examined in terms of a range of factors including impact, implementation issues, economic and social implications, and the level of evaluation information available. • Potential policy identification. This section details the potential policies developed as a result of the preliminary research, and stakeholder engagement processes, and the process of short listing these policies into a list of eleven policies for case study analysis. • Policy analysis case studies. This section analyses each of the policies from the short list as a case study, examining the policies’ social, environmental, and economic effects as well as issues for their introduction and implementation. • Conclusion

Waste Prevention Policy Case Studies 2

2 OBJECTIVES The objectives of this research are set out below: 1.0 to identify the actors / organisations with responsibility / potential responsibility for implementing measures in respect of Household Waste Prevention (HWP); 2.0 to map these actors / organisations to their responsibilities, and so to develop a coherent picture of who might play what role in respect of HWP in the UK; 3.0 to comment on the structure of these responsibilities from a perspective which seeks to improve the potential for HWP through UK waste and resource management policy 4.0 to identify policies for HWP in use in other countries (especially in Switzerland, Germany, Netherlands and Belgium); 5.0 to identify policies in place in the UK: 5.1 with the potential to be applied ‘more positively’ in respect of HWP; 5.2 which have a detrimental impact in respect of HWP; 6.0 to identify, through discussions with stakeholders, policies which could be used in the UK to foster HWP 7.0 to carry out a basic assessment of a long-list of policies identified under 4), 5) and 6). Initially, the intention was to carry out a ‘broad brush’ assessment of these with a view to presenting a short-list of ten to a stakeholder group for discussion and subsequent approval. However, it was decided to make use of a more consultative approach to choose the case studies (see below); 8.0 to identify, through discussions with actors / representatives of organisations identified under 1) above, the top ten policies to be taken forward for more detailed analysis; 9.0 to carry out a more detailed assessment of the ten policies identified with a view to assessing their potential impact, and their applicability in the UK context; 10.0 to disseminate the work to policy makers, including those identified under 1) above, through briefings, conferences, journal articles, national press and the internet, and so to promote more active uptake of the HWP agenda in the UK through policy measures as opposed to more ad hoc measures and initiatives. The report opens with a discussion of the scope of the research and with the elaboration of a framework in which the research is being carried forward.

Waste Prevention Policy Case Studies 3

3 SCOPE It is important at the outset of this project to establish the scope of the work involved so it is clear what is, and is not, included in the work to be undertaken. Work undertaken by the NRWF on Waste Prevention to date has identified a number of initiatives, but rather less by way of policy interventions / amendments to assist in the drive towards waste reduction. It is this gap that the research seeks to fill. Key to establishing the scope therefore is settling on clear definitions of: • What is household waste? • What is covered by the term ‘prevention’? • What is meant by a ‘policy’? These definitions are set out in the following subsections. 3.1 What is Household Waste? The definition of household waste used in this study is based on official UK definitions. ODPM defines household waste as follows: “Household Waste” is all waste collected by Waste Collection Authorities (WCAs) under Section 45(1) of the Environmental Protection Act 1990), plus all waste arisings from Civic Amenity (CA) Sites and waste collected by third parties for which collection or disposal recycling credits are paid under Section 52 of the Environmental Protection Act 1990. 3 For the purposes of this study “Household Waste” is that which arises from dwellings of various types including 4: • houses • caravans • houseboats • campsites • prisons • schools • colleges • universities Household waste arising from these dwellings includes 5: • waste from household collection rounds • wastes separately collected for recycling or composting through bring/drop off schemes and kerbside schemes • waste from street cleaning (inc. gully waste) • bulky waste collection • household hazardous waste collection • litter collections • household clinical waste collection • separate garden waste collection

3 http://www.communities.gov.uk/index.asp?id=1136141 4 Based on the Environmental Protection Act 1990, Section 75 (5) 5 Based on ODPM definitions in http://www.communities.gov.uk/index.asp?id=1136141

Waste Prevention Policy Case Studies 4 • waste from Civic Amenity sites Note: Illegal dumping, events waste, incinerator residues, beach cleansing waste and abandoned vehicles are not classified as household waste for the purposes of this study. 3.2 What is Waste Prevention? According to the OECD, most of the developed world uses the term ‘waste minimisation’ to refer to diversion from landfill, covering avoidance, reduction at source, reuse, recycling and, in some cases, incineration/ energy recovery. It defines waste prevention as covering only the top three elements of the hierarchy describing these as 6: Strict avoidance - the complete prevention of waste generation by virtual elimination of hazardous substances or by reducing material or energy intensity in production, consumption, and distribution. Reduction at source --- minimising use of toxic or harmful substances and/or minimising material or energy consumption. Product rere----useuse - the multiple use of a product in its original form, for its original purpose or for an alternative, with or without reconditioning. In the UK there is no clear or consistent definition of waste prevention (as we shall refer to these activities hereafter) or even waste minimisation. The Waste Minimisation Act 1998, in Section 63A (1), talks about: “…. local authorities…minimising the quantities of controlled waste, or controlled waste of any description, generated in its area ”. For a recent study for Defra on International Waste Prevention and Reduction Practice, Enviros adopted a pragmatic definition of waste prevention in the municipal sense: "Minimising the quantity and hazardousness of municipal waste generated for collection, by the local authority, through prevention/reduction at source and reuse in the local community" Adding to this potential confusion over what is meant by waste prevention in the UK, there appears to be some intent on the part of the Environment Agency in England and Wales, SEPA in Scotland and the Environment and Heritage Service (EHS) in Northern Ireland to ensure that the hazardousness of wastes, as well as the quantities of municipal wastes, is reduced. A problem this raises is which one of these is more important? Reducing hazardousness might include increasing quantity. The definition adopted for a previous NRWF study 7 was: Household waste prevention is minimising the quantity (weight and volume) and hazardousness of household-derived waste generated in a defined community for collection by any party. The following activities are included: • AvoidanceAvoidance; for example by eliminating hazardous components and substances, by not purchasing unnecessary goods, by buying services or experiences

6 OECD, 2000. Strategic Waste Prevention OECD Reference Manual 7 National Resource & Waste Forum, 2005: Towards A UK Framework for Household Waste Prevention – Phase 1 Final Report A Report by Enviros Consulting Limited & Momenta

Waste Prevention Policy Case Studies 5 rather than goods, by using refill systems and by preventing delivery of unwanted mail. • ReductionReduction; for example by buying less hazardous goods, by purchasing less heavily packaged goods and goods that are lighter, more compact and more durable. • ReuseReuse; for example domestic reuse of containers, donation of goods to charities, refurbishment and reuse of goods (not-for-profit or commercially), home and community composting. For clarity, material recycling, centralised composting and energy recovery are excluded. It should be noted that while the three types of activity listed above are generally to be seen as a hierarchy, with avoidance to be preferred over reduction and reduction to be preferred over reuse, this is not always the case. For example, reuse of heavier, durable packaging can be better overall (in environmental impact terms) than use of lighter one-trip packaging. Waste prevention, in terms of the household stream should, where possible, not be at the expense of significantly increased negative life cycle environmental impacts, for example in relation to energy use or transport. For the purposes of meeting Landfill Directive and other targets, weight is the relevant measure, although this does not negate the need to examine the benefits of reducing the hazardousness and volume of waste. Hazardousness is clearly important from a pollution-prevention perspective. Volume is important as it has a clear impact on the cost of waste collection and (where not fully compacted or shredded) the rate at which landfill space is used. A good example is, of course, the plastic bottle which contributes relatively little in weight terms but a lot in volume terms. 3.3 Definition of ‘a Policy’ The Oxford English Dictionary defines a policy as: “a course or principle of action adopted or proposed by an organisation or individual”. Policies therefore establish the intent to take action and/or create specific desired outcomes. For the purposes of this research, this definition of policies is extended to include instruments or ‘tools’ by which the policy is realised in the first instance. This covers incentives or disincentives to action through such instruments as economic, legislative, regulatory mechanisms, statements of intent, directives, voluntary agreements or goals and targets. Under this definition policies therefore ‘change the rules’ by which people formulate their actions and, by doing so, indirectly rather than directly alter future outcomes. The key distinction of policies for this research is that they create the conditions by which action is enabled to take place. Policies will generally by their nature imply or involve programmes of specific direct initiatives and actions in order to realise the intent of the policy. Indeed when evaluating policies, the effectiveness of a policy cannot always be easily divorced from the programme of action through which it is implemented or the organisation carrying it out. However the policy itself is distinct from such programmes or actions. For the avoidance of doubt, policies are not initiatives or actions that seek to directly act on Waste Prevention. For example, charging for the collection of household waste by local authorities is a policy that could be established through instruments such as appropriate legislation

Waste Prevention Policy Case Studies 6 and guidance. In order for households to actually be charged for their waste however, the policy would have to be implemented by local authorities through a series of initiatives that put in place the mechanisms to collect the charges, and monitor and enforce the provision of the service.

Waste Prevention Policy Case Studies 7 4 FRAMEWORK 4.1 Background It is important to have a clear understanding of the anatomy of waste growth and the drivers behind increasing waste arisings in order for policies or actors that have affected waste prevention positively or negatively to be identified. The following subsections present some findings from research into understanding the drivers behind waste growth. The various approaches to analysis are then synthesised into a single waste prevention framework, which aims to provide a structure for identification of waste prevention policies and responsibilities.

4.1.1 Household Waste Arisings Growth The general pattern over last 20 years has been for waste to increase year on year. Total household waste increased by 13 per cent between 1996/97 and 2003/04 from 22.5 million to 25.4 million tonnes, an average increase of 1.7 per cent per year. Over the last 5 years or so however, the rate of increase has been slowing, and household waste actually fell by 1.5 per cent between 2002/03 and 2003/04. Figure 1 shows the amount of household waste and recycling per capita since 1983/84. 8 Figure 1: Household Waste and Recycling: 1983/84 - 2003/04

The above chart shows that household waste per capita has been increasing over time with the first actual decrease in waste shown only by the most recent 2003/4

8 Defra Municipal Waste Management survey 2003/4 http://www.defra.gov.uk/environment/statistics/wastats/mwb0304/wbch04.htm

Waste Prevention Policy Case Studies 8 figure. Also notable from the above chart is the increasing proportion of household waste arisings that are recycled or composted. Residual waste has in fact been falling since 2000/01 but this decrease in residual has been compensated for by the increase in material recycled. By 2003/4 the amount of residual household waste was at approximately the same level as it was in 1996/97. The amount of household waste not collected for recycling fell by 5 per cent between 2002/03 and 2003/04, while the amount of household recycling increased at a rate averaging 15 per cent per year between 1996/97 and 2003/04.

4.1.2 Drivers for Waste Growth Household waste growth can be attributed to a number of factors including how waste is managed, population increases, lifestyle and technology factors and changing consumption patterns. Parfitt (2002) identified the following factors 9: 1. Demographic (particularly the declining average household size and the growth in the rate of new household formation). 2. Increased consumer spending leading to more goods consumed and more waste created. 3. Behavioural change in relation to waste producing activities (food wastage, attitudes towards garden waste, DIY activity etc.,). 4. Transfers of waste from other sectors, rather than true increases: for example, the transfer of material from commercial sources following the introduction of the Landfill Tax in 1996 (this is mostly associated with trade waste arising at CA sites, but may also involve wastes from small businesses deposited in the household waste stream). 5. Changes to waste management services, such as the provision by local authorities of 240 litre wheeled bins to householders in place of plastic sack and standard dustbin collections. 6. The introduction of statutory weight-based recycling targets that are not material specific (for example, a tonne of aluminium cans sent for reprocessing and a tonne of compost used as landfill cover material represent an equal achievement). Household waste growth is not just a UK phenomenon. In 1997 OECD countries produced 540 million tonnes of MSW annually (approximately 500kg per person). Waste grew at an average annual rate of 1.8% between 1980 and 1985, 3.6% between 1985 and 1990, and 1% between 1990 and 1997 10 . A report by the OECD 11 noted the following driving forces behind current and projected household consumption patterns: 1. Rising per capita income 2. Demographics (more working women, more single person households, larger retirement population) 3. Accompanying changes in lifestyles leading to individualised buying patterns 4. Shift towards more processed and packaged products

9 Dr Julian Parfitt, December 2002: Analysis of household waste composition and factors driving waste increases, WRAP. 10 Towards Sustainable Household Consumption? Trends and Policies in OECD Countries, OECD 2002, p 53 11 ibid, p12.

Waste Prevention Policy Case Studies 9 5. Higher levels of appliance ownership 6. Wider use of services and recreation 7. Technology 8. Institutions and infrastructure that create the prevailing conditions faced by householders

Figure 2 below shows the growth in municipal waste plotted against GDP and population. The chart shows that waste has tended to increase at a rate slightly below GDP but noticeably above the level of population growth.

Figure 2: Municipal Waste Generation, GDP and Population in OECD countries 1980 - 2020

A study by the EPA 12 compared levels of GDP, population growth, and consumer spending as measures to predict waste arisings. The study used historical data to establish the predictive accuracy of these measures and found the best predictor of waste arisings levels to be consumer spending. Table 1 below compares the increase in household waste in England since 1996/97 with the increase in economic growth as measured by Household Final Consumption and Expenditure (HFCE). Table 1: Household Waste and HFCE Growth 1996/97 to 2003/04 Year Household Household HFCE Waste waste (annual (million (annual increase) tonnes) increase) 1996/97 22.5 1997/91997/98888 23.3 3.5% 3.7% 1998/99 23.5 0.8% 3.8% 1999/2000 24.8 5.2% 4.6% 2000/01 25.1 1.3% 4.4%

12 EPA, 1999. National Source Reduction Characterisation Report For Municipal Solid Waste in the United States

Waste Prevention Policy Case Studies 10 2001/02 25.5 1.9% 3.1% 2002/03 25.8 1.0% 3.2% 2003/04 25.4 -1.5% 2.3% Source: Defra Municipal Waste Management Survey 2003/4 While it is difficult to draw a tight correlation between waste and consumption on the basis of the above figures, the numbers do suggest that household waste has grown at roughly the same rate as HFCE until, approximately, the year 2000, since when it appears that growth in household waste has begun to decouple from economic growth. In any case the continuing year on year increase in the HFCE data is evidence of a level of increasing consumption, which is the engine that is most probably driving increases in household waste arisings. In considering the above influences on waste growth the following points can be made: • Changes to the management of waste materials is likely to result in relatively short term adjustments to waste patterns, and although this may mask or temporarily overshadow underlying trends the long term pattern is not likely to be substantially altered 13 . • Population pressures on the other hand are likely to have longer term impacts on waste quantities that have to be managed, however population growth itself is not sufficient to account for the level of waste growth that has been historically experienced and it clearly cannot account for the increase in waste arisings per capita experienced in England. • There is a strong relationship between economic activity and in particular household expenditure and the levels of household waste. It would appear that underlying the longer-term pattern of household waste growth is an increase in the quantity of materials consumed by the average household and that this in turn is driven by rising levels of household expenditure. In order to understand the forces behind this increase it is necessary to have some understanding of the drivers behind household consumption patterns. It is clear that we live in a consumer society, one that seems to be characterised by a persistent desire to consume more and posses more goods. Between 1970 and 1997 consumer spending increased by 73%, even when allowances are made for inflation 14 . While improved technology and increased efficiency has helped to reduce pollution, the increase in consumer demand has in many cases offset the benefits that this brings 15 . In real terms, annual household expenditure has increased steadily over time. This is shown in Figure 3. Figure 3: Trend in Weekly Household Expenditure, £ (2002-3 prices)

13 The exception to this is likely to come where waste management services effectively apply a level of incentive to householders that promotes waste prevention, and hence acts as a longer-term restriction on waste growth. 14 “Consumers and the environment: Can consumers save the planet?” National Consumer Council (1997). 15 “Towards Sustainable Consumption Patterns: Progress report on Member State Initiatives”. OECD (2000).

Waste Prevention Policy Case Studies 11 450

400

350

300

250

200

150

100 Weekly HOusehold Weekly £prices) (2002-3Expenditure,

0 1978 1980 1982 1984 1986 1988 1990 1992 1994-5 1995-6 1996-7 1997-8 1998-9 1999- 2000-1 2001-2 2002-3 2000 Year

Source: ONS Family Spending 2002-03 Expenditure by households as a proportion of disposable incomes (excluding imputed incomes from owner-occupied and rent-free households) has tended to decline over time (see Figure 4). Hence, as real incomes grow, consumption rises, but it does not do so at the same rate as disposable income. This real terms growth rate in consumption would be expected to increase waste arisings. However, in order to understand the potential for future growth, and its likely nature, one needs a better understanding of how trends in consumption of specific items are changing.

Figure 4: Household Expenditure as % Disposable Income

Waste Prevention Policy Case Studies 12

105.0%

100.0%

95.0%

90.0%

85.0% Household DisposableExpenditureIncome %as 80.0%

75.0% 1978 1980 1982 1984 1986 1988 1990 1992 1994-5 1995-6 1996-7 1997-8 1998-9 1999- 2000-1 2001-2 2002-3 2000 Year

The Expenditure and Food Survey provides an indication of what households are consuming, and consecutive surveys highlight changes in expenditure patterns over time. The broad expenditure categories have been changing over time as shown in Figure 5 (in constant 2002-3 sterling per week) and in Figure 6 (in % of total expenditure). The level of expenditure on different consumption categories is likely to have a corresponding impact on what shows up in the household waste stream. The most obvious points are the following ones: 1. Expenditure on food and non-alcoholic beverages is falling in relative terms. In real terms, expenditure has remained more or less constant since 1980, but since real household expenditure has grown in aggregate, the proportion accounted for by this category has declined; 2. Mirroring this has been the increase in the proportion of expenditure devoted to leisure goods and services, with the leisure services growing especially quickly. In real terms, between 1978 and 2002-3, expenditure on leisure services increased by 230%; 3. Motoring has also increased in importance in the expenditure of households. This reflects growth in car ownership and the more widespread ownership of more expensive cars, and the rising cost of fuel; and 4. Most other categories have maintained a more or less stable proportion of expenditure so that they have increased somewhat in real terms.

Figure 5: Evolution of Average Expenditure per Household per Week by Expenditure Category (in £ 2002-3)

Waste Prevention Policy Case Studies 13 80

10 £ Spent per Week by UK £SpentHouseholds(2002-3terms) Week per

0 1978 1980 1982 1984 1986 1988 1990 1992 1994-5 1995-6 1996-7 1997-8 1998-9 1999- 2000-1 2001-2 2002-3 2000 Year

10 % Totalof Household Expenditure

0 1978 1980.00 1982 1984.00 1986.00 1988 1990.00 1992.00 1994-5 1995-6 1996-7 1997-8 1998-9 1999- 2000-1 2001-2 2002-3 2000 Year

Housing (Net) Fuel and power Food and non-alcoholic drinks Alcoholic drink Tobacco Clothing and footwear Household goods Household services Personal goods and services Motoring Fares and other travel costs Leisure goods Leisure services Miscellaneous 4.1.3 Material Types There is an obvious link between the characteristics of household expenditure and the different fractions of the waste stream. Waste composition data is analysed below to identify the materials in the waste stream that may be appropriate to target. Figure 7: Total Household Waste Composition (England)

Waste Prevention Policy Case Studies 14

Source: Parfitt 2002 The above chart shows that some 40% of arisings are organic waste with a further 18% paper and cardboard. The above breakdown would suggest that these are the materials that should be targeted in the first instance. Glass, wood, scrap metals, and plastics are the other key elements of the waste stream. An analysis of the residual waste composition shows substantial similarities with the total arisings. Notable differences are that plastic makes up some 50% more of the residual stream than it did of total arisings. Also of note is that scrap metals and white goods, which made up 5% of arisings, makes up less than 1% of residual. This indicates high levels of capture of this material through existing recycling systems. Similarly wood waste makes up 2.3% of residual against 5% of total arisings.

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Figure 8: Estimated Composition of Residual Waste (England) 16

Other non-ferrous metals , Engine oil, 0.0% Batteries , 0.0% 0.0% Misc. non-combustibles , 2.6% Fines, 4.6%

Misc. combustibles , 0.8% Disposable nappies , 3.0% Paper and card, 19.6% Furniture, 0.3%

Wood , 2.3%

Plastics, 11.0%

Glass, 6.9%

Cans, 4.0%

Textiles, 3.6%

Scrap metal/white goods, 0.9%

Garden & Food, 40.4%

The above analysis suggests that organic, paper and card, and plastics are the most important materials to target. Other materials that may be worth targeting include glass, cans, textiles and nappies. Figure 9 shows the further breakdown of paper arisings. This shows that approximately a third of paper arisings are Newspapers and Magazines. However it should be remembered that a large proportion of recycled material is likely to come from this source and so the proportion left in the residual is likely to be significantly lower 17 . A report by Enviros / Momenta for the National Resource and Waste Forum (the NRWF report), made some attempt to understand the evolution of different fractions of the household waste stream. The report made comments concerning the following categories of material: Food and Drink Garden Waste Newspapers and Junk Mail Nappies Furnishings and DIY; and Electrical and Electronic Equipment. Figure 9: Detail of Paper Arisings by Type.

16 The estimated composition for residual waste was arrived at by combining the England arisings dataset from Parfitt with Defra Municipal Waste Management Survey data for recycled material. The datasets are not directly comparable and relate to different time periods so the above figures should be treated as indicative only. 17 National data is not currently available for this breakdown of materials by residual fraction.

Waste Prevention Policy Case Studies 16 Non-recyclable paper, 2.7%

Other card , 0.1% Newspapers & Magazines, 6.6%

Card and paper packaging , 2.7%

Board packaging , 1.3%

Liquid cartons , 0.3%

Other recyclable paper , 4.7%

On the basis of a fairly cursory examination, it concluded: ‘Given the very wide range of influences on the consumer it is difficult to predict where the composition of the household waste stream is going over the next 10 years or so. Taking an overview, however, it seems likely that the situation will be driven by the following factors: more disposable income; more single households; ageing population; fashion trends; “convenience-led” lifestyle. The likely impacts on the UK waste stream can be summarised as: 4% yearly growth in food and drink consumption index - leading possibly to less vegetable/fruit waste as a result of increased purchase of processed food and better packaging, but balancing out with a possible rise through moves towards healthier eating habits in schools and promotion of farmers markets for example. Overall growth in packaging is expected to be below growth in GDP and overall waste arisings, with possible implications for the household waste stream of o small growth in plastic packaging and aluminium associated with beverage cans, mineral water bottles and ‘ready’ meals. o zero growth in other packaging materials. More garden waste, which could be home composted or collected separately as part of a local authority collection service. Free newspaper and ‘unwanted’ mail waste will continue to rise. Fewer disposable nappies as the population demographics change (fewer babies, more older people) take effect, but impact of increase in ‘adult’ nappies not fully understood. An increase in WEEE with around 3% to 5% yearly growth expected.

Waste Prevention Policy Case Studies 17 More furnishing and DIY-related waste in line with housing market performance, although this is anticipated to slow down. These conclusions are likely to reflect one view of the possible evolution in composition and quantity of specific waste fractions over the short-term, and they are based upon a somewhat selective observation of past trends. Furthermore, the potential for increase of home deliveries – and hence, possible increases in cardboard packaging – have not been considered. Evidently, accurate information on past trends is not readily available in the UK owing to the generally poor state of information regarding waste data and in particular, its evolving composition. This implies that one has to base forward extrapolations on past trends, and these trends are probably better in terms of expenditure than in terms of quantities of materials. Furthermore, consumption categories do not necessarily correspond to categories usually used for waste materials.

4.1.4 Consumption Categories The link between household waste fractions and consumption categories was drawn more sharply in a report by TNO / VDI for the European Commission 18 . The report developed scenarios for household waste generation which sought to understand how various future consumption patterns might influence waste generation in the future. As part of this exercise the report established a typology of waste that did not simply focus on the materials themselves, but linked the materials to the functions which those materials helped to fulfil (feeding, recreation, ‘infotainment’, housing, care, clothing and other) (see Figure 10). This is potentially important in that it links an understanding of ‘household waste’ to the evolution in expenditure patterns of UK households. This typology is useful not only in understanding the waste generating characteristics of different household activities but also in identifying the product categories that are involved. This is of particular importance if certain product types are shown to be predominant in the waste stream as they can then be targeted for prevention measures.

18 European Commission (2003) Scenarios of Household Waste Generation in 2020 , European Science and Technology Observatory, Final Report by TNO-STB and VDI-TZ, June 2003

Waste Prevention Policy Case Studies 18

Figure 10: Mapping of Activities to Waste Categories

4.1.5 Supply Chains Examining household waste in terms of the product categories that are present, leads to consideration of the supply chain that delivered the products to the household. If the presence of particular product types in the waste stream are to be reduced then it is legitimate, and perhaps necessary, to understand what processes have led to their presence and what possibilities exist to influence these processes to reduce household waste. One approach to understanding household waste generation and prevention therefore is to look at how the elements that make up household waste have come to be there. With some exceptions, (e.g. garden waste) materials in household waste have their origins in processes outside the home before they are used by the householder and become waste. Different elements of household waste are therefore generated at different points in the supply chain. Approaches such as Life Cycle Analysis and Integrated Product Policy, which attempt to consider the environmental impacts of a product or service throughout its lifecycle

Waste Prevention Policy Case Studies 19 from raw material acquisition to final disposal, tend to simply add up the environmental impacts at each stage of the supply chain. Thus, while the totality of impacts may be in some way accounted for, such approaches generally do not consider how decisions made at one stage of the supply chain impact on subsequent stages. For example, while there are studies that look at the environmental impacts of packaging, there are a lack of studies that consider in detail how packaging decisions impact at the household waste level. Indeed lifecycle analysis can be used to promote the passing on of environmental burden to subsequent stages in the supply chain if it can be shown to lead to an overall improvement in environmental performance. This is often the justification with packaging waste, which despite increases in packaging in household waste, environmental benefit is claimed through reduced product spoilage and improved transport and logistics 19 . Extended Producer Responsibility (EPR) aims to make producers responsible for products over their whole lifecycle. Sheehan and Speigelman20 make the point that by providing ‘free’ household waste collection services local government is effectively providing a subsidy to those producers who sell disposable, over packaged and hazardous products, and that these producers have no incentive to avoid passing on the environmental burden to the householder/municipality. Producer responsibility attempts to redress this by requiring manufacturers to bear the costs of treatment, disposal or recovery of goods. In the UK a number of EU driven producer responsibility initiatives are in place or are in the process of being implemented including, the Packaging Directive, the Batteries Directive, the WEEE directive, and the End of Life Vehicles Directive. However as the Green Alliance report “Return to Sender” notes: Producer responsibility has been fairly successful in increasing collection and recycling go materials at the end of products lives. It has been much less successful in altering the nature of products from the point of design, so that they are easier to recycle and have less impact throughout their life. It was hoped that producer responsibility would influence manufacturers to change design but it appears that incentives are not strong enough 21 (our emphasis). This is a key point in terms of household waste prevention. While there would appear to be much potential to address household waste generation at key points in the supply chain through such initiatives as producer responsibility, current initiatives appear to fall short of enabling this due to lack of sufficient incentive (see Section 19 for a more detailed analysis of this policy). In terms of a tool for analysis however, examining products or materials in terms of the supply chain enables the points where particular household waste materials originate to be identified. The quantity and relative importance of these materials can also then be assessed. This in turn enables the potential for actions that could address the generation of such materials to be identified. Opportunities for reducing the quantity of material that becomes household waste exist therefore not just with the householder but also at different points in the supply chain.

Biffaward, 2004. 19 Packaging’s Place in Society – Resource efficiency of packaging in the supply chain for fast moving consumer goods. 20 Sheehan and Speigelman, 2004. What Can Government Do to Eliminate Waste ? Product Policy Project. 21 Green Alliance, 2005.Return to Sender – producer responsibility and product policy summary report

Waste Prevention Policy Case Studies 20 On the production side, there will be opportunities for reducing the waste impact at the household level in the design of a product (e.g. Is it designed for long life or single use), as well as during its production (e.g. quality of construction), marketing (e.g. use of marketing media, packaging), distribution (packaging) and retail (e.g. packaging). At the consumption end of the supply chain the householder has a number of opportunities to influence the generation of waste, such as the decision to purchase, the choice of item (e.g. whether it is durable or disposable), how the product is used, and what happens to it once it has fulfilled the desired function for which it was purchased.

4.1.6 Analysis Summary There are a number of possible approaches to examining household waste generation. Three that appear to be of particular utility in the context of this study are: • Analysis by Material. This is in many ways the most obvious place to begin as it starts with the materials that are found in the household waste bin, and enables the identification of materials that are going to make the largest impact. • Analysis by Consumption CategoryCategory. This approach is likely to be particularly useful in understanding the dynamic nature of household waste generation and how it is likely to change in the future. • Analysis across the Supply Chain. The supply chain approach is potentially most useful for identifying relevant actors or organisations that have responsibility for various aspects of waste generation and prevention 4.2 Waste Prevention Framework Based on the above analysis, the project team has developed a simple and robust framework that attempts to draw together the different perspectives identified above. The framework aims to allow specific policy areas to be highlighted, the potential for unintended consequences of other non-waste related policies to be drawn out more clearly and for potential new areas of policy action to be identified. The framework is not intended to be a prescriptive or restrictive methodology but to assist in framing the issues and identifying key areas in which to focus research effort. It is therefore a tool that should be applied only in so far as it proves to be useful. The difficulty with attempts to understand the factors that influence waste generation is that all human activity at some level can have waste generation impacts. A reductionist approach therefore risks degenerating into a mass of detail with limited practical application, as it does not enable key factors to be distinguished. On the other hand if the approach to identifying existing and potential policies is not well structured, there is a risk of overlooking less obvious but potentially important policies and the links and dynamic relationships that may exist between policy areas. What the framework attempts to do therefore is to distil key elements most relevant to the generation of waste and build them into a coherent structure that will, when applied to the question of waste generation, help to ensure the right questions are asked and sensible policy initiatives can be drawn out. It is not intended to provide an exhaustive analysis of the factors influencing waste generation. Figure 11 below provides a graphic representation of the draft framework, which is then explained in the following paragraphs.

Waste Prevention Policy Case Studies 21 4.2.1 General Description

Supply Chain The 5 boxes along the top of the graphic are a simplified generic representation of the supply chain within the economy. These are: production, distribution, retail, use and after use. • Production . This covers all aspects of the production process from gathering raw materials, product design, manufacture (including components and subcontractors input), and marketing. • Distribution . This includes all aspects of movement of the product from the manufacturer to the retail environment. It therefore includes all forms of shipping handling, and transportation including wholesalers, and logistics operations, as well as packaging. • Retail . This covers all types of retail outlets including high street shops, local markets, and internet, telephone and mail order suppliers. It also covers retail led marketing and packaging issues. • Use . This refers to use of the products within the home. • After use . This is included within the framework to incorporate repair and reuse aspects as well as to enable the impact of policies directed at disposal behaviours (such as waste management legislation) to be accounted for. Breaking the analysis of waste generation factors down into key elements of the supply chain is important as the influences on waste generation are likely to be profoundly different at each stage, and hence the policy responses are likely to have to be individually tailored and targeted. Although the above division cannot hope to do justice to the complexity of how supply chains actually function, it is felt that the broad groupings provide a useful delineation of basic functions in terms of the influence of key drivers and responsiveness to policy initiatives. The use of basic grouping enables the scope of this framework to be kept succinct and avoids an exponential divergence of individual supply chain diagrams more specific to individual products or waste groupings. This helps ensure that the key issues identified are coherent and cohesive across the range of products and/or materials.

Waste Prevention Policy Case Studies 22

Figure 11: Household Waste Prevention Policy Analysis Framework

Overview Overview Overview Overview Overview

Production Distribution Retail Use After Use Raw Material Product Legislative/ Regulatory Policy? Policy? Factors Policy? Policy? Policy? Amenable to Amenable to Amenable to Amenable to Amenable to

Demand Side Drivers Policy? Policy? Policy? Policy? Policy? Amenable to Amenable to Amenable to Amenable to Amenable to

Supply Side Drivers Policy? Policy? Policy? Policy? Policy? Amenable to Amenable to Amenable to Amenable to Amenable to

Regulatory Regulatory Regulatory Regulatory Regulatory

Financial Financial Financial Financial Financial

Voluntary Voluntary Voluntary Voluntary Voluntary

Waste Prevention Policy Case Studies 23 Note: While the flow of materials is broken down in this framework according to broad steps in the supply chain, it should be remembered that the analysis is concerned only with household waste. That is: what actions or policies at each of the steps in the supply chain lead to the generation or prevention of waste at the household level. The analysis is not intended to identify all waste that is produced at each stage in the supply chain.

Waste Generation Drivers Down the left hand side of the graphic are 3 broad groups of factors that can have an influence on waste generation. These are: legislative and regulatory factors; demand side drivers; and supply side drivers. • Legislative and regulatory factors . This is intended to cover all legislation and regulation that could impact waste generation at the household level. This includes legislation and regulation that is implemented at the national as well as the local authority level, and where applicable may include European and international level legislation. • Demand side drivers. This factor covers the impact of market forces, for example the impacts of increasing affluence and changing lifestyles, the demand for lower priced goods, or demand for increased variety. It also accounts for demographic drivers including changes in population, immigration, reducing household sizes and the changing age profile of the country. • Supply side drivers. This accounts for the impacts of such forces as technological development, globalisation of production, increased production efficiencies (including cheap labour), and increasingly open trade. In context it also covers the effect of the provision of waste management services and technologies by local authorities or private enterprise. While these 3 factors are not intended to be comprehensive it is felt that they cover the broad range of likely influences. Consideration of waste generation in terms of these drivers brings in a dynamic element to the analysis, as it covers the effects over time as well as the fact that waste generation occurs within interacting systems.

Policy Types Along the bottom of the graphic are 3 broad policy types – regulatory, financial, and voluntary. Once factors that interact with and affect waste generation and/or waste prevention policy have been identified it is then possible to evaluate whether or not these factors are (or have the potential to be) affected by waste prevention policy. It may be useful to further determine whether the relevant type of policy is/could be regulatory, financial or voluntary. 4.3 Application of the Framework The framework can be applied in a number of ways. These are outlined in the subsections below. It may be that there are multiple factors that act at any one part of the framework or it may be that there are none. Although the framework should provide a useful check, there is no necessity to fill every box.

Waste Prevention Policy Case Studies 24 4.3.1 Overview Analysis In the first instance each column (i.e. each broad part of the supply chain) can be looked at in overview and so broad factors that impact on household waste generation at each of these steps in the supply chain can be identified. For example a broad lifestyle trend that impacts at the retail stage is the increasing demand for convenience. This demand for convenience applies across a range of product types and materials. For each factor or group of factors that is identified, the potential to use policy as an intervening measure can then be investigated. This then becomes the starting point for identifying the effects of policies that are currently in place, as well as where new policies or changes to policies could potentially have an impact.

4.3.2 Product/Material Analysis Next the framework can be applied to specific products and/or materials in the household waste stream. It makes sense from a waste prevention perspective to focus on product types and materials that have the largest presence within residual household waste, as action on these materials have the potential to yield the greatest impacts. The products/materials that are to be subject to analysis under the framework are identified through analysis of the composition of residual household waste in section 4.3.4 below. The arrows travel back up the supply chain to emphasise that it is the products and materials that appear in household waste that are the starting point. At each step in the supply chain the factors that influence generation of that material as waste at the household level can be identified, as can the impact or potential impact of policy initiatives.

4.3.3 Analysis of Actors/Organisations Finally the framework can be used to facilitate in identifying the actors/organisations that play a part at each of these parts of the framework. Again this can be looked at either in broad terms across the supply chain or in terms of specific product or material categories.

4.3.4 Identification of Key Materials

General Key materials that can be targeted through Waste Prevention policies can be identified in a number of ways: • The most common materials in terms of total household arisings can be targeted. This reflects the significance of the materials in the waste stream as a whole and is consistent with the application of the waste hierarchy. • The most common materials in the residual household waste can be targeted. This accounts for the impacts of recycling and composting and effectively focuses waste prevention effort on those materials that are most problematic for current waste management systems in quantity terms. • Materials for which household waste prevention measures can be implemented with relative ease could also be specifically targeted. This allows a certain amount of focus to be applied to ‘quick wins’, even where the

Waste Prevention Policy Case Studies 25 absolute quantities of material involved may not appear to be especially significant. • Materials can be targeted for prevention in terms of their toxicity for people and the environment. This places some priority on materials hazardous materials that do not make up a large proportion of the waste stream but which may be important to prevent entering the waste stream. A combination of the above criteria is applied below to arrive at a suggested initial list of materials to focus on for waste prevention policy.

Most Common Materials The analysis undertaken section 4.1.3 in this report suggests that a list of potential materials to evaluate using the framework analysis could include the following: • Paper (in particular newspapers & magazines and junk mail) • Kitchen waste • Garden waste • Plastics These materials together account for 71% of the total household residual waste stream. Targeting of these materials would therefore provide significant potential for Waste Prevention.

Other Materials Waste streams that are relatively easy to target for Waste Prevention are likely to include ‘Junk’ mail, Nappies, Packaging (generally), Beverage Containers, and Textiles, Furniture and White goods (through charity and reuse schemes). It may therefore be worth considering these streams specifically in the framework analysis. Waste streams which are likely to have a disproportionately high environmental impact relative to the quantities that are in the total waste stream include batteries, engine oil, and waste electrical and electronic equipment. Additional materials worth considering in the analysis could therefore include: • Textiles • Packaging materials (reduction) • Beverage packaging (re-use) • Nappies • Batteries • WEEE • Furniture • Oil. In reality, however, no stream is likely to be beyond ‘prevention’, the issue is whether the actions will have much by way of quantitative (tonnage or reduction in hazard) impact.

Waste Prevention Policy Case Studies 26

5 WASTE POLICY IN THE UK AND EFFECTS ON WASTE PREVENTION Within the United Kingdom, waste policy has developed apace over recent years. The picture is becoming more complicated by virtue of the fact that Devolved Administrations have responsibility for the development of waste policy, though with certain constraints on some aspects of policy formation. [ Authors Note: This section completed in the first part of the project (early 2006) and all information was as current and correct as possible at the time of writing. ] The different countries of the United Kingdom have set different objectives in respect of waste management. Key objectives are set out in Table 2 below. For waste reduction, they key targets are: • England Current strategy - no targets • Wales by 2009/10 (and to apply beyond) waste arisings per household should be no greater than those (for Wales) in 1997/98 by 2020 waste arisings per person should be less than 300kg per annum. • Scotland Stabilisation of waste quantities by 2010. • Northern Ireland A previous version of the waste strategy included a ‘secondary target’ to stem the increase in waste arisings per household, returning the quantities to 1998 levels by 2005 and thereafter reducing arisings by 1% every three years. In the recently revised version, the objective is ‘ to stabilise waste generation in order to minimise impact on the environment, improve resource efficiency and reduce the cost of waste management in Northern Ireland .’ It is not entirely clear whether this applies to all waste streams or each stream (including household waste). These objectives set out in the waste strategies of the countries concerned are, as we shall see, supported by policies that may or may not have an impact on waste reduction. More importantly, it will become clear that there are very few policies in the UK explicitly dedicated to the prevention of waste. Indeed, arguably there are none dedicated specifically to that purpose. In what follows, we review policies – as distinct from objectives - in respect of household waste prevention in England. We then look at the other nations’ (in the UK) approaches to assess what differences there may be in respect of waste prevention policies across the devolved administrations. These policies may be already in existence, or have the potential to come into existence in the near future.

Waste Prevention Policy Case Studies 27 Table 2: Approaches to Waste Management in Different Countries of the UK Wales England Scotland Northern Ireland WASTE POLICY Waste policy has been devolved to Waste policy determined by DEFRA. Waste policy devolved to the Scottish Waste policy determined by EPD the National Assembly for Wales Executive (NAW). LEGISLATIVE POWERS NAW is responsible for secondary UK Government has primary Devolved to Scottish Exec but some The Waste Regulatory role has been legislation (Regulations) except where legislation powers (for England and powers reserved by Westminster. transferred from the District Councils NAW has not been designated for the Wales). to EHS as a result of the implementation of specific EC implementation of the Waste and Directives either via Section 2.2 of Contaminated Land (NI) Order 1997. the European Communities Act, or through Primary legislation. NATIONAL WASTE STRATEGY The duty to produce a National Waste DEFRA now only have responsibility "National Waste Plan" (Scotland) The Northern Ireland Waste Strategy for Wales has been devolved for producing a waste strategy for published in 2003 Management Strategy was published to NAW. Wise About Waste, The England. The current waste This was formulated by the in March 2000. This Strategy is National Waste Strategy for Wales, strategy for England is Waste amalgamation of 11 Area Waste Plans currently the subject of a review was published in June 2002. Non Strategy 2000. This is currently developed by SEPA, local authorities process. devolved strategic waste policies and being reviewed. and other stakeholders. The Strategy offers a long-term vision instruments (e.g. the Landfill Tax) for the future development of waste affecting Wales are covered in Waste management in Northern Ireland and Strategy 2000. Wise About Waste will provides a framework for this. be reviewed in 2007. LOCAL AUTHORITY ORGANISATION Wales has a single tier of local Mixture of Counties, Districts and There are 32 unitary authorities in There are 26 District Councils in authorities – there are 22 Unitary Unitary Authorities. The Local Scotland. These are represented by Northern Ireland. These are Authorities. The authorities are Government Association represents CoSLA (Convention of Scottish Local represented in Northern Ireland by represented in Wales by the Welsh the authorities in England. Authorities). NILGA (Northern Ireland Local Local Government Association. Government Association) REGIONAL WASTE PLANNING STRUCTURES & ARRANGEMENTS 3 voluntary Regional Waste Groups of Regional Planning Conferences & 11 Area Waste Plan groups made up of There are three Waste Management local authorities have each produced Regional Technical Advisory varying numbers of local authority Groups made up of local authorities in a Regional Waste Plan. Plans are to Bodies/ or Regional Assemblies areas. These consist of representatives Northern Ireland: Southern Waste be revised every 3 years. Waste produce Regional Planning from LA’s, SEPA, business and Management Partnership (SWaMP), Waste Prevention Policy Case Studies 28 Wales England Scotland Northern Ireland Planning Policy defined in "Planning Guidance/ Regional Waste community sector. North West Region Waste Policy Wales" and the associated Strategies / Regional Spatial Management Group (NWRWMG) and TAN21 (Waste). Strategies. Waste Planning Policy arc 21. defined in PPS10. MUNICIPAL WASTE MANAGEMENT STRATEGIES Joint WAG/WLGA "Guidance on DEFRA Guidance. Power in WET Act As above. In addition, local authorities As above. Northern Ireland Waste Municipal Waste Management to require some authorities to also have individual waste Management Strategy and the three Strategies in Wales" – August 2002. produce MWMSs. Guidance strategies/plans. Waste Management Plans. Deadline for production of end March published on MWMSs in July 2005. 2004. To be revised every three years. LANDFILL ALLOWANCES Landfill Allowances Scheme (Wales) Landfill Allowance Trading Scheme Landfill Allowance Trading Scheme Northern Ireland Landfill Allowances Regulations brought into force on 1st (England) Regulations brought into (Scotland). Biodegradable proportion in Scheme (issued for consultation in October 2004. There will be no force on 1st April 2005. There is Scotland 63%. Trading from 2008 January 2004). The consultation trading of allowances in Wales. Wales trading of allowances. The gained the majority of responses in Regs differ in places to the English biodegradable proportion for favour of an allowance-based scheme Regs. The biodegradable proportion municipal waste in England is 68%. that restricted the amount of for municipal waste in Wales is Fines for exceeding allowances are biodegradable municipal waste (BMW) deemed to be 61%. Fines for £150 per tonne of biodegradable disposed of in landfill sites. The exceeding allowances are £200 per municipal waste in excess of Landfill (Scheme Year and Maximum tonne of excedence. allowances held. Landfill Allowance) Regulations 2004 came into force on 22nd July 2004 and set out the allowance for all of NI in each scheme year. The biodegradable proportion for municipal waste has been set as 71%. THE HOUSEHOLD WASTE RECYCLING ACT 2003 The Act enables the National The Act requires local authorities in Does not apply in Scotland. Does not apply in Northern Ireland Assembly for Wales to produce England to collect separately at Regulations to adopt its provisions least two separate recyclable within Wales. fractions of household waste by 2010. Guidance document published in April 2005. STABILISATION AND REDUCTION OF HOUSEHOLD WASTE. By 2009/10 (and to apply beyond) No targets Stabilisation by 2010. A secondary target of the Northern Waste Prevention Policy Case Studies 29 Wales England Scotland Northern Ireland waste arisings per household should Ireland Waste Management Strategy be no greater than those (for Wales) is to stem the increase in waste in 1997/98; arisings per household, returning to By 2020 waste arisings per person 1998 levels by 2005 and thereafter should be less than 300kg per reducing arisings by 1% every three annum. years. TARGETS FOR WASTE RECYCLING AND COMPOSTING Wise About Waste sets the following Statutory targets for household 25% recycling/composting target by Targets for household waste set out in non-statutory targets for municipal waste set in Waste Strategy 2000: 2006 (not statutory). the Northern Ireland Waste waste: To recycle or compost at least 17% 30% recycling and composting by Management Strategy: By 2003/04 achieve at least 15% (average) by 2003; 2008. Recover 25% of household waste by recycling/composting of municipal To recycle or compost at least 25% 2005, of which at least 15% should be waste with a minimum of 5% of household waste by 2005; by recycling or composting. composting (with only compost To recycle or compost at least 30% Recover 40% of household waste by derived from source segregated of household waste by 2010; 2010, of which at least 25% shall be materials counting) and 5% recycling; To recycle or compost at least 33% by recycling and composting. By 2006/07 achieve at least 25% of household waste by 2015. recycling/composting of municipal waste with a minimum of 10% composting (with only compost derived from source segregated materials counting) and 10% recycling; By 2009/10 and beyond achieve at least 40%recycling/composting with a minimum of 15% composting (with only compost derived from source segregated materials counting) and 15% recycling. TARGETS FOR RECOVERY OF MUNICIPAL WASTE No targets. Targets for municipal waste set in No targets. Biodegradable Municipal Waste: Waste Strategy 2000: Reduce quantities being land filled to To recover value from 40% of 75% of the 1995 baseline levels by municipal waste by 2005 2010, 50% by 2013 and 35% by To recover value from 45% of 2020. municipal waste by 2010 Waste Prevention Policy Case Studies 30 Wales England Scotland Northern Ireland To recover value from 67% of municipal waste by 2015. IMPROVED SEGREGATION OF HAZARDOUS HOUSEHOLD WASTE By 2003/04 all civic amenity sites No targets Special Waste Rags came into force The Hazardous Waste Forum was set should have facilities to receive and Aug 2004; Councils must amend up in 2003. store, prior to proper disposal, licences by Dec 31 2004 for facilities The Special Waste Regulations (NI) bonded asbestos sheets. All sites for segregated storage of materials. 1998 came into operation in should also have facilities for September 1998. EHS administer and receiving and storing, prior to control an assignment note system recycling, oils, paints, solvents and requiring a unique code for each fluorescent light bulbs. particular movement of special waste. This is designed as a system of control for dangerous and difficult to control wastes. PUBLIC BODIES TO REDUCE THEIR OWN WASTE ARISINGS By 2005, achieve a reduction in No targets No Targets No Targets waste produced equivalent to at least 5% of the 1998 arisings figure; By 2010, achieve a reduction in waste produced equivalent to at least 10% of the 1998 arisings figure. ADDITIONAL FUNDING FOR LOCAL AUTHORITIES Specific grant for sustainable waste Waste Performance and Efficiency Strategic Waste Fund from Scottish Waste Management Grant management paid to each local Grant (WPEG) allocated to all Executive. Life authority in accordance with SSA authorities. Total sums of £45m in Landfill Tax Credit Scheme formula: - (£93 million from 05/06 to 2005/06, £105m in 2006/07 and 07/08. Landfill Tax "escalator" £110m in 2007/08. payments within RSG (£18 million from 05/06 to 07/08) 2007/08 - £35m. PERFORMANCE IMPROVEMENT/ BEST VALUE Wales Programme for Improvement Best Value. Best Value. LOCAL AUTHORITY PERFORMANCE STANDARDS/INDICATORS No statutory performance standards Statutory BV performance Accounts Commission Performance have been set. National Assembly for standards set for household waste Indicators for waste management - Wales Performance Indicators (NAW recycling. BV indicators measure waste disposal, collection, recycling etc. Waste Prevention Policy Case Studies 31 Wales England Scotland Northern Ireland PIs) cover municipal waste. performance. Composting must be source segregated. Re-use can count towards recycling PIs where there is a ‘formal’ arrangement in place. COLLECTION OF MUNICIPAL WASTE DATA The annual municipal waste survey The annual municipal waste survey Data Collection by SEPA and Accounts A municipal waste survey is carried and the collection of NAW has been discontinued in England Commission. LAWAS survey compiled out quarterly using Wastedataflow Performance Indicators is combined in 2004/05 and replaced by the by SEPA (Local Authority Waste Arisings system from September 2004. The into a single electronic data collection WasteDataFlow system from 1st Survey). Wastedataflow was introduced data will be compiled by the District system known as “WasteDataFlow”. April 2004. in 2006. Councils and managed by The WasteDataFlow system will be Best Value performance indicator Environment and Heritage Service. managed on behalf of the Assembly data are being collected separately Government by Environment Agency by the Audit Commission in Wales. England. MUNICIPAL WASTE BENCHMARKING CLUB Most local authorities are part of a Public Services Network and other There are various working groups No benchmarking club exists in Municipal Waste Benchmarking Club benchmarking clubs exist. looking at benchmarking for different Northern Ireland at present. run by the Wales Audit Office. services/activities. RECYCLING CREDITS Not paid in Wales as the WDA and Paid between WDAs and WCAs. Similar situation to Wales – no WDA or WCA are combined in each Unitary Flexibility arrangements WCAs as all unitary authorities – no Authority. Third party recycling implemented in the Clean significant sums paid out to third payments are paid (e.g. to community Neighbourhoods and Environment parties either as yet. sector groups). Act 2005. Specific measures being consulted upon during Summer 2005. WASTE EDUCATION AND AWARENESS PROGRAMME Waste Awareness Wales receiving WRAP running RecycleNow! Waste SWAG (Scottish Waste Awareness Wake up to Waste campaign was £700k in core funding over 3 years. awareness campaign in England. Group) running national campaign and launched in February 2002.This is a £1.5m allocated for a National media working with each local authority to multimedia campaign to raise awareness campaign running from deliver this at a local level also. awareness of waste issues and 04/05 to 06/07. Wales committed to RecycleNow not applicable in Scotland encourage public ownership of and the Recycle Now brand. participation in sustainable waste management solutions. LANDFILL TAX CREDIT SCHEME FUNDED PUBLIC SPENDING PROGRAMME Waste Prevention Policy Case Studies 32 Wales England Scotland Northern Ireland FOR SUSTAINABLE WASTE MANAGEMENT (replaces the Category "c & cc" part of the original LTCS) Welsh Assembly Government (WAG) LTCS funds in England split LTCS funds used for environmental Landfill Tax Credit Scheme to be will spend its c. £5m p.a. on strategic between WIP and WRAP. projects but since 2003 no longer used operated as a transitional scheme projects to implement the Wales to directly fund waste management until the new scheme is introduced. waste strategy (see ‘Other initiatives’ projects. Increase Fund from Scottish This is proposed for 2005. below). Executive has been released for funding community organisations for increased capacity for waste management and recycling in the community sector. OTHER GUIDANCE AND SUPPORT TO LOCAL AUTHORITIES WAG funding a Welsh Local WRAP running ROTATE. Other Some WRAP projects also running in Some WRAP projects also running in Government Association Peer Review support from WIP. Scotland. Remade Scotland also Northern Ireland. Other support from initiative to review the performance of involved in a variety of research and Full Circle and Investment Belfast. each local authority and identify and analysis projects. Scottish Executive disseminate good practice. has a dedicated Waste Team. SEPA also provide guidance and support through National Waste Strategy. For example In February 2007 SEPA published a Waste Prevention Guide for use by LA’s, Community sector or individuals. OTHER INITIATIVES RELATING TO MUNICIPAL WASTE a) Waste Awareness Wales to lead a WRAP running home composting WRAP Real Nappy Fund released in WRAP campaigns home composting promotion and re-usable nappies campaigns Scotland in late 2004. programme. in England. WRAP home composting campaign will b) Waste Awareness Wales to run a WRAP’s market development reach all 32 LA areas in 2007/8. In campaign promoting re-useable programme. Scotland this is run through SWAG. nappies. Other programs funded through c) 5 local authority/community sector Scottish Executive Increase program “Exemplar” partnerships are aiming include Generous Scotland, a program to achieve 50% recycling and to help improve donations to charity composting within 3 years. sector and CREW which provides d) Circa £15m Strategic Recycling training and support to community Scheme being set up by the Welsh waste prevention champions. Council for Voluntary Action with Waste Prevention Policy Case Studies 33 Wales England Scotland Northern Ireland funding from European Structural Funds and £6.8m matched funding from WAG. e) Funding support for 3 regional kitchen waste composting demonstration plants, including R&D and market development. f) WRAP’s recyclate and compost market development programme funded to cover Wales. COMMUNITY SECTOR The community waste recycling sector The community waste recycling Community Recycling Network Scotland The Community Resource Consortium is represented by the Wales sector is represented by the set up in 2004. Provides support to a was formed in 2002 to provide Community Recycling Network, Cylch. Community Recycling Network, range of Waste Prevention initiatives finance at a community level. The organisation receives core CRN. including community composting and funding from WAG. furniture reuse projects, NEW OPPORTUNITIES FUND, TRANSFORMING WASTE Wales has its own fund, Cleanstream, Transforming Waste fund in Increase Fund from Scottish Executive The Transforming Waste Fund, in administered by the Welsh Council for England. now available for community groups. partnership with ARENA Network. Voluntary Action in partnership with CRNS are involved in providing Cylch, the Welsh Local Government guidance to applicants and Association, and Environment Agency administering the scheme. Wales. In 2006 ScEx has allowed community driven projects to access funding through Strategic Waste Fund where they work in partnership with Local Authorities. Source: http://www.larac.org.uk/uk.htm

Waste Prevention Policy Case Studies 34 5.1 Waste Prevention in England It is worth seeking to understand what has happened to waste arisings in England in recent years.

5.1.1 Analysis of Recent Growth Rates For England as a whole, municipal waste grew at an average of around 3% per annum from 1996/97 to 2002/3. But if one interrogates (to the extent that one can) where this growth occurs, it becomes clear that non-household municipal waste is growing at a far faster rate, this being 9.4%. The household waste component is growing at around 2.3% per annum. Recent figures suggest a significant slowing in the rate of growth in both municipal and household waste. Within the household waste category, ‘other household waste’ appears to be growing fastest at around 5.8%. This might be due to increases in quantities collected from litter bins which could, in turn, be related to patterns of consumption, with more food and drink being consumed ‘on the move’, or to more waste collected as street sweepings as local authorities increasingly seek to reduce their provision of trade waste services. These figures are important since they suggest: That the fastest growing part of municipal waste – non-household waste - is an area which has traditionally been affected more by strategic decisions made by local authorities concerning whether or not to collect commercial waste; and That conventional ‘bin waste’ might be growing at a rate closer to the rate of household formation, though it is difficult to be accurate about this. The rate appears to be between 1% and 2%. The causes of this growth are almost certainly due in part to the growth in household formation. Some of the growth, over time, might have been caused by changes in the method of containment. Other increases will have been associated with the introduction of free collections of garden waste, though some local authorities charge for this service. The patterns of future growth are likely to be different for household and municipal wastes. Notwithstanding a circular from Defra seeking to discourage / prevent local authorities from withdrawing from the collection of MSW, this is likely to be one response of local authorities to the challenge of the Landfill Directive (which targets municipal waste). Hence, there may well be a slow-down, or even a reversal in the growth of the non-household fraction of municipal waste. 22 Of course, this would probably be offset by an increase elsewhere (in the commercial and industrial waste stream) so could not be seen as a genuine slow down in the growth of waste – it merely means it has moved across the administrative border which circumscribes waste defined as ‘municipal’.

22 Another effect of this appears to be that waste is ‘fly-tipped’ by traders alongside litterbins. The push for improved ‘streetscene’ services leads to a situation where those responsible are encouraged to pick up all waste on the streets, even waste which is illegally placed. Consequently, this ‘fly-tipped’ waste may be being recorded as street sweepings, and may be on the increase, especially in dense urban areas. This would mean that some non-household municipal waste would – by virtue of this change – be collected as street sweepings, which is defined as household waste. Waste Prevention Policy Case Studies 35 Regional Variation There is considerable variation in the rates of growth of household and municipal waste in the different regions of England. This is shown in Table 3. If, as many local authorities do, one was inclined to project forward these ‘gross’ growth rates over the period to 2020, one would reach a situation in which the varying growth rates would lead to considerable divergence in the quantities of waste being dealt with (see Figure 12 and Figure 13). Table 3: Variation in Growth Rates and Absolute Quantities (kg per household per week) Across English Regions, Household and Municipal Waste Growth Rates Absolute Quantities (per hhld per week) Household Municipal Household Municipal England 2.3% 3.0% 23.8 27.0 North West 2.4% 3.5% 26.7 29.4 East Midlands 2.0% 3.2% 24.3 26.7 Eastern 3.0% 3.3% 23.8 25.5 South East 2.0% 2.2% 24.3 25.7 Metropolitans 2.1% 2.6% 24.1 28.1 North East 3.6% 3.6% 24.6 29.8 Yorkshire and Humber 2.0% 2.5% 23.2 27.4 West Midlands 2.1% 2.6% 23.8 26.8 London 1.5% 2.6% 20.2 26.6 South West 2.9% 4.1% 23.9 26.3 Non-metropolitan 2.5% 3.2% 24.5 26.7 Authorities

This suggests one of several possibilities: 1. We do not have data of sufficiently good quality to make these types of projection; 2. We need to drill down into the specifics of what it is which leads to the growth in waste in order to: a. Understand the past better than we do; and b. In so doing, make better forward projections than we currently do; and 3. Forward projections are inherently difficult to make since they rely on our being able to predict future trends in waste collection methods, changes in the nature of waste being collected and changes in consumption patterns. In our view, each of the above holds some validity. For this reason, one has to accept that when analysing the effects of potential policies, forward projections of growth are going to be awkward to make, and, in the absence of further analysis, it is probably wise to work with different ‘scenarios’ which might describe progressive states of change in the growth of collected wastes. It would appear from Figure 14 and Figure 15 that there has never been a fifteen to twenty year period where both the rate of growth, and the composition of waste, has remained constant over time. Why should the next twenty years, where changes are, if anything, likely to happen more rapidly than in the past, be any different from the past in this respect? Figure 12: Effects of Variation in Growth Rates in Household Waste if Extrapolated Forward

Waste Prevention Policy Case Studies 36 200.0

180.0

160.0

England 140.0 North West East Midlands 120.0 Eastern South East Metropolitans 100.0 North East Yorkshire and Humber 80.0 West Midlands London South West 60.0 Non-metropolitan Authorities Municipal Waste (index,=Waste Municipal 100) 2002/3

40.0

20.0

0.0 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 Year

Figure 13 : Effects of Variation in Growth Rates in MSW if Extrapolated Forward

250.0

200.0

England North West East Midlands 150.0 Eastern South East Metropolitans Noth East Yorkshire and Humber 100.0 West Midlands London South West Non-metropolitan Authorities Municipal Waste (index,=Waste Municipal 100) 2002/3

50.0

0.0 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 Year

Waste Prevention Policy Case Studies 37

Figure 14: Change in MSW Quantities Over Time (‘Bin Waste’) (million tonnes)

Fines Misc Paper Putresc Metals Glass Textiles Plastics

0 1930 1940 1950 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000

Source: Analysis provided by Dr Julian Parfitt, WRAP. Figure 15: Change in MSW Composition Over Time (‘Bin Waste’)

Fines Misc Paper Putresc Metals Glass Textiles Plastics

100%

90%

80%

70%

60%

50%

40%

30%

20%

10%

0% 1930 1940 1950 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000

Source: Analysis provided by Dr Julian Parfitt, WRAP.

5.1.2 Policies in Place In the recently released Consultation on England’s Waste Strategy, Annex B listed things which have been done since the previous waste strategy, Waste Strategy 2000, which are deemed to be related to municipal waste prevention. Municipal waste includes all household waste, so this provides a useful starting point for discussion. The actions taken are reproduced in Table 4. In the Table, we have emboldened those actions which can be reasonably described as ‘policies’. The other actions include funding measures and support to organisations to deliver programmes of work.

Waste Prevention Policy Case Studies 38

Table 4: Actions Taken by Government in Respect of Prevention of Municipal Waste What we said we would do What we have done Increase opportunity cost of disposing waste by Announced Landfill tax escalator for active increasing the rate of landfill tax waste of £1 per tonne per year in 1999 with a review in 2004. A further increase of £3 per tonne from 2005/6 announced in SR 2004, with an increase of at least £3 per tonne each year thereafter up to a medium to long term level of £35 per tonne. The escalator was increased in the March 2007 budget to £8 tonne each year until at least 2010/11. The increase in the tax will be revenue neutral Announced in SR2004 that the additional to local authorities revenue from increased landfill tax will be recycled back to local authorities via revenue support grant (ECPS). Achieve a significant increase in waste WRAP's initial focus has been on market reduction and reuse through WRAP development for recycled materials and products, to help create stable and efficient markets. Following the introduction of the WIP programme, WRAP has taken forward a targeted programme of work on waste minimisation. Increase WRAP's role in waste reduction Provided WRAP with £50m of additional through four programmes aimed at household funding to take forward the four programmes: waste minimisation 1. Home composting programme established in 2003 (£28m) 2. Real Nappies established in 2003 (£2m) 3. Organics established in 2003 (£10m) 4. Retail Initiative and Innovation Fund established in 2003 (£10m) Create a new funding team under WIP to be Established the WIP Programme in 2003. responsible for the implementation of a number Distributed a total of £270m through the of programmes that deliver additional central Challenge Fund since 2002-03 to support 300 government funding to local authorities new projects enabling local authorities to including the Challenge Fund collect about 450,000 tonnes of household waste for recycling or composting. Replaced the Challenge Fund with a new non-ring-fenced Waste Performance and Efficiency Grant. This will support new and more efficient ways to deliver waste reduction and increase recycling and diversion from landfill. Under the WPEG, local authorities will receive £40m in 2005/06, £105m in 2006/07 and £110m in 2007/08. Provide funding for waste awareness and Provided £30m to WRAP to launch a campaign education to encourage consumers to take to raise consumer awareness of recycling and ownership for the waste they generate, buy to encourage people to take action and recycle recycled and to deal with it in a more now. £10m was allocated to a national sustainable way campaign and £20m was allocated to Local Authorities to fund their own campaigns. The emphasis is on recycling, following research that indicated that the campaign should focus on one message and then expand. WRAP are now considering how to bring re-use messages into the campaign. Introduce EU Producer Responsibility legislation Implemented Producer Responsibility to increase producers' awareness of the legislation for Packaging, ELV; and taken an environmental impact of their products at the active role in negotiating WEEE Directive, with end of their life (often when it ends up in DTI leading on implementation. WRAP (funded household waste stream) through BREW money) to run a series of Waste Prevention Policy Case Studies 39 What we said we would do What we have done nationwide trials on household battery collection starting in Jan 06, in light of the forthcoming Batteries Directive (expected to come into force mid 2006). Currently being negotiated for farm plastics Develop voluntary initiatives on producer Introduced voluntary PR initiatives for newsprint responsibiresponsibilitylity and direct mail and magazines. Investigate options to incentivise householders The Government is continuing to investigate to change their behaviour, such as reducing the options for influencing household behaviour. amount of waste they put out for collection. Research on international schemes and the Initiate pilot schemes to encourage current extent of incentive schemes in England householders to reduce waste (e.g. has recently been completed. The Government performance rewards coupled with intensive has introduced a £3.5m programme to pilot education) household incentive schemes during 2005/06. This is currently in progress with preliminary reports due Spring 2006. WRAP’s communications and awareness work is directly focused on increasing participation in recycling and waste minimisation initiatives. Encourage LAs to consider targets under Best Collaborated with the Audit Commission to Value to reduce the growth in household waste develop CPA2005. In particular it is proposed to per head. Review with ODPM the complete set utilise BV84 (kilograms of household waste of BVPIs to ensure they set the right incentives collected per head of population) to set for local Government to reduce waste minimum and maximum thresholds for waste collected from waste collection, disposal and unitary authorities. Implement Article 5 of Landfill Directive and Undertook 3 consultations on achieving the introduce tradable permits for local authorities Landfill Directive targets culminating in to restrict the amount of biodegradable Regulations introducing the Landfill Allowances municipal waste (BMW) llandfilled.andfilled. Continue to Trading Scheme (LATS) under the Waste and consult on preferred option with regards to Emissions Trading Act 2003. Introduced the allocation of permits and method of trading. Landfill (Scheme Year and Maximum Amount) Regulation 2004 in July 2004. Introduced the Landfill Allowance and Trading Scheme (England) Regulations January 2005. Implement a Communications Strategy to Held two series of regional roadshows with the promote the Landfill Allowance Trading Scheme Environment Agency in July 04 and March 05. and ensure that local authorities understand These were designed to increase local authority how the scheme will operate. understanding of the scheme, encourage participation and to provide a forum for discussions with stakeholders. Source: Defra (2006) A Review of England’s Waste Strategy: A Consultation Document, February 2006. Some actions preceded – just – Waste Strategy 2000, so these are also worth noting. Notable among these was the passage of the Waste Minimisation Act. Other policies which are not listed but which are relevant to the discussion are: • Best Value Recycling targets; and • Recycling credits.

5.1.3 Landfill Tax The landfill tax is a tax on all landfilled waste, with some exemptions. It is applied at two rates: a standard rate, applied to a range of materials, including household waste; and a lower rate, applying to specific ‘qualifying materials’, and including materials such as construction wastes and other ‘inert’ materials. The tax emerged, and has evolved, in the following way: - 1993 – The introduction of the Landfill Tax was preceded by an assessment of the external costs associated with landfill and incineration Waste Prevention Policy Case Studies 40 and by work assessing waste management options in the UK after the introduction of such a tax. 23 A proposal for a tax based on a percentage of disposal costs (an ad valorem tax) emerged, with the order of magnitude of the tax heavily influenced by the external costs study. - November 1994 – Government makes clear its intention to introduce the Landfill Tax. - March 1995 - a consultation process was undertaken to elicit the views of industry, environmentalists, and local authorities. Its major outcome, as announced in the November 1995 Budget, was a change in the tax design, from a percentage of disposal cost (ad valorem) system, to a weight-based tax. Furthermore, it was intended that there should be no exemptions from the tax. - November 1995 – Budget announces the tax will be introduced in October 1996; - October 1996 – tax introduced – active rate £7 per tonne, inert rate £2 per tonne - Budget 1999 – A review of the tax later led to an announcement that, in order to achieve waste management objectives affecting municipal waste, and convey financial incentives to commerce and industry, the tax should be increased (to £10 per tonne), and that there should be an escalator introduced at the level of £1 per tonne per annum between 2000/2001 and 2004/5 (reaching a level of £15 per tonne in the last of those years). - 2002 – publication of review of the waste strategy by the Cabinet Office Strategy Unit. Waste Not Want Not included a proposal that the tax should be further increased by a minimum of £3 per tonne per annum; - 2003 – pre-Budget Report announces intention to increase the rate of the tax by at least £3 per tonne per annum until it reaches a level of £35 per tonne. - 2005/6 - £3 per tonne escalator enters into force (tax at £18 per tonne) - 2007/8 – tax at £24 per tonne; - 2007 – Chancellor announces decision to increase escalator to £8 per tonne from 2008/9, with a projection for the tax to reach £48/tonne by 2010/11.

5.1.4 Impact Various attempts to analyse the effectiveness of the landfill tax have concluded that – at least at pre-existing levels – it has affected construction and demolition wastes, and commercial and industrial wastes, but that its affect on household waste has been limited thus far. 24 There are three relevant issues as regards the influence of the tax on waste prevention:

23 CSERGE, Warren Spring Laboratory and EFTEL (1993), Externalities for Landfill and Incineration: A Study by CSERGE, Warren Spring Laboratory and EFTEL, London: HMSO. Coopers & Lybrand (1993), Landfill Costs and Prices: Correcting Possible Market Distortions, London, HMSO. 24 See ECOTEC (1997), Effectiveness of the Landfill Tax in the UK: Barriers to Increased Effectiveness and Options for the Future, A Final Report for Friends of the Earth, Birmingham: ECOTEC; EFILWC (1998), Employment and Sustainability: The UK Landfill Tax, Dublin: EFILWC. D. Hogg (1999) The Effectiveness of the UK Landfill Tax: Early Indications. In Thomas Sterner (ed.) (1999) The Market and the Environment: Environmental Implications of Market-Based Policy Instruments, Cheltenham: Edward Elgar. Waste Prevention Policy Case Studies 41 1. As regards the tax’s effect on producers upstreamupstream, the tax may or may not change behaviour of producers, but few if any of these producers are faced with paying for the treatment / disposal of materials which they produce and which are subsequently landfilled. Consequently, there is no incentive conveyed by the tax itself to reduce the quantity of the materials which upstream producers are responsible for which end up in the household waste stream. What would be required to make this happen would be a form of producer responsibility which took to form of a surcharge on industrial sectors for the costs of landfilling the materials which they created; 2. As regards the tax’s effect on householdshouseholds, effectively this is rendered completely meaningless by the fact that households are not charged for the collection and treatment / disposal of waste in proportion to the quantity generated, with the exception of specific streams such as garden waste and bulky wastes A number of authorities have introduced bulky waste collection charges over the last decade. The rationale for the introduction of such charges might be, in part, the increased level of the tax, but the intention is more likely to be to recover escalating costs than to ‘prevent’ bulky waste generation. Even so, such charges may, at the margin, have an impact on how households deal with bulky household wastes. They are likely to make more effort to avoid simply disposing of bulky waste, making it more likely that items will be re-used. Equally, it may make people more likely to deliver the materials to CA sites themselves (so as to simply avoid paying the charge); 3. The tax may have an influence on the propensity of locallocal authorities to introduce policies and initiatives which have an influence on waste prevention. At the margin, one would expect this to happen. As the costs of disposal increase, so the financial benefits of waste reduction policies and initiatives increase. However, the extent to which this provides such an incentive has to be understood in the context of: a. The manner of local authority funding, particularly in two-tier areas, implies that there is limited incentive for waste collection authorities (WCAs) to prevent waste. WDAs, on the other hand, would have a direct incentive to prevent waste. Considerable effort has been made by WDAs to exclude trade waste from household waste recycling centres; and b. The limited extent to which this financial incentive can be conveyed to the ultimate target, the householders. To the extent that the effect of a tax is likely to occur through the mechanism of price, then the lack of any price signal for householders - other than for, in some cases, specific wastes such as garden waste and bulky waste – would most likely lead to the view that the landfill tax has no direct impact on household behaviour as regards waste prevention. Rather, the question might be ‘how, and in what circumstances, could it have such an effect?’ It is perhaps worth reflecting on the fact that local authorities were the most numerous respondents to the original Consultation Paper preceding the tax’s introduction. Municipal waste management is financed by local authorities, so local authorities could see that the tax would significantly affect their waste management costs. Fees at landfill sites for disposal of municipal waste vary across the country from about £8 to £25 per tonne. Therefore in percentage terms the increase implied by the tax was significant. Waste Prevention Policy Case Studies 42 Local authorities perceived that they had limited scope to influence the amounts of waste generated by householders. Existing legislation prevents the use of variable charging schemes, which would convey some form of incentive to householders to reduce disposals. Also contractual rigidity meant that they had little control over the cost or method of disposal. Some local authorities are locked into contracts which specify that they will deliver minimum quantities for disposal to landfill. In addition, they bear the costs of clearing up waste that is fly- tipped on public land, and there was a strong suspicion that such practices would increase after the tax’s introduction. Lastly, there was some concern that waste which was previously in the commercial and industrial stream might enter the household stream through being taken to civic amenity sites (sites where householders can take bulky wastes) and even to the homes of the owners of small businesses.

5.1.5 Landfill Allowances Schemes The Waste and Emissions Trading Act 2003 essentially transposes the Landfill Directive into UK law, and was granted Royal Assent on 13 November 2003. The legislation gives the Secretary of State powers to impose a duty upon waste disposal authorities to ensure that they landfill no more biodegradable municipal waste than that for which they possess permits. Within the UK, the different devolved administrations have each adopted an approach to meeting the Article 5 Landfill Directive targets which makes use of the allocation, to local authorities, of a diminishing (over time) number of allowances for the disposal of biodegradable municipal waste. However, the details of the scheme in the different countries are not the same (see Table 5). Notably, England and Scotland allow trading of allowances; Wales and Northern Ireland do not. In addition, for the purposes of making mass balance calculations, the biodegradable content of waste is assumed to be different in the different countries. Of particular significance to this study is the way in which the biodegradable content of landfilled waste will be calculated. The Draft Regulations for England state (Part 3, Reg.13): (2) For the purposes mentioned in paragraph (1) it must be assumed that -

(a) The amount of biodegradable municipal waste in an amount of collected municipal waste is 68% by weight (rounded up to the nearest tonne); 25 This assumption is clearly aimed at simplifying the calculation of the biodegradable content of landfilled waste, especially where no adequate compositional data exist (which is probably still the majority of places). This is also a consequence of not measuring the biodegradability of landfilled waste through direct measurements (using, for example, respirometry). Table 5: A Comparative Analysis of The Landfill Allowance Schemes In England, Wales, Scotland And Northern Ireland

ENGLAND WALES SCOTLAND NORTHERN IRELAND Name of the Landfill Landfill Landfill Landfill Scheme Allowance Allowances Allowances Allowances

25 Landfill Allowances & Trading Scheme (England) Regulations 2004, http://www.opsi.gov.uk/si/si2004/20043212.htm Waste Prevention Policy Case Studies 43 Trading Scheme Scheme Scheme Scheme Biodegradable 68% 61% 63% 71% content of municipal waste Introduction of 1 April 2005 1 October 1 April 2005 1 April 2005 the scheme 2004 Trading of Trading is No trading of Trading will be No trading of allowances permitted allowances permitted allowances. although not from 2008. Transfer of obligatory. Before 2008, allowances waste between disposal authorities authorities permitted. may be able to swap allowances, at the discretion of the Executive. The Landfill 2009/10 – 2009/10 – 2009/10 – 2009/10 – Directive 11,200,000 710,000 1,320,000 470, 000 tartartargetstar gets for 2012/13 – 7, 2012/13 – 2012/13 – 2012/13 – each of the 460,000 470,000 880,000 320, 000 countries 2019/20 – 2019/20 – 2019/20 – 2019/20 – (tonnes of 5,220,000 330,000 620,000 220,000 biodegradable municipal waste) Source: Defra (http://www.defra.gov.uk/environment/waste/localauth/lats/pdf/lats- comparanalysis.pdf) It is clearly a simplification to believe that all local authorities will have similar waste composition. Indeed, the fact that the composition of waste in the different devolved administrations is deemed to change as one crosses borders between the countries of the UK highlights what a peculiar approach this is. It is well known that (amongst other things) differences in housing types, and differences in socioeconomic standing will influence the composition of household waste. Another factor which will influence composition is the nature and quantity of commercial waste collected as municipal waste in any WDA area. Whether this is collected at household waste recycling centres (HWRCs) or at commercial premises on collection rounds is likely to determine how much of the non- household waste is, for example, inert rubble or biodegradable paper. The quantity of commercial waste collected itself is affected by strategic and policy decisions made by WCAs and WDAs. As such, the grandfathering of allowances (i.e. their allocation based on past quantities collected) is likely to imply the awarding of assets to those who may have made strategic decisions in the past to maximize commercial waste collection as a revenue-raising activity for the DSO. The only way to limit the degree to which the value of these assets can be realized without taking any effective action is to seek to restrict the degree to

Waste Prevention Policy Case Studies 44 which the proportion of non-household waste collected in municipal waste can change over time. Defra has tried to clarify the way in which non-household waste is to be dealt with by local authorities. Specifically, it has sought to restrict the degree to which local authorities can reduce the amount of commercial waste they collect by providing clarification of its interpretation of Section 45(1) of the Environmental Protection Act 1990. 26 However, would-be commercial waste customers choosing, in possession of all the facts, a lower cost service than one on offer from a given local authority could not be restrained from making such a choice. It would be difficult to argue that such waste would remain ‘under the control of’ the local authority concerned where it is no longer chosen as the collection contractor. It can be seen that both the allocation mechanism and the way in which the biodegradable content of landfilled waste is calculated are likely to lead to some perverse strategies being developed, notwithstanding Defra’s move to try to head off actions by local authorities intending to reduce the amount of commercial waste they collect. It is doubtful whether Defra could really require local authorities to continue to collect commercial waste from their existing customers, and the recent court judgement in the case of WRWA v Wandsworth would tend to support this view. 27 The additional risk that this would imply in respect of maintaining a balance of allowances sufficient to cover the quantity of BMW being landfilled could itself be argued as justifying an increase in the price of the service being offered by the local authority. Since competitors in the market for the provision of commercial waste collections in the WDA area would not be faced with any such risk (the waste would not fall under the definition ‘municipal’), then this would be tantamount to forcing customers to choose a higher priced service, thereby restraining trade. 28 The desire to improve recycling performance on the part of WCAs is over- shadowed by the desire of WDAs to ensure that they comply with the terms of the Landfill Allowances Scheme under which they are operating. Different collection schemes – through affecting waste quantities – have different impacts on performance as measured under the LAS. The decision to set the biodegradable composition of collected waste at a fixed percentage irrespective of the actions of a given WCA / WDA has the following consequences: If a local authority sets out to collect garden waste from the doorstep free of charge, one can expect the quantity of waste collected to increase. Using the mass balance approach, even though 100% of the increased quantity of waste (or a figure similar to this) is likely to be biodegradable, the current approach

26 Defra (2004) Municipal Waste, Commercial Waste and the Landfill Allowances Trading Scheme 27 In this judgement, Justice Evans-Lombe ruled that WRWA, which sought judicial review of a decision made by Wandsworth BC to set charges for trade waste which effectively reduced the quality of waste collected by the authority, had no case for such a review. In other words, Wandsworth had not acted outside the law in essentially seeking to reduce its collection of non- household municipal waste. 28 Matters would, or course, have looked somewhat different had Defra taken the view that municipal waste did in fact include all commercial waste in the WDA area, irrespective of who collected it. This would have made the tasks of data acquisition and verification more difficult, but it would also have led, potentially, to a more rational form of collection logistics rather than encouraging its fragmentation. It might also have ensured a more enlightened approach to procurement of facilities in which treatment facilities were designed to deal not only with the material collected by the WCAs / WDAs, but also with the wider commercial wastes. Waste Prevention Policy Case Studies 45 assumes that only (in England) 68% of the additional tonnage is BMW. 29 Table 6 shows the peculiar consequences of this approach. The more additional waste is collected for composting, then the less the calculated quantity of BMW in residual waste becomes. This is despite the fact that in our calculation (for the sake of making the point) we have assumed absolutely nothing has happened to the nature of waste being landfilled. All that has happened is that additional biowaste has been collected. Consequently, the quantity of BMW in residual waste is exactly the same as at the outset, even though the mass balance approach reports ‘diversion’ of, for example, 100kg when 300kg of additional waste is collected. Table 6: Hypothetical Effects of Increased Garden Waste Collections on LATS Balance Before Garden Additional Garden Total Waste TotTotTotalTot al BMW BMW in Actual Waste Collection Waste Collected (tonnes/hhld) in Waste Residual BMW in (tonnes per (tonnes / hhld) (68%) Using Mass Residual household) Balance Method 1.00 0.10 1.10 0.75 0.65 0.68 1.00 0.20 1.20 0.82 0.62 0.68 1.00 0.30 1.30 0.88 0.58 0.68 1.00 0.40 1.40 0.95 0.55 0.68 1.00 0.50 1.50 1.02 0.52 0.68 1.00 0.60 1.60 1.09 0.49 0.68 1.00 0.70 1.70 1.16 0.46 0.68 1.00 0.80 1.80 1.22 0.42 0.68 1.00 0.90 1.90 1.29 0.39 0.68 1.00 1.00 2.00 1.36 0.36 0.68 1.00 1.10 2.10 1.43 0.33 0.68

The current method effectively rewards local authorities for collecting and treating additional waste as long as it is biodegradable. One could almost say it encourages local authorities to chase after additional sources of biodegradable waste so as to reduce the amount of biodegradable municipal waste they are assumed to be sending to landfill (even in cases where there is a limited effect in this regard).

Home Composting If a particularly successful initiative involving home composting is in place, then it will be the case that less biodegradable waste will be collected than if the initiative was absent. However, the assumption that waste composition is always constant would imply that the authority concerned would only be credited with a reduction in the quantity of biodegradable material collected of (in England) 0.68 tonnes for every tonne of material composted at home, even though one might reasonably assume that 100% of this material (or a figure similar to this) was biodegradable. 30 One might have thought that in the context of a policy – the Landfill Directive – which seeks to ensure the amount of biodegradable waste sent to landfill is

29 The figure of 68% applies, of course, to England and the figure is different in the other devolved administrations. 30 The figure of 0.68 tonnes would be, in Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland, 63%, 61% and 71%, respectively Waste Prevention Policy Case Studies 46 reduced, measures such as home composting would be encouraged. The LAS offer no such encouragement. This is shown in Table 7. Because the home composted material is deemed, under the mass balance approach, to be only ‘68% biodegradable’, the effect of home composting on the biodegradable content of collected waste is not fully recognized (it is ‘68% recognised’). Table 7: Effect of Home Composting on Assessment of Biodegradable Content of Waste Using Mass Balance Method Before Home Effect of Home Waste Collected BMW in Waste Actual BMW in Composting Composting (tonnes/hhld) Collected (68%, Waste Promotion Promotion mass balance Collected (tonnes / hhld) (tonnes / hhld) approach) 1.00 0.01 0.99 0.67 0.67 1.00 0.02 0.98 0.67 0.66 1.00 0.03 0.97 0.66 0.65 1.00 0.04 0.96 0.65 0.64 1.00 0.05 0.95 0.65 0.63 1.00 0.06 0.94 0.64 0.63 1.00 0.07 0.93 0.63 0.61 1.00 0.08 0.92 0.63 0.60 1.00 0.09 0.91 0.62 0.59 1.00 0.10 0.9 0.61 0.58

Furthermore, if the material that is home composted is material which would otherwise have been separately collected for composting, then home composting actually worsens the position of the local authority in respect of landfill allowances. This is because: 1. Composting 1 tonne of separately collected biowaste effectively translates into a one tonne credit in terms of landfill allowances; 2. Home composting of 1 tonne of biowaste effectively translates into only 0.68 tonnes of credit in terms of landfill allowances; 3. Consequently, if the material which is home composted is material which would otherwise have been set out for separate collection, the net effect to the authority, in terms of landfill allowances, is to lose a credit of (1-0.68) = 0.32 allowances. It should be mentioned, however, that considered from the perspective of costs, home composting still proves a more than useful approach to dealing with biowaste in the context of waste management systems. The conclusion which one is led to draw is that the LAS – which was intended to encourage least cost compliance – potentially incentivises local authorities to collect as much biowaste as they can, and discourages source reduction of any biodegradable fractions of waste which could otherwise be separately collected. This contrasts with the situation for non-biodegradable materials. Here, if waste prevention occurs, then it is assumed that there is less biodegradable material being collected, even though the biodegradable content of the ‘prevented’ waste may be 0%. We may conclude that the effect of LATS on waste prevention is: To encourage it for non-biodegradable materials; To potentially discourage it (but encourage collection for recycling) for biodegradable materials.

Waste Prevention Policy Case Studies 47 5.1.6 Recycling Targets All administrations in the UK have recycling and composting targets in place. In all cases, these are set as percentage targets – by weight – of either household or municipal waste. Suppose that a local authority is seeking to meet a given recycling target, and the authority introduces a garden waste collection free of charge to householders. Evidence suggests that the increase in waste collected through the household collection system can exceed 100kg per household per annum, even accounting for any offsetting reductions in deliveries to HWRCs (though seasonal changes in garden waste make such an analysis somewhat problematic). Even if the collection system collects no waste that was already in the system, the additional quantity will contribute to recycling and composting rates. This is shown in Figure 16. This shows how additional material affects recycling rates in a hypothetical case where the local authority is collecting 1,000 kg per household of material before the new collections are introduced. Figure 16: Contribution to Recycling Rates from Additional Garden Waste Collected

40.00%

35.00%

30.00%

25.00%

20.00%

15.00%

10.00% (based household(based uponper1000kg at start) Contribution CompostingRecycling to/ (%) Rate

5.00%

0.00% 0 100 200 300 400 500 600 700 Additional Material Collected (kg per household)

At lower quantities of additional material, there is an almost linear relationship between the contribution to recycling rates and the additional material collected. As the additional material collected increases, so the contribution of the marginal material to recycling and composting rates declines. Whilst the additional quantity of material is only 25kg, each 25kg contributes 2.44% to the recycling and composting rate. When the additional quantity reaches 500kg, each additional 25kg of material contributes only 1.13% to the recycling rate. Consequently, garden waste collections – to the extent that they add material to the waste stream – can be said to display ‘diminishing marginal returns’ in terms of their impact on recycling and composting rates. Even so, the contribution made by this material inclines local authorities to collect this material so as to increase recycling targets. This has probably been especially true of waste collection authorities in two tier areas in England since there is no cost implication for the WCA of collecting more waste for subsequent treatment. Indeed, to the extent that recycling credits remained payable, some WCAs might Waste Prevention Policy Case Studies 48 have been collecting additional material for relatively low-cost windrow composting and receiving a recycling credit at a much higher level for each tonne of material collected even where the concept of ‘avoided disposal’ could not have been applicable for the ‘additional’ waste. The Consultation on the Waste Strategy in England appears to acknowledge the potential consequences of weight-based recycling targets in pulling more garden waste into the collected waste stream: Providing some incentive for reducing waste. It is argued that current standards can have the perverse incentive to collect more waste that can all be recycled. Cost and LATS provide a disincentive to do this and the promotion of waste reduction (e.g. through home composting) may be more cost effective. However, the steps authorities can take to reduce waste may be limited so a standard on waste reduction alone may not be deliverable. One way to balance these concerns might be to set a standard for the proportion or amount of waste that is not recycled. This could be achieved by reducing waste collected and/or increasing recycling. The suggestion is that Government may be considering a target for residual waste as opposed to recycling so as to capture the effects of both waste prevention and waste recycling / composting.

5.1.7 Recycling Credits Districts, as waste collection authorities (WCAs), have responsibility for the collection of waste. How they choose to collect waste is largely left up to them, though two key factors affect, or may affect, their decisions: a) The WCAs are faced with statutory recycling targets, as well as stretches on these targets resulting from an agreed LAA; b) The WET Act gives, to waste disposal authority (WDA), certain powers of direction, which the WDA may exercise subject to certain constraints. Included within these is a requirement that, should the WDA ask the WCA to collect waste in a specific way, then as long as the WCA is achieving its statutory performance targets, the WDA would need to compensate the WCA for the additional costs it would incur in changing its approach to collection in the manner requested by the WDA. Counties, as waste disposal authorities, are required to arrange for the disposal of waste. They do this effectively independently of collection activity. However, in recent times, the LATS has become a key driver in WDAs’ decision making. There is no payment made from the WCA to the WDA in lieu of the quantity sent for treatment / disposal. The only financial transfer made between the WCAs and the WDA has been through the system of recycling credits. The recycling credit has been seen as the key mechanism for encouraging recycling in two-tier areas. The recycling credit scheme was introduced under the EPA 1990 and was intended to provide an incentive for recycling by WCAs in two- tier areas, and by third parties. Payments were designed to reflect the net saving a WDA or WCA makes by not having to dispose of the tonnages that have been diverted for recycling. The scheme was not designed to cover the additional collection costs associated with recycling. However, insofar as the scheme affected WCAs by reflecting the avoided cost of disposal, it provided an incentive to WCAs to shift the balance of their investment in collection systems towards separate collection and away from collection of residual waste for treatment and / or disposal. As the EPA 1990 makes clear (see 52(6)), the value of a recycling credit must be equal to the net saving made through not having to collect or dispose of the Waste Prevention Policy Case Studies 49 recycled material. In the case of these credits for disposal, the saving must be based on the cost of the most expensive form of disposal used. The prevailing reality, therefore, has been one where: • WCAs fund the collection of waste – whatever the approach – through Council Tax and Revenue Support Grant; • WDAs fund treatment and disposal through Council Tax and Revenue Support Grant; • WCAs receive, from WDAs, payments in lieu of avoided disposal for all materials collected for recycling. Questions might reasonably asked, therefore, as to whether this system of funding is likely to lead to an outcome which: reflects Best Value for citizens; and creates the proper incentive structure for the development of a quality waste management system. The fact that recycling credits are paid for all waste collected for recycling and composting has been a bone of contention for WDAs where garden waste collections have been concerned. There are two reasons for this: WCAs might have been in a position to have garden waste treated at open-air windrows so the payment of the recycling credit has, as landfill tax has risen, enabled them to benefit from the cost differential between open-air windrow costs, and the costs of disposal. They have, in other words, been extracting rents from the system. Whilst this may seem reasonable for waste for which disposal is genuinely ‘being avoided’, in areas where local authorities are collecting garden waste free of charge, there is evidence of a significant increase in quantities being collected. In other words, there is some material which, prior to the collection scheme’s introduction, was not being disposed of at all (because it was not being collected). The lack of any tonnage based payment from WCAs to WDAs, or any such measure which effectively incentivises the WCA to collect less waste, effectively ensures that the interests of the WCA and the WDA are misaligned. Recently, Government has issued the The Environmental Protection (Waste Recycling Payments) Regulations 2006, 31 and accompanying Guidance. 32 This actually opens up the possibilities for WDAs and WCAs to agree new mechanisms for financial transfers, including those that might actually incentivise waste prevention on the part of the WCAs (through recognising the implications for system costs of their actions in the sphere of waste collection). This has led to a revision of the relevant paragraphs in the Environmental Protection Act 1990 as set out in Box 1. Box 1: Extract from the Environmental Protection Act 1990, pre April 2006 52. —(1) Where, under section 48(2) above, a waste collection authority retains for recycling waste collected by it under section 45 above, the waste disposal authority for the area which includes the area of the waste collection authority shall make to that authority payments, in respect of the waste so retained, of such amounts representing its net saving of expenditure on the disposal of the waste as the authority determines.

(2) Where, by reason of the discharge by a waste disposal authority of its functions, waste arising in its area does not fall to be collected by a waste collection authority under section 45 above, the waste collection authority shall make to the waste disposal authority payments, in respect of the waste not falling to be so collected, of such amounts representing its net saving of expenditure on

31 http://www.opsi.gov.uk/si/si2006/20060743.htm 32 Defra (2006) Guidance on the Recycling Credit Scheme, Defra, April 2006, http://www.defra.gov.uk/environment/waste/localauth/pdf/recyclingcreditscheme-guidance.pdf Waste Prevention Policy Case Studies 50 the collection of the waste as the authority determines.

(3) Where a person other than a waste collection authority, for the purpose of recycling it, collects waste arising in the area of a waste disposal authority which would fall to be collected under section 45 above, the waste disposal authority may make to that person payments, in respect of the waste so collected, of such amounts representing its net saving of expenditure on the disposal of the waste as the authority determines.

(4) Where a person other than a waste collection authority, for the purpose of recycling it, collects waste which would fall to be collected under section 45 above, the waste collection authority may make to that person payments, in respect of the waste so collected, of such amounts representing its net saving of expenditure on the collection of the waste as the authority determines.

(5) The Secretary of State may, by regulations, impose on waste disposal authorities a duty to make payments corresponding to the payments which are authorised by subsection (3) above to such persons in such circumstances and in respect of such descriptions or quantities of waste as are specified in the regulations.

(6) For the purposes of subsections (1), (3) and (5) above the net saving of expenditure of a waste disposal authority on the disposal of any waste retained or collected for recycling is the amount of the expenditure which the authority would, but for the retention or collection, have incurred in having it disposed of less any amount payable by the authority to any person in consequence of the retention or collection for recycling (instead of the disposal) of the waste.

(7) For the purposes of subsections (2) and (4) above the net saving of expenditure of a waste collection authority on the collection of any waste not falling to be collected by it is the amount of the expenditure which the authority would, if it had had to collect the waste, have incurred in collecting it. Importantly, from the perspective of waste prevention, the new text allows for arrangements to be concluded between a WCA and a WDA such that the existing mechanism – which has been replaced by a default approach that caps the level of the recycling credit (even as disposal costs increase) – can be jettisoned if the WCA and WDA agree to do so. Hence para. 52(1B) of the EPA, as amended, now reads: (1B) A waste disposal authority is not required to make payments to a waste collection authority under subsection (1) above where, on the basis of arrangements involving the two authorities, the waste collection authority has agreed that such payments need not be made. Furthermore, the new legislation allows for payment of re-use credits. Para 52(12) reads: (12) In this section, references to recycling waste include re-using it (whether or not the waste is subjected to any process). This measure has been welcomed by the Furniture Recycling Network, the umbrella organization which includes, among its members, furniture and WEEE re- use organizations. Hitherto, very few Councils have paid any credit to incentivise re-use. Now, it is likely that more will do so. This is a potentially important change in the law, and could lead to a change in the way WCAs and WDAs relate to each other in the financial sense. In particular, in the absence of charging systems, it becomes possible for WDAs to ensure WCAs ‘see’ the costs of residual waste management. New mechanisms would be enable the payment from WDAs to WCAs to reflect the quantity of residual waste transferred to the WDAs for treatment / disposal.

5.1.8 Packaging The Producer Responsibility Obligations (Packaging Waste) Regulations 2005 are the Government’s means of implementing the requirements of the Packaging Waste Prevention Policy Case Studies 51 Waste Directive (Council Directive 94/62/EC on packaging and packaging waste 33 ) as amended by: • Council Regulation (EC) No 1882/2003 adapting to Council Decision 1999/468/EC the provisions relating to committees which assist the Commission in the exercise of its implementing powers laid down in instruments subject to the procedure referred to in Article 251 of the EC Treaty; 34 • Council Directive 2004/12/EC amending Directive 94/62/EC on packaging and packaging waste; 35 and • Council Directive 2005/20/EC amending Directive 94/62/EC on packaging and packaging waste. 36 The current Regulations are a consolidated version of the original regulations, which were amended a number of times. The regulations concentrate on important industrial and commercial sources (i.e. companies that handle more than 50 tonnes of packaging per annum and have a turnover of more than £2 million per annum) and apply the shared producer responsibility approach.

Background The Directive on Packaging and Packaging Waste,, adopted in 1994, set out to limit the amount of packaging waste placed on the market. However, there are targets only for the recycling and recovery of packaging waste which are determined as a percentage of the overall amount of waste packaging. Therefore, there is no real incentive for waste minimisation, and as noted in Environmental Signals 2002, the Directive has had a minimal impact on prevention even in “countries with relative success in waste prevention”. The Packaging and Packaging Waste Directive does, however, set out Essential Requirements which explicitly require material use and volume to be minimised. The initial Directive’s targets for recovery and recycling for 2001 were: • between 50% and 65% by weight of packaging waste for recovering; • between 25% and 40% by weight of packaging waste for recycling with a minimum of 15% by weight per packaging material; The Directive was implemented in the UK in 1997 as the Producer Responsibility Obligations (Packaging Waste) Regulations 1997 and these were amended by the following instruments: Producer Responsibility Obligations (Packaging S.I. 1999/1361 Waste)(Amendment) Regulations 1999 Producer Responsibility Obligations (Packaging S.I. 1999/3447 Waste)(Amendment)(No 2) Regulations 1999 Producer Responsibility Obligations (Packaging S.I. 2000/3375 Waste)(Amendment)(England and Wales) Regulations 2000 Producer Responsibility Obligations (Packaging S.I. 2002/732 Waste)(Amendment)(England) Regulations 2002 Producer Responsibility Obligations (Packaging S.I. 2002/813 (W 93) Waste)(Amendment)(Wales) Regulations 2002

33 OJ No. L 365, 31.12.1994, p. 10. 34 OJ No. L 284, 31.10.2003, p. 1. 35 OJ No. L 47, 18.2.2004, p. 26. 36 OJ No. L 70, 16.3.2005, p.17. Waste Prevention Policy Case Studies 52 Producer Responsibility Obligations (Packaging S.I. 2003/3238 (W 318) Waste)(Amendment)(Wales) Regulations 2003 Producer Responsibility Obligations (Packaging S.I. 2003/3294 Waste)(Amendment)(England) Regulations 2003 Producer Responsibility Obligations (Packaging S.I. 2005/717 Waste)(Amendment)(England and Wales) Regulations 2005 Producer Responsibility Obligations (Packaging S.S.I. 2000/451 Waste) Amendment (Scotland) Regulations 2000 Producer Responsibility Obligations (Packaging S.S.I. 2002/147 Waste) Amendment (Scotland) Regulations 2002 Producer Responsibility Obligations (Packaging S.S.I 2003/613 Waste) Amendment (Scotland) Regulations 2003 Producer Responsibility Obligations (Packaging S.S.I. 2005/271 Waste) Amendment (Scotland) Regulations 2005 As mentioned above, the Regulation was re-issued in consolidated form in December 2005. This reflects the fact that, almost annually, there have been various discussions – some of them seemingly arcane, but of significance to the operation of the UK system.

5.1.9 Essential Requirements The Essential Requirements aspect of the Directive is not covered in the UK Regulation. When the Packaging Regulations came into force the Local Authority Coordinators of Regulatory Services (LACORS) 37 made a resources bid which DTI accepted and money was added to the Revenue Support Grant. However, because it was based on a 'soft touch' enforcement approach with low inspection frequencies it was for not more than £120,000, divided between about 200 Trading Standards Authorities in the UK, amounting to about £600 per authority. Guidance, developed by the DTI in conjunction with LACORS, was published in August 1998. It did not give a steer to Local Authorities about inspection frequencies or enforcement approach. A "code of practice for optimising packaging and minimising packaging waste" was produced by the Industry Council for Packaging and the Environment (INCPEN) and endorsed by relevant industry associations, the Institute of Packaging and LACORS. A series of compliance statements for different types of packaging has been published by LACORS, available on the LACORS open website at www.LACORS.org.uk (under Information Services), while the European standards body, CEN, has developed standards which allow clearer interpretation of the Essential Requirements. Whilst the larger companies have tended to ‘comply’, it is believed that there are still low levels of awareness among SMEs about the Requirements. This is disappointing, since the only onerous requirement is record keeping, and there may be distinct financial advantages to the companies themselves in achieving compliance especially given the implications of existing producer responsibility mechanisms. Work for what used to be called the Environmental Technology Best Practice Programme (ETBPP), now Envirowise, has shown that packaging minimisation can save companies large sums of money without compromising product protection, consumer acceptance etc.

37 Previously known as the Local Authority Committee on Trading Standards (LACOTS) Waste Prevention Policy Case Studies 53 Impact of UK Implementation Upon Waste Prevention There are two routes through which waste prevention might be promoted through the UK approach: • Obligated companies voluntarily seeking to reduce the quantity of packaging waste on the market; and • LACORS taking action to reduce the amount of packaging waste on a case- by-case basis. These are discussed in more detail below.

Waste Prevention Resulting from Obligation Not all companies who handle packaging are obligated to recover and recycle packaging under the UK Regulation. ‘Producers’ are defined within the Regulation through Schedule 1. This sets thresholds for companies who are, or are not obligated to recover and recycled packaging under the Directive. These thresholds are set out in Para 3 of Schedule 1: 3.3.3. A person satisfies the threshold tests if— a. his turnover in the last financial year in respect of which audited accounts are available before the relevant date was more than £2,000,000; and b. in the calculation year the person handled in aggregate more than 50 tonnes of packaging or packaging materials. The first possible impact of the Regulation, therefore, is that companies who handle just over 50 tonnes of packaging have an incentive – they avoid their obligation – to reduce this to a level just below 50 tonnes. This is of interest since the effects of this are likely to include one or more of: • Light-weighting of the same material (e.g. glass) to reduce quantities of packaging per unit of product sold; • Concentrating product in the same packaging; • Scaling back packaging; and • Switching material (from, for example, glass beverage packaging to plastics); The same types of strategy might also be used by those seeking to meet their obligation where they are obligated producers. The amount of packaging which must be recycled and recovered – set out in Schedule 2 of the Regulation - is directly proportional to the quantity of packaging handled by the organization (see Box 2). The smaller that quantity is, the lower the quantity of material needing to be recycled and recovered. This translates into savings for the producers since they must discharge their obligation either by: • Recycling or recovering the material themselves; or • Having their legal obligation discharged by a compliance scheme. In either case, the new Regulation makes clear (at Reg. 4) that: (5) A producer may only demonstrate compliance with his recovery and recycling obligations through the acquisition of PRNs 38 or PERNs 39 or both. (6) A PRN or PERN that relates to packaging waste delivered or exported for reprocessing in December in a year may be relied on by a producer to

38 Packaging Recovery Note 39 Packaging Export Recovery Note Waste Prevention Policy Case Studies 54 demonstrate compliance with his recovery and recycling obligations either in that year or the following year. Since PRNs and PERNs are effectively tradable compliance credits, and since they have a value in the market place (depending upon the tightness of the market for ‘evidence of compliance’) then reducing the quantity of material for which this evidence is sought will save money through both reducing the costs of the activity of recycling / recovery itself as well as reducing the cost of any PRNs / PERNs which may be required to demonstrate compliance. Reliable evidence of any waste prevention impact of this nature is limited. However, there are anecdotal cases – which are entirely credible – of packaging quantities being optimized (for example, quantities of glass used in containers being reduced to the minimum necessary for the purpose), or of packaging re-use being implemented (for example, in the case of pallets used for transporting goods). A key question might be, to what extent did the reduction in packaging (per unit of service) occur as a consequence of the Regulations, or would these reductions have occurred anyway? This is one of the difficulties in measuring the impact of any attempt at regulation, as it could be argued that light-weighting of packaging is nothing new, and that because there can be definite financial benefits from minimising packaging, companies will tend to pursue it anyway 40 .

40 For example, a report by Perchards, 2003, Impacts of the Packaging (Essential Requirements) Regulations – A Brief Survey, notes that the “ INCPEN (the Industry Council for Packaging and the Environment) has reported that yoghurt pots are 60% lighter than 30 years ago; plastic soft drink bottles are one-third lighter than when first introduced 30 years ago; plastic carrier bags are half as thick as 20 years ago; and drinks cartons are 16% lighter than 10 years ago .” Waste Prevention Policy Case Studies 55 Box 2: Key Targets as Set Out in Schedule 2 of the Packaging Regulations 3.3.3. —(1) The amount of packaging waste to be recovered by a producer in relation to a class of producer to which he belongs is calculated as follows— P × C × X = Z where— • "P" is the amount in tonnes to the nearest tonne of packaging and packaging materials handled in Great Britain by the producer in the preceding year; • "C" is the percentage prescribed in paragraph 4 below in relation to the class of producer; • "X" is the percentage prescribed in paragraph 5 below as the recovery target for the relevant year; and • "Z" is the amount by tonnage of packaging waste which is to be recovered within the relevant year. (2) The proportion of the packaging waste referred to in sub-paragraph (1) above which is to be recovered by recycling, in relation to a class of producer to which the producer belongs in the years 2006, 2007, 2008, 2009 and 2010 is not less than 92% of the amount by tonnage of packaging waste represented by "Z" in sub- paragraph (1) above. (3) Where in the preceding year the producer has handled any recyclable material (whether in the form of packaging or packaging materials), the producer shall recover by recycling an amount of packaging waste consisting of that material calculated as follows— M × C × Y = Q where— "M" is the amount in tonnes to the nearest tonne of the recyclable material (whether in the form of packaging or packaging materials) handled in Great Britain by the producer in the preceding year; "C" is the percentage prescribed in paragraph 4 below in relation to the class of producer; "Y" is the percentage prescribed in paragraph 6 below as the recycling target for the relevant year; and "Q" is the amount by tonnage of packaging waste consisting of that material which is to be recycled in the relevant year. 4.4.4. —(1) The following percentages are prescribed as the percentages for the following classes of producer— (a) manufacturer 6% ; (b) converter 9%; (c) packer/filler 37% ; (d) seller 48% ; (e) secondary provider 85% ; and (f) service provider 85% . (2) The following percentages are prescribed for the class of importer— a) the manufacturer's percentage, that is 6% — i. on Class A supplies, where the importer also carries out the functions of a converter; ii. on Class B supplies, where the relevant packaging or packaging materials are supplied, by the distributor who receives them, to a converter; and iii. on Class C supplies to a converter; b) the manufacturer's and the converter’s percentages aggregated, that is 6% + 9% = 15% — i. on Class A supplies, where the importer also carries out the functions of a packer/filler; ii. on Class B supplies, where the relevant packaging or packaging materials are supplied, by the distributor who receives them, to a packer/filler; iii. on Class C supplies to a packer/filler; and iv. on Class G supplies; c) the manufacturer's, the converter’s and the packer/filler's percentages aggregated, that is 6% + 9% + 37% = 52% — i. on Class A supplies where the importer also carries out the functions of a seller; ii. on Class B supplies where the relevant packaging or packaging materials are supplied, by the distributor who receives them, to a seller; and iii. on Class C supplies to a seller; d) the manufacturer's, the converter’s, the packer/filler's and the seller's percentages aggregated, that is 6% + 9% + 37% + 48% = 100% — (i) on Class F supplies; and (ii) on Class A supplies, where the importer is also the final user or consumer. 555.5 The following is prescribed as the recovery target "X"— (a) for the year 2006, 66% ; (b) for the year 2007, 67% ; (c) for the year 2008, 68% ; (d) for the year 2009, 69% ; and (e) for the year 2010, 70% .

Waste Prevention Policy Case Studies 56 Box 2: Contd

6.6.6. The following percentages are prescribed as the recycling target "Y" in respect of the recyclable material specified in the first column in relation to the years indicated at the head of the subsequent columns Recycling targets Material 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 Glass 65 69.5 73.5 74 74.5 Aluminium 29 31 32.5 33 33.5 Steel 56 57.5 58.5 59 59.5 Paper/Board 66.5 67 67.5 68 68.5 Plastic 23 24 24.5 25 25.5 Wood 19.5 20 20.5 21 21.5

As far as household waste is concerned, notwithstanding the fact that there may be financial implications for a producer in using ‘excess packaging’, there are also financial implications for local authorities (and hence, taxpayers in general). Thus, the use of excess packaging imposes a pecuniary externality upon taxpayers in general, via the need for councils – and by extension council taxpayers - to pay for costs of collection and recycling or treatment/disposal. If charging systems were in place, then arguably, some of the externality would at least be visited upon those who purchased the products in question (so there might, at the margin, be an incentive to choose products which were not so heavily packaged). Taking action to reduce packaging waste consumed is therefore not currently incentivised. This in itself is likely to reduce the potential impact of the Essential Requirements. Also, because much of the cost of recycling packaging waste is borne by local authorities, there may be a tendency to pay rather less attention to the material as it ends up in the household waste stream. This is particularly likely for those materials where targets under the Regulations are likely to be met quite easily, such as cardboard.

Actions of LACORS in Implementing Essential Requirements As described above, Local Authority Trading Standards officers can take action to investigate claims of excess packaging. However, as mentioned above, the resources for LACORS are minimal relative to the magnitude of the task. Since the essential requirements were introduced there have been three prosecutions under the regulations in the UK. These were: A producer was prosecuted for use of a false bottom in containers of mushroom soup A butcher was prosecuted for using upturned trays inside meat packs to increase the apparent quantity of meat. An office products supply company was prosecuted for using boxes that were too large when supplying items ordered through the internet. While 3 prosecutions since 1998 would seem to suggest either a high level of compliance or a low level of enforcement activity, there are a number of contributing factors as to why this number is low: The Trading Standards officers tend to take a ‘soft’ approach to enforcement – thus they will bring potential issues to the attention of manufacturers or distributors and work with them to implement solutions, rather than pursuing a prosecution;

Waste Prevention Policy Case Studies 57 The packaging regulations require packaging to be minimized over the supply chain not simply at the retail level, and so it can be more difficult to evaluate and prove a case of excessive packaging; Finally the issues surrounding packaging performance can be highly technical, and/or subjective (as in the case of ‘consumer appeal’), and this can again create difficulty in proving a case of over-packaging –particularly where the investigating authority may not be resourced to pursue a case in such detail. There are not any records held of the number of complaints brought by the public, the number of items investigated by Trading Standards Officers, the number of challenges that have been brought, and the actions resulting from challenges (i.e. voluntary or partnership based change, or no change). Similarly there are no records held of organisations approaching Trading Standards voluntarily to ensure compliance. These records are reportedly not held because the information is not required on the statutory returns to the DTI 41 . This suggests that one possible avenue to improve the effectiveness of the Essential Requirements would simply be to require reporting on Essential Requirements activities. This would enable actions to be monitored and performance standards set, and would help ensure a consistent ongoing application of the Essential Requirements regulations. A survey covering the implementation of the Essential Requirements by LACORS has recently been conducted, which may shed some light on the level of activity in enforcing the essential requirements. However at the time of writing of this report these results had not yet become available. A further issue here is that very few citizens, let alone local authority officers, are aware of the fact that they can make complaints about excess packaging and how to go about it. This issue was raised in a recent report to the Advisory Committee on Packaging which noted the following: 5.10 The Task Force believes that there is a need for a broader awareness campaign to build on the WRAP initiative and to support and encourage the LACORS/ Envirowise programme. Compliance schemes that operate under the Packaging Waste Regulations are ideally placed to provide this service and it is felt that a case can be made for requiring them to use their special position to promote this. CosWiG could be approached to discuss a common approach and LACORS can provide suitable material. 5.11 Trade Associations can be a means for extending awareness. We recommend that the Packaging Federation, Food & Drinks Federation and the British Retail Consortium be nominated to coordinate action. 42

Independent Evaluation of the Essential Requirements Two studies that have attempted to evaluate the impact of enforcement of the Essential Requirements: a 2003 study for the DTI and a 2005 study for the EU. These are looked at further below. DTI Survey

41 Personal Communication with Maggie Gibbons-Loveday Lead Officer on Environmental Issues for the Trading Standards Institute. 42 ACP, October 2005. Report of Essential Requirements Task Force Waste Prevention Policy Case Studies 58 A 2003 study by Perchards for the DTI 43 surveyed 22 companies: 5 retail/wholesale companies and 17 packaging/filling companies to ascertain awareness of the regulations and impact on their packaging use. The DTI Study found that although it was difficult to say to what degree packaging reduction would have happened without the Essential Requirements, the regulations provide a clear rationale through which personnel responsible for packaging waste reduction can drive change through the company. 18 of the 22 respondents reported that the application of the Essential Requirements had resulted in changes to their packaging. The sample for the survey, although small, did encompass a number of major players in the market who are likely to have a disproportionate level of influence. The respondents included the following: • GlaxoSmithKline plc • B&Q • Kellogg Company of Great Britain Ltd • Bayer CropScience Ltd • Kraft Foods • Boots Group plc • Masterfoods, a division of Mars UK Ltd • BP Chemicals Ltd • Nestlé UK • Cadbury Trebor Bassett • Nike Europe • Coca-Cola Enterprises Ltd • J Sainsbury plc • Unilever plc • The Gillette Company The level of interaction between companies and the respondents in respect of the Essential Requirements is a potential indicator of the awareness and effectiveness of the Essential Requirements. Figure 17 and Figure 18 below show the respondents that have been approached by Trading Standards Officers and the respondents who voluntarily approached the enforcement authority.

43 Perchards (2003). Impacts of the Packaging (Essential Requirements) Regulations – A Brief Survey. Final Report to DTI Waste Prevention Policy Case Studies 59

Figure 17: Respondents Approached by LA Authority Officers

Figure 18: Respondents who have Approached Enforcement Authority

The above charts show that the enforcement authority has approached half of the respondents while almost as many (45%) voluntarily approached the enforcement authority over packaging issues. This contact resulted in 27% making changes to existing packaging and 9% to new packaging when approached by the LA, while some 13% made changes to existing packaging and 18% to new packaging when they approached the enforcement authority. While this level of reported change as a result of interaction with the Trading Standards Officers would appear to be a positive result. It must be remembered that the organisations in the survey are responsible for literally thousands of product lines and there is no indication from the survey as to the number of product packaging changes that resulted or the extent of change that took place. One impact from the above level of interaction as the study also notes is that enforcement of the regulations has improved dialogue between local authorities and those companies surveyed. This reportedly has resulted in better understanding of technical issues by Trading Standards Officers, and enhanced perceptions among the businesses of how their packaging is perceived. Once an enforcement procedure is in place the changes introduced tend to work themselves through the supply chain, as compliant packaging becomes a commercial requirement within a businesses supply chain, and as packaging producers thereafter tend to supply compliant packaging to other parties even though it may not have been requested. Large companies are liaised with using LACORS’ ‘Home Authority’ policy. Under this approach issues are dealt with Waste Prevention Policy Case Studies 60 between the Head Office and the Local Authority where they are based. This improves dialogue and avoids duplication of effort and the need to coordinate responses. The report notes that Trading Standards enforcement authorities are understaffed but because of the tendency for practices to work their way through the supply chain, constant vigilance is not necessarily required, and that compliance activity has slackened off as packaging design issues have become clearer and TS Officers become more satisfied with companies’ responses. By way of conclusion it is worth quoting from the study: “In reality, it is rather difficult to say how far the changes made have been the result of interventions from the enforcement officers and how far they have simply been the natural outcome of the emergence of a culture of ‘continuous improvement’ with regard to packaging minimisation.” 44 Even so, it is difficult to be confident that the approach too implementing the Essential Requirements regulations has been as effective as it could be. If there is really not much by way of any ‘causality’ between packaging reduction and the regulations, it is difficult to argue against the possibility of implementation being made far more effective. European Union Study This recent study undertaken by PIRA and Ecolas in 200545 looked at the correlation between GDP and packaging waste generation. The study evaluated packaging waste generation rates relative to GDP in countries with enforcement regimes (the UK and France) and compared these with packaging waste generation rates relative to GDP in the rest of the EU. Figure 19: Packaging Waste Generation against GDP in the UK

Figure 20: Development of Packaging Waste Generation and GDP in the EU 15

44 Perchards 2003. Impacts of the Packaging (Essential Requirements) Regulations – A Brief Survey. Final Report to DTI. P.14 45 PIRA, ECOLAS 2005 Study on the Implementation of Directive 94/62/EC on Packaging and Packaging Waste and Options to Strengthen Prevention and Re-use of Packaging. Final Report to the EU.

Waste Prevention Policy Case Studies 61

The results displayed in Figure 19 indicate a clear decoupling of packaging waste generation from GDP. The figures for the EU as a whole displayed in Figure 20 do not show the same clear pattern. 46 Although it is suggestive, the data is not able to attribute the decoupling shown to the impacts of the Essential Requirements or their method of enforcement. 47 Indeed this is a difficulty with this level of analysis as, although a correlation may be established between enforcement of the Essential Requirements and packaging generation, this is not sufficient to determine cause and effect. Furthermore, the short time period over which the comparison has been made makes it entirely possible that in some countries, efforts at packaging waste minimization might have started earlier. Finally, the ‘trends’ are heavily reliant upon good data being available.

5.1.10 Voluntary Agreement Concerning Direct Mail

The Direct Marketing Association estimates that about 5,438 million items of direct mail were mailed in 2003 (+3.9% on 2002). This includes:

• Direct mail - advertising messages individually addressed • Door-to-door - unaddressed advertisements posted by hand • Inserts - advertising material in magazines and newspapers

The items sent were split between 78% (4,240 million) consumer mailings and 22% (1,198 million) business mailings. The overall volume of direct mail has increased by 139% in the last 13 years. Over the same period, direct mail expenditure increased by 165%. £2,467 million was spent on direct mail advertising in 2003, split between postage at £1,019 million and production at £1,448 million. It is estimated that consumer direct mail generates nearly £27 billion worth of business every year (+ 2.3% on the 2003

46 It is unclear from the report whether the EU 15 figures include data from UK France and Spain and Belgium where there are packaging waste prevention plans in place. If (as it would seem) they do then this would clearly reduce the differential between the data from countries where measures are in place versus those where there are none. 47 PIRA, ECOLAS 2005 Study on the Implementation of Directive 94/62/EC on Packaging and Packaging Waste and Options to Strengthen Prevention and Re-use of Packaging. Final Report to the EU. Waste Prevention Policy Case Studies 62 figure). Of this, over 41% (£11 billion) is spent on clothes, while books account for £2.8 billion and electrical goods £1.8 billion. Geographically those in the north of the country spend more through direct mail, accounting for 73% of the total (nearly £27 billion) compared to 27% in the south. According to industry figures: 48 • The average British household receives 14.1 items of direct mail every four weeks • 60% of consumer direct mail is opened, 40% is opened and read, 13% is kept to read later or passed on by somebody else • 37% of consumers had responded to direct mail at least once in the past 12 months, with 41% saying they had ever made a purchase • ACORN A, and ACORN B Households receive considerably more direct mail than the average UK household (an average of 370 items per annum)

The Direct Mail Association (DMA), which represents about 900 members involved in the direct mail and promotions industry, signed an agreement with Government in July 2003 to raise recycling levels to:

• 30% by the end of 2005 • 55% by the end of 2009 • 70 percent by the end of 2013

In 2003 only about 13% of direct mail was recycled.

The DMA also pledged to:

• Work with local authorities to promote kerbside collections of paper to be recycled, and to make sure the collections have the capacity to meet recycling targets; • Make sure its members use recycled paper for their mail-outs, and avoid using materials which might cause problems with the recycling process (e.g. glue); • Help cut down on waste by improving the targeting of direct mail campaigns and by publicising services such as the Mail Preference Service, which enables people to stop direct mail being sent to them.

The impetus for the DMA to agree to voluntarily introduce these initiatives is the threat of regulatory measures and mailing levies. 49 The producer responsibility scheme includes no mechanism to reduce the number of items, or the amount of material associated with those items. Also of note is the fact that while the overall volume of direct mail (as noted above) has increased by well over 100% in the last 13 years the producer responsibility scheme provides no targets, for reducing overall quantities of direct mail, reducing the rate of growth in direct mail, or a reduction in quantities of direct mail per household. This kind of outcome, which from the perspective of the environment is what would be most beneficial, is perhaps not to be expected

48 Direct Mail Information Service 2004 49 http://www.dma.org.uk/content/Sch-Article.asp?id=2421 Waste Prevention Policy Case Studies 63 from a voluntary agreement as if successful it could involve a reduction in the volume of business and the diversion of clients to other marketing options. For the past 10 years the DMA has had mechanisms in place to reduce wastage, including: • A DMA branded product called NSF which can be used to suppress mailings to people who have moved or are deceased • Electoral Role based products which update names and addresses. The full electoral role is no longer available therefore these products are unofficial ‘pseudo’ versions. • The Mailing Preference Service (MPS), which allows consumers to register their wish to limit the amount of direct mail they receive. The first two above mechanisms are essentially intended to improve the targeting of direct marketing materials and will not necessarily act to substantially reduce overall quantities at the household level. The MPS by contrast, while it does improve targeting of direct marketing, also results in a reduction of the quantity of materials received by householders. The MPS is supported and promoted by local authorities. The DMA notes the following: “There is a common misperception that once consumers hear about the service they register, this is not the case, research shows that 9% of people who had heard about the service were very likely to register, for the rest receipt of direct mail is welcomed or not seen as a problem.” 50 Clearly if most people who did hear about the MPS chose to register then, the more successful and wider the promotion of the service was, the more people would opt out of receiving direct mail. If the majority of people did register then the potential audience for organisations who comply with the MPS would be very small indeed and one would expect that this could have significant consequences for the industry, The DMA indicate that their intention is that all householders eventually be made aware of the MPS and how to use it so that they have the choice of opting out of receiving direct mail. 51 However given that this is the intention, the most obvious and potentially effective avenue for promotion of the service – on direct mail material – is specifically and curiously rejected: “We see no benefit in displaying prominently the details of the MPS on all direct mail material. Such an approach would do irreparable damage to the direct marketing industry. It would compromise any promotional and marketing message and severely reduce the efficiency of direct mail. Many clients would move out of Direct Mail into other direct marketing media, which would have a severe economic impact on the direct mail supply side of the industry, leading to job losses and company closures. 52 ” The above quote would appear to be in essence an admission that if promotions were properly targeted, then they would be too effective. One must therefore question the degree to which tools such as the MPS are merely serving the needs of the industry – to more accurately target direct mail - as opposed to making a genuine attempt to achieve waste prevention goals. One would of course be surprised if the industry were to aim to prevent waste to the degree that it caused their business to suffer. The natural conclusion would appear to be that one

50 2003, Producer Responsibility for Direct Mail and Promotions. P.7 51 DMA 2003, Producer Responsibility for Direct Mail and Promotions. P.10 52 DMA 2003, Producer Responsibility for Direct Mail and Promotions. P.10 Waste Prevention Policy Case Studies 64 would expect the likes of the DMA to promote waste prevention initiatives to the degree to which they are going to be beneficial (or at least not harmful) to their industry, and not beyond. This further suggests that there are limits to the effectiveness of the current direct mail voluntary agreement in terms of waste prevention and that if Government wishes to go beyond these limits it will have to look to independent bodies or regulations to achieve these ends. Results A report by the DMA to DEFRA on the success of the Voluntary agreement is due to be published immanently but is not yet available at the time of writing of this report. Further Initiatives To accelerate client environmental awareness, the DMA has also embarked on a project to gain active support from the Top 50 mailers in achieving the Producer Responsibility Scheme’s goals. As this group represents by volume, over 50% of all Direct Mail, their support is vital if these objectives are to be met. As a first step, they have been asked to sign up to support the DMA’s Environmental Charter which includes committing support for suppression use. This equates to stopping approximately 92 million items of inaccurate mail even going through the front door. 53

5.1.11 Voluntary Actions to Reduce Packaging – The Courtauld Commitment In July 2005 the Government through WRAP signed an agreement with 13 major retailers to reduce packaging and food waste. Known as The Courtauld Commitment the initiative is aimed at promoting innovation to minimise household food and packaging waste. It aims to do this through: • Examining developments in packaging design • Instilling a culture of partnership working in the retail supply chain and optimising information dissemination • Implementing ideas for light-weight packaging through The WRAP Innovation Fund • Developing centralised systems for dealing with small quantities of waste at many individual stores Companies that have become signatories to The Courtauld Commitment have signed up to voluntarily to reduce packaging and food waste. This is a high level commitment involving the following leading retailers: 1. Asda, 2. Boots, 3. Budgens, 4. The Co-operative Group, 5. Londis, 6. Iceland, 7. Kwik Save, 8. Marks & Spencer, 9. Morrison's, 10. Sainsbury's, 11. Somerfield, 12. Tesco 13. Waitrose

53 http://www.dma.org.uk/content/Sch-Article.asp?id=2421 Waste Prevention Policy Case Studies 65 It is clearly an attempt to engage with the industry leaders, with a view to getting the leaders to show the way for the rest of the retail sector. As this initiative was not yet a year old at the time of writing it was too early to say how effective it has been both in terms of facilitating new initiatives among signatories and in terms of any follow on impacts in the sector. Progress made by signatories is due to be evaluated after a year, although the nature and extent of this evaluation is not clear.

5.1.12 Implementation of the WEEE Directive The Directives on Waste Electrical and Electronic EquipmentEquipment (WEEE(WEEE) and Restriction on Hazardous Substances (ROHS(ROHS) were adopted in October 2002. Most significantly, individual producer responsibility is the pivotal principle in both Directives. Producers are responsible for funding the treatment of their own products, but the final text leaves ample scope for collective financing. The annual waste collection target, for 2006, has been set to four kilos per inhabitant (on average 14kg of WEEE per inhabitants are produced). Recycling targets amount to between 50% and 75% of product weight depending on appliance type. A number of hazardous substances are effectively banned in manufacture from July 2006. The UK implementation of the Directive has been delayed. Hence, at present, the effects of the Directive on the UK cannot be meaningfully estimated. However, the fact that there has been a clear attempt to ensure that local authorities (as with packaging) shoulder some of the financial burden of delivering the Directive’s requirements leads one to suspect that the financial incentives for acting to reduce the amount of WEEE may be less than in the case where producers shoulder the full financial burden of the measure. 5.2 Waste Prevention in Scotland In Scotland, data collected since 2000-01 suggests a growth in household waste of 2% per annum (see Table 8). Since non-household waste has been on the decline, municipal waste growth appears to be around 1.2% per annum since 2000-01. 54 Table 8: Household and Municipal Waste in Scotland 1998 2000-01 2001-2 2002-3 2003-4 Waste type Tonnes Waste collected for disposal Household* 2,181,000 2,020,436 2,120,791 2,094,872 2,015,580 Civic amenity sites 385,728 384,578 351,632 381,868 326,065 Commercial sources 284,015 532,761 472,012 494,830 486,238 Industrial sources 46,030 42,215 77,116 77,164 29,987 Other non-household sources † 86,757 69,663 30,130 62,473 Total 2,896,773 3,066,747 3,091,214 3,078,864 2,920,343 Waste collected for recycling and composting Household 112,653 122,433 148,788 206,166 342,574 Non-household ‡ 4,461 22,250 26,695 60,428 70,052 Total 117,114 144,683 175,483 266,594 412,626

54 Note these calculations exclude the data from 1998, which may be of a less reliable nature. If these figures are included, the growth rates for household and non-household waste, respectively, are 0.05% pre annum and 18% per annum. Waste Prevention Policy Case Studies 66 TOTAL ARISINGS § 3,013,887 3,211,430 3,266,697 3,345,458 3,332,969 Household 2,679,381 2,527,447 2,621,211 2,682,906 2,684,219 NonNon----household‡household‡ 334,506 683,983 645,486 662,552 648,750 HH Waste Growth -5.67% 3.71% 2.35% 0.05% Non Household Waste Growth 104.48% -5.63% 2.64% -2.08%

The policy in Scotland, as set out (as a voluntary target) in the National Waste Strategy, was ‘to reduce municipal waste arisings of 1% per annum’. 55 It was not entirely clear that this was a formal commitment and the National Waste Plan revised the policy and set an objective of reducing the rate of growth in municipal waste to zero by 2010: Scotland’s ultimate objective, set out in NWSS 99, is to stop and then reverse the growth in waste, but it is recognised that demographic and economic circumstances make this a considerable challenge. The Waste Strategy Area Groups have, therefore, adopted a relatively conservative approach to forecasting their ability to slow waste growth, recognising that the key drivers – household numbers, product design, consumer behaviour and economic growth – are all working against the target of stopping or reversing the trend. In particular, household numbers in Scotland are projected to continue to grow at the same rate as for the past 10 years suggesting that, in the absence of measures to slow waste growth, municipal waste could continue to grow at the rate experienced in recent years. 56 In doing so, it based forward projections on the assumption that arisings were growing at around 2% per annum. As suggested above, this seems higher than the last four years’ data would suggest. Hence, it may well be that with greater efforts targeting waste reduction, municipal waste growth could be reduced to zero by 2010. The aim of the NWP is to then reduce municipal waste (make the growth rate negative). The NWP estimates that by 2010, MSW arisings will be 3.5 million tonnes in 2010. Based on the previous three years, the figure could be expected to reach 3.6 million tonnes. With the move to zero growth, figures of 3.5 million tonnes, or perhaps less, would seem possible.

5.2.1 Recent Consultation In February 2006 the Scottish Executive issued a consultation document on preventing Household Waste in Scotland. Consultations were due to close at the end of April 2006. The consultation document and responses will inform the development of a waste prevention strategy for Scotland. The consultation identified five key types of policy tools that are available to tackle waste prevention: • Economic instruments e.g. taxes. Fiscal measures are a reserved matter for HM Treasury, although local taxation is a devolved matter. • Incentives e.g. deposit-refund schemes. • Legislation e.g. producer responsibility legislation, bans on certain hazardous materials and on certain materials going to landfill, direct and variable charging for the collection of household waste.

55 SEPA (1999) National Waste Strategy Scotland, http://www.sepa.org.uk/nws/guidance/nws/nws_1999.htm 56 Scottish Executive and SEPA (2003) National Waste Strategy Scotland: The National Waste Plan 2003, http://www.sepa.org.uk/nws/guidance/nwp.htm Waste Prevention Policy Case Studies 67 • Education and awareness raising , to change values/attitudes and then behaviour, e.g. 'resource efficient shopping', home composting, real nappies. • Voluntary agreements and partnerships such as supply chain and community partnerships, e.g. on product design and packaging, take back/reuse, and direct marketing It then looked at these policy tools in terms of the supply chain, focusing on the following elements: • Product designers and manufacturers • Retailers • Consumers • Communities • Local Authorities Key measures identified in the consultation include those listed in the following subsections:

Product designers and manufacturers • Working more closely with the Design Council, the Business Design Association and professional institutions to promote waste prevention in design • Developing product ‘waste profiles’ that could be used to set targets, benchmark, certify products, establish differential rates of taxation, and provide consumer information/labelling to inform purchasing decisions • Requiring longer product guarantees, and better availability of spare parts (This work would need to be undertaken at a UK level) • A levy on disposable products

Retailers • Guidelines on food promotions and their waste implications • Better information for consumers on how much of the retail price of a product relates to the packaging • Deposit refund and ‘reverse vending’ schemes • Pilot projects for Product Service Systems • Product labelling

Consumers • Environmental Loyalty cards • Plastic (and paper) bag levy/bans/information

Communities • Extending recycling credits to re-use and waste prevention

Local Authorities • Mandatory requirements restricting household residual waste bin sizes and collection frequencies • Introduction of variable charging on residual waste • Inclusion of waste prevention performance measures and incentives in waste contracts and service level agreements

Waste Prevention Policy Case Studies 68 5.3 Waste Prevention in Wales Table 9 shows the key waste statistics for Wales between 1998/99 and 2004/05. In Wales, household waste growth since 1998-99 has been 3.0%, and municipal waste 3.8%. Unlike Scotland, non-household municipal waste has been increasing over recent years. Indeed, the rate of increase has been much higher than household waste at 7.9%. According to statistics, the amount of non-household waste collected increased by 58% between 1998/99 and 2004/5. This merely underlines the point made previously concerning the need to distinguish between household and municipal waste, and the factors influencing them. The rate of growth in the non-household fraction has not shown any signs of slowing down in more recent years, with rates of growth since 2001/2 being 2.9% for household waste, 9.5% for non-household waste, and 4.1% for municipal waste. That having been said, the proportion of municipal waste which is non- household waste is still (at 17.8%) less than in Scotland (19.5%), though it is far higher than in England (12%) and Northern Ireland (12%).

Waste Prevention Policy Case Studies 69

Table 9: Key Waste Statistics for Wales 1998/99 – 2004/05 (Thousands of Tonnes) 1998/9 1999 / 2000/2000/1111 2001/2 2002/3 2003/4 2004/5 2000 Household waste: Household waste recycled/composted 69 84 90 126 179 252 286 Other household waste 1,261 1,326 1,315 1,330 1,309 1,271 1298 Total household waste 1,330 1,410 1,404 1,456 1,488 1,522 1,585 Non-household waste: Non-household waste recycled/composted 6 25 25 18 43 82 139 Other non- household waste 212 189 223 244 253 228 214 Total nonnon----householdhousehold waste 218 214 248 262 281 298 344 Municipal waste Municipal waste recycled/composted 75 109 115 144 222 334 425 Other municipal waste 1,473 1,515 1,537 1,573 1,562 1,499 1,512 Total municipal waste 1,547 1,624 1,652 1,718 1,784 1,833 1,937 HH Waste Growth 6.02% -0.43% 3.70% 2.20% 2.28% 4.14% Municipal Waste Growth 4.98% 1.72% 4.00% 3.84% 2.75% 5.67% Source: Statistical Directorate National Assembly for Wales 2005. Municipal Waste Management Survey 2004-05: Results of the Survey for Wales’ 5.4 Waste Prevention in Northern Ireland For Northern Ireland, key data are as shown in Table 10. These suggest a growth in household waste of around 1.07% per annum over the period shown, and of 1.69% for municipal waste. The figures, as presented, highlight an unpredictable amount of non-household waste over the period, with the figure for 1998/9 being particularly low and that for 1999/2000 being particularly high (almost as though the material was being stockpiled). The previous Northern Ireland waste management strategy set a ‘secondary target’ for reducing household waste arisings to 1998 levels by 2005. It may be that this has been interpreted in terms of a ‘per household’ figure as opposed to an absolute figure. Figure 21 shows that whilst some Districts are below the target level, for others, this is proving challenging.

Waste Prevention Policy Case Studies 70

Table 10: Key Household and Municipal Waste Data for Northern Ireland, 1998/9-2002/3 Key Indicator 1998/9 1999/ 2000/1 2001/2 2002/3 2003/4 2000 No. of Households 597,358 604,219 620,529 643,821 656,968 656,968 Household Waste (tpa) 867,503 868,771 878,560 902,454 897,655 915,002 Household Waste per 1.45 1.38 1.44 1.40 1.37 1.39 Household (tpa) Hhld Composting (tpa) 37367 46739 51554 63134 Hhld Recycling (tpa) 43067 60514 83923 Recovery Rate for Household 4.90% 6.40% 8.90% 9.95% 12.48% 16.07% Waste (%) Commercial & Industrial Waste 87,645 158,895 134,732 120,679 129,024 135,000 (tpa) Municipal Waste (tpa) 959,954 1,003,736 1,056,298 1,023,133 1,026,679 1,050,002 Municipal Waste per 1.61 1.66 1.70 1.59 1.56 1.60 Household (tpa) HH Waste Growth - 0.15% 1.13% 2.72% -0.53% 1.93% Municipal Waste Growth - 4.56% 5.24% -3.14% 0.35% 2.27%

Figure 21: Waste Arisings per Household in 2002, versus 2005 Targets

1.70

1.60

1.50

1.40

1.30

1.20 Waste ArisingsWaste per Household (tpa)

1.10

1.00 Ards All NI All Derry arc21 Down Larne Moyle Newry Antrim Belfast Omagh Lisburn Armagh SWaMP Strabane Coleraine Limavady Banbridge Craigavon Ballymena Cookstown NWRWMG Fermanagh Dungannon Ballymoney Magherafelt North Down North Castlereagh Carrickfergus Newtownabbey arc21 NWRWMG SWaMP

2002 2005 Target

5.4.1 Northern Ireland Waste Prevention Framework Northern Ireland published its Waste Prevention Framework in September 2005. The framework is based on the behaviour model designed for the UK Sustainable Development Strategy (refer Figure 22 below). The behaviour change model was used to identify range of proposed activities for Northern Ireland to focus on. These activities are presented in Table 11 below. Waste Prevention Policy Case Studies 71 Figure 22: Behaviour Change Model for Sustainable Development in the UK

Source: Environment & Heritage Service, Framework for Waste Prevention in N I September 2005 Table 11: Summary of Proposed Activities Under the Waste Prevention Framework

Source: Environment & Heritage Service, Framework for Waste Prevention in N I September 2005

5.4.2 Northern Ireland Waste Management Strategy Northern Ireland has recently released its waste management strategy to cover the period 2006 – 2020. The strategy covers six strands, the first of which is

Waste Prevention Policy Case Studies 72 Waste Prevention. The waste prevention strand builds on the framework and applies the model across the following areas: • Government leadership • Site waste management • Financial incentives • Business sector waste • Preventing waste in the home • Targets for waste prevention Key policy tools for household waste identified in the strategy include those listed below: • A commitment to bringing forward for public consultation detailed proposals to provide councils with the necessary powers to encourage householders to reduce waste through variable charging schemes for residual household waste, and to pilot test such schemes before wider introduction. • Encouraging the use of Environmental Product Labelling. This is a current initiative which is based on a voluntary approach initially. • Funding of £3 million for the Community Waste Innovation Fund to support waste prevention and other projects within communities. 5.5 Locally Implemented Policies Although, officially, it is not possible to charge householders directly for waste in the UK, it is well known that many authorities are interested in doing so, and that several would almost certainly experiment with the approach if the law were phrased differently. There is a sense that a degree of frustration is leading authorities to implement their own policies within the constraints of the existing law. For example, Barnet’s compulsory recycling policy reflects a desire to push households to do things which the Council wants them to do. In the absence of any possible financial incentive, compulsion might have appeared one of the only ways forward. The case below – that of Blaby – shows that variable charging of a sort is possible in England, even where many believe the law forbids it. The implications are that other authorities could well consider their room manoeuvre within the existing law so as to implement incentives for waste prevention.

5.5.1 Blaby District Council

Description Variable Charging schemes refer to where some or all of the cost of providing a waste collection service is charged directly to the user of the service on the basis of the degree to which they avail themselves of the service. Variable Charging type systems are common and well established worldwide, and when applied to residual waste, have been shown to have a positive effect in terms of reducing the amount of residual waste that is disposed of and increasing quantities of material recycled. 57 There are a number of variations on how this service is provided and these include weight-based schemes, pay per bag schemes, pay per pickup, and hybrid charging schemes.

57 Eunomia Research & Consulting, 2002. Waste Collection: To Charge or not to Charge? Report to IWM (EB) Waste Prevention Policy Case Studies 73 In the UK however direct variable charging for waste collection is specifically prohibited under section 45 of the EPA 1990. This restriction had, until relatively recently, prevented any UK Councils from introducing variable charging type schemes. Between October 2000 and October 2001, however Blaby, a small shire district in SW Leicestershire with some 91,000 residents 58 and 37,444 households introduced a hybrid variable charging scheme, which has demonstrated a degree of success, and perhaps equally importantly, done it legally. Although the government has signalled that the prohibition on variable charging may be removed in the future, the timetable for this is uncertain, and so if variable charging schemes are to be considered in the near future then it is Blaby’s example that must be looked to. Accordingly research here has focused on what Blaby has done and the lessons that might be learned from their experience.

Overview Under the Blaby variable charging scheme, all households are supplied with a 140 litre wheeled bin for the weekly collection of their residual waste, a 140 litre wheeled bin for fortnightly collection of paper and card, a separate ‘pre-sort’ box for fortnightly collection of plastic bottles and cans, and since the start of 2005, a separate ‘pre-sort’ container for fortnightly collection of glass bottles. No direct charge is made for any of these services. The variable charging element of the scheme is that residents are required to pay for any additional residual capacity. They are able to purchase wheeled bins for a flat one off fee, rent them on an annual basis, or purchase side waste sacks. Garden waste is not allowed in the refuse, and garden waste wheeled bins can also be rented, or garden waste sacks purchased. Table 12 outlines the options that are provided and the charges that were initially applied as well as current charges that have applied from 1 April 2005. Table 12: Charges for Additional Collection Capacity in Blaby Annual One Off Large Proposed Rental Payment* Households** Annual Rental Extra 140 L £12 £50 £0 £24 refuse 240 L refuse £12 £50 £0 £24 360 L refuse £18 £75 £6 £36 60 L Side waste n/a £1.20*** £1.20 £2.00 sack (pack of 3) 240 L Garden £19.20 n/a £19.20 £19.20 waste 60 L Garden n/a £1.50 £1.50 £1.50 waste sack (pack of 3) Notes: * The one-off payment option was discontinued from 1 April 2005. ** Large households are defined as more than 5 people *** User pays refuse sacks and garden waste sacks are supplied through local supermarkets at a cost of £83 per 210 which equates to approximately £0.40 per sack. These are on-sold to the public at approximately £0.50 per sack.

58 Source: Blaby DC Waste Prevention Policy Case Studies 74 Section 46 (3) allows the council to determine whether the receptacles are provided: a) free of charge to the householder; b) whether they will be provided on the basis of a single payment; c) whether they will be provided on the basis of a periodic payment; or d) whether the householder provides them. This means that, while a WCA cannot charge for the collection of refuse or recycling, they can charge for the container. Crucially in this context, the legislation does not provide any guidance or stipulation as to how any charge for the container should be set. This means that the charge levied for the container does not have to bear any relation to the actual cost of the container, and so the WCA can set the charge at a level that suits their purpose, whether this be for cost recovery purposes or in order to establish a disincentive, as Blaby set out to do.

Uptake

Bins Table 13 below shows the numbers and proportion of households provided with additional bin capacity under Blaby’s variable charging scheme. As can be seen from Table 13 above, the majority of households that are taking up the scheme are those that are defined as ‘large households’ with the bulk of these opting for a 240 L wheeled bin, an option that is available at no charge to the large households. Discounting the large households that have not paid anything for their additional residual waste capacity, only 1122 households – or 3.0% of Blaby households - have participated in the charging scheme by purchasing additional bin capacity. This suggests a positive result in that charging would appear to restrict the uptake of additional capacity. However, the counterfactual scenario – in which either no charge was applied, or in which no additional waste was allowed – cannot be known. Table 13: Uptake of User Pays Bins in Blaby Annual Rental Lifetime Large Total payment Households Number % Number % Number % Number % Extra 140 L 42 0.1% 8 0.0% 104 0.3% 154 0.4% 240 L 736 2.0% 136 0.4% 1652 4.4% 2524 6.7% 360 L 154 0.4% 46 0.1% 242 0.6% 442 1.2% Total 932 2.5% 190 0.5% 1998 5.3% 3120 8.3%

Side Waste Sacks Annual Sales of user-pays side waste sacks run at around 50,000 sacks. These sacks are sold in packs of 3 and so this equates to some 17,000 separate sales of sacks. As sacks are sold through supermarkets, no record is kept of the number of unique households that use the service. Because (at current charges) the cost of purchasing sacks is relatively high compared to the capacity provided by a wheeled bin (to provide a similar weekly capacity in sacks compared to a wheeled bin would be £52 per year as against £12 for the annual cost of an extra 140 litre wheeled bin) residents are unlikely to purchase side waste sacks on a regular basis. (It is possible that this charging differential might be counter- productive by encouraging those who have only a small amount of extra waste to opt for a larger bin). If for example, an average of 10 sacks are purchased each Waste Prevention Policy Case Studies 75 year by those households that purchase side waste sacks, then it could be assumed some 5,000 households, or approximately 13% of households are participating in the user pays scheme for side waste bags.

Arisings One of the principal reasons for introducing the variable waste charging scheme was to restrict the increase in arisings associated with the provision of wheeled bins for residual refuse. Prior to the introduction of the wheeled bins household waste arisings were in the order of 26,000 tonnes per annum. This jumped 11.5% to 29,000 tonnes following the introduction of wheeled bins, but has remained constant since. As can be seen from Figure 23 below, the quantities of household collected material have remained reasonably constant over time. In the period April 1999 to September 2000 an average of 2,331 tonnes of material was collected each month. This compares with an average of 2,401 tonnes collected each month in the period since the introduction of Variable Charging. It is notable from the chart that the amount of residual kerbside material has fallen over time as the amount of kerbside collected recyclable material has increased. This suggests that the Variable Charging scheme as introduced by Blaby has been effective in encouraging householders to divert material through the kerbside recycling systems. Figure 23: Household Collected Waste by Month

3000

2500

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Kerbside Recycling 1500

Tonnes Kerbside Residual First Phase Second Separate Rollout of Phase Glass 1000 Scheme Rollout of Collection Total Kerbside Completed Scheme Collected

500

9 0 1 1 1 2 3 3 4 4 4 0 0 03 0 0 -9 t-99 -00 -0 -0 t-02 r-03 l-0 -0 t-04 ul-99 n ul-00 ul- ul-02 c p ul- Apr J Oc Ja Apr-00 J Oct Jan-0 Apr J Oct-01 Jan-02 Apr- J O Jan- A Ju Oct- Jan-0 Apr J Oc

Table 14 below shows the BVPI rates for recycled, composted and household collected material since 2001/2. It is notable that the figures have remained fairly constant until the current year (which is still at this stage an estimate). The most significant figures are that the amount of composted material has increased five-fold over the previous year, and that the total amount of collected material has for the first time increased substantially. This is due to the roll out of the user pays wheeled bin garden waste collection service to the remainder of the borough resulting in some 4,500 additional households taking up the service. Table 14: BVPI Rates for Blaby

Waste Prevention Policy Case Studies 76 2001/2 2002/3 2003/4 2004/5 (est) BV82a (Recycled) 19.1 19.7 19.79 21.8 BV82b 1.56 1.9 1.63 8.3 (Composted) BV84 (Collected) 353.3kg 351kg 353.25kg 377kg

It should be noted that it has been impossible to understand whether or not the scheme’s influence on arisings has affected waste deposits at HWRCs. There are no sites in Blaby district itself and so material from Blaby is taken to others sites in the County. No attempt (understandably) is made to record the origins of the material taken to these sites. Therefore it is impossible to tell what, if any, material has been diverted from site (especially since Blaby is so tiny, any impact would probably be lost in the noise). Probably, the only impact on HWRC streams would come through the new green waste collection scheme.

Recycling The other key reason for introduction of the variable charging system was to provide an incentive for residents to increase the amount they recycle. This objective appears to have been achieved with the amount of material recycled rising from a reported 90kg per household prior to the introduction of the scheme to 140kg per household. As Figure 24 below shows, the introduction of kerbside recycling saw an additional 112 tonnes per month of material collected on average in Blaby. The introduction of the kerbside collections does not appear to have impacted the tonnages gathered through bring banks - which remained relatively steady. The amount of material increased steeply to an average of around 212 tonnes per month following the introduction of the restricted residual capacity together with the Variable Charging scheme in 2000 to the first 60% of households. Again there was little apparent impact on bring tonnages. The roll out of the second phase of the scheme in 2001 however saw a sharp increase in tonnages gathered to around the current average level of413 tonnes per month. This also corresponded with a fall in the tonnages of paper collected through bring banks from around 60 tonnes per month to approximately 35 tonnes per month. Glass bring tonnages however appear to have remained largely unaffected, although this may change when more recent data becomes available which shows the impact of the addition of glass collections through the kerbside scheme. Figure 24: Recycling from Kerbside and Bring Systems (tonnes)

Waste Prevention Policy Case Studies 77 600

500

Variable Charging Start 400 Glass Kerbside Recycling Recycling Paper Banks Start 300 Kerbside

Tonnes Separate Full Roll-out of Glass Variable Charging Collection

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6 7 8 8 9 9 0 1 2 3 4 -96 9 -96 -97 9 -97 -98 9 -9 -99 9 -9 -00 -01 -02 -03 0 -04 0 -04 g- c r g- c r g- c r g- c r r r r g- r g- e p e p e p e p u u Apr Au D A Au D A Au D A Au D A Aug-0 Dec-00 Ap Aug-0 Dec-01 Ap Aug-0 Dec-02 Ap A Dec-03 Ap A Dec

Participation is reported to have increased following the introduction of variable charging. Participation prior to the scheme starting was already high at 65-70%. However a study by MEL Research in 2004 found that it had increased since the scheme was introduced, to a current level of 80%. As the scheme is a fortnightly service it has a high set out rate of 72%. The introduction of the scheme also saw a jump in the number of requests for recycling containers. Figure 25 is based on a Waste Analysis conducted by MEL Research in 2004. 59 It shows that Blaby has been reasonably successful in capturing paper which shows an overall capture rate of around 60%, but less successful in capturing plastics and cans which show capture rates of around 20%. At the time of the analysis, glass was not being separately collected at kerbside. Figure 25: Recycling Capture Rate of Kerbside Collected Materials

59 MEL Research, March 2004, Leicestershire Kerbside Collected Household Waste and Recycling Study Waste Prevention Policy Case Studies 78 4.5

3.5

2.5 Recycled Residual

kg/hh/wk 2

1.5

0.5

c s n s E rd i le s tal tal e a b la e e HW EE c xtiles rde H d last G m a Fin W p Te ustible usti s G n b b u Kitchen r a o e Plastic film rr com com ap Dense n- Ferrous m -fe P c. o n s n o Mi N isc. M

Capture An interesting feature of the above analysis is the extremely low level of garden waste. 60 The analysis was conducted in March 2004. In March, green waste production is typically increasing from low winter levels. Therefore the low level of garden waste in residual waste might not be attributed to a low level of production, or to a seasonal low, but possibly reflects some success of the variable charging scheme in reducing the amount of garden waste that enters the waste collection system. An extension of the pre-pay wheeled bin service from 1,600 households to a total of 6,000 households since March 2004 has seen the amount of garden waste collected rise from 500 tonnes per year to an estimated 3,000 tonnes in the year ending 31 March 2005. Another interesting feature is the apparently low level of capture of dense plastics according to the analysis. Given the bulky nature of this material, one might have expected higher captures of plastics given that the scheme effectively restricts volume. One possible explanation for this may be that the fortnightly provision of the pre-sort bins is too low a volume to capture all the plastic and cans generated over a fortnightly period. This suggests there may be room for further scheme optimisation.

Resident Feedback Public satisfaction surveys conducted in 2000 and 2003 showed that levels of satisfaction with both the refuse and recycling services have increased since the introduction of variable charging. Table 15 below shows the results of these surveys. Table 15: Public Satisfaction Survey Results

60 Note that the waste analysis did not analyse garden waste collected in the pre-pay scheme. An estimated tonnage figure of 500tonnes per annum for the district as a whole was therefore added to the data in order to account for the collection of this material in the above analysis. Waste Prevention Policy Case Studies 79 Public Satisfaction 2000 2003 Refuse Service 84% 91% Recycling Service 76% 85.5%

Although the increase in satisfaction does not imply that variable charging is responsible for achieving the improved levels of satisfaction, it does clearly show that high levels of public satisfaction can be achieved for schemes of which variable charging forms a part.

Implementation Costs Implementation costs for the Variable Charging Scheme are estimated to be approximately £48,000. No breakdown of these costs was available.

Operating Costs and Revenue Operating costs of the scheme are reported to be negligible, and the additional workloads imposed by administering the scheme can be managed within existing council resources. This is largely due to the fact that billing for the Variable Charging bin rental service is only required for some 1,364 (3.64%) households. The administrative burden in respect of this task is further minimised through the use of a specially developed computer system that generates the bills automatically when rentals are requested, or when the annual fee is due. As the service requires payment in advance, this also avoids the need to chase bad debtors. Table 16: Income Generation 2003/4 Income Stream Amounts Annual Rentals £13,560 One-off Payments £10,420 Sales of Side Waste Sacks £20,000 Garden Waste Sacks & Bins £127,000 Total: £170,980

As can be seen from Table 16 above the majority of the income from the scheme is from the sale and rental of Garden Waste Sacks and bins. Income from the scheme overall offsets the costs of the service to the tune of £4.57 per household per annum. Set against this, one must recognise that the provision of a separate garden waste collection will have cost the authority more money. Hence, the revenue offset occurs against the backdrop of a collection system which may cost rather more.

Budgetary Implications The overall costs of introducing the scheme are likely to be small. Blaby’s waste collection system costs approximately £50 per household per annum. This is a reasonable figure given the nature of service provision (notably, including weekly refuse collection) and the relatively high levels of performance and satisfaction that the system is reported to have achieved. The economical performance of the system can be attributed to a number of factors including: • The fortnightly collection of recyclable materials;

Waste Prevention Policy Case Studies 80 • The collection of recyclables in separate streams (particularly fibres being collected in a wheeled bin) which enables efficient collection while avoiding the need for additional MRF sorting costs; • The variable charging scheme which has successfully reduced residual waste growth; and • The user pays garden waste scheme (together with the ban on garden waste in residual) has also helped to reduce residual waste growth.

Key Success Factors As a whole Blaby’s waste management system appears to work very effectively. Key factors in the design and implementation of the system include the following: • The system successfully restricts residual capacity for householders while providing what is perceived to be a reasonable level of service • The system was market tested prior to introduction and improvements made from the feedback received • The Council placed a strong emphasis on communicating the system to residents • The user pays billing systems are designed to minimise the administrative burden for Council. This is achieved by distribution of sacks through shops and supermarkets, and by billing for additional wheeled bins options in advance of service provision and ‘by exception’ – i.e. including in the billing system only those who have to pay – who at some 3.6% are only a small minority of households.

Issues The positive effect of the Blaby variable charging scheme in restricting the uptake of additional capacity may be offset somewhat by the fact that once a household has purchased a bin, the incentive actually begins to work the other way: i.e. once additional capacity has been paid for the incentive is for the household to make the most use of it and fill the bin up as much as possible. Therefore the scheme only works as an incentive on those residents who regularly produce slightly more than the 140 L of waste for which the Council provides capacity without charge. This type of householder will be encouraged to engage in recycling and waste minimisation (and most likely a bit of compaction!) in an attempt to reduce the volume they dispose of. Once the amount that a household produces gets above certain level of excess residual waste, which cannot be easily reduced, then the household will purchase additional capacity, and the incentive to recycle will no longer be applicable. In a number of variable charging schemes around the world, the choice of container size is thought to be an important issue in determining whether or not the scheme works sufficiently strongly on ‘marginal waste production’. It might have been interesting to offer a greater range of (smaller) bin sizes to residents. Another issue for Blaby, notably in respect of performance on the dry recyclables side, is whether or not considerably more might not have been achieved through the switch from fortnightly to weekly collections. The current performance – 140kg per household – is very good for a fortnightly collection of this nature, though not exceptional for schemes where there is a fortnightly residual waste collection in place. We suspect that in the absence of the variable charging scheme, the same capture of dry recyclables could have been achieved through moving the dry

Waste Prevention Policy Case Studies 81 recyclables collection to a weekly basis, but at a greater additional cost than was achieved through the charging scheme.

Implications for Waste Prevention Policy Although Blaby has effectively managed to find away around the current prohibition on variable charging it is perhaps equally notable that no other authorities have followed their lead. This may be partly because the results, while positive, are not in excess of what can be achieved through other methods that are more comfortably within the boundaries of the existing legislation. This may be (as has been discussed) due partly to the nature of the system design, which only acts on marginal waste production up to the point where a household decides they need an extra bin, at which point the incentive switches towards filling up the extra bin and getting the ‘maximum value for money’ out of the additional capacity that has been purchased. If a truer variable charging system had been put in place the impact may have been greater. The obvious way forward would be to not provide extra bins but to restrict additional waste to having to be put out in user pays side waste sacks. This would clearly focus the incentive on keeping residual waste below 140L per week, as each incremental 60 litres of waste has to be paid for. A further extension of the scheme could be to provide no container or fixed volume but to only collect user pays sacks. This may seem dangerously close to contravening the intent of the legislation, however it may be worth some further consideration. The ‘loophole’ in the legislation that Blaby’s scheme has utilised is that while it is illegal to charge for the collection of household waste, councils are expressly allowed to charge for the container. Blaby has demonstrated through their charging for side waste sacks, that the charge for the container can apply equally well to a sack as it can to a bin. A brief review of the relevant sections of the legislation may be pertinent: 46. —(1) Where a waste collection authority has a duty by virtue of section 45(1)(a) above to arrange for the collection of household waste from any premises, the authority may, by notice served on him, require the occupier to place the waste for collection in receptacles of a kind and number specified. (2) The kind and number of the receptacles required under subsection (1) above to be used shall be such only as are reasonable but, subject to that, separate receptacles or compartments of receptacles may be required to be used for waste which is to be recycled and waste which is not. (3) In making requirements under subsection (1) above the authority may, as respects the provision of the receptacles— (a) determine that they be provided by the authority free of charge; (b) propose that they be provided, if the occupier agrees, by the authority on payment by him of such a single payment or such periodical payments as he agrees with the authority; (c) require the occupier to provide them if he does not enter into an agreement under paragraph (b) above within a specified period; or (d) require the occupier to provide them. (4) In making requirements as respects receptacles under subsection (1) above, the authority may, by the notice under that subsection, make provision with respect to— (a) the size, construction and maintenance of the receptacles;

Waste Prevention Policy Case Studies 82 Of note is that the provision of receptacles “ shall be such only as are reasonable ” (46 (2)). This could be interpreted, as in Blaby, that a specific residual capacity should be provided free of direct charge. However section 46(3)b clearly states in respect of the receptacles provided that they can be charged to the householder, and so it would appear the test of ‘reasonableness’ applies not to the charge, but to the number and type of receptacles. Section 46(3)b however also gives the householder the choice in that they must agree to the payment, and if they do not agree then the householder can be required to supply them (section 46 (3) c). This would clearly provide a way by which the householder could decide to not purchase the official sacks and simply supply their own ones. The only comeback for the authority could be in respect of 46 (4) a – which enables the authority to specify the size and construction of the receptacles. In this instance (and depending on the specification), it may be that ordinary black sacks could be deemed to not meet the councils specification – and therefore that official ones (which do meet the specification) must be purchased. The net result of the above reading of the legislation is that it would (in theory) appear possible within the boundaries of the existing legislation to introduce a paid residual sack form of variable charging. Even with a with a clear intent on the part of central government to enable variable charging in the UK, there is likely to be a timeframe of several years before the mechanisms are in place for local authorities to implement variable charging schemes (given that it will require a change to primary legislation). In this context therefore the possibility of introducing a scheme within the current legislative framework may warrant further investigation. 5.6 Summary of UK Policy on Waste Prevention The UK has relatively few policies in place that directly affect waste prevention. Of those that are in place and could have an impact (such as the essential requirements regulations) implementation is almost deliberately weak. An important issue in the context of policy making in this area is the way in which responsibilities are assigned and discharged (see Section 6). In particular, the UK waste situation is now being shaped significantly by the different approaches of the devolved administrations. It is worthwhile noting that there appears to be a degree of enthusiasm for pursuing waste prevention policy initiatives in Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland, but that the ability of the devolved administrations to implement a number of the measures, such as variable charging, and product labelling is limited by the power that has been devolved to them. This is a key problem for the devolved administrations given that they have tended to show greater appetite and appreciation of the desirability of constraining growth in waste. ‘Whitehall’ continues to have a significant influence over not just the English waste strategy, but also, the strategies of the other administrations. In this context, the Review of the English waste strategy acquires considerable significance. The Consultation Draft stated: Waste prevention is integral to achieving the UK’s Sustainable Development goal and is a priority for action in its sustainable consumption and production (‘SCP’) agenda as set out in Securing the Future. It also noted that the proposed revision of the Waste Framework Directive has suggested that Member States should develop waste prevention programmes. Defra states:

Waste Prevention Policy Case Studies 83 We propose that the revised waste strategy will take the first steps towards our programme of waste prevention measures. In the discussion of the issue, it states: Tackling the causes of waste generation, to break the link between economic growth and environmental degradation, will require a focus on both the production and consumption phases of products and materials. The life-cycle approach helps to identify and prioritise these actions. On the production side, waste can be prevented through the processes of design, manufacture, use and disposal. On the consumption side, the aim is to achieve more sustainable consumer purchasing patterns, informed by environmental criteria. However, the extent to which this leads to revised policies is still not yet clear.

Waste Prevention Policy Case Studies 84 6 RESPONSIBILITY ANALYSIS 6.1 Introduction To understand how current and prospective waste prevention policies can best be implemented, it is important to gain a clear understanding of who holds what responsibilities in the different activity areas that have a potential bearing on waste prevention policy, and indeed, what these areas with potential for waste prevention policy are. This chapter provides suggestions of responsibility for the implementation of household waste prevention policy as it is defined in the scope of this report 61 . The aim is to map out the departments and bodies with responsibility for implementing waste prevention policy across all areas that hold potential for waste prevention. This includes providing a clear picture of who holds responsibility for implementing and regulating current policies, as well as providing an understanding of the responsibilities held by Government departments or other bodies which may be relevant to further waste prevention policies.

6.1.1 Current Waste Prevention Responsibility As with many complex environmental issues, there is currently no single body with specified responsibility for waste prevention in the UK. This may be partly down to the nature of waste prevention as a cross-sectoral issue and partly due to the relatively recent focus on cross cutting environmental issues in Government strategy. The current departmental government structure was not set up to deal with such concepts. However, the Waste Framework Directive dictates that waste prevention is what Member States should do first and foremost. As such is it imperative that responsibility for waste prevention is clarified and allocated within the UK Government. The waste prevention policies that exist already are implemented by a number of different Government departments and regulatory bodies, sometimes jointly, with little structure or clear approach as to who really holds responsibility for which areas of waste prevention. 62 And perhaps more importantly, the integration between departments with different policy roles is often confused or awkward. As a result, it can be difficult to develop policy that is practicable in the current UK regulatory structure. An example of this is the difficulty and confusion surrounding the implementation of the WEEE directive in the UK. See Table 17 for a summary of the Government departments and other bodies responsible for the current waste prevention policies.

61 See Section 3.0 for a definition of waste prevention 62 See Section 5 for a review of current UK waste policy Waste Prevention Policy Case Studies 85 Table 17: Current UK Waste Prevention Policy Responsibility [a1]

Waste prevention policy Introductory body 636363 Implementation body 646464 Enforcement authority Landfill Tax The disbanded Department of HM-Treasury HM Revenue and Customs Environment, Transport and Regions (DETR) Disposal tax Landfill Allowances Schemes European Commission (EC Defra landfill policy team Environment Agency for England and Wales (EA); Scottish Directive 99/31/EC) Environment Protection Agency (SEPA); Environment and Heritage Service (EHS-NI) Disposal cap Producer Responsibility Obligations European Commission (EC Defra Producer Responsibility Unit (in EA, SEPA, EHS-NI (Packaging Waste) Regulations Directive 94/62/EC) Waste Management Division) Packaging (Essential Requirements) European Commission (EC DTI Trading Standards departments in mainland Britain and Regulations Directive 94/62/EC) Department of Enterprise, Trade and Investment in Northern Ireland Waste Electrical and Electronic European Commission (EC DTI, Defra Waste Management Division EA, SEPA, EHS-NI Equipment (WEEE) Directive 2002/96/EC) for permitting treatment facilities, Devolved Administrations

End-of-Life Vehicles Regulations European Commission (EC DTI, Defra Waste Management Division EA, SEPA, EHS-NI Directive 00/53/EC) for permitting treatment facilities, Devolved Administrations Producer Producer Responsibility policies Courtauld Commitment Defra Secretary of State, WRAP N/A (Voluntary policy) WRAP Direct mail and promotions material Defra Producer Responsibility Defra Producer Responsibility Unit (in N/A (Voluntary policy) voluntary agreement Unit, Waste Management Waste Management Division) Division, DMA Voluntary Voluntary agreements

63 The body responsible for proposing the initial concept 64 The body responsible for installing the policy into UK law and the application of the policy in the UK

Waste Prevention Policy Case Studies 86 6.1.2 Areas of Potential for Waste Prevention As discussed above, to gain an understanding of who could hold responsibility for potential waste prevention policy implementation, it is first necessary to understand the areas that hold potential for waste prevention. This analysis draws from a larger piece of work that investigated the current or prospective activities for household waste prevention in the UK along the whole waste supply chain from raw material extraction to disposal 65 . In this broader activities assessment, key players from all stages of the waste supply chain were consulted on their knowledge of current or potential waste prevention activities. From this work, and utilising the Waste Prevention framework discussed in 4.2, it was possible to group the areas of current or potential waste prevention activities into areas of potential for waste prevention. See Table 18 below for this categorisation. Table 18: Areas of Potential for Waste Prevention 1. Increasing the cost of wastefulness in products Section 6.2 2. Producer responsibility Section 6.3 3. Sustainable procurement Section 6.4 4. Minimum product standards Section 6.5 5. Consumer market stimulation or repression Section 6.6 6. Education Section 6.7 7. Housing planning and design Section 6.8 8. Limiting or charging for household waste collection Section 6.9 9. Home and community composting Section 6.10 10. Waste prevention targets Section 6.11

6.1.3 Responsibility Analysis This responsibility analysis aims to suggest the Government departments and agencies or other bodies (independent task forces; non-governmental public or industrial bodies) that may be suitable to hold responsibility for introducing, implementing and regulating policies for waste prevention in each of these areas of potential listed in Table 18. These suggestions are proposed given the current structure of responsibility for similar waste policies, or other parallel policies such as energy efficiency. The suggestions also take input from consultations with key players from the waste supply chain including both national and local Government departments and regulatory agencies. This analysis is not suggesting that Government policy should be implemented in all of these areas that hold potential for waste prevention. Policy is not always the most suitable, effective or practical option. What this analysis aims to provide is a clearer picture of which bodies hold responsibility for implementing which areas of policy, if and when it is decided that such policies are appropriate. The areas of potential for waste prevention in Table 18 above are taken in turn throughout this section and the responsibility for each area discussed.

65 Pending Environment Council report: UK Waste Prevention Activities and Responsibility

Waste Prevention Policy Case Studies 87 6.2 Increasing the Cost of Wastefulness Taxes are likely to be the key policy mechanisms that can aim to increase the cost of wasteful products through the market mechanism. Her Majesty’s Treasury (HMT) is the Government department that holds responsibility for the tax system. In 1997 HMT released a Statement of Intent on environmental taxation that stated their responsibility to: “reform the tax system to increase incentives to reduce environmental damage”. “How and what governments tax sends clear signals about the economic activities they believe should be encouraged or discouraged, and the values they wish to entrench in society” 66 . In the recent Strategy Unit report 67 , the Government pledged their commitment to following the waste hierarchy more closely and to increase efforts for waste prevention. As such, waste prevention can be taken as a value that the Government wants to “entrench in society”, and thus a legitimate focus for the application of environmental taxes. Taxation with the aim of household waste prevention could work in different ways, possibly being applied to products or materials at different stages in the supply chain including: a) the raw material stage (encouraging more prudent use of product resources); b) the retail stage (taxing high waste products as if they were a luxury good); or c) the disposal stage (discouraging disposal).

6.2.1 Raw Material Taxes Taxing the raw materials that make up the products and goods that eventually end up in household bins would make them more expensive or less available. These materials could be considered more valuable, causing less to be thrown to waste. While an outcome of these taxes may be to increase the amount of recycled materials used, other effects pertaining to waste prevention may be seen. These include product and packaging light-weighting if raw materials rise in value, increased re-use of materials, or perhaps lower consumption (leading to less disposal) through the higher prices of product material being passed down to consumers. There are two environmental taxes already in place in the UK that apply to raw materials. The Aggregates Levy and the Climate Change Levy. The Aggregates Levy is a one stage specific tax charged at £1.60 per tonne of sand, gravel and rock subjected to commercial exploitation in the UK 68 . The Climate Change Levy is a charge on the industrial and commercial supply of taxable commodities that can produce greenhouse gases, leading to climate change including gas, coal, electricity and liquid petroleum gas 69 . Together these taxes provide a basis for responsibility of a potential raw material tax for waste prevention. The Aggregates Levy, though not concerned with waste prevention, provides a blueprint for how raw material taxes for waste prevention may be administered. The Climate Change Levy holds some parallels for a potential ‘waste

66 HM-Treasury (1997), Statement of Intent on environmental taxation 67 Prime Minister’s Strategy Unit (2002), Waste Not, Want Not 68 http://www.defra.gov.uk/environment/waste/aggregates/index.htm 69 http://www.hmrc.gov.uk/

Waste Prevention Policy Case Studies 88 prevention’ type levy on raw materials also in the way it taxes raw materials that lead to an environmental concern later in their lifecycle, rather than in the process of their extraction. Table 19: Responsibility for Raw Material Taxes

Policy introduction The Aggregates and Climate Change Levies were introduced by the since disbanded Department for Environment, Transport and Regions in agreement with the Treasury and the Chancellor. The responsibility for considering the environmental case for future raw material taxes would now likely fall to Defra Waste Strategy Division or Defra Environmental Quality Division in partnership with the Devolved Administrations as the body taking over from the DETR in this area.

Policy implementation The Treasury holds responsibility for the implementation of environmental taxes.

Policy regulation Environmental levies and taxes implemented by the Treasury are administered and enforced by HM Revenue and Customs, in common with other taxes and duties. Traders account for their levy themselves, but there is a range of penalties and interest for late payment, mis-declaration, non-compliance and evasion 69 .

6.2.2 Taxation on Disposable Products A tax on disposable products could create a step shift in attitude towards waste. Many products are still intended to be used just once and then disposed of. These include the usual suspects of disposable nappies, plastic carrier bags and one-way packaging on products with no option for return and re-use. However, there are also many other products which still market themselves on a single use basis such as certain products and equipment for domestic cleaning and eating utensils amongst others. If these types of products incurred a small tax they may no longer be perceived as the cheap and easy option (for example, householders may invest in reusable picnic equipment, or non-disposable razors). This may also stimulate the market for more durable and long lasting products, and also for returnable packaging schemes or technologies. Some products considered ‘luxury’ such as alcohol and tobacco have heavy duties places on them. If disposable products were categorised in a similar way then they could be subjected to similar duties.

Table 20: Responsibility for Taxation on Disposal Products

Waste Prevention Policy Case Studies 89 Policy introduction Taxes for one-way packaging, plastic bags or other disposable products is a topic that has been considered by the Defra Waste Strategy division and if such a tax were to be introduced this department would be the likely body to introduce it. The Devolved Administrations of Scotland and Northern Ireland are also currently consulting on this matter and would be the responsible bodies for introducing this tax on a regional level. In parallel, the DTI may hold responsibility for joint policy development as taxing a range of different disposable products would influence both trade and industry. The new DTI sustainable consumption and production department could play a role here.

Policy implementation Setting of excise and duties are the responsibility of HMT and applied by HM Revenue and Customs.

Policy regulation Customs and Revenue officials are responsible for the administration and regulation of product duties.

6.2.3 Disposal Taxes An end point tax on the disposal of waste into a landfill or incineration plant can promote the application of ‘polluter pays principle’, by increasing the price of disposal to better reflect its environmental costs. Used wisely, these increased taxes can be felt along the whole supply chain. The waste disposal authorities would be paying these taxes to dispose of waste. These could then be passed to the householders either through charging or through raised council tax levels. These disposal taxes could potentially also be passed on to producers through extended individual producer responsibility (see 6.3.2) or lifecycle assessment policies. There is already a disposal tax in the UK in the form of the Landfill Tax 70 . This tax aims to encourage waste producers to produce less waste, recover more value from waste, for example through recycling or composting, and to use more environmentally friendly methods of waste disposal. Additional disposal taxes such as an incineration tax would probably work with a similar framework for responsibility.

70 See section 5.1.3 for discussion of this policy

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Table 21: Responsibility for Disposal Taxes

Policy introduction The Landfill tax was introduced by the since disbanded Department for Environment, Transport and Regions in agreement with the Treasury and the Chancellor. The responsibility for considering the environmental case for future disposal taxes would now likely fall to Defra Waste Strategy Division or Defra Environmental Quality Division in partnership with the Devolved Administrations.

Policy implementation The Treasury holds responsibility for the implementation of these environmental taxes.

Policy regulation Environmental levies and taxes implemented by the Treasury are administered and enforced by HM Revenue and Customs, in common with other taxes and duties. Traders account for their levy themselves using the weighbridges at disposal sites, but there is a range of penalties and interest for late payment, mis-declaration, non- compliance and evasion.

6.3 Producer Responsibility This concept aims to pass responsibility for the management of product disposal back to the producing actors or organisations involved in production. Most forms of producer responsibility, as implied by the phrase, demand some form of financial input from producers, whether as individuals, or as part of dedicated compliance schemes. The magnitude of this input is likely to act as an incentive for product light- weighting or extended product life spans, or increased re-use of packaging, with industry offering more upgrade or repair services. Other forms of producer responsibility are more voluntary in nature. There are a number of producer responsibility policies currently in place in the UK. These are both legislative policies that have been transposed into UK law from the EC directives, and also voluntary measures, monitored by Government, that have been initiated by trade associations, manufacturers and retailers. See Table 17.

6.3.1 Legislative Policies There are a handful of producer responsibility policies either in place or in the process of being introduced. These include the Producer Responsibility Obligations (Packaging Waste) Regulations, Waste Electrical and Electronic Equipment (WEEE), Restriction of the use of certain Hazardous Substances in electrical and electronic equipment (RoHS), End-of-Life-Vehicles and Batteries.

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Table 22: Responsibility for Current Producer Responsibility Legislation

Policy introduction The current producer responsibility directives were identified in the European Union's Fifth Environment Action Programme71 . These Directives require compliance by the EU member states, including the UK. The EU introduced these policies for "priority waste streams" because of growing concern about their impact on the environment.

Policy implementation Producer Responsibility policy implementation is currently split between the DTI and Defra. The DTI, working in partnership with the Devolved Administrations, leads the EU negotiations on and the single market aspects of the policies. Defra Waste Strategy division holds responsibility for the setting of recycling and recovery targets.

Policy regulation The regional environmental agencies (EA, SEPA, EHS-NI) are responsible for inspecting and accrediting the producers and retailers to ensure compliance with the targets set by the producer responsibility targets.

Generally, the UK approach has been to seek to achieve the minimum targets set by the European Commission. Furthermore, there have been growing tensions between the LGA and central Government concerning the mechanisms used for transposing EU Directives into UK law. As far as household waste products are concerned, this centres around one key issue: to what extent should producers bear the costs of collection and re-use / recycling / treatment / disposal, and to what extent should these be borne by local government? Possibly because of the central role played by DTI in design and implementation of policy in this area, the tendency appears to have been to protect producers from the full costs of producer responsibility. This has two impacts: The financial incentive for producers to change behaviour is reduced; and Because local government financing of service provision is de-linked from what individual householders do, there is no direct impact on household behaviour either. Consequently, UK mechanisms for ‘producer responsibility’ tend to be compromised by the weakness of the incentive effects implied by their design.

6.3.2 Individual Producer Responsibility The current implementation system for producer responsibility policies provides little incentive for waste prevention, as there is no responsibility assigned for the actual cost of disposal. The recovery targets specified can be met with no waste prevention activities. Although re-use can be included as recovery, all the recovery targets can be met through energy from waste processes. There is only a weak motive for individual producers to minimise their own waste, as they pay for the management of their industry’s waste as a whole, and not just their own products. There is little incentive for light-weighting or increasing product life spans. Waste prevention therefore requires a more specific approach to producer responsibility with producers ‘owning’ their own waste. A system allowing producers to

71 Towards Sustainability, (1993) Official Journal of European Communities , No C 138/5

Waste Prevention Policy Case Studies 92 take responsibility for solely their own products, and encourage waste prevention as much as recycling and recovery would require bodies to take on further responsibility.

Table 23: Responsibility for Individual Producer Responsibility

Policy introduction Individual producer responsibility would also fall under the EU Directives that cover the current producer responsibility policies. The DTI is the body that presently negotiates producer responsibility with the EU, and as such would be the department best placed to change the transcription of the EU Directives into UK policy to allow for individual producer responsibility.

Policy implementation For more effective introduction of producer responsibility policy, one clear coordination department is needed. This is especially true of extended producer responsibility where producers can take responsibility for the disposal costs of their individual products. Due to their environmental focus, Defra may not be the best placed organisation to manage this policy area. Although the outcomes of these policies aim for environmental protection, their implementation is targeted at trade and industry. Therefore the DTI may be the best option as the co-ordinating body.

Policy regulation Chips or other tracking technology may be required to enable charging for individual producers’ products. A monitoring agency would need to collate this data, and then charge the producers accordingly. The regional environmental agencies would be in a strong position to do this as they are accustomed to collating and dealing with waste data, and already play a regulatory role in the current producer responsibility policies.

6.3.3 Voluntary Policies There are a number of voluntary producer responsibility policies set up in voluntary collaboration between the Government, specifically the producer responsibility team of the Defra Waste Management Division, and industry. Most of these are currently aimed at increasing recycling or the use of recycled materials. However, the Direct Marketing Association is working with Defra to reduce the amount of junk mail in circulation 72 , and there is scope for further work with the major retailers working with Defra and WRAP as part of the Courtauld commitment 73 . Other policy areas such as market stimulation or repression (see section 2.5) and education about waste prevention (see section 2.6) will drive further policies of this nature as organisations aim to raise their CSR profile.

Table 24: Responsibility for voluntary producer responsibility agreements

72 See section 5.1.10 for discussion of the Direct Mail voluntary agreement 73 See section 5.1.11 for a discussion of the Courtauld commitment

Waste Prevention Policy Case Studies 93 Policy introduction The Defra producer responsibility team, WRAP, or industrial associations can all be responsible for the introduction of these voluntary policies.

Policy implementation The implementation of the policies is also the responsibility of the Defra producer responsibility team, WRAP, or participating industrial confederations, trade associations or retail consortia. Policy regulation As these are voluntary policies, regulation does not apply. However, where monitoring and evaluation is needed, the Defra producer responsibility team, aided where necessary by waste data handlers or other relevant environment agencies, or standards agencies (e.g. EMAS ISO14001) can work with the industries to ensure the agreed prevention targets are being met.

6.4 Minimum Product Standards A policy that demands minimum standards for products in relation to waste prevention could require products to make the most efficient use of materials in terms of bulk, and/or to increase product lifespan through greater durability or a potential for repair as far as reasonably possible (phasing out the obsolescence incorporated into some of today’s products). This area of potential for waste prevention refers to standards that products are required to meet. This does not include market drivers that encourage the consumption of products with low waste values, as this is covered in section 6.5.

6.4.1 Product Weight and Volume Minimisation An effective way to prevent waste is by minimising the size and weight of the products that eventually end up in the waste stream. In line with requirements for other environmental standards for energy efficiency and hazardousness, standards for products could be incorporated that demand minimum resource use and disposal requirements within acceptable bounds of product application, safety and consumer acceptance. A policy to this effect already exists for packaging in the Packaging (Essential Requirements) Regulations. These regulations require any packaging used on goods to be minimised in terms of weight and volume - taking into account safety, hygiene and consumer acceptance. 74

74 http://www.netregs.gov.uk

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Table 25: Responsibility for Product Standards

Policy introduction The Essential Requirements legislation is derived from an EU producer responsibility directive, and was transcribed into UK law by the DTI. Due to this, and their remit of trade and industrial standards, the DTI may be best placed to take the lead on introducing further policy in this area.

Policy implementation The DTI is the implementing body for the Packaging Essential Requirements regulations. Similar requirements for minimum standards in relation to the energy efficiency of products are coming into place 75 , also the responsibility of the DTI. Therefore the DTI could be the department best placed for implementing further policies that set standards for product light weighting or minimisation.

Policy regulation The Trading Standards Departments within British local authorities, and the Department of Trade, Enterprise and Investment in Northern Ireland are the regulatory agencies for the Packaging Essential Requirements. However, the Trading Standards officers have a very wide remit, and are already over-stretched in their inspection loads 76 . If more products were considered for minimum standards, significantly more resources would need to be allocated to Trading Standards to allow for effective enforcement. A separate proposed ‘product body’ 77 might have further potential in this area as a monitoring and enforcement organisation.

6.4.2 Product Durability and Extended Life-spans Lengthening the life of products, either through product durability or by providing repair services at economically attractive prices, could also work to prevent waste by reducing the number of products that are replaced after short periods of time and thrown away. Policies for achieving this could take the form of mandatory guarantees on specified products, providing laws against designing products that are purposefully unable to be repaired, and legislating for mandatory repair services to be offered by producers. The responsibilities for policies in this area are similar to Table 25. There is however one extra factor worth considering for responsibility. As policies relating to increasing product lifespan can potentially affect economic growth rates or patterns due to slowing down the consumption of new material products, the Treasury, or even the Chancellor should be responsible for working in partnership with the DTI to ensure sensible policy approaches in this area.

75 The Energy Information and Energy Efficiency Regulations 2001, Statutory Instrument 2001 No. 3142 76 See section 5.1.9 for further discussion of the Packaging Essential Requirements 77 Green Alliance (2005), Potential for a ‘Product Body’ and for product EIA in the UK

Waste Prevention Policy Case Studies 95 6.5 Sustainable Procurement Government procurement policy can have a great influence on the development and supply of sustainable, in this case low waste products and services. The UK Government buys £13 billion worth of goods and services and spends £125 billion through the wider public sector each year 78 . This level of expenditure creates significant incentives for development of products and services that are specific to the requirements made by these policies. In the case of waste prevention, if Government procurement demanded products with durability, light weighting and free from excess packaging, this would be a significant ‘demand pull’ 79 to stimulate a market richer with low waste products. In addition, Government leadership is needed as a driver for behaviour change on a national level. Discord between Government behaviour and Government strategy on waste prevention is a huge disincentive for businesses being asked to decrease their waste production. A recent Government report goes so far as to say, “Only with government leadership can the consumption patterns of business and consumers be shifted onto a more sustainable path” 78 . In 2005 the Sustainable Procurement Task Force was set up, funded jointly by Defra and the Treasury. The Task Force's membership includes business - both major suppliers to government and representatives of best private sector practice, non- governmental organisations, trade unions, professional bodies, major public sector procurers and the Sustainable Development Commission. The aim of the Task Force was to make the UK Government amongst the leaders in the EU on sustainable procurement by 2009. This was an aim stated in the Government’s 2005 Sustainable Development Strategy. Their National Action Plan: ‘Procuring the Future', delivered its findings and recommendations on 12 June 2006. 75 ‘Procuring the Future’ refers specifically to waste prevention. Figure 26 specifies how their procurement hierarchy mirrors the waste hierarchy, prioritising the elimination of waste at source and consideration of real product need.

78 Sustainable Procurement Task Force (2006) Procuring the Future, Sustainable Procurement National Action plan Design Council (2005) A Scoping Report for the Sustainable Design Forum 79 Design Council (2005) A Scoping Report for the Sustainable Design Forum

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Figure 26: The Procurement Hierarchy Mirrors the Waste hierarchy in the National Action Plan for Sustainable Procurement

This National Action Plan sets out a number of recommendations of how best to achieve this sustainable procurement, including recommendations of responsibility. These are summarised below in Table 26.

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Table 26: Responsibility for Sustainable Procurement

Policy introduction There are EU Public Procurement Directives. The Sustainable Procurement Task Force was set up develop and introduce policy into this area, in response to recommendations from the Sustainable Development Commission. The Scottish Procurement Directive takes this role in Scotland.

Policy implementation The National Action Plan recommends implementation from Government departments and public organisations. • Government must include clear and measurable targets and set mandatory minimum product and service standards for sustainable procurement on the government estate. The Office of Government Commerce of the Treasury in partnership with Defra has already taken some action here. • Every public organisation must write their own public procurement strategy. To assist with this, the Treasury should produce a Green Book guide “which is easy to use and must enforce requirement for whole life costing. • All public sector organisations must define clear objectives and targets and put monitoring/reporting mechanisms in place. • Public sector organisations must work with business to identify and set future minimum requirements and so encourage investment in R&D by suppliers. They must ensure their national and regional contracts do not offer any products / services that fall below these minimum standards The Scottish Procurement Directive holds responsibility in Scotland.

Policy regulation The Sustainable Procurement Task Force felt that enforcement and scrutiny of the procurement process was of high importance. The report recommends that bodies such as the Public Accounts Committee and the National Audit Office “link sustainable procurement objectives and targets to the scrutiny process”. The Sustainable Development Commission keeps track of the procurement process in its watchdog role, and the Audit Commission and Healthcare Commission should act as “chief assessors of sustainable procurement of central and local government and the health sector respectively”. Public sector audit organisations must make clear that they are auditing for long-term value for money and thus for sustainability. Managers must be held to account for failure to meet minimum standards. To enable this, the public sector should “report on its performance on a regular basis” Audit Scotland is responsible for auditing LA accounts in Scotland.

Waste Prevention Policy Case Studies 98 6.6 Consumer Market Stimulation or Suppression A major factor in the volumes of waste produced is the consumer market. Most purchased products have a lifespan and will eventually no longer be required or wanted. Therefore, the amount and type of products consumed by householders directly links with waste arisings. The consumer market can be manipulated to aid waste prevention in two ways, either by stimulating the consumption of less wasteful products such as product service systems, or by repressing the consumption of wasteful products, or even repressing excessive over-consumption of material products in general. The control of consumer markets in this way can lead to a positive feedback cycle; when consumer purchase patterns change, markets will follow and lead to changing consumption patterns further. This policy area does not include the many behaviour change initiatives that occur on national and local levels. This is not because these initiatives are ineffective, but because this research is looking specifically at responsibility for polices which ‘change the rules’, rather than all potential waste prevention activities.

6.6.1 Advertising Advertising could be regulated for wasteful products in the way it is restricted for unhealthy products such as cigarettes, or anti-social products such as weapons. Such regulations could probably only be applied to excessively wasteful products, but could deter both consumers and manufacturers from concepts such as use-once-and- dispose. Table 27: Responsibility for Policy in respect of Advertising

Policy introduction Advertising regulations tend to be introduced by the Government department relevant to the complaint. The Defra Environment, Business and Consumer division has worked on product labelling policies, and so with the Defra Waste Strategy division could be well placed to introduce an advertising policy for waste. The DTI is also responsible for advertising policy on products.

Policy implementation The Advertising Association is the policy making body of the industry. They would apply a policy that had come from the Government and incorporate this into their advertising codes of conduct.

Policy regulation The current system of responsibility for advertising standards lies in a self-regulatory and co-regulatory system between the advertising industry and Government. The Office of Fair Trading (OFT), with Trading Standards officials, are the enforcement bodies for legal advertising regulations. However, as criminal prosecutions are expensive and time-consuming, TS officers will often hand over advertising non-compliance to the Advertising Standards Authority (ASA). The ASA is the body that investigates and regulates the advertising industry codes of conduct. Broadcasters or licensers then adhere to these codes for the advertising included in their publications or broadcasts. It is only when they break these codes consistently that they are referred back to the OFT for legal prosecution.

Waste Prevention Policy Case Studies 99 6.6.2 Product Labelling Labelling products with a resource efficiency rating, in a similar way to the energy efficiency ratings currently applicable to white goods, can be an effective mechanism for changing consumption patterns. 80 Labelling can stimulate the market to product more efficient products. A high efficiency rating can give products a leading edge over market competitors. This has been demonstrated clearly in a recent study by the Market Transformation Programme on the retail of energy efficient fridge/freezers 81 . Table 28: Responsibility for Policies in Respect of Product Labelling

Policy introduction The product labelling regulations on energy efficiency that currently exist are largely as a result of a series of European directives requiring energy labels for specific domestic appliance types 82 . Further policies concerning the wastefulness of products could also potentially come from the EU, but could also be introduced as part of Defra’s Waste Strategy. The DTI is also responsible for product claims/labelling policy.

Policy implementation Defra is the body responsible for transposing this to UK law, specifically their Environment, Business and Consumer division. The DTI is also responsible for product claims/labelling policy. In addition, product labelling is in the remit of the Government initiative the Market Transformation Programme (MTP). This programme is jointly funded by Defra and the DTI, and was set up to bring forward products, systems and services that do less harm to the environment, using less resources. The MTP has also recently expanded its outlook to include waste in its remit, providing a body for the development of any waste or resource efficiency (rather than just energy efficiency) labelling.

Policy regulation The enforcement authorities for product labelling are Trading Standards officers, or the Department of Enterprise, Trade and Investment in Northern Ireland.

6.6.3 Product Information Services Services providing information about the environmental impact and credentials of products may lead to greater awareness of products that are more or less wasteful, and lead consumers to purchase less wasteful products. In the same way as product labelling, this may also stimulate markets to produce less wasteful products if they felt this would be a selling point. The information services could then also be aimed at producers keen to produce sustainable products. The establishment of the proposed Environment Direct consumer help-line service83 may fill this role. The info-line service may encourage the purchase of less wasteful goods, and also help stimulate smart shopping where consumers buy only to their needs, learn to plan food shopping, and are less likely to over consume.

80 http://www.mtprog.com 81 Market Transformation Programme (2005) Sustainable Products 2005: Policy Analysis and Projections 82 Directive 92/75/EEC 83 ERM (2005) Scoping of an Environmental Direct Service

Waste Prevention Policy Case Studies 100 Table 29: Responsibility for a Product Information Service

Policy introduction The Defra Environment, Business and Consumer division commissioned concept research and a scoping paper for the Environment Direct service. This body may be best placed to bring forward further policy in this area.

Policy implementation According to the scoping paper on Environment Direct 83 , these services should “not be seen as a creature of Government”. It should be close enough to Government to inform policy and make recommendations for areas for future research. A fairly arms-length set-up, similar to the Carbon Trust might be appropriate, independent of both business and Government, but with a board consisting of members from both sectors. Perhaps the local authorities that implement the similar Consumer Direct service introduced by the DTI 84 would be appropriate actors for the implementation of this service.

Policy regulation The Environment Direct scoping report recommends that an Independent Assurance Board should make decisions on what information to include within Environment Direct and how to present it. Board members should be representative of Environment Direct’s main stakeholders 83 .

6.6.4 Retail Marketing Techniques The way in which products are sold or marketed within stores can affect the consumption patterns of consumers and the levels of potential packaging or produce wastage. Policies that could be developed in this area include ideas such as making it mandatory for the large retailers to provide low waste, non-packaged produce for major product lines in the way of self-service scoop bins or delicatessen/butcher type layouts. These not only create less packaging waste, but consumers are able to buy only the amount of produce they want, and help prevent excess food waste.

84 http://www.consumerdirect.gov.uk/

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Table 30: Responsibility for Waste Prevention in Retail Marketing

Policy introduction Policies introduced in this area would probably be developed in voluntary collaboration with the major retailers. A possible platform for this would be the Courtauld commitment 73 (or future similar commitments), which is a Defra supported agreement between WRAP, the British Retail Consortium and with the 13 top grocery retailers.

Policy implementation The WRAP waste minimisation programme could be responsible for the policy application of such voluntary retail agreements. However, if these policies became legislative, the DTI may need to be involved in the trading standards aspect of this policy area.

Policy regulation If legislative retail standards were put in place, then Trading Standards officers would be the bodies most suited to enforcing these regulations.

6.6.5 Sustainable procurement Leading by example through sustainable public procurement can stimulate more sustainable and less wasteful choices from household consumers. This is covered in section 6.5 above. 6.7 Education Behaviour change is an important component of waste prevention. Education is accordingly necessary for supporting this change in behaviour. Policy for education on waste prevention can be applied at three separate levels: School curriculum, public information availability, and training for public sector employees.

6.7.1 School Curriculum Although some aspects of production cycles and resource efficiency are covered by various subjects, including Geography and Citizenship, there is currently no clear requirement for a solid education in concepts of sustainability, including waste prevention, and sustainable lifestyle choices 85 .

85 In Scotland there is the Eco schools program, which is currently writing a section on waste prevention. 80% of Scottish schools have signed up to Eco Schools.

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Table 31: Responsibility for School Curriculum

Policy introduction Department for Education and Skills (DfES) is working with Forum for the Future to ensure sustainability is promoted across the spectrum of post-school sector bodies and together they have established a Sustainability Integration Group. This body is currently responsible for developing policy for sustainability education.

Policy implementation DfES in England and the Education departments of the Devolved Administrations are ultimately responsible for what must be taught in schools via the national curriculum. A new government-commissioned report calls for a major new partnership between DfES and Defra to be established to better manage education for sustainable development policy86 . If Defra and DfES can establish a more coherent framework, it could help to clear up confusion around how multiple initiatives like healthy schools, citizenship and international education strategies, contribute to education for sustainable development 87 . Another area of potential policy collaboration would be between DfES and the Sustainable Procurement Task Force. These bodies are already working together on the ‘Sustainable Schools’ programme 88 concerned with making school buildings more environmentally efficient. School education could be improved if the pupils were able to participate in the practicalities of improving sustainability within their own schools, and promote practical experience of waste prevention more effectively than with classroom sessions alone.

Policy regulation The Office of Standards in Education (OFSTED) is responsible for monitoring the teaching in schools. This would include any mandatory resource efficiency or waste prevention topics. Her Majesty’s Inspectorate of Education takes on this role in Scotland.

6.7.2 Public Education It is worth noting that while education can help to raise public awareness, but it is only the first step. There is a large gap between raising awareness and actually changing peoples’ behaviour. Effective public education campaigns need to clearly communicate how people can change their behaviour, and the infrastructure must be in place to support them in this. Potential policies to provide education to the public could include requirements for local authorities to provide widespread and effective public awareness campaigns. These could include door knocking or leafleting. Another option would be to include waste prevention training in the social service work, in the same way that health information and education is offered to the public. However, consideration should be

86 IHPC (2005), Review of Funding for Sustainable Development 87 http://www.forumforthefuture.org.uk/education 88 http://www.breeam.org/

Waste Prevention Policy Case Studies 103 given to the fact that any effective policies for widespread public education would be very resource heavy and expensive. The establishment of the Environment Direct consumer help-line service 83 may also provide public education. See section 6.6.3 for details of responsibility for this service.[a2] Table 32: Responsibility for Public Education

Policy introduction Policy for public education about waste prevention falls in the remit of the Defra Waste Strategy division, and the Scottish Executive in Scotland.

Policy implementation Potential policies to educate householders to prevent their waste may be most effective working at local or regional levels with the waste prevention officers (or the workers with the nearest role to this) of individual local authorities. The local authorities may be best placed to write their own strategies given the diversity of constituencies around the country

Policy regulation The Department for Communities and Local Government with their remit of coordinating best practice and a commitment to sustainability 89 could be an organisation with responsibility for administering this regulation.

6.7.3 Work-based Training 1 worker in 5 of the UK work force is employed in public sector jobs. 90 If this proportion of the public was educated in the need for waste prevention procurement, and the practical solutions that householders can affect themselves in purchasing sustainable products, then significant inroads could be made to public education. This is especially true if taking into account potential further dissemination via family and friend networks.

89 http://www.communities.gov.uk/ 90 ONS

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Table 33: Responsibility for Work-based Training in Public Employment

Policy introduction The Sustainable Procurement Task Force include recommendations their National Action Plan for sustainability procurement training for employees in all public bodies 78 .

Policy implementation The National Action Plan recommends the following: The Government must create a sustainable procurement delivery team, perhaps an extension of the current Task Force, to support research, practical advice and training to procurers both centrally and in regions. All public sector organisations must establish effective Management Information Systems to support the delivery of staff training on sustainable spending decisions.

Policy regulation The public procurement scrutiny bodies such as the Audit Commission and the National Audit Office could report on gaps in the delivery team’s approach to link sustainability with personal performance objectives.

6.8 Housing Planning and Design When houses are planned, consideration is given to the behaviour and needs of the occupants in relation to how and where they will dispose of their waste. If these considerations were subjected to waste prevention policies, the behaviour of the occupants may follow suit. This is applicable on two levels: Planning of housing waste in relation to the local waste collection systems, and planning of the layout and installations in individual housing design.

6.8.1 Waste Collection Planning When housing is planned, consideration is given to waste collection systems, and how much waste will be produced per house. This is currently calculated with predictions of a 3% rise in household waste arisings per annum 91 . If the policy for this planning was changed to fix a limit to how much waste will be collected from an area of planned housing, then the occupants of these houses could be restricted in their waste arisings. A similar policy that is currently in place is restrictions on car ownership in city housing. In some areas, due to lack of parking, houses are planned with less than one car per unit. Occupants have been willing to cooperate with these restrictions.

91 http://www.communities.gov.uk/

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Table 34: Responsibility for Waste Prevention Planning Policy

Policy introduction The body with responsibility for waste planning for housing policy is the waste planning department of the DCLG, and they could have ultimate control over setting a policy that required minimising waste allowances per household. The Scottish Executive holds responsibility in Scotland.

Policy implementation As regional variations in waste collection allowances already apply, it is likely to fall to local planning authorities to apply the minimum reasonable waste allowances for each area.

Policy regulation As set out in the current Planning Policy Statement 10 (PPS10) for sustainable waste management, Regional Technical Advisory Bodies (RTABs) should be set up to consider national policy expectations and requirements 92 . PPS10 recommends that to undertake this role effectively an RTAB will need to be broadly-based, drawing from those with a direct interest in and knowledge of sustainable waste management including: – the Regional Assembly and its Regional Development Agency; – the Environment Agency; – waste planning authorities; – waste collection and disposal authorities; – Government Office; – industry and commerce; – the waste management industry; – key Non-Government Organisations.

6.8.2 Housing Design Sustainable waste management within households is important for minimising the amount of household waste sent to landfill. An option for sustainable household waste management that provides waste prevention is home composting. If it became mandatory for new houses to be designed with an easy home composting system (e.g. a chute from the kitchen to an external compost bin attached to the outside of the house) composting rates could be dramatically improved. A similar policy in place is the current requirement for all new houses to be built with a shower to aid in water and energy efficiency. 93

92 Planning Policy 10, Planning for Sustainable Waste Management, ODPM [ now DLGC ], July 2005 93 The Building Regulations 2000 (SI 2000/2531)

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Table 35: Responsibility for Housing Design

Policy introduction Following the Better Buildings Summit in October 2003, the Government set up the Sustainable Buildings Task Force to identify ways in which Government and industry could improve the quality and sustainability of new and refurbished buildings94 . The main recommendation of this task force was to set up a code for sustainable buildings. The Scottish Executive holds responsibility in Scotland.

Policy implementation Responsibility for housing design requirements is the remit of the DCLG. Indeed, the housing design department in the then ODPM [now DLGC ] recently released a consultation document for a code for sustainable homes (as suggested by the Sustainable Buildings Task Code) including suggestions for household sustainable waste management systems 95 . However, this proposed code would be voluntary and not a mandatory policy. The Select Committee on Environmental Audit released a report in January 2005 stating that: “the ODPM [ now DLGC ] must make clear that the requirements of the Code are precursors to more stringent Building Regulations. It would also help the building industry if the Department set out a clear timeframe for the standards in the Code to be met or to be translated into the Regulations. This is the only way a voluntary Code will have any significant impact on house builders” 96 The Scottish Executive holds responsibility in Scotland.

Policy regulation Each local authority in Britain, through its Building Control section, has a general duty to see that building work complies with Building Regulations. It is also the role of the local authority, as the enforcing body, to carry out prosecutions for non-compliance. Local authorities check plans before granting planning permission, to ensure they comply with Building Regulations, and any contraventions are notified to builders or developers with the aim of rectifying the problem on site 96

6.9 Limiting, or Charging for, Household Waste Collection Several countries in Europe 97 and other parts of the world have systems of waste charging, or collection limitations in terms of rubbish bin size or the interval between collections. This is the most direct way to compel householders to reduce their waste. The current infrastructure system for waste collection in the UK makes the implementation of this process more complicated than in other countries. There are options for responsibility to be taken at a number of different levels. The Defra waste

94 DEFRA Press Release, 12 November 2003 'Sustainable Buildings Task Group line-up revealed' 95 ODPM [ now DLGC ] (2005) Proposals for Introducing a Code for Sustainable Homes 96 Environmental Audit, January 2005 First report 97 See Sections 7, 8 and 9.

Waste Prevention Policy Case Studies 107 strategy division has responsibility for overall policy decisions about limiting or charging for waste, but the level at which waste collection will be charged or limited is at a local authority level. Therefore waste authorities can use their initiative and can develop their own policies 98 . Moreover, due to the local level of implementation, the Devolved Administrations in Northern Ireland, Scotland and Wales also have the ability to change their waste strategy relating to this policy area. In addition, the differences between two-tier and unitary waste authorities also provide variations in responsible parties and potential implementation systems. However, for the purpose of this analysis, responsibility will be discussed only for potential standardised national policies rather than regional allowances. Consideration may also have to be given to limiting or charging for the collection of recyclables for true waste prevention. If there is no limit to the amount of waste that can be disposed of by consumers, on the condition that it will be recycled, there may not be a significant preventative effect. However, in accordance with the waste hierarchy, recycling could be collected more regularly than residual waste.

6.9.1 Limiting Waste Collection Table 36: Responsibility for Limiting Household Waste Collection

Policy introduction The Waste Strategy division of Defra, in collaboration with the waste strategy departments of the Devolved Administrations is responsible for developing national policy for changes in waste collection arrangements.

Policy implementation The local waste collection authorities would be responsible for implementing a policy most suited to their locale. Local systems would have to take into account regional factors. In order to nationalise this policy among local authorities, a best practice system for all waste authorities could be put in place. This could be facilitated by the ODPM Department for Communities and Local Government (DCLG). The ODPM may have further responsibility for changing planning systems for waste collection in communal waste disposal areas to allow individual household charging. Policies limiting waste collection would have to be backed up by composting availability, and fly-tipping regulations and enforcement. This would also be the responsibility of the local waste authority, in collaboration with the environmental agencies (EA, SEPA, EHS-NI).

Policy regulation The National Audit Office in coordination with the DCLG could together ensure best practice for waste collection limiting via the regular public body audits of NAO and the Best Value Performance Indicators collated by the DCLG.

98 See section 5.5.1

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6.9.2 Charging for Waste Collection Table 37: Responsibility for Charging Householders for Waste Collection

Policy implementation Responsibility for charging for waste collection is similar the responsibilities in Table 6.8.1. Direct waste charging requires further considerations if a national policy were to be implemented. Firstly, the way council tax is charged for waste collection in the UK. Changes may have to be made to this to justify extra collection charges. If the charge was a national level policy, with extra commission being made, the treasury may need to be involved with the finance departments of local authorities to decide how this extra revenue for charging would be spent. Secondly, Integration would be needed between waste disposal and waste collection in two-tier authorities. It would make sense for the collection authorities to charge for the waste collected, but as the disposal authorities would be paying the landfill tax and charges, it would also be important for the disposal authorities to receive some of the revenue.

Policy regulation As Table 36.

6.10 Home and Community Composting Composting is an important part of waste prevention for a number of reasons. Food waste and green waste makes up over 40% of the residual waste stream 99 . It is an area that is perceived to be natural and so inert as a waste stream by much of the general public, when in fact it is the opposite, causing a significant amount of greenhouse gas emissions upon its anaerobic respiration in landfill. It is also a waste stream that will be difficult to minimise effectively with other non-composting initiatives. There are three opportunities for policy in this area: Initiating best practice composting regimes for local authorities, extending the LATS scheme to take into account of home composting and adapting the waste management licensing regulations to allow for easier community composting.

6.10.1 Best Practice for Local Authorities Given the current housing infrastructure of this country, it is not feasible to make a policy enforcing home composting. However, policies can be put in place to provide best practise for local authorities, for example by employing a composting coordinator for every collection authority.

99 Parfitt, J. (2002), Analysis of household waste composition and factors driving waste increases, WRAP.

Waste Prevention Policy Case Studies 109 Policy for encouraging community composting could also be placed in best practice guidance for local authorities, indicating mandatory community composting arrangements where possible. Table 38: Responsibility for Local Authority Best Practice for Composting

Policy introduction A targeted national waste management best practice policy would be the responsibility of Defra Waste Strategy division and the devolved administration waste strategy departments.

Policy implementation Individual local authorities could hold responsibility for setting home composting targets, and allocating waste management budget towards this area of potential. Local authorities are also responsible for keeping records and making returns on information their waste tonnage collection and disposal. As referred to in section 6.8.2, housing design could play a role in encouraging home composting. As discussed above, the housing design department of the DCLG holds responsibility for this implementation. The Scottish Executive holds responsibility in Scotland.

Policy regulation The National Audit Office could enforce best practice in local authorities for prioritising home composting including the recruitment of a composting officer in coordination with the Department for Communities and Local Government. Audit Scotland is responsible for auditing LA accounts in Scotland.

6.10.2 Inclusion of Home Composting in Landfill Allowances Schemes The LATS policy already in place requires disposal authorities to limit the amount of hazardous wastes, which includes biodegradables, which enter the waste stream 100 . However, it does not specify composting as a way to achieve this, and as yet does not count home composting within reduction targets. As local authorities must meet these targets or be fined, if home composting was creditable in this scheme then the authorities would dedicate further budget and effort to pushing home composting in their region. Accurate monitoring of home composting to provide an average reduction in biodegradable material per composting household would be needed to implement this effectively.

100 http://www.defra.gov.uk/Environment/waste/localauth/lats/index.htm

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Table 39: Responsibility for LA(T)S

Policy introduction The Defra waste management division are responsible for LATS and so would be best placed to introduce additional factors such as home composting.

Policy implementation The inclusion of home composting in the LATS scheme would be the responsibility of Defra, as the LATS operating body. To assist in the implementation of this policy, WRAP has been researching average collection rates of home composters 101 and could hold responsibility for future monitoring on redirected waste tonnage by home composting. Alternatively, WRAP could be responsible for training waste authorities to monitor the waste reduction rates from home composting within their own regions. The Scottish Executive holds responsibility in Scotland.

Policy regulation The environment agencies (EA, SEPA, EHS-NI) are responsible for the monitoring and regulation of LATS.

6.10.3 Waste Management Licensing for (Community) Composting Other policies that may affect community-composting rates are health and safety policies such as waste licensing and the animal-by-product regulations. The Community Composting Network feels these regulations are restrictive and too ridged in their requirements and that health and safety standards could be securely met with more flexible approaches to waste handling methods, on a smaller scale. 102 If policy was made more flexible on these licensing guidelines then a potential increase in composting could be seen. Table 40: Responsibility for Composting Licensing

Policy introduction The parties responsible for composting safety policies are the Defra divisions of Licensing and enforcement for waste licensing, and the Animal health and Welfare for the animal-by-products regulations. The Scottish Executive holds responsibility in Scotland.

Policy implementation Integrating community composting into local authorities’ waste management strategies would require local waste planning and waste disposal authorities to work together.

Policy regulation The enforcement agencies for the safety regulations are the regional environmental agencies, (EA, SEPA, EHS-NI). If these health and safety regulations were made more flexible, more extensive monitoring would be necessary, and these agencies would be responsible for providing this resource.. A suggestion in Scotland is to develop a Community composting Code of Good Practice, which will cover legal requirements. This will shift burden of responsibility to one of self-regulation by the community sector. The Agencies still can intervene if required.

101 http://www.wrap.org.uk/ 102 Personal communication the Community Composting Network, March 2006.

Waste Prevention Policy Case Studies 111 6.11 Waste Prevention Targets There are currently no waste prevention targets in the national waste strategies. In the recent review of England’s Waste Strategy, Defra stated, “The Government does not consider that there is sufficient information on which to base a single prevention target for all waste or for single major categories of waste”. However, the Devolved Administrations of Scotland and Northern Ireland are looking into prevention targets more closely in their consultation documents. Table 41: Responsibility for Waste Prevention Targets

Policy introduction The Defra Waste Strategy division and the Devolved Administration waste strategy bodies hold responsibility for target setting.

Policy implementation For waste prevention targets to be implemented, sufficient information is needed on which to base these targets. An organisation needs to hold responsibility for collating and researching data on this issue. The waste data section of the environment agencies would be best placed to fill this role. Instead of tonnage targets of waste prevented, which is notoriously hard to assess due to the difficulties in measuring a negative, it is possible to aim for reduction targets of waste per head. As part of their local government performance monitoring the ODPM currently collates Best Value Performance Indicator 84 (BV84) that provides information on KG of household waste collected per head. This information could be used to develop waste minimisation targets by aiming to reduce the amount of KG per head. It would be the responsibility of the local waste disposal authorities to monitor this information, and the responsibility of the DCLG to collate this information. The Scottish Executive holds responsibility in Scotland.

Policy regulation The National Audit Office, working in collaboration with the DCLG could monitor the waste arisings from the local authorities and enforce penalties when the minimisation targets were not met. Audit Scotland is responsible for auditing LA accounts in Scotland.

6.12 Conclusion As stated in the introduction, this chapter is not intending to suggest that policy should be put in place in all the above areas. Section 11 gives some consideration as to policies which should be considered further in respect of preventing waste from arising. However, when considering a policy as a tool to tackle waste prevention, it is important to have an understanding of which bodies are responsible for its implementation. In summary, there is a responsibility infrastructure in place for implementing waste prevention policies across all the areas of waste prevention discussed in this section. Waste prevention policy is not lacking in terms of potential implementing bodies, but instead, it appears that responsibility for waste prevention is currently not formalised, or rather, not prioritised.

Waste Prevention Policy Case Studies 112 When analysing responsibilities, it is important to consider that even in areas where responsibility is already assigned and being acted upon, this does not guarantee its successful implementation. Although waste prevention is a crosscutting issue, not all departments or bodies who hold responsibility for its implementation are aware of their role, or prioritise it, in their activities. For example, the DTI holds responsibility for some of the waste policies, but it was apparent through interviews with the department and their regulatory bodies, such as Trading Standards, that they do not prioritise this area of work in terms of the allocation of resources. Throughout the investigations, it was clear that there was a correlation between those organisations that worked directly with waste, and those that felt they had a role to play in waste prevention. This is perhaps predictable, but it is still an important consideration when reviewing the responsibilities in this section of the report. The everyday levels of contact with waste prevention issues must be addressed when deciding upon responsible parties for each policy role (introducer, implementer, regulator). Although during the research there was found to be a general understanding of who has responsibility for what, there was a lack of clarity about where the boundaries of responsibility for one actor lay, and where the responsibilities of another actor began. It is of primary importance to ensure that there is effective co-ordination between all those organisations and bodies that have a role to play in waste prevention policy. Each player needs to have a clear understanding of their remit, and of others they need to interact with, as well as having the necessary resources to make an effective contribution. Finally, this policy responsibility analysis recognises a lack of a coherent strategy between the Devolved Administrations. Defra and the Devolved Administrations, although they work closely together at some levels, have adopted different approaches for policy development. Waste and product streams do not have national boundaries so attempting to get producers or retailers to deal with different policies in different areas may make co-operation and implementation considerably more problematic. For devolved administrations, where competences are somewhat constrained, what are sometimes perceived as Whitehall-centred decisions (or an absence thereof) can hinder the aspirations of devolved administrations as they seek to improve their performance in respect of waste prevention.

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7 POLICIES FOR HWP IN THE NETHERLANDS 1985-2005 7.1 Introduction This Section is intended to provide an initial inventory of some 10-15 prevention policies applied in the Netherlands 103 . The idea is to describe the main characteristics of such policies, in order to allow for a comparison with the experiences from polices from other countries and selection of the most interesting ones for the UK in consultation with the client and other parties. The most promising potential policies then can be analysed in more detail in the next project phase. Before giving the short descriptions of Dutch polices according to a common format in Sections 7.3 to 7.12. Section 7.2 gives a short background of prevention policy and its results in the Netherlands. 7.2 Dutch Waste Prevention: a Short Background

7.2.1 Historical Perspective Dutch waste prevention really became a hot political topic in the period 1985-1990. Years before, Member of Parliament Lansink had launched his famous ‘stair concept’, adopted in a motion of Dutch parliament to the Environment Minister in 1979, and known more widely as ‘Lansink’s Ladder’. The stair concept stipulates that the following order of preference should be taken into account when dealing with waste: prevention, re-use, incineration and landfill. Little was done with this call from parliament in the early 1980s, but a series of scandals in the field of soil pollution, and related dioxin emissions from incinerators, as well as the ‘Waldsterben’ (dying forests) as a result of acid rain gave a tremendous boost to environmentalism from around 1985. An alarming report of 1988 called ‘Concern for Tomorrow’ from the Dutch National Institute for Public Health and Environment, a much respected Dutch laboratory, led to a general increase in public concern and support for environmental problems. The Environment Ministry anticipated this and had prepared its first National Environmental Policy Plan (NEPP), presented in 1989, in response. These events conspired to put the environmental issue high on the policy agenda, and even the Prime Minister started to play a leading role in shaping and acting upon the environment dossier. At this time, the political and societal pressure on the Environment Ministry to realise results was extremely high. On the positive side, this Environment Ministry could count on a high level of support from politicians for additional funding, human resources, and the implementation of measures to reach what were seen as highly desirable results. Of course, the goals to be met had to be politically right and

103 The project brief also calls for giving attention to Belgium, but the most interesting examples like DifTar, and producer responsibility for e.g. packaging and electrical and electronic products are already described for the Netherlands. It would not lead to much more relevant information for the UK situation, but rather duplication, when these Belgian cases would have been described in detail as well. We have made some notes upon the Belgian systems in passing.

Waste Prevention Policy Case Studies 114 fashionable. After years of silence, the call for waste prevention and re-use became stronger and stronger in the policy arena. In 1988 the Dutch Environment Ministry sent its White Paper on Prevention and Re- use to the 2 nd Chamber (the equivalent of the English Lower House). It covered all major waste streams (excluding contaminated soil and polluted sediments and some specific high volume waste streams) and proposed targets for prevention and re-use that should be met in the period between 1985 and 2000. For prevention, an overall target of 10% was set, whilst re-use targets were assumed easier to reach and set much higher. Parliament did not accept this and asked for a doubling of the proposed prevention target, and this was adopted as an overall guiding principle from there on. The main vehicle used by the Environment Ministry to directly intervene in the waste cycle and stimulate prevention and re-use was a series of ‘Strategic processes’ leading to ‘Implementation plans’. Reflecting the consensual and egalitarian Dutch culture, under guidance of facilitators and with support of independent, external experts, parties that played a key role in the chain of production and waste would agree what was the best way to reach the envisaged prevention and re-use targets. Such an agreement typically ended up with a ‘covenant’, a kind of contract, which in principle was voluntary, but in practice was to be respected by all. 104 The waste streams had been chosen on the basis of an earlier priority setting study that included characteristics like volume and toxicity of the waste. In this way, implementation plans were developed for e.g.: - building and construction waste; - packaging - plastic waste - municipal solid waste fly ash - waste from electrical and electronic products - etc. On top of this rather centralised policy effort, the provinces played an important role. They were responsible for waste management planning, and in the late 1980s/ early 1990s most of them were developing their 2 nd Provincial waste management plans, that under new legislation had to be accompanied by a Strategic Environmental Impact Assessment. Such SEAs had to develop environmentally friendly alternatives for the proposed Waste Management Plan, and hence of course had to develop alternatives for the envisaged prevention efforts by provinces. This often led to additional prevention activities, mostly in the form of an initiative, or range of initiatives, rather than policies. In the 1990s this waste management planning was gradually centralised, mainly due to the fact that the scale of one province was not suitable to match demand and supply for waste destined for incineration in the incineration infrastructure that had been developed. Central government took a number of measures to ensure that available waste would be steered to incineration rather than landfill, most notably landfill bans and later also landfill taxes. Such measures indirectly also stimulated prevention and re-use.

104 The Dutch experience was important in developing a growing interest across Europe in so-called voluntary, or negotiated agreements.

Waste Prevention Policy Case Studies 115 7.2.2 Some Figures With the year 2000 now having passed, it is of course interesting to look back on whether, and to what extent, policy efforts made from the 1980s and 1990s bore fruit. Surprisingly, the National Waste Management Plan of 2002 could state that the aim set by parliament in 1988 had been met. Compared to economic growth since 1985, the total volume of waste production in the Netherlands had fallen by about 20%. 105 However, for the specific stream of household waste the conclusion was less bright. Here, the growth in waste volumes has been slightly higher than economic growth. Hence, where, on the face of it, industrial waste flows had seen a relative decoupling and a degree of prevention, no such success could be reported with households 106 . Another interesting issue is that in the Dutch situation, for a quite long time, research has been done into which components make up household waste. Such analyses give guidance as to what are the most important components in household waste, and hence which components are most interesting from a prevention policy perspective. Table 42 and Table 43 give illustrations of such data 107 . Table 43 also gives an indication of typical policies that can be applied to reduce the volume of such components.

105 Landelijk AfvalbeheersPlan (LAP), AOO [Waste Management Council], Utrecht, Netherlands, 2002. Note this still implies a net volume growth, of course, since the economy has grown considerably more than 20% 106 It is likely that the success of measures that influenced household waste arising have been annihilated by counter-acting trends like the ever lower number of persons per household, the rising time pressure on citizens and hence the need to use time-saving (food) products that often imply higher packaging waste, the introduction of ICT equipment (computers, printers, and paper use), etc. 107 Editorial note: this is still the table that the author used in the Waste scenario study TNO did for IPTS. It extrapolates Dutch composition data to an EU context. In due time we will replace this table by a table reflecting Dutch waste volumes.

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Table 42: Components in Dutch Household Waste, excluding bulky waste (BW = bagged waste, SC = separately collected) 108

Waste type % BW BW SC HHW % HHW Subdivision Organic waste 30.7 1 1 2 527 40.7 100.0(%) Yard waste 2.3 80068 1459 1 174 18.9 46.5 Kitchen waste 12.4 431 365094 796 12.8 31.5 Other organic waste 16.0 556 0 556 9.0 22.0 Paper and cardboard 34.9 1 840 2 054 33.1 100.0 Diapers 11.7 407214 0 407 6.6 19.8 Newspapers 5.6 195 378 573 9.2 27.9 Advertising and journals 5.2 181 378 559 9.0 27.2 Food packaging 4.2 146 55 201 3.2 9.8 Drink packaging 2.2 77 29 106 1.7 5.2 Other packaging 3.5 122 122 2.0 5.9 Other cardboard 2.5 87 87 1.4 4.2 Plastics 11.0 383 000 383 6.26.26.2 100.0 Food packaging 4.1 143 143 2.3 37.3 Drink packaging 0.2 7 7 0.1 1.8 Other packaging 4.3 150 150 2.4 39.1 Other plastics 2.4 83 83 1.3 21.8 Glass 4.74.74.7 163 309 472 7.67.67.6 100.0 Food packaging 2.3 80 172 252 4.1 53.3 Drink packaging 1.6 56 119 175 2.8 37.1 Other packaging 0.2 7 15 22 0.4 4.6 Other 0.6 21 3 24 0.4 5.1 Metals 4.54.54.5 157 000 157 2.52.52.5 100.0 Ferro 3.8 132 132 2.1 84.4 Food packaging 1.8 62 62 1.0 39.3 Drink packaging 0.5 19 19 0.3 12.0 Other packaging 0.3 9 9 0.1 5.6 Other 1.2 43 43 0.7 27.6 Non-ferro 0.7 24 24 0.4 15.6 Food packaging 0.2 6 6 0.1 3.6 Drink packaging 0.0 1 1 0.0 0.4 Other packaging 0.1 5 5 0.1 3.1 Other 0.4 13 13 0.2 8.4 Textiles 3.13.13.1 108 414141 149 2.42.42.4 100.0 Clothing 1.8 64 24 88 1.4 59.4 Other textile 1.3 44 17 60 1.0 40.6 Total of other waste fractions 11.1 386 818181 467 7.57.57.5 100.0 Bread 2.2 75 75 1.2 16.2 Animal waste 1.7 58 58 0.9 12.5 Ceramics 2.7 93 93 1.5 19.9 Carpets 0.4 14 14 0.2 3.0 Leather/rubber 0.8 26 26 0.4 5.6 Other leather/rubber 0.4 13 13 0.2 2.7 Wood 2.2 77 60 137 2.2 29.3 Special waste 0.5 16 16 0.3 3.4 Small chemical waste 0.4 14 21 35 0.6 7.5 Total 100 3 2 6 208 100.0 478 730

108 This table is taken over with adaptations from A. Tukker, J. Hoogendoorn, H. Luiten, T. Wiedmann, K. Schindel and U. Albertshouser, Scenarios for Household Waste Generation in Europe in 2020, ESTO/DG JRC IPTS, Sevilla, Spain, 2003, in turn derived from Cornelissen, A. J. and Beker, D. (1998), ‘Onderzoek naar de fysische samenstelling van het Nederlandse huishoudelijk afval: Resultaten 1996’ [Research into the Physical Composition of Dutch Household Waste. Results for 1996] RIVM, Bilthoven, the Netherlands

Waste Prevention Policy Case Studies 117 Table 43: Components in Household Waste in EU15 in 1,000 tonnes in 1995, Based on EEA data and Dutch Composition Data (excludes waste from offices, bulky waste, car related waste, etc.) 109

Type of waste In number percentage rel. perc. Typical prevention/ rere----useuse measure Feeding 56322 33,0% 100,0% Kitchen waste 22044 12,9% 39,1% Separate collection organic or home composting Packaging 25375 14,9% 45,1% Packaging reduction and recycling measures Small Durable Goods 8903 5,2% 15,8% Deposit fee, producer responsibility Recreation 33535 19,6% 100,0% Yard waste 28177 16,5% 84,0% Separate collection organic or home composting Pet waste 5358 3,1% 16,0% Separate collection organic or home composting Infotainment 24285 14,2% 100,0% Newspapers 9524 5,6% 39,2% Paper collection and recycling Advertising 9292 5,4% 38,3% ‘No’ sticker and paper collection Electronics 1516 0,9% 6,2% Deposit fee, producer responsibility Paper (work) 1446 0,8% 6,0% Paper collection and recycling Plastic bags and sacks 2507 1,5% 10,3% Plastic collection and recycling Housing 23080 13,5% 100,0% Furniture 13961 8,2% 60,5% 2nd hand shops, recycling Decoration 6481 3,8% 28,1% Cleaning 2638 1,5% 11,4% Care 9866 5,8% 100,0% Diapers 6766 4,0% 68,6% Recycling Medicines 2405 1,4% 24,4% Cosmetics 694 0,4% 7,0% Clothing 6831 4,0% 100,0% Disposal 5151 3,0% 75,4% Washing equipment 1680 1,0% 24,6% Deposit fee, producer responsibility Not allocated 16927 9,9% 100,0%

Total 170845 100%

7.2.3 Classification of Prevention Policies The former text makes clear that prevention policies can be classified as follows: a) GeneGeneric ricricric. Here, generic measures are taken that generally encourage or force parties to reduce their amount of waste offered for re-use or treatment. Examples include landfill bans and taxes, or ‘pay per weight’ waste collection schemes. b) Component basedbased. Here, specific measures in the upstream chain related to the waste component measures are taken that prevent waste arising or improve the quality of the waste. An example is concentrating washing powder, so that a smaller amount has to be used (and hence packed) for the same amount of washes. In the next sections, we will discuss some examples of such component related and generic waste prevention policies in the Netherlands. The policies covered are: 110

109 Table 2.2. was derived from the basic data given in Table 2.1, combined with EU15 waste data and re-grouping of activities to ‘household functions’. See A. Tukker, J. Hoogendoorn, H. Luiten, T. Wiedmann, K. Schindel and U. Albertshouser, Scenarios for Household Waste Generation in Europe in 2020, ESTO/DG JRC IPTS, Sevilla, Spain, 2003 110 List inspired by SEAs on the waste managements plans of the Province of Utrecht (1990), South- Holland (1994), Drenthe (1994), and Dutch National Waste Management Plans of 1992, 1995 and

Waste Prevention Policy Case Studies 118 a) Generic. 1. ‘Diftar’: tariff differentiation, or ‘pay per kg’. 2. Landfill bans 3. Landfill tax b) Component related. 1. Packaging covenant (later replaced by legislation), which includes a host of smaller measures: a. Concentrating active ingredients of products, so that less packaging is needed per functionality b. Implementing re-usable and refillable packaging c. Etc. 2. Deposit system on electrical and electronic products (later replaced by legislation) 3. Stimulation of home composting (initiative) 4. Stimulation of product re-use via 2 nd hand shops (initiative) 5. Prevention of paper waste from advertisement by ‘No’ stickers on post- boxes (self regulation/initiative). 6. Product re-use and material re-use of car tyres

2002. Since 1995 the SEA was made centrally for the National Waste Management Plans, and the structure of developing provincial plans with dedicated SEAs was abandoned since it created many duplications in the analysis of strategic questions.

Waste Prevention Policy Case Studies 119 7.3 ‘Diftar’ (Tariff Differentiation), or ‘Pay As You Throw’.

7.3.1 Description In the Netherlands, the traditional way of paying for waste is a charge imposed by the municipality for waste collection services. This charge is usually paid on a flat rate basis per household, often differentiated by family size (e.g. three groups: 1, 2, or more persons). This charge is usually paid annually, or monthly (in such cases often combined with the energy bill, and collected by the energy supplier). This structure does not give any incentive for waste reduction to households. Since the 1990s, various municipalities in the Netherlands have been experimenting with ‘pay per container’ or ‘pay per kg’ systems. This system is called ‘DifTar’, short for ‘Differentiated Tariff’. 111

7.3.2 Policy Context and Reason for Introduction The idea is that households now have an incentive to reduce the amount of waste offered for final treatment. With municipalities being (legally) responsible for offering a waste collection system (either by a municipal service or by contracting it out), the initiative is usually taken by a municipality. The driving factors at local level are often very diverse, and determined by the local context. It may be the initiative of a group of interested officials, it may be the idea of a policy maker that makes it a point in a municipal election, etc.

7.3.3 Date & Timetable of Introduction Different for different municipalities. Initiatives started in the 1990s and spread over the following 15 years.

7.3.4 Prerequisites for Introduction Political willingness, societal acceptance. Tends to work best where residual waste treatment / disposal costs are relatively high (around €100 per tonne or more).

7.3.5 Implementation Mechanisms Usually, there is a base charge per household. This enables greater certainty regarding revenue generation. For the differentiation, there is a variety of forms: 1. payment on the basis of the number of times that a container is set out for collection. This system is e.g. used in Apeldoorn and Stadskanaal 112 . Each household has a container with a unique chip, and the waste collection truck registers how many bins from which household are emptied. For people living in apartments, there is a common container into which waste bags can be put. This container has to be opened with a chip-card, and for each time the container is opened a charge is accounted for. Citizens can see on the

111 See for instance the websites of the municipalities of Apeldoorn, http://www.apeldoorn.nl/smartsite.dws?id=4751 (accessed 23 March 2006) 112 http://www.diftar- stadskanaal.nl/nl/pagina/Huishoudelijk+afval/Diftar/100/31/Wat+is+diftar.html (accessed 23 March 2006)

Waste Prevention Policy Case Studies 120 municipal website how often they have provided waste. 113 An advantage of the system is that it does not matter if neighbours are inclined to ‘cheat’ by putting additional waste in a bin waiting to be emptied. 2. payment on the basis of weight. This system is e.g. used in Haren, one of the pioneers with DifTar in the Netherlands. The base fee is 116 Euro, where additionally a fee of 0.19 Euro per kg is raised. Here, the container is weighed before and after emptying. The container contains a chip, which helps to register how much waste from which household has been submitted. 114 3. payment via the ‘expensive bag’. In this system, only specifically labelled plastic bags are collected. People putting regular ‘grey bags’ on the side of the street will be fined. The bags can only be bought from the municipality, and cost say 1 Euro per bag. Additionally, a base fee is paid. This system is in use in Maastricht and Meerssen in the south of the Netherlands. 115

7.3.6 Monitoring and Measurement Techniques Applied See under implementation mechanisms.

7.3.7 Impact A study conducted by the Ministry in 1997 showed that at that time only about 60 municipalities (fewer than 10%) had adopted a differentiated fee system based on volume, weight or frequency. 116 The study provides quantitative information about the preventive effects (3 to 12%) and unintended effects (3 to 10%). The study estimated that the introduction of differentiated tariffs would lead to a 12 to 30% reduction in household waste, including 6 to 8% due to sorting, 3 to 10% due to unintended activity and 3 to 12% due to prevention. In 1999, the AOO completed a survey of the taxes and fees on municipal waste. 117 The results of this survey are shown in Table 44 below.

113 http://www.apeldoorn.nl/smartsite.dws?id=16125 (accessed 23 March 2006) 114 See http://www.haren.nl/html/dienst/B1A_11.htm and http://www.haren.nl/html/dienst/B1A_11.htm 115 http://www.maastricht.nl/maastricht/show/id=109748 (accessed 21 March 2006) 116 Zelle Rogier &Van Der Zwaan Rogier, (1997), Ervaringen met tariefdifferentiatie en huishoudelijk afval , VROM, Zoetermeer, p. 66. 117 AOO (1999), Gemeentelijke Afvastoffenheffingen in 1999, AOO, Utrecht, p. 57, cited in Stefano Proietti (2000) The Application of local Taxes and Fees for the Collection of Household Waste: Local Authority Jurisdiction and Practice in Europe, Report for the Association of Cities for Recycling, Brussels: ACR.

Waste Prevention Policy Case Studies 121

Table 44: Tariff Differentiation Systems in the Netherlands in 1999 Average Amount in number of Municipalities Households Tax and levy system NLG households (%) (%) (EUR) per municipality 373 Linked variable fee 222222 131313 6,831 (169.20) 441 Volume 8.3 4.7 6,786 (200.10) Purchased bags 3.5 2.9 205 (93.10) 9,694 394 Volume/Frequency 7.2 3.2 5,303 (178.80) 372 Weight 1.7 0.6 4,594 (168.80) 511 Composting 0.2 0.1 5,484 (231.90) 430 Combination 1.5 1.3 10,424 (195.10) 413* Non-linked variable fee 636363 585858 10,904 (187.40) 413 Fixed fee or tax 151515 292929 22,868 (187.40) Note: * taxes for one-person households A study was undertaken for VROM by KPMG in 2001. 118 The principal objectives of the study were to understand the fate of the materials diverted from the residual waste stream, in particular, to understand the degree to which the reduction if refuse collected was due to a) ‘positive’ changes (in respect of genuine waste reduction) and b) ‘negative’ changes (in respect of evasive activities / illegal disposal. Questionnaires were used to develop an understanding of households’ behaviour, though the study team recognized that such questionnaires were unlikely to be reliable (since people would not voluntarily declare themselves to be acting illegally). Generally, it was concluded that both types of behavioural change –positive and negative – would occur, but it was impossible to generalize about the relative proportions of waste reduction which occurred through ‘legal’ and ‘illegal’ routes. Not only were there huge differences between different towns (and the difference between rural and urban municipalities was a feature), but also it was also clear that systems functioned best where thorough provision was made for convenient source separation. 119 3 types of each of 4 different ‘DifTar’ systems were examined, the 4 types being: 1. Volume based;

118 KPMG Bureau voor Economische Argumentatie (2001) Gedragseffecten van Tariefdifferentiatie. The Hague: KPMG. 119 Personal communication with S. van Weele, KPMG Netherlands.

Waste Prevention Policy Case Studies 122 2. Volume and frequency based;

3. Bag based; and

4. Weight based.

Comparative results across the system types were reported in an AOO publication and are shown in Figure 27. Figure 27: Quantities of Separated Waste and Refuse by Charge System Type, 1999

450

400

350

300

250 Residual Waste Vegetables, Fruit and Garden Waste 200 Textiles Glass Paper 150 Quantity of (kg/inhabitant/yr) Waste 100

0 Sack-based Volume-based Volume and Weight-based Without DIFTAR frequency-based Charging System

Source: AOO (2001) Afval Informatief, Informatiebulletin, 06, Juin 2001. The results of the systems seem quite promising. Reductions of 20% and more have been reported (see also Figure 28). However, it must be very clear to distinguish between reductions in residual waste quantities and reduction in total waste. The Figure below shows the former, so it is likely that only part of the effect is due to prevention. It is most likely that citizens have an incentive to separate their waste more carefully, particularly recyclable streams like paper, glass, etc. Much of the reduction hence may be caused by merely a better separate collection of re-usable waste, which does not equal prevention. The majority of the waste may still be collected and centrally processed, but for recycling, composting and re-use. However, Figure 27 clearly indicates that ‘genuine’ waste prevention does occur, depending upon the system used. Even here, however, the extent of genuine prevention activity must be set alongside the possibility that some of the reduction is due to increases in illegal disposal, and movement of commercial waste from small traders into the ‘proper’ commercial stream.

Waste Prevention Policy Case Studies 123

Figure 28: Residual Waste (in kg per annum per household) in Municipalities with and without DifTar in Municipalities Serviced by ROVA 120

Note: red line is houses with DifTar Schemes, blue line is houses outside DifTar scheme.

7.3.8 Economic Implications The effectiveness of the systems vary greatly. Sad stories exist about municipalities that chose the wrong systems and made heavy investment in structures that in the end did not work. But if the system is implemented in a well-prepared way, overall costs are not excessive, and after an initial period, may lead to cost reduction (see Figure 29). The cost reduction will be greater where the costs of residual waste management are higher.

7.3.9 Social Implications Not clear.

7.3.10 Distributional Implications Not clear. They depend on the system introduced (see further down).

Figure 29: Costs for Waste Collection and Management per Household (in Euro per annum) in Municipalities with and without DifTar in Municipalities Serviced by ROVA

120 ROVA is an organisation established by various municipalities, mainly in the East of the Netherlands, to support them in dealing with their legal obligation to providing waste management services. Their service area covers around 300.000 households, of which in 2002 one-third used DIfTar The fact they deal with rural areas explains the somewhat high amounts of residual waste. Source of the figure is http://www.rova.nl/index.php?cms[categoryID]=293 (accessed 23 March 2006). The municipality of Haren even reached a 37% reduction of organic waste and 28% reduction of residual waste in their first year of introduction of Diftar, see http://www.haren.nl/html/dienst/B1A_11.htm

Waste Prevention Policy Case Studies 124

Source: http://www.rova.nl/index.php?cms[categoryID]=295 (accessed 23 March 2006)

7.3.11 Enforcement Issues Much fuss has been made about the potential for waste tourism (taking bags to a neighbouring municipality without DifTar), or for dumping waste as litter following the implementation of DifTar schemes. It is unclear to what extent such stories are simply the fruit of heated political debates in the Municipal Council: DifTar is one of those issues that make headlines and is always a nice issue of discussion between left wing ‘greenish’ politicians, and liberal politicians that want to keep things simple. Research has shown that ‘waste tourism’ can be kept under control 121 , though at the same time there are clear examples of problems with less-well thought through DifTar systems that have been reported (see 7.3.14) .

7.3.12 Political and Public Response As indicated DifTar seems to be a nice topic for policy discussion and hence controversial. It probably has to do with the fact that everybody is affected by it, and the system forces households to change their behaviour. Also, implementation has to be thoughtful, and failures are visible and costly (though not necessarily individual cases) and hence add to the discussion.

7.3.13 Other Impacts Not relevant.

121 For instance, in the municipality of Oostzaan, a pioneer in this field, noted that about 5% of the waste disappeared via e.g. employers or neighbouring municipalities. Dumping in nature or sewage was less of a problem. See e.g. http://www.coelo.nl/afvalaanbod.html (accessed 23 March 2006)

Waste Prevention Policy Case Studies 125 7.3.14 Key Success / Failure Factors It is not possible to give a full analysis of success- and failure factors within an overview of prevention polices in the Netherlands. Particularly in the case of DifTar many elements have to be taken into account to analyse why successes or failures occurred. However, some initial guidelines can be given • ensure a proper communication trajectory before, but also after implementation. Experience shows that some initial problems about bills, etc., often occur, and it is very important to handle this quickly to ensure that the population keeps on trusting the system 122 . • Ensure a technically sound implementation that is easy to use for citizens. In the municipality of Geldrop, particularly in areas with apartment blocks a clear resistance developed to the system (see Figure 30). A major problem was that the DifTar system used underground containers, in which bags had to be deposited. In flats, there used to be a system of chutes, in which bags could be dumped. Now all people, including the elderly, have to walk their bags downstairs. A ‘retourette’, intended as a kerbside system for recyclable waste, appeared to be heavily (ab)used for dumping residual waste and had to be closed. Communication systems between the main container and the registration computers failed. Etc. As a result, several political parties are now calling for discontinuation of the system 123 . • Do good homework in advance, and ensure implementation does not become a political issue. This happened in Zoetermeer, where the DifTar initiative became a topic in the municipal elections of 2002. The elections resulted in a major change in political relations, and the new council decided to stop the system in 2003. They did so since it appeared that implementing the system would cost more than expected, and waste reductions might not reach the 27% hoped for – implying a net increase in overall cost for citizens and the municipality. Zoetermeer lost a lot of money anyway since investments already made could not be recouped 124 .

Figure 30: Response to a Waste Evaluation inquiry in Geldrop. Translation: ‘the municipality should have never started this. The pipe system was excellent. And now with waste [bags] on balconies animals are attracted’

122 http://www.haren.nl/html/gemeentelijkestukken/Beleidsnotities/F3a_01j.htm (accessed 23 march 2006) 123 This information and the note in Figure 3.3 comes from a website dedicated to the protest against ‘the system’, see http://home.hetnet.nl/~geschiedenis-coevering/diftar/diftar.htm (accessed 23 March, 2006). Other websites show how policy laden the discussion can be. For the municipal election of March 2006 the (very left wing) Socialist Party in Oosterhout declared to be against this system. ‘The producers have to be targeted first!’ 124 http://www.afval.noordhoek.nl/archief/2003/diftar_in_zoetermeer_gaat_niet_d.htm (accessed March 21, 2006)

Waste Prevention Policy Case Studies 126

7.3.15 Future Changes / Modifications Planned Depends very much on the specific municipality.

7.3.16 Evaluations Undertaken

Prior to Introduction Depends on the municipality.

Following Introduction Depends on the municipality. Examples are: • VROM 1997. Ervaringen met Tariefdifferentiatie en Huishoudelijk Afval (“Experience with differentiated tariffs and domestic waste”). Ministry of Environmental Affairs, Den Haag. • KPMG Bureau voor Economische Argumentatie (2001) Gedragseffecten van Tariefdifferentiatie. The Hague: KPMG. • Linderhof, V., P. Kooreman, M. Allers and D. Wiersma (2001) Weight-based Pricing in the Collection of Household Waste: The Oostzaan Case, Resource and Energy Economics , 23, pp.359-71; • Dijkgraaf, E. and R. H. J. M. Gradus (2003) Cost Savings of Unit-based Pricing of Household Waste: The Case of the Netherlands, Research Memorandum 0209 , OCFEB, Erasmus University, Rotterdam • Dijkgraaf, E., and R. H. J. M. Gradus (2004) Cost Savings in Unit-based Pricing of Household Waste: The Case of The Netherlands, Resource and Energy Economics , Vol.26 (2004) 353-71

7.4 Landfill Bans

7.4.1 Description For a large number of categories of waste, both from households and industry, a landfill ban has been implemented since 1995. The goal is to steer waste away from landfill to incineration and re-use, and through the related price effect, to stimulate

Waste Prevention Policy Case Studies 127 prevention. Currently, landfill is banned for over 30 categories of material (see Table 45 below) Table 45: Categories of Waste for which Landfill is banned in the Netherlands 125 Car batteries Tyres Other batteries End of life vehicles Fluorescence lamps Fly ash from waste incineration Thermometers containing mercury Building and demolition waste and residues of this Oil filters Sand from building and demolition waste processing Various hazardous wastes from EU lists codes 18 01 plants 01, 18 01 02, 18 01 03*, 18 01 04, 18 01 06*, 18 Blasting grit 01 07, 18 01 08*, 18 01 09, 18 01 10*, 18 02 01, Wood waste 18 02 02*, 18 02 03, 18 02 05*, 18 02 07*, 18 02 Waste treatment sludges 08, 20 01 31* of 20 01 32. Contaminated soil Packaging of chemicals Organic waste from agriculture Other packaging Waste from markets and similar Paper and cardboard Household waste Organic waste Office waste Electrical and electronic equipment Fluid waste Oxy-chalk sludge Waste that is corrosive, oxidating, inflammable etc. Plastic waste from processes in the plastic industry Not identified chemical products, from research Plastic foils from agriculture

7.4.2 Policy Context and Reason for Introduction The main reason for introduction of the ban was that landfill, even when controlled and compliant with high standards, tends to be much cheaper than incineration and re-use. At the time, the Netherlands was rebuilding its incineration plants as a result of a dioxin emission scandal in the late 1980s. To ensure that this incineration capacity would be used, and hence, that the high investment cost would not be wasted, some protection from the competition from cheap landfill had to be given. The same applied for re-use technologies.

7.4.3 Date & Timetable of Introduction - 1995: Publication of the Decree on a Ban of Landfill of Waste - 1995-1999: Ministerial decrees that regulate that the Decree is applicable to specific waste streams that were exempted when the Decree was first published. For many waste streams the Decree went into force directly. However, for some waste streams no treatment technology or enough capacity was available. Once a relatively cost-effective technology became available, landfill of a specific stream would be banned. - 1997: Publication of a Decree on Landfills and Ban on Landfill of Waste, that combines the Decree of 1995 with another Decree that arranged permitting procedures for landfills 126 . - Related EU Directives: 1999/31/EC (L182, 16.7.1999), Directive on Landfill of Waste and 2003/33/EC (PbEG L11, 16.1.2003) on Criteria and procedures on the acceptance of waste on landfills

125 Note this is not an authorized nor exact translation of the Decree, but mainly to give an impression 126 See: http://wetten.overheid.nl/cgi-bin/sessioned/browsercheck/continuation=29495- 002/session=532342511010954/action=javascript-result/javascript=yes (accessed 23 March 2006)

Waste Prevention Policy Case Studies 128 7.4.4 Prerequisites for Introduction Political willingness, supported by important groups in society. Here, there was broad consensus that landfill was least desirable, and important players in the waste management structure supported the ban since their own technologies would benefit.

7.4.5 Implementation Mechanisms Legislation.

7.4.6 Monitoring and Measurement Techniques Applied Not relevant, see further under enforcement.

7.4.7 Impact The ban worked quite well in steering waste away from landfill. In combination with other policies, there is now only 3 Mio tpa of landfill in the Netherlands 127 , the level having been between 11 and 15 Mio tpa in 1990 128 . However, the effect on prevention is very indirect and very difficult to measure. One has to see it as a measure that raises prices in the waste management systems, and that hence, where there is a system for producer responsibility, indirectly some incentive is created for re-design of products in such a way that less waste is created. Probably, there is some interaction also with the implementation of DifTar schemes. If DifTar schemes had been introduced against the backdrop of lower costs for residual waste treatment, the structure of charges might have been more difficult for Councils to justify, and the additional costs of introducing the system would have been higher (making them more problematic to justify in the political sphere).

7.4.8 Economic Implications Landfill (even engineered landfill) typically costs a few dozen Euros per tonne, where incineration is over 100 Euro per ton. Costs of management of waste have, as result, risen considerably.

7.4.9 Social Implications Not clear

7.4.10 Distributional Implications There are no clear distributional implications. Higher costs of waste management are reflected by the Contribution to Waste management, a fee collected by municipalities from its citizens for waste management. Apart from municipalities that have Diftar systems in place (see former chapter), in most municipalities there are fixed fees for 1 person households, 2 person households, and families. One could argue that lower income households are hence relatively worse off as a result of higher waste management fees.

127 Landelijk Afvalbeheersplan (LAP) [National Waste Management Plan], Afvaloverlegorgaan, Utrecht, Netherlands, 2002 128 Ontwerp Tienjarenprogramma Afval (TJP.A) [Draft Ten Year Program Waste Management] Afvaloverlegorgaan, Utrecht, Netherlands, 1992, Annex 2, page 10

Waste Prevention Policy Case Studies 129 7.4.11 Enforcement Issues Enforcement is via a variety of organisations (Inspectorate for the Environment, Provincial inspectors, Municipal Inspectors, regular police).

7.4.12 Political and Public Response The landfill ban is not under discussion and well accepted. It also goes further than the EU regulations mentioned regarding landfilling.

7.4.13 Other Impacts Not relevant

7.4.14 Key Success/Failure Factors - simple measure and easy to enforce - political and societal backing for implementation

7.4.15 Future Changes/Modifications Planned Probably some additional waste flows will be brought under the ban, although the system is operational now for most types of waste.

7.4.16 Evaluations Undertaken

Prior to Introduction For all waste flows under the ban, an evaluation has been carried out and this suggests that there is a re-use or treatment alternative that poses no excessive costs.

Following Introduction See above. For waste flows later brought under the ban similar evaluations have been done. . 7.5 Landfill Tax

7.5.1 Description A landfill tax was introduced in 1995, and gradually enhanced over time.

7.5.2 Policy Context and Reason for Introduction The landfill tax was meant to support the landfill ban. The idea was that if waste for landfill would be taxed, automatically other options would be more attractive.

7.5.3 Date & Timetable of Introduction - 1995: Publication of a regulation on the basis of the Law Environmental Taxes - 1995-now: various changes in the taxation level to the level in force now (84,78 Euro per ton for incinerable waste and 13,98 Euro per ton for other waste) 129

129 See http://www.minfin.nl/default.asp?CMS_ITEM=MFCWD970934C51F83449B932D1E9D4D61AF6DX22 X55355X16#afvalstoffen (accessed March 22, 2006).

Waste Prevention Policy Case Studies 130 7.5.4 Prerequisites for Introduction Political willingness, societal acceptance

7.5.5 Implementation Mechanisms The tax is included in the landfill price and hence collected by landfill operators.

7.5.6 Monitoring and Measurement Techniques Applied Not relevant

7.5.7 Impact As with the landfill ban, the effect on prevention is very indirect and very difficult to measure. Where there is a system for producer responsibility, indirectly some incentive is created for re-design of products in such a way that less waste is created. Again, as with the landfill ban, probably, there is some interaction with the implementation of DifTar schemes. If DifTar schemes had been introduced against the backdrop of lower costs for residual waste treatment, the structure of charges might have been more difficult for Councils to justify, and the additional costs of introducing the system would have been higher (making them more problematic to justify in the political sphere).

7.5.8 Economic Implications Landfill (even engineered landfill) typically costs a few dozen Euros per ton, and the tax makes it considerably more expensive. This has to be paid by the polluter.

7.5.9 Social Implications Not clear

7.5.10 Distributional Implications See under landfill bans. Given the flat-fee system in most of the Netherlands, one could argue that lower income households are relatively worse off as a result of higher waste management fees.

7.5.11 Enforcement Issues Enforcement is via a variety of organisations (Inspectorate for the Environment, Provincial inspectors, Municipal Inspectors, regular police)

7.5.12 Political and Public Response The tax system is rather well accepted. Only the plan to double the tax was not implemented since the combination of the existing ban and the existing tax was deemed to work very well.

7.5.13 Other Impacts Not relevant

7.5.14 Key Success / Failure Factors Key issues are that the tax is: - simple measure and easy to enforce

Waste Prevention Policy Case Studies 131 - political and societal backing for implementation

7.5.15 Future Changes / Modifications Planned Not known.

7.5.16 Evaluations Undertaken

Prior to Introduction None reported, apart from a straightforward evaluation in the decree.

Following Introduction Recently, an evaluation was carried out as part of a wider study concerning the effectiveness of landfill taxation. 130 This suggested that for household waste, the effects of landfill taxes were only significant as regards quantities of waste generated in municipalities with DifTar schemes. Recycling and incineration increased as a consequence of the tax. 7.6 Packaging Covenant, Underlying Measures and Subsequent Legislation

7.6.1 Description In June 1991 the Environment Minister and the Chairman of the Organisation for Packaging and the Environment signed a Covenant on prevention and re-use of packaging. To summarise, the covenant set targets for prevention and re-use, and industry committed itself to realising these. Note that the Covenants cover ALL packaging waste, including industrial flows. The third Covenant of 2001 stipulated that by end 2005 the following goals had to be met, e.g. that the amount of packaging can increase at only 2/3 the rate of economic growth, and that at most, 850.000 tpa could be landfilled and incinerated (the second covenant had a goal of 940.000 ktpa by 2001 – the situation in 1986 was that 1600 ktpa were landfilled and incinerated). 131 132 In 2006 statutory producer responsibility was introduced, and the following demands made (note no prevention targets are set anymore): 133 - plastic drink packaging with a content of over 0.5 litre, should be collected so that over 95% would be delivered for material recycling; - plastic drink packaging with a content of less than 0.5 litre, should be collected so that over 55% would be delivered for material recycling; 134

130 Bartelings, H., P. van Beukering, O. Kuik, V. Linderhof, F. Oosterhuis, L. Brander and A. Wagtendonk (2005) Effectiveness of Landfill Taxation , R-05/05, Report Commissioned by Ministerie von VROM, November 24, 2005. 131 See: Ten Years of Packaging Developments, SVM-PACT, den Haag, Netherlands, 2001 132 See for instance: http://www.senternovem.nl/uitvoeringafvalbeheer/Beleid/Lokaalbeleid/20lokaal_afvalbeleid/60prod ucentenverantwoordelijkheid/Verpakkingsafval.asp, accessed 24 March 2006 133 See http://wetten.overheid.nl/cgi-bin/sessioned/browsercheck/continuation=28675- 002/session=539878930311449/action=javascript-result/javascript=yes, accessed 24 March 2006

Waste Prevention Policy Case Studies 132 - for other plastic packaging, at least 45% should be re-used and 27% recycled; - of glass packaging, 90% should be collected for material recycling; - of paper and cardboard packaging, 75% should be collected for material recycling; - metal packaging should reach 85% material recycling; and - wood packaging should reach 25% material recycling.

7.6.2 Policy Context and Reason for Introduction Packaging is one of the most visible waste streams, and important in terms of volume (typically 10-20% of the amount of household waste). It was a target of actions by NGOs in the late 1980s, calling for phasing out of (in their view) harmful packaging like PVC, reduction of the use of packaging, and the use of refillable packaging, all with the aim of realising resource efficiency. Against this background, packaging was one of the fields where there was considerable pressure to create successful prevention and re-use policy.

7.6.3 Date & Timetable of Introduction - Before 1991: studies into the prevention and re-use potential for packaging materials - June 1991: First Packaging Covenant signed - 1990s: many LCA and eco-efficiency studies within the framework of the covenant to analyse the environmental benefits of refillable packaging versus one-way packaging, re-use options, etc. - June 1994: the EU Packaging Directive comes into force - 1997: Second Packaging Covenant signed, with more stringent targets, now however mainly with regard only to the amount of packaging that can be landfilled and incinerated (not regarding waste prevention) - 2001: Third Packaging Covenant signed - 1 January 2006: Decree ‘Beheer verpakkingen en papier en karton’ [Management Packaging and paper and cardboard] introduced, that arranges producer responsibility for these materials 135 .

7.6.4 Prerequisites for Introduction The covenant structure that was practiced in the Netherlands works providing a number of prerequisites are fulfilled: - a well organised industry sector needs to be in place - there has to be a culture and attitude of trust between government, industry and NGOs - there has to be a willingness to delegate responsibility on the part of the government (as opposed to a top-down, command and control attitude and culture). - there has to be an appropriate institutional and cultural setting for monitoring (in this case, industry is willing to report data that others would see as

134 Note that in former regulations and covenants only re-fillable bottles were allowed, unless an LCA showed that a system based on material re-use would perform better environmentally. 135 See http://www.vrom.nl/pagina.html?id=9171, accessed 23 March 2004

Waste Prevention Policy Case Studies 133 confidential, and respected independent institutions like the Institute for Public Health and Environment need to be in place that perform this monitoring). As for introducing the intervention in the market that the first covenant actually was, the following preconditions played a key role - Clear societal pressure, which gave policy and the Environment Ministry the legitimacy to act; - Recognition by industry that they had to act, and that the covenant structure would give them a context in which they had a reasonable degree of freedom to choose their own measures. - A well thought-out organisational structure that allowed for more dedicated decision making on specific issues (e.g. refillable packaging versus recycling of packaging material) by using a science based approach (e.g. LCA) within boundary conditions set by the covenant and of which results where evaluated by a steering committee that not only included scientists, but also trade and industry. This gave confidence that decisions would not be entirely political, but at the same time, that societal perspectives would be taken into account.

7.6.5 Implementation Mechanisms The packaging covenant had a complex implementation mechanism. Virtually all relevant industries were members of the Organisation for Packaging and Environment (later SVM-Pact, which in turn was replaced by Nedvang - see below) and committed themselves to reach the targets of the covenant. For the Covenant, a special Packaging Commission was established that assessed the progress and compliance of the Covenant. The Commission was chaired by a retired Member of Parliament, and members are partly appointed by the Ministry of Environment and partly by trade and industry. It consists, in practice, of a mix of industry, science, and other representatives with a clear societal position. One of the most important roles of the Commission is to use monitoring data (production data from industry, and waste management data from the National Institute of Public Health and Environment) to check if the goals of the covenant are met. Under the Commission, various other committees played a role. Packaging materials were divided into groups (e.g. soft drinks, juices, milk, others), and where relevant, LCA studies focused on these groups were carried out to find out which options for prevention and re-use were likely to be better from an environmental and economic perspective. To ensure the quality of the work was of the required standard a Scientific Council (consisting purely of scientists) was established, and the results were brought into the Committee Environmental Analysis of Packaging. Individual studies additionally had their own peer-review panel (and often also a societal panel). This structure helped, considerably, to streamline the rather tense discussion on refillable versus one-way packaging. In this way, industry tried to work out the best way for it to realise prevention and re-use of packaging waste. Over the years, this structure was adapted. Under the current regulation, industry has set up a new Organisation called Nedvang (acronym of Netherlands from Waste to Materials) that deals with the embedded producer responsibility system 136 .

136 http://www.nedvang.nl/Nedvang (accessed 23 March 2006)

Waste Prevention Policy Case Studies 134 7.6.6 Monitoring and Measurement Techniques Applied As indicated above, large companies who were part of the covenant had to report the production of packaging, on a voluntary basis. Following the 2 nd covenant of 1997, also smaller companies were given an obligation to submit monitoring reports. Reporting also included plans for prevention and re-use. Waste collectors and companies that re-use waste provide the amount of separately collected and re-used packaging, and the National Institute of Public Health and Environment (RIVM) calculates on the basis of sorting tests the amount of packaging in municipal solid waste. The full picture is then compiled and checked by RIVM and submitted to the Packaging Committee.

7.6.7 Impact The impact of the Covenants and subsequent regulation has been substantial, particularly with regard to the amount of packaging waste landfilled and incinerated. Prevention was also reasonably successful. Compared to 1986, when corrected for GNP growth, 27% less packaging was put on the market in 2001 (with a target of 10% reduction). 137 For instance, many of the examples given in the booklet ‘Ten Years of Packaging Developments’ of SVM-PACT (the organisation of the packaging industry) show about 10-30% reduction of the use of packaging by smarter design, making packaging thinner, or concentrating the packaged materials (e.g. washing powder) 138 .

7.6.8 Economic Implications The measures taken of course came at a cost, but it is difficult to analyse what the net impact on industry was. After all, prices for waste management (incineration and landfill) soared in the Netherlands from a few dozen Euros per tonne to well over 100 Euro per tonne due to improvement of quality of installations and landfill taxes and bans. As avoided disposal costs increased, of course, re-use and prevention became relatively less costly.

7.6.9 Social Implications There are no clear social implications.

7.6.10 Distributional Implications There are no clear distributional implications.

7.6.11 Enforcement Issues Enforcement has not been a real issue in the covenant period. A main reason may have been that packaging also represents brand value for many industries, and non- compliance with the Covenant, that certainly would have been noted due to the elaborated monitoring, would probably jeopardize much more value than could be saved by ‘playing’ around the rules. Note also that since industry tried to work together in elaborating solutions, they would not tolerate a (visible) free rider within their group.

137 See e.g. http://www.fnli.nl/werkgebieden/conv-verp2.php, accessed 23 March 2006 138 Important successes like the partial elimination of industrial packaging like shrink-wrap are less relevant for this study on household waste.

Waste Prevention Policy Case Studies 135 7.6.12 Political and Public Response Where the packaging issue was clearly a hot and visible political topic in the early 1990s, the profile is now much lower. The pressure on industry, and also on politicians, has clearly eased, and other topics (safety, multicultural society, education, the health system) now dominate the agenda. This was reflected by the fact that since 2002, only a junior minister is responsible for the Dutch Directorate General Environment portfolio for the first time in Dutch history. In this environment, industry saw a clear opportunity to eliminate the one measure that they most disliked: the inherent preference in the Covenant system (and later legislation) for refillable bottles 139 . The logistics of the return system, and particularly the space demands at retail shops, was not appreciated by retailers and (soft) drink producers. Recently, the junior minister for Environment accepted that one-way, recyclable (as opposed to return, re-usable) PET bottles could be used. After 15 years of the debate, industry finally found the window of opportunity to win this battle.

7.6.13 Other Impacts Not relevant

7.6.14 Key Success/Failure Factors - See under provisions for implementation

7.6.15 Future Changes/Modifications Planned As indicated, the system now has been modified to a target setting system on the basis of a legal Decree. Amongst other things, this fits more comfortably with the situation shaped by the EU that sets demands with regard to packaging in a formal Directive. Under the new Decree, the options exists that deposit schemes may be implemented – although this is considered unlikely at this point in time.

7.6.16 Evaluations Undertaken

Prior to Introduction Various studies within the framework of the implementation plan on packaging in the 1990s.

Following Introduction A great variety of LCAs and eco-efficiency analyses were done on individual packaging groups to find out the best way of improving the system. Furthermore, there is an annual monitoring and evaluation exercise with regard to the amounts of packaging put on the market, and their treatment, to see if targets are met.

139 The covenant literally stated that LCAs had to prove that only if a recycling option proved to be at least equal or better than refillable bottles in environmental terms, then a recycling system could be used. Such proof almost always failed, with even the most efficient recycling systems at best close to equal to the environmental performance of refillable bottles.

Waste Prevention Policy Case Studies 136 7.7 Producer Responsibility with Deposit system for Electrical and Electronic Products

7.7.1 Description By Decree producers and importers of electrical and electronic goods are held responsible for collection and treatment of end of life products. The idea is that such producer responsibility will: a) boost re-use; but b) also influence the design of products, leading to less product waste and less hazardous product waste.

7.7.2 Policy Context and Reason for Introduction Electrical and electronic products had long been seen as a priority waste stream with hazardous components. They were identified as priority waste stream in the White Paper on Prevention in 1998 and an Implementation Plan was written. When it became clear that voluntary measures were unlikely to have the desired effect, the Dutch Environment Ministry opted for statutory intervention. In 2003 the EU launched similar legislation EU wide via its WEEE Directive 140 . This prompted an adaptation of the Dutch regulation, which also implemented demands with regard to the restriction of hazardous substances in electrical and electronic equipment.

7.7.3 Date & Timetable of Introduction - 1988 Waste from Electrical and Electronic goods identified as priority waste stream in the White paper on Prevention. - Early 1990s: Implementation plan on Prevention and Re-use of Electrical and Electronic products written. - Mid 1990s: discussions on implementation via voluntary and legal approaches - 1 June 1998: Decree on the Treatment of White and Brown Goods implemented - 1 January 1999: Decree in force for ‘large’ White and Brown Goods - 1 January 2000: Decree in force for all White and Brown goods - 6 July 2004: Revision of the Decree to implement the WEEE and RoHS directives 141

7.7.4 Prerequisites for Introduction Introduction obviously needed clear political backing and determination. Consideration was given to issues relating to costs, secondary environmental impacts and effects on employment. The approach was acceptable for industry since it

140 Directive 2002/96/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27 January 2003 on waste electrical and electronic equipment (WEEE) and Directive 2003/108/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 8 December 2003 amending Directive 2002/96/EC on waste electrical and electronic equipment (WEEE). 141 Decree OF July 6, 2004 establishing rules for the management of waste electrical and electronic equipment and for the use of certain hazardous substances in electrical and electronic equipment (WEEE Management Decree). Available via http://www.vrom.nl/pagina.html?id=7107, accessed 19 March 2006

Waste Prevention Policy Case Studies 137 created a level playing field, and allowed industry to organise waste management themselves.

7.7.5 Implementation Mechanisms The Decree obliges producers and importers to take responsibility for collection and treatment of waste of electrical and electronic products. They have to take back, free of charge, any such waste from municipalities, retail stores, and repair shops, and are also responsible for transport. Municipalities, retail stores and repair shops also have an obligation to take back such waste from consumers. The costs for municipalities are covered by the regular waste management fee every citizen in the Netherlands pays, whereas for retail stores and repair shops it is financed through producer responsibility. Whereas the Decree formally gives individual responsibility to every producer and importer, this responsibility can be discharged via a collective system. Industry organisations have developed two systems: • The first system covers the more traditional electrical and electronic products, and finances its costs by charging a limited levy on every new product sold 142 . • The second system has been set up by importers and producers of ICT (computers, printers and similar), and in this system the total costs of collection and treatment are paid by the importers/producers on the basis of their current market share.

7.7.6 Monitoring and Measurement Techniques Applied Individual companies, or the organisations that they have set up to represent them, have to indicate how they will deal with the producer responsibility and report that to the Environment Ministry. The junior Minister for Environment then approves or rejects the plan 143 . Monitoring and financial management is carried out by dedicated legal entities that have been established by industry organisations to implement the waste management system.

7.7.7 Impact The systems implied a tremendous boost in recycling rates. Particularly for large waste products, close to 100% now enters the management system. Recycling rates to be met are on a kg basis and are now based on the targets set in the WEEE Directive. There is no data on re-use but as there is no direct obligation it is essentially left to the second hand market. In terms of waste prevention, the effect is much less clear. There is no clear evidence of dramatic lowering of the amount of WEEE that becomes available. The amount of WEEE was 117,000 tonnes in 1992 144 , and around 134,000 tonnes in 2001 145 . The

142 The system is organised by the Nederlandse vereniging Verwijdering Metalektro Produkten (Dutch organisation Management of Metal-Electro Products, NVMP) 143 In practice a state agency, SenterNovem, performs this operational task. See http://www.senternovem.nl/uitvoeringafvalbeheer/Uitvoeringsbesluiten/Productbesluiten/index.asp (accessed 19 March 2006) 144 K. Meiling and A.H. Hanemaayer (1993), Werkdocument afgedankt wit- en bruingoed [Working document waste from electrical and electronic products]. RIVM, Bilthoven, Netherlands, report 736202005

Waste Prevention Policy Case Studies 138 situation is complicated by the fact that much of the electrical and electronic equipment sold is added to a stock in society, so that there is a (long) delay before the equipment ends up in the waste system. Improvement in the field of hazardousness of waste is related to implementations of the Dutch equivalents of the EU Directive on Restriction of Hazardous Substances.

7.7.8 Economic Implications The economic implications are surprisingly small. The ‘Treatment fee’ on products after introduction was rarely more than a few percent of the original price.

7.7.9 Social Implications There are no clear social implications.

7.7.10 Distributional Implications There are no clear distributional implications, given the relatively low costs involved

7.7.11 Enforcement Issues Enforcement is rather straightforward. Every producer or importer has to be, in practice, a member of one of the two organisations that arranges for management of these materials. A sizable importer that would seek to avoid this system would be easily spotted by the Environment Inspectorate, and jeopardise its image and brand value.

7.7.12 Political and Public Response There is general acceptance of the system and its principles. Industry, however, tends to be negative about the recycling targets, set in kg. In their view, getting hazardous and/or valuable materials out from the products is much more relevant, whereas much of the bulk material, like plastic, could, they argue, be used for energy recovery with similar environmental benefits.

7.7.13 Other Impacts Not relevant

7.7.14 Key Success/Failure Factors - Political determination - Long period of discussion and study, and involving industry in this (Implementation Plan approach) - Obligations for producers, importers, retailers and repair shops. - Leaving the practical implementation to industry - Clear communication with the public when the systems were implemented

145 Informatieblad wit- en bruingoed [Information Leaflet Electrical and Electronic Products], Environment Ministry, den Haag, Netherlands, 2001. The figure of 134.000 tpa still appears in more recent documents, which suggests that no clear estimates have been made about waste arisings (which is not the same as the amount of WEEE treated) since then. Compare http://www.vrom.nl/pagina.html?id=7106, accessed 20 March 2006

Waste Prevention Policy Case Studies 139 7.7.15 Future Changes/Modifications Planned Since 2003 the Dutch regulation has been de facto surpassed by EU developments. The Dutch regulation now serves as the implementation mechanism for the EU’s WEEE Directive and RoHS Directive.

7.7.16 Evaluations Undertaken

Prior to Introduction Various studies within the framework of the Strategic Process / Implementation Plans on Prevention and Re-use of White and Brown Goods.

Following Introduction None reported. 7.8 Case B3: Stimulation of Home Composting (initiative)

7.8.1 Description Several provinces and municipalities have stimulated home composting by making available composting equipment for a reduced price to households, or by organising educational activities 146 .

7.8.2 Policy Context and Reason for Introduction Organic waste is the most voluminous component in household waste (30-40% in volume). Home composting can hence contribute considerably to waste prevention via re-use on site.

7.8.3 Date & Timetable of Introduction - No formal implementation. Various municipalities stimulated home composting via various mechanisms

7.8.4 Prerequisites for Introduction Introduction needs to be accompanied by public awareness campaigns.

7.8.5 Implementation Mechanisms Through the municipal service home composting equipment can be purchased, often subsidized, and information and education about composting is given.

7.8.6 Monitoring and Measurement Techniques Applied Not relevant

146 Examples include the (mostly rural) municipalities of Ermelo, Soest and Roosendaal in the Netherlands and Tremeloo in Belgium. See for instance: http://www.soest.nl/smartsite19044.dws, http://www.roosendaal.nl/dspage.asp?objectid=13517, http://www.ermelo.nl/index.asp?p=http://www.ermelo.nl/tDocumenten/detail.asp?pKey1=20919148 2; http://www.tremelo.be/Milieu/Compost_en_houtsnippers/Middelen_om_thuis_te_composteren; all accessed 20 March 2006

Waste Prevention Policy Case Studies 140 7.8.7 Impact The impact in practice is quite limited. Some of the municipalities referred to above openly indicated on their website that ‘response was low’ and that they therefore embarked on additional initiatives like education. In practice, in the Netherlands, home composting appears to be a niche. The mainstream approach is the compulsory separated collection of organic waste in the Netherlands, combined with centralised composting. Since most municipalities provide garden waste collections, often (unless in some DifTar schemes) without any charge, then the convenience of the separate collection systems means that home composting is for real enthusiasts only.

7.8.8 Economic and Social Implications There are no clear economic and social implications.

7.8.9 Distributional Implications There are no clear distributional implications, given the relatively low costs involved.

7.8.10 Enforcement Issues Since it is a voluntary measure, enforcement is not really relevant.

7.8.11 Political and Public Response As indicated the political and public response is rather limited. The implementation of separate collection of organic waste has a much higher impact in reducing waste flows to incineration and landfill. As with many local authorities in the UK, the typical approach to organic waste collection in the Netherlands includes the collection of garden waste. Consequently, unless charges are in place for use of the biowaste container, there is likely to be some disincentive to home compost biowaste (owing to the convenience of the collection scheme).

7.8.12 Other Impacts Not relevant

7.8.13 Key Success/Failure Factors - Political determination - Public awareness raising - Combination of the initiative with DifTar (‘pay per kg’) is probably enhancing impacts considerably, by giving a driver to households to reduce the amount of waste for collection.

7.8.14 Future Changes/Modifications Planned None. As for the separate collection of organic waste, it has to be noted that policy backing is gradually diminishing. The system is rather expensive and not applied anyway in quarters with apartment buildings/flats. Various studies have questioned the environmental gains of separate collection and composting compared to integrated collection and incineration (a.o. the SEA on the National Waste

Waste Prevention Policy Case Studies 141 Management Plan 2002). The current regulation on obligatory separated collection of organic waste allowed already for exemptions, which will be broadened in future 147 .

7.8.15 Evaluations Undertaken

Prior to, and Following, Introduction None reported

7.9 Stimulation of Product Re-use via 2 nd Hand Shops (initiative)

7.9.1 Description Several municipalities work together with 2 nd hand shops. Bulky waste that is collected via the municipal system, and that still is usable, is transferred to 2 nd hand shops where it is re-furbished and sold again 148 .

7.9.2 Policy Context and Reason for Introduction Bulky waste is not as voluminous as regular household waste, but is still a sizeable waste stream. It is also rather difficult to handle in incinerators, so in the Dutch context, where the ban on landfill is in place, avoiding disposal is more beneficial.

7.9.3 Date & Timetable of Introduction - No formal implementation.

7.9.4 Prerequisites for Introduction Political willingness and availability of 2 nd hand shops in or near the municipality

7.9.5 Implementation Mechanisms The municipal waste collection service has an agreement with second hand shops to check collected items for re-usability and hands over the items for refurbishment and re-sale.

7.9.6 Monitoring and Measurement Techniques Applied Not relevant

7.9.7 Impact The impact, in practice, is quite limited. For important streams of bulky waste (refrigerators, TVs, washing machines, other brown and white goods) producer responsibility had been implemented (since 2003 via the WEEE Directive). This already gives a recycling channel for such waste. The main remaining materials of interest are old furniture items. Furthermore, buying second hand material is a marginal activity in the economy: most people tend to prefer new equipment.

147 http://www.vrom.nl/pagina.html?id=9165 148 See for instance the websites of the following municipalities, which have contractual agreements with 2 nd hand shops. It concerns e.g. Zaandam and Dinkelland, http://www.zaanstad.nl/mv/afvalinzameling/kringloopwinkels/; http://www.dinkelland.nl/ondernemers/nieuws/00011/

Waste Prevention Policy Case Studies 142 7.9.8 Economic Implications In principle there is a win-win, since citizens are provided with goods for lower prices. However, the labour costs for refurbishing secondary products are often prohibitive.

7.9.9 Social Implications Second hand shops tend to provide a mechanism that helps people who are long- term unemployed, or social dropouts, to re-integrate in society 149 .

7.9.10 Distributional Implications There are no clear distributional implications

7.9.11 Enforcement Issues Since it is a voluntary measure, enforcement is not relevant.

7.9.12 Political and Public Response As indicated the political and public response is rather limited. The implementation of waste management schemes for the most relevant bulky waste streams via producer responsibility is seen as much more important and mainstream.

7.9.13 Other Impacts Not relevant

7.9.14 Key Success/Failure Factors - Public awareness raising - Introduction of WEEE type of legislation is a failure factor for such initiatives, since people now are encouraged to send their discarded products to such waste management schemes (for recycling only).

7.9.15 Future Changes/Modifications Planned Not relevant.

7.9.16 Evaluations Undertaken

Prior to, and Following, Introduction None reported 7.10 Prevention Through ‘No Junk Mail’ stickers on post boxes (self-regulation/initiative)

7.10.1 Description Dutch citizens can put a uniform sticker on their post box that contains just two words: No-Yes or No-No. The No-Yes sticker says ‘No’ to paper advertisement material, and ‘Yes’ to free, local newspapers, and the second sticker says ‘No’ to both. The idea is that households get much less junk mail (see Figure 31).

149 For instance, re-integration is mentioned as a formal goal on the website of the organisation f 2 nd hand shops in the Netherlands, http://www.kringloopwinkels.nl/ (accessed 22 March 2006)

Waste Prevention Policy Case Studies 143 Figure 31: Example Stickers

7.10.2 Policy Context and Reason for Introduction This is a very simple measure leading to waste prevention. It is a way for households to make visible to outsiders their environmental awareness. It fits with the general concern for the environment that arose in the late 1980s in the Netherlands. Next to packaging, advertising material such as mail-shots was another very ‘visible’ material which led to increased waste. It was heavily targeted by environmental NGOs in the early 1990s and in the end led to a ‘Code of Conduct on Distribution of non-addressed Advertisement Materials’ that is part of the general Code of Conduct for Advertisement, set up by the Dutch ‘Reclamecode-commissie’ [RCC, Commission for Code of Conduct for Advertisement] 150 .

7.10.3 Date & Timetable of Introduction - The Code was adopted first on 1 January 1993 and revised on 1 January 2004.

7.10.4 Prerequisites for Introduction Awareness and willingness of the population to embark on waste prevention.

7.10.5 Implementation Mechanisms The sticker can be obtained for free from the relevant industry organisation, the municipality or environmental NGOs 151 . The (limited) costs should be covered by the parties that are members of the RCC and adopted the Code of Conduct for Advertisement 152 . It concerns the vast majority of organisations who are

150 See for further explanation (in Dutch): http://www.reclamecode.nl/infomenu/boekje_tekst.asp?ID=41 151 See for instance the websites of Milieudefensie, municipality of Leiden, municipality of Hilversum, and others: http://www.milieudefensie.nl/globalisering/doemee/reclamdw.htm, http://www.leiden.nl/dspage.asp?objectid=8580; http://www.hilversum.nl/live/index.jsp?nav=397&loc=973&det=67040 152 Note that financing the RCC is not totally trouble free. There is no hard obligation, and the RCC sends out request for contributions to the advertisement branch on the basis of annual turnover of a company. But, as the Annual Report 2004 indicates: “about 55% of the parties providing

Waste Prevention Policy Case Studies 144 representatives of the publishing and advertising industries, and consumer organisations. The Code of Conduct stipulates that the sender of the advertising material should always be recognisable, and that the message on the sticker should be respected. Also, the amount of advertising material produced should be adjusted to the number of households that have indicated their desire to reject such material.

7.10.6 Monitoring and Measurement Techniques Applied Not relevant

7.10.7 Impact To our knowledge there has not been a dedicated monitoring of the impact, but it could be significant. About 5% of household waste is advertising material, and 5% is newspapers. This very simple measure hence can in theory prevent over 5% of household waste. The practical impact is of course dependent upon the number of households using such a sticker. No data on this are available, but it is likely to be significant.

7.10.8 Economic Implications The economic implications are not clear. The direct impacts are of course minimal, and it is likely that households will spend their income in a similar way even if they receive less advertisements.

7.10.9 Social Implications Probably not relevant

7.10.10 Distributional Implications Probably not relevant

7.10.11 Enforcement Issues If someone receives advertising materials despite having a sticker, he/she first should contact the sender. If the problem persists, he/she can submit a complaint to the RCC. The RCC then can investigate the problem and take disciplinary action to the party that failed to comply with the Code. Disciplinary action implies 153 : - public announcement that someone offended the Code; - (if the problem persists) exclusion of the offender from distributing his or her advertisement via parties that subscribed to the Code.

7.10.12 Political and Public Response The measure is rather successful. Many households use the sticker.

7.10.13 Other Impacts Not relevant advertisements reacted to this request’. RCC, Jaarverslag 2004 [Annual Report 2004], Amsterdam, Netherlands 153 See the webside of the RCC at: http://www.reclamecode.nl/faqmenu/faq.asp?engels=&vaagID=2#2 (accessed 18 March 2006)

Waste Prevention Policy Case Studies 145 7.10.14 Key Success/Failure Factors - Public awareness raising - Visibility of the measure

7.10.15 Future Changes/Modifications Planned Not relevant.

7.10.16 Evaluations Undertaken

Prior to introduction None reported

Following introduction None reported. 7.11 Implementation Plan (Small) Batteries (Qualitative Prevention and Re-use)

7.11.1 Description For improving waste management and realising (quantitative) prevention of batteries two regulations were implemented. First, in 1995 a Decree on waste management of (small) batteries was implemented, that enforced producer responsibility. Importers and producers of batteries became obliged to take back batteries for free and take care of their treatment. Collection is organised via a general collection system of household hazardous waste by municipalities (paid for from the regular Waste management fee) or retail shops (‘battery box’). Importers and producers of batteries decided to set up a Foundation, Stibat, which would arrange waste management of batteries for them (upon financial compensation). Whereas this system may have provided some incentives for qualitative prevention, the real reduction and phase out of hazardous components such as mercury was arranged via dedicated actions. In the early 1990s two covenants were agreed upon between industry and government on: - the replacement of mercury-oxide batteries by zinc-air batteries - reduction of the mercury content of batteries These covenants were later replaced by legislation on the basis of EU Directives on the mercury content of batteries.

7.11.2 Policy Context and Reason for Introduction Batteries form a small waste flow, but are the single most important contributor to flows of heavy metals in household waste. With incineration being the main household waste treatment method in the Netherlands, batteries in this waste could have a negative influence on the incinerator fly ash and slags from these incinerators. Mercury is a volatile heavy metal so it is more likely to be found in the raw (uncleaned) flue gas of incinerators. Depending on the effectiveness of its removal from the flue gas, some will also be emitted to the atmosphere. As far as incinerator slags were concerned, it was deemed very important to maintain the quality of in

Waste Prevention Policy Case Studies 146 particular the bottom ash at a quality suitable to allow its re-use in road foundations or other applications. Apart from this technical reason, batteries were one of the main symbols of hazardous household waste and hence a logical target for policy.

7.11.3 Date & Timetable of Introduction - Late 1980s: covenants on the replacement of mercury-oxide batteries by zinc- air batteries, and reduction of mercury content of batteries to less than 0.15% (both goals achieved by 1991). - Early 1990s: presentation of studies on batteries 154 and development of the Implementation plan Batteries 155 . - 1995 implementation of the Decree on waste management of small batteries - 1998 EU Directive on the mercury content of lead batteries (maximum limit 5 ppm Hg)

7.11.4 Prerequisites for Introduction Political willingness and the availability of a well organised industry organisation.

7.11.5 Implementation Mechanisms See under description.

7.11.6 Monitoring and Measurement Techniques Applied There are two points relevant for monitoring. First, the amount of batteries sold has to be reported, and the related producer responsibility fee has to be transferred to Stibat. Stibat has a clear interest to have as complete as possible sales data since their revenues depend on this 156 . With regard to management, for hazardous waste a centralised notification system is in force to collect data on collection, treatment and treatment after export 157 .

7.11.7 Impact The impact of the measures has been a steady rise of collected and treated amount of batteries, though the goal of 90% in 1999 was not met (70% was collected; some 1,850 of 2,667 tpa). There has been no effect on quantitative prevention. Qualitative prevention was realised by the national and EU legislation on reduction of hazardous substances in batteries.

7.11.8 Economic Implications Economic implications are not clear. Costs of treatment (per kg) are very high compared to landfill, but likely to be limited compared to the price of batteries.

154 Informatiedocument Batterijen (Information Document Batteries), RIVM, Bilthoven, Netherlands, 1991, Report 73902014 155 Implementatieplan Batterijen [Implementation plan Batteries], Publication Series Waste Management 1992/9, Environment Ministry, den Haag, Netherlands. 156 See for instance www.stibat.nl, accessed 22 March 2006. 157 See for instance http://www.senternovem.nl/uitvoeringafvalbeheer/index.asp, and http://www.lma.nl, accessed 22 March 2006

Waste Prevention Policy Case Studies 147 7.11.9 Social Implications Probably not relevant

7.11.10 Distributional Implications Probably not relevant

7.11.11 Enforcement Issues No specific enforcement problems.

7.11.12 Political and Public Response No specific responses of interest

7.11.13 Other Impacts Not relevant

7.11.14 Key Success/Failure Factors - Nature of batteries (small) - Multiple routes in the collection system: the regular collection system for small quantities of hazardous waste, drop-off points at shops, etc.

7.11.15 Future Changes/Modifications Planned Not relevant.

7.11.16 Evaluations Undertaken

Prior to introduction Research within the framework of the Implementation Plan Batteries.

Following introduction Regular monitoring 7.12 Product Re-use and Material Re-use of Car Tyres

7.12.1 Description A Dutch Decree regulates targets for product- and material re-use for car tyres via producer responsibility. The target is 60% for product re-use (direct and after tread renewal), 20% for material re-use (granulation of tyres and use of the granulate for other rubber products) and 20% incineration. Producers and importers of tyres are obliged to take back tyres and organise re-use and treatment according to the targets set out above. Repair shops and garages are obliged to take in old tyres when they sell a new one. There was no explicit obligation that producers, importers and retailers should bear the costs or that the original tyre owner should be able to deliver it free of charge 158 .

158 One could argue if this waste flow should be classified as household waste: normally tyres are disposed off via repair shops and garages.

Waste Prevention Policy Case Studies 148 This led to the situation in which repair shops and garages still had an incentive to find the cheapest way for treatment. A new decree implemented in 2003 forces producers and importers to collect tyres free of charge. However, targets are now less strict, and only 20% material re-use is asked for in the regulation.

7.12.2 Policy Context and Reason for Introduction Used tyres are a voluminous waste stream that cannot be incinerated easily, and hence often end up on landfills or as litter. With the general trend to reduction of landfill, it was clear that something had to be done about tyres in the early 1990s. The form chosen was a regulation.

7.12.3 Date & Timetable of Introduction - Early 1990s: research for the implementation plan on car tyres - 1995: Decree management of car tyres adopted - 1995: Publication of the Decree on a Ban of Landfill of Waste (including tyres) - 9 December 2003: Decree adopted to make the producers and importers of car tyres also financially responsible for treatment.

7.12.4 Prerequisites for Introduction Political willingness, and a rather strong organisational structure within the industry.

7.12.5 Implementation Mechanisms An organisation structure set up by industry, backed up by regulation.

7.12.6 Monitoring and Measurement Techniques Applied Monitoring is rather difficult. Authorities relied on data of the Vereniging Band en Milieu [Organisation for Tyres and the Environment], who were charged with implementing the Decree of 1995, and estimates were fragile 159 .

7.12.7 Impact Until 2001 targets were not met. Many repair shops and garages did not do business with the certified collectors and hence a separate market existed though which tyres were managed. The effect on prevention can be discussed from two perspectives: - direct prevention is probably limited. It is not likely that the legislation at stake will influence producers to develop tyres with longer life spans. Indeed, the latest National Waste Management Plan of 2002 concluded that ‘the average life span of tyres has been reduced’, probably due to imports of lower cost but lower quality tyres. - Prevention in terms of product re-use may be more relevant. After all, in the system an incentive is now given to look for an alternative use of a used tyre, if possible, after renewal of the tread. However, the National Waste

159 AfvalOverlegOrgaan [Waste Management Council] (2004), Nederlands Aval in Cijfers, gegevens 2000-2003 (Dutch Waste in Figures, Data 2000-2003) AOO 2004-07, p16, Utrecht, Netherlands, available via www. aoo.nl/afvalscheiding.info/publicaties/ check_gegevens.asp?file_id=541&publicatie_id=431 (accessed 20 March 2006)

Waste Prevention Policy Case Studies 149 Management Plan of 2002 concluded that ‘due to imports of low-cost tyres the interest in tread renewal is stagnant’ 160

7.12.8 Economic Implications There are limited economic implications, in that sense that car driving was made marginally more expensive by this measure. Costs for management of used tyres became higher.

7.12.9 Social Implications Probably not relevant

7.12.10 Distributional Implications Probably not relevant

7.12.11 Enforcement Issues The initial regulation set a standard for re-use and recycling, but this was difficult to enforce since the industry set up a system, but this systems was not obligatory, and hence was not used by all the relevant actors. As indicated the adapted regulation mainly is based on providing price incentives for re-use and avoiding littering of tyres. The main enforcement issue is registration of importers and producers, but that is rather straightforward. The recycling target seems to be of little relevance. The main interest now seems to be to ensure that tyres are re-used (though re-treads are less attractive due to imports) or used for their energy content in cement kilns.

7.12.12 Political and Public Response The measure is rather invisible for the public and the policy is well accepted. The main problem was that targets were not met.

7.12.13 Other Impacts Not relevant

7.12.14 Key Success/Failure Factors - legislation did not include financial incentives nor obligations to use the re-use system set up by industry. - No clear obligations for realising re-use percentages - Product character of used tyres (hence a regular good not covered under waste regulations) - Trend of consumers to choose for products with low initial investment, also if they last shorter and lifetime costs may be higher.

7.12.15 Future Changes/Modifications Planned Not relevant.

160 Landelijk AfvalbeheersPlan, Sectorplan 11, Auto-afval (National Waste Management Plan, Sector Plan 11, Automotive Waste). Available from Ministry of Environment, the Hague, Netherlands, and www.vrom.nl/get.asp?file=docs/ milieu/LAP_sectorplan11.pdf

Waste Prevention Policy Case Studies 150 7.12.16 Evaluations Undertaken

Prior to Introduction As a part of the Implementation Plan Car Tyres

Following Introduction None.

Waste Prevention Policy Case Studies 151

8 POLICIES FOR HWP IN USE IN GERMANY 8.1 Introduction Household waste in the Germany became a political issue in the 1970s. Before that time there were 50,000 waste disposal sites throughout West Germany without technical measures to secure safe disposal. With the first nation-wide Waste Disposal Law (Abfall-Beseitigungsgesetz - AbfG) from 1972 unauthorised disposal sites were closed and 98% of German citizens could use the refuse disposal service to dispose of their waste. It is remarkable that Art. 14 of the Waste Disposal Law contained a delegated power for an ordinance to impose restrictions on the packaging industry, even including a ban on packaging that would cause too much waste. But this ordinance was neither passed in the 70ies nor in the 80ies. Instead the waste problem was growing (the so called “Müllberge” or “Müllnotstand”) and the disposal of waste via landfill and thermal treatment did not solve the problem. In the revised Waste Disposal Act from 1986, besides the disposal of waste, the prevention and recycling of waste was regulated in Art. 1a. But the prevention of household waste remained empty words, because government did not pass the possible ordinance to regulate the waste prevention. Not until 1991 with the enactment of the Packaging Ordinance (Verpackungsverordnung) was the prevention of (household) waste targeted as a first step. The successor of the Waste Law was the Closed Substances and Recycling Act Kreislaufwirtschafts- und Abfallgesetz) 1994. This introduced a waste management hierarchy in Art. 4, establishing that waste generation must, firstly, be prevented by means of reducing its amount and its toxicity. Secondly, waste must be subjected to substance recycling or for energy recovery, which means to use waste as a substitute fuel. Only in a third step, when minimisation or recovery is not possible, waste should be disposed of. A novelty in the Closed Substances and Recycling Act were the regulations on the producer responsibility in Articles 22 sqq committing the producers and distributors to design their products in a way that prevents waste in the manufacture and usage of a product. In Germany, apart from the packaging ordinance and some regulations in the Electrical and Electronic Equipment Act – (ElektroG) or the Battery Decree the producer responsibility concerning household waste is not widespread. 8.2 Local Waste Statutes Regarding Waste Charges

8.2.1 Description (pay per volume model) The local competent authorities raise disposal fees from their citizens for the disposal of waste. These fees are required to cover the costs of the disposal. A realization of profits is not intended by the collection of those waste fees (the principle is that of cost-recovery in accordance with the law on charges). The levels of waste fees vary considerably across Germany. In several waste laws of the German Länder, it is stated explicitly that waste charges for the disposal of waste shall constitute incentives to prevent waste as well as incentives to separate and recycle waste (e.g. Art. 9 para 2 of the waste law of North-

Waste Prevention Policy Case Studies 152 Rhine-Westfalia). In other states of Germany (Länder) these incentives are not regulated explicitly (e.g. the waste law of Hesse) but their regulations have to consider the principle of waste avoidance in a similar way. The calculation of waste charges in Germany basically follows two models: - Calculation according to the number of persons per household (flat-rate model, applied by the majority of the municipalities in Germany). Waste fees are usually divided into an annual fee and a container fee. The annual fee depends on the number of persons in the households, the container fee depends on the size of the container, usually a wheeled bin. - Calculation according to the quantity of the waste disposed (pay-per-volume model; e.g. municipalities in the counties “Darmstadt-Dieburg” and “Gießen” in the Land Hesse). To realize a variable charging for the residual waste, two models are used in Germany: • Bar Code System and • Token system (“Wertmarkensystem”) Citizens can choose between different sizes of wheelie bins (50 l - 240 l, sizes vary from county to county) and between two different disposal frequencies (twice a month or once a month). It is obligatory to use the smallest possible bin. According to German jurisprudence, citizens are obliged to dispose of their waste using the local waste disposal system. Citizens cannot, therefore, refuse to have a wheeled bin. The reason for this in case law is the fact that the fees for the public disposal service have to be paid by the community. The two counties Darmstadt-Dieburg and Gießen in the Land Hesse will serve as examples of the description of the pay-per-volume system.

Structure of the Waste Disposal Charge in the County Darmstadt-Dieburg Starting in 1996 in the county Darmstadt-Dieburg, a waste disposal charge per volume was introduced and implemented using a barcode-sticker on the wheeled bin. According to the new structure of the waste disposal charge the basic fee covers the collection of the residual waste in wheeled bins (“Graue Tonne”) having volume ranges from 50 to 240 litres per month. For any further clearing of the wheeled bin, an additional charge was to be levied. The structure of charges is shown in Table 46. Other household wastes, like the DSD-waste (“Gelber Sack”), organic waste (“Braune Tonne”) and waste paper are not directly included in the above mentioned system, but the cost decreasing effects of those waste streams are taken into account in the overall-calculation of waste charges.

Waste Prevention Policy Case Studies 153

Table 46: Structure of Waste Charge for Residual Waste in the County Darmstadt- Dieburg Size of the whewheelieelie bin Basic fee per year¹ Fee for additional (litre) Clearance

50 96.00 EUR 8.00 EUR 60 115.20 EUR 9.60 EUR

80 153.60 EUR 12.80 EUR

120 230.40 EUR 19.20 EUR

240 460.80 EUR 38.40 EUR

1,110² 3,162.00 EUR

¹ Including 12 collections ² Collection every fortnight

Structure of Waste Disposal Charge in the County Gießen 161 Standard Volume In order to determine the correct wheeled bin size for a household, there is usually set a need for 15 litres of capacity for residual waste per person and week (standard volume). Minimum Volume If the waste is separated perfectly, citizens can manage with an even lower minimum volume of 7.5 litres per person and week. At the very least, the fee relate to this minimum volume has to be paid by everyone. Apart from this, the following fees are applied. Waste Paper 240-Litre-waste paper bins are placed at the disposal of all private households free of charge (in addition to their wheeled bins for residual waste). The waste paper bin is emptied monthly. NeighboNeighbourur wheelie bin One-person-households can reduce the costs using a wheelie bin with neighbours together. The neighbours only have to agree on who is paying the fee; only this person receives then the fee-invoice.

Table 47: Charges for Residual Waste Size of the bin Emptying Fee intervals

161 See also www.trend-abfall.de for further information.

Waste Prevention Policy Case Studies 154 60 Litre once a month 71.40 Euro twice a month 147.60 Euro 120 Litre once a month 133.20 Euro twice a month 277.20 Euro 240 Litre once a month 262.80 Euro twice a month 538.80 Euro 1.100 Litre-bin once a month 1,212.00 Euro twice a month 2,472.00 Euro

Table 48: Charges for Organic Waste Collection Size of the bin Emptying interval Fee 120 Litre twice a month 28.80 Euro

240 Litre twice a month 57.60 Euro

8.2.2 Policy Context and Reason for Introduction The disadvantage of the flat rate per-person charging system is that there are no “strong” incentives to avoid waste, because for the calculation of charges the quantity of disposed waste is not important, only the number of persons matter. With the introduction of the pay-per-volume system, waste avoidance and separation could be promoted by financial incentives and in this way the competent local authority will save costs where residual waste treatments are relatively expensive. The decision to introduce the pay-per-volume model (“waste producer pays”) thus follows both, the cost recovery principle and the goal of waste avoidance.

8.2.3 Date & Timetable of Introduction Examples for the two counties: Pay-per-volume system of the county Darmstadt-Dieburg: - practical test in one of the municipalities of the county - starting from 1996: further municipalities introduced the flexible fee-system - since 2001: application of the system in all municipalities of the county Pay-per-volume system of the county Gießen: - 2001: the municipality Wettenberg was the first community of the county to introduced the system - 2002-2004: 9 of the 17 municipalities in the county introduced the pay-per- volume system - Period to the end of 2005: all of the remaining municipalities introduced the new fee-system

Waste Prevention Policy Case Studies 155 8.2.4 Prerequisites for Introduction A basic prerequisite for the introduction of waste charges is a legal regulation in the nature of a local waste charge statute. In regard to technically (logistics) aspects of the pay-per-volume system it is important to combine the bar code system with the different sizes of waste bins available and to coordinate the collection frequencies in designing rounds.

8.2.5 Implementation Mechanisms It is important to provide information for citizens because the system is based on cooperation with them. According to the law, a prerequisite is a change to the waste charge statute where previously there was no regulation for a pay-per-volume system. In Germany the local municipalities or counties are responsible, by law, for the collection and disposal of waste (Art. 15 Para 1 of the Waste Recycling and Disposal Act, Art. 4 Para 1 of the waste law of Hesse, Art. 5 Para 1 of the waste law of North-Rhine Westfalia). Therefore the local authorities have the right (and an obligation) to set up waste charge regulations. In Germany the technical side of waste management is carried out by special associations for the waste disposal (“Abfallzweckverband”). The establishment of such an association or the conversion of the structure of an existing association is advisable for economic and logistic reasons.

8.2.6 Monitoring and Measurement Techniques Applied First, the local competent authorities themselves supervise the gathering of waste data within their territory. On the basis of the data they can draw conclusions on the behaviour of the waste producers. Other examples of how monitoring occurs are to be found in the inquiries of different federations (e.g. federation of tax payers) or public institutions (Chamber of commerce and industry). Different municipalities are compared with one another regarding the fees the charge. Depending upon the interests of the “monitoring” institution, the factors examined differ. For example the federation of taxpayers focuses primarily on consumer interests while the Chambers of Commerce and Industry evaluates the economic potential of a region.

8.2.7 Impact The waste is separated better due to the incentive to save money. For example the amount of waste arising per- person per month in the county Gießen was reduced on the average from 17 kg to 10.4 kg. Therefore also the costs of the local competent authorities decreased (see Economic Implications).

8.2.8 Economic Implications For the local competent authorities the shift to a pay-per-volume system has a – sometimes considerable - cost saving effect. For example after changing to the pay- per-volume system the county Gießen has saved costs estimated at 1.3 million Euros per year. The investment costs, which are require for a district or county to convert of

Waste Prevention Policy Case Studies 156 to the waste charge system, are effectively more than recouped through the reduction in the quantities of waste. 162 The levels of the fees (and the correlative saving costs) differ from county to county. 163 The differences result from the different usage of the waste disposal facilities as well as the population in the responsible local municipal authorities.

8.2.9 Social Implications The levels of acceptance and satisfaction among citizens regarding a pay-per-volume system are clearly higher than with the flat rate per-person system. This is due to the fact that the local competent authorities have passed on the reduction in costs associated with improved performance in waste prevention and recycling directly to the citizens. In addition, some households – the majority - saw reductions in fees, sometimes considerable ones, because the increased waste avoidance is reflected directly in a reduced fee. 164 In the long run the pay-per-volume fee system is more transparent, since the citizens can control and follow the resulting costs.

8.2.10 Distributional Implications The introduction of flexible waste fee systems is the responsibility of competent local authorities (counties or municipalities). The respective fee systems thus are only applied in limited areas in Germany.

8.2.11 Enforcement Issues There are no fundamental changes for the citizens after the introduction of the flexible waste charge system. Apart from having more transparency with regard to the costs, there are no major modifications for them regarding the enforcement of the waste disposal.

8.2.12 Political and Public Response There is generally a positive response to the application of the system (see also “acceptance” under chapter “social implications”).

8.2.13 Other Impacts Other impacts are not reported.

8.2.14 Key Success/Failure Factors Key advantages are the cost savings which accrue to the local competent authorities and, as a consequence, the reduction in fees for the citizens. As a key disadvantage, one could point to the increased expenditures in coordination and logistics, but these are typically offset by avoided disposal costs.

162 See www.uni-giessen.de/ilr/gaeth/projekte/pro_gebuehrensystem/pro_gebuehrensystem.html ; the introduction of the flexible pay per volume system in the county Gießen was scientifically attended by a university project at the University Gießen. 163 EUWID from 23.08.2005, p. 11. 164 EUWID from 22.3.2005, p. 17.

Waste Prevention Policy Case Studies 157 8.2.15 Future Changes/Modifications Planned Modifications of the flexible waste charge systems in the municipalities examined in this paper are not reported at the time. It is not known whether the flexible pay-per- volume system will be introduced in other counties in Germany.

8.2.16 Evaluations Undertaken

Prior to Introduction Sachverständigen Rat für Umweltfragen (SRU) Umweltgutachten 2002, July 2002, p. 432, see: http://www.umweltrat.de 8.3 Cost Effects of Disposal Ban

8.3.1 Description Until 1 June 2005 a huge amount of household waste was still disposed in landfills. This was a consequence of the fact that the disposal of waste in landfills is far cheaper than materials recovery, or energy generation from waste. Suffering from the falling amount of residual waste, municipalities in many German regions which own the landfills tried to reduce the problems of overcapacity by lowering the prices for disposal. In other German regions, municipal waste incinerators had been the main fate of household waste for 5, 10, 15 or more years. The treatment of household waste in modern municipal waste incinerators (with acceptable technologies according to the legal obligations) is much more expensive than the simple disposal in landfills. Therefore many cities and counties have developed and realized regional waste management concepts (includes measures for waste prevention, waste separation and recycling: glass, paper, metals, composting plants etc., special local waste charges with incentives to reduce the amount of waste 165 ) to reduce the overall costs of household waste disposal and ease the cost burdens for the single households. The disposal of household waste is based on the Technical Instructions on Waste from Human Settlements (Technische Anleitung Siedlungsabfall – TASi). The TASi has been amended by the Ordinance on the Storage of Municipal Wastes and on Biological Treatment Processes (Abfallablagerungsverordnung), which entered into force in March 2001. According to the TASi, the disposal of untreated wastes in landfills has been forbidden from 1 June 2005.

8.3.2 Policy Context and Reason for Introduction - Tremendous environmental problems caused by landfills in Seventies and Eighties. - Considerable technical developments in the field of recycling, pre-treatment of waste and waste incineration.

8.3.3 Date & Timetable of Introduction Starting on 1 June 2005, untreated waste is not to be put in landfills any more if certain limit values are exceeded, e.g. regarding the organic fraction. This marks the

165 For more details see the policy description above „Waste charges in local waste statutes”.

Waste Prevention Policy Case Studies 158 end of a transition period for the Technische Anleitung Siedlungsabfall ‘TaSI ’166 (Technical Instructions on Domestic Waste – comparable to a regulation) lasting 12 years.

8.3.4 Implementation Mechanisms The quite demanding requirements of the TaSi were eased with a long transition period (1993 to 1 st of June 2005) to give the authorities enough time to develop new waste management concepts and investments in new technologies and installations.

8.3.5 Impact Higher costs for dealing with waste provide the most obvious incentive for private households and communities, respectively, to foster waste prevention and, obviously, where increasing costs relate to disposal, to a much greater extent, waste separation and recycling. Knowing the TaSi deadline (1 June 2005) for many years, fundamental changes were introduced in Germany concerning household waste management in the last 10 – 15 years. In 1999 about 49 % of household waste was recycled, in 2003 the recycling rate reached 61 %. Furthermore the rate of waste treatment in municipal waste incinerators (the much more expensive option, but better way for the environment) increased and the rate of disposal in landfill has fallen over the last 15 years (see Table 49).

166 TA Siedlungsabfall, Technische Anleitung zur Verwertung, Behandlung und sonstigen Entsorgung von Siedlungsabfällen, (Dritte Allgemeine Verwaltungsvorschrift zum Abfallgesetz) vom 14. Mai 1993, (BAnz. Nr. 99a vom 29.05.1993).

Waste Prevention Policy Case Studies 159

Table 49: Treatment of household waste in municipal waste incinerators in Germany Year Municipal waste Input Capacity in Average Input Capacity Incinerators Germany in total (in per Incinerator (in (Number) 1,000 tons/y) 1,000 tons/Y) 1990 48 9,200 191 1992 50 9,500 190 1993 49 9,420 192 1995 52 10,870 202 1998 53 11,900 225 2000 61 13,999 230 2005 67 16,900 252 2007 167 72 17,779 247 Source: Daten zur Umwelt, Der Zustand der Umwelt in Deutschland, Ausgabe 2005, Umweltbundesamt Berlin.

8.3.6 Economic Implications According to the BDE the TaSi (with the threat of the disposal ban for 1 June 2005) has caused investments of 20 Billion Euros in new treatment, recycling and incineration plants since 1993 in Germany. 168

8.3.7 Social Implications Of course the disposal ban concerning landfills could not be realized for free regarding costs. Increasing costs for private households was a key argument against the TaSi and its consequences. But in many cities and counties it could be shown in practice that the realization of intelligent waste management concepts (waste separation, local waste charges with incentives for waste prevention etc.) deliver good results. This means, remarkably enough, relative cost savings in the overall waste disposal costs in a region. So even if the disposal costs per tonne increased as a result of the measure, the costs per household did not necessarily increase in the same way because of the possibility of generating a dynamic incentive to reduce waste quantities, and increase recycling rates. This highlights the important role of higher disposal costs incentivising municipalities to introduce measures such as variable charging to avoid the rising costs of disposal. 169

167 Estimated figures. 168 BDE: Bundesverband der Deutschen Entsorgungswirtschaft, EUWID, Nr. 28. 12. 07.2005. 169 Interestingly, in Landkreis Schweinfurt, the ban on landfilling of untreated waste was cited as a major reason for enhancing the sophistication, and strengthening the incentives within, a charging scheme incentivising household waste reduction. The authority anticipated having to pay higher costs for disposal of waste to incineration, and in anticipation, sought to incentivise more segregation and waste reduction activities (see Eunomia (2003), Waste Collection: To Charge or Not to Charge? A Final report to IWM (EB), http://www.eunomia.co.uk/Charging%20report.pdf .).

Waste Prevention Policy Case Studies 160 8.3.8 Distributional Implications The overall driving force for a change in waste management is the fact that the treatment of household waste in municipal waste incinerators could be up to 10 times higher per ton than disposal on landfills (about 170 – 250 Euro/tonne compared to about 20 – 40 Euro/tonne). 8.4 Duales System Deutschland (DSD –The Green Dot)

8.4.1 Description The first packaging ordinance from 1990 introduced a new mechanism – the take- back obligation in the packaging chain, and in specific cases an obligatory deposit. It was not intended to realise this take-back obligation in the sales outlets themselves – which is costly, and hence, unpopular with the retailers. Instead it was agreed upon in advance to install a “dual waste management system” for packaging waste parallel to the rest of municipal waste management system. Participation in this system exempts the retailers from the take-back obligation as long as the system fulfils specific conditions (countrywide operation, kerbside collection, meeting recycling targets). But the packaging ordinance had no individual responsibility mechanisms forcing an individual retailer, producer or filler to meet their obligations. It was enough that they offered the take-back to his customers even if the take-back offer was just theoretical as far as its practical use was concerned. The enforcement mechanism was a collective one that inevitably produced free riders. The revised packaging ordinance (1998) introduced responsibility at the level of individual organisations. Retailers and other members can choose whether they take back packing waste themselves (or supported by waste management companies) or join a comparable system to the DSD, or the DSD itself, as before. The difference now is that they have to provide proof of compliance with the quantitative demands of the packing ordinance through the measures they have taken (where they do not join a system). The Green dot is an internationally registered trademark. In its early years, it was used as a PR-Symbol to make the DSD-system popular for separate collection. Its meaning is restricted to one that shows that the producer or distributor of the packaging has paid licence fees to DSD (or another Green dot system). It is not a ‘recycling guarantee’ and nor does it imply anything concerning the specific qualities of the packaging itself. The Green dot provides a simple check as to whether license fees for the packaging have been paid. Being a registered trademark any use of the Green dot constitutes a legal relation between the user and the organisation keeping the property rights of the trademark. In any case of misuse a claim to court has a sound legal basis. Therefore the trademark character of the Green dot is essential for managing the free rider problem.

8.4.2 Policy Context and Reason for Introduction In the late Eighties and early Nineties the “waste emergency debate” raged all over Germany. At this time authorities, the economy, the media and the public feared that in the near future, it would be extremely difficult to find sufficient disposal outlets in many regions (especially in regions with a high density of population and with a

Waste Prevention Policy Case Studies 161 intense concern in environmental issues). Therefore, the awareness of the government of the need to find solutions which could address the waste emergency was very high. Related to these debates concerning waste issues in general, and given the growing significance, and attention given to, packaging waste, the Federal Government decided to introduce the packaging ordinance, with the implementation of the DSD to foster waste prevention and recycling.

8.4.3 Date & Timetable of Introduction Starting in 1990, the DSD was confronted with a huge free rider problem. In the early years, packaging producers marked their packing with the Green dot without paying license fees. The trademark status of the Green dot became the legal basis for calls for compensation. The large retailers demanded the use of the Green dot by their suppliers. Suppliers refusing to do so had to risk losing their customers. The retailers had a strong interest in the build-up, and function of, the DSD because otherwise they had to install the take-back of packaging in their stores, which they wanted to avoid on the basis of cost. The collective pressure mechanism of the packaging Ordinance worked well in the case of the large retailers (a small number of companies have a market share of more than 80 % in the food sector, and the market concentration is even greater in the non-food sector). In a second phase the DSD and the retailers built up a new control system through the exchange of data between the DSD system and the retailers regarding the amounts and types of packaging, the suppliers, and the accounts settled. After a short while, accurate data for the relevant products and packaging types was being collected through data exchange with the retailers on the basis of the EAN code. In the third phase, DSD has built up a database which is kept up to date through market research. Green dot sales are now organised in branch groups. Experts with detailed market know-how can control each branch efficiently.

8.4.4 Prerequisites for Introduction A waste management hierarchy is established in Art. 4 of the German Act for Promoting Closed Substance Cycle Waste Management and Ensuring Environmentally Compatible Waste Disposal (Kreislaufwirtschafts- and Abfallgesetz - in the following called Waste-Avoidance, Recycling and Disposal Act - WRDA) and also in the European Waste Framework Directive (75/442/EEC) in Art. 3. Pursuant to these important clauses, waste generation must, firstly, be prevented by means of reducing its amount and its noxiousness. Secondly, waste must be subjected to substance recycling or for energy recovery which means to use waste as a substitute fuel. Only in a third step, when minimisation or recovery is not possible, waste should be disposed of. Besides the waste hierarchy a legislative act is necessary that regulates the producer responsibility for a product group (e.g. like the Packaging ordinance does for packages, see chapter 8.5). Such a legislative act makes the duty concrete and binding. In this context it is important to notice that the producers are only released from their producer responsibility by the “Green Dot” (called Dual System, because it runs beside the normal waste collection, see chapter 8.2) as long as they run the separate collection system.

Waste Prevention Policy Case Studies 162 8.4.5 Implementation Mechanisms See chapter description.

8.4.6 Monitoring and Measurement Techniques Applied The DSD is forced by the packaging ordinance to hand over detailed figures concerning the amount of packaging, and recycling quotas, on an annual basis to the ministries for environment of the German Länder. Furthermore the DSD publishes, voluntarily, the summarized figures for whole Germany. To gather the data the DSD collects all single data from the licensed partners of DSD (recycling and disposal companies). There is no obligation to show figures which address waste prevention effects separately (i.e. reduction of waste quantities). It is, of course, a difficult task to separate the waste prevention effects of the DSD from the effects of other influences.

8.4.7 Impact Beside effects of the DSD concerning enhancement of recycling or energy recovery quotas for packaging waste two different studies claim positive effects of the DSD regarding waste prevention itself (i.e. of reducing its amount and its hazardousness). The Prognos AG 170 calculated an 18 % decrease between 1991 – 2000 (1.6 Mio. tons/y in 2000) of packaging material in Germany caused by the DSD system. The figure was created by a hypothetical calculation of the packaging material developments with and without the existence of the DSD. The experts of the Prognos AG underscored the decoupling of GDP and the amount of packaging material in Germany. The second study was carried out by the Öko-Institut commissioned by the DSD. 171 The results of the in depth work showed a 4 % absolute decrease of packaging material in Germany over the period of time 1990 – 1999. The Öko-Institut pointed out, that this decline followed a long period of time with continuous increases in packaging material and packaging waste. Furthermore the Netherlands (without a system like DSD) showed an increase of packaging material (15 – 20%) in the same time period. The Öko-Institut assumed that the relative effect (concerning the growth in the Netherlands) of the DSD on waste prevention could be about 25 %. However, the experts of the Öko-Institut suggested deeper investigations concerning, in particular, the topic of waste prevention and the effects of DSD to obtain a clearer picture. The task of isolating the effects of the DSD on waste prevention is not trivial because different other developments and influences (GDP-rates, trends in the packaging sector like PET instead of glass etc., light weighting of packaging) must be taken into account.

170 Assessment of Sustainability and the Perspectives of the DSD, Prognos AG, commissioned by the Duales System Deutschland AG, Düsseldorf, June 2002. 171 Advantage of the Green Dot for the Environment, Öko-Institut, commissioned by the Duales System Deutschland AG, Düsseldorf, March 2002.

Waste Prevention Policy Case Studies 163 8.4.8 Economic Implications The Prognos AG published a report in the year 2002 that suggested the DSD had created 17,000 jobs in total (net figure - possible job cuts in some specific sectors of the economy were included). Furthermore the study underlined the important contribution of the DSD in promoting technical innovations and investments. But Prognos mentioned also that the DSD system implies a financial burden for the economy and the consumers relative to an alternative system based on incineration and landfilling. The Öko-Institut concluded that the criticisms levelled against the DSD on financial grounds did not take into account the tremendous amount of external benefits associated with the system relative to alternative forms of waste treatment.

8.4.9 Social Implications In the first years of the DSD, arguments against the system were very often of a social nature. It was argued that people would not accept that they should separate their household waste, or that the separation of waste was not acceptable for the - mostly – female persons who would be forced to do this. After 15 years of the implementation of the DSD, these arguments have become irrelevant for the majority of the population (see below “Political and Public Response”). These debates no longer exist. Nevertheless it should be mentioned that social implications could often be found in housing areas dominated by large multi-occupancy residential buildings. In these areas the single household is not always rewarded for its contribution to waste prevention and recycling because the other households in the same building might not be so concerned about waste separation. To address such specific problems in quarters with a high density of population, technical solutions like the “Zwickauer Müllschleuse” 172 were developed.

8.4.10 Distributional Implications For packaging waste, the food sector is the most important concerning packaging in the business to consumer case. In Germany consumers still have quite a strong influence over food retailers. Despite the fact that large companies in this sector are well known and very prominent in the market, the market concentration is quite low, and large companies are in competition in the food sector. Therefore it is very difficult for the companies to transfer the costs for the Green Dot to the consumers. On the other hand this means an incentive for the suppliers to act in the spirit of producer responsibility by minimizing packaging waste. Despite this the DSD claims a 36 % reduction of its overall costs (and so prices) between 1998 and today following the implementation of innovative technologies and better contracts with the different recycling partners resulted. 173

172 This means closed waste containers for the public. The waste containers could be opened with a specific code by every single household. The waste charge could be individualized in this way for every household. 173 www.gruener-punkt.de „What are the costs of the Green Dot?

Waste Prevention Policy Case Studies 164 8.4.11 Enforcement Issues The revised packaging ordinance (1998) introduced responsibility at the level of individual organisations. Retailers and other members can choose whether they take back packing waste themselves (or supported by waste management companies) or join a comparable system to the DSD, or the DSD itself,

8.4.12 Political and Public Response Despite the reduction of packaging waste and enhanced recycling, the DSD was under fire ever since it was implemented in 1990. Most of the criticism came from important and powerful retailers and a large fraction of the media. Most arguments against the DSD were focused around issues of “monopoly” and “inefficiency”. But the debate was mostly polemical and triggered by self-interest on the part of the different parties. There were some scandals in the early years of the system (recycling of green dot packaging waste in inappropriate plants overseas) and these contributed to sometimes damage the image of the DSD in the media. Many politicians have claimed that the end of the DSD system and the “yellow bag” was imminent ever since 1990. Nevertheless the majority of the population has learned to deal with the “yellow bag” and accepted the Green Dot system. Following a poll in 2004, it became clear that the percentage of population who think “the Green Dot is a good thing” had risen from 27 % in 1992 to 67 % in 2004. The percentage of the population who think negatively about the Green Dot system fell from 52 % in 1992 to 20 % in 2004. 174

8.4.13 Other Impacts The DSD System has had a marked impact on other fractions of household waste – especially goods made of plastic and metals which are not packaging materials. People often place these plastic goods (plastic cups, spoons etc.) at the end of their life in the yellow bag (and not the conventional waste bin). Through the DSD system those materials are also becoming input streams for recycling plants.

8.4.14 Key Success/Failure Factors - Strong example of producer responsibility - Incentives for recycling and – in a certain amount – for waste prevention - Strong opposition against DSD concerning the fact “monopolist created by law” and the argument of “Inefficiency” (not easy to face against this argument because very often it is unclear what inefficiency means and the lack of possibility to survey the better efficiency of a waste system without the Green Dot system.

8.4.15 Future Changes/Modifications Planned Not known, but similar systems like the DSD will not be realized in the future in Germany following restrictions of the German anti-trust commission.

174 “Study Environment 2004“, Institut für Demoskopie Allensbach, 2004.

Waste Prevention Policy Case Studies 165 8.5 Deposit on Cans and One-way Bottles (one-way deposits)

8.5.1 Description Mandatory deposits were introduced in Germany in January 2003 for non-refillable containers (cans, glass and plastic bottles) for water, beer and carbonated soft drinks. On 28 th of May 2005 the 3 rd amendment of the packaging ordinance came into force. 175 It simplifies the deposit on cans (regulated in Art. 8 of the packaging ordinance). In December 2004 the European Court of Justice did confirm that the compulsory deposit is in principle compatible with EU law. 176 This decision paved the way for the new provisions. The new provisions are implemented in two steps. The first step has already started, having come into force on the 28 th of May 2005: There is only one standard deposit of 25 euro cents for all sizes of packaging (ranging 0.1 litres to 3 litres). In the second step, which will take effect from May 2006, the deposit will be extended to all ecologically unfriendly one-way packaging, and the so-called “individual solutions” (major discounters such as Aldi, Lidl and Plus) will be discontinued. Under the "individual solutions", discounters only had to take back one- way drinks packaging sold by their own sales chain. In the future, stores that sell drink cans, glass or plastic bottles are obligated to take back corresponding packaging from other drinks manufacturers. Empty one-way bottles and cans can be returned to any outlet where one-way packaging is sold. This regulation effectively promotes the development of a uniform nationwide return system which is now being built up by the different economic actors. As of May 2006 the deposit is compulsory for all ecologically unfriendly one-way packaging from 0.1 litres to 3 litres. This includes all packaging of beer, mineral water and carbonated soft drinks which are already subject to deposit. In the future, a deposit must also be paid for non-carbonated soft drinks and alcoholic mixed drinks, especially the so-called alcopops. The deposit is compulsory for ice tea cans just as it is for coke or beer cans. Packaging of juices, milk and wine as well as ecologically advantageous packaging such as drink cartons, polyethylene tubular bags and stand- up bags remain exempt from deposit. The German Parliament decides in the Packaging ordinance based inter alia on scientific studies which type of packaging is ecologically advantageous and which is not.

8.5.2 Policy Context and Reason for Introduction The main reason for the introduction of the deposit on cans was the failure to achieve the targeted reuse rate (72 % of the packaging of beverages has to be reusable) over a number of years. As a step towards the current situation, the necessary regulation (Art. 9 Para 2 of the packaging ordinance from 1998) came into force and the deposit on cans was introduced. With this legal regulation in place, the deposit on cans now became independent of compliance with the target reuse rate.

175 Ordinance of 21 August 1998 (Federal Law Gazette I p. 2379); as last amended by Article 1 Third Amending Ordinance of 24 May 2005 (Federal Law Gazette I p. 1407 of 27 May 2005). 176 ECJ from 14.12.2004, C-463/01 (Mineralwässer); ECJ from 14.12.2004, C-309/02 (Radlberger).

Waste Prevention Policy Case Studies 166 Furthermore there was the objective of the former German government to promote reusable packaging as a way of implementing a deepening in product responsibility and at the same time, strengthening the promotion of the saving of natural resources.

8.5.3 Date & Timetable of Introduction - 1991: The Packaging Ordinance came into force (the ordinance contained a reuse rate of 72 % for the promotion (and protection) of reusable beverage packaging as environmentally advantageous packaging; the Ordinance stated that if the rate of the beverages filled up in reusable packages fell below 72% a deposit would become compulsory for several types of one-way packaging). - 1998: amendment of the packaging ordinance - 1997-2002: repeated non-achievement of the reuse rate - April 2002: assessment of costs for the introduction of the deposit on cans - January 2003/October 2003: introduction of the one-way deposit in two steps - July 2003: The German parliament agreed the amendment of the packaging ordinance. - October 2004: The Upper House of the German parliament agrees on a regulation for a deposit on cans. - May 2005: The ordinance was adopted by the German parliament. - May 2005: In order to simplify the regulations concerning one-way drink packaging a new packaging ordinance came into force (third amendment of the packaging ordinance). - January 2006: The fourth amendment of the packaging ordinance came into force (implementation of the directive 2004/12/EU – packaging and waste packages). - As of May 2006: The deposit will be compulsory for non-carbonated soft drinks and alcohol-mixed drinks (alcopops).

8.5.4 Prerequisites for Introduction - Political willingness - Willingness of the industry to come up with its producer responsibility, e.g. organizing the take-back system - Capacity to build up the infrastructure, e.g. establishment of a collecting system - Legal regulations: It is important to regulate which kind of packaging is subject to deposit.

8.5.5 Implementation Mechanisms As well as the introduction of the prerequisite statutory regulations, the provision of the logistics infrastructure is crucial for the implementation of the deposit on cans. This includes, in particular, the relevant infrastructure for implementing deposit-return systems (setting up of deposit-return machines, transport, recovery).

8.5.6 Monitoring and Measurement Techniques Applied - The Council of Environmental Advisors publishes an environmental report (“Umweltgutachten”) every two years by order of the German federal government. This report contains statements with regard to special questions of waste management

Waste Prevention Policy Case Studies 167 - The Federal Environmental Agency („Umweltbundesamt, UBA“) conducts the scientifically expert monitoring in the field of waste management. - Further monitoring by associations and research institutes (e.g. Gesellschaft für Verpackungsmarktforschung, GVM)

8.5.7 Impact The implementation of the new deposit regulation has affected the whole beverages market. The impact on beverage sales was notable. Sales volumes have fallen in some sectors subject to the deposit, and increased in others. The sectors that profited from the Regulation consist of both types of beverages subject and not subject to the deposit fee. The increasing sector consists, for example of still soft drinks, not subject to the deposit, but also of water, which is included in the deposit duty. It is argued that this outcome could be explained partly by a shift in the behaviour of consumers from one kind of beverage to another one in order to avoid the payment of the deposit, for example from carbonated soft drinks bearing a deposit to non-carbonated soft drinks and juices which are not deposit-bearing. Beer and classic carbonated soft drinks on the other hand were sold less. The adoption of the new deposit regulations certainly has achieved the effect intended, namely the shift back to refillable bottles. All categories of beverages subject to the deposit can list a significant change. The overall market share of refillable bottles increased from 63 % for the period of May 2000 to April 2001, to 69 % in 2003.

8.5.8 Economic Implications The companies had to cope with different demands for various types of packaging. Each chain responded differently to the deposit rules. The companies claimed that up to 25,000 people could loose their jobs in 2004 as a result of the deposit. This is being disputed be the Federal Ministry of the Environment, which speaks of a job shift from large-scale production to the medium-sized industry. On the other hand, contrary trends can be observed. In the sector of returnable packaging, major investments took place and new jobs were created. The German beer brewery “Krombacher” for example invested 25,000,000 Mio. Euro since the implementation of the deposit. The one-way deposit did, on the other hand, create 14,400 new jobs in parts of the beverage economy according to a study in the first half of the year. For the small and medium-size breweries in Bavaria, which sell bottled beer only, the introduction of the deposit on cans proved to be extremely positive. Growth rates within the two digit per cent range for small and medium-seized breweries were not unusual. After years of declining market shares, this downward trend was reversed. 177 After the introduction of the one-way deposit obligation the market share of beverages in returnable bottles increased in January 2003 to over 61 % from 52, 2 % by the end of 2002. The quota for multi-trip packaging for beer rose from 74.7 to 91%, for Coca Cola and for lemonade beverages, from 50.5 to 75.8 %, for water from 67 to 78.7 %.

177 EUWID, No. 35 08/2003, p. 11.

Waste Prevention Policy Case Studies 168 8.5.9 Social Implications A crowding-out of reusable systems could be observed in the years before the mandatory deposit was introduced, resulting in a threat to as many as 250,000 jobs, particularly in small and medium-sized enterprises in the retail sector and in the filling industry. However since 1 st of January 2003 there has been an upsurge in the market for re-usable packaging. In the first year after the introduction of the deposit, clear growth was recorded in the use of reusable packaging. Therefore the deposit is playing a role in keeping jobs in the reusable sector by stabilising reusable systems. Furthermore the deposit on cans is also creating jobs amongst manufacturers of deposit-return machines and in logistics enterprises. Finally the compulsory deposit is a step towards turning people away from their “throw-away mentality”. The deposit on cans and one-way bottles is expected to put an end to the littering of streets, public places and landscape.

8.5.10 Distributional Implications See economic and social implications.

8.5.11 Enforcement Issues Retailers and the beverage-filling industry in Germany developed, before 1 st of October 2003, deposit-return systems, which are compatible and, hence, combinable. In the main, two systems are in operation: 1. Lekkerland-Tobaccoland runs its own deposit system, the P-System. Their cans and non-refillable bottles are marked with a “P”. The P-System is being used nationwide on more than 20,000 mainly small outlets like gas stations, bakeries etc. 178 VfW/Spar used to operate a system in a large number of sales outlets, which consisted of an electronically readable label on the product. Since October 2004 VfW/Spar has joined to the P-System. Currently the number of outlets in Germany which are members of the P-System is still increasing. 2. In addition, Westpfand /Interseroh is active in the area around the city of Cologne. Their products are marked with a special “Westpfand-logo” and a code.

8.5.12 Political and Public Response The beverage industry and the retail industry (especially the discounter markets Aldi, Lidl, Plus) resisted the planned introduction of the deposit on cans. But there was acceptance from the environmental federations and the reusable packaging industry. Also the Länder were divided into supporters and opponents, so that an extensive political debate was held between the federal government and the Upper House of the parliament (the representation of the Länder in the legislative procedure). The supporters of the deposits fee referred to the fact that during the utilization of one-way packages, there is a greater environmental impact. More resources continue to be used if one-way packaging is used instead of reusable packaging.

178 Interview Jörg Veil, Tobaccoland-Lekkerland, 2.11.2004.

Waste Prevention Policy Case Studies 169 The opponents of the deposit take the view that the recovery of one-way beverage packing is usually possible; very high recycling rates can be reached and thus can be seen equivalent to re-usable packaging. Furthermore the one-way packages were optimized, e.g. new manufacturing processes for cans and packages made of glass, permit material savings of over 30% relative to the conditions of 1991, the time when the packaging ordinance came into force. The subject of the „Dosenpfand“ was of great significance for the German public. The Federal Ministry of the Environment has commissioned a survey in June and October of 2003, questioning 2,000 citizens in order to understand their position on the mandatory deposit system. 75 % of the respondents stated that they are in favour of the deposit duty. 48 % of the interviewees stated that they have made mostly good experiences with the nationwide return system. Around 70 % however are not satisfied with the way in which the retail markets are applying the system. According to an inquiry by the Bielefelder market research institute “Valid Research” on behalf of the working group packaging and environment, the new deposit regulation, which became effective on 1 st of October 2003, is a flop. The institute had asked 600 households via telephone between 2 nd and 6 th of October. According to the study 78 % of the German households are of the opinion that the new system of one-way packaging did not improve in relation to the past. 52 % pronounced that they are in favour of an abolishment of the deposit obligation. Some shops refused to take back packaging or to pay back the deposit, criticized 26 % of the asked ones. 36 % feel the return of empty cans and bottles to be annoying. 28 % complained about delays at the till. 51 % buy less or no cans or one-way packages because of the disposal. 179 Over several years the German Council of Environmental Advisors (“Sachverständigenrat für Umweltfragen, SRU”) has reached the conclusion that the one-way deposit system should be withdrawn. The SRU regard the deposit as ecologically ineffectively and economically inefficient. 180 Under the current legal climate, after the amendment of the packaging ordinance, the SRU sees further possibilities to encourage reusable systems to meet environmental and economic objectives. 181

8.5.13 Other Impacts The environment benefits from reduced greenhouse gas emissions. 182

8.5.14 Key Success/Failure Factors - standardised deposit regulation (no differentiation by content of beverage) - standardised level of deposit (25 euro cents) - a nationwide functioning deposit-return systems

179 EUWID, No. 43 10/2003, p. 8. 180 Council of Environmental Advisors (SRU), Environmental Report 2002 (“Umweltgutachten”), p. 411. 181 SRU, Environmental Report 2004, p. 350. 182 Federal Environmental Agency (Umweltbundesamt, UBA), UBA-texts 37/00; Press release of German non-governmental organization “Deutsche Umwelthilfe (DUH)“ from 12.12.2003 nouns a number of 450.000 tons less greenhouse gases per annum, see www.duh.de .

Waste Prevention Policy Case Studies 170 8.5.15 Future Changes/Modifications Planned The extension of the deposit to all ecologically unfriendly one-way packaging is already regulated but will enter into force as of May 2006.

8.5.16 Evaluations Undertaken

Prior to Introduction - Council of Environmental Advisors (Sachverständigen Rat für Umweltfragen, SRU) Environmental Report („Umweltgutachten“) 2002, July 2002, p. 411. - Council of Environmental Advisors (Sachverständigen Rat für Umweltfragen, SRU) Environmental Report („Umweltgutachten“) 2004, July 2004, p. 350, (See: http://www.umweltrat.de for further information). - Federal Environmental Agency (Umweltbundesamt, UBA), lifecycle assessment for beverage packaging II – body (Ökobilanz für Getränkeverpackungen II – Hauptteil), UBA-texts 37/00 (See http://www.umweltdaten.de/uba-info-presse/hintergrund/oebil.pdf )

Following Introduction No evaluations undertaken

8.6 Electrical and Electronic Equipment Act – (ElektroG) 183

8.6.1 Description According to the Electrical and Electronic Equipment Act (Elektro- and Elektronikgerätegesetz - ElektroG) producers are obliged to take back waste electronic and electric equipment (WEEE) and either reuse, recycle or dispose of it according to ecological standards. As of the 24 of March 2006 the disposer of WEEE has to discard his WEEE separately from the municipal solid waste stream. 184 The collection of WEEE is primarily conducted by the competent authority body responsible for the collection of waste (counties and communities) but retailers and producers may also organize separate collection. The collection of household WEEE has to be free of charge and separated into five categories: - large household appliances and automatic dispensers - refrigerating appliances - IT and telecommunications equipment and consumer equipment - gas discharge lights - small household appliances, lighting equipment, electrical and electronic tools, toys, leisure and sports equipment, medical, monitoring and control instruments. The main responsibility for the management of WEEE according to the EletkroG is with the producer. Responsibility covers the following issues:

183 Act Governing the Sale, Return and Environmentally Sound Disposal of Electrical and Electronic Equipment, as of: 23 March 2005 (Federal Law Gazette BGBl. I, p. 762-774. 184 Users of non-household WEEE - be it historical or WEEE of products sold after 13.08.2005 - may arrange diverting solutions with the producer.

Waste Prevention Policy Case Studies 171 - Providing the containers in which the public collection sites have to separately collect WEEE - Organizing the transport and treatment of WEEE from the public collection site to the treatment facilities - Controlling whether old appliances can be reused - Removal of certain substances, according to the WEEE and ROHS Directive - Informing consumers about the possibilities and the necessity of sound management of WEEE - Reporting of relevant data to the clearing house

8.6.2 Policy Context and Reason for Introduction In contrast to most other types of waste, the amount of WEEE in Germany has increased continuously in the recent past. 1.8 million tons of WEEE is generated annually in Germany (see Table 50). Table 50: Estimated Amount and Types of WEEE in Germany per year Type of WEEE Quantity (tonnes per annum) Household appliances (Haushaltsgeräte) 630,000 Entertainment electronics 400,000 (Unterhaltungselektronik) Information technology 110,000 (EDV/Informationstechnik) Office machines (Büromaschinen) 110,000 Communication technology 140,000 (Kommunikationstechnik) Industry electronics (Industrieelektronik) 360,000 Medical technology (Medizintechnik) 50,000 Total amamount:ount: 1,800,000

Although collection systems for WEEE have been in existence in the cities and counties before the introduction of the ElektroG, only 10 per cent of WEEE was being and recycled. The rest was mainly landfilled or thermally recovered in waste incinerators. Across Germany, the collection system before the introduction of the ElektroG was quite varied – from cities collecting two types of WEEE-products to some collecting 20 types, from some cities charging for the collection of WEEE to others collecting free of charge. Against that background the aims of the ElektroG - being identical with the two EU- Directives – are: - to prevent and reduce the amount of WEEE, - to reduce waste volumes through reuse, provisions for collection, recovery and recycling quotas, - reduce the amount of toxics in the residual waste by banning the disposal of WEEE in the residual waste collection. - to reduce the content of hazardous substances in equipment

8.6.3 Date & Timetable of Introduction - 1991: Draft of a German WEEE-Ordinance (Entwurf der Elektronikschrott- Verordnung), which was not finalized and replaced by the ElektroG

Waste Prevention Policy Case Studies 172 - 27 th of September 1994: Producer responsibility regulated in Art. 22 of the Closed Substances and Recycling Act (Kreislaufwirtschafts- und Abfallgesetz - Krw-/AbfG) - 2003: Directive 2002/96/EC on waste electrical and electronic equipment (WEEE) and Directive 2002/95/EC 185 on the restriction of the use of certain hazardous substances in electrical and electronic equipment requires Member States to comply with the Directive by 13 August 2004. - 23 rd of March 2005: ElektroG was formally adopted. - 31 st of December 2005: Almost all regulation of the ElektroG entered into force. - 24 th of March 2006: Free of charge disposal entered into force.

8.6.4 Prerequisites for Introduction - “Willingness” of the industry to come up with its producer responsibility, e.g. organizing the recycling system - Capacity to build up a recycling infrastructure, e.g. sufficient personnel in the communities for collecting points, transport capacity, e.g. containers to collect, etc.) - No legal obstacle for a take-back system run by industry, e.g. anti-trust law

8.6.5 Existence of Central Institution Organizing Implementation Mechanisms Before a producer can put electric and electronic appliances on the market in Germany, they have to register with the Old Electric Appliances Register Foundation (Stiftung Elektro-Altgeräte Register- EAR) which is assigned duties according to Art. 17 ElektroG. A condition for the registration is the constitution of a financial guarantee, covering the cost of sound disposal of the household appliances he plans to sell after 13 August 2005. The clearing house EAR’s main role is the supervision of the transport of WEEE from the collection site to the treatment facility. It is the focal point of information concerning the management of WEEE for public authorities and the private sector and it supports decision-making. The law provides that the clearing house be constituted with a council, whose members are producers, retailers, public entities responsible for waste management, representatives of the Federal level and of the German Länder (states), and consumer and environment protection associations. Once a certain amount of a category of WEEE is collected, the collection site informs the clearing house. Then, the clearing house assigns a producer to the transport and treatment of this WEEE. The clearing house decides on the attribution of an appliance to one of the five categories and calculates the respective volume of WEEE (including historical WEEE). Each producer is responsible for an amount of WEEE according to its market share. Once a municipality reports, that a certain volume of WEEE is collected, the clearing house determines objectively the producer responsible for the transport and treatment of the reported volume of WEEE.

185 Directive 2002/96/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27 January 2003 on waste electrical and electronic equipment (WEEE) - Joint declaration of the European Parliament, the Council and the Commission relating to Article 9, Official Journal L 037, 13.02.2003, p. 24.

Waste Prevention Policy Case Studies 173 Furthermore, the clearing house has an obligation to inform the general public of disposal possibilities. It must also report the collected data to the Federal Environment Agency. It is not allowed to conclude or arrange contracts with disposal- enterprises. To raise the awareness of the general public, the ElektroG introduces obligations for producers, the clearing house and the competent authorities of the Land (state, e.g. Bavaria) to inform the users of WEEE about the importance of collecting and recycling WEEE. To increase the efficiency of treatment of WEEE, the producers have a duty to inform treatment facilities about the features of their products within the year of their placement on the market.

8.6.6 Monitoring and Measurement Techniques Applied As a key instrument to measure the impact of the ElektroG producers have monitoring obligations, i.e. to collect and transfer data on the following aspects of WEEE management: - Amount of products introduced to the market on a monthly basis - Annually recovered appliances by public collection site - Volume of collected, recycled, reused, recovered and exported appliances The so-called first-treatment site is subject to an obligation to inform the producers. This information concerns the volume, components and materials of WEEE going into the first-treatment facility, coming out of the facility and going to recovery facilities. Furthermore, the first-treatment facility is subject to an annual certification. This certification will only be attributed if the site proves that it can provide the data required from the producer.

8.6.7 Impact No reliable information is currently available as the law just has entered into force. But Otmar Frey from ZVEI (German Electrical and Electronic Manufacturers' Association) assumes, due to enormous logistical efforts for the take-back system "that there will be a rate of wrong disposal (failures) of 10% in the beginning, which will affect 40 transports daily” .186

8.6.8 Economic Implications Producers have to guarantee the financing of the collection and treatment of their products by participating in a collective or by setting up an individual compliance scheme. Retailers are allowed to indicate the costs of disposal until 13 February 2011 or 13 February 2013, depending on category of waste. The ZVEI (German Electrical and Electronic Manufacturers' Association) estimates that the new law will cost industry €5,000,000 p.a.

8.6.9 Social Implications From the 24 of March 2006 consumers are not allowed to dispose electronic appliances in to the residual waste. According to the ElektroG the responsibility lies with the consumers to bring the WEEE to one of the 1500 collection points. In the beginning of the new system it is expected that consumers will dispose of the

186 See a report in the German newspaper „Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung“ (FAZ) from 21.03.2006, p.13.

Waste Prevention Policy Case Studies 174 accumulated appliances in their households all at once. But there are fears that consumers will dispose small appliances in the residual waste in the long term. Several communities or counties run an extra collection system where the WEEE is collected from the households on demand. In communities without such an extra collection system the disposal of heavy household appliances like washing machines may lead to extra burdens for the households bringing the appliance to the collecting point. Two important implications are: - possible increases in price of products; and - the possible alteration of waste disposal charges due to the free collection of WEEE. As the disposal of WEEE is free of charge for the consumers, producers announced they will put the costs on the new products. It is unclear whether this will happen and to which extent. Gotthard Graß (General Executive Manager of the ZVEI) was reported as saying: "I expect that the prices for new appliances will increase." Whereas for some electric appliances like washing machines the recycling is cost-neutral due to the high price for scrap metal, the recycling of fluorescent tubes or energy saving light bulbs is more complicated because of the mercury content. For the latter product types the recycling costs can cover 20 to 60 % of the product price. Nevertheless according to Bitkom 187 the producers of PCs, computer equipment, mobile phones and entertainment electronics have only small possibilities to increase prices due to a drop in prices in those branches. Experts have different opinions on whether the free of cost collection system for WEEE will lead to sinking or even rising waste disposal charges. It is reported that some communities will increase the waste disposal charges arguing that they will have to enlarge and reconstruct their collection points in order to comply with the ElektroG. The German Environmental Ministry and the Bitkom-expert Mario Tobias are of the opinion that waste disposal charges must decrease because from now on the communities only have to collect the WEEE and not have to transport and recycle it anymore. A speaker of the German Environmental Ministry is cited as saying that waste disposal charges are not very transparent anyway as it is not known which other costs are covered.

8.6.10 Distributional Implications See “implementation mechanisms”.

8.6.11 Enforcement Issues Although all affected companies according to the ElektroG should have been registered since November 2005, as of March 2006 only half of the companies have been registered. Regulatory offences listed in Art. 23 ElektroG are aimed at producers placing electrical and electronic equipment on the market. Contravening the regulations of the ElektroG or producers failing to register can be subject to a fine up to 50,000

187 BITKOM represents 1,300 companies, some 700 of which are direct members. These include almost all of the leading players in the industry, as well as more than 500 smaller, medium-sized and new businesses, see: http://www.bitkom.org/ .

Waste Prevention Policy Case Studies 175 Euro. Other offences, like failing to collect containers can result in a fine of up to 10,000 Euro.

8.6.12 Political and Public Response The behaviour of the consumers remains open as it has been only shortly introduced. More information is given under social implications.

8.6.13 Other Impacts A causal link between the introduction of the ElektroG and other impacts, e.g. like an improvement of the product lifetime or enhancing the recyclability of electric and electronic equipment cannot be drawn at the moment.

8.6.14 Key Success/Failure Factors - industry designs its products for the purpose of reuse and recyclability - no free-riders / all companies do register with the EAR - collection and treatment infrastructure is tailored to the amount of WEEE disposed - consumers find the take-back system comfortable and are not illegally disposing especially small electric appliances in the residual waste.

8.6.15 Future Changes/Modifications Planned None announced.

8.6.16 Evaluations Undertaken

Prior to Introduction Sachverständigen Rat für Umweltfragen (SRU) Umweltgutachten 2002, July 2002, p. 65, see: http://www.umweltrat.de

Following Introduction Too early, as the free of charge take back of WEEE has just been introduced in March 2006.

Waste Prevention Policy Case Studies 176 8.7 Battery Decree (Household and car batteries)

8.7.1 Description According to the Battery Decree (Batterieverordnung - BattV) all producers/importers and retailers are obliged to collect free of charge used batteries and accumulators of the kind they have sold. 188 The consumers are not allowed to dispose of spent batteries and accumulators in the residual waste and instead have to bring them back to retailers selling batteries, the collection points of the retailers, or local collection points of the municipalities, e.g. in the town hall (Articles 5 and 15 BattV). The retailers have the duty to inform the consumers on the possibilities to return batteries to the retailer (Articles 12 and 15 BattV) and are required to take back spent batteries regardless of whether these were purchased in their store. The producers/importers have to organize the recycling, or if not possible, the safe disposal of batteries. 189 The disposal and recycling requirement does not apply to municipalities. As ever, they do have to take back batteries.

8.7.2 Policy Context and Reason for Introduction According to the German Government 190 33,000 t/p.a. of household batteries are sold in Germany, of which 85 % are non-rechargeable batteries and 15 % are rechargeable batteries (accumulators). Until April 1998 the retailers in Germany were taking back batteries containing toxic substances according to a voluntary agreement. Due to the fact that under the voluntary agreement only one fifth of the sold batteries have been collected, the Federal Decree Regarding the Collection and Disposal of Used Batteries and Accumulators (Batterieverordnung – BattV) were implemented in Germany transposing the EU Directive on batteries. The aim of the decree is to reduce the amount of hazardous substances in waste due to batteries in the following manner: - Batteries containing certain hazardous substances may not be put into circulation, - Used batteries are taken back and recycled safely and properly in accordance with the provisions of the German Waste Management and Recycling Act or non-recyclable batteries are disposed of in a manner compatible with public health, - Batteries should be manufactured in such a way to make them reusable several times and technically long-lasting. In its second programme on the reduction of environmental pollution caused by batteries, the German Government aims at a collection-quota of 60% until the end of 2006, particularly through improved information to the public. 191

188 Batterieverordnung (BattV) as of: 27 March 1998 (Federal Law Gazette BGBl. I, p. 658). 189 A different regulation is in force for car batteries. To achieve a maximum return rate of used batteries the consumer has to pay a compulsory deposit of 7, 50 EUR if he buys a new car battery without returning a used car battery (Article 6 BattV). 190 EUWID from 06.005.2003, p. 17. 191 2. Programm der Bundesregierung zur Verminderung der Umweltbelastungen aus Batterien und Altbatterien entsprechend Art. 6 der Richtlinie 91/157/EWG über gefährliche Stoffe enthaltene Batterien und Akkumulatoren, 30. April 2003.

Waste Prevention Policy Case Studies 177 8.7.3 Date & Timetable of Introduction - 18 th of March 1991: EU-Directive 91/157/EEC Regarding batteries and accumulators containing hazardous substances 192 - Until 1998 in Germany: Voluntary agreement on the take back of batteries - 27 th of March 1998: German Battery Decree serves to implement the Council Directive 91/157/EEC the Commission Directive 93/86/EEC 193 - 1st of September 2001: Revision of the Battery Decree 194 transposing the Directive 98/101/EC 195 on the mercury content of lead batteries (max. 5 ppm mercury)

8.7.4 Prerequisites for Introduction - “Willingness” of the industry to come up with its producer responsibility, e.g. organizing the recycling system. Cooperation between the retailers and manufacturers concerning the collection and recycling of batteries between the retailers and the manufacturers. - Capacity to build up a recycling infrastructure, (e.g. sufficient personnel in the communities for collecting points, enough containers to collect, etc.) - No legal obstacle for a take-back system run by industry, e.g. anti-trust law - Existence of central institution for organizing and monitoring the system

8.7.5 Implementation Mechanisms Manufacturers and retailers are only allowed to put batteries or batteries incorporated into appliances on the market if they ensure that the consumer can return the batteries free of charge (Art. 3 BattV). To that aim the manufacturers must ensure the collection of used batteries by establishing a common battery collection and recycling system or by participating in such a system. The collection system must: - be available to all manufacturers under the same terms and conditions, - collect all batteries, regardless of their type, brand or origin, - collect batteries free of charge from the collection points agreed with the retailers or at the collection points provided by the municipalities, and proceed with recycling or disposal, - provide suitable collection containers at the collection points free of charge, - issue invitations to tender for disposal services such as logistics, collection, transportation, sorting, battery recycling and the disposal of non-recyclable batteries in a procedure which ensures a competitive allocation, for a maximum of three years,

192 Official Journal EC No. L 78, p. 38. 193 Commission Directive 93/86/EEC of 4 October 1993, by way of amendment of the Council Directive 91/157/EEC regarding batteries and accumulators containing hazardous substances in technical progress (Abl. EC No. L 264 p. 51), 194 First Decree amending the Battery Decree as from 26.06.2001 (Federal Law Gazette BGBl. I, p. 1361). 195 Commission Directive 98/101/EC dated 22 December 1998 by way of amendment to the Council Directive 91/157/EEC regarding batteries and accumulators containing hazardous substances in technical progress (Official Journal EC No. L 1 ,p. 1).

Waste Prevention Policy Case Studies 178 - secure funding by ensuring that the costs remaining after collection, recycling and disposal, including sales tax and other necessary overheads, are divided among the individual manufacturers in proportion to the share of the respective previous year's sales (according to the volume of batteries subdivided by system and type group), and that appropriate contributions are made by the individual manufacturers, - disclose, at least once a year, the costs of collection, sorting, recycling and disposal of the collected batteries, subdivided by system and type group. The “Gemeinsame Rücknahmesystem Batterien (GRS)” is a foundation guaranteeing the uniform and nation-wide collection of spent batteries in Germany. It was established in May 1998 by leading battery manufacturers and the German Electrical and Electronic Manufacturers' Association (ZVEI). The foundation is financed by contributions from its users. These manufacturers and importers pay disposal contributions to the foundation for the services rendered, through a trustee and in accordance with the quantity and type of batteries sold in Germany. 616 producers and importers have been member of the GRS at the end of 2004. The goal of the GRS is to further increase the number of spent non-rechargeable and rechargeable batteries that are returned, to find new technologies for sorting and recycling, and to optimise current processes.

8.7.6 Monitoring and Measurement Techniques Applied In accordance with section 10 of the Battery Decree, the GRS prepares a report by 31 st of March every year, which includes information on: - Batteries put into circulation, volume of batteries collected, sorting of spent portable batteries, recycling and disposal results - Summary of the operative procedures - Total prices paid for sorting, recycling and disposal - Quality assurance and environmental protection - Public relations

8.7.7 Impact In 2004 only one third of the batteries put on the market were collected by the GRS. The GRS collected 11,733 tons of used non-rechargeable and rechargeable batteries in 2004. 160,000 collection sites are run by the GRS, of which 140,000 are located at sales outlets. For this purpose GRS delivered more than 675,000 collection containers and transport boxes for spent batteries to roughly 140,000 sales outlets. Furthermore the GRS delivered approximately 70,000 barrels to municipalities as well as commercial users. 48% of the batteries collected by GRS came from the sales outlets, 26% from the competent authorities for waste collection (communities), 25% from trade and 1% from the German Army. Amount of returned Batteries collect by GRS:

Waste Prevention Policy Case Studies 179

The amount of batteries collected by GRS that have been recycled has increased from 1999 to 2004 from 19 % to 77% whereas the rate of disposal decreased in the same period from 81% to 23%. The following table shows the development of disposal and recycling of batteries collected from GRS in per cent:

Concerning NiCd-Batteries the amount of batteries (including those in appliances) put on the market in Germany decreased between 1999 and 2002 and is now at about 2.700 t (a decrease of 14% ). 196 Regarding the influence of the Battery Decree on the sales figures of rechargeable batteries there is no information reported. The Öko- Institut assumes that there has not been a relevant shift of consumers to buy rechargeable batteries because of the Battery Decree.

8.7.8 Economic Implications Probably not of relevance.

8.7.9 Social Implications It is not known that an increase in battery prices followed as a consequence.

196 GRS 2003, 2002, 2001; BOSCH, 2003, 2000; VfW-REBAT, 2003, 2000

Waste Prevention Policy Case Studies 180 8.7.10 Distributional Implications Besides the GRS other producers (e.g. producers for special batteries) have set up separate take-back systems, like the Bosch Recycling Centre for Accumulators in Electronic Tools (drilling machines, etc.) or the Organisation for Recycling of Secondary Materials (Vereinigung für Wertstoffrecycling - VfW), which is empowered by many producers to collect and recycle their batteries.

8.7.11 Enforcement Issues The collection system may charge manufacturers who do not belong to the collection system for the costs of the sorting, recycling or disposal of the sorted batteries (Art. 4 para 2 BattV). Infringements of the regulations, for the purposes of Article 61, Para 1, No. 5 of the German Waste Management and Recycling Act, are deemed to have been committed by parties who for example put batteries on the market or do not take back batteries contrary to the Battery Decrees provisions.

8.7.12 Political and Public Response See the description given in the topic “impact”.

8.7.13 Other Impacts Not reported

8.7.14 Key Success/Failure Factors - Avoidance of free riders / all battery producers participate in take-back systems, like GRS - collection and treatment infrastructure is tailored to the amount of GRS disposed - consumers find the take-back system comfortable and are not illegally disposing batteries in the residual waste. - A key problem for the successful return of batteries is consumers storing 70% of batteries at home for over 3 months, see the following chart:

- It is argued that a high quota of returned batteries can be only achieved through a collection close to the households 197

197 Bundesverband der Deutschen Entsorgungswirtschaft e.V. (BDE), EUWID from 06.005.2003, p. 9.

Waste Prevention Policy Case Studies 181 8.7.15 Future Changes/Modifications Planned On the EU-level the proposal for a directive Com (2003) 723 final from 21.11.2003 on batteries and accumulators and spent batteries and accumulators is at the moment in the parliamentary process. The Directive will repeal and replace the existing Community legislation on batteries and will have to be transposed in German Law. According to the proposal the quota for the collection of spent batteries shall be 25 % four years after the transposition into German Law (foreseeable 2012) and 45% eight years after the transposition (2016). Moreover all producers and importers will be obliged to register - similar to the WEEE-Directive for example.

8.7.16 Evaluations Undertaken

Prior to introduction None reported

Following introduction - Sachverständigen Rat für Umweltfragen (SRU) Umweltgutachten 2004, Mai 2004, p. 564, see: http://www.umweltrat.de . - BOSCH (2000): Recyclingzentrum Elektrowerkzeuge: Erfolgskontrolle 1999 gemäß § 10 Batterieverordnung. Robert Bosch GmbH. - BOSCH (2003): Recyclingzentrum Elektrowerkzeuge: Erfolgskontrolle 2002 gemäß § 10 Batterieverordnung. Robert Bosch GmbH. - GRS Batterien (Stiftung Gemeinsames Rücknahmesystem Batterien) (2001): Erfolgskontrolle 2000. Hamburg: GRS Batterien. - GRS Batterien (2002): Erfolgskontrolle 2001. Hamburg: GRS Batterien. - GRS Batterien (2003): Erfolgskontrolle 2002. Hamburg: GRS Batterien, see: http://www.grs-batterien.de/facts/pict/erfolg02.pdf [as from 20.08.2003]. - Vfw AG (2000): Vfw-REBAT. Erfolgskontrolle für das Jahr 1999 gemäß § 10 Batterieverordnung. Köln. Not published. - Vfw AG (2003): Vfw-REBAT. Erfolgskontrolle für das Jahr 2002 gemäß § 10 Batterieverordnung. Köln. Not published. - German Government (2003): 2. Programm der Bundesregierung zur Verminderung der Umweltbelastungen aus Batterien und Altbatterien entsprechend Artikel 6 der Richtlinie 91/157/EWG über gefährliche Stoffe enthaltende Batterien und Akkumulatoren, see: http://www.bmu.de/files/zweite_programm.pdf [as from 06.04.2003].

Waste Prevention Policy Case Studies 182

9 POLICIES FOR HWP IN USE IN SWITZERLAND 9.1 Residual Waste-sack Fee (Abfallsackgebühr)

9.1.1 Description In about 70% of Switzerland’s local councils (mostly in the German-speaking regions), non-recyclable household waste will be collected by the council only if it is in a particular rubbish sack specified by the council. Dustmen refuse to collect non- approved sacks; they leave them at the kerb. Households buy sacks for a fee determined by the local council, which is set on a cost/litre basis, usually in the range of 0.05-0.10 CHF/litre. A typical fee for a 35-l sack is CHF 2-3 (or around £0.9-£1.40 at an approximate exchange rate, £/CHF = 2.20). Because only specified sacks are collected, and legislation usually also forbids fly tipping, this is not a voluntary measure.

9.1.2 Policy Context and Reason for Introduction Local councils in Switzerland are responsible for household waste collection and disposal, which according to the federal Environmental Protection Act, must be funded by user fees, not by taxes. In other words, the polluter pays. Most councils in German-speaking Switzerland (about 70% of the population) break the fees into two parts: 1) a flat fee per household (sometimes graduated by number of rooms) and 2) a sack-based fee. Some councils use a sack fee only. In French- and Italian-speaking parts of Switzerland, most councils use a per-household fee only. The polluter-pays principle of the Environmental Protection Act is the reason for introducing fees. The reason for sack fees, as opposed to flat household fees, is to encourage ‘pay-as-you-throw’ mentality and behaviour, encouraging waste recycling and waste prevention.

9.1.3 Date & Timetable of Introduction - 1985, Environmental Protection Act comes into force. This mandates the ‘polluter pays’ principle, and sets the legal backdrop to subsequent legislation/rules. - 1990, Technical Ordinance for Waste Disposal comes into force. This requires: 1) cantons and councils to ensure that recyclable fractions of household waste – glass, paper, metal and textiles – are collected separately and recycled, and 2) only non-combustible wastes to be landfilled. If recycling cannot pay its own way, it must be subsidised. - Throughout the 1990s, ‘extended producer responsibility’ or EPR is applied to various waste-generating sectors, either by negotiation or by legislation. In practical terms, EPR means the industry producing what later becomes waste must organise and finance its collection and recycling. Three sectors with EPR are significant with respect to household waste: batteries, beverage containers and electrical/electronic goods. - 1997, a federal Statute regarding the Obligation of Councils to finance household-waste disposal according to polluter-pays principles comes into

Waste Prevention Policy Case Studies 183 force (passed as an amendment, Article 32a, to the Environmental Protection Act). This statute required councils to introduce user-fees for household waste that cover the full cost of collection and disposal, including any necessary subsidies for recyclables. The statute encourages councils to set fees according to polluter-pays principles, but it does not explicitly stipulate that fees must be on per sack, per household, or other basis – these details are left to councils to decide.

9.1.4 Prerequisites for Introduction Switzerland has pursued an integrated approach to household waste policy and to waste policy in general. There are three pillars to household waste policy: 1) a ban on combustibles to landfill, which forces councils either to incinerate or to recycle waste, combined with a mandate to set up recycling systems for waste glass, paper, metal and textiles from households; 2) a fee on rubbish sacks, which encourages households to avoid or prevent waste; and 3) provision of free-to-the-user collection systems for recyclables, which allows households to recycle waste rather than dispose of it.

9.1.5 Implementation Mechanisms Rubbish fees are set by local councils. The Federal Environmental Agency (formerly BUWAL, recently renamed BAFU) recommends that rubbish fees include per sack fees and has issued detailed guidance on this, but councils are not obliged to impose sack fees, and about 30% of councils still do not do so. However, for residents in a council with sack fees, the fees clearly are mandatory.

9.1.6 Monitoring and Measurement Techniques Applied All Swiss cantons keep detailed waste statistics. The Federal Environmental Agency conducts a detailed waste audit every two years. Fees imposed and collected by councils, as well as waste quantities collected and disposed, are a matter of public record.

9.1.7 Impact The sack fee – combined with free-to-user recycling systems – has dramatically spurred household waste prevention. Probably the most convincing evidence comes from a waste-audit in 2001-02 of 13 local councils, nine of which had recently introduced sack fees. Within a matter of months, councils with sack fees saw collected volumes of non-recyclables drop 30% and recyclables climb 30%. In the four councils without sack fees, volume of collected non-recyclables actually increased. Other evidence suggests less conclusively that sack fees have an impact. First, per capita generation of residual household waste in Switzerland peaked at 445 kilogram’s/person/year in 1989. It had fallen steadily to 351 kgs by 2003 (the last year of currently available data), and cantonal statistics suggest it is still declining. Second, in absolute terms, 351 kgs is far lower than the European average of around 550 kgs, even though Switzerland’s per capita GDP lags only Luxembourg’s in Europe

Waste Prevention Policy Case Studies 184 and is fifth highest in the world. Third, Switzerland has some of Europe’s highest recycling rates.

9.1.8 Economic Implications Councils are obliged to set rubbish fees such that they cover disposal and recycling costs, so there is more economic transparency than there would be in a tax-funded system. The fees are a least a minor issue in local politics. Composite statistics are not available, but nonetheless, disposing of Switzerland’s household waste surely costs more – probably substantially more – than it would if all waste was collected together and disposed of in the cheapest way possible. However, incineration fees alone currently run at CHF 150-200/tonne, which is far more expensive than landfilling. Although separate collection usually costs more than combined collection, the total system costs depend upon the costs of residual waste treatment / disposal. The higher these are, the greater are likely to be the benefits from increased recycling and waste prevention, motivated by the charge.

9.1.9 Social Implications Rubbish fees, like sales taxes, are socially regressive, in that they burden lower- income users proportionately more than high-income users. However, there are mechanisms available for addressing regressive impacts (for example, exempting lower-income users from fixed-rate parts of the overall charge). When sack fees first were introduced, there were anecdotal reports of ‘waste- tourism’, where residents near the border unload their non-approved sack of rubbish in the neighbouring country. Fly tipping (including littering) is estimated at 1-2% of the total household waste generated. The Federal Environmental Agency believes that fly- tipping rates are ‘slightly higher’ in councils with sack fees than in those without. However, fly tipping clearly occurs both in Councils with and without sack-based charges. It may also be that any increase due to the charges is temporary as the system ‘beds in’ following initial protests (or can be made so by effective action).

9.1.10 Distributional Implications This is a consumption-based fee that can be avoided through generating less waste, so it provides the greatest economic incentive for those on lower incomes. It is possible, therefore, that if there are no mechanisms for reducing flat-rate fees, some lower-income households may be better off after the charge’s introduction than before, depending upon their behaviour in respect of waste sorting and waste prevention.

9.1.11 Enforcement Issues Other than ‘waste tourism’ and fly tipping, there do not appear to be any significant problems here. Fly tipping is explicitly forbidden, and those who are convicted of fly tipping are fined. No statistics were available on the extent of illegal dumping, however anecdotally it appears to be on occasional but not a major problem.

9.1.12 Political and Public Response According to surveys conducted by The Federal Environmental Agency, 75-85% of the public welcome the polluter-pays principle for household waste disposal. At the same time, 40% of people in councils without sack fees are sceptical of their introduction:

Waste Prevention Policy Case Studies 185 they question the practicality of implementing them as well as the financial burden they would introduce. Only 3% of people living in councils with sack fees argue that the fees should be eliminated.

9.1.13 Other Impacts There is anecdotal evidence that retailers have responded to the sack fee by 1) reducing the amount of packaging on their products and 2) offering customers the possibility of unwrapping products at the shop and giving back packaging directly to the retailer.

9.1.14 Key Success/Failure Factors - Integration of the sack fee with a ban on landfill of combustibles and provision of free-to-the-user collection systems for recyclables - Strong belief that economic incentives can change individual behaviour

9.1.15 Future Changes/Modifications Planned None announced.

9.1.16 Evaluations Undertaken

Prior to Introduction None reported.

Following introduction Verursachergerechte Finanzierung der Entsorgung von Siedlungsabfällen Herausgegeben vom Bundesamt für Umwelt, Wald und Landschaft (BUWAL) Bern, 2001. 9.2 Ban on Combustible Waste to Landfill (combined with separate collection mandates)

9.2.1 Description Switzerland’s local councils, which are responsible for household waste collection and disposal, are obliged to set up and subsidise systems for the recycling of glass, paper, metal and textiles. At the same time they are forbidden to landfill the remaining non- recyclables without incinerating them first. This has prompted a major expansion in the system for collection and processing of household compostables, because composting them is far cheaper than incinerating them.

9.2.2 Policy Context and Reason for Introduction The policy was mainly motivated by perceived shortage of landfill capacity in the late 1980s. Also it was motivated by a theoretical desire for a sustainable waste-disposal system, with the presumption that landfill is not sustainable.

9.2.3 Date & Timetable of Introduction - 1990, Technical Ordinance for Waste Disposal comes into force. This requires: 1) cantons and councils to ensure that recyclable fractions of household waste

Waste Prevention Policy Case Studies 186 – glass, paper, metal and textiles – are collected separately and recycled, and 2) only non-combustible wastes to be landfilled. If recycling cannot pay its own way, it must be subsidised. - 1997, a federal statute secures funding for recycling as well as gives an economic incentive (sack fee) for households to recycle. The Statute regarding the Obligation of Councils to finance household-waste disposal according to polluter-pays principles was passed as an amendment, Article 32a, to the Environmental Protection Act. This statute required councils to introduce user- fees for household waste that cover the full cost of collection and disposal, including any necessary subsidies for recyclables. In about 70% of Switzerland’s councils, a rubbish-sack fee was introduced, in some cases before the statute was enacted.

9.2.4 Prerequisites for Introduction Switzerland has pursued an integrated approach to household waste policy and to waste policy in general. There are three pillars to household waste policy: 1. this policy, i.e. a ban on combustibles to landfill, which forces councils either to incinerated or to recycle waste, combined with a mandate to set up recycling systems for waste glass, paper, metal and textiles from households; 2. a fee on rubbish sacks, which encourages households to avoid or prevent waste; and 3. provision of free-to-the-user collection systems for recyclables, which allows households to recycle waste rather than dispose of it.

9.2.5 Implementation Mechanisms The ban on combustibles to landfill was simply issued to landfill operators. Guidance on recycling systems is available from federal and cantonal governments, as well as from material producers, recycling equipment vendors and recyclers.

9.2.6 Monitoring and Measurement Techniques Applied Landfills are subject to licensing and to periodic inspections. All Swiss cantons keep detailed waste and recycling statistics. The Federal Environmental Agency conducts a detailed waste audit every two years. Fees imposed and collected by councils, as well as waste quantities collected, disposed or recycled are a matter of public record.

9.2.7 Impact The ban on landfilling combustibles surely has extended the capacity of Switzerland’s landfills. Given that permitting is difficult to obtain and that suitable, available sites are limited either by mountainous terrain or urban development, this is significant. Recycling volumes have grown dramatically since this policy was introduced in 1990. The amounts collected expressed as a percentage of the amounts consumed are: • paper, 50% in 1990 to 70% currently; • glass containers, 65% to 96%; and • non-container aluminium, 15% to 31%.

Waste Prevention Policy Case Studies 187 Household-waste composting has grown from about 250 kilotonnes per year to 700 kilotonnes, and textiles recycling from 17 kilotonnes to 44 kilotonnes. In principle it could be argued that this growth would or could have happened anyway, but presumably the policy had a major effect.

9.2.8 Economic Implications Composite statistics are not available, but nonetheless, disposing of Switzerland’s household waste surely costs more – probably substantially more – than it would if all waste was collected together and disposed of in the cheapest way possible. Incineration fees alone currently run at CHF 150-200/tonne, which is far more expensive than landfilling. Separate collection almost always costs more than combined collection. As recycling ramped up in the early 1990s, recycling often was a zero-sum business for councils, i.e. they could cover their collection costs from the proceeds of selling their collectables for recycling. As quantity rose and quality fell, collecting recyclables became a money-loser for councils, and that looks unlikely to change in the near future. Councils are obliged to set rubbish fees such that they cover recycling costs. However, in some councils, tax revenues are used to subsidise recycling. Either way, this is a cost to the local community. High collection rates have also distorted the natural markets for recyclables. Compost is the most extreme example – most of it ends up in agriculture, and instead of being sold, the compost operators pay the farmers to take it off their hands. There are many initiatives to develop markets for recyclables, but these have shown limited results. Demand-stimulation programmes such as ecolabels and green public-procurement have also have delivered limited results, not least because they have been hindered by charges that they are unfair barriers to competition and trade.

9.2.9 Social Implications Funding for all this is paid for by user fees, which are socially regressive, in that they burden lower-income users more than high-income users.

9.2.10 Distributional Implications User fees can be avoided through generating less non-recyclable waste, so they provide the greatest economic incentive for those on lower incomes.

9.2.11 Enforcement Issues There do not appear to be any significant problems here.

9.2.12 Political and Public Response The landfill ban on combustibles is not a public/political issue as such, probably because it is rather arcane. Recycling engendered by this policy is an occasional political issue. To some extent it is a ‘motherhood’ topic, i.e. impossible to be against. On the other hand, occasionally there have been muted criticisms of the overall costs/subsidies involved in recycling.

Waste Prevention Policy Case Studies 188 9.2.13 Other Impacts Incineration is likely to generate more greenhouse-gases than landfill. The environmental impact of recycling at high marginal rates compared to landfill or incineration for, say, paper or glass, may be net negative.

9.2.14 Key Success/Failure Factors - Integration of the policy together with a rubbish-sack fee that both funds recycling subsidy as well as offers an economic incentive for households to bring recyclables for collection.

9.2.15 Future Changes/Modifications Planned None announced.

9.2.16 Evaluations Undertaken

Prior to Introduction None reported.

Following Introduction "Evaluation der Abfallpolitik des Bundes" and "Nachhaltige Rohstoffnutzung und Abfallentsorgung" are to be published in April or May of 2006. Both studies were commissioned by The Federal Environmental Agency. 9.3 Extended Producer Responsibility (EPR)

9.3.1 Description Producers and distributors in various waste-generating sectors are subject to EPR. In practical terms, EPR means the industry producing what later becomes waste must organise and finance a system for collection and recycling, and the system must achieve recovery targets set by the government. Broadly speaking, EPR is similar to the ‘take back’ legislation in Germany that spawned the ‘green-dot’ system, although in Switzerland it is focused much more narrowly. Three sectors covered by EPR are significant with respect to household waste: o batteries; o beverage containers; and o electrical/electronic goods.

9.3.2 Policy Context and Reason for Introduction Switzerland’s federal Environmental Protection Act, which took effect in 1985, states that in matters of waste disposal, the polluter must pay. This legal principle, coupled with pan-European concerns about packaging waste in the late 1980s, sparked the introduction of EPR. It could be argued that EPR makes the supply chain pay, but in general, the costs of EPR are passed on to consumers. The reason for introducing EPR for batteries was mainly motivated by the desire to prevent their heavy metal content from entering incinerator flue gases and thus spread throughout the atmosphere.

Waste Prevention Policy Case Studies 189 9.3.3 Date & Timetable of Introduction - 1985, Environmental Protection Act comes into force. This mandates the ‘polluter pays’ principle, and sets the legal backdrop to subsequent legislation/rules. - 1990, Technical Ordinance for Waste Disposal comes into force. This requires: 1) cantons and councils to ensure that recyclable fractions of household waste – glass, paper, metal and textiles – are collected separately and recycled, and 2) only non-combustible wastes to be landfilled. If recycling cannot pay its own way, it must be subsidised. - Throughout the 1990s, ‘extended producer responsibility’ or EPR is applied to various waste-generating sectors, either by negotiation or by legislation. In practical terms, EPR means the industry producing what later becomes waste must organise and finance its collection and recycling. Three sectors with EPR are significant with respect to household waste: batteries, beverage containers and electrical/electronic goods. In the case of beverage containers, there is an overlap of jurisdiction with the Technical Ordinance for Waste Disposal.

9.3.4 Prerequisites for Introduction Switzerland has pursued an integrated approach to household waste policy and to waste policy in general. There are three pillars to household waste policy: 1. a ban on combustibles to landfill, which forces councils either to incinerated or to recycle waste, combined with a mandate to set up recycling systems for waste glass, paper, metal and textiles from households; 2. a fee on rubbish sacks, which encourages households to avoid or prevent waste; and 3. provision of free-to-the-user collection systems for recyclables (EPR is part of this, mandated council-organised recycling systems are the other), which allows households to recycle waste rather than dispose of it.

9.3.5 Implementation Mechanisms Packer-fillers pay third-party guarantors (usually on a volume or unit basis) to manage the actual recycling system. For instance, PET Recycling Switzerland runs the PET- bottle system, and INOBAT runs the battery system. The third-party guarantors finance and supervise collection and recycling. They are not collection or processing companies as such; this work is contracted to waste and recycling companies. Retailers make space and manpower available to support the collection of batteries, electrical/electronic goods and PET bottles. (Local councils collect other beverage containers (aluminium and glass) as well as tinplate and carton.)

9.3.6 Monitoring and Measurement Techniques Applied All Swiss cantons keep detailed waste statistics. The Federal Environmental Agency conducts a detailed waste audit every two years. Fees imposed and collected by councils, as well as waste quantities collected and disposed, are a matter of public record. So are those of third-party guarantors.

Waste Prevention Policy Case Studies 190 9.3.7 Impact Recycling volumes have grown substantially since EPR has been introduced. Battery collection has risen from 58% of consumption in 1993 to 67% in 2004. PET bottle collection climbed from 53% in 1992 to over 80% in the late 1990s, from which it has slipped back to around 75%. Aluminium drinks cans collection rose from 40% in 1990 to 91% in 2002, from which it has slipped to around 88%. Collection of aluminium food tins and tubes has double and tripled, respectively, as a proportion of consumption, since the mid-1990s. In principle it could be argued that this growth would or could have happened anyway, but presumably the policy had a major effect. The growth of recycling surely has extended the capacity of Switzerland’s landfills. Given that permitting is difficult and that suitable, available sites are limited either by mountainous terrain or urban development, this is significant. Removing aluminium and batteries from the incineration stream is also a more efficient use of incinerators, because except for some battery components, they are non-combustible. Perhaps ironically, this is not always appreciated by incinerator operators, who understandably prefer a waste stream of consistent heating-value. During the 1990s, they often complained about the ongoing shift in the heating-value of their waste. However, this seems to have settled down in recent years, either because operators have learned better how to deal with the shift, or because the waste stream has become more consistent, or both. Removing batteries from the incineration stream is clearly positive, because this prevents their heavy metal components from being released in incinerator flue gas. Absolute quantities of these items consumed have risen but it is not possible to say whether the level of this rise is lower than it would have been without the policy in place.

9.3.8 Economic Implications Producers of batteries, aluminium containers and PET bottles subsidise the EPR collection and recycling systems. Naturally, they would prefer not to do this, but it is accepted as a sort of ‘license fee’ for doing business. They pass their EPR costs onto consumers, although not on a 1:1 basis for each product. Larger, more expensive items tend to carry a proportionally higher part of the EPR cost in their retail price (which is perverse, in that at least larger items tend to be less costly to collect and recycle). In 2004 for instance, INOBAT, the third-party guarantor for batteries, spent CHF15 million to recover 3,600 tonnes of batteries. INOBAT’s income from its fee on battery sales was almost identical. Of its expenses, 80% went to disposal companies, about 8% to collection, another 8% to information campaigns and the rest to administration. Subsidies of batteries are highest, followed by PET bottles and then aluminium. Of course it follows that the greater the subsidy, the greater the distortion of the market.

9.3.9 Social Implications EPR fees to consumers, like sales taxes, are socially regressive, in that they burden lower-income users more than high-income users.

9.3.10 Distributional Implications This is a consumption-based fee that can be avoided through generating less waste, so it provides the greatest economic incentive for those on lower incomes.

Waste Prevention Policy Case Studies 191 9.3.11 Enforcement Issues The main issue here is that of ‘free riders’, who use one of the EPR systems without paying into it. Switzerland’s two leading supermarket chains, Migros and Co-op, support the EPR systems if not out of conviction, at least out of public relations/marketing grounds. However, the number three retailer, Denner, did not join the PET system until 1-2 years ago, and Denner has been patchy about implementing the battery program. Both Migros and Co-op claimed that Denner was free riding. Denner retorted that the PET system was inefficient and designed to coddle Migros and Co-op. There probably is truth in both sides of the argument.

9.3.12 Political and Public Response All the EPR groups run information campaigns (whether they like it or not, these are mandated by EPR agreements), so there is a public consciousness of the EPR systems. For instance, in 2004 INOBAT spent CHF 1 million on this. There is a moderate political debate that breaks out every year when the EPR groups report their recovery rates from the previous year, especially as rates have declined a bit over the past few years. This usually consists of finger-pointing: the EPR groups blame the public for not being conscientious enough; some parties blame the EPR groups for not spending enough money; and other parties argue that the EPR systems are too expensive already.

9.3.13 Other Impacts None not mentioned above.

9.3.14 Key Success/Failure Factors - Integration waste management, i.e. combination of free-to-the-user collection systems for recyclables with a sack fee that gives incentive for households to bring collectibles for recycling. - Built-in financial base for recycling subsidy, which at these recycling rates is clearly required. - Strong belief that economic incentives can change individual behaviour.

9.3.15 Future Changes/Modifications Planned None announced.

9.3.16 Evaluations Undertaken There are numerous reports and studies available, particularly from EPR organisations. However, there does not seem to be a comprehensive evaluation. Perhaps this will be part of "Evaluation der Abfallpolitik des Bundes" and "Nachhaltige Rohstoffnutzung und Abfallentsorgung", which are to be published in April or May of 2006. Both studies were commissioned by The Federal Environmental Agency.

Waste Prevention Policy Case Studies 192 10 POLICIES FOR HWP IN USE ELSEWHERE An international review of waste reduction policies that may be of interest for implementation in the U.K was conducted. From our review the following were selected to be investigated in more detail: • Irish Plastic Bag Levy • Danish Waste Tax • Danish Packaging Tax • Raw Materials Taxes • French Unwanted Mail Decree • Wallonia Residual Waste Levy Outlines of our investigation of these policy tools are presented in the subsections below. In addition to the initiatives noted above we focussed research efforts on Australia and New Zealand, North America (including Canada), South Korea and Europe. Highlights from this investigation include the following: • EPR schemes were found to be in place in all of the countries investigated suggesting a worldwide realisation of the part producers must play in waste minimisation. • Deposit-refund schemes were found in South Australia and North America applying to a variety of beverage containers. • South Korea has some very interesting and highly effective policies in place; the volume based waste fee system and a campaign to reduce food waste were of particular interest. • Researching Danish policies revealed several initiatives considering the entire product life cycle. Product panels and integrated product policy consider waste production from ‘cradle to grave’. Product Panels are interesting as they bring together experts from all stages of the products life who would not normally meet, this provides a unique opportunity to discuss possibilities for minimising waste. • There were definite trends in the policies and initiatives used throughout the world, the importance of producer responsibility, considering the entire product life cycle and considering externalities in calculating waste production were the most important of those we found. 10.1 Irish Plastic Bags Levy (‘Plastax’)

10.1.1 Description The tax targets disposable plastic carrier bags with the specific intention of reducing their consumption. A tax of 15 Euro cents per bag is applied at the point of sale and retailers are obliged to pass on the levy to the customer. The tax was introduced primarily to combat the problem of plastic bag litter.

10.1.2 Policy Context and Reason for Introduction The decision to introduce the Plastic Bags Levy followed a consultancy report on the issues of plastic bags and their environmental impact. The report recommended a

Waste Prevention Policy Case Studies 193 levy as the most appropriate means of reducing consumption of plastic shopping bags and thereby reduce consequent environmental problems. In the words of Declan Kelly, Irish Ambassador to Australia, ‘the levy was introduced primarily as an anti-litter measure. While not the largest component of litter in Ireland, disposable plastic bags were perceived to be the most visible and unsightly. Dropped by careless consumers and whipped up by the Irish winds, plastic bags were a common and unwelcome decoration on Irish trees and hedgerows’ (speech given in Canberra, Sept. 2002).

10.1.3 Date & Timetable of Introduction - 1999 ‘Consultancy Study on Plastic Bags’ published - 14 February 2001 Governments Litter Action Plan published which signalled intention to introduce the plastic bag levy 198 . - Regulations published in draft form on 18 September 2001 - Signed into Law 20 Dec 2001 by The Minister for the Environment and Local Government, Mr. Noel Dempsey - 11 February 2002 start of the T.V. advertising campaign for the introduction of the Plastic Shopping Bag Environmental Levy - Regulations formally came into effect 4 March 2002.

10.1.4 Prerequisites for Introduction The key driver for introduction of the plastic bag levy was the political determination to put this sort of initiative in place. Detailed consideration was given to issues relating to compliance with EU legislation, administrative costs, secondary environmental impacts and effects on employment.

10.1.5 Implementation Mechanisms As discussed, this is a point of sale tax that the retailer must pass onto the customer. Regulations also demand that the levy is itemised on any invoice, receipt or docket issued to the customer. Retailers have to make payments to the Revenue Commissioners quarterly and are also required to keep records. Compliance with the application of the levy is enforced by the Revenue Commissioners 199 . The tax does not apply to bags used to contain fresh fish, meat and poultry, and fish meat and poultry products. It also does not apply to plastic bags used for fruit, nuts, vegetables, confectionary and cooked food. Reusable plastic shopping bags which are sold for 70 euro cents or more are also exempt.

10.1.6 Monitoring and Measurement Techniques Applied The key instruments for measurement of the impact of the levy include the sales data kept by the Revenue Commissioners and industry data on sales of plastic bags.

198 http://www.environ.ie/DOEI/DOEIPub.nsf/enSearchView/CEC0C7477623366380 256F0F003DBA91?OpenDocument&Lang=en 199 http://www.environ.ie/DOEI/DOEIPol.nsf/enSearchView/EDD69C7C591B96BB80256F62003C99 A3?OpenDocument&Lang=en

Waste Prevention Policy Case Studies 194 10.1.7 Impact Receipts from the plastic bag levy amounted to €9.6million for the first year. Taking into account start-up and ongoing administrative costs, total net receipts from the Plastic Bag Levy amounted to €8m. The levy is expected to bring in around €11million in a full year. These proceeds go to the Environment Fund to support waste management and other environmental initiatives. Most retailers report a reduction of over 90% in the consumption of disposable plastic bags since the levy's introduction. Prior to the introduction of the levy, an estimated 1.2 billion plastic bags were provided free to the public each year. 200 Pre Levy bag consumption was estimated to be 340 bags/inhabitant/year, since the Levy was introduced consumption has dropped to 20 bags/inhabitant/year. Anecdotal reports suggest that the quantity of plastic bags present in litter has reduced substantially, but no data has been cited to substantiate this.

10.1.8 Economic Implications It was estimated that 21% of plastic bags used in Ireland are manufactured there with the remainder imported - mainly from the rest of the EU and certain Southeast Asian countries. Prior to the introduction of the tax four companies, employing 177 persons, were engaged in the manufacture of plastic bags in Ireland. It is not known what impact the tax has had on this sector. Retailers, who were sceptical of the levy, and the additional work involved in administering it, have reportedly been won over when it became clear that they were able to save money on disposable bags - and make a margin on selling bags for life.

10.1.9 Social Implications Consumers are reported to have gone to significant lengths to avoid the tax, and the levy has appeared to raise awareness of plastic bags as an environmental issue. Some anecdotal reports suggest that people have avoided purchasing plastic bags because they don’t want to be seen using them, rather than because they want to avoid the cost. There are of course those who oppose the plastic bag tax, the Carrier Bag Consortium is particularly vocal in its hostility to the levy, they argue the following main points: a) Litter is a behavioural problem not caused by the bags themselves b) Plastic bags only constitute 1% of litter anyway c) Plastic bag production is very energy efficient, more so than paper bags d) Plastics bags only take up an average of 0.3% of landfill space e) Plastic bags are six times lighter and take up ten times less storage space than paper bags and are therefore more energy efficient to transport. Of course industry pressure such as that from the Carrier Bag Consortium is to be expected when it is considered that the Irish Plastic Bag Levy has caused an estimated 90% reduction in plastic bag production in Ireland according to the Irish EPA.

200 http://www.environ.ie/DOEI/DOEIPub.nsf/enSearchView/C0795CFC510A94FB80256F0F003DBA2 0?OpenDocument&Lang=en

Waste Prevention Policy Case Studies 195 10.1.10 Distributional Implications As this is a sales based tax which can be avoided through not purchasing plastic bags it provides the greatest economic incentive for those on lower incomes.

10.1.11 Enforcement Issues It is reported that a small number of retailers are failing to comply with the requirements of the levy and are either not applying the levy correctly or are withholding revenues. Retailers who fail to implement the Levy Regulations correctly are liable on summary conviction to a fine not exceeding €1,905 or to imprisonment for up to 12 months, or both or, on conviction on indictment, to a maximum fine of €12.7million, or to imprisonment for up to 10 years, or both. A system of daily fines applies where an offence continues to be committed after conviction i.e. up to €254 per day for a summary conviction, or up to €127,000 for conviction on indictment.

10.1.12 Political and Public Response The public response is largely reported to be positive. Tesco Ireland's environmental manager, Jim Dwyer was reported as saying: "Customers are telling us they broadly welcome the introduction of the levy. We have seen a marked change in customers' behaviour in anticipation of the new levy, reflected in the significant increase in sales of our re-usable bags."

10.1.13 Other Impacts Anecdotal reports from opponents of the plastic bag levy report increased paper bag use, theft of wire and plastic shopping baskets from stores, and people carrying purchases in their clothing making it harder to detect theft. 201 In addition, some retailers have reported a doubling in the sales of other types of plastic bag products, such as bin liners, since the levy was introduced, leading to claims that the tax has simply shifted consumption of plastic to a different product.

10.1.14 Key Success/Failure Factors - Political determination - Setting of the tax at a high level - Proceeds of the Levy directed to new Environmental Fund and can only be used for specified environmental purposes. - The administration of the tax was kept relatively simple - Clear communication to the public of the reasons for the tax and how it applies.

10.1.15 Future Changes/Modifications Planned There is anecdotal evidence of some slippage in the enforcement of the tax. Consumption has increased from the 20 bags/inhabitant/year best performance to 28 bags/household/year in 2005. There are calls for an increase in the levy to prevent any further slippage.

201 : http://www.carrierbagtax.com/notbeentold.htm

Waste Prevention Policy Case Studies 196 10.1.16 Evaluations Undertaken Prior to introduction Fehily Timoney & Company (1999), Consultancy Study on Plastic Bags, prepared for Department of the Environment and Local Government, Custom House, Dublin, 1999. Following introduction None reported. 10.2 Danish Waste Tax

10.2.1 Description The purpose of the Danish waste tax is to decelerate the increase in annual waste arisings in Denmark. The original tax rate was 40 DKK/tonne of waste reaching final treatment regardless of what was done with the waste. Since the tax was implemented not only has the rate increased but charges are now differentiated according to final treatment option. The taxes are differentiated in such a way that treatment options deemed preferential by the government pay a lower tax. Landfill is the most heavily taxed option, recycling is tax exempt.

10.2.2 Policy Context and Reason for Introduction The waste tax was introduced to reduce the quantity of waste diverted to landfill and incineration in Denmark and to increase participation in recycling. During the 1980’s there were considerable problems in finding new sites for landfills, incineration was under scrutiny as a possible source of diffuse dioxin production. This created a need to reduce the amount of waste reaching final treatment. The Danish waste system operates a typical ‘waste hierarchy’ whereby waste is preferentially not produced in the first place, re-use or recycling is the next most preferable option, if this is not an option waste is incinerated and finally landfill is the least favoured and most heavily taxed option

10.2.3 Date and Timetable of Introduction - (1 st January 1987) Danish waste tax first came into effect. - Taxation has been increased 5 times since 1987 (1990, 1993, 1997, 1999, and 2000). The largest increase was in 1997 due to the green tax reform. During the 1997 increase the average tax increase amounted to 60% 202 . - (1997) Incineration with electricity production was given its own tax bracket as it was deemed preferential to incineration without electricity production. - Current tax rates are DKR 375 for landfilling and DKR 330 for incineration.

10.2.4 Prerequisites for Introduction A tax on waste in Denmark was conceptualised in a report from the Danish EPA on possible use of economic instruments in environmental policy published in 1985. During the 1985 budget political agreement was obtained for a general tax on waste which was included in the bill to reform the Danish Environmental protection Act in1996.

202 http://www.mst.dk/homepage/

Waste Prevention Policy Case Studies 197 The waste tax in Denmark followed the introduction of taxes on electricity and packaging. The waste tax was different in that it was introduced with a very direct environmental policy objective: to stem the increasing waste amounts 203 . Denmark has a small population of just 5 million inhabitants yet due to its small landmass (43,000 sq Km) Land is a very precious commodity. The Danish government wanted to reduce the proportion of the waste stream entering landfill as they were well aware of the serious lack of space for new landfill sites. The general tax on waste is a unique policy instrument that can be used to both reduce total waste arisings and increase participation in recycling.

10.2.5 Implementation Mechanisms The general waste tax in Denmark is charged per tonne of waste arriving at final treatment destination it is a fiscal environmental tax, yield from the tax is not earmarked for any particular use. Waste is weighed upon arrival at its final destination be it incinerator or landfill. Waste removed for recycling is also weighed with regard to a refund for the tax. Registered plants report quantities on a quarterly basis; these statements are used to calculate tax payable. Data from the collection of taxes is forwarded to the EPA for calculation of waste arisings for the quarter in question.

10.2.6 Monitoring and Measurement Techniques Waste is charged to the disposal authority per tonne arriving at final treatment. All registered sites are equipped with vehicle weighing systems so the weight of the waste can be determined. Taxes are payable quarterly. Tax payable is a direct measure of the waste reaching final treatment. As landfill and incineration are charged at different rates their representative proportions of the total waste stream are known.

10.2.7 Impact Analysis of the Central Customs and Tax Administrations levying of the waste tax between 1987 and 1996 shows a reduction in the total waste delivered to municipal plants annually of 1,029,00 tonnes, this is equivalent to a 26% reduction. The waste tax acted as a catalyst for increased recycling. Although the tax does not directly apply to households producing waste it acted as a locomotive to companies collecting municipal waste to improve the recycling infrastructure. The waste tax is charged to the collection company by weight arriving at treatment plant yet most collection companies traditionally charge the waste producer by volume. Unless the increase in recycling can be converted to a reduction in volume the producer sees no gain from reduced waste production. For this reason several municipalities in Denmark have started charging for household waste collection by weight. Districts using weight based charging for waste collections have seen the greatest reductions in waste production and also a reduction in the cost of collection which is passed on to the producer. The municipality of Tinglev has seen a 50% reduction in waste arisings and a 25% reduction in collection costs 204 .

203 http://www.mst.dk/udgiv/publications/1999/87-7909-512-7/html/helepubl_eng.htm 204 http://www.mst.dk/udgiv/publications/1999/87-7909-512-7/html/kap09_eng.htm

Waste Prevention Policy Case Studies 198 10.2.8 Economic Implications The tax has raised questions as to whether competition is sufficiently free in the markets for recyclable materials. Due to high transport costs waste products often have to be delivered locally. This may allow a single company to monopolise the area, this situation can be exploited to the extent of charging for the collection of recyclable materials. A study carried out on the effects of waste charging on small businesses in Denmark found that waste costs rarely exceeded 0,5% of company turnover and as such were not damaging to profits 205 The tax is only a very small percentage of overall tax revenues so not sufficient to have any macroeconomic effects.

10.2.9 Distributional Implications The general tax on waste in Denmark is paid by the company delivering waste to the final treatment plant. Costs are not necessarily passed on directly to those producing the waste. When municipal waste is collected on a weight based system costs are transmitted more directly. Households who produce more waste will pay more for their collection. It is not possible to make assumptions as to the distributional implications of this as there is no evidence proving that income has an effect on the volume of waste produced. All that can be concluded is that larger households will pay more as they will inevitably produce more waste.

10.2.10 Enforcement Issues The tax covers all waste going to plants receiving waste from municipal collection as well as private landfill for inert waste. All plants receiving waste of this kind must be registered with the Central Customs and Tax Administration. Tax is payable by weight which is recorded using weigh bridges at the treatment plant. Waste diversion is not an issue as all municipal waste is taxable so delivering waste to sites not registered for the tax is not an option. There is no evidence to suggest that the waste tax has led to a drastic increase in fly tipping as the reductions in waste arriving at final treatment have been matched by an increase in recycling. Local administrations have indicated that some countryside fly tipping does occur 206 .

10.2.11 Political and Public Response The waste tax was designed not to apply direct financial pressure on the household to reduce waste arisings but to act as a catalyst to encourage collection companies to provide better recycling facilities. This has indeed caused an increased participation in recycling.

205 Anderson Mikael Skou, 1997. The Danish Waste Tax: The role of institutions for the implementation and effectiveness of economic instruments, Paper to be presented at The International Workshop on the Institutional Aspects of Economic Instrument for Environmental Policy, Copenhagen May 1997.

206 http://www.mst.dk/udgiv/Publications/1999/87-7909-512-7/html/kap09_eng.htm

Waste Prevention Policy Case Studies 199 10.2.12 Other Impacts -Increased recycling rate -Reduction in demolition/construction waste -Increase in efficiency of incineration plants used

10.2.13 Key Success / Failure Factors -Taxation levels reviewed regularly and adjusted to maximise performance -26% net reduction in waste delivered to municipal plants between 1987 & 1996. -Tax successfully acted as a ‘locomotive’ to increase recycling -Led to the introduction of weight based collection fees in some municipalities -Plants reprocessing materials can re-claim some of the waste tax paid on the residual waste left after reprocessing. -A ban on landfilling waste suitable for incineration was introduced parallel to a financial incentive favouring incineration. With a ban in place there is no need for differential costs of landfilling and incineration.

10.2.14 Future Changes / Modifications Planned Review of taxation levels

10.2.15 Evaluations Undertaken Holmstrand, H.C et al (1989) Vurderin af affaldsafgiftens styrende effecter, Bind 1-2, Undersǿgelsesprojekt for Miljǿstyrelsens Affaldskontor, Kǿbenhavn: GENDAN Miljosyrelsen (1991) Notat om affaldsafgiftens virkninger til Folketingets Miljǿ – og planleiginingsudvalg Christoffersen et al (1992) Affaldsaftgiftens effecter, Kǿbenhavn: Amternes og Kommunernes Forskningsinstitut Anderson Mikael Skou (1997 ) The Danish Waste Tax: The role of institutions for the implementation and effectiveness of economic instruments, Paper to be presented at The International Workshop on the Institutional Aspects of Economic Instrument for Environmental Policy , Copenhagen Danish Environmental Protection Agency (1996b) Environmental Review No. 5, Waste Statistics, Copenhagen Henderson (1997), Waste charges and taxes in the Netherlands , pp. 97-112 , in Environmental taxes and charges, Dublin: European Foundation. 10.3 Danish Packaging Tax

10.3.1 Description The Danish packaging taxes are a variety of fiscal measures that are used with the combined aim of reducing the overall amount of packaging used in Denmark. There are five separate tax systems currently used that have an effect on packaging. 1- a volume based tax on beverage containers 2- a weight based tax on paper and plastic bags 3- a weight based tax on disposable tableware 4- a weight based tax on PVC foils 5- a weight and environmentally based tax on packaging for selected commodities

Waste Prevention Policy Case Studies 200 The Danish Packaging tax system applies to a range of containers that are used to hold 18 different product groups. 17 product groups directly relate to packaged goods 1 product group is carrier bags. Compared to other packaging taxes, the Danish system has a much wider scope. It covers products such as drinks, oils, vinegar, sauces, dairy products, detergents, paints, cosmetics and pet food. At the moment it does not cover other items such as general foodstuffs and household goods. However there is an intention to expand the scope of the tax in the future. The weight and environmentally based tax on packaging will be the focus for this review.

10.3.2 Policy Context and Reason for Introduction The packaging tax was introduced to encourage producers to reduce the amount of material used in packaging. The current policy is a weight and environmentally based system that replaces a weight only system. With the weight system the notion was that if all materials were taxed at a uniform rate there would be no substitution between materials to avoid taxation. It was thought this method would be most effective for an overall reduction in the quantity of waste produced. A shift in opinion led to a switch to variable taxation rates set according to LCA in 2001. All rates were set in reference to glass which was given a tax index of 1. Higher tax rates were given to Aluminium, plastics, steel and expanded polystyrene. Paper/cardboard and wood were given lower tax indices. The new tax is much broader in scope, and is seen as a more sophisticated in design.

10.3.3 Date and Timetable of Introduction - Danish Action Plan for waste (1993-97) - Initial attempts to integrate a packaging reduction policy during the early 1990’s failed due to a lack of methodology to develop a comprehensive, environmentally beneficial taxation system. --- In 1996 the government again examined the possibility of introducing a packaging tax and found that a weight-based system differentiated by material would be best. - The 1998 budget included provision for a volume based packaging tax. The volume based tax provision conflicted with the weight-based tax recommended by the 1196 review. Therefore agreement was reached for a weight-based tax to be introduced. - Proposals were agreed in June 1998 with the tax coming in to force in January 1999. This tax was a weight-based tax with all materials charged at the same rate. - In April 2001 the tax was changed from a weight-based fee that was uniform across material types to a differentiated tax based on the results of LCA studies.

10.3.4 Prerequisites for Introduction The Danish Action Plan for Waste 1993-97 was the major driving force behind the creation of the Danish Packaging Tax. This called for an assessment of the possibilities for taxing packaging as a means of influencing consumer behaviour. In addition there was a desire for any such tax to relate to the environmental impact of different types of packaging.

10.3.5 Implementation Mechanisms Responsibility for the collection of the tax belongs to the Tax and Customs Administration Ministry, they also ensure correct revenues are paid. There are 13 different tax levels materials can be assigned to. Composite materials are taxed

Waste Prevention Policy Case Studies 201 according to their constituent materials. Re-usable containers are taxed on a volume- based system so as not to penalise against the thicker walls used in these packages. To facilitate administration of the tax companies trading or producing products that would incur a tax of less than €670 are exempt.

10.3.6 Monitoring and Measurement Techniques Applied The quantity of tax collected is in itself a measure of the amount of packaging material used.

10.3.7 Impact There was little data available on the amount of packaging material used prior to the implementation of the packaging tax. Collection of the tax has created an improved understanding of the amount of packaging used in Denmark annually. The table below shows the revenue created by the tax between 1998 and 2004 and is hence a reflection of the packaging used during this period. Error! Objects cannot be created from editing field codes. Source 207 Note: From 2002 tax from the use of disposable tableware is included with the packaging tax figures. The disposable tableware tax in previous years accounted for between 3 and 10 million euros per annum. As the figures available only cover five of the eight years covered by the tax to date it is difficult to draw any conclusions as to the effect of the tax on total packaging used. The figures do suggest that in more recent years (between 2002 and 2006) packaging waste arisings do appear to be levelling off although an accurate analysis cannot be made without more data.

10.3.8 Economic Implications The packaging tax has created an interesting situation with regard to the import/export of bottled drinks in Denmark. Large numbers of beer and carbonated drinks are imported to Denmark and sold from machines in shops as the deposit is higher. This creates a surplus of bottles that can be used by Danish drinks suppliers without the intervention of the tax authorities. If the Danish drinks producers then export drinks contained in these bottles they are refunded the packaging tax that would normally be paid on these containers. The Danish Treasury estimates this costs the Danish state some DKR 15 million per year, the canning industry estimates a loss of DKR 50 million due to this activity. 208 The tax has received some opposition from representatives in the packaging industry who claim that it is a barrier to free trade and prevents fair competition. As the tax favours certain materials that are deemed to have a lesser environmental impact companies producing these materials will see increased revenues whereas the more heavily taxed materials will be expected to suffer.

207 Adapted from: European Topic Centre on Resource and Waste Management, 2005, Effectiveness of packaging waste management systems in selected countries: an EEA pilot study. Annex Denmark. European Topic Centre on Resource and Waste Management, Copenhagen. 208 http://europa.eu.int/eur-lex/pri/en/oj/dat/2004/ce033/ce03320040206en01020103.pdf

Waste Prevention Policy Case Studies 202 10.3.9 Social Implications It is hoped that by taxing materials that are deemed more environmentally damaging packaging manufacturers will shift away from these materials to the less damaging materials. As even those materials that are less environmentally damaging still carry taxation it is hoped that total packaging use will be minimised by the tax. There has been no study conducted on the shifts in behavioural patterns caused by the tax but it may be hypothesised that the above mentioned changes could be expected. An increase in the price of heavily packaged materials and media coverage of the taxation may help to induce the consumer to purchase lightly packaged products.

10.3.10 Distributional Implications The Danish EPA is not aware of any studies carried out on the distributional effects of the tax. As far as the extent to which the tax affects the rich rather than the poor or vice versa is not known. If the tax is successful it will have the effect of reducing waste production thus decreasing the disposal costs and shifting burden to the producer. Waste management industries involved with final treatment are expected to see some shrinkage whereas those involved with recycling, re-use and minimisation should see their sector grow. The tax is more damaging to industries such as steel and aluminium who are subject to the highest taxation rates as they are deemed more environmentally damaging.

10.3.11 Enforcement Issues Those found to be avoiding the tax can be fined or imprisoned for up to 2 years.

10.3.12 Political and Public Response The Danish packaging tax has attracted much attention from abroad. Germany and Holland are both considering the inclusion of a similar tax. The European Commission encourages the use of fiscal instruments based on life cycle assessments as part of integrated product policies. There has also been some negative response to the tax most of which claims that the tax is unfair and it favours certain sectors of the packaging industry. The EEA (Europe’s Aluminium Association), Europen (the European packaging chain association) and APEAL (European association for producers of steel for packaging) have all submitted formal complaints to the European Commission. The grounds for their complaints are that the tax creates a distortion of competition rules and creates obstacles to trade.

10.3.13 Key Success/Failure Factors - Good coverage of materials covered by the tax. - A switch from weight-based taxation to LCA analysis based tax. - Tax levels set high enough to have an impact. - Tax levels regularly reviewed.

10.3.14 Future Changes/Modifications Planned The level of tax applied to each packaging material is under constant review and the tax index for a given material can be adjusted in accordance with review data.

Waste Prevention Policy Case Studies 203 10.3.15 Evaluations Undertaken Danish Environmental Protection Agency (1996b), Environmental Review No. 5, Waste Statistics 1995 , Copenhagen Henderson (1997) Waste charges and taxes in the Netherlands , pp. 97-112 , in Environmental taxes and charges, Dublin: European Foundation. European Topic Centre on Resource and Waste Management (2005) Effectiveness of packaging waste management systems in selected countries: an EEA pilot study Annex Denmark, European Topic Centre on Resource and Waste Management, Copenhagen.

10.4 Raw Materials Taxes

10.4.1 Description Raw materials taxes are taxes on the extraction of raw materials from the earth. These taxes range from mining taxes to taxes on the felling of timber. The aim of raw material taxes is to limit resource exploitation by reducing demand through increased competitiveness of alternative, preferably secondary materials. Amongst those who currently have raw materials taxes on selected materials are the Czech Republic, Russia, Norway, U.K Sweden and Poland. Denmark has had a general tax on raw material extraction since 1990. This tax covers the extraction of all raw materials except a small group that are exempt. The current taxation rate is DKR 5 per cubic metre of raw material extracted.

10.4.2 Policy Context and Reason for Introduction Raw materials taxes are introduced to reduce the extraction of raw materials from the earth and promote the use of alternative, preferably secondary products. Raw material taxes are fiscal measures that can either be charged ad quantum, according to the physical amount of material extracted or they can be charged ad valorem, accordingly to the value of the material. When taxes are charged ad quantum the level of the tax is set according to an estimation of the external costs of the material extraction.

10.4.3 Date & Timetable of Introduction Several important raw materials taxes have been implemented since 1990. These include the Danish tax on raw materials introduced in January 1990 and the Swedish tax on gravel extrication in 1996. More recently Russia introduced a tax on the extraction of mineral resources in January 2002. This replaced a more general tax on material extraction. The United Kingdom introduced its aggregates levy during April 2002.

10.4.4 Prerequisites for Introduction Raw materials taxes are introduced because the extraction of these finite resources cannot continue unchecked indefinitely. The extraction of raw materials has certain external costs such as the loss of amenities and co 2 emissions that can be internalised in the cost of the product by the introduction of material taxes. The introduction of raw materials taxes requires a government that sees the opportunity

Waste Prevention Policy Case Studies 204 to promote the use of alternatives at the same time as raising income through taxes. Introducing raw material taxes can be damaging to quarrying activities so a thorough investigation of the economic implications of the tax is necessary prior to introduction.

10.4.5 Implementation Mechanism As discussed material taxes can be either be ad quantum or ad valorem. Denmark charges its tax on raw materials ad quantum ; charges are made per cubic metre of material removed from the ground. The current rate is 5DKR per cubic metre extracted with total amounts rounded down to the nearest cubic metre. Anyone extracting materials abroad or sending materials abroad must still pay the tax presuming the total amount exceeds 200 cubic metres per annum to prevent unnecessary administration. All companies who are involved in the commercial extraction of raw materials or receive raw materials from abroad must register with the central tax and customs authorities. The Danish raw material tax does not apply to the following. - Raw materials extracted with the purpose of beach reclamation - Seabed materials derived fro dredging that are subsequently recovered as raw materials - Residues and waste products extracted from closed down landfills - Top soil and mould delivered free of charge A raw material tax is used in Latvia and the rate at which the tax is charged varies depending on the intended final use of the material. For example the tax rate on sand varies between 0.05 LVL/m 3 and 0.20LVL/m 3. Although this method of taxation makes the use of certain raw materials less attractive it is questionable if it promotes the use of less damaging alternatives.

10.4.6 Monitoring and Measurement Techniques Applied The quantity of tax collected is a measure of the total material extracted for both ad valorem and ad quantum taxes presuming the initial taxation method and level of tax is known.

10.4.7 Impact According to the Nordic Council of Ministers 90% of all demolition material in Denmark is recycled today 209 . Unfortunately no data is available on the figures for recycling prior to the introduction of the tax. The quantities of taxed raw materials extracted in Denmark have mirrored those for non-taxed materials but at a lower level suggesting that untaxed materials are preferentially used 210 . The total amounts of raw material extracted have fluctuated since the tax was introduced but levels in 2002 were in fact slightly lower than 1990 suggesting the tax has had a beneficial effect on the proportion of material that is recycled. In Sweden the tax on gravel extraction has led to reduction in the extraction of natural gravel and an increase in the use of crushed rock and other alternatives211 .

209 Tema Nord 2002:581. The use of economic instruments in Nordic environmental policy 1999-2001. Copenhagen: Nordic Council of Ministers. 210 http://www.statistikbanken.dk/statbank5a/SelectVarVal/saveselections.asp 211 http://www.sgu.se/kartpubl/sgupubl/perpubl/perpubl_3-02/Grusrapport2002_3.pdf

Waste Prevention Policy Case Studies 205 10.4.8 Economic Implications Raw materials taxes are designed to make alternative secondary materials more attractive to the consumer. It is preferable therefore that the extra cost of the tax is passed on to the consumer rather than being swallowed by the extraction company. Problems can arise when raw material taxes are not applied to all materials. The problem lies in the classification of materials, in particular aggregates are difficult to classify. In an ideal system all materials whose extraction is deemed harmful and the government wish to limit will be covered by the tax, other materials who benefit from this through a pricing advantage do so justly as the government has not included them under the tax and are therefore not considered to pose a problem. The U.K has a tax on aggregate materials which has caused some upset amongst the aggregates industry. The problem lies in the fact that in some cases two materials that are almost identical can be taken yet only one is covered by the tax. An example is in the U.K slate taken from a North Wales quarry and road stone taken from a quarry that could be just next-door. The slate is exempt from the £1.60 per tonne tax yet the road stone must pay the tax despite the two materials being almost identical. According to the British Aggregates Association it has become increasingly difficult to sell lower value products as they have been undercut by typically more expensive materials that are not covered by the tax 212 .

10.4.9 Social Implications It is hoped that the tax on raw materials will encourage the use of alternatives and promote the use of secondary products. A recycling rate of 89% has been achieved in Denmark for demolition materials; however the raw materials tax cannot take all the credit for this impressive figure. An agreement with the Danish Contractors Association on selective demolition and a state tax on waste have played a large part in reaching this figure In the U.K roughly 10% of the funds raised through the aggregates levy are diverted to the Aggregates Levy Sustainability Fund (ALSF). The aim of the ALSF is to address the environmental and social issues created by aggregate extraction 213 . English Nature plays a large role in the distribution of the funds aiming to increase biodiversity and enhance areas affected by aggregate extraction.

10.4.10 Distributional Implications The tax on natural gravel in Sweden will affect regions where there is no alternative material available to extract more than regions where crushed rock or other alternatives can be used. Regions who cannot switch to mining other materials will be forced to continue mining the gravel and will have to pay the tax. As the Danish raw material tax is charged at a flat rate of 5 DKR per m 3 extracted lower value materials will see a greater affect of the price hike than the more expensive materials as the tax will constitute a larger percentage of the overall cost.

212 http://www.british-aggregates.com/documentation/doc34a.pdf 213 http://72.14.203.104/search?q=cache:Cgz2ba2h63kJ:www.ciria.org/pdf/emsaggissue10.pdf+imp acts+gravel+tax&hl=en&gl=uk&ct=clnk&cd=2

Waste Prevention Policy Case Studies 206 10.4.11 Enforcement Issues For the Danish Raw Materials Tax all enterprises extracting or receiving from abroad raw materials in excess of 200 m 3 annually must register with the central customs and tax authorities. As an extraction of more than 200m 3 requires a considerable scale of operation tax avoidance through unregistered extraction is unlikely to be occurring on a large scale.

10.4.12 Political and Public Response Raw materials levies are unsurprisingly not popular amongst extraction industries. In the U.K the gravel tax has received a constant stream of opposition from the British Aggregates Association (BAA) who argue that the tax has not led to an increase in use of recycled aggregates and that there will always be a need for primary raw materials in the construction industry where quality cannot be compromised. The BAA claim that “the only thing the tax is promoting is an ever growing waste mountain of by- product, which is too expensive to sell” 214 .

10.4.13 Other Impacts Improved environment through schemes such as the ALSF in the U.K who have funded schemes to improve biodiversity and enhance geological/geo-morphological features in areas affected by extraction.

10.4.14 Key Success/Failure Factors In Denmark an accurate measure of the externalities to be included in the tax price was not carried out. Regional fluctuations in the tax price allowing for regions with low external costs to have lower taxes and regions with high external costs to have higher taxes would increase the efficiency of the tax. The Danish Raw Material Tax applies to several materials that can be used as substitutions for one another. This is beneficial in that it promotes the use of secondary materials. As the Danish tax is charged at a flat rate of 5DKR for all materials it will have differing effects on each material as it will constitute a differing percentage of overall costs.

10.4.15 Future Changes/Modifications Planned A 2004 report for the Swedish Government suggests a review of possible materials that may be added alongside gravel under a raw materials tax. Phosphate is outlined as a possible candidate as it is in very limited supply. It is mentioned in the report that a wide ranging tax on raw materials was not recommended unless there was international agreement to do so 215 .

214 http://www.british-aggregates.com/news/news.html 215 http://www.naturvardsverket.se/bokhandeln/pdf/620-8190-X.pdf

Waste Prevention Policy Case Studies 207 10.4.16 Evaluations Undertaken The Swedish Ministry of Finance (2003) An analysis of the consequences of the gravel tax in order to evaluate the need for a further tax increase, Finansdepartmentet The Swedish EPA (2000) Examining the effects of the tax on the use of natural gravel, Svenska Naturvardsverket 2000. 10.5 French Unwanted Mail Decree

10.5.1 Description ‘Junk mail’ is described as third class mail often addressed to the ’occupier’ or ‘resident’. Initiatives concerning junk mail tend to be voluntary as governments do not wish to harm industry by placing taxes on the use of post as a marketing strategy. In March 2006 the French government announced plans to introduce a decree to tackle the wastage created by mail marketing activities. The decree is a voluntary contribution towards government recycling costs. If there is not sufficient industry participation in the decree the government have threatened the introduction of a junk mail tax.

10.5.2 Policy Context and Reason for Introduction According to the French environment ministry the average French household receives 40kg of unsolicited printed materials each year. It is estimated that recycling just half of this material would cost 75 million euros in taxpayer’s money. The French government has recently taken decisive action in the form of an extended producer responsibility scheme to attempt to reduce the volume of junk mail sent to households each year. Distributors of junk mail will have to pay for the recycling of the resultant waste under a decree agreed by the council of ministers. This sector has been informed that if they fail to comply with the decree the government will introduce a tax on junk mail. The decree states that the participants can either pay into a fund that will be used to pay for recycling by local authorities or they can pay for advertising to encourage consumers to recycle. Payment levels will be set later in 2006 after meetings between the government and interested parties. The decree is designed to help meet an official target of reducing the amount of waste entering landfill or incineration to 200kg per person annually by 2005

10.5.3 Date & Timetable of Introduction The decree was announced in March 2006, payment levels will be decided late in 2006.

10.5.4 Prerequisites for Introduction In 2005 the French government announced a change in waste policy direction for the next ten years. One of the main focuses of the policy change was to reduce the amount of waste sent to landfill/incineration annually from 290kg per person in 2005 to 250kg by 2010 and 200kg by 2015. The high costs of recycling the unwanted mail also acted as a catalyst for the government to insist on a fiscal measure to reduce the junk mail problem.

Waste Prevention Policy Case Studies 208 The decree is currently a voluntary scheme, if industry does not respond willingly the government will enforce a tax on junk mail.

10.5.5 Implementation Mechanisms As the decree was only announced a month prior to this report being written no information on the mode of action is yet available.

10.5.6 Monitoring and Measurement Techniques Applied The method used to set the payment levels will decide if the revenue collected can be used as a measure of the volume of junk mail being sent. It is most likely that some form of monitoring industry participation in the decree will be used to determine its success.

10.5.7 Impact The intended impact of the decree is to encourage direct marketing firms to better target their campaigns thus reducing the overall volume of junk mail that is sent. With better-targeted campaigning advertising should only reach those who desire to receive the information and less media will be produced that goes directly in to the waste stream.

10.5.8 Economic Implications As the decree has only just been announced and the level of payments has not been decided yet it is not possible to comment on its economic implications. It is very unlikely that the government will set payment levels high enough to damage the direct marketing industry as it would not be in their interest to do so.

10.5.9 Social Implications It is hoped that the decree will encourage more successfully directed marketing campaigns which will require a reduced use of paper. The money from the decree used to fund advertising campaigns for recycling may have a small effect on participation in recycling.

10.5.10 Distributional Implications The decree is a voluntary initiative and as such no distributional implications are expected. There will be potential for free loaders to avoid contributing but it is hoped internal industry pressure will encourage all to participate in order to avoid the introduction of a junk mail tax.

10.5.11 Enforcement Issues Due to the voluntary nature of the decree no enforcement issues are expected. The threat of a junk mail tax is hoped to be enough to encourage industry members to participate.

10.5.12 Political and Public Response The decree is expected to be well received by the public as it joins a snowballing campaign to reduce junk mail. French Environment Minister Serge Lepeltier has urged households to place a ‘StopPub’ sticker on their mailbox if they do not wish to

Waste Prevention Policy Case Studies 209 receive non-addressed mail. Mr Lapetier claims that if 1 million households use these stickers then 40,000 tonnes of waste paper will be prevented from entering the waste stream each year. This is a questionable claim as by the time the mail reaches the box it has already been produced, for the message to be returned to the advertiser so mail is not sent again a reliable system would need to be in place.

10.5.13 Other Impacts Increasing the cost of marketing via mail may increase industry participation in direct advertising by phone/e-mail. 10.6 Wallonia Residual Waste Levy

10.6.1 Description The Walloon Region of Belgium introduced a new and innovative instrument in January 1999. The instrument is a specific tax on municipalities if the total amount of household waste collected by the municipalities exceeds the legally allowed amount. The tax covers household waste that is collected by the municipalities or associations of municipalities. Reusable materials and specific wastes that are collected either by the municipalities or by private companies that have been agreed on by the Walloon Government are not subject to the tax. The measure taken by the Walloon Region for exerting political pressure on the municipalities is as impressive as it is simple. Every tonne of waste that exceeds a pre-set threshold level is subject to a special tax that has to be paid by the municipalities to the Walloon Region. The ultimate aim is to ensure that every inhabitant will be conscious of waste prevention in order to limit as far as possible the quantity of waste produced.

10.6.2 Policy Context and Reason for Introduction The large amount of waste currently generated in the municipalities of the Walloon Region was regarded as problematic and was predicted to increase if no changes were made. In the Walloon Region, the average production of household waste in 1995 was about 381 kg/inhabitant/year. In many municipalities it exceeded 400 kg/inhabitant/year. Not only was the amount of waste produced in the Walloon Region considered to be very high, but also levels of source separation, though high compared with UK averages, were felt to be inadequate. The Walloon Region therefore decided to enhance a prevention policy by introducing the new tax. This tax incentivises the municipalities to improve their waste management systems, to raise the general awareness of waste minimisation among their population and thus to limit as much as possible the quantity of waste produced. It is felt that the tax has been important in motivating many municipalities to introduce pay-as-you-throw (variable charging) systems so as to minimise exposure to the tax.

10.6.3 Date and Timetable for Introduction -A decree on the tax of waste in Wallonia appears to have first been introduced in December 1991 -The decree was modified in 1992, 1994 and 1996. -In 1998 a decree relating to public perception of the implementation of a residual waste tax set at a municipal level was published. -The Tax on residual waste was finally introduced in January 1999.

Waste Prevention Policy Case Studies 210 10.6.4 Prerequisites for Introduction The reform of the Belgian institutions in the 1980’s was a key moment in that it allowed control of waste management to be given to the municipality. This was a necessary step for the introduction of a residual waste levy because it allowed for targets to be set at a municipal level for waste minimisation. An integral part of the Danish waste management strategy is self-sufficiency in terms of end disposal. This allows for the entire waste management process to be monitored ‘in house’, allowing an accurate picture of waste arisings to be produced. This is important for the residual waste levy because it allows tax levels to be set per municipality according to accurate data.

10.6.5 Implementation Mechanism The basis of assessment for the application of the taxation is the total quantity of household waste collected within one year. The allowable tax-free quantity of household waste was 270 kg/inhabitant in 1999. After 1999 this amount decreased each year by 10 kilos to 240 kg/inhabitant in 2002. In 1999 each tonne of waste exceeding the allowed amount cost the municipality about £16. Each year the costs increased by about £1.50 to roughly £22 in 2002. Some kinds of wastes are not taken into account when calculating the yearly allowable amount of waste which is not subject to tax: -The reusable wastes, like paper or glass, etc. that are collected through specific collections are not at all subject to the tax, in order to support waste recycling. -Additionally, the collection of household waste by the municipalities covered by the tax has one essential exception: Any material that still could be eliminated, segregated, or recycled from the household waste after the collection is not taken into account. In this context, recycling is also understood to include thermal recovery. In the Walloon Region recovery is defined as waste with a calorific value of more than 2 MJ/kg 216 .

10.6.6 Monitoring and Measurement Techniques Applied Very good statistics are available for the tonnages of all waste streams produced annually in Wallonia. This is important for monitoring of the tax and setting tax-free allowances as well as price per tonne for any waste exceeding the allowance. Information on the mechanism for measuring quantity of tax collected is currently unavailable

10.6.7 Impact Because the municipality is subject to the tax, it is thought to have been a prime reason for increasing the level of municipal waste taxes and introducing pay as you throw schemes. The municipalities are also encouraged to develop new activities for segregation and prevention of waste. These measures have had the cumulative effect of increasing public awareness of the importance of recycling and the need to reduce waste production. Pay as you throw schemes in particular are effective in reducing the overall quantity of waste produced and boosting recycling levels.

Waste Prevention Policy Case Studies 211 10.6.8 Economic Implications Information not currently unavailable

10.6.9 Social Implications Through an increase in awareness of waste management issues the tax has managed to not only increase participation in recycling but also reduce the total quantity of waste produced by promoting reduction, re-use and recycling. The tax has been particularly effective in changing the behaviour of the inhabitants of Wallonia by putting a financial drive behind efforts to reduce the amount of waste produced.

10.6.10 Distributional Implications Information currently unavailable

10.6.11 Enforcement Issues Information currently unavailable

10.6.12 Political and Public Response The Residual Waste Levy has driven Municipalities to respond by introducing policies that encourage waste minimisation. The public have been receptive to these measures and have adjusted their behaviour to reduce the quantity of waste produced through minimisation and source separation of recyclables.

10.6.13 Other Impacts With the introduction of variable charging schemes such as pay as you throw there is always a worry that an increase in fly tipping will be seen. There is currently no information available as to whether this has been the case in Wallonia.

10.6.14 Key Success/Failure Factors -Tax is well designed to promote waste minimisation as well as increased recycling -Reusable wastes are not subject to taxation -Tax free amount of waste decreased annually and price per tonne exceeding allowance increased.

10.6.15 Future Changes/Modifications Planned Information Currently Unavailable

10.6.16 Evaluations Undertaken Information Currently Unavailable

Waste Prevention Policy Case Studies 212 11 POTENTIAL POLICY IDENTIFICATION The next phase of this research project aimed to develop a list of policy tools to provide a basis on which to assess which policies are likely to be worthwhile for taking forward for more detailed analysis. This phase included three stages: 1. A workshop engaging key stakeholders, as identified by the Responsibility Analysis in Section 6, in the work so far and their ideas for potential waste prevention policies for the UK. Stakeholders across the supply chain were included, from public and private and community sectors. 2. A broad-brush assessment was carried out to synthesise the information of potential policy tools gained from the national and international policy reviews (Sections 5-10) and the stakeholder workshop. This assessment resulted in a long list of potential waste prevention policies with a basic analysis of the potential scope of each policy tool. A second workshop was then held for key policy stakeholders to examine the long list of collated policies, and shortlist to a selection of 11 key policies to take forward for detailed analysis. These stages are referred to in objectives 6, 7 and 8 of this research project: - Objective 6: to identify, through discussions with stakeholders, policies which could be used in the UK to foster HWP. - Objective 7: to carry out a basic assessment of the policies identified under objectives 4, 5 and 6 (See Section 2). - Objective 8: to identify, through discussions with actors / representatives of organisations identified under objective 1, the top ten policies to be taken forward for more detailed analysis. 11.1 Policy Scoping Stakeholder Workshop The primary aim of this workshop was to engage a cross section of the waste supply chain in taking a fresh look at household waste prevention policy, and contribute to ongoing research to assist the development of future policy tools.

11.1.1 Workshop Objectives 1. To share initial research findings, including international perspectives. 2. To undertake a ‘reality check’ of the responsibility analysis component of the research by discussing gaps and identifying the priority areas for further work 3. To take a fresh look at what policies could be introduced to reduce household waste

11.1.2 Workshop Attendees and Representation The workshop attendees included representatives from organizations across the whole supply chain. Figure 32 below provides a graphic of the representation on the day.

Waste Prevention Policy Case Studies 213 Table 51 indicates which organisation each boxed number relates to. While efforts were made to recruit more stakeholders from the retail and manufacturing industries, the relatively low level of interest in this policy engagement from these sectors should be noted. Figure 32: A Representation of the Stakeholder Workshop Attendees by their Positioning along the Waste Supply Chain

16 18 23 27 32 19 24 28 33 3 12 25 25 4 1 3 1 5 7 3 6 7 7 20 29 34 26 Raw material Design Manufacture Marketing Packaging Retail Use Reuse Disposal

2 2 6 2 9 10 14 14 21 8 6 30 1 2 9 9 15 35 22 14 2 2 11 15 9 31 17 Table 51: Organisations Represented at the Stakeholder Workshop

Box Organisation Box Organisation 111 Confederation of Paper Industries 191919 DTI 222 INCPEN 202020 Defra - Waste strategy unit 333 Social Marketing Practice 212121 CIWM 444 Market Transformation Programme 232323 Hackney Council 555 Design Council 242424 Bath + NE Somerset Council 666 British glass – Ardagh Glass Group Plc. 252525 LARAC 777 WRAP 262626 London Recycling Officers Group 999 Nappy Alliance 272727 Eunomia Research consulting 101010 Valpak 282828 NLWA 111111 Trading Standard Institute 292929 CIWM 121212 Environment Agency 303030 Essex County Council 141414 Waste Watch 313131 London Borough of Richmond 151515 Oko Institut 323232 Atlantic Consulting 161616 Defra - Local Authority Waste Funding and 333333 Defra - Joint waste review Governance team 171717 EHS Northern Ireland 343434 West Sussex County Council 181818 Brook Lyndhurst 353535 Welsh Assembly Government

11.1.3 Workshop Outputs The waste prevention policy tools research aimed to examine current UK waste prevention policies, and look for further policies that show potential for generating results in a UK context. To input into this research, the tables were provided with different material types, and the workshop attendees given the following task:

Waste Prevention Policy Case Studies 214

1. Each table to consider one material 2. What might the waste prevention policies be for this material? 3. Each table to identify its 2 favourites 4. Record on flipchart

Each table was given a specific material to consider. These are listed in Table 52 below. These materials were targeted due to their prevalence in the waste stream as discussed in Section 4.3.4 Material Types. These materials together account for 71% of the total household residual waste stream. Targeting of these materials would therefore provide significant potential for Waste Prevention. Table 52: Materials Provided for Policy Consideration at the Stakeholder Workshop Materials provided Non packaging paper Food Garden Waste Hazardous waste (paint / batteries / pharmaceutical waste) Electrical equipment / Gadgets Packaging Furniture

For full details of the stakeholder policy suggestions, see Appendix I for a copy of the meeting report. 11.2 Policy synthesis and broad brush assessment Table 53 provides a long-list of policies to be considered. It has been derived from: a) A review of what happens in other countries; b) Suggestions from the stakeholder workshop; and c) Thoughts of the research team. This listed policy synthesis of the previous work and stakeholder input forms the basis on which to assess the policy tools for further analysis.

Waste Prevention Policy Case Studies 215

Table 53: Long List Of Waste Reduction Policies # Policy Description Upstream – materials use 1 Raw materials taxes Tax on raw materials – would need to affect imports of goods also 2 Substance bans Prohibition on production or use of a substance in production where it has potential to reside within the product (NB this qualification merely to keep within the scope of the work). Change in Producer Behaviour (Product Design / Placement) 3 Sectoral targets for waste prevention Targets for specific sectors to reduce waste entering the household stream 4 Tax shift through increases in consumption Consumption taxes such as VAT increased (and differentiated) with income taxes taxes and reduction in income taxes reduced 5 Advanced disposal fees (one form of producer Charges placed on products to fund take-back systems, possibly with refunded responsibility) charges for proper collection / disposal 6 Stream-specific implementation plans Development of implementation plans on recycling and re-use with the full chain of producers, retailers, consumers/consumer organisations and waste managers involved in a major waste stream. Such projects analyse which mix of specific measures will result in the most feasible levels of prevention and re-use 7 Extended product warranties Requiring, for some products, the issuing of extended (several years) warranties to ensure durability of product 8 Variable warranty periods with cost per annum Furniture producers are able to state whether the warranty period is x, y, z, a, or b labelling years and are required to label products in terms of price per year of warranty duration 9 Product Service Systems Policies designed to shift to sales of services rather than products for some service-oriented consumables 10 Tax on disposable items Tax on all disposable items 11 Mandatory use of rechargeable batteries Requirement to sell new appliances with rechargeable batteries

Waste Prevention Policy Case Studies 217 # Policy Description 12 Ban on sale of disposable batteries only Requirement for retailers to sell both rechargeables and disposables 13 Ban on disposable batteries Disposable batteries phased out over time to foster switch to rechargeables 14 Ban on use of specific substances in batteries Banning specific hazardous substances like Pb, Cd, other than those already banned (Hg) 15 Standardising peripheral components (e.g. Standards set for electrical leads, transformers, etc. so that these are made plugs etc.) interchangeable across brands 16 Newspaper / Magazine advertising tax Charge for advertising space for newspapers based around circulation and area 17 Producer responsibility with full financial Revision of producer responsibility to ensure producers are made fully responsibility responsible for collection and recycling of products and packaging 18 Essential Requirements Strengthening of existing essential requirements legislation through improved clarity around ‘consumer acceptance’ criteria, and more structured and well resourced funding, monitoring and reporting 19 Take-back obligation Legislation that removes waste-disposal responsibility from government and places it instead on suppliers. 20 Deposit-refund schemes for beverage Deposits on containers refunded when returned to retailers containers 21 Producer responsibility for mattresses, Making producers collectively responsible for the recycling / recovery / proper furniture, toys, batteries treatment / disposal of mattresses, furniture, toys, batteries, etc. 22 Plastic bag tax Tax on disposable plastic bags 23 Junk mail producer responsibility (use of Instead of producers having the ‘right’ to send junk mail, senders would need to licenses to print / send) obtain licences with charges related to length of list 24 Mandatory free return of all junk mail All junk mail to be delivered with the facility for free return of any such mail 25 Legal obligation to not deliver junk mail if Requirement to not place flyers and unaddressed mail in mailboxes that display requested ‘no junk mail’ stickers 26 Ban / Tax on free newspapers Implementation of a tax / ban on newspapers distributed freely 27 Ban / Tax on all Junk Mail Introducing a tax /ban junk mail

Waste Prevention Policy Case Studies 218 # Policy Description 28 Minimum standards for appliances Introduce minimum standards that products must meet in terms of durability, light weighting (similar to energy using products) 29 Impose restrictions on the advertising of Similar to advertising restrictions for cigarettes and alcohol as these are deemed wasteful products to be bad for the population. Could this approach be similarly applied for wasteful products? 30 Review of Green Claims Code Setting standards for, and regulating against these, Green Claims 31 Mandatory advertising of cost per use for Introducing a requirement to label cost per use / cycle for durable items. The aim durable products would be to shift purchasing decisions in favour of items which have a long life, rather than those with a short life 32 Improve practice of eco-efficiency in product Voluntary code of conduct for education centres to include sustainability/eco- design through training design into all relevant courses (design / manufacturing / architecture…)

Housing Stock 33 Use of planning system Setting and implementing planning policies designed to improve prospects for apartment living and for communal facilities 34 Including gardens in Building Regs Setting standards for garden planting / design so as to reduce garden waste generation (and reduce water use) Change in Household Behaviour 35 DVR Charging / Diftar Differential charging of householders for waste collection 36 Deposit refunds Introduction of deposit refund scheme for beverages 37 Stimulating re-use of durable goods Introducing a system of ‘first call’ for specified bulky items to be delivered to repair shops 38 Junk CDs Ensuring all ‘junk-mail’ CD’s are Re-writable 39 ‘Experiences, not stuff’ National scheme of gift vouchers for cultural / entertainment as opposed to ‘things’ 40 National home composting campaign Campaign to promote home composting of garden and food waste including master composters

Waste Prevention Policy Case Studies 219 # Policy Description 41 Sustainable education Integrate sustainable education into all schools. Both in the school building itself, how it is used and integrated throughout the curriculum. Changing Local Authority Behaviour 42 Procurement Local authorities exclude disposables in procurement – orient purchases towards durable / low waste products (subject to wider environmental concerns). ‘First choice refurb’ policy (i.e. first choice is refurbished furniture /WEEE) 43 Co-operative Procurement (demand pull to Public sector procurement used to call forward low waste (and other env impact) enhance environmental specs) products 44 Variable charging for schools and public Implementing variable charging at all schools and public buildings buildings 45 Home composting included in LATS (& BVPI Revision of landfill allowances scheme mass balance calculation to account for calculations) home composting 46 Removal of garden waste from recycling Re-assessment of recycling and composting targets to exclude garden waste targets contribution 47 Residual waste levy Levy on residual waste above a pre-set level (declining over time) 48 Targets for waste prevention (residual waste) Change to national recycling and composting targets to targets for residual waste (standards for reporting of data) per hhld (or per inh) 49 Alternative Recycling credit systems Systems designed to align financial interests of WCA and WDA in two-tier systems Waste Disposal 50 Landfill taxes Tax on landfill 51 Waste tax Tax on all residual waste (including all residual waste treatment / disposal) 52 Landfill bans All materials landfilled, or landfilled without pre-treatment

Waste Prevention Policy Case Studies 220 11.3 Short-listing Policy Workshop This workshop was a stage in aiming to examine waste prevention policy options along the whole supply chain. This was a more select meeting than the previous open stakeholder workshop and was aimed at key policy makers and the project steering committee. This short-listing workshop was initiated to discuss the above long list of waste prevention policies with researchers and key policy stakeholders to decide on a shortlist of policies for further analysis.

11.3.1 Workshop Objectives 1. To share the initial long list of waste prevention policies with key stakeholders. 2. To review the long list of policies on account of a. Their likely impact b. Their feasibility 3. To undertake a prioritisation exercise to produce a short list of policies for further detailed investigation

11.3.2 Workshop Attendees Name Organisation Eric Johnson Atlantic Consulting, Switzerland Gillian Neville Defra, Waste strategy division Kerry Vitalis DTI, Sustainable development and waste policy Jon Foreman Environment Agency Claire Mellier The Environment Council Mike King The Environment Council Olivia Errey The Environment Council Dominic Hogg Eunomia Consulting Mathias Buchert Oko Institute, Germany Andreas Hermann Oko Institute, Germany Gillian Smith Scottish Executi ve Alan Dundas SEPA Arnold Tukker TNO, Netherlands Dan Cooke Viridor Jim Fielder Waste Watch Andrew Osborne Welsh Local Government Association (Waste Aware Wales) Patrick Mahon WRAP

Waste Prevention Policy Case Studies 221 11.3.3 Workshop Outputs The attendees were given the task of prioritising 10 policies from the long list to be taken forward for further analysis. To facilitate this process, each waste prevention policy idea from the long list was transcribed onto a post-it note, and stuck on the wall (grouped under supply chain headings for ease of viewing). On the opposite wall, a Johari grid was assembled with the axis of impact and feasibility. The aim of this grid was to be used as a tool for prioritising the policies most suitable for further investigation. See Figure 33 below for a diagram of the Johari grid used.

Figure 33: The Johari Grid Model Used to Short-list the Policies

Policies we should Challenges focus on

High

Quick wins

Low Impact Stakeholders wereLow then given the followingHigh instructions: 1. In groups, pick up policies you are interested in and discuss each policy for

approximatelyFeasibility 6/7 minutes.

2. Following the discussion, position the policies on the Johari grid axis depending on the criteria of impact and feasibility.

Waste Prevention Policy Case Studies 222 Figure 34 below indicates how the Johari grid was populated with the policies. Each yellow rectangle corresponds with each policy on the long list in Section11.2, Table 53.The grid was then split into 4 sections; the red dashed lines on the diagram indicate these sections. - Policies in section 1 were the priority for investigation and analysis. - Policies in section 2 were second priority for investigation and analysis. - Policies in section 3 were open for consideration for further investigation and analysis. - Policies in section 4 were to be disregarded from further consideration. Once the policies were in the agreed positioning on the grid, the research team decided on the policies to take forward for further investigation. This included grouping some similar policies that could be looked at as one whole concept. The policies decided upon for further investigation are ringed below in the blue circle. Figure 34: Policies Prioritised for Further Analysis in Terms of Feasibility and Impact.

3 2 1 44 41 7 45 37 3 X6 23 14 52 25 28 13 1 27 32

36 10 20 43 50 High 5 42 47 21 17 40 48 18 19 9 49 4 31 16 46 29 26 51 4 24 39 2 33

34 12 8 38 15 30 22 Low Impact Low High Feasibility

Waste Prevention Policy Case Studies 223 It is important to note that direct charging (number 35) was not taken forward as Defra was already funding research into this policy option. Landfill tax (number 50) and a national composting campaign (number 40) were also left out as the former was under discussion in the context of the revision to the English strategy (and an increase in the escalator was announced in the 2007 Budget) and the latter was not a clear ‘policy’ as defined in the study. From the process detailed above, Table 54 shows the policies taken forward for further investigation, and also the consultancy carrying out this research. Table 54: Policies to be Taken Forward for Further Analysis ### Policy optiooptionnnn 45 Home composting inclusion in LATs and BVPI calculations 41/44 ‘Low waste schools’: Charging schools for waste collection with parallel requirements for sustainable education. 47/48 Local authority targets for waste prevention, with a residual waste levy 7 Extended product warranties 37 Stimulating re-use of durable goods (requiring a deposit for re-use as first port of call of disposal) 28/32 Minimum standards for appliances, including requirements for efficiency in product design training. 11 Mandatory use of rechargeable batteries in new products 23/25/ Junk mail limitation mechanisms (e.g. ban; tax; producer responsibility 27 licensing; legally binding opt-outs) 3/6 Sectoral waste prevention targets (Decided to be outside study remit in liaison with Defra) Stream specific implementation plans 5/17/1 Producer responsibility schemes (e.g. advanced disposal fees; producer 8/19/2 responsibility on specific items such as mattresses and furniture; take 1 back obligations; packaging essential requirements legislation; producer responsibility with full financial responsibility) 43 Co-operative procurement

Waste Prevention Policy Case Studies 224

12 INTRODUCTION TO CASE STUDY ANALYSIS The following case studies have been undertaken by the consultants in the spirit of exploring the potential for different policies to deliver positive waste prevention (and other) benefits. They are not intended to be, and nor could they be, extensive investigations. It was recognised at the outset that the nature of the inquiry was such as to identify policies which might be worthy of further investigation. Generally, developing a full-blown policy recommendation takes many months of intensive deliberation. Each of the case studies has had only a limited allocation of time and resources to devote to it. The quantitative analysis should be understood in this context. It is preliminary, and intended principally for illustrative purposes. This is not to say that we have not sought to understand the likely impacts in as clear a manner as possible. However, partly because of the lack of widespread experience, there is a dearth of the types of response parameter which would enable greater confidence to be afforded to the quantitative modelling (where this proves possible).

Waste Prevention Policy Case Studies 225 13 IMPLEMENTATION PLANS FOR WASTE PREVENTION AND RE-USE 13.1 Description of Policy The main vehicle for the Dutch Environment Ministry to directly intervene in the waste cycle and stimulate prevention and re-use were a series of ‘Strategic processes’ leading to ‘Implementation plans’. This policy was developed in the late 1980s, and was implemented mainly in the period from 1990 to 1995. In a fashion that probably is typical for the consensual and egalitarian Dutch culture, this was done under the guidance of facilitators and with support of independent external experts - parties that played a key role in the chain of production and waste, and who would agree the best way to reach the envisaged prevention and re-use targets. Such an agreement typically resulted in a ‘covenant - a kind of contract that in principle was voluntary but in practice respected by all. The waste streams had been chosen on the basis of an earlier priority setting study that included characteristics like volume and toxicity of the waste. In this way, implementation plans were developed for e.g.: - building and construction waste; - packaging - plastic waste - municipal solid waste fly ash - waste from electrical and electronic products - etc. Note that this policy was directed at waste in general, and not only household waste. In principle, implementation plans could target the full chain of production-use-waste generation and related actors. In practice though, specific segments of this chain were addressed, depending on which actor or which action could deliver prevention and re-use of waste most easily. The actual policies would be agreed upon in the strategic process, and hence could differ per waste stream. For instance, with regard to waste from electrical and electronic products, household behaviour was targeted: householders were incentivised to bring back old appliances to shops or to give them for separate collection by municipal services. For a waste stream like municipal solid waste fly ash, some measures were suggested that would lead to qualitative prevention, but in general measures targeted producers, and households were left largely out of the picture. 217 However, various common elements emerged in many of the policies for the specific waste streams. Often, a form of producer responsibility was implemented to make sure that that waste owner was not confronted with high costs when getting rid of his waste. Technical measures were agreed upon to reduce the potential waste volume (e.g. agreements to use smaller or less packaging, or to concentrate products like washing powder so that less packaging could be used).

217 Households did play an important role though via the separate collection of small quantities hazardous waste. Various waste streams had to be kept apart and were to be collected by chemocars and the like.

Waste Prevention Policy Case Studies 226 13.2 Rationale The rationale and history behind the approach was the following. Like many countries, the 1970s were, for the Dutch, the era in which the environmental legislation and other formal systems were institutionalised. In the late 1970s, a law on management of regular waste and hazardous waste was adopted. Members of parliament felt frustrated with the fact that legislation alone proved insufficient to implement a proper waste management system, and that the focus mainly was on the management rather than prevention of waste. Against this background, in 1979, a Member of Parliament Lansink launched his famous ‘ladder concept’, in the form of a motion of Parliament to Dutch government. The ladder concept briefly stipulates that the following order of preference should be taken into account when dealing with waste: prevention, re-use, incineration and landfill. Little was done with this call from parliament in the early 1980s. But when various crises like the Lekkerkerk soil pollution scandal, the acid rain problem, and others put the environment higher on the agenda, by the mid and end 1980s, the time was right for really starting work on prevention of waste. In 1988 the Dutch Environment Ministry sent its White Paper on Prevention and Re- use to the 2 nd Chamber (the equivalent of the English Lower House). It covered all major waste streams (excluding contaminated soil and polluted sediments and some specific high volume waste streams) and came up with targets for prevention and re- use that should be met in the period between 1985 and 2000. For prevention, an overall target of 10% was set, whereas re-use targets were assumed easier to reach and were set much higher. Parliament did not accept this and asked for twice this prevention target, which was adopted as an overall guiding principle. The implementation plans mentioned in the previous sub-section were, for the Environment Ministry, the main vehicle to reach this ambitious goal of 20% prevention (relative to economic growth), and even more ambitious re-use and recycling targets (which differed by waste stream). 218 The key reason behind the introduction of the policy in this form was the conviction that in a complex field such as waste management and waste generation, top-down planning does not work. It was regarded as fanciful to believe that two dozen experts in the Ministries’ waste prevention department could determine targets and technical implementation routes for measures that could realise these targets. The (probably justified) fear was that such an approach would just lead to fruitless clashes between the Ministerial experts and the (industrial) actors who would have to implement these measures, and who, in general, had superior technical knowledge about their production processes. To avoid such a mutual stalemate, the process of developing implementation plans was organised in an open fashion. The overall target of 20% prevention (for most waste streams) was not up for negotiation, but for the rest the experts from the ministry, process -and content consultants, in close co-operation with the actors on the ground, worked out the ‘ how to’ part of the equation . As a result, industrial actors felt committed to the results of the process, since they had had a major say in how to reach the targets, and could bring in their ingenuity and experience. Hence, they usually left the process with a feeling that if the targets had

218 In fact, later targets were focused on a maximum amount of incineration and landfill.

Waste Prevention Policy Case Studies 227 to be met, now at least, they had made sure that this would be done in the most effective way. 13.3 Scenario Development As indicated, the structure of the policy differed a lot between waste streams, since the measures would be agreed upon within the strategic process. Furthermore, each specific waste stream had its own potential for prevention and re-use, and was related to specific technical measures. Since the development of ‘strategic prevention and re-use plans’ is such a generic policy, it is not appropriate to develop specific scenarios. Indeed, the development of specific scenarios is part of the strategic plan development itself, and the stakeholders will choose one specific scenario after deliberation of the pros and cons. Table 55 gives some examples of waste streams that were subject to the development of strategic waste management processes, the measures taken, and the impacts the approach had. 13.4 Environmental Impacts of the Policy In the Netherlands, the environmental impacts of the policy has mainly been measured and reported in terms of quantity of waste generated, recycled, treated and landfilled. Hazardousness, in general, was not an issue. 219 The overall waste prevention policies in the Netherlands have been surprisingly successful. Parliament asked in the late 1990s for an across the board prevention target of 20% relative to economic growth, in the period 1985-2000. The National Waste Management Plan of 2002 was able to state that the aim set by parliament in 1988 had been met. Compared to economic growth since 1985, the total volume of waste production in the Netherlands had fallen about 20%. 220 These prevention targets mainly had been realised via reduction of voluminous flows like industrial and building and construction waste. Household waste generation had seen a slight growth, even compared to economic growth. This is despite the fact that some implementation plans were targeting important fractions of household waste (e.g. the Implementation plans on Plastics; on Packaging; and on Electrical and electronic goods). It is likely that the success of measures that influenced household waste arising have been overwhelmed by counter-acting trends like the ever lower number of persons per household, the rising time pressure on citizens and hence the need to use time-saving (food) products that often imply higher packaging waste, the introduction of ICT equipment (computers, printers, and paper use), etc. Also, a large part of household waste is made up of organic waste fractions from garden waste and kitchen waste, and here the effort was mainly to realise separate collection and recycling, rather than prevention. Table 55 also lists, as far as available, data on the generated amounts and treatment routes of different waste streams.

219 Exceptions were of course waste streams like municipal solid waste incinerator fly ash that were monitored on quality as well. 220 Landelijk AfvalbeheersPlan (LAP), AOO [Waste Management Council], Utrecht, Netherlands, 2002. Note this still implies a net volume growth, of course, since the economy has grown considerably more than 20% over the same period.

Waste Prevention Policy Case Studies 228 13.5 Economic Impact of the Policy Again, given the fact that the approach of Implementation plans is a process approach for developing specific policies, it is difficult to elicit a specific impact assessment with regard to the economic consequences. Some data are available, however.

13.5.1 Government a. The central government had a budget of €1-3 million per year in the period between 1989 and 1995 to manage the process of developing implementation plans ; b. Implementation and operational costs for the central and regional authorities were limited, since it was the other stakeholders who were really responsible for taking prevention and re-use measures. Of course this translates also in additional costs for the authorities, but in an indirect way (e.g. higher costs for demolition of old buildings, due to the higher quality level of treatment of the waste); c. There were of course also additional costs for enforcement and execution of policy (like permitting), but these are to some extent difficult to specify. Since the late 1980s both the central as regional and municipal authorities embarked on an important effort to implement quality permitting and enforcement systems, which were rather lax directly after the implementation of waste legislation in the late 1970s. Where it is obvious that more legislation and ‘semi-legislation’ (in terms of voluntary agreements) implies more enforcement costs, it is difficult to specify or to allocate specific cost items to specific policies 221 .

221 For instance, the annual report of the Inspectorate of the Ministry of VROM does not give easy insight in how many inspectors or effort was dedicated to specific waste streams. Yet, given the size of the Inspectorate and their tasks, it is clear that at most a dozen inspectors may deal with compliance checks of measures agreed upon in implementation plans, including producer responsibility. A further complication is that waste management permitting and enforcement has been delegated to the provinces, and that they control the operational technical performance, like with any other industrial plant.

Waste Prevention Policy Case Studies 229 Table 55: Some characteristics of Implementation plans 222 Waste stream Description of the main problem Measures taken Impact Remarks The plan hence tried to realise a much more The main impact of the plan was sophisticated treatment plant. Unlike most that the existing, low-grade technical other Implementation plans, this plan clearly infrastructure had to use stringent went counter the interest of the existing players Collection of waste oil was problematic, input control to avoid the inadverted in the chain. Since no investor stood up to and the relatively simple treatment (oil- processing of halogenated waste. realise the ‘central processing unit’, existing water-sediment separation) could not With organohalogens becoming less Waste oil treatment firms stayed in business for years. deal with organochlorine contamination. frequently present, this problem Recently, the EU announced that they would The recycled oil was suited as a diminished anyway. The main withdraw the Directive on Waste Oil, that called secondary fuel. impact of all efforts was a significant for processing waste oil to regenerated rise of the amount of waste oil lubricant. If this demand is dropped, there is no collected, from 37 ktpa in 1995 to need for further upgrading of the management 84 ktpa in 2000 223 . infrastructure Halogenated waste formed a main problem in the waste management Main measures investigated and taken were infrastructure, since it usually concerned The main impact of the plan was a prevention and re-use measures. A number of persistent and bio-accumulative massive reduction of the amount of processes that generated halogenated waste materials, that could not be landfilled, organochlorine waste that had to be were closed. The use of halogenated solvents and for which (also hazardous) waste treated. In 1988, 29,6 ktpa was for degreasing etc. was reduced. Recycling of Note that here prevention was just Halogenated waste incinerators had significant restrictions. generated (or 65 ktpa including on- such solvents via distillation was boosted. A a minor issue. In the 1980s significant amounts of this site treated waste. The plan foresaw dedicated plant at Akzo Nobel Rotterdam, waste were burned in sea-going vessels, a reduction of incineration to a level capable of transforming highly chlorinated creating a lot of opposition in society. of 10% of this amount, a target by waste into HCl via incineration, was allowed to and large met) 224 . incinerate waste from third parties as well.

The implementation plan concentrated mainly Of the 24.8 Mio ton generated in Construction and demolition waste on recycling, and devised a number of 2004, just 0.8 Mio ton had to be Construction and formed one of the most voluminous waste measures that could promote this. The main landfilled, and 55 kt was demolition waste streams, and a significant amount was approach was to ensure that the stony fraction incinerated. The rest (96%) was landfilled. would be crushed and would become available recycled). This implied a massive as a stony fraction for road foundation. Via a improvement compared to the

222 Largely based on information from the various ‘Milieuprogramma’s’ (Environmental Programs) from 1991, 1992 and 1993, and information about treatment routes given in publications like the AfvalOverlegOrgaan [Waste Management Council] (2004), Nederlands Aval in Cijfers, gegevens 2000-2003 (Dutch Waste in Figures, Data 2000-2003) AOO 2004-07, p16, Utrecht, Netherlands, available via www. aoo.nl/afvalscheiding.info/publicaties/ check_gegevens.asp?file_id=541&publicatie_id=431 and Nederlands afval in cijfers, gegevens 2000-2004. SenterNovem, Utrecht, Netherlands. Available via http://www.uitvoeringafvalbeheer-tools.nl/images1/aoo_nl/bestanden/UA_2005-13H_NAIC2.pdf 223 http://www.eu-milieubeleid.nl/print/ch05s08.html 224 Ministery of Environment (1993). Trendstudie Chemisch Afval, Publicatiereeks Afvalstoffen 1993/2

Waste Prevention Policy Case Studies 230 ‘Building material decree’ quality criteria for situation in the 1980, when secondary materials were implemented. Landfill recycling percentages hovered at bans and taxes stimulated recycling. It was also 40-50% at best. 225 tried to find higher level recycling methods, e.g. the re-use of the stony fraction in concrete, but this never really took off This voluminous waste stream is produced during cleaning metal surfaces The implication of the plan was that from paint. The main efforts were directed in 2004 66% of the grit was Blasting grit towards steering this material to a new recycled, where in the 1980s almost recycling technology, that allowed for 100% was landfilled. recycling of the grit after cleaning. Packaging waste, electrical and electronic See under producer responsibility equipment, batteries, and others

225 Nederlands afval in cijfers, gegevens 2000-2004. SenterNovem, Utrecht, Netherlands. Available via http://www.uitvoeringafvalbeheer- tools.nl/images1/aoo_nl/bestanden/UA_2005-13H_NAIC2.pdf

Waste Prevention Policy Case Studies 231

13.5.2 Households Costs to households for waste management have risen considerably in the period between 1985-2005. However, the main problem here was not the implementation of a prevention policy, but the pressing need to shift away from landfill to incineration, to upgrade flue gas treatment of incinerators, and to implement advanced collection systems that allows for recycling and re-use. 226 In most municipalities, households pay a flat rate that only marginally changes with the number of persons in the households, or (in case of Differentiated Tariff schemes), only a part is related to the amount of waste generated. Typical costs for landfill and incineration were €10 and €47 per tonne, respectively, in 1985, but these had increased to €134 and €100 per tonne in 2000. 227 A shift from landfill to incineration and additional costs for more complicated collection systems meant that waste management fees paid by households multiplied in real terms between 1985 and 2005. It is obvious that low- income, single households spent a relatively high share of their income on waste management issues. Also, producer responsibility fees usually were a fixed sum on a product, implying that relative to income, poorer residents paid more.

13.5.3 Business Business in most cases bore the brunt of the costs, but in practice this appeared not too problematic. First, the implementation plans made sure that nationally, a level playing field was created. For instance, for product-related waste, both Dutch producers and importers of products had to comply with the same rules, contribute in similar ways financially, etc. Particularly for markets that by nature are national (e.g. the building and construction market) this implies that implementation of new schemes was relatively painless for the sector at stake. Second, at least in the European context, many other EU member states were embarking on similar policies with regard to prevention and re-use. The ‘implementation plan’ approach ensured that business had a considerable influence in selecting the most effective measures. This can be contrasted with the development of packaging legislation in Germany, which was developed rather top- down, resulting in a much higher burden on the packaging sector than in the Netherlands. This, and the fact that environmental costs in general tend to be just a few percentage points of industrial turnover, implied that business in the Netherlands was not confronted with excessive or problematic costs. 228 There is also no clear reason to assume that small businesses will be disproportionally affected both in positive or negative terms, other than in dealing with administrative burdens.

226 Indeed, where in 1988 just 10% of the Dutch waste was incinerated and 55% was landfilled, now the vast majority is recycled and incinerated. In 2003, just about 10% of the 10 Mio tonnes of incinerable waste was landfilled (Nederlands Afval in cijfers, Data 200-2004. SenterNovem, 2005; and National Environmental Policy Plan, Ministry VROM, 1989). 227 http://www.mnp.nl/mnc/i-nl-0428.html, accessed 25 February 2007 228 Total environmental costs rose from 6-7 Billion Euros in 1990 to 13 Bio Euro in 2005 (in Euro’s of 2005; http://www.mnp.nl/mnc/i-nl-0428.html, accessed 25 February 2007). The costs for waste management are almost one third of this sum in 2005. This is about 3% of the Dutch GNP of around 400 Billion Euros of 2005.

Waste Prevention Policy Case Studies 232 Dedicated solutions for this have been proposed (for example, in the case of packaging). 13.6 Dynamic efficiency In general the implementation plan approach gives room for innovation, since it usually focuses on goals (ends) rather than means. The policies in general have generated jobs since more advanced techniques for prevention, re-use and treatment have been developed, which required higher skills than waste hauling and dumping in landfills. As a general rule, business will develop more efficient ways to reach the targets, so costs will, in general, become lower over time. A telling fact is for instance, that the upfront fees for end of life management of cars and electrical and electronic goods have been dramatically lowered, or even abolished. Once the systems acquired momentum, they proved to work much more effectively, being able to find other sources of revenue, etc. 229 13.7 Social Impacts Given the generic nature of implementation plans, it is difficult to point out specific social impacts. In some cases solutions that depend on separate collection of waste streams may be a little difficult to handle for the elderly, disabled, etc., but also, for working professionals living alone. Health and Safety issues usually are well covered by regular HSE regulation, although the somewhat more complex waste treatment structure may be a little more prone to accidents. This however, is a minor problem given the tremendous improvement in compliance with waste legislation and the improvement in treatment and re-use technologies (implying a large reduction of illegal dumping practices, and much less landfill at low quality sites). 13.8 Implementation & Design Issues As indicated, one of the key strengths of the implementation plan approach was to involve stakeholders who were most affected, and most knowledgeable, about the specific problems and opportunities in the development of policy itself. This was a huge success. It is obvious that the following structure worked very well: • Government initiating the process of policy development; • Jointly developing the means (technical, legislative, and other) that makes up the policy (all relevant stakeholders), ending with an agreement to implement this; • Government finally taking up the responsibility of enforcement, although also self-administration by an executive organisation with third party control has been applied. 13.9 Other Impacts No other non-waste prevention related consequences (intended and unintended) are known.

229 As we will show in the next chapter, the waste management levy on cars diminished from over 120 Euro in 1995 to just 15 Euro in 2007. Also waste management levies on many electrical and electronic goods were abolished or sharply reduced over time, except for large electrical equipment like fridges.

Waste Prevention Policy Case Studies 233 13.10 Summary & Conclusions In sum, the implementation plan approach is an interesting approach to ensure that societal parties that relate to a specific waste stream are involved directly in operationalising prevention and re-use policy. This avoids a situation where policy officials, who never can know all technical details, start to prescribe technical measures for prevention and re-use, instead the knowledge and skills of the people who know most about it are used. Additionally, the groups feel committed since they have developed the practical choices largely themselves. Obviously, and important pre-condition is that government (or others) can impose a sense of urgency on these other stakeholders – several times the government threatened to implement legislation if this process of stakeholder involvement would not lead to results. 230

230 Alternatively, strong societal expectations can form a source of pressure to deliver.

Waste Prevention Policy Case Studies 234

14 INCLUSION OF HOME COMPOSTING IN BVPI & LA(T)S CALCULATIONS 14.1 Introduction The Waste Resources Action Programme (WRAP) has done extensive work since 2004 with the aim of supporting the inclusion of material diverted from disposal through home composting in the mass balance calculations used to determine performance under the Landfill Allowance Trading Scheme (LATS) in England and Landfill Allowance Schemes (LAS) elsewhere in the UK (where both are being referred to, we refer to the schemes as LA(T)S). This report therefore draws heavily on the WRAP work, and does not attempt to duplicate work already done. The focus of this report is on the Waste Prevention implications of a policy which supports the inclusion of home composting. It should also be noted that the Welsh Assembly Government has already developed a protocol for inclusion of home composting in the calculation of composting targets contained in Wise about Waste: The National Waste Strategy for Wales . This protocol is based on the work undertaken by WRAP which is noted above, and is to be implemented from 1 April 2007. The Welsh protocol and the proposed UK wide methodology for inclusion in LA(T)S calculations are substantially similar, and for clarity are presented together with points noted where they differ. 14.2 Description of Policy This policy takes the form of an amendment to the way that composting targets and landfill allowances are calculated. In the case of landfill allowance calculations an amendment to the landfill allowance regulations may also be required in respect of the definition of Municipal Waste. 231 The policy is targeted at local authorities, and aims to both reward local authorities for efforts made to incentivise home composting and to encourage further levels of home composting to be undertaken. Central to being able to implement the policy is being able to determine how much a household which engages in home composting will divert from the municipal waste stream. Significant work over a period of two years has been undertaken by WRAP to develop a sound basis on which this calculation could be made. Evidence from a variety of sources was taken into account including:

231 The WET ACT 2003 defines Municipal waste as a) waste from households, and (b) other waste that, because of its nature or composition, is similar to waste from households (this definition is based on that in the Landfill Directive). Under this definition home composting could be counted as Municipal waste, however the Landfill Allowances and Trading Scheme (England) Regulations (2004), refer to “collected d municipal waste”, which it defines as ‘ municipal waste which comes into the possession or under the control of - (a) a waste disposal authority, or (b) a waste collection authority within the area of the disposal authority, whether or not the waste comes into the possession or under the control of that authority under or by virtue of the Environmental Protection Act 1990 .’

Waste Prevention Policy Case Studies 235 A national home composting participation survey (covering approximately 20,000 hhlds across Great Britain); Intensive pilot trial monitoring, involving waste composition analysis, questionnaires and garden based observational surveys; GIS data on garden sizes; Defra WasteDataFlow statistics; Waste Composition Analyses at three different points in time, repeat sampling the same households; and ONS household characteristics data. A wide range of variables that are likely to influence home composting diversion rates were considered. These included: Garden size; Climate & regional factors (mean net soil moisture deficit); Waste collection services offered; Material home composted; Types of home composter used; Demographics; Whether people receiving home compost bins are new or existing home composters; Whether home compost bins are given away or must be purchased by householders; and Opt-in versus opt out schemes (opt-in: where everyone gets a bin unless they explicitly refuse). Data from these sources were used to input into a number of computer models (household, district and intensive pilot area models). Multiple regression analysis was used to determine which factors had a significant (from a statistical point of view) bearing on the outcomes. The outcome of these calculations is a set of potential diversion rates which can be applied where households home compost. The rates put forward are: 220kg per year of organic waste is diverted from the municipal waste stream, where households that receive a home compost bin were not previously home composting (‘New Recruits’) 60kg per year of additional organic waste is diverted from the municipal waste stream where households receive a home compost bin but where they were previously home composting (‘Enhanced Existing’) In England the ratio of ‘New Recruits’ to ‘Enhanced Existing’ composters is estimated to be 50:50. For Scotland the ratio is estimated to be 60:40. 14.3 Rationale Home composting is generally recognised as having a number of positive environmental benefits compared to other methods of managing certain organic fractions of the waste stream. These include: Waste is essentially managed at source, which exemplifies the proximity principle; Home composting avoids the need for local authorities to collect, transport, treat or dispose of the material, with consequent avoided costs; A soil conditioner is produced that can help improve soil structure through increased humic content. This results (amongst other things) in the benefits of

Waste Prevention Policy Case Studies 236 water retention, increased microbial density and recycling of trace minerals and micro-nutrients; Organic matter that is accumulated in the soil can act as a carbon sink, delaying return of carbon to the atmosphere, thereby effecting a ‘time-limited sequestration’ of greenhouse gas emissions; Research has shown that home composting produces very low concentrations of fugitive methane emissions. These features do not necessarily imply that home composting is the best management route from an environmental perspective, and indeed, our own work suggests this may not be the case. 232 However, these features, combined with the fact that home composting reduces the costs of managing waste, are reflected in the fact that home composting is regarded as a ‘high in hierarchy’ waste management option and should therefore be considered a priority for action. Despite this, as highlighted in Section 0, the LA(T)S regime as currently structured does not take full account of the impact of home composting, and indeed, the existing mass balance calculation method may constitute a disincentive to home composting. Quantities of material home composted are only accounted for in the LA(T)S calculations to the degree that they reduce overall arisings. But because total arisings are assumed to have a biodegradable content of 68% 233 then in effect only 68% of the biodegradable material removed through home composting (which will actually be close to 100%) is credited. This policy initiative attempts to redress this imbalance and allow local authorities to receive full credit in terms of LATS allowances for efforts made to promote home composting. 14.4 Scenario Development WRAP has developed draft protocols for calculating the diversion of Biodegradable Municipal Waste (BMW) from landfill through home composting for the UK. It is important that a standard protocol is applied across all UK administrations as different protocols would lead to problems with Landfill Directive reporting. The proposed protocol for the UK, and the protocol Wales is adopting for calculation of its waste strategy targets, are substantially similar, though minor differences do exist at the current draft stage. The following are key features of the protocols: Local authorities are able to claim credits under LA(T)S, for quantities of BMW diverted from landfill through home composting. In Wales local authorities will be able to claim credits for the contribution of home composting towards Welsh waste strategy composting targets. The home composted quantity will be offset against a WDAs balance of landfill allowances; The inclusion of home-composted material towards targets will apply only to ‘additional’ home composting activity relative to a specific baseline. In the context of these schemes the ability to claim these credits is based on the number of home composting bins supplied by local authority to householders;

232 See Eunomia (2007) Managing Biowastes from Households in the UK: Applying Life-cycle Thinking in the Framework of Cost-benefit Analysis , Banbury, and Oxon: WRAP to be published in 2007. 233 In England, the equivalent figure is 61% in Wales, 63% in Scotland and 71% in Northern Ireland

Waste Prevention Policy Case Studies 237 In order to qualify for inclusion in the calculations of BMW diversion/composting targets, local authority home composting bin schemes must meet certain standards. The schemes have to be supported through the following: • Users provided with instructions on how to make and use compost • A telephone helpline and/or website should be available • Composting advisors must be available to provide one-to-one support • Exhibits/demonstrations/talks etc should be conducted (Wales only) In the UK protocol, it is proposed to establish certified third party schemes which meet these requirements, and which local authorities could subscribe to. This would minimise the burden of regulators having to check schemes to ensure that they qualify for the credits. Such third party schemes will be one option available to local authorities that wish to claim credits. If local authorities wish to run their own schemes they will need to meet qualifying standards in their own right; Qualifying schemes must monitor and record data on the numbers and distribution of home composting bins. The data required includes the following: • The number of bins distributed each year; • The ratio of ‘New Recruits’ to ‘Enhanced Existing’ composters; • Numbers of people still using bins (participation data). This applies principally to Wales. In England a ‘lapsed composter’ rate of 2% per annum can be applied as a default if no participation data is gathered; and • Number of home composters using bins for garden waste only and those using them for kitchen waste as well (Wales only). Local authorities are able to claim both for home compost bins distributed in the past, and in the current year that meet the qualifying standards. The scheme in Wales is due to start from 1 April 2007 and authorities can also, in their first year, claim for qualifying bins distributed between 1 April 2002 and the start date. No start date for the UK scheme has yet been determined, 234 but it has been proposed that in the first year, authorities will be able to claim for qualifying bins distributed between 1 April 2003 and the start date. 235 Table 56 shows an example of how the calculation is proposed for the UK wide scheme. Table 56: Worked Example for Home Composting Diversion Estimates from a Qualifying Home Composting Scheme Distributing 1,000 Bins Over 3 years 236 LATS/ LAS accounting year

234 1 April 2008 has been proposed as the start date for the UK scheme. 235 In addition it is proposed, for England, that authorities should be allowed to make nominal claims of 30kg per bin per year for bins distributed between 1 April 1998 and 1 April 2003. Allowance is also made in the English draft protocol for ‘non qualifying’ bins distributed after 1 April 2003. It is suggested that non-qualifying bins should be assumed to have a diversion of 60 kg a year and be progressively retired as they reach ten years of age. 236 Where 2005 is the first qualifying year of the example scheme and 2007 is the LATS/LAS accounting year for which the diversion calculation is being made

Waste Prevention Policy Case Studies 238 2005 20202006 20 060606 2007 new diversion bins distributed in year 300 50 150 enhanced diversion bins distributed in year 200 100 200 rate of lapsing / year 2.0% 2.0% 2.0% new diversion kg per year 66,000 11,000 33,000 enhanced diversion kg per year 12,000 6,000 12,000 total diversion capacity placed that kg per year 78,000 17,000 45,000 year allowance for lapsed kg per year 0 1,320 1,514 home composting kg per year 0 240 355 Total kg per year 0 1,560 1,869 Total diversion in year new diversion capacity kg per year 66,000 75,680 107,166 enhanced diversion kg per year 12,000 17,760 29,405 capacity Total kg per year 78,000 93,440 136,571 Grand total for 2007 136,571 diversion Source: WRAP, February 2007. Proposal for a Method of Calculating Diversion of Biodegradable Waste from Landfill through Home Composting. Our presumption is that the home-composted quantities, as calculated by this method, will be netted off against the balance of landfill allowances. 14.5 Environmental Impacts of the Policy Calculations on the environmental impacts of the policy are based on the inclusion of Home Composting in the LA(T)S calculations only. This is because: 1. Moves to include home composting in LA(T)S calculations are already well advanced, with substantial work behind possible projections of performance; 2. The purpose of this policy is to incentivise local authorities to promote (or not to cease promotion of) home composting. It is difficult to estimate the implications of the one policy (inclusion in LA(T)S) let alone, the inclusion in composting targets as well. It is not clear how much additional home composting would be brought about if home composting were included in both composting targets and LA(T)S calculations as opposed to just the latter. In England, including home composting in LA(T)S calculations is likely to be a more significant incentive than inclusion in recycling and composting statistics as LA(T)S provides a financial driver for local authorities (through the proposed system of fines) whereas there are no direct financial drivers supporting attempts to meet recycling and composting targets. Therefore the impact of inclusion in LA(T)S calculations alone may be similar to the effect of its inclusion in both BVPI & LA(T)S calculations.

Waste Prevention Policy Case Studies 239 The key environmental impacts of the policy are a function of: 1. the degree to which the ability of local authorities to claim credit under the LA(T)S stimulates home composting; and 2. the impacts of dealing with waste through home composting relative to the likely alternative route through which the material would have been managed. In respect of the first of these issues, Figure 35 shows the results of projections undertaken by WRAP for the UK. It is estimated that by 2019/20, some 1,400,000 tonnes of organic waste could be diverted, through home composting, from MSW collection (the red line). It is further assumed that the impact of this is split evenly across residual waste collections, and separate collections for garden waste, with each of these showing a reduction in the order of 700,000 tonnes of material per annum by 2019/20 in the home composting growth scenario. The cumulative impact of this between 2004/5 and 2019/20 is a total of 14,600,000 tonnes of material diverted from MSW collection, equal to an average of 912,500 tonnes per year over the period. It is important to note that any delays in the introduction of this policy beyond the current planned introduction date of 1 April 2008 may adversely impact the long-term performance of the policy. This is because local authorities, who may otherwise have actively pursued home composting due to this policy, may instead attempt to meet their LATS obligations through collection of garden waste for centralised composting. For most local authorities the decision as to whether or not to collect garden waste is likely to be taken in advance of the 2009/10 Landfill Directive target date as this material will be considered valuable in meeting the target. Material that has been ‘mobilised’ into garden waste collections is then less available for home composting, and is difficult to subsequently divert to home composting. Therefore, as there will be less potentially home compostable material available, the performance of this policy is likely to be compromised. Figure 35: Impact of Home Composting on Collected Residual and Garden Waste

Waste Prevention Policy Case Studies 240 9,000,000 Garden waste for centralised 8,000,000 composting (no growth in HC scenario) 7,000,000 Garden waste for centralised composting HC 6,000,000 growth scenario

5,000,000 Residual Garden Waste (no growth in HC scenario)

tonnes 4,000,000

Residual Garden 3,000,000 Waste (HC Growth scenario)

2,000,000 HC Diversion from MSW 1,000,000 Collection (50% hh by 2020)

5 /7 0 2 3 5 7 8 0 4/ 5/6 7/8 /1 /1 /1 /1 /19 /2 0 0 06 0 1 4 6 8 0 0 09 17/1 19 2 20 2 20 2008/9 0 01 01 01 0 0 2 2010/11 2 2012/1 0 2015/16 2 2 201 2 20013/14 2

Source: Parfitt (2006) Home Composting~Opportunity or Threat? Presentation to Composting Association Conference These estimates are certainly open to challenge. Both the quantities mobilised, and the ‘alternative routes’ through which it is assumed waste would otherwise have been managed, are open to debate. The environmental impact clearly depends upon these factors – the quantities mobilised, and the alternative routes through which waste would have been managed otherwise. 14.6 Economic Impact of the Policy Home composting is a relatively cost effective means of diverting material from disposal, even allowing for high levels of support to home composters. Material that is home composted is likely therefore to result in cost savings at the local authority level. Examples of values used to calculate cost savings in this exercise are shown in Table 57 below.

Table 57: Values for Key Years used to Calculate Cost Savings from Home Composting (£/tonne including haulage and landfill tax where applicable) 2005/6 2009/10 2012/13 2019/20 Home £11.00 £12.00 £12.75 £14.50 composting support Windrow £22.00 £28.00 £30.50 £34.00 composting Disposal £40.00 £52.00 £54.00 £80.00

Waste Prevention Policy Case Studies 241 Avoided £15.00 Residual Waste Collection Avoided Garden Waste Collection Based on Parfitt (2006) Home Composting~Opportunity or Threat? Presentation to Composting Association Conference The values in Table 57 were multiplied by the tonnages of material estimated to be handled by each of waste management option under the home composting growth and no growth scenarios to arrive at a total cost for each option. The annual estimated costs/savings for key years are shown in Table 58 below. Table 58: Estimated Costs and Savings due to Increase in Home Composting 2009/10 2012/13 2019/20 Total (2005/6 ––– 2019/2019/20)20) Cost of Home £12,000,000 £12,750,000 £20,300,000 £191,150,000 Composting Savings from £14,000,000 £15,250,000 £23,800,000 £226,862,500 avoided central composting Savings from £26,000,000 £27,000,000 £56,000,000 £458,650,000 avoided disposal Total Savings £28,000,000 £29,500,000 £59,500,000 £494,362,500 (net of costs) from Home Composting

Table 58 shows that although home composting support will impose costs, the savings from avoided centralised composting and disposal of material that is home composted is substantially greater. By 2019/20 savings across all local authorities are estimated to be in the order of £60 million per annum. The way that costs change over time is illustrated in Figure 36 below. Figure 36. Estimated Cost Differentials between Home Composting Growth and No Growth Scenarios

Waste Prevention Policy Case Studies 242 Millions £500

£450

£400

£350

£300

£250

£200

£150 Cost HC growth Scenario Cost No HC Scenario £100

£50

£- 2004/5 2005/6 2006/7 2007/8 2008/9 2009/10 2010/11 2011/12 2012/13 20013/14 20014/15 2015/16 2016/17 2017/18 2018/19 2019/20

14.6.1 LATS Implications Aside from this ‘bare’ issue of system cost, one can consider the implications for landfill allowances of a) an authority, and b) the UK as a whole under the assumptions envisaged. If one accepts the quantitative evidence from WRAP then each 2 tonnes of waste home composted avoids a) one tonne of waste being centrally composted and b) one tonne of waste being collected as residual waste (and to the extent that one believes that the LA(T)S system will drive change, in the short term at least, this is likely to have otherwise been landfilled). A basic analysis of the ‘without’ and ‘with’ policy scenarios can help demonstrate the impact upon landfill allowances of managing these 2 tonnes of waste in the different ways suggested. The results are shown in Table 59. What this shows is the difference in the ‘with’ and ‘without’ policy scenarios under three assumptions: 1. The home composted waste is not counted in collected waste, but it contributes towards improving the balance of landfill allowances; and 2. The home composted waste contributes towards improving the balance of allowances, but is also counted as collected biodegradable waste on a 100% basis; and 3. The home-composted waste contributes towards improving the balance of allowances, but is also counted as collected biodegradable waste on a 68% basis. The scenario which best represents the actual situation is Scenario 3, which results in one tonne more being landfilled in the ‘without policy’ scenario than in the ‘with policy’ scenario 237 . This matches the actual situation. Table 59: Effect of Policy on Balance of Landfill Allowances Without With Policy Policy Landfilled Waste 1 tonne 0 tonnes

237 We understand from WRAP that this is the method that it is proposed will be used.

Waste Prevention Policy Case Studies 243 Composted Waste 1 tonne 0 tonnes Home Composted Waste 0 tonnes 2 tonnes Collected Waste 2 tonnes 0 tonnes BMW in Collected Waste 1.36 tonnes 0 tonnes BMW Diverted 1 tonne 2 tonnes Net Liability (Landfill Allowances) (home composting not 0.36 tonnes -2 tonnes considered in collected waste) (1) Net Liability (Landfill Allowances) (home composting 0.36 tonnes 0 tonnes considered in collected waste as 100% biodegradable) (2) Net Liability (Landfill Allowances) (home composting 0.36 tonnes -0.64 tonnes considered in collected waste as 68% biodegradable) (3) Difference Under Mass Balance Calculation (home composting not 2.36 tonnes considered in collected waste) (1) Difference Under Mass Balance Calculation (home composting considered 0.36 tonnes in collected waste) (2) Difference Under Mass Balance Calculation (home composting considered 1.00 tonne in collected waste as 68% biodegradable) (3) Actual Difference in Landfilled BMW 1.00 tonne

If this convention is followed (scenario 3), then one can make the following observations in respect of the additional benefit associated with an improved balance of landfill allowances.

National Scale (maroeconomic) Two possible situations can be identified: • UK complies with requirements of Landfill Directive in all years irrespective of inclusion of home composting in policy: In this case, it is assumed that across the whole of England, where allowances are tradable, the benefits to one authority of an improved balance of allowances are compensated by reduced revenues received by others. The net situation for the UK as a whole would be neutral as reduced LATS purchases by one authority effectively equals loss of income for the authority(s) from which they would be purchased; • UK fails to comply with requirements of Landfill Directive in all years without inclusion of home composting in policy: In this case, the improvement in the balance of allowances under this policy may have the effect of either: o Reducing fines imposed by the European Union; or o Eliminating the likelihood of fines from the European Union by putting the UK’s performance ‘out of the red and into the black’. At the national level, there appears to be nothing to lose, and potentially, much to gain.

Local Authority Level At the local authority level, including home composting in the calculations of balances of landfill allowances would assist some local authorities, especially those struggling to meet their obligations under the existing mass balance approach. However, the

Waste Prevention Policy Case Studies 244 opportunities for home composting are greatest in those areas where households have gardens. Consequently, the benefits are likely to be felt most strongly in more rural areas where no garden waste collection has been implemented. Even so, those with less potential to benefit directly from the policy might benefit indirectly. In those countries (England and Scotland) where trading may occur, an improved national level performance will reduce demand for allowances and hence, the price of allowances to those who need to purchase them

14.6.2 Impacts on Householders Householders will experience a small one off cost impact if they participate in home composting and buy a subsidised home compost bin as a result of the policy. In addition householders will benefit from cost savings experienced by councils from home composting growth noted above. This may be in the form of Council Tax reductions or more likely lower levels of increase in Council Tax or increased service provision. If, over the period during which this policy was in place, local authorities were to introduce direct charging for households, there would be a direct effect on the costs paid by householders for their waste management service (the magnitude of which would depend upon the nature of the charging system, and the structure of charges). Some householders might experience an increased (relative to the counterfactual) level of cost associated with waste management due to reduced revenues from the sale of landfill allowances.

14.6.3 Impacts upon Businesses Home composting will have some cost implications for the business sector. These may include the following: Home compost bin manufacturers and scheme support organisations will experience increased business as a result of meeting the increased demand for home compost bins; Commercial compost plant operators will experience reduced tonnages and hence reduced gate fee income under a scenario where home composting is considered likely to grow. However in accordance with the tonnage projections shown in Figure 35 this is almost certainly going to be in the context of a slightly slower rate of growth in tonnage than in terms of any actual decline in tonnage; Waste collection companies will have to handle slightly less material under a scenario where home composting is considered likely to grow. Depending on how services are structured, this may or may not result in a loss of income; Waste disposal and treatment operations will receive lower tonnages of material. This is likely to result in reduced income from gate fees, although the industry may be able to offset this to some extent by increases in per unit gate fees.

14.6.4 Distributional Consequences (local authorities) There are a number of aspects to the distributional consequences of this type of measure. Other things being equal, the benefits of the policy will favour: • Those for whom the likelihood of having to trade in landfill allowances is high. These authorities may see the need to trade in allowances reduced by the

Waste Prevention Policy Case Studies 245 measure. Conversely, those with surpluses of allowances to sell will either sell less, or receive a reduced price for those allowances sold; • Rural authorities with large numbers of households with gardens. Urban authorities stand to benefit less from this policy in proportion to the size and number of gardens within their boundaries. • Authorities who have never promoted home composting to a significant degree. Those who were already promoting home composting heavily before the first date where the effect of bins can be considered will ‘lose’ from their ‘first mover’ approach. Late movers, arguably, have most to gain. Consequently, different authorities will be affected differently by this type of policy.

14.6.5 Dynamic Efficiency As mentioned this policy will provide a boost to the suppliers of home composting bins and support services. However the degree to which it will result in increased competition and innovation is not clear. There is no obvious dynamic incentive generated by this measure other than the fluctuating value of landfill allowances.

14.6.6 Additionality The policy is expected to have impacts above and beyond what is expected in its absence. Much, however, depends upon the nature of response of local authorities to the measure, and the reality is that this can only be estimated at present. Beyond the impact on the business sectors mentioned in 14.6.3 above, it is not anticipated that this policy will result in further significant economic impacts. 14.7 Social Impacts The policy is expected to result in increased participation in home composting. This could have unquantified impacts on householders’ gardening and waste management habits. Some householders could be induced to garden more, while people who home compost may also be more likely to engage in other waste prevention and recycling behaviours. 238 Households with gardens will receive the benefits of subsidised compost bins, while those households living in flats and multi-unit dwellings will receive no benefit beyond any impacts of the initiative on Council Tax. Providing that scheme support takes account of the social and demographic mix in each local authority, it is not anticipated that certain sectors of society who wish to home compost will be significantly favoured over others. 14.8 Implementation & Design Issues

14.8.1 General This policy is targeted at local authorities and will have no direct public or political acceptability issues. Local authorities are likely to respond positively to the initiative

238 Tucker (2003) discusses a range of correlations between recycling, reduction behaviours, and home composting. The research suggests that there is a two-tier effect whereby similar behaviours are most strongly correlated in the short term but that over the longer term there may be a strong relationship between environmental behaviours generally.

Waste Prevention Policy Case Studies 246 as it will provide a further avenue through which they will be able to attempt to meet their landfill allowance obligations, and/or waste strategy targets. 239 In both the case of the LATS/LAS and target calculations it is firstly up to the regulating authorities to establish a protocol. In the case of waste strategy targets the protocol would be the responsibility of Defra and DCLG in England, SEPA in Scotland, Assembly Government (Waste Strategy Branch) in Wales, and the Department of the Environment in Northern Ireland. As far as possible, established protocols should be standard across all the UK administrations. This is of particular importance in respect of the landfill allowance calculations in order to facilitate securing the agreement of the European Commission to this change in UK reporting arrangements in relation to the Landfill Directive. 240 In order to introduce the scheme for LATS/LAS an amendment to the landfill allowance scheme regulations may be required. If the scheme were to be introduced in respect of waste strategy targets/BVPI’s it is not anticipated that this initiative would require any legislative or regulatory changes to introduce. There is a danger that amendments to the landfill allowance regulations could cause delays in the introduction of this policy, hence there may be an argument to proceed with introducing the change to waste strategy targets/BVPI’s (as Wales is about to do) across the UK, and if necessary later harmonising these with a finalised LATS/LAS protocol.

14.8.2 Monitoring and Regulation The scheme would require monitoring and regulation to ensure that authorities claiming credits were adhering to the requirements of the established protocol. Key tasks of the monitoring authority would include the following: To ensure they are satisfied that local authorities claiming the benefit of diversion through home composting have a qualifying schemescheme in placeplace; To be satisfied that the claimed number of bins has been distributed in the authority’s area. An approved scheme provider should be able to provide audited figures for this purpose, leaving regulators to check only those outside an approved scheme; Check that the calculation has been done correctly in each case. The England protocol proposes that a standard spreadsheet, similar to the example in Table 56, be provided to reduce the risk of calculation errors. 241 Local authorities participating in the scheme and claiming home composting credits would have to supply data to the regulator annually.

239 Defra has established a stakeholder group to input into the development and implementation of LATS. The following organisations are represented: Local Government Association, National Association of Waste Disposal Officers, Society of County Treasurers, County Surveyors Society, Government Offices, Greater London Authority, Association of London Government, Environmental Services Association, Environment Agency 240 WRAP, February 2007. Proposal for a Method of Calculating Diversion of Biodegradable Waste from Landfill through Home Composting 241 Based on WRAP (2007) Proposal for a Method of Calculating Diversion of Biodegradable Waste from Landfill through Home Composting, February 2007.

Waste Prevention Policy Case Studies 247 There may also be a need to understand the ongoing effect of home composting on waste quantities and composition. A number of issues might be expected to alter quantities of waste being home composted in future. For example, should the Government introduce legislation to enable variable charging to be introduced, then it is well known that this tends to intensify efforts related to home composting. Climate change may also alter growth patterns of foliage and grass, and might necessitate a revision in the ‘per household’ performance associated with home composting.

14.8.3 Other Issues There needs to be a distinction made between ‘opt-in’ schemes where bins must be ordered by households, and ‘opt-out’ schemes where they are distributed to anyone who does not specifically request not to receive a bin. Distribution of bins to all households that do not request exemption, as in ‘opt-out’ schemes, is likely to result in a much higher rate of households receiving bins which they then do not use to make compost. 242 14.9 Other Impacts No other significant impacts are anticipated from this policy 14.10 Summary & Conclusions The WRAP work on inclusion of home composting in LATS/LAS calculations is well advanced and has succeeded in developing a sound basis on which local authorities should be able to claim LATS/LAS credits for efforts to encourage home composting. It is not anticipated that there would be significant additional benefit in terms of increased home composting through extending the ability to claim credit for home composting to BVPI calculations, however in the event that there is any delay in introduction of the change in LATS/LAS calculations due to the need to amend regulations, there may be sound rationale for including it in BVPI calculations in order to ensure that the waste prevention benefits of home composting are gained earlier and the impact of the incentive is not eroded by the widespread introduction of garden waste collection schemes. If introduced this scheme would assist in balancing the current perverse incentives in the LATS/LAS and BVPI regimes, and give due credit to home composting. However in the case of LATS/LAS it is not clear that this scheme necessarily represents the best way forward. A simpler and more straightforward approach to address the issue of perverse incentives around home composting in LATS/LAS calculations would be to consider how the calculation itself is made. The most obvious route here is to evaluate local authority BMW percentages/tonnages directly on the basis of waste composition analyses undertaken by certified agencies in accordance with a set protocol 243 . In addition to the financial benefits to local authorities who are able to claim credits for BMW diverted from landfill through home composting, there would appear to be

242 ibid 243 Refer to ECOTEC Research and Consulting Ltd. (1999). Policy Instruments to Implement the Proposed Landfill Directive BMSW Targets - Final Report to DETR

Waste Prevention Policy Case Studies 248 substantial waste prevention benefits that could accrue from this policy, with associated savings in avoided costs of collection, processing and disposal. Draft protocols have been put forward for the UK and these will require final consultation and agreement before being put in place.

Waste Prevention Policy Case Studies 249

15 WASTE PREVENTION TARGETS & RESIDUAL WASTE LEVY 15.1 Introduction Recent developments in the EU Parliament hint that waste prevention targets are likely to be mandated by the EU, and devolved to member states. 244 Having coherent targets for waste prevention is clearly being considered as more important than in the past. This policy aims to reduce the quantities of household waste generated through introducing a target for residual waste. In addition the option of a residual waste levy is explored to reinforce the target. Residual waste targets (and levies) give credit to waste prevention through focusing attention on residual waste levels rather than recycling or composting rates. Focusing on the quantities of residual waste, as opposed to quantities that are recycled or recovered, effectively gives equal weighting to all initiatives that reduce residual household waste, whether it is through prevention, recycling or composting. The government’s current percentage based recycling and composting targets have resulted in some perverse effects of material being driven down, rather than up the hierarchy. For example, as discussed in Section 5.1.6, composting targets incentivise local authorities to collect garden waste (because of the large quantities that can be collected), thereby increasing the tonnages being collected through the formal waste management system, and effectively reducing management by households through home composting. In addition the recycling and composting targets have resulted in a reduced incentive for local authorities to engage in waste prevention activities, as material prevented is only counted in so far as it reduces the denominator (residual waste) in the recycling rate calculations. Furthermore, if the material prevented would have otherwise been recycled or composted (e.g. junk mail, biowaste), then waste prevention activities have the potential to actually reduce recycling rates. A residual waste target based on waste quantities per capita overcomes most of these perverse effects and encourages local authorities to reduce residual waste quantities in the most effective and cost effective means. It is suggested that the policy be targeted at the Waste Collection Authority (WCA) level. It is not anticipated that the policy would require additional primary legislation to enact the target related elements of the policy, although new administrative structures may be required. If a residual waste levy were introduced at a national or regional level, this would require legislation and regulation to establish the authority to administer the levy and the basis on which it would be done. However, at a County level, it would appear that this could be achieved through a change in the default mechanism for paying recycling credits. Three scenarios are explored through which the policy could be enacted. These are: A residual waste target that declines over time;

244 http://www.letsrecycle.com/legislation/news.jsp?story=6536

Waste Prevention Policy Case Studies 250 A residual waste target that declines over time, supported by a residual waste levy applied where the target is not met; and A target set at the average level of residual waste generation, with levies applied to those authorities whose residual waste quantities per inhabitant are above the average level, and the revenue rebated to those authorities whose residual waste quantities per inhabitant are below the average level. 15.2 Description of policy: Residual Waste Target One of the best examples of a residual waste target comes from Flanders, in Belgium. This example is examined in brief here. The Flemish-speaking region of Flanders has a population of 6 million living in 2.4 million households. It is divided into five provinces and subdivided into 308 municipalities. In its municipal waste management plan 1997-2001, OVAM, the public waste agency of Flanders, set the following targets for the generation of residual waste: 1998: 225 kg per person 2001: 220 kg per person 2006: 200 kg per person 2010: 150kg per person Success in meeting and exceeding these targets during the plan period led to the targets being revised and further tightened in the 2003-2007 waste management plan. The revised targets are: 2003: 180 kg per person 2005: 165 kg per person 2007: 150 kg per person Figure 37 below shows the residual waste per captia against targets from 1991 to 2002 with the targets from 1998 to 2007. More recent data obtained suggests that residual waste per capita dropped to 159 kg per person by 2004, a figure below the 2005 target level (see Figure 38. 161 of the 308 municipalities were below the 150 kg per person level (the 2007 target) in 2004. 245 It should be noted that the targets and arisings levels reported above relate to ‘Municipal Solid Waste’ and not household waste specifically. However the definition of MSW in Flanders is not dissimilar from the definition of household waste in the UK, as it does not include commercial waste, but only waste from households, bulky waste and council activities. 246 Figure 37: Flanders Residual Waste Reduction Targets and Actual Quantities

245 Julie Hill, Hannah Hislop, Charlotte Steel and Ben Shaw (2006) An International Survey of Zero Waste Initiatives , Green Alliance. 246 Frank Parent, Luc Vanacker, Anne Vandeputte, Danny Wille (2004) Municipal Waste Management in Flanders - Experiences and Challenges , Public Waste Agency of Flanders, April 2004.

Waste Prevention Policy Case Studies 251

Source: David Davies Associates (2003) High Diversion of Municipal Waste: Is It Achievable? Resource Recovery Forum Figure 38: Flanders Residual Waste Reduction Targets and Actual Quantities

Source: Danny Willle (2006) The Polluter Pays: Key to Successful Household Waste Policy, Presentation to ACR+ Conference, Dublin Castle, 19th May 2006. In calculating the targets, residual waste is defined as not recycling/composting. The quantity included in the residual figure includes waste that is incinerated. The total quantities of landfilled waste have fallen substantially over the period from 1.13 million tonnes (43% of waste arisings) in 1993 to 147,000 tonnes (4% of waste arisings) in 2002. While quantities of waste incinerated have remained relatively constant (821,000 tonnes [31%] in 1993 compared to 868,000 tonnes [26%] in 2002. 247

247 David Davies Associates (2003) High Diversion of Municipal Waste: Is It Achievable? Resource Recovery Forum.

Waste Prevention Policy Case Studies 252 In terms of waste prevention the question is: to what degree has the per capita residual waste target reduced arisings versus simply stimulating greater recovery from the waste stream? The data suggests that the reduction in residual waste per capita has come substantially from an increase in recycling. This is shown in Figure 38 above. Waste Arisings grew by an average of 2.9% per annum over the period 1991 – 2002. However, in the period since 1998, when the first target was introduced, the growth in arisings has slowed considerably. In the 1998-2004 period, the line of best fit suggests an average growth rate of 0.42%, though the correlation of this fit is poor. In the period 2000-2004, the line of best fit actually suggests a decrease of 0.44% per annum, though again, the correlation is poor, and inspection by eye suggests zero net growth over the period. While the measures taken by OVAM have clearly not reduced overall arisings in absolute terms, the question can be asked as to whether the rate of growth might have been different in a counterfactual scenario. This is difficult to say, but if the trend from 1991-2002 had continued from 1998, the arisings per inhabitant would have been 628kg per inhabitant by 2004. The policy could, under this assumption, have been responsible for a 10.8% reduction in overall waste quantities over the 6- year period. Even here, however, the matter is not so clear. Generally, the pre-1998 evolution shows that prior to this date, overall waste arisings were increasing as recycling rates improved. This may well have been due to the roll out of biowaste collections to households, generating ‘above background’ growth rates. Notwithstanding this fact, there does appear to have been a slowing in the rate of growth, though of course, one could not, unequivocally, attribute this change to this policy alone. 248 It is worth stating that the setting of residual waste targets alone cannot be held to be responsible for the reduction in residual waste that has been observed in Flanders. The targets form part of an integrated package of initiatives which include: implementing awareness and information campaigns (possibly with specific target groups in mind, such as schools); drafting municipal environmental covenants or cooperation agreements between local authorities and the Flemish region; financial aid for initiatives pertaining to waste prevention and reuse, and developing a collection and processing infrastructure for the separated collection of municipal waste; imposing environmental taxes on the incineration and landfilling of waste; consultation on policy relating to appropriate environmental permits; systematically and consistently applying the ‘the polluter pays’ principle; implementing acceptance and take-back obligations, based on the principle of producer responsibility; implementing and applying landfilling and incineration bans; monitoring and enforcing the observance of rules and regulations. 249

248 Parent et al (2004) attribute some of the decrease in waste growth to an increase in reuse centres and a decrease in the total quantity of packaging, due mainly to light weighting of packaging design (see Frank Parent, Luc Vanacker, Anne Vandeputte, Danny Wille (2004) Municipal Waste Management in Flanders - Experiences and Challenges , Public Waste Agency of Flanders, April 2004). 249 Frank Parent, Luc Vanacker, Anne Vandeputte, Danny Wille (2004) Municipal Waste Management in Flanders - Experiences and Challenges , Public Waste Agency of Flanders, April 2004.

Waste Prevention Policy Case Studies 253 Although a wide range of initiatives has been employed, the importance of setting a target should not be underestimated. The target provided a clear focus for action, and the need or desire to meet the target was integral to the successful implementation of the above initiatives. OVAM also enforced the target through the application of upper target limits which no single municipality was allowed to exceed. 250 These were 220kg/pp in 2003 and 200kg/pp in 2005. In addition local authorities are encouraged to reduce residual waste through signing voluntary ‘Environmental agreements or covenants’. These link the results obtained to the provision of financial support which is financed through taxes on the landfilling and incineration of waste. 251 15.3 Scenario Development: Residual Waste Target The policy scenario put forward here is that Central Government sets a residual waste target based on kilograms of residual waste per capita per year. The quantities of residual waste allowed could be set so they decline over time. A per capita target is preferred as it takes account of population growth, and enables easy comparison across authorities and nationally. 252 An alternative is to use a per household figure, but this has the disadvantages of being less readily comparable, as the number will be affected by household sizes which vary by locality, and of being influenced by changes in household size over time – as household size declines a per household figure would also show a decline with no change in actual waste generation levels. Therefore, a ‘per household’ figure is less comparable over time and across localities, and is not preferred. Proposals from the European Parliament suggest that a requirement may be introduced to stabilise waste arisings at 2008 levels by 2012. 253 The need to stabilise levels at an absolute figure could be taken account of in per capita calculations by allowing for population growth. This would be important in devolving targets to local authority areas which will experience different rates of population growth. Basing targets on a per capita figure means that areas that are bearing the brunt of population growth are not unfairly penalised. The use of a residual waste target could take the place of the current percentage based recycling and composting targets. If this was done then implementation of the target at the local authority level could be accomplished through existing Best Value guidance and reporting procedures. Measurement of residual household waste quantities would be relatively easy to establish and could be done using waste data that is currently gathered, together with official population data. Setting a level for the per capita figure will ultimately be a decision for government based on what is believed to be achievable and the government’s aspirations. Residual waste levels are around 404kg per person according to 2004/5 Defra

250 It is not clear what sanction was applied to enforce this requirement 251 Frank Parent, Luc Vanacker, Anne Vandeputte, Danny Wille (2004) Municipal Waste Management in Flanders - Experiences and Challenges , Public Waste Agency of Flanders, April 2004. 252 This figure is also currently a UK Government sustainable development strategy indicator 253 http://www.letsrecycle.com/legislation/news.jsp?story=6536

Waste Prevention Policy Case Studies 254 figures 254 against a total arisings level of 517kg per person, and a recycling rate of 113kg per person (22%). This compares with residual waste levels of 332 kg per person and a recycling rate of approximately 18% in Flanders prior to the introduction of their residual waste targets. This suggests that Flanders was at a similar level of performance as the UK currently when their residual waste targets were introduced. If targets are to be set, it makes sense for them to be aspirational, but also based on what has been shown to be achievable. For the purposes of this report a residual waste target figure of 200kg per person per year by 2020 is modelled, with interim targets set as follows: 2011/12 300 kg pp/yr 2015/16 250 kg pp/yr 2019/20 200 kg pp/yr Assuming total household waste arisings stabilise at current levels, a 200kg residual waste target would be equivalent to a recycling rate in the order of 60%. 15.4 Description of Policy: Residual Waste Levy In Wallonia (Belgium), the regional Government introduced a novel instrument in which the local authorities were subjected to a residual waste levy. This instrument is described in more detail in Section 10.6. In essence, the levy specified a quantity of residual waste per inhabitant which could be generated free of any levy. For those authorities whose generation of residual waste exceeded this ‘quota’, a levy on the excess was applied. The quota was reduced over time to encourage local authorities to reduce the residual waste generated. In Wallonia, this had the effect, amongst other things, of encouraging widespread dissemination of variable charging. The development in the uptake of charging schemes is shown clearly in Figure 39 below. Figure 39: Residual Waste per Inhabitant Related to Charge Scheme Development of Charging Scheme Types

254 2004/5 figures derived from: http://www.defra.gov.uk/environment/statistics/waste/kf/wrkf04.htm

Waste Prevention Policy Case Studies 255 No scheme

Volume -based

Weight -based

Note: OMB (kg/hab.an) = Residual Waste per Inhabitant per Year Residual waste levies applied only to waste quantities exceeding a specified target level imply that where waste quantities fall below this level, there is no further motivation for residual waste reduction. The intent of the proposed residual waste levy is to create incentives for local authorities to both: a) not exceed a set annual waste per household target; and b) reduce annual waste per household arisings as much as possible below this target. It is suggested here that there are two ways of doing this: a) By setting a pre-determined target and charging WCAs who exceed the target level and refunding the revenue to those who fall below it. By using this approach of ‘rebating revenue’, those doing better are rewarded with the penalty revenue gained from those doing worse; or b) By setting the level against which rebates are paid at the average level of performance of the authorities. Those above would be charged a pre- determined levy, with the overall revenue refunded to those who are below the average level in proportion to how far below they are.

15.5 Scenario Development: Residual Waste Levy As discussed above, there are two approaches possible for the design of the levy.

15.5.1 Pre-determined Target The first approach sets targets to continuously improve. For the purposes of this exercise the same target level of 200kg per person per year by 2019/20 is proposed, but the impact of the levy is to incentivise achievement of the target, resulting in the target level being achieved at a faster rate. The following schedule is proposed:

Waste Prevention Policy Case Studies 256 2009/10 300kg pp/yr 2012/13 250kg pp/yr 2015/16 200kg pp/yr Critical to the success of the levy would be setting the fines/rebates at a level that would provide sufficient incentive for authorities to take action without being unduly punitive for authorities that fail to reach the target levels. This needs to be considered in the context of landfill tax and LATS considerations which are already creating incentives to local authority action. On the other hand, since the levy is fiscally neutral, with rebates equalling fines, then it seems possible that the marginal incentive could be slightly higher than in cases where no such rebating system was in place. Although the level of any levy would have to be announced in advance, it seems possible that it (and possibly the targets themselves) could be periodically reviewed so as to give greater or weaker incentives, as appropriate, to ensure targets were met without generating unduly large costs or benefits to specific authorities.

15.5.2 Levy Based on Average Residual Quantities The second approach generates a relatively unpredictable target, but it has the merit of avoiding the setting of targets which prove to be impossible to achieve (under existing frameworks). Authorities would have an incentive always to be operating with above average performance (lower quantities of residual waste than others) so as to avoid charges and receive refunds. This ought to imply that the average residual waste per household trends continuously downwards. In a slightly dystopian outcome, this approach may promote cross-authority cooperation to maintain relatively conservative and constant quantities of residual waste arisings, but even here, there would be a considerable incentive to cheat, or to stay out of such a collusive arrangement. The target is set as the annual average quantity of residual waste per household and establishes accountability for every authority because evidently the average is, by definition, attainable. More interesting variants could apply levies on the excess which increase as the magnitude of the excess changes. Some possible options are considered below.

15.5.3 Scenario Examples In Figure 40, we show how such a levy might function in the case where there are 4 authorities, two whose arisings exceed the target level (expressed in terms of kg per inhabitant per annum – the figures are indicative only) and two who have residual waste quantities below the target level. Figure 40: Residual Waste Levy, Pre-set Target @ 300kg/inh

Residual waste per inhabitant Excess of 100kg/inh

Excess of

60kg/inh

Below target by 75kg/inh

300kg Waste Prevention Policy Case Studies Below target by 257 100kg/inh Authority A AuthorityB AuthorityC AuthorityD

Assume that: • Authority A has 75,000 households; • Authority B has 50,000 households; • Authority C has 60,000 households; and • Authority D has 100,000 households. Assume also that the levy is set at £30 per tonne. Then: • Authority A has a total excess of residual waste = 75,000 x 100kg = 7,500 tonnes. It pays 7,500 * £30 = £225,000 • Authority B has a total excess of residual waste = 50,000 x 60kg = 3,000 tonnes. It pays 3,000 x £30 = £90,000. This gives a total of levy revenue of £315,000. Those that do better than target would receive this revenue (net of administrative costs, here assumed to be zero for the sake of simplicity). Hence • Authority C has a total ‘deficit’ of residual waste = 60,000 x 750kg = 4,500 tonnes; • Authority D has a total ‘deficit’ of residual waste = 100,000 x 100kg = 7,500 tonnes; • The total ‘better than target’ performance amounts to 12,000 tonnes of which Authority C is responsible for (4,500/12,000) = 37.5%, and Authority D is responsible for (7,500/12,000) = 62.5%; • Consequently: o Authority C receives 37.5% x £315,000 = £118,125; and o Authority D receives 62.5% x £315,000 = £196,875 In the round, the approach is revenue neutral. It implies transfers from authorities which do well to authorities which do less well. In the case where the average is used as the target, then from the same figure: • Authority A produces 400kg/inh; • Authority B produces 360kg/inh; • Authority C produces 225kg/inh; and • Authority D produces 200kg/inh. Then the weighted average is 285.96 kg/inh. It can be seen that the same calculation in terms of levies and rebates would generate similar results, but in this case, the quantum of revenue would be greater (the excesses are larger), so the rebates would be greater also. What would clearly be different in the two examples is how the impact of the levy would change over time. Where the target is pre-determined, then care would be needed to ensure that the targets were achievable. If they are too challenging, then the consequence might be that authorities simply pay the levy and there is no recipient of the rebate. This could also be the outcome if the levy is set too low (so that the cost of taking action exceeds that of doing nothing).

Waste Prevention Policy Case Studies 258 This is one of the reasons why one might be inclined to favour the approach in which the target is set at the average level. What could then happen is that the level of incentive would be used to drive average performance lower with the desired speed, subject to the levy rates being announced sufficiently far in advance for authorities to take action to reduce their liability to pay the levy. This second levy option is not modelled separately at this stage as it is not possible to determine with any certainty the likely magnitude (or even direction) of the impact, without further in depth research. 15.6 Environmental Impacts of the Policy The impacts of the policy options were estimated by modelling the environmental benefits assuming the targets were to be achieved. In the case of the target (without the levy) it is clear that simply setting targets will not by itself result in them being achieved and, as in Flanders, a range of initiatives are likely to be required to support the targets. It is beyond to scope of the current exercise to consider what these programmes might be and the costs and benefits involved. Therefore the modelling concentrated on the level of benefits that might accrue if the targets were to be achieved. These benefits can then be considered as the level of resource that could be made available to put in place programmes that would enable authorities to meet the targets. In order to account for the impacts of introducing a levy based on the target, the reductions in residual waste are assumed to be achieved at a faster pace than with the target alone. The benefits are therefore expressed in terms of tonnages and cost savings resulting from earlier achievement.

15.6.1 Modelling Methodology A model developed by Eunomia for calculating the impact of variable charging systems in England was adapted to model the impacts of meeting the residual waste target of 200kg of residual waste per capita by 2020. This is a spreadsheet-based model that takes account of impacts on collection costs, disposal costs including landfill tax, income from recycled materials, waste prevention impacts, and different configurations of household type and collection system. The model calculates a baseline scenario as well as a scenario where targets are met. Modelling was conducted for England only, and not for any of the devolved administrations, as the data necessary to undertake this was readily available. For the purposes of this exercise, the results for England should be able to be applied to the devolved administrations on a pro-rata basis according to population. A single year (2019/20) was modelled in both the baseline and target scenarios. This data was then used to calculate probable impacts on a pro-rated basis for other years leading up to 2020.

Waste Prevention Policy Case Studies 259 15.6.2 Key Parameters Office of National Statistics (ONS) population and household projections for the year 2021 were used. The population for England in 2021 is estimated to be 54,604,000 living in 24,000,000 households with an average household size of 2.28. 255 In the baseline scenario, waste arisings are assumed to increase in the baseline situation at an average rate of 1.5% per annum to 2020. 256 The different collection systems modelled are shown in Table 60 below. In order to achieve a residual waste level of 200kg per person it is assumed that in the residual target scenario waste arisings are stabilised at 2008 levels in accordance with proposals agreed by the EU Parliament regarding waste prevention targets. In addition to achieve the residual waste level of 200kg per person, recycling rates in the model were set at the following levels:

Table 60: Scheme Types in Model % of BaselinBaselinee Scheme Type Key Components HHHHHH performance 257 Sack Residual (weekly) ‘Urban 1’ Paid Garden (fortnightly) 20% 23% Food waste Separate (weekly) Paper, glass, cans, plastic, card (weekly) Wheeled Bin Residual (weekly) ‘Urban 2’ Paid Garden (fortnightly) 20% 24% Food waste Separate (weekly) Paper, glass, cans, plastic, card (weekly) Wheeled Bin AWC Residual ‘Urban/Rural Paid Garden (fortnightly) 20% 37% 1’ Food waste Separate (weekly) Paper, glass, cans, plastics, card (weekly) Wheeled Bin AWC Residual ‘Urban / Rural Free Garden (fortnightly) 40% 43% 2’ Food waste Co-collected with Garden Paper, glass, cans, plastics, card (weekly)

255 http://www.statistics.gov.uk/STATBASE/Expodata/Spreadsheets/D7678.xls . This compares with a population of approximately 49,000,000 living in 20,750,000 households with an average household size of 2.36 in the 2001 census. 256 This rate was selected based on an estimate of the underlying average historical growth rate, and is the same rate agreed with Defra for use in the variable charging modelling. 257 Estimated performance in the year 2020 where no performance targets are in place beyond current recycling targets. This performance relates to household collected waste only and is different from BVPI figures.

Waste Prevention Policy Case Studies 260 Table 61: Modelled Recycling Performance of Collection Schemes KerbsKerbsideide Recycling CA Site Recycling Scheme Type Performance Performance ‘Urban 1’ 52% 77% ‘Urban 2’ 61% 77% ‘Urban/Rural 1’ 66% 77% ‘Urban / Rural 2’ 60% 78% Average 59% 77%

15.6.3 Modelling Results Table 62 below shows that if the target is achieved in 2019/20 some this would result in a reduction in residual household waste in the order of some 8.5 million tonnes in that year. Some 5 million tonnes of this is the result of increased recycling and composting, while the remaining quantities are due to a reduction in waste arising growth. Table 62: Annual Tonnage Impacts from Meeting 200kg/pp/yr Residual Target (20019/20) Baseline Post Target Change Waste Quantities 31,823,595 28,502,848 -3,320,748 Residual Waste* 19,572,712 10,932,882 -8,639,831 Waste Recycled 5,457,086 9,154,373 3,697,287 Waste Composted 6,793,797 8,121,579 1,327,782 Recycled and Composted 12,250,883 17,275,952 5,025,069 Recycling Rate 17.1% 32.1% 15.0% Composting Rate 21.3% 28.5% 7.2% Total Recycling and Composting 38.5% 60.6% 22.1% Rate

Residual Waste per Person 358 200 ---158 -158 (kg/pp/yr)

Landfill Allowances Associated 21,640,045 19,381,937 with Waste Landfill Allowance Credits due to Paper Recycling and Biowaste 9,561,668 12,764,739 Composting Net BMW to Landfill 12,078,377 6,617,197 Improvement in Balance of 5,461,179 Landfill Allowances *including illegal disposal

Waste Prevention Policy Case Studies 261 If a residual waste levy is introduced with payments made for authorities below the target level and fines for those above, then the performance impacts expected relative to the target only scenario are calculated in Table 63 to Table 65.

Table 63: Estimated Changes in Waste Quantities Between 2006/7 and 2019/20 If Target Achieved Change in Quantity Average Annual Change 2006/7-2019/20 Waste Quantities - 24,905,607 - 1,778,972 Residual Waste - 64,798,730 - 4,628,481 Waste Recycled 27,729,649 1,980,689 Waste Composted 9,958,368 711,312 Recycled and 37,688,017 2,692,001 Composted

Table 64: Additional Changes in Waste Quantities Between 2006/7 and 2019/20 if Target Achieved Using Levy Additional Change in Quantity Average Additional Annual

2006/7-2019/20 Change Waste Quantities Residual Waste -18,221,519 -1,301,537.10 Waste Recycled 7,698,094 549,863.86 Waste Composted 9,985,520 713,251.40 Recycled and 17,683,614 1,263,115.26 Composted

Table 65: Total Changes in Waste Quantities Between 2006/7 and 2019/20 if Target Achieved Using Levy Change in Quantity Average Annual Change 2006/7-2019/20 Waste Quantities -24,905,607 -1,778,972 Residual Waste -83,020,249 -5,930,018 Waste Recycled 35,427,744 2,530,553 Waste Composted 19,943,887 1,424,563 Recycled and 55,371,631 3,955,116 Composted

As Table 64 shows, if a levy successfully incentivises achievement of the residual waste targets by 2019/20 this will result in the diversion of approximately 18,000,000 additional tonnes of residual waste from disposal over the period, equivalent to some 1,300,000 tonnes per annum relative to the scenario with the target only.

Waste Prevention Policy Case Studies 262 15.6.4 Changes Over Time The change in residual waste quantities over time in each of the scenarios modelled is shown in Figure 41. Figure 41: Changes in Residual Waste Quantities Over Time by Scenario

25,000,000

20,000,000

Baseline 15,000,000

Target Only tonnes Target Plus 10,000,000 Levy

5,000,000

6 7 8 9 1 2 9 0 8/ 13 /14 /15 20 15/16 16/17 2005/ 2006/ 2007/ 2009/10 2010/1 2011/1 2012/ 20 20 2017/18 2018/1 2019/2 20013 20014

Figure 41 illustrates that, whilst both the target only, and the target plus levy options eventually result in the same level of residual waste reduction, the ability of the levy to achieve this result more rapidly results in a substantial quantity of waste being diverted from disposal. A similar profile would be likely to be observed in respect of energy and CO 2 savings 258 . 15.7 Economic Impact of the Policy The economic impact of the policy was calculated by adapting Eunomia’s model developed for calculating the impact of variable charging systems in England. The model accounts for impacts from changes to quantities of material collected, recycled and disposed of. All figures are based on current capital and operating costs and systems that are in use today. The benefits associated with avoided disposal are estimated at £80 per tonne. 259 In this scenario analysis no account has been taken of economic effects associated with trading of landfill allowances. In effect, it is assumed: a) that the UK meets its targets (no fines are levied); and

258 Savings from waste prevention and increases in recycling will lead to savings in CO2 emissions and energy, which cannot be accurately quantified without further research. The majority of these savings are likely to be from increase in recycling rather than waste prevention. 259 This can be taken to represent either the cost of landfilling plus tax plus the value of landfill allowances associated with a tonne of landfilled residual waste, or the cost of alternative residual waste treatment.

Waste Prevention Policy Case Studies 263 b) that across the country as a whole, the cost of allowances is zero (because LATS entails trading between authorities, and expenditure by authorities purchasing LATS allowances will equal income by authorities selling LATS allowances, and there will be no fines levied as targets will be met). Table 66 below shows the estimated annual savings that would result from achieving the target of 200kg per person per year. Table 66: Annual Costs/Savings from achieving the 2020 Target (all figures in real terms) Cost Baseline Cost per household £ 130.10 Cost per household if target met £ 107.61 Savings per household £ 22.49 Savings from Collection -£ 3.86 Savings from Disposal £ 26.35 % Reduction in Waste Management Costs 17.3% Savings per person £ 9.89 Total Savings for England in Year £ 539,843,097

As can be seen, the net savings are in the order of £22.50 per household per year or £9.90 per person per year. The savings come from reduced quantities sent for disposal. In order to achieve this level of savings however, more sophisticated (and hence more costly) collection systems have to be put in place. The additional costs of collection are in the order of nearly £4.00 per household, and offset to a small degree the savings from disposal. These savings will accrue at the local authority (both collection and disposal authority) level, and could be passed on to householders through reductions (or smaller increases than would otherwise occur) in council taxes. If this level of savings is pro-rated based on the tonnages collected and tonnage reductions in disposal (and with adjustment made for the level of landfill tax that is applicable) the following costs and savings can be calculated: Table 67: Costs and Savings from Achieving Residual Target between 2006/7 and 2019/20 (n.b. negative figures imply costs) Total Savings Annual Average Cost of Collection -£694,389,275 -£49,599,234 Savings from Disposal £4,712,355,964 £ 336,596,855 Net Savings £4,017,966,690 £ 286,997,621

Table 68: Additional Costs and Savings from Achieving Residual Target with Levy between 2006/7 and 2019/20 (n.b. negative figures imply costs) Total Savings Annual Average Cost of Collection -£ 325,814,741 -£ 23,272,482 Savings from Disposal £ 1,320,784,517 £ 94,341,751 Net Savings £ 994,969,776 £ 71,069,270

Waste Prevention Policy Case Studies 264 Table 69: Total Costs and Savings from Achieving Residual Target with Levy between 2006/7 and 2019/20 (n.b. negative figures imply costs) Total Savings Annual Average Cost of Collection -£ 1,020,204,016 -£ 72,871,715 Savings from Disposal £ 6,033,140,481 £ 430,938,606 Net Savings £ 5,012,936,466 £ 358,066,890

15.7.1 Cost to Business No specific costs to businesses have been calculated. Cost impacts would occur for waste management companies, with greater income to be gained through providing the more sophisticated recycling collection and processing systems that would be required. Waste prevention and the reduction in tonnage to landfill would however result in a decrease in income for landfill operators.

15.7.2 Distributional Consequences One of the issues with a national target and any associated levy is that some local authorities may meet the target relatively easily while others will struggle. In order to determine how this might apply on a geographic basis, BVPI waste arisings and recycling and composting data was examined. 260 This shows that there is a differentiation with the South and East producing lower residual quantities per person compared to the North. The relative distributions of authorities are shown in Figure 42 below. The BVPI data suggests that residual waste quantities per person vary from less than 250 kg/yr to nearly 500 kg/yr, with the authority average around 360kg per year (2005/6 data). 261 Although there are regional differences, the chart also shows that the differences within regions are clearly greater than those between regions. The average for the best performing region (East Midlands) is 345 kg/pp/yr, compared to 399 kg/pp/yr for the poorest performing region (Yorkshire & Humberside). Also of note from the chart is that no authority is currently achieving the suggested target level of 200kg/pp/yr and only a few are currently achieving levels below 300kg/pp/yr.

260 BV84 (waste collected per capita), data was compiled for each authority and multiplied by the BV 82a+b percentages, which were then subtracted from the total waste collected figure to give a nominal estimate of residual waste per capita. 261 Note that this average figure reflects only the average of the data for each authority, and this takes no account for the relative proportion of overall arisings in the better and worse performing areas. Hence, the figure will differ from the official Defra figures (which account for total tonnages).

Waste Prevention Policy Case Studies 265

Figure 42: WCA Residual Waste per Capita, Grouped by Region

600

500

400

300 kg/pp/yr

200

Average Figure

100

- East Midlands East South West South East London West Midlands North East North West Yorkshire Poorer authorities may not be as able to put initiatives in place to bring about residual waste reduction. However many of these are less affluent urban authorities with fewer gardens, and smaller, denser housing, and may have lower rates of waste generation to begin with. Indeed, a residual waste target may be fairer than a recycling and composting target for similar reasons to those expressed above. Traditionally, it has been multi-occupancy dwellings and flats which have been seen as ‘difficult to reach’ where recycling rates are concerned. However, the quantity of waste generated by these households is likely to be lower in the first place, so that residual quantities are likely to be more comparable than recycling rates across different areas and housing types.

15.7.3 Dynamic Efficiency It is likely that the requirement to meet challenging residual waste targets will spur innovation and competition to deliver workable, bankable solutions to waste prevention, recycling collection and processing issues. Change is already being seen in the waste industry as the sector strives to meet current targets, with significant change having taken place since the waste strategy was published in 2000. A residual waste based target will help to spur innovation through removing some of the less desirable effects of existing targets. This will allow a more rational approach with greater emphasis placed on waste prevention initiatives coming to the fore. 15.8 Social Impacts The policy may be expected to create greater awareness of waste generation at the household level which has the potential to lead to lifestyle changes. The degree to which this would occur is not possible to quantify at this stage.

Waste Prevention Policy Case Studies 266 Processing of recyclable materials leads to higher levels of job creation than sending the material to disposal and it can result in resources being available locally which can spur local economic development. The extent to which this takes place will depend on the degree to which the need to process captured materials is met by development of local processing capacity versus export to offshore markets. Biowaste materials, which make up the largest fractions of the residual waste stream, will almost certainly be processed within the UK and most processing will occur relatively locally to the point of production and/or end use due to the economics of transporting this material long distances. It is therefore likely that this sector of the market at least will achieve a substantial boost from a national residual waste target being achieved. Waste prevention initiatives are also likely to be relatively labour intense, not least since they rely upon good provision of information to citizens. Few local authorities have officers dedicated to the issue of waste prevention, though this is beginning to change. 15.9 Implementation & Design Issues The introduction of a residual waste target would be relatively simple. It would require that the current BVPI recycling and composting targets be replaced by residual waste targets. This would require a change in the method by which the indicators are calculated and some minor changes in reporting. There are likely to be two key issues on which decisions would have to be taken: 3. Whether all local authorities should have the same targets, and if not, on what basis targets should be differentiated between authorities and how the level of differentiation should be calculated. Local authorities do have significantly differing levels of performance in respect of waste recycling and composting and are faced with widely varying situations in relation to geography, demographics and economy. That seemed to be the logic behind differentiating recycling and composting targets in England. There seems to be less reason to differentiate the target for residual waste, and indeed, the Flemish experience makes no provision for exceptions. It would be preferable to have no exceptions from the target in this case. 4. How waste outside of a WCA’s control is accounted for, and apportioned to WCAs, will be important. Clear rules and agreements as to how waste arisings and recycling from CA sites, not under the control of WCAs, is to be apportioned would be desirable. In addition a residual household waste target could act to disincentivise authorities from collecting residual waste from schools and institutions, as this would reduce the total quantity of waste collected, and hence, the residual waste collected, from that authority. The issue has also been raised that, in presentational terms, a residual waste target appears more negative and less easy to grasp compared to a recycling target. It is likely however that overcoming this is simply a matter of communication and education. A residual waste levy in whatever form is likely to be substantially more difficult to establish and to administer than a simple target, as it is more complex, and the legislative instruments by which it would have to be brought about do not yet exist.

Waste Prevention Policy Case Studies 267 However, in England, at the County level, the opportunity to do this exists through simply revising the recycling credits scheme.

15.9.1 County-Level Levy System One of the reasons why the ‘two-tier’ arrangement for local government is regarded as less than optimal is that neither of the two tiers of government ‘sees’ the whole system cost of collecting, treating and disposing of waste. The costs of managing waste, understood in ‘whole system terms’, consist of both of these functions. As the costs of managing residual waste increase, a rational single authority would be expected to shift the balance of its investment in the management of waste increasingly towards means other than disposal. Districts, as waste collection authorities, have responsibility for the collection of waste. How they choose to collect waste is largely left up to them, though two key factors affect, or may affect, their decisions: c) the WCAs are faced with statutory recycling targets; and d) the WET Act gives, to WDAs, certain powers of direction, which the WDA may exercise subject to certain constraints. Included within these is a requirement that, should the WDA ask the WCA to collect waste in a specific way, then as long as the WCA is achieving its statutory performance targets, the WDA would need to compensate the WCA for the additional costs it would incur in changing its approach to collection in the manner requested by the WDA. Counties, as waste disposal authorities, are required to arrange for the disposal of waste. They do this effectively independently of collection activity. However, in recent times, the LATS has become a key driver in WDAs’ decision making. There is no payment made from the WCA to the WDA in lieu of the quantity sent for treatment / disposal. The only financial transfer made between the WCAs and the WDA is through the recycling credit system.

Recycling Credits The key financial mechanism for encouraging recycling in two-tier areas has been the system of recycling credits. Recycling credits were introduced under the EPA 1990 and were intended to provide an incentive for recycling by waste collection authorities (WCAs) in two-tier areas (and by third parties). Payments were designed to reflect the net saving a waste disposal authority (WDA), or WCA, makes by not having to dispose of the tonnages that have been diverted for recycling. The scheme was not designed to cover the additional collection costs associated with recycling. However, insofar as the scheme affected WCAs, by reflecting the avoided cost of disposal, it should have provided an incentive to WCAs to shift the balance of their investment in collection systems towards separate collection and away from collection of residual waste for treatment and / or disposal. Until recently, the system of recycling credits was one in which WDAs were required to make payments to WCAs in accordance with principles set out in the EPA 1990. A review of recycling credits, and associated consultations were carried out in 2004 and proposals for changes to the scheme were included in section 49 of the Clean Neighbourhoods and Environment Act 2005 (CNEA 2005) alongside a commitment to developing guidance on the scheme. These key changes were:

Waste Prevention Policy Case Studies 268 • to increase flexibility of payments from waste disposal to waste collection authorities in two-tier areas by giving authorities the option to agree alternative arrangements; • to give the Secretary of State powers to set the calculation of recycling credits through secondary legislation; and • to clarify that credits can be paid for re-use. Defra then consulted again on proposals for change to the scheme. Most recently, Government issued the The Environmental Protection (Waste Recycling Payments) Regulations 2006, 262 and accompanying Guidance. 263 In line with proposals in CNEA 2005, this actually opens up the possibilities for WDAs and WCAs to agree new mechanisms for financial transfers, including those that might actually incentivise waste prevention on the part of the WCAs (through recognising the implications for system costs of their actions in the sphere of waste collection), as of early April 2006. The Regulations have also led to a revision of the relevant paragraphs in the Environmental Protection Act 1990. The new text allows for arrangements to be concluded between a WCA and a WDA such that the existing mechanism – which has been replaced by a default approach that caps the level of the recycling credit (even as disposal costs increase) – can be jettisoned if the WCA and WDA agree to do so. Hence para. 52(1B) of the EPA, as amended, now reads: (1B) A waste disposal authority is not required to make payments to a waste collection authority under subsection (1) above where, on the basis of arrangements involving the two authorities, the waste collection authority has agreed that such payments need not be made. Furthermore, the new legislation allows for payment of re-use credits. Para 52(12) reads: (12) In this section, references to recycling waste include re-using it (whether or not the waste is subjected to any process). This is a potentially important change in the law, since it paves the way for a change in the way WCAs and WDAs relate to each other in the financial sense. It is important to stress that new arrangements do not have to be related to the amount of material recycled . Essentially, WCAs and a WDA are free to discuss the nature of financial transfers between them so as to align their interests, and help achieve joint objectives, whilst seeking to deliver Best Value for their residents. The new regulations, therefore, allow for a residual waste levy to replace the default mechanism of recycling credits where the relevant parties agree to do so. In essence, therefore, Counties are free to introduce this scheme today in England. However, to the extent that the above system implies some WCAs benefiting, and some losing, this is likely to have to be one component of an overall payment to the WCA rather than the sum total (since some WCAs would move very quickly from being net recipients under the previous scheme to net losers if they perform bellow the average level of performance in the County).

262 http://www.opsi.gov.uk/si/si2006/20060743.htm 263 Defra (2006) Guidance on the Recycling Credit Scheme, Defra, April 2006, http://www.defra.gov.uk/environment/waste/localauth/pdf/recyclingcreditscheme-guidance.pdf

Waste Prevention Policy Case Studies 269 15.9.2 Nation-wide Levy Scheme At the national level, introducing a levy based on residual waste raises the following issues: 1. If the levy is to be kept cost neutral in the round (i.e. rebates are paid out of income from fines), the size of the rebates that could be made available may, initially, be difficult to predict as it would depend on the number of, and extent to which, authorities exceed the target in a given year. This would result in a level of unpredictability about levels of reward and mean that as an income source local authorities, would find it difficult to budget for such income but would be inclined to regard it as ‘windfall’. 2. Care would need to be taken, in the cases where pre-determined target levels were used, to ensure that the targets are achievable, as too high a target could result in few, or no authorities achieving the levels in a given year. Conversely if the targets are set too low there will be little spur to action, and correspondingly low levels of rebate as any rebate would be shared out amongst a large number of authorities. 3. The level of a levy would have to be set carefully in order to stimulate the desired level of action (whether the targets were pre-determined, or set at the average level of performance). The levy could be adjusted periodically, however, to bring about the desired level of performance. 4. The addition of a levy would add a further price signal to a sector that already has to deal with and attempt to develop strategies around the Landfill Tax, LATS, and increasing costs of collection and treatment. Balancing the implications of such a levy against these other price considerations would add another layer of complexity to an already changed waste management sector. For example, an authority whose LATS strategy centred on collection of green waste or treatment of residual would have to weigh the costs and benefits of meeting LATS obligations versus levy charges for exceeding their residual waste target. On the other hand, the mechanism is effectively intended to transmit part of the message that the LATS and LASs convey, albeit in slightly different form. 5. The legislative instruments to enable Central Government to administer this type of levy do not appear to exist, and would probably require changes to primary legislation, or the introduction of new primary legislation to put this policy into effect. The change would have to be implemented through appropriate regulation and guidance which set the details of the levy mechanism. 6. There is a danger, the extent of which would need to be determined, that some of those councils who are the poorest performing in terms of residual waste per capita may also be authorities with fewer financial resources to effect the change needed. In such instances, levying fines could simply make the task of effecting change more difficult, and could lead to them consistently failing improve. It is possible to overstate this issue, but it is a situation which would potentially need to be monitored.

Waste Prevention Policy Case Studies 270 7. The lead times for the introduction of a levy would have to be sufficient to allow authorities to develop and begin to implement strategies to deal with the implications of a levy. In addition to the above potential issues, a residual waste levy based on the average residual per capita could present issues around the ability of local authorities to plan for the impact of the levy. The purpose of basing the levy on performance above and below the average is to provide a real fiscal incentive to get below the average, thus driving quantities of residual waste down faster. The extent to which this is likely to happen is, however, very difficult to determine in advance, and this would create a degree of uncertainty amongst local authorities as to where they are likely to be positioned relative too other authorities, especially in early years. This could be readily overcome by announcing the scheme in advance, and publishing data in those pre- scheme years which makes it clear to authorities how their current performance compares with that of other authorities. 15.10 Other Impacts It is not felt that there are likely to be other significant impacts from this policy. 15.11 Summary & Conclusions A per capita residual waste target is a simple and logical way to avoid the perverse impacts inherent in the current recycling rate based BVPI targets regime, and focus effort on arguably the most important factor, which is reducing residual waste. It would be relatively straightforward to develop and administer the necessary protocols to implement it. Targets on their own however risk a degree of irrelevance if there is not sufficient sanction and/or support structure to incentivise their achievement. One option examined here is A per capita residual waste target is a simple and logical way to avoid the perverse impacts inherent in the current recycling rate based BVPI targets regime, and focus effort on arguably the most important factor, which is reducing residual waste. It would be relatively straightforward to develop and administer the necessary protocols to implement it.

Two possible mechanisms for applying such a levy were examined in this research: • A levy-cum-refund scheme based on doing worse, or better, than a predetermined target level; and • A levy-cum-refund scheme based on doing worse, or better, than an average level of performance. In either option a levy has the potential to provide substantial incentive to action and result in achievement of desired target levels more quickly than a target without a supporting levy. This would lead to significant environmental and economic benefits as a result of diverting material away from disposal. Implementing a levy at the national (or UK) level is unlikely to be without some complications. One issue is how a levy would integrate with existing financial mechanisms such as (in England) LATS. On the other hand, at least in England, in Counties, the possibility to exists to implement such a measure today as an alternative to the default mechanism for calculating payments from WDAs to WCAs under the recycling credits system.

Waste Prevention Policy Case Studies 271 Finally it should be noted that as in the Flanders example (15.2 above), a range of mechanisms (for example, variable charging, landfill bans, education etc) are likely to have to be employed in support of any target or target plus levy regime. Targets or levies themselves provide incentive for action but alone are not sufficient to bring about change.

Waste Prevention Policy Case Studies 272 16 ‘LOW WASTE SCHOOLS’: SEPARATE RECYCLABLE MATERIALS COLLECTIONS AND VARIABLE CHARGING FOR SCHOOLS’ WASTE COLLECTION 16.1 Description of Policy Investigation of possible policy tools to effect waste prevention in schools has revealed various complex and interesting issues, as detailed in the following sections. The intent of the policy would be to encourage schools to reduce overall waste arisings through variable charging, while ensuring they are provided with a recycling service to enable them to off-set costs for refuse collection. By charging for both refuse and recycling, the emphasis remains on promoting waste prevention. A pre-requisite to successful implementation would be the widespread, or universal, presence of comprehensive collection systems. This is likely to require a mechanism which makes the provision of recycling collection services to schools mandatory. It would also be necessary to specify a minimum number of materials collected separately for recycling. Consequently, this is a policy which is effectively two policies in one: A mechanism to ensure that waste collection services offered to schools are comprehensive in terms of the number of materials being collected separately for recycling; and A requirement for variable charging (based on quantity of waste) to be introduced for waste collection services for schools. Such a policy could be seen as a potential fiscal incentive for schools to a) reduce quantities of waste, and b) source-separate any recyclable waste generated. This is particularly relevant to the large quantity of paper waste generated by schools (see Section 16.4 below). 16.2 Rationale Under UK waste legislation 264 household waste includes the following waste streams, for which local authorities can impose a collection charge, if they choose to do so: 1. Any article of waste which exceeds 25 kilograms in weight. 2. Any article of waste which does not fit, or cannot be fitted into — a. a receptacle for household waste provided in accordance with section 46; or b. where no such receptacle is provided, a cylindrical container 750 millimetres in diameter and 1 metre in length. 3. Garden waste. 4. Clinical waste from a domestic property, a caravan or from a moored vessel used wholly for the purposes of living accommodation.

264 For England, Wales, and Scotland see Statutory Instrument 1992 No. 588 (Schedule 2) of the Controlled Waste Regulations Act 1992 . For Northern Ireland the relevant legislation is Statutory Rule 2002 No. 248 of the Controlled Waste Regulations (Northern Ireland) 2002 .

Waste Prevention Policy Case Studies 273 5. Waste from a residential hostel, a residential home or from premises forming part of a university, school or other educational eestablishmentstablishment or forming part of a hospital or nursing home. 6. Waste from domestic property or a caravan used in the course of a business for the provision of self-catering holiday accommodation. 7. Dead domestic pets. 8. Any substances or articles which, by virtue of a notice served by a collection authority under section 46, the occupier of the premises may not put into a receptacle for household waste provided in accordance with that section. 9. Litter and refuse collected under section 89(1)(f). 10. Waste from — a. in England and Wales, domestic property forming part of a composite hereditament; b. in Scotland, the residential part of part residential subjects. 11. Any mineral or synthetic oil or grease. 12. Asbestos. 13. Waste from a caravan which in accordance with any licence or planning permission regulating the use of the caravan site on which the caravan is stationed is not allowed to be used for human habitation throughout the year. 14. Waste from a campsite, other than from any domestic property on that site. 15. Waste from premises occupied by a charity and wholly or mainly used for charitable purposes, unless it is waste falling within paragraph 1 of Schedule 1. 16. Waste from a prison or other penal institution. 17. Waste from a hall or other premises used wholly or mainly for public meetings. 18. Waste from a royal palace. It should be noted that these waste streams are only captured in household waste statistics if a local authority collects them. Where a private contractor collects this waste, it is essentially lost from household waste data records, and this is clearly an issue with the current system. Schools and other public premises represent concentrated waste streams of significance, and should therefore properly be accounted for in national household waste statistics. 265 Indeed, the suggested waste prevention policy could be applied to other specific premises from which local authorities collect household waste for which they can charge (as presented above). For the purposes of the current study, however, policy will be discussed as it applies to schools only, due to ancillary benefits, such as links with environmental education, and because schools are likely to represent the largest single source of institutional ‘household’ waste.

265 Accounting for all schools waste in household waste data, will effectively increase household waste arisings figures, and this will have implications for Landfill Directive targets and national recycling targets. Accounting for all schools’ waste in waste data, although sensible in theory is likely to be problematic in practice, as it would require data from commercial operators to be gathered. Even if this could be established, the degree to which schools data is accounted for separately by operators, and the quality of the data is likely to be questionable. One alternative, if variable charging is introduced for schools, is to require schools to file returns with their local authority providing estimates of the tonnages of waste collected based on the charges levied by operators. The administrative burden involved would have to be weighed against the value of the data obtained, but given that it is in local authorities’ interests to under-report schools’ arisings data there is likely to be little incentive for authorities to ensure the completeness of this data.

Waste Prevention Policy Case Studies 274 There are currently only relatively ‘soft’ drivers for the reduction of waste arising from schools (summarised in Table 70), which may be the result of a lack of understanding of the magnitude of waste being generated. Table 70: Current Drivers for Waste Prevention in Schools Driver Description Developed by the Department for Education and Skills (DfES) to provide guidance on how the education sector can operate more Sustainable sustainably. Four distinct areas are identified: Development Action 1. Education for sustainable development; Plan (2003) 2. The environmental impact of the DfES and its partner bodies; 3. The environmental impact of the education estate; and 4. Local and global partnership activity. Landfill tax (and EC The cost of landfill tax is indirectly translated to waste producers. Landfill Directive The landfill tax reflects the UK’s commitment to the EC Landfill 1999) Directive 1999. Eco Schools and the Waste Watch School’s Waste Action Club School Environmental (SWAC) programmes are examples of initiatives that foster waste Programmes reduction within a general environmental awareness focus. School Environmental There is increasing pressure for schools to adopt their own Policy environmental policies, which may refer to waste management. The intention of the proposed policy would be to reduce overall waste arisings from schools, establish source-separation of recyclable materials, and support the ethos being promoted by the Department for Education and Skills (DfES) Sustainable Development Action Plan 2003. 16.3 Scenario Development Schools present a complicated situation with respect to waste collection. Government-maintained and independent schools may receive, or pay for, waste collection services from local authorities and/or private contractors. Therefore any policy would ideally target all possible school waste collections, regardless of the service provider. This raises issues regarding restraint of trade: it may be difficult for a policy to be implemented where it is seen to constrain the trade of private operators, and so any such policy would have to be carefully designed to avoid these issues. As indicated above, the structure of an effective policy would involve development of two policies or mechanisms to ensure: 1. Segregated collections of all household waste (regardless of whether this waste is generated by a ‘household’, or a premise from which waste is defined as ‘household’ according to the Controlled Waste Regulations, noted above); and 2. Variable charging for all household waste.

16.3.1 Separate Collections The Household Waste Recycling Act (HWRA) 2003 inserts the following section into the EPA 1990: "45A Arrangements for separate collection of recyclable waste (1) This section applies to any waste collection authority whose area is in England (an "English waste collection authority").

Waste Prevention Policy Case Studies 275 (2) Where an English waste collection authority has a duty by virtue of section 45(1)(a) above to arrange for the collection of household waste from any premises , the authority shall ensure that the arrangements it makes in relation to those premises include the arrangements mentioned in subsection (3) below, unless it is satisfied that (in that case)- (our emphasis) (a) the cost of doing so would be unreasonably high; or (b) comparable alternative arrangements are available. (3) The arrangements are arrangements for the collection of at least two types of recyclable waste together or individually separated from the rest of the household waste. (4) The requirement in subsection (2) above shall apply from 31st December 2010. (5) The Secretary of State may, if requested to do so by an English waste collection authority, direct the authority that subsection (4) above shall have effect in relation to that authority as if the date mentioned there were such later date as may be specified in the direction (being a date no later than 31st December 2015). (6) In this section, "recyclable waste" means household waste which is capable of being recycled or composted." 266 It is fair to say that the HWRA has not yet received a high level of attention by central government and local authorities for several reasons: 1. the other drivers for action (in particular the statutory recycling targets and LATS) are a key focus; 2. most authorities are likely to meet the requirements of the HWRA in respect of household collections; 3. the requirement does not come into force until 2010; and 4. the sanction that will be applied for failing to meet the requirements of the Act is unclear. To date the HWRA has been viewed as applying to waste collected from households only. Consequently the need to collect at least two streams of recyclables from schools and institutions appears to have been given little attention. Yet 45A (2) clearly states that the act applies to household waste from any premises . It should be noted that guidance refers to the Controlled Waste Regulations 1992 for the definition of household waste (which includes schools’ waste). The application of the Act is, however, qualified by the fact that it only applies where the collection authority has a duty under Section 45(1)(a) above to arrange for the collection of household waste. Section 45(1)(a) reads as follows:

45. —(1) It shall be the duty of each waste collection authority—

(a) to arrange for the collection of household waste in its area except waste— (i) which is situated at a place which in the opinion of the authority is so isolated or inaccessible that the cost of collecting it would be unreasonably high, and

266 Household Waste Recycling Act 2003

Waste Prevention Policy Case Studies 276 (ii) as to which the authority is satisfied that adequate arrangements for its disposal have been or can reasonably be expected to be made by a person who controls the waste; This implies that where schools (or other institutions which do not produce industrial waste) request a collection authority to collect their waste, the duty effectively applies. This would appear to suggest that, at least in England and Wales (the HWRA applies only to England and Wales), wherever collection authorities collect schools waste, it is in fulfillment of their duty under 45(1)(a), and consequently, the HWRA applies. Current guidance covering the HWRA suggests that the types of recyclable waste to be separately collected could include glass, metals, paper, plastics, textiles and shoes, garden waste, kitchen waste, batteries, hazardous household liquids (i.e. paint and varnish), electrical or electronic waste (e-waste) and wood. 267 Any combination of two materials would meet the requirements of the HWRA. The intention of this policy is not to restrict the implementation of source separation schemes only to schools whose waste is collected by local authorities. The HWRA alone, therefore, would not appear to be sufficient to establish separate collections from all schools (and other institutions): 1. In the case of the schools whose waste is collected by local authorities, then by virtue of the fact that this is in fulfilment of their duty under 45(1)(a), it would appear that simply enforcing the requirements of the Act would be sufficient and that no new legislation or regulation would be required. Our interpretation of the legislation is that a two-stream recyclables collection is required to be offered by the local authority to all premises where household waste is collected consistent with Section 45(1)(a) of the EPA (with the exceptions noted in the legislation). The local authority would be able to charge for this service (under the Controlled Waste Regulations 1992), and the schools would be under no obligation to participate. Local authorities would have the incentive to offer the service as it would serve to enhance recycling rates, and if the material were biodegradable (the two largest streams are paper and kitchen waste), then it would also serve to improve their balance of landfill allowances. 2. In the case of schools whose waste is NOT currently collected by local authorities, it would appear necessary to amend the existing legislation. This could be done by extending the HWRA in such a way that schools (and other institutions) are required to arrange for services with equivalent performance, or through separate legislation. It is worth noting that current Defra guidance makes little mention of the implied requirement in the HWRA to implement separate collection at premises other than households. Revision of the guidance might be welcome in this regard. It should be noted that the HWRA applies only to England and Wales and not to the other devolved administrations. Finally, one might reasonably ask whether ‘two- stream’ separate collection is sufficient. Generally, schools produce a range of wastes, many of which are recyclable. Two streams would appear to be a bear minimum, and that might be good reason to require the scope of recycling provision

267 Guidance for Waste Collection Authorities on the Household Waste Recycling Act 2003, April 2005

Waste Prevention Policy Case Studies 277 to be enhanced well beyond the two materials currently set as the minimum in the HWRA.

16.3.2 Variable Charging Variable charging for waste and recycling services is an obvious mechanism for promoting waste prevention, with successful examples being well documented in a range of studies. 268 A first step would be to incentivise local authorities to charge for collections from schools and institutions on a variable basis. This could be implemented through issuing official guidance. However local authority collection services do not cover all schools, and therefore for this policy to be effective, it would also have to apply to private contractors. This raises the issue as to how one could require private contractors to formulate their charges, and this could be interpreted as constituting a restraint on trade. Byelaws could possibly be used as a mechanism to enable variable charging at the local authority level. However, new policy would need to be developed to allow the introduction of byelaws of this nature since the scope of coverage of byelaws is currently limited to specific areas. Defra is currently considering the implications of variable charging for the UK as part of the revision of the national waste strategy, therefore any national policy or guideline could be considered within this context. One further possibility is that the market could provide a sufficient response. If two (or more) stream recyclables collections are required to be put in place, then if residual waste disposal / treatment costs rise, it might make sense for all schools and collectors to seek to minimise the quantity of residual waste they have collected / collect. Indeed, those providing such a service involving charging may find, under the requirement to offer a minimum level of service in terms of recyclables collection, that their collection services are more competitive. 269 These measures, combined with improved national level support for environmental education, would encourage waste prevention in schools. For example, local authorities could initiate and support ‘reduce waste’ competitions, development of school composting schemes, etc, rather than leaving these programmes to the management of external organisations, such as Waste Watch. 16.4 Environmental Impacts of the Policy For schools, reduced paper waste could be the most significant environmental impact of a waste prevention policy. There is relatively little data available regarding the quantity and composition of waste arising from schools, which is surprising given that schools represent highly concentrated sources of waste.

268 For example refer see Eunomia Research & Consulting (2006) Impact of Unit Based Waste Collection Charges. Environment Directorate , Working Group on Waste Prevention and Recycling, OECD; Eunomia (2003) To Charge or Not to Charge? Final report to IWM (EB). 269 The competitiveness of local authority waste collection services may be negatively influenced in future by the need to account for the cost of LATS on waste collected from schools. This could form a barrier to the expansion of local authority variable charging waste collection services beyond schools that are already provided with a service.

Waste Prevention Policy Case Studies 278 The most comprehensive data currently available are those provided in the Biffaward Mass Balance Movement Education Sector Report. 270 However, this data should be treated with some caution, for the following reasons: According to the Biffaward report, UK schools (primary and secondary) generate an estimated 202,460 tonnes of waste per annum (see Table 71). Waste volumes obtained through school waste audits were converted to weights using a conversion factor of 0.04 (i.e. 40 kg/m 3), whereas, depending on the level of compaction, a conversion factor of between 0.1 – 0.25 is likely to be more accurate. 271 Based on a considerable amount of waste collections data, Eunomia Research & Consulting uses an average conversion factor of 0.23 (i.e. 230 kg/m 3) in calculating collection logistics and non-compacted vehicle fill rates. 272 If 0.23 is applied to the Biffaward results, we obtain a figure of 1,163,560 tonnes per annum for UK schools (or approximately 39 tonnes per school per annum, 273 or 126 kg per student per annum 274 ); The estimate of total waste arisings from UK schools (approximately 30,000) was extrapolated from measurements taken at 51 primary schools and 23 secondary schools that volunteered for the exercise. This possibly implies an element of self-selection and an elevated level of awareness of environmental issues among survey participants, and possibly better waste management practices than at schools on average; Waste from approximately residential buildings at 600 UK boarding schools is not included in the study. Of the total waste arising, approximately 55%, or 651,598 tonnes (see Figure 43 and Table 72) is comprised of paper and card and 17%, or 191,989 tonnes, is food and garden waste. Paper, card, food and green waste are all biodegradable, and therefore, reducing the landfilling of these materials reduces impacts associated with landfilling, and in the case of paper, generates additional greenhouse gas benefits through recycling. These materials are also relatively easy targets for waste

270 The Mass Balance Movement (2006) Resource Management in the Education Sector . Biffaward Programme on Sustainable Resource Use. 271 The Biffaward report claims that 40kg/m 3 is a standard industry density used to convert volume to weight, however this is unlikely. For example, using this conversion rate, a typical 60-litre household rubbish sack would only weigh 2.4 kg (in fact, the average weight is 10 kg). By way of comparison the Environment and Heritage Service Municipal Waste Data Monitoring and Reporting: Interim Guidelines (2003) uses a figure of 0.2 for household waste. 272 This conversion factor is based on typical household residual waste composition, and represents the weighted average of densities calculated for each waste material type (i.e. newspaper, office paper, etc). The data available for school waste composition is not detailed enough to accurately determine an average ‘school waste’ conversion factor. However, based on the composition data provided in the Biffaward report, and using averaged densities for broad material types (i.e. paper), a conversion factor of 0.28 was calculated. This provided some degree of validation for the use of the typical 0.23 conversion factor. 273 This figure compares well with data obtained for 60 London schools, which indicated approximately 46 tonnes total waste arising per school (Eunomia Research & Consulting, Islington Borough Council data). 274 Given that each student spends approximately 190 days per year in school, it is highly unlikely that each student would generate only 0.11 kg waste per day (i.e. 22 kg/190 days), especially considering that daily waste includes catering and general office waste.

Waste Prevention Policy Case Studies 279 prevention initiatives, such as double-sided copying and printing to reduce paper consumption, and composting food and garden waste in school gardens. Over time, there may be a reduction in paper waste as schools move towards more electronic- based resources and teaching. Indeed, this may be an area where local authorities can focus assistance to promote less paper consumption. Table 71: Comparison of Waste Estimates for the Education Sector (based on a sample of 96 primary and secondary schools, further and higher education (FHE) institutions, both government maintained and independent) Estimates using Estimates using Statistic 0.04 conversion 0.23 conversion factor factor Average waste per primary or secondary 22 kg 126 kg student per annum Average waste per FHE student per annum 96 kg 552 kg Estimated total annual waste arising from 202,460 tonnes 1,163,563 tonnes schools Estimated total annual waste arising from 488,650 tonnes 2,808,333 tonnes FHEs Source: The Mass Balance Movement (2006). Resource Management in the Education Sector. Biffaward Programme on Sustainable Resource Use. Figure 43: Estimated Waste Composition (by weight) for Schools (primary and secondary) in the UK (based on a sample of 74 institutions) (NB – excludes material separated for recycling)

other 9%

food + green waste 17%

paper + card 55% plastic 13% glass 3% metal 3%

Source: The Mass Balance Movement (2006). Resource Management in the Education Sector. Biffaward Programme on Sustainable Resource Use.

Waste Prevention Policy Case Studies 280

Table 72: Estimate of Materials Arising as Waste from Schools (tonnes per annum) Category Estimated tonnes Estimated tonnes per annum ––– 0.04 per annum ––– 0.23 conversion factor conversion factor Paper + card 113,378 651,598 Metal 6,074 34,908 Glass 5,062 29,092 Plastic 26,320 151,264 Food + green waste 33,406 191,989 Other 18,221 104,718 Total 202,461 1,163,569

For the purposes of illustration the potential impact from introducing either compulsory two-stream recycling (i.e. applying the existing HWRA) or compulsory five- stream recycling and variable charging measures were calculated. In both scenarios, it is assumed that waste prevention initiatives, motivated by charging for residual waste, will result in approximately 10% of the residual material being diverted through activities such as reusing paper, and efforts to increase use of electronic media etc, while 25% of food and green waste is diverted through on site composting. Under a compulsory provision of two-stream recycling services to schools it is estimated that 50% of the paper, metal and glass is recycled while a further 20% of garden and food waste is collected for centralised composting. These estimates take account of the fact that not all material identified as belonging to each of these classifications will be recyclable, and that the streams collected by authorities and private contractors will differ (i.e. authorities may target paper and biowaste to improve their position with respect to the LATS, whereas private contractors may target paper and metal for commercial benefit). Under compulsory provision of five-stream recycling services to schools, it is estimated that 80% of the paper, 70% of metal, and 60% of glass is recycled while a further 80% of garden and food waste is collected for centralised composting. Table 73 shows potential tonnage diversion from disposal based on a conversion factor of 0.23 tonnes per cubic meter for both scenarios. The examples suggest that some 500,000 tonnes per year could be diverted from residual disposal by enforcement of the existing HWRA, and some 800,000 tonnes per year through compulsory 5-stream recycling. This is equal to a reduction of approximately 44% (first scenario) or 71% (second scenario) of current residual waste from schools.

Waste Prevention Policy Case Studies 281

Table 73: Estimated Tonnage Impacts from Waste Prevention and Recycling in Schools Category Waste Recycling Total Reduction % Prevention in Residual Reduction 2-stream compulsory recycling scenario:

Paper + card 65,160 325,799 390,959 60.0%

Metal 17,454 17,454 50.0% Glass 14,546 14,546 50.0% Plastic 0.0% Food + green waste 47,997 38,398 86,395 45.0%

Other 0.0% Total 113,157 396,197 509,354 43.8% % impact 9.7% 34.1% 43.8% 5-stream compulsory recycling scenario:

Paper + card 65,160 521,278 586,438 90.0%

Metal 24,436 24,436 70.0% Glass 17,455 17,455 60.0% Plastic 0 0.0% Food + green waste 47,997 153,591 201,588 105.0%

Other 0 0.0% Total 113,157 716,760 8282829,917 82 9,917 71.3% % impact 9.7% 61.6% 71.3%

16.5 Economic Impact of the Policy Ensuring that all local authorities comply with the existing Household Recycling Act (to the extent that it applies to all premises generating ‘household waste’, unless the collection authority has not duty to do so under Section 45(1)(a)) could, in any event, be a costly endeavour for central government, involving monitoring and enforcement. Establishment of a national-level policy to require variable charging at schools might generate some additional administration costs above and beyond the costs of enforcing the HWRA, but these would be expected to be limited. For local authorities that do not already offer a recycling collection, the policy would incur costs associated with setting-up necessary collection infrastructure, as well as, potentially, additional administration in billing. However, since authorities are allowed to charge for waste collections from schools, they would be able to recuperate these costs.

Waste Prevention Policy Case Studies 282 The issue of whole system cost is an interesting one. As landfill tax increases, it must be an open question as to whether a system in which most waste is collected as refuse will be lower in cost than one where considerable quantities are collected for recycling, and where, as a consequence of waste prevention, less waste is collected in total. The charges to schools, therefore, may be lower than in the counterfactual scenario where both variable charging and a requirement to implement separate collection for two or more fractions is in place. In other words, school administrations would probably find that the unit charge for their residual waste collection increases, but (and this is the purpose of the policy) they would be able to offset this increase through (potentially government-supported) waste prevention and recycling initiatives. To the extent that private contractors are also bound by a variable charging policy, then the initial investment in appropriate infrastructure may incur costs for the operators. However, as with the local authorities, costs would be expected to be recovered. Indeed, the net effect might be to shift existing collections into the domain of higher value-added services. Monitoring and enforcement of potential side effects, such as fly tipping, may incur further costs to local governments although this is not expected to be an issue for schools. Diversion of paper, card and biowaste from landfill could also achieve considerable benefits for some waste disposal authorities in respect of their performance under the Landfill Allowances Trading Scheme (LATS). In England, authorities that might be net purchasers of allowances might see the need to purchase allowances reduced, or even eliminated. Equally, net sellers would, other things being equal, see their revenue from sales decline. For the UK as a whole, it seems quite possible that the overall performance in respect of the Landfill Directive would improve. This may have implications for the UK as a whole, especially if compliance with the requirements of the Directive is not assured. 16.6 Distributional Consequences As discussed above, to the extent that disposal costs rise, it becomes an open question as to whether the costs of the policy – as they affect schools – increase or decrease relative to the counterfactual. Hence, at least in the medium-term, significant economic consequences seem unlikely to arise. Equally, the distribution of consequences does not obviously follow any particular logic. The task facing boarding schools may resident students generate somewhat more challenging owing to the nature of the waste streams? However, boarding schools are attended, in the main (although not exclusively) by relatively wealthy families. To the extent that any additional burdens were to arise at such schools, they could be expected to be relatively small compared to the overall costs of running the school. If these costs were passed on to parents of children, then it would be expected to be a relatively minimal increase that falls upon what are, other things being equal, wealthier households. There is the potential for the policy to generate innovation in the separate collection of recyclable materials from schools (and other concentrated waste sources). Contractors offering a higher level of service, with collection of a greater number of materials, may have a competitive edge. In addition, schools may be motivated to seek innovative ways to prevent waste arising, and thereby save on collection costs.

Waste Prevention Policy Case Studies 283 16.7 Social Impacts It is anticipated that the implementation of this policy will lead to an increase in source segregation and waste prevention actions within schools. This is likely to act as a significant practical awareness-raising tool within local communities. The degree to which this impact is felt will depend on the approach of the school involved, and the extent to which pupils and other members of the community are directly involved in waste prevention activities, and are involved in activities in respect of source segregation. The policy would likely contribute to the growing resource recovery industry, by generating additional collections and management jobs. Possible negative impacts on the economy may result from a reduction in schools’ resource consumption (i.e. less paper purchasing). 16.8 Implementation & Design Issues There is general public enthusiasm and support for increased recycling initiatives; however recent media coverage of the possibility of introducing variable charging has been generally negative, and it is possible that the media could also present variable charging in schools in a negative light. If presented correctly, schools should respond to the policy as an opportunity to reduce costs associated with waste and enhance environmental education and performance. If poorly presented, schools may view variable charging as an additional cost for a service already paid for through taxes. Variable charging has already become a politicised issue. Mechanisms for introducing a requirement to apply variable charging to schools would need to be developed at a national level. Implementation could, however, be the responsibility of individual local collection authorities. For example, one method of introducing the requirement could be through byelaws introduced at the LCA level. In addition, local authorities would need to administer, monitor, and enforce the policy. The relation between charges for recycling and variable charges for residual collection need to favour segregation of material for recycling otherwise any potential impact of the policy will be obviated. With landfill charges likely to increase in the future then this is not likely to be an issue, however there may be circumstances where the economies of service provision favour a widely available residual collection operation over a specialised recycling collection service. 16.9 Other Impacts Positive impacts associated with the policy may include greater environmental awareness of school staff and students, with a flow-on effect to the community-at- large. Clearly, the policy does not simply impact upon waste prevention. There are likely to be impacts upon waste recycling and composting too. Schools may also come under considerable pressure from both boards of directors and local authorities to prevent waste in order to reduce costs and reduce schools’ contribution to MSW arisings.

Waste Prevention Policy Case Studies 284 16.10 Summary & Conclusions Implementing policy to target waste prevention in schools is more complex than it might first appear. Government-maintained and independent schools may receive waste collection services from either local authorities and/or private contractors. 275 Although local authorities are able to charge for the service, they do not always do so. The Household Waste Recycling Act already stipulates that separate collections must be provided for household waste, as long as the collection falls under the duty set out in Section 45(1)(a) of the EPA. This appears to include schools waste as long as that does not fall outside exceptions under Section 45(1)(a), which probably implies that it includes, in practice, all schools waste collected by local authorities or their contractors acting on their behalf. This Act would need to be re-enforced at a national level to ensure that quality separate collections were in place across all schools. A national level policy would also need to introduce a mechanism (possibly a byelaw) to implement variable charging for all collections from schools. This mechanism could not be seen to restrain trade by favouring local authorities and their contractors unduly. Given that waste disposal costs are likely to rise in the UK, there is a possibility that such mechanisms are introduced more naturally in the market place. However, policy could help to push matters forward at a somewhat quicker pace, and the benefits in terms of student behaviour could be important in raising the level of environmental consciousness of younger people more generally. As regards the specific issue of waste prevention, the evidence base is somewhat weak for estimating exactly what the impact of this policy might be (the effect on recycling and waste prevention would seem to be potentially considerable, but one cannot be more accurate than this). It could be argued, for example, that by increasing support for waste prevention initiatives and associated environmental education programmes, the government might achieve a similar impact on waste prevention in schools to that which it might have through policy change. On the other hand, charging clearly does generate incentives for behavioural change, and one might argue that whatever is achieved in the absence of charging might be bettered in a system where there was a financial incentive to ‘do some more’. Finally, the benefits which accompany a policy which requires schools to be served with segregated collections for two-or-more materials are potentially as significant (in terms of enhanced recycling and composting / digestion), perhaps more so, than those associated with waste prevention.

275 Anecdotal evidence provided by the UK National Bursars’ Association suggests that some schools receive a local authority waste collection and a private contractor’s recycling service.

Waste Prevention Policy Case Studies 285 17 REDUCING QUANTITIES OF JUNK MAIL The existing voluntary agreement between Defra and the Direct Marketing Association (DMA) was described in Section 5.1.10. It was noted that the voluntary agreement includes no mechanism to reduce the number of direct mail items, or the amount of material associated with those items despite the fact that the overall volume of direct mail has increased by 139% in the last 13 years. The agreement with the DMA (struck in July 2003) was intended to raise recycling levels to:

• 30% by the end of 2005 • 55% by the end of 2009 • 70 percent by the end of 2013

In 2003 only about 13% of direct mail was recycled. Interestingly, the impetus for the DMA to agree to voluntarily introduce these initiatives is the threat of regulatory measures and mailing levies. 276 A draft report on the success of the voluntary agreement to date, prepared by the DMA, has been presented to Defra, but at the time of preparation of this report had not been made available to the researchers. If the impact of the agreement has not reached the levels desired by government, then stronger regulatory or other policy measures are clearly in the picture. Possible policy approaches to preventing waste include measures such as bans, taxes, producer responsibility licensing and legally-binding opt-outs. These, and other possibilities, are explored in what follows. 17.1 Description of Policy Several junk mail policies are already in place, and others are theoretically possible. All of the policies need to take on board two issues: 1. How junk mail is defined; and 2. To what extent should the freedom to advertise be curtailed. The latter issue might appear to render one possible policy - a general ban – unlikely. This policy is not being considered further in this case study. 277 Various ways of implementing constraints on junk mail exist, and some of these are identified in Table 74.

Table 74: Junk Mail Policies Name Description Type Exists in Activist Pressure on mailers or on list - Executive or Numerous regions in

276 http://www.dma.org.uk/content/Sch-Article.asp?id=2421 277 It is recognised that there are frequent calls for bans on junk mail, even in the scientific literature. To the French researcher (see Annie Resse (2005) ‘Stop Pub’: Can Banning of Junk Mail Reduce Waste Production? Waste Management & Research 2005. 23: 87-91) who blithely states that “banning junk mail would be a simple solution”, we agree that this could be a solution, but it would hardly be simple. Taxes or levies on mail would also be problematic.

Waste Prevention Policy Case Studies 286 Name Description Type Exists in campaign providers to limit junk mail ministerial decision the UK and other countries Ban, specific Prohibition on delivering Legislation or USA unstamped or unfranked items administrative rule to letter boxes Opt-out A service that allows Voluntary agreement Voluntary opt-outs consumers to have their or mandatory available in the UK, names and home addresses legislation Germany, other EU removed from or added to countries and the mailing lists used by mailers USA. Postage Higher tariffs for bulk mailing, Legislation No postage increases increase (on in order to discourage junk to limit junk mail are bulk mail) mail known. Levy (with Waste levy on direct mail / free Legislation producer newspapers. This would have responsibility) similar impact to postage increases but would use a different legislative mechanism. Suppression Removal of records from a Voluntary agreement Voluntary agreement mailing file or database that or legislation in the UK are no longer accurate or current, or records of people who have opted out. Notification of All junk mail could be required Legislation MPS on mail to have details of MPS and the householder’s rights printed in the material (similar to food labelling). A requirement to encourage recycling of material could also be included. Legislative Legal obligation on distributors Legislation Australia (legislation reinforcement of junk mail to not put items in and schemes vary by of ‘No Junk boxes displaying ‘No Junk Mail’ state) Mail’ stickers stickers. This requires a firm Brussels definition of junk mail and good enforcement structures. Licensing Distributors of junk mail are Legislation licensed to ensure they abide by industry codes. Businesses using unlicensed distributors could be liable for fines.

17.1.1 Direct Mail, Valuable Mail and Junk Mail – Is There a Difference? Defining broadly, from the top down, which mail is wanted and unwanted is a tricky business. “Half the money I spend on advertising is wasted,” once said John Wanamaker, a hugely successful American merchandiser of the 19 th century. “The trouble is, I don't know which half.” In the case of direct mail advertising, the waste quotient is certainly more than half. Some companies in financial services consider any response rate in excess of 0.5% to be exceptional, suggesting that the vast majority of some types of direct mail are

Waste Prevention Policy Case Studies 287 destined to become waste. As the direct mail industry’s lobby group Direct Mail Information Service points out: 278 : “Despite the growing weight of receipt, two-thirds of items [are] opened and 45 per cent read. Half of all consumers have responded to Direct Mail at some point, with one third doing so in the last 12 months. Typically, 7 per cent of consumers responded to the last item they received. Direct mail remains the most responsive media. Nearly two-thirds of consumers have bought as a result of direct marketing in any medium. One-third of consumers have bought from Direct Mail, lower than in previous years, but this is partly due to the growing use of mailings to drive traffic to web sites where transactions are completed. Clothes, books, music and DVDs, and household goods are the most commonly purchased items.”

17.1.2 The Freedom to Advertise The freedom to advertise products and services is largely undisputed, at least at a macro level. But at a micro level, in private spaces, there appear to be good arguments to restrict this freedom. Legal precedent within this advertiser-consumer dispute seems to be largely that of ‘live and let live’. Advertisers are discouraged or forbidden from invading consumers’ privacy without permission (and there is plenty of argument as to where the sphere of privacy ends), but they are allowed considerable freedom in more public spaces (albeit, frequently at a cost). Consumers are allowed to decline receipt of personalised advertisements and they may complain about offensive ones, but they may not, for example, remove a legitimate billboard poster simply because they find it irritating. Schaub sets out the contested nature of the argument: “The sending of unsolicited commercial communication by email is often compared with other forms of ‘intrusive’ marketing that are not forbidden. Who asked for those screaming ugly billboards everywhere, or for the TV- commercials interrupting your favourite programme, or the personally addressed envelope with the message that you might have won a new car? All these marketing methods are not forbidden. On the other hand, there are strict regulations concerning automatic calling machines and the sending of facsimile messages. Unsolicited email can equally be compared to these techniques. The heart of the problem seems to be the contradiction between the interests of the business world and the users of email: the freedom to use email marketing to its full potential versus the right to keep your inbox clear from commercial messages. ”279 17.2 Rationale Junk mail, according to the NRWF accounts for 3-5% of UK household waste arisings, or 750,000 to 1.25 million tonnes per year. Roughly half of this is junk post; the other half is free newspapers and flyers. Volume has approximately doubled in the last 10 years.

278 Direct Mail Information Service, 2006. Consumer Direct Mail Trends 2006 . 279 M Y Schaub (2002) Unsolicited Email: Does Europe Allow Spam? The State of the Art of the European Legislation with Regard to Unsolicited Commercial Communications. Computer Law & Security Report , Volume 18, Issue 2, 31 March 2002, Pages 99-105.

Waste Prevention Policy Case Studies 288 In France, where consumption and waste streams are reasonably similar, a recent study 280 measures junk mail (not including free newspapers) at 4.9% of total average rubbish weight. Newspapers weigh in at another 6.7% of the total. Although the study does not break out paid-for and free newspapers, presumably some would be free, and therefore considered ‘junk’. Junk mail is an ideal target for prevention, because it is a relatively large, homogeneous stream of waste that is inherently preventable, and moves to restrict it are likely to be popular with many people. 17.3 Scenario Development Of the policies listed in Table 74, three are already used in the UK: activist campaigns, opt-outs and suppression. Two of these policies – opt-out and suppression – are underpinned by a voluntary agreement between the Direct Mail Association and the Government. 281 Postage increases on bulk mail and a tax or levy on junk mail, are likely to be feasible, and are considered further below. Legislative reinforcement of ‘No Junk Mail’ stickers is clearly a workable solution in Australia, and deserves further in-depth consideration here in the UK. Requiring all direct mail to contain details of the MPS and advise householders what to do if they wish to stop receiving unsolicited mail may be an effective way of publicising the service and is considered further below. Licensing of distribution agents is not likely to lead to reductions in junk mail directly but it may result in higher levels of compliance with any voluntary agreements or legislative actions that are put in place. While this initiative is not dismissed out of hand, it is likely to be complex to implement and enforce for little direct gain, and so it is not investigated further at this stage. A specific ban such as exists in the US is deemed technically infeasible, because it would require a fundamental change in UK post delivery – the introduction of US-style letterboxes. 282

17.3.1 Activist Campaign Various levels of government in the UK and other countries have conducted activist campaigns (or junk mail awareness initiatives) to make mailers and consumers aware of junk mail waste. These programmes appear to be launched by executive decision of government officials.

280 Annie Resse (2005) ‘Stop Pub’: Can Banning of Junk Mail Reduce Waste Production? Waste Management & Research 2005. 23: 87-91. 281 The following indented text comes from http://www.defra.gov.uk/ENVIRONMENT/WASTE/topics/paper.htm 282 The US Postal Service (USPS) delivers post only to ‘regulation’ letterboxes. These may be delivered to only by USPS officials, and they may deliver only stamped or franked USPS mail. For anyone else to put anything else in a regulation letterbox is a breach of federal mail-tampering laws. To some extent this is overlooked in day-to-day practice, but larger breaches are policed or prosecuted. By and large, this prevents the distribution to letterboxes of unstamped/unfranked materials (newspapers and flyers) that account for perhaps half the volume of junk mail. These still are distributed to households, but surely less so than if the letterboxes were available to them. Stamped or franked junk mail is not affected by this law; it is delivered along with the ordinary post.

Waste Prevention Policy Case Studies 289 For instance, in 2001 the Midlands Co-ordinating Group on Trading Standards carried out a ‘Junk the Junk Mail’ campaign. 283 Principally, these campaigns are aimed at making consumers aware of their opt-outs (discussed below) or making opt-outs easier, but surely there is a least some ‘bully pulpit’ effect to the campaigns as well. One campaign that should be conducted would be at the Royal Mail itself. As a recent peer-reviewed paper 284 points out, managers at the Royal Mail promote junk mail.

“I tell all the staff here to fill in as many reply-paid envelopes as possible and to get their names on as many mailing lists as possible because this is what pays their wages,' [says one manager]. Rather than seeing ‘junk mail’ as a nuisance, the managers at the Royal Mail see this is an area of the business that they want to expand. After all, as one person said, ‘You can put it in the bin.' Another person said, ‘We have no volume of junk mail at all.' making the point that it is not ‘junk’ to the Post Office but is a considerable source of revenue and they do not wish to alienate their customers by describing direct mail as ‘junk'.”

17.3.2 Opt-out This existing policy is a service that allows consumers to have their names and home addresses removed from or added to mailing lists used by mailers. In the UK today, this is a voluntary agreement (see above), but in principle it also could be made permanent, or strengthened, through legislation. In the UK, opt out managed by the Mailing Preference Service; in Germany by the Robinson List; and in the US by the Mail Preference Service. The direct marketers’ trade associations run all of these. Consumers may individually opt out by contacting mailers or address-list vendors directly, or they can put ‘no advertising’ or ‘no free newspapers’ stickers on their mail slot, but these are not really policies.

17.3.3 Postage Increase / Waste Levy The purpose of both a postage increase and a levy or tax would be to increase the cost of direct mail to the advertiser, thereby leading advertisers to advertise through other media, or to target their mailings more carefully. Although this might be the most obvious way to prevent junk mail, it clearly has not been implemented in the UK. This is documented in the literature, and it is apparent from Royal Mail promotions (for example at http://www.royalmail.com/portal/rm ) that it encourages and offers discounts to direct mailers. 285

283 National Resource & Waste Forum (2004) Household Waste Prevention Toolkit , Part C. Marketing Behaviour Change. 284 Nerys Fuller-Love and Joan Cooper (2000) Deliberate Versus Emergent Strategies: A Case Study of Information Technology in the Post Office, International Journal of Information Management , Volume 20, Issue 3, June 2000, Pages 209-223. 285 Nerys Fuller-Love and Joan Cooper (2000) Deliberate Versus Emergent Strategies: A Case Study of Information Technology in the Post Office, International Journal of Information Management , Volume 20, Issue 3, June 2000, Pages 209-223.

Waste Prevention Policy Case Studies 290 Critics might argue that demand for use of the mail system is relatively inelastic with respect to postage rates are relatively inelastic, as a recent study points out. 286 Nonetheless, the same study shows that elasticities across a number of countries range from -0.2 to -0.8, which means that a 10% increase in postage rates cuts demand by approximately 2 - 8%. Moreover, the study adds that in the UK postage elasticities “are significantly higher than elasticity measures developed in any other [countries].” Presumably a postage hike aimed at limiting junk mail would be enacted through licensing supervision of the Postal Services Commission, the UK postal services regulator.

17.3.4 Producer Responsibility Levy The existing DMA voluntary agreement contains targets for the DMA to achieve, but no obvious mechanism by which they themselves contribute to the cost of meeting even those targets included in the agreement. In particular, where junk mail in the household waste stream is concerned, we are not aware of any contribution which the DMA makes towards the cost of ensuring that mail delivered through household letter boxes is a) collected for recycling; and b) recycled. An obvious extension of the existing agreement would be to change this. Essentially, a producer responsibility scheme would imply that the costs of ensuring the separate collection and recycling of junk mail would be shouldered by the direct marketing industry itself. The revenue would be raised from all those involved in the delivery of direct marketing literature and free newspapers through mailboxes. The revenue would be redistributed to local authorities to support the costs of collecting junk mail for recycling. Although this measure would seem to support only recycling, the point would be that the more wastage occurred, the higher the costs would be. This would, in turn, be expected to generate an incentive for reduced wastage in the first place.

17.3.5 Suppression Suppression is the technical term for keeping mailing lists up-to-date and relevant. Although it might be thought this means ensuring that direct mail reaches its target audience, a better description is that it removes non-targets from the lists. Users of direct mail services, though not necessarily the mailers themselves, have an inherent incentive to suppress their lists to avoid wastage and customer annoyance. However, the cost of doing this can constitute a disincentive, whilst mailers themselves are unlikely to pursue this option with any vigour. Precisely what constitutes non-targets is debatable and contradictory. Although the Direct Marketing Association says that suppression should eliminate from lists “people who have moved house, died, have registered on one of the industry suppression files, who have told you they do not want your mailings, or indeed, who just do not match you company’s prospect profile ,” 287 a local pizza delivery service

286 Alan Robinson (2006) A Review of Price Elasticity Models for Postal Products , Background Paper No. 2007-01, Direct Communications Group, Guelph, Ontario, Canada. September 2006. 287 Direct Marketing Association, 2004. DMA Guide to Suppression . 5 October 2004.

Waste Prevention Policy Case Studies 291 might argue that new residents or relatives of the deceased may want to order a pizza. In practice, suppression amounts to list cleaning: eliminating dead, moved and opt-out names, correcting errors and removing unsuitable prospects. For economic reasons, suppression has existed as long as direct mail has, but with the rise in direct mail volumes and waste consciousness, government has begun to encourage it, culminating in the voluntary agreement between the Direct Mail Association and the Government (see above). In principle this voluntary agreement could be made permanent, or strengthened, through legislation.

17.3.6 Legally Binding ‘No Junk Mail’ Stickers Many local authorities in the UK promote the use of ‘No Junk Mail’ stickers, including making them available to householders. While there is evidence to suggest that the stickers alone can be effective, those delivering direct mail are under no legal obligation to heed the householder’s request. 288 Added to this is the fact that there is no clear definition of what does and does not constitute the ‘Junk Mail’ referred to by the stickers. For example does it include addressed mail, free community newspapers, or council mail-outs? One solution to enhance the effectiveness of ‘No Junk Mail’ stickers and encourage their use is to provide legal sanction for the deliverer of junk mail to abide by the request of the householder. This is the approach taken in Australia. A report by Envision summarises the Australian situation as follows: 289 In Australia, all states have some form of regulation ensuring that ‘No Junk Mail’ stickers on mailboxes are observed. Hotline numbers are supplied so that householders can call and register complaints if their sticker has been ignored. The Distribution Standards Board is recognised in all states and territories of Australia. The board has a code of practise that includes the observance of ‘No Junk Mail’ signs and any public complaints are acted on and reported back to the advertiser. The litter problems caused by junk mail from overflowing letterboxes or dumped material has led to strict laws throughout several Australian states. In Victoria littering is considered an offence under the Environmental Protect Act (1970) and placing advertising material in a letterbox displaying a sticker is regarded as littering. The advertiser can face fines for any litter items that can be linked to them. The act is enforced by local Council officers. In the Australian Capital Territory (ACT) the Litter Amendment Bill 2002 was introduced to specifically address unsolicited advertising material. The Bill lays out a clear definition of junk mail and describes the penalties faced by those (distributors and advertisers) who commit offences including ignoring ‘No Junk Mail’ stickers. Real estate agents in Australia have come under close scrutiny recently as many don’t consider their advertising material to be junk mail. Earlier this year the Federal Government revealed details of plans to impose large fines on real estate agents who send unsolicited, personally addressed mail to

288 Envision (2005), Reducing Junk Mail in North Shore City , Report to North Shore City Council, New Zealand 289 Envision (2005) Reducing Junk Mail in North Shore City , Report to North Shore City Council, New Zealand

Waste Prevention Policy Case Studies 292 homeowners. Amendments to existing legislation are under way to make it a criminal offence to send junk mail in this manner and that those who continued to flout the law will be heavily fined. This approach would appear to be a simple and logical solution, provided that householders are made aware of their rights under such legislation, and that sufficient enforcement is undertaken to ensure a high level of compliance by delivery agents. Key to the success of this approach is likely to be: • A clear definition of junk mail; and • A clear definition of on whom the liability falls in the case of any infringements. This approach gives householders a clear choice as to whether they receive junk mail or not, while still allowing advertisers the freedom to promote their goods and services, albeit to a smaller but likely more receptive audience. The scheme could even provide different legally defined terms for different levels of junk mail protection to allow people chose whether to exclude for example community newspapers, or addressed mail, as well as unaddressed mail. It is possible that, with such a policy, householders would have greater confidence in the efficacy of ‘No Junk Mail’ stickers and thereby their use would be more widespread. Certainly it is likely that delivery agents would have a higher level of compliance. However the degree to which this type of legislative sanction has an impact over and above simply supplying stickers to householders is likely to be uncertain without further research.

17.3.7 Promotion of the MPS on Direct Mail Material The DMA indicate that their intention is that all householders eventually be made aware of the MPS and how to use it so that they have the choice of opting out of receiving direct mail. 290 However given that this is the intention, the most obvious and potentially effective avenue for promotion of the service – on direct mail material – is specifically and curiously rejected: “We see no benefit in displaying prominently the details of the MPS on all direct mail material. Such an approach would do irreparable damage to the direct marketing industry. It would compromise any promotional and marketing message and severely reduce the efficiency of direct mail. Many clients would move out of Direct Mail into other direct marketing media, which would have a severe economic impact on the direct mail supply side of the industry, leading to job losses and company closures.”291 Clearly the DMA feels quite strongly against promotion of the MPS on direct mail material, however no evidence is presented in support of this position, and the above quote would appear to be in essence an admission that if promotions were properly targeted, then they would be too effective. This leads one to question the degree to which tools such as the MPS are merely serving the needs of the industry – to more accurately target direct mail - as opposed to making a genuine attempt to achieve waste prevention goals. It would of course be surprising if the industry were to aim to prevent waste to the degree that it caused their business to suffer. The natural conclusion would appear to be that one would

290 DMA 2003, Producer Responsibility for Direct Mail and Promotions. P.10 291 DMA 2003, Producer Responsibility for Direct Mail and Promotions. P.10

Waste Prevention Policy Case Studies 293 expect the likes of the DMA to promote waste prevention initiatives to the degree to which they are going to be beneficial (or at least not harmful) to their industry, and not beyond. This further suggests that there are limits to the effectiveness of the current direct mail voluntary agreement in terms of waste prevention and that if Government wishes to go beyond these limits it will have to look to independent bodies or regulations to achieve these ends. One obvious option in this context is to use the direct mail as a promotional tool for the MPS. As noted above the DMA is clearly opposed to this option, but it may well be possible to design and stipulate the wording and appearance of such information as to alleviate the association’s concerns that it would lead to the ruination of the industry, while still being effective in its intended waste prevention purpose. 17.4 Environmental Impacts of the Policies The impacts of some of the policies have been estimated in this section.

17.4.1 Impact of Promotion of Opt-outs (Promotion of the MPS on Direct Mail Material) Opt-outs and suppression, as constituted today, prevent roughly 100,000 tonnes per year of junk post. Suggested policy initiatives could increase this to up to 136,500 tonnes per annum, an enhanced reduction of 36,500 tonnes of material. Opted-out junk mail, mostly paper, adds up to 73,570 tonnes per year. According to the Direct Marketing Association, the UK opt-out, the Mailing Preference Service, has 3,226,695 subscribers. 292 We assume that: • All of these are households, and • Mailing Preference eliminates junk post by 95% (claimed by the Direct Marketing Association), but not hand-delivered or unaddressed newspapers and flyers; and • This junk post amounts to 24 kg/yr in non opt-out households. 293 If the MPS was promoted through advice to householders on items of direct mail it would, presumably, increase the number of subscribers to the MPS. The impact of this is difficult to calculate with any accuracy. However for the purposes of illustration some assumptions can be made. Over a twelve-month period, the Waste Awareness Wales ‘no junk mail//dim sgrwtsh’ campaign saw an increase of 52% in people deregistering their details from advertising mailing lists. 294 If it were assumed that promotion of the MPS on direct mail was similarly effective, a 50% increase in subscribers to the MPS would generate an additional 1.6 million subscribers that would mean a reduction in junk post of approximately 36,500 tonnes per annum.

17.4.2 Impact of Postage Increase / Waste Levy If a postage increase were instituted to prevent junk post, its effects could be estimated using the demand elasticities presented earlier. These demand elasticities cover a considerable range, and some are based upon estimates of aggregate

292 Rachel Aldighieri, spokeswoman of the Direct Marketing Association. Email of 11 December 2006. 293 A re-hash of the NRWF figures presented earlier in Section 1.2 294 http://www.wasteawarenesswales.org.uk/1487.html?diablo.lang=eng

Waste Prevention Policy Case Studies 294 demand (i.e. all postal services are included in the estimate) whereas others estimate the demand for specific products. The range mentioned earlier suggested values between -0.2 and -0.8. For direct mail products on their own, and in the UK (where there is a suggestion of slightly higher price responsiveness), it seems reasonable to use a range between -0.4 and -0.8. The literature does not give sufficient confidence for a significant narrowing of these estimates. Under these estimates, then a 10% increase in price for direct mail services due to a levy might cause mail volume to dip by 4- 8%, which, at current levels would prevent an additional 15,000-50,000 tonnes per year of junk post.

17.4.3 Impact of Producer Responsibility Levy Producer responsibility levies ought to cover the costs of collecting and reprocessing junk mail items, free newspapers and the like. It is difficult to know exactly what these costs might be, and what the nature of the change in materials used might be if such a policy were introduced. The detailed composition of ‘junk mail’ is not known, but it is likely to include many forms of paper which are considered as ‘contamination’ in some collections (envelopes with windows), as well as plastic films, CD ROMs, and the like. For local authorities, the costs of providing services for the collection of these materials cannot be clearly known without a better understanding of the composition, and the routes through which material is sent by householders. Arguably, when paper markets are buoyant (as now), then these costs might be quite low as far as paper is concerned, at least as long as the quality of the material (in terms of how low contamination rates are) is high. As a baseline calculator, one might consider the costs of refuse collection and disposal (so as to give an order of magnitude to the costs of dealing with junk mail). If one assumes that: • the costs of refuse collection are of the order £30 per tonne; and • the costs of disposal to landfill are (early in the next decade) of the order £65 per tonne; and • the value of landfill allowances is of the order £30 per tonne, Then the cost of collecting and landfilling 0.75 million to 1.25 million tonnes of waste would be of the order £87-144 million. It is interesting to compare this with the expenditure on direct mail. £2,467 million was spent on direct mail advertising in 2003, split between postage at £1,019 million and production at £1,448 million. The figures of £87-£144 million relate to recovery of free papers as well as mailings. If one assumes that half of all the junk mail is direct mail, then the costs of collecting and disposing of this for local authorities amounts to 1.8-2.9% of the overall costs of direct mail production and post, or 4.2%- 7.1% of the postage-related costs. The suggestion is that this is small enough not to affect the industry unduly, but of sufficient significance to illicit some change in behavior from the industry to incentivise reductions in mailings. This could be in terms of heightened efforts on suppression, which could translate directly into cost savings, or through changes in the materials used, or through changes in the weight of items used.

Waste Prevention Policy Case Studies 295 It may be worth noting that if one assumes that these additional costs were all related to postage, and then assuming elasticities of demand between -0.4 and -0.8, then a reduction of between 6,400 to 35,400 tonnes of direct mail could be expected. There has been no attempt here to understand the impact of this measure on free newspapers and other junk mail items. It is interesting to note that there was a discussion as to whether envelopes should be considered as packaging for the purposes of the Packaging Waste (Producer Responsibility) Regulations. As such, aspects of ‘mail’ have already been considered, at least, in the context of producer responsibility.

17.4.4 Impact of Suppression Suppression, as motivated by the Voluntary Agreement on Direct Mail, may prevent an additional 7,860 -13,100 tonnes per year of junk post. This is based on an estimate, as follows. • The Voluntary Agreement on Direct Mail requires mailers to suppress their lists within 90 days before a mailing. There is an economic incentive which encourages mailers to suppress theirs lists anyway, but we assume here that without the Voluntary Agreement they would do so only once a year. So the average days non-suppressed would be 45 with the Agreement and 182 without, or an additional 137 days without. • Around 15,000 people either move home or die every day in the UK. 295 This ignores suppression based on opt-out, but that has been estimated above already; • 15,000 people x 137 days gives 2.055 million people, or an average of 1.028 million people who could be removed from lists over the whole period; • All 49 million UK residents over the age of 16 years (according to National Statistics) are on the lists; • Therefore, the lists are on average 2.1% more out-of-date for deaths and moves than they would be without the Voluntary Agreement; and • Junk post in the UK amounts to 375,000-625,000 tonnes per year; 2.1% of that is 7,860 -13,100 tonnes per year. This impact, though significant, could be enhanced further if the scope of suppression was made such that a genuine effort was made to remove those who were unlikely to respond to the advertising concerned. Indeed, this is the type of change which would generate the most savings for those who make use of direct mail services. One might speculate as to whether the level and frequency of suppression is optimal in the current situation. Different parties in the chain of supply of direct mail have quite different interests. It seems less than likely that current efforts in respect of suppression are optimal from the point of view of society at large, though further investigation would be required to understand whether this is the case, and how suppression could be systematically improved.

17.4.5 Impact of Legally Binding ‘No Junk Mail’ Stickers In Brussels a 1999/2000 campaign encouraged the use of an anti-advertising/free newspaper door sticker with mandatory force (i.e. delivery companies had to respect

295 Direct Marketing Association, 2004. DMA Guide to Suppression . 5 October 2004.

Waste Prevention Policy Case Studies 296 the presence of the sticker). This measure alone resulted in a reduction of around 1,800 tonnes out of an original 12,400 tonnes posted – a 15% reduction. 296 If one was to assume a similar level of reduction for the UK this would be equivalent to a 112,500 - 187,500 tonnes per annum reduction in junk mail quantities. This would include non-addressed mail, free newspapers, and flyers.

17.4.6 Impacts of Postal Commerce Versus Other Channels One might ask the question as to whether, if marketing managers reduced expenditure on direct mail, they might generate a greater environmental impact through spending on marketing via other, alternate channels. Firstly, one should point out that increasingly, these channels are likely to be through electronic media such as the internet, e-mail, podcasts etc, where environmental impacts do not increase in proportion to the quantity of information presented. Second, the assumption behind such a substitution effect assumes any of the measures presented will increase the costs of direct mail to such a level that substitutes are deployed to a much greater degree. This would need further research, yet it seems likely that marketing managers already use a multitude of channels to market products rather than relying on one specific medium. Furthermore, to the extent that these measures encourage a reduction in ‘wasted’ direct mail, then this is likely to be in line with what marketing managers would wish to see anyway (this reduces annoyance of customers with no interest in some specific products, and reduces costs). The point is that relatively little analysis has been done here, and the matter may be worth some further study. Two studies have been conducted that address this with respect to a related, though rather different, question: the difference in impacts between conventional and online retailers. 297298 The latter study shows online retailing (which has many similarities to postal retailing) to be far more energy efficient then traditional retailing of consumer books. Its authors point out (with, one could argue, a rather limited boundary for the analysis), “ sale of products on the Internet is beneficial to the environment. For example, emissions from vehicles driven to shopping malls can be avoided, retail space can be reduced, and inventories and waste can be reduced .” To argue that some disbenefits might arise from the policies suggested here relies upon an assumption that the measures would affect the channel through which purchases are made. None of the policies discussed here obviously does this. Indeed, in the example given, if the opportunity to buy books on the internet clearly exists and is well acknowledged, arguably, purchases are increasingly unlikely to be made through direct mail in a society where internet access is increasingly widely available.

296 Institut Bruxellois pour la Gestion de L’Environnment. See: www.ibgebim.be , cited in National Resource & Waste Forum (2004) Household Waste Prevention Toolkit , Part A. 297 E. Brynjolfsson and M.D. Smith (2000) Frictionless Commerce? A Comparison of Internet and Conventional Retailers. Management Science 464646 (2000), pp. 563–585. 298 H. Scott Matthews, Eric Williams, Takashi Tagami and Chris T. Hendrickson (2002), Energy Implications of Online Book Retailing in the United States and Japan. Environmental Impact Assessment Review , Volume 22, Issue 5, Sustainability in the Information Society, October 2002, Pages 493-507.

Waste Prevention Policy Case Studies 297 17.4.7 Summary of Impacts Table 75 shows possible policies and their estimated impact, assessed against the estimated effects of existing effects achieved through suppression under the existing voluntary agreement with the DMA. Table 75: Direct Mail Policies and Their Estimated Impact Impact on Direct Impact on Free Policy Description Mail Newspapers etc. (tonnes) (tonnes) Existing Direct Mail Existing Suppression 7,860 – 13,100 n/a Agreement Enhanced Suppression Promotion of Mailing Enhanced Opt-outs 36,500 n/a Preference Service Increase in costs of Postage Levy direct mail-related 15,000 - 50,000 n/a post (by 10% of price) Targets for recycling Producer Responsibility supported by cost 6,400 – 35,400 Potentially similar Levy recovery from users of direct mail / s Enforcement of no junk Legal support for 56,250 - 93,750 56,250 - 93,750 mail stickers rejection of junk mail

The indication is that these policies could have a significant impact on household waste prevention. The effects across policies might not be additive, but there would, most likely, be a synergistic impact if more than one policy was pursued. The weakest argument is likely to be in respect of the postage levy. It might, for example, be difficult to ensure that only direct mail was affected by this measure. Equally, there is a weak link between a postage levy and any measure of environmental impact, or responsibility on the part of producers. 299 17.5 Potential Economic Impacts Associated with the Policies There are direct and indirect costs and benefits – to mailers and to users – generated by the policies listed above. Direct ones are avoided costs of waste collection and disposal, possible reductions in costs to users of direct mail, and costs of administration of the different proposed policies. Indirect costs and benefits relate to the possible impact on ‘non-target’ actors, and the potential impact on sales.

17.5.1 Direct Costs The waste prevention effects of the policies generate benefits for local authorities. Assuming the range of impacts outlined in Table 75, and assuming a range of avoided collection and treatment / disposal costs as in Table 76, the benefits – in terms of savings to local authorities - are as shown in the Table below.

299 It is not clear what effect the shift from weight-based to volume-based postage pricing might have had on direct mail weights / volumes. There may already have been some impact associated with changes in pricing which could have assisted in any future modelling of such an instrument.

Waste Prevention Policy Case Studies 298 Table 76: Cost Savings from Junk Mail Policies Avoided Collection Policy Impact Cost Savings and Disposal Low High Low High Low High Existing Suppression 7,860 13,100 £98 £120 £770,280 £1,572,000 Enhanced Opt-outs 36,500 36,500 £98 £120 £3,577,000 £4,380,000 Postage Levy 15,000 50,000 £98 £120 £1,470,000 £6,000,000 Producer Responsibility Levy 6,400 35,400 £98 £120 £627,200 £4,248,000 Enforcement of junk mail stickers 112,500 187,500 £98 £120 £11,025,000 £22,500,000 Total New Policies (excl ppostageostage levy) £15,229,200 £31,128,000

If all of the new policies with the exception of a postage levy were introduced, the net savings could be of the order £15-£31 million. Existing suppression avoids between £0.8 – £1.5 million per year in collection and disposal costs. Administration of new schemes would incur costs, but this could be compensated by reduced waste and customer alienation. For instance, the Direct Marketing Association argues 300 that: “ the cost of suppressing should be significantly less than the cost to mail, when all the factors are totalled, so it actually saves [marketers] money. ” The Producer Responsibility concept would clearly incur additional costs to the direct mail supply chain. We estimated this above to be of the order £87- £144 million if all costs of collection and treatment / disposal are shouldered by industry. If we take the total quantity of reduced junk post from the three new policies, and if we assume that it would have been sent at the cheapest bulk rate of around £1,700/tonne, 301 then the avoided postage costs associated with reduced mailing would be £169-282 million. On top of this, avoided costs of production would reduce costs to users of direct mail. Unsurprisingly, this is less than the benefits to local authorities (the savings associated with reduced mail costs are lower than the savings associated with reduced collection and disposal).

17.5.2 Indirect Costs The loss in direct mail costs to mail users would be felt by the providers of direct mail services themselves, and the postal services. The reduced revenue from supply of direct mail and postal services could, however, be offset by (either within the same companies or in others) the development of services to improve suppression and the targeting of product marketed through direct mail. Some loss of sales due to junk mail elimination are to be expected due to these policies. In the case of opt-outs, this should be accepted without complaint (because people accepting opt-out can be assumed not to have wanted the advertising in the first place), but in the case of suppression this is not so obvious. One way to measure this impact would be compare the results of identical mail shots sent to suppressed and unsuppressed lists – if such data could, or would, be made available, and if such an experiment could be delivered.

300 Direct Marketing Association, 2004. DMA Guide to Suppression . 5 October 2004. 301 From the Bulk Business Mail Calculator at www.mailsorttechnical.com

Waste Prevention Policy Case Studies 299 17.6 Social Impacts To the extent they impose extra costs on mailers and users, limits on direct mail could be said to discriminate against citizens on the disadvantaged side of the ‘digital divide’, i.e., people who use the mail service instead of the Internet. On the other hand, none of the measures obviously affects the most ardent potential users. 17.7 Implementation & Design Issues Existing policies presumably are politically feasible, or they would not have come about in the first place. Extending them seems quite possible, and is likely to be relatively popular amongst the general population. Raising postage is also politically feasible, because it has happened so many times in the past. Other initiatives such as providing legal force to ‘No Junk Mail’ Stickers, mandating promotion of the MPS on all direct mail, and introducing fully-fledged producer responsibility would require legislative provision. Thus, although they make for greater impacts, they will also be the most time consuming and difficult to implement. 17.8 Summary & Conclusions Existing initiatives have an effect in limiting junk post, although they do little or nothing to address junk newspapers and flyers. Their effect probably could be heightened through promotion or perhaps through legislation, but whether and how this should be done is an open question. . There are a number of practical policy options for further reducing quantities of junk mail at the household level, and these deserve further investigation. These would tend to create savings for local authorities and possibly for the companies using direct mail. The providers of direct mail services and the postal service might experience negative impacts.

Waste Prevention Policy Case Studies 300 18 MANDATORY USE OF RECHARGEABLE BATTERIES This case study concerns the mandatory use of rechargeable batteries, i.e. the requirement that new appliances must be sold with rechargeable batteries, as opposed to primary batteries that can be discharged only once. Given that this project is concerned with household waste, we concentrate on a policy as it might affect so- called portable batteries that weigh less than 1 kg, as opposed to automotive and industrial batteries (which are mostly rechargeable anyway). 18.1 Description of Policy A rechargeables mandate is, at this point, theoretical. No such law for batteries currently exists. Existing and proposed battery laws in the EU are focused on hazardous-material content, and separate collection systems (and their rates of collection) as well as labelling. Nonetheless, other sectors offer partial precedents for a rechargeables mandate, for instance: • the EU Packaging Directive, which sets recycling and recyclable targets; • the US Corporate Average Fuel Economy (CAFE) rules, which set fuel efficiency targets for automobiles; and • Switzerland’s Beverage Containers Regulation, which sets valorisation targets. A mandate to ensure that appliances are sold incorporating rechargeables would be implemented in one of two ways: • a positive law or government rule requiring a certain fraction of all battery- operated (or assisted) devices to be sold with rechargeable batteries only; or • a negative law or government rule banning in whole, or in part, the sale of battery-operated devices with primary batteries. In either case, the law probably would apply either to retailers, producers or importers or some combination of the three. As a broad model for how a positive mandate would be implemented and enforced, the European directive on Waste of Electrical and Electronic Equipment (WEEE) may be useful. Another model for a positive mandate could be electrical/electronic standards as governed by CENELEC (European Committee for Electrotechnical Standardisation). 302 CENELEC standards could probably also be applied to a negative mandate (effectively, a ban), but a ban could probably be implemented without reference to specific standards. The intention of the mandate would be to reduce the quantity of batteries in the waste stream. It would stimulate the use of reusables / rechargeables in place of disposables / primary batteries. It is possible to consider a policy extending beyond the sale of appliances and towards the use of rechargeable batteries more generally. This might be in the form of producer responsibility legislation, with targets for the supply to chain to maintain a steadily falling proportion of primaries in battery use. In addition, as we shall see, there may be a need to ensure that battery switching does not have negative side- effects by introducing accompanying measures aimed at phasing out batteries made

302 The UK national body for CENELEC standards is BSI British Standards.

Waste Prevention Policy Case Studies 301 from more harmful substances. Indeed, in order to secure environmental benefits, this may be a necessary counterpart measure (though further work would need to be undertaken to establish this).

18.1.1 What is a Rechargeable? A key issue would be the definition of what is, and what is not a rechargeable battery? We suggest preliminary definitions (Table 77 and Figure 44) based on chemical composition (which determines whether a battery is rechargeable or not), users and types. Table 77: Primary and Rechargeable Batteries, Delineated by Chemical Composition Primary (disposable, one-way) batteries Alkaline Cells (sometimes called alkaline manganese) Leclanché Cells (zinc carbon or zinc chloride) Lithium Primary Cells (Li thionyl chloride and Li CFX, known as ‘coin cell’ batteries) Mercury Silver Oxide Cells Thermal Batteries Water Activated Batteries Zinc Air Cells Rechargeable (sec(secondary)ondary) batteries Flow Cells (Redox) Lead Acid Lithium Secondary Cells (LiIon and Li polymer) Nickel Cadmium Nickel Iron Nickel Metal Hydride Nickel Zinc Rechargeable Alkaline Manganese (RAM) Sodium Sulphur Other Galvanic Cells Zebra Cells Source: Adapted and expanded from http://www.mpoweruk.com/chemistries.htm

Figure 44: Battery Market, Segmented by Users, Chemistry and Types

Waste Prevention Policy Case Studies 302

Source: Bio Intelligence (2003) Impact Assessment on Selected Policy Options for Revision of the Battery Directive. Which devices would be subject to the mandate? We suggest that the primary aim would be those appliances using portable batteries (less than 1 kg). Although this study is about waste prevention in households, it would probably not be feasible to restrict the mandate purely to household or consumer devices, because many devices – for example, personal computers, clocks or mobile phones – are used not only in households but also in the commercial environment.

18.1.2 Exemptions – Which and How Many? Exemptions to policy instruments generally undermine their effectiveness, and should be considered only where absolutely necessary. It is important to remember that the mandate being considered applies to the first sale of products. It does not necessarily have to be extended to a complete ban on the use of rechargeable batteries per se (so once a product has been purchased, the user could choose to revert to primary batteries). Indeed, a problem with a measure that applies only at the point of sale of appliances leaves open the possibility that an increasing number of appliances would be sold with ‘batteries not included’ so as to side-step the need for any change. This highlights why a policy might need to extend to some form of producer responsibility more generally (as opposed to just at the point of sale of appliances) in order to be effective. If this were not the case, and if the ban were to be applied to the use of primary batteries, then there might be cases for exceptions to this ban. This relates to

Waste Prevention Policy Case Studies 303 technical issues associated with rechargeables, since these tend to have higher self- discharge rates (see Table 78). Table 78: Self-discharge Rates, Primary versus Rechargeable Batteries System Self-discharge Alkaline-manganese round cells max. 2%/year Zinc round cells max. 4%/year Rechargeable (dependent on system) 15% to 25%/month Source: British Battery Manufacturers Association. http://www.bbma.co.uk/introduction.htm As the British Battery Manufacturers Association explains 303 : “In principle, no battery can be stored without loss of energy, although some battery systems may be stored for longer periods of time than others. Processes inherent to the battery's electrochemical system cause a gradual, but unavoidable loss of usable energy which, however, is predictable. The best-known process is "self-discharge". This generally has to do with the electrolytic solubility of the positive electrode material or its thermodynamic instability (e.g. spontaneous decomposition). Self-discharge in rechargeable batteries (secondary batteries, accumulators) is particularly high in comparison to primary batteries. At room temperature the rate of self-discharge is in the range of 15% to 25% per month, depending on the system. Electrochemical self-discharge in primary batteries is considerably lower, and may even be below 2% per year at room temperature. However, various processes take place in parallel with this, which lead to an increase of the battery's internal resistance during storage. These processes lead to a reduction in load capability. Loss of usable energy becomes noticeable only at relatively high discharge rates (e.g. motor applications, flashlights etc.). This effect, however, has nothing to do with self-discharge. At low discharge rates the increased internal resistance which occurred during storage will not be detectable. Under normal storage conditions, the following approximate values ( see Table 78 ) apply to self-discharge: ” The self-discharge rates of rechargeables (Table 78) suggest that, if left in storage for anywhere from 4 months to a year, most rechargeable would have lost their charge. Primary batteries, by contrast, have a typical shelf life of 10 years. 304 This relative performance failure might need to be overcome if a mandate to use rechargeables were to be introduced. If the policy was extended in this way, it could be argued that rescue equipment (torches, tools, winches) – which needs to work when (periodically) needed, even if it has sat on a shelf for an extended period – could be exempted from such a mandate to use rechargeables (but not from the mandate to ensure that the sale of equipment includes rechargeables as opposed to primaries). Other exemptions could be for applications in the military, or medical and emergency- equipment applications. Even here, there is room for some accommodation. For example, the US Army, for maximum security and safety, still uses primary batteries in war zones, yet in training exercises, it uses rechargeables.

303 British Battery Manufacturers Association. http://www.bbma.co.uk/introduction.htm 304 Isidor Buchmann (2005) Battery University, Cadex Electronics, Vancouver BC Canada. www.batteryuniversity.com

Waste Prevention Policy Case Studies 304 A more contentious exemption would be the case of inexpensive toys and gadgets. Producers could argue that the cost of rechargeables would, in some cases, exceed the cost of the toy or gadget itself. On the other hand, the requirement to sell including rechargeables might diminish the tendency to make ‘throwaway toys’ for the same reason. The price effect could be positive for this reason. Finally, there would be a case for a third type of exemption, loosely defined as ‘alternative battery technology’. This would include battery-replacements such as solar cells and fuel cells which are not rechargeable. Clearly, it would make sense – and would be broadly consistent with government policy - not to ban these under a rechargeables mandate. They would, therefore, need to be allowed, probably by exempting appliances from the mandate where such alternative technologies were included. This would require some such definition of these alternative sources. 18.2 Rationale The intended effect of the mandate would be to reduce the quantity of batteries in the waste stream by stimulating the use of reusable in place of disposables, i.e. rechargeables instead of primaries. It is fairly clear that reducing the current volume of batteries landfilled or incinerated would provide an environmental benefit. A recent study for DEFRA 305 “ shows that increasing recycling of batteries is beneficial to the environment, due to the recovery of metals and avoidance of virgin metal production. ” Unfortunately, without further specific study, it is impossible to predict confidently to what extent a rechargeables mandate – which would replace primaries with rechargeables – would benefit, or even harm, the environment. Clearly, there would be a shift of materials being used in batteries from primary to rechargeable (Table 77). There would be a shift in energy sourcing from battery producers (who manufacture primary batteries) to utility companies (who generate electricity for recharging), and there would be increased production and use (and disposal) of rechargers. From simple examination, it is unclear whether all this on the whole would be good or bad. Before implementing a rechargeables mandate, policy makers would be well advised to examine the impacts via a life-cycle assessment, or input-output analysis. Clearly, opponents of the mandate will do this, and if the results come out in their favour, they will use them to argue against it. 18.3 Scenario Development A rechargeables mandate probably could be implemented as either producer/ importer/ retailer-responsibility, or as a ban. The former would be as a positive law or government rule requiring a certain fraction of all battery-operated (or assisted) devices to be sold with rechargeable batteries only. The latter would be as a negative law or government rule banning in whole or in part the sale of battery-operated devices with primary batteries. In the case of an extended policy aimed at encouraging greater use of rechargeables more generally, responsibility licensing – i.e. the obligation of producers, importers and/or retailers to increase the market share of rechargeables – seems more

305 ERM (2006). Battery Waste Management Life Cycle Assessment, Final Report for Defra, 18 October 2006.

Waste Prevention Policy Case Studies 305 appropriate. This law could work in a similar fashion to the US Corporate Average Fuel Economy (CAFE) rules, or the returnable quotas that are part of German packaging laws. A rechargeables target, or targets, would be set. If these are not met, then a deposit would be imposed on the sale of primary batteries. Our scenario presumes that a rechargeables mandate is introduced which reduces the quantity of primary batteries in the sale of goods. This could be supported by producer responsibility legislation to encourage more widespread use of rechargeables. We also comment, in passing, on the desirability of two counterpart policies: • As discussed above, a producer responsibility target requiring rechargeables to take a growing share of the market; and • A policy seeking to ensure that switching to more harmful battery types, or the environmental impact thereof, is minimised (either through phase out of more harmful varieties, or through mandating higher recycling rates for the battery types which are considered most hazardous in the residual waste stream). This raises a key issue regarding the effect on the market-share of rechargeables as opposed to primaries. This is made all the more difficult to estimate since the counterfactual, in the years ahead, is a market which will already be influenced by the Batteries Directive, which could influence the shares of different battery types. Regarding the hazardous nature of batteries, the Directive already prohibits the placing on the market of any batteries that contain more than 0.0005% of mercury by weight; and of portable batteries that contain more than 0.002% of cadmium by weight. There are some exemptions to the prohibition for button cells containing mercury and for batteries containing cadmium, namely those that are used in emergency/alarm systems, medical equipment and cordless power tools. The benefits associated with a mandate for recharegeables has to be set against a counterfactual in which all requirements of the Batteries Directive are transposed in UK law. The key aspects of the Directive are shown in Box 4. Table 79 shows an estimate of the overall market share, by weight, for UK batteries in 2003 (though the source acknowledges uncertainty in the data). The total market share of primaries is currently 79.12% according to these figures. The majority of these are alkaline manganese batteries.

Waste Prevention Policy Case Studies 306 Box 4: Summary of Directive Requirements Collection targets • A 25% collection rate for waste portable batteries to be met six years after entry into force of the Directive into UK law (by 26 September 2012). There is also a 45% collecti on rate to be met ten years after entry into force (by 26 September 2016). • Prohibition of final disposal of automotive & industrial batteries into landfill and incineration, requiring, therefore, all industrial and automotive batteries to be recycled (indirectly, therefore, this means 100% collection rate). • All identifiable separately collected batteries to be treated and recycled. Collection schemes • Collection schemes for the return of used portable batteries are to be established. These are to b e free of charge to the end user. As a producer responsibility Directive, producers must finance the collection schemes. In addition, distributors are required to take back waste batteries free of charge. • Producers of industrial batteries to offer free take back on all batteries from end users. • Producers of automotive batteries to set up collection schemes for spent automotive batteries not covered under schemes established under the End of Life Vehicles Directive. Prohibitions • The Directive also prohibits the placing on the market of any batteries that contain more than 0.0005% of mercury by weight; and of portable batteries that contain more than 0.002% of cadmium by weight. There are some exemptions to the prohibition for button cells containing mercury and for batteries containing cadmium, namely those that are used in emergency/alarm systems, medical equipment and cordless power tools. Recycling Efficiency Targets • Recycling efficiency targets to be met (by 26 September 2011): 1. 65% by average weight of lead-acid batteries and accumulators, including recycling of the lead; 2. 75% by average weight of nickel-cadmium batteries and accumulators, including recycling of the cadmium; 3. Recycling of 50% by average weight of other waste batteries and accumulators. Financing • Producers of portable batteries, or third parties acting on their behalf, to finance the costs of collection, treatment and recycling of all separately collected portable batteries. • Producers and users of industrial and automotive batteries may conclude other financing arrangements. • Producers, or third parties acting on their behalf, required to fund consumer information campaigns. Removability • Member States shall ensure that manufacturers design appliances in suc h a way that batteries and accumulators can be easily removed. Capacity Labelling • Member States shall ensure that the capacity of all portable and automotive batteries and accumulators is indicated on them in a visible and indelible form. Registration • Member States shall ensure that each producer is registered. Registration shall be subject to the same procedural requirements and the European Commission is to provide guidance on the procedures.

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Table 79: UK Battery Sales, 2003

Source: ERM (2006). Battery Waste Management Life Cycle Assessment, Final Report for Defra, 18 October 2006. The data does not allow one to understand how many of these primary batteries are associated with the purchase of new appliances. We have assumed that as a consequence of this policy, the quantity of primary batteries used falls by 30% of the current level. There is no basis for this figure. It is merely an estimate designed to give a flavour to the scenario analysis. There would be expected to be a counterpart increase in the quantity of rechargeable batteries in use, but much smaller in tonnage terms, than the reduction in usage of primaries. The exact ratio of the two ought, in principle, to be calculable. However, the life of primaries and rechargeables depends upon the way both are used. 18.4 Environmental Impacts of the Policy There are three main environmental impacts of interest that would result from the scenario described in the previous section. These are discussed in the following subsections. Knowledge in all three areas is sketchy. If this policy is to be pursued, we recommend that the areas be further researched. It is beyond the scope of this work to examine these areas in detail.

18.4.1 A Decline in the Quantity of Battery Waste Under a rechargeables mandate, the weight of battery waste (including rechargers) probably would decline. The precise figure would depend on a number of factors, including: 1. Crucially, the degree to which appliance producers could simply side-step the law by not providing batteries with appliances at the point of sale; 2. The relative weight of the original and the substitute batteries; 3. The number of rechargers required per household and their lifetimes;

Waste Prevention Policy Case Studies 308 4. The degree to which people actually use the rechargeables in the manner intended (it could be the case that some consumers simply throw the rechargeables away after the end of their first charge; and 5. Importantly, the lifetime-in-use of rechargeables relative to primaries. If this policy is to be pursued, these issues are worthy of further study. In particular, the first of these issues suggests that if it proves impossible to devise a policy instrument which cannot readily be evaded by the appliance producers, then some form of producer responsibility policy would be required to ensure that objectives were met.

18.4.2 A Change in Hazardousness of the Battery Waste Stream A rechargeables mandate would potentially shift the battery waste-stream content away from zinc carbon and alkaline manganese toward lithium, nickel-cadmium and nickel metal hydrides (Table 79). Does this represent a net gain for the environment? Human toxicities of five major battery components (Table 80) vary considerably. Although this is only one environmental impact, it is a critical one, and the point is that reducing the volume of waste (as a rechargeables mandate almost surely would do) will not automatically reduce hazard (or exposure, either), and that it could increase both. Table 80: Human Toxicity Factors for Airborne Emissions of Battery Metals (1,4- dichlorobenzene equivalents/ kg emission) Substance Human toxicity factor Cadmium 145,000 Lead 467 Mercury 6,010 Nickel 35,000 Zinc 104 Source: CML 2 baseline 2000 V2.03. (This is a life cycle assessment method, published by Leiden University, Institute of Environmental Sciences (CML)). It is difficult to understand the net impact upon the environment without a clear understanding of the fate of the batteries. In this respect, it might be argued that if the capture of batteries from the waste stream is sufficiently high, and if the recycling route incurs minimal losses from the input stream, then the nature of the material becomes less of an issue. It may also be that less frequent disposal of batteries (because of their rechargeable nature) makes them more likely to be recycled through take-back schemes. Consequently, this issue has to be understood against the backdrop of a changing situation in respect of the collection system for batteries likely to result from implementation of the Batteries Directive. Clearly, the main focus of EU battery regulation in recent years has been to reduce exposures to lead and nickel-cadmium, 306 both of which are found in rechargeables. A decade ago, the European Commission called for a ban on nickel-cadmium rechargeables, because of concerns over cadmium entering the environmental upon disposal. 307 Mercury, which was also a major concern, has already been mostly

306 British Battery Manufacturers Association. http://www.bbma.co.uk/environment.htm 307 Resources, Conservation and Recycling 34 (2002) 289–309. Life cycle inventory of recycling portable nickel–cadmium batteries. Carl Johan Rydh and Magnus Karlström.

Waste Prevention Policy Case Studies 309 regulated out of the market. 308 The Batteries Directive will require (see Box 4) that certain recycling efficiency rates are achieved for different batteries, and this figure is 75% for nickel cadmium batteries, including the cadmium. It also imposes maximum proportions of cadmium (by weight) in nickel cadmium batteries. However, collection rates could still be relatively low as long as the Directive’s 25% and 45% targets are met (by September 2012 and 2016, respectively). Consequently, the Directive itself probably gives insufficient comfort to believe that all environmental issues associated with a possible switch to rechargeables are ‘covered’. It is possible that, unless counterpart measures are simultaneously put in place, the shift to rechargeables could increase the toxicity of the battery waste stream, even where the total quantity is reduced in size. The consequences of this need, however, clearly need to be understood in the context of an understanding of the (changing) fate of batteries and their changing hazardousness owing to the Batteries Directive. It would seem prudent, however, to introduce counterpart legislation – possibly higher collection rates than are in the existing Directive – to maximise benefits from switching to rechargeables.

18.4.3 A Shift in Energy Delivery Associated with Battery Applications From available data, it is difficult to say whether a shift to greater use of rechargeables would be positive or negative in respect of life-cycle energy use, and much depends on the nature of the switch. On the one hand, Waste Online 309 contends “ the energy needed to manufacture a battery is on average 50 times greater than the energy it gives out .” This factor is also likely to be affected by whether or not the metal used is recycled or from a primary source. Most lifecycle analyses concentrate on the issue of recycling batteries, and there are surprisingly few studies which seem to address the relative benefits of rechargeables and primaries in a manner which reflects a clear understanding of the market trends, and the substitution possibilities. On the other hand, rechargeables have much higher leakage (or self-discharge) rates than do primaries (Table 78), the energy consumption of making and selling rechargers may be significant, and recharging itself will be penalised by efficiency losses (some chargers are 30% or less efficient 310 ), whilst recharging may lead to some user confusion and misuse, 311 as well as energy wastage from recharging units being plugged in without any battery in the recharger. The net energy usage of the system depends, therefore, on a whole host of factors, including the nature of materials used and the nature of the recharging system.

308 Mercury is no longer being used in the manufacture of non-rechargeable batteries, except button cells where it is a functional component, and the major European battery suppliers have been offering mercury-free disposable batteries since 1994. Source: www.wasteonline.org.uk/resources/InformationSheets/Batteries.htm 309 Waste Online. www.wasteonline.org.uk/resources/InformationSheets/Batteries.htm 310 Natural Resources Defence Council, 2003. The Energy Efficiency of Common Household Battery Charging Systems: Results and Implications. 11 June 2003, Suzanne Foster. 311 MPowerUK. http://www.mpoweruk.com/chargers.htm

Waste Prevention Policy Case Studies 310 18.5 Economic Impact of the Policy Moving market share in favour of rechargeables through the type of mandate under consideration would have the following economic impacts on producers and users. • Purchase prices of rechargeables are higher than those of primaries, whilst rechargers obviously imply an initial outlay as well. This implies higher costs for consumers. It also implies higher costs of products where batteries are supplied with the appliances. 312 This would be likely to suppress demand. Two responses might follow: o The appliance could be supplied without a battery; or o The demand falls as a consequence of higher prices; • Operating costs of rechargeables are lower than of primaries, but only if they are used enough. The efficiency of rechargeables in long-term storage applications is far lower than primaries (Table 78), which possibly makes them more costly in some applications. • Many products would need to be re-engineered to accommodate rechargeables. Appropriate standards would also be needed. The technical and commercial challenges of swapping rechargeables for primaries across the board have not been studied in detail. However, one study that looked at replacing only cadmium batteries suggests that the challenges are considerable. In many cases (Table 81). 313 Substitution is not simply a matter of plug-and-play.

Table 81: Available Substitutes for Cadmium Batteries / Accumulators

312 I nitial costs per unit of rechargeable cells are higher than for equivalent capacity disposable cells. To this must be added the costs of a suitable charger and the availability of a power source, and, frequently, the need to have a duplicate set of batteries if continuous operation is required. Rechargeable cells can be cycled hundreds of times if they are not mis-used and over a long period of time, the initial cost of the rechargeable cells and the power consumed will be eclipsed by the ongoing costs of disposable cells. Chargers may need AC mains or a generator, or a current- regulated DC source from a vehicle battery. This may be difficult to supply in remote sites, although solar cell- powered chargers may be suitable for use with low capacity cells in some areas. Source: www.britishecologicalsociety.org/articles/education/resources/teg/1995/batteries/ 313 Bio Intelligence (2003) Impact Assessment on Selected Policy Options for Revision of the Battery Directive .

Waste Prevention Policy Case Studies 311

Source: Bio Intelligence (2003) Impact Assessment on Selected Policy Options for Revision of the Battery Directive. In addition to the above, some form of administration would need to be funded to operate the mandate.

18.5.1 Impact on Battery Producers Battery producers tend to be fairly large, regional and global players. For them, the impact would be mixed. Major players in rechargeables and rechargers would experience rising demand and possibly higher profitability. Companies whose production is focused on primary batteries would, conversely, suffer from reduced demand. This could be mitigated or worsened by pre-announcing the policy to allow time for adjustment. It should be noted that, in the context of a Directive which will require batteries to be collected to meet specified targets, and which also requires producers of portable batteries, or third parties acting on their behalf, to finance the costs of collection, treatment and recycling of all separately collected portable batteries (see Box 4), there may be an incentive, at the margin, to see greater use of rechargeables anyway (though this depends not only on collection costs, but also, those of recycling). The costs of meeting the Directive requirements could, therefore, other things being equal, fall following implementation of a mandate, owing to a greater shift to

Waste Prevention Policy Case Studies 312 rechargeables (and indeed, this may occur to a limited extent anyway as a direct consequence of the Batteries Directive).

18.5.2 Impact on Producers of Appliances Producers of electrical and electronic products are diverse in size and spread all over the world. For many appliance producers, rechargeables are already the norm. For others, the impact would at best be neutral. Where necessary, producers would try to recoup the costs of re-engineering their UK products to be rechargeable through the price mechanism. On balance, however, it is hard to see that they would make more profit from this, and in some product lines they might still would lose (much depends upon demand elasticities for specific products). For some inexpensive products – such as calculators, gadgets and toys – the cost of rechargeables and chargers might be significant relative to the cost of the product. The alternative for producers of these is to re-engineer and demand much higher prices, withdraw the product from the UK market. Either way, the economic impact would be significant.

18.5.3 Impact on Users / Consumers Rechargeables’ higher purchase costs, and the associated extra costs of rechargers, would be the most obvious impact on users/consumers. Other possible impacts are: 1) The requirement to have a range of chargers for different batteries since recharging is not necessarily a ‘one-size-fits-all’ matter. 314315 There is likely to be some frustration through misuse; 2) Non-performance of rechargeables. As the British Ecological Society notes 316 , “some battery uses that require long dormancy periods and few replacements, so a major issue is charge retention. In these circumstances, certain rechargeable battery technologies may not be appropriate, as they may have a high self-discharge rate compared to equivalent non-rechargeable batteries. For example, a flashlight used for emergency purposes must work when needed, even if it has sat on a shelf for an extended period of time. Primary cells are also more cost-efficient in this case, as rechargeable batteries would use only a small fraction of available recharge cycles. ” 3) Withdrawal of products, by producers who cannot or will not accept the costs of switching to rechargeables. A potential benefit of rechargeables is the operating cost savings that they offer against primaries. If users behave rationally (which is certainly not necessarily the case), this saving is already recognised in today’s market. However, given that a mandate would surely spark innovation in batteries, further savings in some applications might be realised.

314 MPowerUK. http://www.mpoweruk.com/chargers.htm 315 Energy Alternatives. www.energyalternatives.ca/SystemDesign/chargers1.html 316 British Ecological Society. www.britishecologicalsociety.org/articles/education/resources/teg/1995/batteries/

Waste Prevention Policy Case Studies 313 18.5.4 Government’s Role The central role of government would be to define and then enforce a rechargeables mandate. DEFRA is best placed to deal with the key definitional issues: what is/is not a rechargeable, what are exempt applications (and why), what would be the rechargeable market-share targets and by when, how would market-share be measured and what sanctions to be imposed for non-compliance. In addition, DEFRA might want to define some ‘performance indicators’ to measure whether implementation is working as planned. Guidance might be needed for the battery supply-chain, from producers through to waste-disposers, to assist implementation and adjustment. Registration could be the way to ‘accredit’ products as rechargeable. This could be a license or a declaration to import or market an electronic or electric product. Sellers or importers would declare each product to be in compliance with rechargeable guidelines. In principle, a third-party verification or an audit of registrations could be required. An administrative body would be needed to oversee the registration. This could be set up within DEFRA or in a new organisation; perhaps there would be synergies to administer a rechargeables mandate together with other, similar programmes such as implementation of the Waste electrical and electronic equipment (WEEE) and Restriction of the use of certain hazardous substances in electrical and electronic equipment (RoHS) Directives. Enforcement could be done through trading standards officers in coordination with inspectors from the administrative agency. A quasi-public, Internet-accessible database could be established of allowed and non-allowed products.

18.5.5 Other Impacts A rechargeables mandate is likely to spur innovation, because technical solutions would be needed to adapt many electrical and electronic applications to rechargeables. A rechargeables mandate clearly would be ‘additional’, because the market, as it currently exists, is unlikely to alter the extent of use of primary batteries to a significant degree. As discussed above, at the margin, demand for products could fall, though this depends upon how consumers perceive the cost of rechargeables. They may understand that the higher ‘up-front’ costs would be compensated by lower costs over the battery lifetime. 18.6 Social Impacts A rechargeables mandate could be perceived as regressive. It would raise prices of batteries and force the purchase of rechargers, which are likely to be less affordable to lower-income users. In our scenario development, we discussed the potential need for emergency and military equipment to be exempt from a rechargeables mandate. If this were not the case, there would be social implications for ‘users’ of such services. As a fact sheet from SF Environment 317 points out:

317 Environmental Agency of the City and County of San Francisco, CA, USA. Fact sheet at http://www.sfenvironment.com/recharge_batteries.pdf

Waste Prevention Policy Case Studies 314 “Rechargeable batteries should NOT be used for emergency equipment, because they lose up to 1% of their power capacity per day, NiMHs are not good choices for the following: • Emergency equipment (i.e.: flashlights, radios, emergency medical devices, etc…) • Low-power-use devices in difficult-to-access areas (i.e.: field monitoring devices or ceiling clocks) At 32°F (0°C) rechargeables last 20% shorter than at room temperature. Capacity drops sharply below freezing.” 18.7 Implementation & Design Issues Responsibility for definitions, exemptions, enforcement and implementation of the mandate would rest with government, presumably in consultation with the entire supply chain. There are three key stakeholder groups: battery producers, producers and retailers of electrical/electronic equipment, and organised users (e.g. emergency services or military). The latter two groups would likely oppose a rechargeables mandate. Some battery producers would join them, with the possible exception of companies that are specialised in rechargeables or alternative fuel systems. As we have hinted at above, a mandate might not be effective in and of itself. The implementation of such a mandate might best be combined with one or more of: • A target to shift the share of the market as a whole, in the spirit of producer responsibility, towards greater use of rechargeables; and one or both of: o Implementation of the Batteries Directive which specifies higher collection rates (than the minimum levels specified) so as to reduce the impact of any switches to more hazardous materials in batteries. It is possible that this measure alone could, at the margin, stimulate more switching to rechargeables (since this reduces collection costs to producers); and / or o Measures designed to prevent switching to more hazardous materials through progressive phase out of these materials. There are good precedents here in other sectors for the use of tradable allowance systems acting within a diminishing quota for the utilisation of hazardous materials (with the ultimate objective being a complete phase out). 18.8 Summary & Conclusions A rechargeables mandate on its own could have a rather limited impact. It may be difficult to specify a mandate in a manner in which it can be effective since arguably, to do so would imply forcing all appliance manufacturers to include batteries with appliances wherever they are sold. If it proved impossible, or politically undesirable, to do this, then alternative policies would be required, for example, targets and measures designed to shift the market more generally towards rechargeables. Although this type of mandate, especially where supported by targets, would be expected to prevent some volume of waste, the overall environmental benefit is not entirely clear. There may be some additional energy inefficiency associated with the use of chargers and rechargeables, whilst in the absence of accompanying measures,

Waste Prevention Policy Case Studies 315 further analysis would be required to demonstrate the impact in respect of hazardousness of the waste stream. For this reason, it might be prudent for this type of measure to be allied with measures to either reduce hazardousness of batteries which are used as rechargeables, or to ensure that their fate is far more likely to have more benign environmental outcomes (for example, by requiring high rates of collection and recycling). To be politically acceptable, a wider rechargeables mandate might require some exemptions, almost certainly for emergency equipment and perhaps for all longer- term storage applications. On the one hand, this would weaken the presumed effect of the legislation, but on the other, it would reduce the political obstacles surrounding such a measure. In short, a rechargeables mandate on its own might fail to deliver much by way of net benefits. In conjunction with other measures, it could do so, but the magnitude of these relative to the costs would require further investigation. Complicating matters somewhat is the fact that the counterfactual is not a ‘business as usual’ baseline, but a shifting one as the UK moves to implement the Batteries Directive. On the other hand, implementation of the Directive would appear to provide an ideal opportunity for policy to be designed to secure broader objectives than those specifically set out in the Directive. This would be a break with UK tradition in this respect (see Section 19). One possible way of seeking to deliver these benefits would be to establish the objectives (UK ones, not EU ones), and then seek to deliver these through a process akin to that followed in the Netherlands (see Section 13).

Waste Prevention Policy Case Studies 316

19 ‘DEEPENING’ PRODUCER RESPONSIBILITY 19.1 Description of Policy Under producer responsibility schemes, producers and importers of specific products (e.g. vehicles, electrical and electronic goods, window frames, and others) are held responsible for collection and treatment of end of life products. In general, the policy is designed as a hard obligation backed up by regulations, though there are also examples where the softer instrument of a covenant is, or was used. In the Dutch situation, regulation was applied for end of life vehicles and electrical and electronic goods, whereas, to ensure recycling of specific PVC waste streams, voluntary agreements were deemed sufficient. The obvious difference is that regulation is binding and can be enforced, where voluntary agreements are not. Note that in many cases producer responsibility schemes were developed in the context of the Implementation plans discussed in the Section 13. This implies that to some extent waste streams and data discussed in the two Sections may overlap. In the Netherlands, the organisation and execution of policy for producer responsibility usually follows the following pattern: a. The sector under examination is made responsible for organising a waste management structure that meets certain minimum requirements, e.g. with regard to recycling and re-use percentages, or collection targets. b. Both the national producers of the product and the importers of the product have to comply with this demand. c. Producers and importers can set up a waste management structure themselves, but also can delegate this (usually upon payment of financial support) to a dedicated organisation that manages the waste management structure with required specifications. d. Even in the case where the waste management is largely delegated, actors in the sector still may fulfil a role, usually as collection point (which is the case, for example, for shops selling electrical and electronic goods; they tend to be involved in the take back of old equipment as well). e. In several cases, in order to stimulate collection, a levy is charged on new products, and this money is used to finance the collection scheme. This allows owners of end of life products to bring such material for free to a collection point, rather than having to pay for it. 318 Table 82 gives some examples for arrangements in the Netherlands. Typically, when producer responsibility is implemented via legislation, all firms mentioned under c) have to organise themselves in one way or another. Firms have to show they either organise waste management themselves, or have it delegated to a specific organisation. This specific organisation usually needs to be approved by the Environment Minister, who has delegated this task to a state agency, SenterNovem.

318 Which is for instance the case when one would need to bring a sizable amount of demolition waste to a landfill.

Waste Prevention Policy Case Studies 317 A crucial aspect of the producer responsibility mechanism is the mechanism through which financial responsibility for the specific targets producers are given to the producers. This is particularly true of streams which are part of the household stream, such as packaging. In the absence of producer responsibility measures, municipalities typically collect these streams as part of household waste. The mechanism used to fund household waste collection therefore funds the collection of the targeted stream. The question then arises as to how financial responsibility is to be allocated across producers and municipalities where such streams are targeted by producer responsibility. In the UK, the tendency has been to allow much of the burden of producer responsibility to rest with municipalities, with a correspondingly small proportion of total responsibility resting with producers themselves. Packaging is a notable example in this regard. 19.2 Rationale The idea is that such producer responsibility will a) boost collection, re-use and recycling; and b) influence the design of products, leading to less product waste and less hazardous product waste. In practice, however, the immediate effect of producer responsibility is often a significant improvement of the quality of waste management. For instance, in the Netherlands, where end of life management of cars in the 1980s took the form of a quasi-legal and low-quality business – cars usually were stacked on a field and occasionally people came along to look for spare parts – by 2000, end of life vehicles were usually processed by highly professional businesses, separating useful spare parts from cars and selling them afterwards. 319 Monitoring of success is usually also focused on the question if re-use and recycling targets are met, and there is little focus on prevention. The concept of producer responsibility implies that obligated entities should be responsible for the actions which are sought as outcomes of the measures implemented. In the case of packaging, this ought to imply that obligated entities are responsible, directly or indirectly, for the costs of recycling and recovering packaging to the required levels. This was intended to be the essence of ‘extended producer responsibility’.

319 Indeed, the archetypical operators of such businesses in movies and the like were popularly depicted as big, dangerous looking men with big dogs, gypsies, or other less reputable folk.

Waste Prevention Policy Case Studies 318 Table 82: Examples of producer responsibility schemes in the Netherlands Waste stream Organisation Historical developments Targets Achievements Costs Auto Recycling Nederland (ARN) is the For each new car, a waste organisation that manages end of life management fee of 15 (!) Euro vehicles in order to realise the initial Dutch In 2005, 89% of the end is asked, per 1 January 2007. and later EU goals with regard to recycling of life vehicles were This is sufficient for ARN to pay and re-use of automotive waste. ARN is managed via the ARN recycling firms for specific owned by the organisation of car producer The targets are set in Dutch system. In this system, recycling activities that and importers, garages, and end of life End of life vehicles - Early 1990s: Implementation legislation and are somewhat the 85% recycling target is otherwise would not be vehicle firms. ARN has developed a system (www.arn.nl, accessed plan end of life vehicles more stringent than in EU met, already since 1997. profitable. Note this fee that allows for a high level of recycling of 20 February 2007; - 1996: producer responsibility legislation: Prevention is not realised: diminished tremendously since vehicles. ARN covers costs of deconstruction Decree Management Car for end of life vehicles - 2006: minimum of 80% in 2000 410 ktpa car the introduction of the system steps that are not yet profitable. Only firms Wrecks ‘Beheer implemented, and ARN re-cycling and a minimum of wrecks were processed, in 1995, when it was about that comply with ARN standards are allowed autowrakken; Dutch established 85% of recycling and where in 2006 the 115 Euro (250 NLG) per car. In to enter the system. This is checked by an National Waste - 1996-now: adjustment of recovery expected amount was fact, the system proves to be independent certification body. The system Management Plan legislation to the EU directive on - 2007: minimum of 85% 420 ktpa. Qualitative almost cost neutral and the fee allows a car owner to bring his old car to a 2002) end of life vehicles of 2000. re-cycling and 95% recycling prevention is only realised asked is almost a token sum on treatment plant without paying costs. The and recovery due to the fact that the costs of a car. This reflects system is backed up by a Decree that legislation prohibits the the learning curve achieved in imposes payment of a management fee on use of hazardous the system, as well the fact that every new car sold to ARN, and obliges materials like cadmium. higher revenues can be producer responsibility for producers and obtained for materials like importers (e.g. by seeking access to the ARN steel. system). A Decree obliges that producers and Costs of municipalities are - 1988 Waste from Electrical and importers take responsibility for collection covered by the regular waste Electronic goods identified as and treatment of waste of electrical and management fee every citizen priority waste stream in the electronic products. They have to take back Depending on the product in the Netherlands pays, where White paper on Prevention. for free any of such waste from category, recycling for retail and repair shops it is - Early 1990s: Implementation municipalities, retail, and repair shops, and Initially specific Dutch targets, percentage hover again a form of producer Electrical and electronic plan on Prevention and Re-use are also responsible for transport. currently according to the EU’s between 60 and 80%, and responsibility. The sector is equipment of Electrical and Electronic Municipalities, retail and repair shops have WEEE Directive, which are recovery percentages responsible for transport and (www.nvmp.nl, accessed products written. the obligation to take back such waste from depending on the type and between 70 and 90%. treatment costs, as indicated 20 February 2007; - Mid 1990s: discussions on consumers. Producers and importers can weight of the appliance 80%, Also here we see that they cover this by a levy on WEEE Directive; Dutch implementation via voluntary take up the responsibility via a collective 75% or 60% recovery, with prevention is not each product or by directly National Waste and legal approaches system (which has to be approved by the somewhat lower recycling rates achieved. The amount supporting the dedicated Management Plan - 1 June 1998: Decree Treatment Minister for Environment, who delegated this (all by weight): disposed of 2000 was organisation on the basis of 2002) of White and Brown Goods to state agency NOVEM). A first system 130 ktpa, but the amount market share. The levies had implemented covers the more traditional electrical and expected in 2006 will be been diminished dramatically. - 1 January 1999: Decree in force electronic products, and finances its costs 160 ktpa. They are now zero for e.g. for ‘large’ White and Brown by charging a limited levy on every new electrical tools, just 1 Euro for Goods product sold 320 . A second system has been selected small household set up by importers and producers of ICT - 1 January 2000: Decree in force appliances, and 17 Euro for

320 The system is organised by the Nederlandse vereniging Verwijdering Metalektro Produkten (Dutch organisation Management of Metal-Electro Products, NVMP) Waste Prevention Policy Case Studies 319 (computers, printers and similar), and in this for all White and Brown goods larger appliances like freezers. system the total costs of collection and - 6 July 2004: Revision of the treatment is paid by the Decree to implement the WEEE importers/producers on the basis of their and RoHS directives 321 current market share.

It is difficult to assess specific costs for management of Under the packaging covenant virtually all - plastic drink packaging packaging, particularly since relevant industries were member of the with a content of over 0.5 the costs of regular waste Organisation for Packaging and Environment litre, should be collected management (landfill, (later SVM-Pact, which in turn was replaced June 1991: First Packaging for over 95% for material - Compared to 1986 can incineration) rose as well with by Nedvang, see below). They committed Covenant signed recycling; corrected for GNP growth, almost a factor of 5-10 in just themselves to reach the targets of the June 1994: the EU Packaging - plastic drink packaging 27% less packaging was - 15 years. Nedvang now has a covenant. For the Covenant, a special Directive in force with a content of less put on the market in fixed and variable cost Packaging Commission was installed that than 0.5 litre, should be 2001 (with a target of - 1997: Second Packaging system 325 : assessed the progress and compliance of collected for over 55% for 10%) 324 . In 2004, 65% of Covenant signed, with more Fixed the Covenant. It consists in practice of a mix material recycling 323 ; the about 2.7 Mio tpa stringent targets, now however < 15 tpar: 40 Euro of industry, science, and other persons with mainly only with regard to the - for other plastic packaging was recycled of Packaging materials 15-1000 tpa: 200 Euro a clear societal position. One of the most amount of packaging that can packaging, at least 45% recovered. In the period (www.nedvang.nl and >1000 tpa: 5000 Euro important roles of the Commission is to use be landfilled and incinerated should be re-used and 2001-2006 the amount of www.svm-pact.nl, Variable (consumer packaging monitoring data (production data from 27% re-used as material packaging waste could accessed 22 February - 2001: Third Packaging only): industry, and waste management data from Covenant signed - glass packing should rise with 2/3 of economic 2007; - glass: 4.9 ct/kg the National Institute of Public Health and 1 January 2006: Decree reach 90% material growth, but this target - - metal 6.2 ct/kg Environment) to check if the goals of the ‘Beheer verpakkingen en papier recycling; was not met. The result - plastic 10.1 ct/kg covenant are met. After a decade of en karton’ [Management - paper and cardboard was a higher than - paper 0.19 ct/kg covenants, it was decided to arrange the Packaging and paper and packaging should reach expected amount of - other: 0 ct/kg producer responsibility legally. Nedvang is cardboard] introduced, that 75% material recycling; incinerated and landfilled The administrative burden now the main organisation that collects arranges producer responsibility - metal packaging should amount of packaging in proved to be relatively high for packaging fees, arranges contracts with for these materials 322 . reach 85% material 2005. firms putting small amounts of waste management firms to realise the recycling . packaging on the market, and desired collection and treatment targets, wood packaging should - dedicated fees have been etc. reach 25% material agreed for them. recycling In 2005, authorities performed some 200 site visits to control

321 Decree OF July 6, 2004 establishing rules for the management of waste electrical and electronic equipment and for the use of certain hazardous substances in electrical and electronic equipment (WEEE Management Decree). Available via http://www.vrom.nl/pagina.html?id=7107, accessed 22 February 2007 322 See http://www.vrom.nl/pagina.html?id=9171, accessed 23 February 2007 323 Note that in former regulations and covenants only re-fillable bottles were allowed, unless an LCA showed that a system based on material re-use would perform better environmentally. 324 See e.g. http://www.fnli.nl/werkgebieden/conv-verp2.php, accessed 23 February 2007 325 Unfortunately neither Nedvang nor its predecessor, SVM Pact has published data on the total financial contribution of packaging firms to the system. Waste Prevention Policy Case Studies 320 the system. For improving waste management of batteries a regulations were implemented. In 1995 a Decree on waste management of (small) batteries was implemented, that enforced producer responsibility. Importers and producers of batteries became obliged to take back batteries for free and take care - Early 1990s: presentation of of treatment. Collection is organised via a Batteries (National studies on batteries 327 and About 70% separate Companies selling batteries in general collection system of household Waste Management development of the collection and treatment the Netherlands pay a levy to hazardous waste by municipalities (paid Plan 2002, part 29; Implementation plan in 1999, improving up to Stibat according to weight: from the regular Waste management fee) or 90% separate collection and Annual Report Stibat, Batteries 328 . 83% in 2005. The < 50 gram: 2ct/battery retail shops (‘battery box’). Importers and treatment in 1999 2005; www.stibat.nl, - 1995 implementation of the batteries collected where < 150 gram: 6 ct/battery producers of batteries decided to set up a accessed 22 February Decree on waste management for 100% recycled and re- …mounting up to 54 ct/battery Foundation, Stibat, which would arrange 2007) of small batteries used. for a weight of 751-1.000 gram waste management of batteries for them

(upon financial compensation). 326 Due to the rather low collection levels discussions on a deposit scheme for batteries popped up various times, but this has never materialised in the Netherlands. Stibat still tries to realise the high targets of 90% collection via voluntary incentives. In the early 1990s, PVC came under strong By 2000, however, only a The goal was obviously to pressure due to among others (perceived) tiny 50 tpa was collected, realise a boost in recycling of problems in the waste management stage. whereas it was expected window frames and similar PVC Incineration would contribute to a lot of flue See former column. Due to the very that 1000 to 2000 tpa flows. The costs for the Dutch system gas cleaning residue (and according to low collection and recycling rates, window frames would The Voluntary Commitment of were about 2.3 Euro per new some: dioxin formation), landfill would also in other EU countries, and enter the waste stage. the PVC industry now sets the window in 2000. However, create a burden for the future of ongoing pressure on the PVC sector Apart from collection following targets for 2005: these costs were sufficient to organochlorines, stabilisers, etc. Under this from NGOs and policy makers, the problems, this may be due PVC materials (window 50% recycling of window cover the chain deficit of the pressure the representative organisations of PVC sector in the EU decided to to a longer than expected frames, pipes, cables) frames and pipes; small amount of collected window, pipe and cable producers and commit itself in realising higher lifetime of PVC window 50% recycling of membranes window frames in that year. importers offered the Ministry a voluntary targets in the future. The Vinyl 2010 frames, re-use of A catch though is that these Costs will significantly rise agreement to recycle post consumer waste. Voluntary Commitment of the PVC windows, or other percentages apply to the when higher collection rates For window frames, the Foundation industry now sets targets as listed in recycling. ‘collectable available are achieved. Recycling Association of Plastic Window and the right column. Also at European level it quantities of post consumer Profile Producers (SRVKG) organised the appears difficult to realise waste’, not the real amount of system. Members would pay a fee to deal significant targets; for post consumer waste. with the chain deficit in the treatment instance, in 2005 the

326 Other regulations saw upon qualitative improvement of waste by banning hazardous substances like mercury. This is relevant, but of course is not related to producer responsibility 327 Informatiedocument Batterijen (Information Document Batteries), RIVM, Bilthoven, Netherlands, 1991, Report 73902014 328 Implementatieplan Batterijen [Implementation plan Batteries], Publication Series Waste Management 1992/9, Environment Ministry, den Haag, Netherlands. Waste Prevention Policy Case Studies 321 system of collected amounts of waste. The recycling rate was about landfill ban on recyclable building and 31% for membranes. demolition waste of 1997 and landfill taxes implemented later stimulated closed loop recycling of post use windows as well. Furthermore, the Environment Minister used a generic legal power to declare the voluntary initiative ‘generally binding’, i.e. that individual firms were not allowed to neglect the scheme.

Waste Prevention Policy Case Studies 322 When examining the UK system, based upon PRNs, it would be tempting to take the cost of acquiring PRNs as the cost of complying with the Directive. Yet this is clearly not the case. The costs of collection of the materials being collected is not always being borne by those responsible, except in the instances where those obligated achieve part of their obligation through their own activities (in which case, they pay for the collection and recycling of these materials). This is not true of those materials which enter the household waste stream. In these cases, the costs of materials collection and recycling are being met by local authorities, and hence, taxpayers in general. The cost of PRNs has typically been around £45 million. However, mainly local authorities shoulder the cost of household packaging collections. The costs of collecting over 1 million tonnes of packaging from households (see Table 83) are difficult to estimate since different materials incur different costs. However, it is likely to have been of the order £100 million (in other words, twice the value of PRN revenues in a typical year). Table 83: Packaging In Different Streams and Estimate Household Capture Rate in 2003 2003 Packflow Hhld In Household In stream In C&I Stream Estimate (hhld, direct Capture Stream and from residual) Rate Paper 3,839,000 959,750 2,879,250 179,100 19% Glass 2,700,000 2,025,000 675,000 717,400 35% Steel 676,000 473,200 202,800 124,300 26% Aluminum 146,000 138,700 7,300 16,000 12% Plastic 2,174,000 1,391,360 782,640 36,300 3%

There is no transparent mechanism through which funds are transferred from obligated entities to local authorities. It could be argued that some of the value from PRN sales will be passed on to the waste collectors as the balance between supply of materials and demand tightens. But the degree to which this actually happens is a) difficult to estimate, and b) less than transparent. From the perspective of a local authority treasurer, the potential instability of any support related to revenues from PRN / PERN sales is unlikely to constitute an argument for implementing a collection system for packaging where none currently exists. The arguments for doing so are likely to relate to other issues, among them, national targets, EU-related targets, the (excluding PRN revenue) financial situation, and broader environment / political concerns. The unstable nature of the potential revenue related to market-determined revenues from PRN sales is unlikely to persuade a local authority to do what it otherwise would not. If obligated entities need to increase recycling of packaging from the household waste stream, then who should pay for this? The intention of producer responsibility is to make the costs fall on the producers / consumers. The only way to do this is to make producers fund the collection of packaging from households, as happens in many other countries. Why should local authorities pay at all for recycling packaging? 19.3 Scenario Development The proposed measure would imply re-framing the existing Packaging Regulations in the following way:

323 • Targets would be set at higher levels than currently; • Producers would be required to fund packaging collections from households. This could happen either through funding collections directly, or supporting collections through fixed payments, set at a level designed to support the full cost of packaging collections. The full detail of the measure would need to be considered carefully. Critically, the system would need to be fair in ensuring that the cost of collecting and treating household packaging fell upon those who bore principle responsibility. 19.4 Environmental Impacts of the Policy

19.4.1 Waste Prevention Effects As long as the costs of complying with obligations under the Packaging Directive do not fall entirely on producers, the incentive to alter behaviour is diminished relative to the situation in which the burden of compliance falls entirely on the producers and vendors of packaging. It seems reasonable to argue that if the costs of complying with their obligations fall fully on producers, then the incentive to reduce those compliance costs – either through packaging minimisation or through switching materials – would increase. The actual effects are difficult to estimate in advance. Studies concerning the German DSD system hint at the positive effects of the DSD regarding waste prevention. Prognos AG calculated an 18 % decrease between 1991 – 2000 (1.6 Mio. tons/y in 2000) of packaging material in Germany caused by the DSD system. The figure was estimate using a hypothetical calculation based on packaging material developments with and without the existence of the DSD. 329 The second study was carried out by the Öko-Institut commissioned by the DSD. 330 The results of the work showed a 4% decrease in packaging material in Germany over the period 1990 – 1999. The Öko-Institut pointed out that this decline followed a long period of continuous increases in packaging material and packaging waste. Furthermore the Netherlands (which until recently, organised producer responsibility through a voluntary covenant – see Table 82) showed an increase of packaging material (15 – 20%) over the same period. The Öko-Institut estimated that the relative effect (relative to the growth experienced in the Netherlands) of the DSD on waste prevention could be about 25 %. The Öko-Institut suggested a need for deeper investigations concerning, in particular, the topic of waste prevention and the effects of DSD to obtain a more authoritative picture. The task of isolating the effects of policy on waste prevention is clearly not trivial because other developments and influences (GDP growth rates, materials switching in the packaging sector, light weighting of packaging) need to be taken into account. Table 83 indicates that in the UK, around 5 million tonnes of packaging were in the household stream. The above estimates suggest that it might not be unreasonable to assume a prevention effect of the order 5%, or 250,000 tonnes.

329 Assessment of Sustainability and the Perspectives of the DSD, Prognos AG, commissioned by the Duales System Deutschland AG, Düsseldorf, June 2002. 330 Advantage of the Green Dot for the Environment, Öko-Institut, commissioned by the Duales System Deutschland AG, Düsseldorf, March 2002.

324 19.4.2 Waste Recycling Effects The UK’s performance in terms of packaging recycling is not especially good compared to leading countries in Europe. In 2004, the UK was (according to European Commission statistics): • 12 th in terms of performance on paper and board; • 14 th in terms of performance on glass; • 14 th in terms of performance on plastics; and • 14 th in terms of performance on metals. Even so, eight years after the Packaging Regulations were introduced, there are repeated discussions concerning whether or not the UK will meet targets set under the Regulations. There is a sense in which the rationale for the implementation of the Packaging Regulations has been lost. The focus appears to be, mainly, on just meeting the European Directive targets. There is little by way of serious discussion about implementing the Directive in a different way, even though, ironically, there are frequent discussions about increasing targets for recycling in the household waste stream, not least in the consultation on the English waste strategy. If household packaging was recycled at the maximum rates achieved by other EU states, then in 2003, instead of just over 1 million tonnes of packaging being recycled, 3.7 million tonnes would have been recycled. Needless to say, there would be no discussion concerning whether or not EU Packaging Directive targets would be met. An additional 617,000 tonnes of biodegradable waste would be diverted from landfill, contributing to meeting Landfill Directive targets. It is worth referring to Table 82 for an overview of the achievements in the Netherlands with regard to improvement of the management of end of life vehicles, electrical and electronic goods and small batteries in the Netherlands. The information is given in the Table in terms of tonnes of waste managed via a specific route. As indicated, producer responsibility was a supportive means to reach these targets; the targets in themselves were instrumental in realising these goals. We see in general that where legal targets and producer responsibility were implemented in binding ways, targets usually were met (with the exception of batteries). The voluntary PVC recycling system was much less successful in realising high targets.

19.4.3 Climate Change Impacts In order to understand the potential economic consequences of this measure, it is worth considering the social benefits associated with the greenhouse gas savings related to recycling of specific materials. For the dry recyclables, the savings (relative to landfilling) are of the order: • For aluminium: 7-11 tonnes CO 2 equivalent • For steel: 0.7 – 1.5 tonnes CO 2 equivalent • For HDPE: 0.5 – 1.4 tonnes CO 2 equivalent • For PET: 1.0 - 1.8 tonnes CO 2 equivalent • For glass: 0.29 – 0.6 tonnes CO 2 equivalent • For paper: 0.63 – 3.0 tonnes CO 2 equivalent • For card: 0.2 – 2.5 tonnes CO 2 equivalent The suggestion is that the benefits derived from additional recycling are likely to be significant. For waste prevention, the effects depend upon the recycled content of the

325 material whose use is being prevented. The higher is the recycled content of the material, the lower will be the benefits from prevention. 19.5 Economic Impact of the Policy One of the most interesting aspects of the measure is that the nature of funding for: a) compliance with the Packaging Regulations; and b) local authority waste collections would change as a result of the measure. As far as packaging is concerned, one would expect: a) Costs to producers to increase, possibly to the tune of around £200 million. Depending upon the elasticity of demand for packaging, a proportion of the costs of this would be passed through to consumers; b) Costs to taxpayers to fall by roughly the same amount. Beyond consideration of packaging, there is a more general pattern to be considered. Essentially, producer responsibility mechanisms hold out the promise of the collection of materials for recycling being funded by those upon whom the obligation falls. This has the interesting effect of shifting the burden of cost away from taxpayers and towards obligated entities (and consumers of packaging and products). This is what producer responsibility mechanisms should be designed to do. 19.6 Social Impacts The social impacts ought to be positive in that: • Additional jobs are created in reprocessing; and • Packaging recycling and recovery is funded through a fairer system (the polluters, rather than the generality of taxpayers, pay). There might be some regressivity in the measure. The cost of goods would be expected to internalise the full costs of the enhanced producer responsibility measure.

19.7 Implementation & Design Issues The principle design issue is the change from the existing system to the revised policy. However, the Netherlands has made a not so dissimilar change. Evidently, producers would be opposed to the plan. However, this type of approach is the only one which offers enhanced incentives for waste prevention through producer responsibility. 19.8 Summary & Conclusions Producer responsibility has proven to be an effective way to improve waste management practices and re-use and recycling levels significantly, at relatively low costs for authorities and society as a whole. A sector takes responsibility for realising the agreed targets, and is hence able to work out the most efficient way of doing this. Up until now, there is limited proof that producer responsibility leads to significant prevention. The principle reason for this is that almost all systems have, as their central aim, improving collection and the level of treatment/recycling. Logic dictates that the greater the proportion of the overall cost which producers have to bear, the greater will the motivation be for waste prevention. The incentive for

326 ‘design for recycling’ or ‘design for prevention’ is more limited where producer responsibility limits the degree of financial responsibility of the obligated producers. The UK systems tend to be quite weak in this regard. Strengthening them is likely to improve the incentive for waste prevention, with a number of other positive consequences.

327

20 COLLABORATIVE PROCUREMENT 20.1 Description of Policy This policy was suggested for further evaluation in a late stage in the project at the request of Defra. It is worth stating that the term is not widely used, and that procurement approaches tend to have a wider remit than waste prevention, if indeed waste prevention is considered at all. By collaborative procurement in this context, we mean traditional Green Public procurement, but focused on the issue of waste reduction, and carried out not by one individual authority alone, but organised across a number of public authorities. The idea is, simply stated, that by adjusting procurement policies, less waste could arise. If the policy was to be designed to focus on waste prevention, this creates a number of problems. a. the policy is derived from Green public procurement (GPP). This is now a fairly well understood approach, implying that an authority tries to buy and use products that have a relatively low impact on the environment during the whole life cycle. It is hence based on an integrated environmental assessment of different types of impacts. This directly indicates the somewhat odd situation that the current policy proposal may imply. The suggestion would be to develop a GPP scheme that focuses on waste issues mainly or exclusively. But this can have very undesirable consequences. In theory an authority could decide to use low-waste products that generate many other undesirable impacts (energy use, toxics, etc.). b. Even if it would be justified to focus on waste only, it is not very clear what kind of evaluation criteria for ‘low waste products’ should be used. Should it be waste during production? Or waste after buying at end-of-life? Or both (i.e. life cycle perspective)? The latter would make most sense, but particularly for products where production generates a lot of waste, reminding ourselves of the focus of this particular study, we mainly solve an industrial waste problem, not a household waste problem. c. Since it concerns products purchased by authorities , the degree to which the policy can affect quantities of household waste is limited. Household waste does not simply include ‘waste from households’ (see Section 16.2). Reduction in the amount of household waste can occur to the extent that local authorities procure materials which subsequently become household waste. Even so, the amount of waste generated by local authority offices and other operations (where procurement may have some influence on waste reduction) pales in comparison to waste generated by households, and collected as part of cleansing services. To sum up, GPP can be a very powerful tool for authorities to create markets for cleaner products (including products generating low amounts of waste). Yet, GPP should always have an integrated scope on environmental problems, much broader than waste, and has a limited relation to the generation of household waste.

328 Given the interest in having a sound description of the pros and cons of ‘collaborative procurement’, we give this analysis here. However, this analysis is only indirectly related waste prevention policy, and is, more correctly, a generic policy stimulating greener markets, with the view that this will enable greater choice/more competitive pricing for householders who wish to engage in green purchasing, including waste prevention directed purchases. 20.2 Rationale At the 2002 World Summit on Sustainable Development in Johannesburg a Plan of Implementation was agreed. Paragraph 18c of that Plan states that relevant authorities at all levels should: “Promote public procurement policies that encourage development and diffusion of environmentally sound goods and services” . Each year councils in England spend almost £40 billion 331 of public money “externally”. This represents about half of local government’s overall expenditure. It is clear that expenditure of £40bn makes local government a significant consumer of goods and services. This is a market position that needs to be handled sensibly. It can provide councils collectively with significant potential for savings and provides leverage with suppliers. The rationale for implementing general GPP schemes is to transform markets in such a way that greener products increase their share of the market. This can occur through ensuring that the evaluation of tenders received in response to procurement notices is carried out in such a way that environmental criteria (and not only price) are taken into account. Collaborative procurement, as envisaged here, goes a little further than this. It actively seeks to achieve a ‘stretch’ on environmental performance by pushing tenderers to offer ‘leading edge design of products and services so as to suppress environmental impacts. We will describe in the next sections some aspects of the policy, in part based on a report that discusses the implications of the EU directives on public procurement for sustainable purchasing. 20.3 Scenario Development The policy implies that in the purchasing procedure, quality criteria are introduced with regard to environmental characteristics of the products. At the same time, since public procurement has to be ‘value free’, ‘impartial’, non-corrupted and fair, the EU and member states have set rules that must guarantee that procurement takes place in a context of fair and open competition. It cannot be that, via the guise of GPP, some suppliers are tacitly placed in a position of advantage, where others are de facto ruled out from the procedure. Therefore, the procedure has to comply with certain standards. How GPP has to be organised is, in fact, subject to thorough discussion among legal experts, and important jurisprudence at EU and national level has been developed. A thorough

331 £40 billion is calculated from Local Government Financial Statistics No 13 2002, ODPM National Statistics Jan 2003 pages 56, 132, 131. It includes an element of HRA, Repairs and Maintenance – Capital Expenditure, new construction, vehicles and equipment

329 analysis of this matter is not possible here, and so we confine ourselves to giving a summary of an earlier study done on this subject. 332 A typical public procurement procedure consists of the following phases: 1. definition of the contract; 2. development of technical specifications; 3. selection of the candidates (based on exclusion criteria); 4. award of the contract (based on award criteria) 5. execution of the contract. In almost all of these phases, environmental criteria can play a role. In the contract definition phase, the rules of the procurement procedure are set. In the next phase, the technical specifications – which may include environmental specifications – are determined. Then, candidate suppliers are selected on the basis of exclusion criteria specified. After this, the contract is awarded to a selected supplier on the basis of the award criteria. How the contract is executed also may play a role. A very important choice in public procurement procedures is the selection of the basis for awarding the contracts: a) based on the lowest price, or b) the most advantageous offer. In practice, the latter approach forms a better opportunity to give environmental matters a powerful place in the procurement procedure. If the award is on the basis of the lowest price, all products that meet the technical specifications set, and candidates that comply with the exclusion criteria provide that, must be accepted. One cannot balance price with any difference in quality of the product: the suppliers that offer the lowest price must be awarded the contract. If the procedure is based on the procedure of the most advantageous offer, however, the situation is different. Again, only suppliers that meet the technical specifications and exclusion criteria enter the award procedure. But here, the purchaser now has the possibility to weigh up, for example, a somewhat higher price with a better environmental performance – that is, if the purchaser has announced this decision rule in advance when defining the contract. Usually, the purchaser presents in advance a formula or procedure how he wants to weigh price against other aspects that he/she finds of importance. In such a procedure, it is, for instance, possible for a municipality to buy buses that are slightly more expensive than the ones of another supplier, if they generate, for example, much lower NOx and PM10 emissions. Since the broader goal of GPP is not to select greener products in individual procedures but to green the markets as a whole, it is obvious that GPP will work best if applied by a large number of public authorities. For this reason, in several countries GPP networks have been set up, to support authorities in GPP. 333 This, however, does not necessarily imply that such authorities make best use of their collective buying power. The measure envisaged implies that authorities seek to push the boundaries of product specification through the elaboration of the tender

332 Pels Rijcken en Droogleever Fortuijn (PRDF; the Dutch State Attorney) and TNO (2002) Pilot Study on Sustainable Purchasing and the EU Directives on Public Procurement . PRDF/TNO/Ministry of Environment, Den Haag, Netherlands 333 The aforementioned Dutch study was performed in support of a Dutch GPP network. In Japan, GPP got even institutionalized backing by a Green Purchasing Law, that obliges public authorities to buy green, This, in turn is supported by a Green Purchasing Network in which scientists, government and industry participate, and Green Product exhibitions showing very clearly what green products are.

330 documents, and the evaluation methodology. The potential for doing this is assessed in what follows in the context of UK procurement policy.

20.3.1 UK Government Approach The Government’s approach to sustainable development in government departments and agencies was set out in the Framework for Sustainable Development on the Government Estate launched in July 2002 (www.sustainable-development.gov.uk). This builds on the work of the former Greening Government initiative. The material contained in that online toolkit included: • OGC-DEFRA Joint Note on Environmental Issues in Purchasing • Green Guide for Buyers • Green Claims Code The Framework commits all Government departments to identify their most significant sustainable development impacts as the basis for prioritising the introduction of an Environmental Management System (EMS) based on EMAS2 or ISO 14000 or similar. For office sites these were to be in place by March 2004. Other key features of the Framework included: • Planned development of targets for all environmental impacts • Extension of the Framework to cover social issues Government departments were obliged to develop plans to target all their significant impacts, and allocate their resources accordingly. Targets for environmental management systems, travel and water were announced in July 2002. This Framework did not, in itself, directly address the issue of procurement. It only did so insofar as this was considered part of the implementation of environmental management systems (which, clearly, it should be). In November 2001, DEFRA announced that a cross-Whitehall Sustainable Procurement Group would be established to develop recommendations on the procurement of sustainable goods and services within the framework of EC public procurement rules. The Group’s report was published in October 2003 (www.sustainable-development.gov.uk). It supported a risk-based approach to sustainable procurement. It also identified where ‘Quick Wins’ could be made in the areas of office supplies, other equipment, larger plant and consumables by buying products that meet standards for energy efficiency, recycled content and biodegradability. Following publication of the report, in November 2003, Defra and OGC announced a mandatory requirement for all new government department contracts to comply with the specified environmental standards (‘Quick Win specifications’). This meant that all Departments were expected to buy goods that meet or exceed the specifications identified, or to account for the discrepancy. These specifications were published by OGC Buying Solutions: (http://www.ogcbuyingsolutions.gov.uk) together with information on the OGCbs framework agreements (e.g. G-Cat) that could be used to acquire goods and services meeting the specifications. Examples of Quick Win specifications are: • PCs - “Energy Star” requirements • Copying paper - 100% recycled content - minimum 75% post-consumer waste • Paper for printed publications - minimum 60% recycled content - of which 75% is post-consumer waste • Kitchen and toilet tissue - 100% recycled content.

331 • Growing media and soil improvers - all ingredients to be derived from the processing & /or re-use of waste materials. The above presentation shows that UK Government has begun to take this issue very seriously, recognizing the power that Government spending (and hence, procurement) can have on the nature of the market place, including that for recycled materials.

20.3.2 Local Government Procurement ODPM launched a new National Procurement Strategy for Local Government in October of 2004. The Strategy sought to bring together lessons from various key reports, including: 1. Delivering Better Services to Citizens (the Byatt Report); 2. Rethinking Construction (the Egan Report); and 3. the Second Report on the Private Finance Initiative (the Bates II Report), The Strategy also highlighted the impacts of: • The Local Government Act 2003 • The Local e-Government Strategy • Best Value and CPA • Race equality in procurement • Reform of the EC Public Procurement Regime • Cross Government thinking in relation to Procurement (OGC) • Reducing Red Tape (Cabinet Office) • The Treasury Cross Cutting Review of the role of voluntary and community sectors in service delivery and Efficiency Review (Treasury, OGC, Cabinet Office).

20.3.3 Local Government Act The Strategy notes that the Local Government Act 2003 helps move the policy context for procurement forward. It notes that freedoms and flexibilities introduced through the new Act in relation to procurement include: • a prudential capital finance system, which will enable councils to borrow for capital investment without central government consent, as long as they can afford to service the debt; • power for the Government to authorise councils in the “fair”, “good” and “excellent” performance categories to trade in relation to any of their ordinary functions • new powers for all councils to charge for discretionary services. The Government was also committed to increasing the opportunities for councils to work in partnerships.

20.3.4 Best Value Best Value Circular 03/2003 on Best Value and Performance Improvement from ODPM explains how the messages of the Byatt Taskforce and the Government’s Best Value Review should be built into each council’s approach to Best Value: “Each calls for innovative approaches to commissioning, procuring, and providing services which genuinely challenge existing ways of doing things and enable service users, staff and management to feel engaged and involved throughout. The cross-cutting review of the Role of the Voluntary and

332 Community Sector in Service Delivery, echoed this amongst voluntary sector providers”. It goes on: “Within procurement, the Government’s definition of “best“best value” is “the optimum combination of whole life costs and benefits to meet the customer’s requirement”. This approach enables sustainabilisustainabilityty andand quality to be taken into account. For example, the consideration of whole life costs allows factors such as fuel efficiency and replacement cycles to be taken into account.” While this falls short of requiring the environmental and social costs of purchasing decisions to be quantified (an extremely difficult and fraught task) and included in purchasing decisions, it does extend the base for decision making away from simple consideration of the upfront purchase price and enables the costs of impacts from use, which are likely to have environmental implications, to be considered.

20.3.5 EC Public Procurement Regime In addition to the UK local government legislation mentioned above, there are legal requirements that govern procurement by public authorities, including councils, right across the European Union. In the UK these are set out in public procurement regulations that implement EC directives on supplies, services, works and procurement by utilities. The regulations provide remedies for aggrieved suppliers if the rules are flouted, including the ability to seek redress in the UK courts. Modernisation and simplification of the EC public procurement regime has been on the agenda for some years. EU member states recently agreed a package of changes to the EC public procurement directives. These changes streamline and simplify the rules for both public bodies and utilities. The IDeA provides advice on these matters to Local Government.

20.3.6 Sustainable Procurement National Action Plan The Government’s 2005 Sustainable Development Strategy set out the goal of making the UK a leader in the EU in sustainable procurement by 2009. In response to this a Sustainable Procurement Taskforce was established to develop a Sustainable Procurement National Action Plan. The Plan was launched on 12 June 2006 and makes the following key recommendations: 1. The Government must lead by example. Policy statements have not been translated into procurement decisions. To address this, the Task Force recommends a clear commitment from the very top of Government and down through Permanent Secretaries, local authority members and chief executives in all public bodies. This should be cascaded down through both government targets and performance management systems and progress monitored by external scrutiny bodies. 2. The Government must set clear prioritiespriorities. The Task Force recommends that government rationalise the significant number of (sometimes competing) policies through procurement into a single integrated sustainable procurement framework. 3. ThThThe Th e Government should raise the barbar. Existing standards should be enforced and extended across the public sector and new standards developed in priority areas. This will raise the performance of buying and selling organisations and of the products and services being procured and give clear signals to the

333 marketplace on future requirements. The Task Force recommends working with suppliers to identify future needs and to phase out products and services that fall below minimum standards by 2009. 4. The public secsectortor must build capacitycapacity. The task force noted that procurers reported a lack of unambiguous information and training, confused messaging and lack of tools showing how to put sustainability into practice. The Action Plan requires a new commitment to training and education for public sector procurers as part of the delivery of the National Action Plan, alongside rapid implementation of the Government’s existing plans to develop a robust knowledge base on the sustainability impacts of products. 5. The GovernmenGovernmentt needs to remove barriers to sustainable procurementprocurement.procurement Evidence submitted to the Task Force suggested that whole life costing was not being implemented in practice, the focus is on lower upfront costs and the Government’s Efficiency Programme was perceived to be a barrier to sustainable procurement. Other barriers recorded were the split between management of operation and capital budgets and uncertainty on how to take account of non-monetary benefits. The Task Force wants to see these barriers removed. The Task Force, recommends that HM Treasury simplify and clarify existing guidance on whole life costing and reinforces the requirement that it is applied in public spending. 6. The public sector needs to capture opportunities for innovation and social benefits and to manage risk better through smarter engagement with the market. This will require better engagement with suppliers.

20.3.7 : Market Transformation Programme & ‘Quick Wins’ List The Market Transformation Programme (MTP) is a government-funded initiative that supports the development and implementation of UK Government policy on sustainable products. The MTP works by providing consensus-based information to Government, its agencies, industry, trade bodies and others who are involved in designing and implementing policies and measures that influence the environmental impact of products. The Programme: • Gathers evidence and draws up action plans in consensus with a wide range of stakeholders. • Quantifies the impact of products, and develops plans for how various policy measures could best transform the market for each major product type. • Estimates the environmental impact savings that could be achieved through the proposed mix of policies to help prioritisation. • Works with stakeholders to publish reliable information about the environmental performance of products as well as current and anticipated future performance standards. • Seeks to establish the role that innovation could play in achieving policy goals. 334 The MTP has published a list of key products that public sector organisations purchase, and recommended minimum procurement specifications for those products. The list covers specifications for 54 types of items including: Computers,

334 http://www.mtprog.com/Background.aspx

334 CRT & LCD Monitors, Printers, Copiers, Copy Paper, Paper for Printed Publications, Envelopes, Cars, Gas Boilers, Central Heating Systems, Lighting systems, Detergents, Low flush Toilets etc. The 2006 Candidate Specifications can be downloaded from: http://www.mtprog.com/ReferenceLibrary/Quick_Wins_Candidate_Specifications_Se p_2005.pdf . 335

20.3.8 The Charted Institute of Purchasing and Supply The Institute of Environmental Management and Assessment and The Chartered Institute of Purchasing and Supply have produced a guide on Environmental Purchasing in Practice with the support of the NHS Purchasing and Supply Agency. The guide explains how the environment can be considered at each of the key stages in the purchasing process. The document makes the connection between supply chain management and environmental management systems (EMS). Finally a number of good practice examples and case studies are included - references and website addresses are also provided. The document can be downloaded from: http://www.cips.org/BigPage.asp?PageID=647&CatID=205

20.3.9 Waste Resources Action Programme (WRAP) WRAP’s procurement programme focuses on stimulating purchasing of recycled materials in the paper and construction sectors. Guidance, toolkits, case studies, and product information are made available through the programme.336

20.3.10 Using Buying Power - Co-operative Procurement The Fraunhofer Institut in Germany is one of a number of bodies to have studied the potential for co-operative procurement (and the ‘mass-buying power’ which results) to contribute to innovation in environmental design. The approach involves groups of entities – local authorities, or hotels, of financial bodies – coming together to specify a contract for a product which performs ‘above’ existing best practice. The theory is that sellers, recognising that the contract is a large one (and that the product specification is in line with what others may subsequently wish to procure), innovate to ensure that they comply with the product specification. The results of the Fraunhofer Institut work illustrated the potential of this type of procurement to accelerate the rate of product innovation in areas such as water consumption, energy use, and materials use.

20.3.11 Using Buying Power - Influencing Purchasing Consortia There are at least 13 purchasing consortia operating on behalf of local authorities. Some (such as the Central Buying Consortium) arrange framework contracts for purchases. Others (such as Yorkshire Purchasing Organisation) have a stores-based operation. These consortia may also serve other customers (such as schools). They compete with individual suppliers and catalogue operators from the private sector.

335 A version of the specifications is also available from the Office of Government Commerce (OGC) website: http://www.ogcbuyingsolutions.gov.uk/environmental/products/environmental_quickwins_home.asp 336 http://www.wrap.org.uk/procurement/index.html

335 A number of purchasing consortia already have green flags in their catalogues to indicate environmental products. However, current practice does not make users aware of the full range of products that have recycled content: A variety of flags are used, awarded according to different criteria. Recycled content is not systematically identified. (For example, an eco-labelled paper may be flagged but have zero recycled content.) Many products do not carry a label, such as building products, tissue hygiene products and furniture. In order to achieve the objectives outlined above, local authorities should be asking purchasing consortia to identify clearly those products that contribute to their sustainability policy objectives – as a guide to buyers. 20.4 Environmental Impacts of the Policy The environmental impacts of the policy are difficult to estimate at this stage. It would require insight in how much of the public procurement would take place according to GPP principles, and how much reduction of life cycle impact each GPP procedure would entail. To our knowledge no statistical insight is available in either of the elements. However, what is clear is that the potential impact can be very large. Typically, governments are responsible for about 20% or more of the final consumption in a country, and a significant part of (material) investments and infrastructure. If they were to apply GPP on broad scale, this would send a tremendous signal to the market, and transform the public sector market. How much the reduction in environmental impact will be depends, again, on the type of product and the greener alternative purchased. Yet, it is well known from ecodesign studies that product designs do not have to be not too radically improved to give up to a Factor 2 reduction in environmental impact (e.g. a low energy fridge compared to the average fridge sold in the early 1990s, low energy and low water use washing machines, etc.). Such a move also gives clear market signals, and (like energy labelling) spurs producers to improve their products even more. As discussed above, the aim of co-operative procurement is to push the boundaries of product performance. Consequently, the approach has the potential to give impetus to product innovation through ensuring that the combination of collective buying power and careful tender specification, combined with appropriate evaluation procedures, delivers environmentally superior responses from tenderers. It is not clear how this measure could impact upon waste prevention, still less, household waste prevention. In addition, if the counterfactual is more conventional ‘green procurement’ (which simply seeks to ensure favourable treatment of greener products already in the market place), so that one is evaluating the effects only of the measure designed to accelerate product innovation, then the impact on waste prevention might be expected to be relatively small, although there could be spill-over effects from procurement of products and services by municipalities to products purchased by households. 20.5 Economic Impact of the Policy The economic impact of the policy is difficult to assess, given the fact that so many different products can be at stake. In some cases green products may be a little more

336 expensive, or even much more expensive, but in other cases the price differential will be almost zero, or be compensated by other benefits. Indeed, one effect of this type of approach would be expected to be a reduction in prices for greener products (relative to the counterfactual). There will be industrial losers, but others will still deliver the products and so the net impact on industry is unlikely to be significant (and might, rather, be positive to the extent that consumption shifts to higher value- added products). Obviously, the purchasing department of a public authority has to get used to acquaint itself with different approaches to procurement, which will imply an initial effort. Once this is done, however, it is unlikely that purchasing procedures will be much more costly as they were previously. It is unlikely that there would be important distributional effects, and the approach clearly is a way to transform markets, thereby creating a dynamic in support of green innovation. 20.6 Dynamic Effects of the Policy One of the key objectives of the policy is to call forward innovation. Whilst GPP carried out by one municipality on its own may improve environmental quality by changing the impact of procurement in that authority, the rationale for procuring on a co-operative basis is to make use of collective purchasing power to drive forward innovation. Where tenders are made sufficiently attractive (because of the volume of business available to the winning company), it is expected that the weight of purchasing power can accelerate the rate of product innovation in environmentally positive directions. Once again, the effect on waste prevention may be one positive consequence of this, but the focus might be wider than ‘just’ waste. Another dynamic effect, mentioned above, is to change prices in the market place. Volume purchasing of greener products can enable producers to benefit from scale economies. These products ought, as a result, to become cheaper. Ultimately, they may become more competitive than traditional, ‘less-green’ products. It is, therefore, primarily a tool for product policy, rather than waste policy. 20.7 Social Impacts It is difficult to see potential non – cost related social impacts. GPP is by nature holistic, so HSE impacts should be included in the deliberation. Some companies will be disfavoured by the new purchasing criteria, but this is the intention. The rationale of the measure is to shift the nature of the market in favour of environmentally superior products and services. Such companies would be forced to adopt existing techniques and innovate, seeking to green their production as well. 20.8 Implementation & Design Issues The principles of GPP, in the general sense, are well accepted across Europe – in government and public circles. A problem, though, is that particularly when high volume procurement procedures are at stake, and the stakes literally are very high, heel-digging behaviour of supplier who are potentially placed at a disadvantage in the process. There is a growing body of jurisprudence relating to cases where a party which lost a bid where environmental criteria played a role, went to court and tried to nullify the award decision of the purchaser. This usually occurred on the grounds (or

337 so it was argued) that the award criteria were set so strictly that normal competition was ruled out. To a degree, this reflects attempts on the behalf of the affected suppliers to use ‘scare tactics’ to influence public purchasing departments in the hope that these will not exercise their green purchasing power. The counter-remedy is obviously the type of activity that countries like Japan, the Netherlands and others now display: developing good guidance on how to organise GPP, giving concrete examples for specific products, disseminating this knowledge, and organising self-help and collaboration among purchasing departments. In this way, the purchasing departments can become familiar with the adjusted purchasing procedures, acquire experience with them, and integrate them into their normal practice without having to worry too much about actions of suppliers. At this stage GPP – at least in Europe – is still a voluntary affair. Monitoring of the extent GPP is implemented, though, would be helpful to demonstrate how this practice diffuses. Central government or an Agency would be well placed to take on this job. 20.9 Summary & Conclusions GPP is an interesting, and already active field of procurement (see section 6.6.5) being used in the UK to transform markets and augment the market share of greener products. In addition, authorities also already collaborate in purchasing syndicates to make some of their purchases. It is not clear to what extent these two aspects of procurement have been brought together. There are at least 13 purchasing consortia operating on behalf of local authorities. Some arrange framework contracts for purchases. Others have a stores-based operation. These consortia may also serve other customers (such as schools). They compete with individual suppliers and catalogue operators from the private sector. A number of purchasing consortia already have green ‘flags’ in their catalogues. However, a variety of flags are used, awarded according to different criteria. Waste prevention performance does not seem central to these. Collaborative Procurement is likely to require changes in procurement procedures, and collaboration between purchasing departments. Support and guidance is helpful and probably essential to ensure widespread adoption of Collaborative Procurement. The relation between GPP and household waste generation is not a direct one: GPP by nature does not focus on waste issues alone, and only focuses on goods bought by authorities, not households, but through stimulating the market for green goods this could have flow on effects for household waste generation. The same is likely to be true for Collaborative Procurement, though the extent of additional effect (relative to GPP alone) is difficult to gauge.

338 21 MINIMUM STANDARDS FOR APPLIANCES / TRAINING FOR EFFICIENT PRODUCT DESIGN 21.1 Description of Policy The possible design of an overall policy can cover the following four sub-policies. The overall policy can be achieved by a step-by-step approach towards a regulation for binding minimum criteria for products: 1. The incorporation of requirements for eco-efficiency in product design training; 2. A soft form of policy could be to encourage further use/broader dissemination of the (already used) EU eco-label in the UK; 337 3. A stricter form would be the compulsory labelling of durability and weight of products, somewhat akin to the compulsory labelling for energy efficiency products (see Directive 92/75/EEC and Directive 96/57/EC); and 4. Introducing minimum criteria concerning durability and weight as legally binding pre-requisites, starting with one product group. Government would introduce minimum standards for consumer goods that these products must meet in terms of durability and / or light weighting (similar to energy using products). The policy of minimum standards should not target household products where the impact ‘in use’ is greater than impacts associated with production (unless impact in use is ‘waste-related’). It must be noted that the policy interacts with policy on extended product warranties (see Section 23).

21.1.1 Labels Addressing Minimum Standards for Weight and Durability A voluntary labelling-system for environmental minimum product standards does exist in Germany, called Blue Angel (Blaue Engel). 338 In the European Union the European ecolabel the “Flower” 339 has been in existence since 1992. The usual criteria for the Blue Angel in Germany are: • Content of hazardous substances, • Content of secondary material the product contains (e.g. paper); and • The energy efficiency during the use of the product. The Blue Angel in Germany has become, within the last 27 years, the most successful German eco-label. About 3,700 products in 80 different products groups have been labelled. 49 % of consumers in Germany pay some attention to the Blue Angel when they go shopping. The label is awarded for three years with the possibility for extension after that period. Compliance with the criteria is controlled by independent organisations. There are not usually detailed criteria concerning the material efficiency for the final product (i.e. weight and kind of material used in the product). In contrast, the voluntary EU Eco-label includes the enhancement of product durability as a general criterion for a small number of products (using the whole life-cycle-

337 Cp. http://www.defra.gov.uk/environment/consumerprod/ecolabel/index.htm. 338 Cp.: http: www.blauer-engel.de . 339 Cp.: http://ec.europa.eu/environment/ecolabel/index_en.htm .

339 approach) such as mattresses, shoes and clothes, computer and televisions. Hazardous substances are also a focus of the label: • For bed mattresses the durability is tested with load-simulation (30,000 load- procedures: The loss of height shall be < 20 mm (Test method EN 1957), Loss of firmness shall be < 20% (Test method EN 1957)); • For footwear and clothes performance and durability criteria exist; • Computers and televisions must be designed so that important parts (graphic cards, CD writers, DVD writers) are accessible and can be easily exchanged. Spare parts must be available over a 7-year period.

21.1.2 Legally Binding Minimum Standards In Germany (and most probably in the EU) no legally binding requirements exist regarding minimum standards on weight and lifetime of appliances. There is a general clause in the German Waste and Closed Loop Recycling Law (KrW-/AbfG) stipulating producer responsibility for this, but there are no provisions in the EU Waste Framework Directive of this nature. So far the German producer-responsibility-clause has not been "used" to introduce, and regulate against, concrete minimum standards. The most obvious way to introduce binding minimum product standards (like weight and durability) would be to introduce them into already existing or planned product standards developed by the European Committee for Standardization (CEN), 340 and parallel, or subsequently in corresponding, national standards (in Germany the DIN, in the UK, the BS standards). 341 According to EU policies and activities, standardization is an important component of European enterprise policy, and is intended to contribute to sustainable development and take into account the environmental dimension. The 6th Environmental Action Program called for the integration of environmental aspects into standardisation, as a way to promote sustainable production and consumption patterns.

21.1.3 Eco-efficiency in Product Design Training In the UK the Government has stated its intent to give much greater priority to developing a coherent ‘product policy’, and is committed to promote eco-design as a mainstream element of good design practice by bringing together expertise through a new Sustainable Design Forum and the international Sustainable Products Task Force. 342 Besides the importance of training product designers in eco-efficiency, it seems to be important to integrate eco-efficiency as an important aspect of designing a product in any company, on a par with other design criteria. Environmental management systems, already established in many companies, are unlikely to be capable of delivering on this approach. Only if eco-efficiency is integrated as a standard part of

340 Cp.: http://www.cen.eu/cenorm/index.htm . 341 Cp.: http://www2.din.de/index.php?lang=en . 342 It shall be supported by the Market Transformation Programme, Envirowise’s Designtrack scheme and WRAP’s Innovation Fund.

340 management tools for product development will design training have the desired effect in practice. 343 21.2 Rationale The rationale for the policy is to seek to prevent waste by either setting standards to reduce the potential for waste as a consequence of consumption, or by ensuring that waste is, as far as possible, ‘designed out’ at the product development stage through training. 21.3 Scenario Development A 10% enhancement of the average product life-time in the EU would mean 10% less waste of durable household goods and 10 % less resource input for new products, 10 % less waste of durable household goods would be an ambitious goal and would not be achieved using the existing voluntary eco-labels, but would call for minimum product standards on “weight” and “durability”. 21.4 Environmental Impacts of the Policy It is hard to quantitatively evaluate the environmental impact of the integration of “weight” and “durability” criteria into an eco-label, or in minimum product standards. Legally binding minimum standards intend to stimulate the production of long-lasting products and thus avoiding waste resulting from products that have to be disposed of more frequently. Certainly, if criteria like “weight” and “durability” are integrated in eco-labels (see examples of the EU Eco-label supra) this could have a positive environmental impact. There are two issues here: 1. The fact that the goals of the eco-labelling scheme are rather too general and vague; and 2. The degree to which the eco-label is well recognised (and, as a result, influences consumption patterns). In respect of the first issue, durability-, or weight-based criteria may be difficult to build into the eco-label scheme (as currently designed) at the level of criteria development, since this process is often somewhat idiosyncratic. Policy goals would, most likely, have to be built into the structure of the scheme, and used to inform a new criteria development process, which could then ensure that ‘waste prevention principles’ were reflected in the Ecolabel criteria as they were developed. The Commission could use the current revision of the scheme to harness the label in respect of its relation to specific policies such as this one. Also important for increasing the environmental impact is the number of companies using the label and consumers buying those products. Here it must be noted, that several studies - forming the basis of the revision of the EU Eco-label – demonstrate a lack of knowledge and recognition of the EU Eco-label on the part of consumers, costumers and retailers. This is by far the largest barrier for the diffusion of the EU Eco-label. A further considerable constraint is the lack of competitive advantage to be gained by the various actors involved, though this may increase as consumers

343 See: Grießhammer, R., Kooperative Produktentwicklung und –vermarktung, p. 387. in: Führ, M.: Stoffstromsteuerung durch Produktentwicklung, 2000.

341 become more environmentally aware. Even if customers are aware of the EU Eco- label, in the absence of such awareness and enhanced consciousness, consumers might not be persuaded to buy eco-labelled products, thus negating any real reward that companies might otherwise reap. This barrier is particularly high for potential new applicants, leading to nearly 88% of companies failing to participate in the EU Eco-label scheme. 344 For Germany it must be noted that concerning packaging of consumer products, the German Packaging Ordinance (Verpackungsverordnung) and the associated introduction of the Green Dot scheme, had an impact on the weight of packaging (material input for cans, plastic containers). The potential extent of waste avoidance was estimated at about 25 %, but detailed figures have not been researched. 345 21.5 Economic Impact of the Policy Benefits for companies if “weight” and “durability” are included in eco-label schemes are that this will contribute to setting targets for better environmental product performance and influence the demand for suppliers to meet high environmental standards. Companies participating in eco-label schemes can use the eco-label in their marketing campaigns. It offers industry, trade and crafts companies the opportunity to document their environmental competence in a simple and inexpensive way for all to see. Negative aspects of eco-label schemes will continue to exist after the possible introduction of “weight” and “durability”, e.g. for the EU Eco-label research shows that there is a low awareness and uneven geographic take-up of eco-label, insufficient product group categories and it suffers from cumbersome procedures and organisational structures - i.e. bureaucracy which limit the Scheme's ability to grow and respond to opportunities. Furthermore, fees and the cost of obtaining the label are perceived as barriers, as are the lack of perceived benefits. Consumers will not directly benefit from the introduction of “weight” as a criterion but much more from “durability” in an eco-label giving them practical guidance to help them considerably in their selection and their decisions on the expectable lifetime of a product. It helps consumers to save money because they decide to buy products with an excellent quality and a long service life – or by simply saving energy. It is expected that the economic effects of minimum standards for “weight” and “durability” will add environmental value by supporting eco-design and innovation in product development and supporting recognition in the market of better-performing products. Concerning legally binding minimum criteria for “weight” and “durability” no unintended impacts are apparent which would make compliance more difficult for a particular social group than for others. Existing or newly designed products with increased “weight”- and “durability”-performance will not necessarily have to be more expensive than others. Certainly those companies who would not comply with minimum standards would have to make more effort to fulfil the minimum standards.

344 See for restrictions and barriers: IEFE – Università Bocconi et. al., EVER: Evaluation of EMAS and Ecolabel for their Revision, 26 December 2005, http://ec.europa.eu/environment/ecolabel/revision_en.htm . 345 Cp. Wollny, V. et. al., DSD 2020: Beiträge der Dualen System Deutschland AG zur nachhaltigen Entwicklung –Stand und Perspektiven, Öko-Institut 2001.

342 Companies not having the know-how to do so, or for whom it is not profitable, might have to accept either reduced sales (under an eco-label where environmental labelling influences consumer choice) or elimination from the market where the standard was established as a regulatory minimum. As a result prices of products could rise according to increased efforts of companies to meet for example better “durability” standards. But if minimum standards are binding for all companies in a market a one-level-playing-field exists and competition could lead to products with increased durability and less weight at lower prices. This would be to the benefit of the consumers and the environment at the same time. 21.6 Social Impacts For voluntary and compulsory eco-labelling, no negative social impacts can be foreseen from the point of view of consumers. On the contrary, consumers might have more confidence in ‘green claims’. For example the EU Ecolabel provides EU consumers with an environmental certification they can trust, unlike certain other labels which are “self-certification claims”. Additionally it can give businesses the opportunity to use one label for all their pan-European or global marketing. If, under legally binding minimum criteria, prices for products were to increase (and the spur to innovation offered by the standard might not necessarily imply this), then poorer families could face higher product prices. However, the durability standard would be expected to reduce ‘use costs’ over the product’s whole life. 21.7 Implementation & Design Issues Two main actors to implement minimum standards are Governments / Governmental bodies and Standards bodies. Standards bodies have a central role on the International, European and national level in shaping frameworks or rules to operate environmental aspects in practice in a global market, e.g. in the work of ISO 346 internationally on eco-design, product labelling and declarations. At EU level, a ‘New Approach’ using technical harmonisation and standardisation to help deliver policy objectives in the Single Market, is discussed to support the delivery of improvements in products’ environmental performance. 347 If minimum performance standards can be identified and agreed, then they can be established in an Integrated Product Policy (IPP) on national, and better still, on the European level. For instance, specific eco-design requirements could be adopted in a manner similar to that of the EU's Directive on Energy Using Products (EuP). 348 A prerequisite for introducing sensible criteria to reduce “weight” and enhance “durability” in eco-labels, and minimum products standards, is quality information. Based on specific product types, eco-label requirements have been set to award

346 The ISO 14000 series - see full list at: www.iso.org/iso/en/CatalogueListPage.CatalogueList?ICS1=13&ICS2=20&ICS3=10&scopelist = 347 See Communication From The Commission To The Council And The European Parliament on Integrated Product Policy: Building on Environmental Life-Cycle Thinking , http://europa.eu.int/eur- lex/lex/LexUriServ/site/en/com/2003/com2003_0302en01.pdf , p. 11. 348 Directive 2005/32/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 6 July 2005 establishing a framework for the setting of eco-design requirements for energy-using products and amending Council Directive 92/42/EEC and Directives 96/57/EC and 2000/55/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council, OJ L 191 from 22.7.2005, p. 29.

343 products with the lowest adverse environmental impacts (usually those that fall in the top 5 - 25% of their group). Minimum criteria could be developed for product groups where eco-labels exist. The information generated for eco-labels could be used to set minimum standards in order to eliminate a similar percentage of products with the poorest environmental characteristics from the market. To achieve this, a review could be undertaken to establish in which product groups the European Eco-label has already collected the required amount of reliable information upon which to base minimum standards. At the moment there are over 240 different product groups under the National and European Eco-labelling schemes, providing a potentially huge information resource. The EU's Eco-label's environmental criteria cover everyday consumer goods and services, and the flower logo can be awarded to 25 product groups. For some products the background information available is good and provides a firm basis for developing reasoned proposals. Dishwashers are an example. For other product groups, like paints, the information available, at least in the public domain, is sparse. Indeed, access to appropriate data is the most challenging aspect when defining minimum standards, and setting a limit, or level, for “durability” and “weight” could be difficult in many cases. Possible means to overcome a lack of information could be: • Using whatever limited data exists; • Undertaking a limited round of testing to develop performance data; • Relying on stakeholder consensus building to develop general agreement on key issues; and • Using a mixture of all the above. Under the eco-label schemes, the ecological criteria are a result of scientific studies and extensive consultation within the European Union Eco-labelling Board (EUEB), composed of different stakeholders, such as government authorities, representatives from environmental NGOs, from consumer and industry associations, from trade unions and from business. In a study 349 commissioned by ANEC (The European consumer voice in standardisation) 350 an approach to setting up the key criteria in rating products according to their environment-friendly qualities was developed, and then applied to a diverse range of product groups. The approach was devised on the basis of a review of criteria used for five product groups: dishwashers, vacuum cleaners, dishwasher detergents, paints and varnishes and textiles. In Germany the NAGUS committee (Principles of environmental Protection Standards Committee) 351 is the responsible committee at the DIN (German Institute for Standardization) for interdisciplinary generic standardization in the field of the environment protection at national, European and international level. The main areas of work include, inter alia, environmental aspects in product development and environmental labelling and environmental performance evaluation.

349 L. Oldman and J. Poll (2003) The Suitability of Eco-label Criteria to Derive Environmental Baseline Requirements Applicable to all Products on the Market , May 2003; see: http://ec.europa.eu/environment/ecolabel/pdf/news/aeatstudyforanec.pdf . 350 Cp.: http://www.anec.org/ . 351 Cp.: http://www.nagus.din.de .

344 As hinted at above, revisions to the processes currently used may be necessary to ensure incorporation of ‘waste prevention criteria’ in the development of eco-label standards. 21.8 Other Impacts Minimum standards and eco-labels can be aligned with initiatives for green public procurement. Products with an eco-label, or which meet specific standards, should be favoured due to their better environmental performance compared to other products without an eco-label. 21.9 Summary & Conclusions In Germany (and most probably in all EU Member States) no legally binding requirements exist regarding minimum standards on weight and lifetime of household appliances. Requirements have been set in the voluntary EU eco-label to award the label to products with the lowest adverse environmental impacts (usually those that fall in the top 5-25% of their group). Minimum criteria could be developed for product groups where eco-labels exist. The information generated for eco-labels could be used to set minimum standards in order to eliminate a similar percentage of products with the poorest environmental characteristics from the market. Binding minimum criteria for weight and durability could be introduced in already existing, or planned, product standards developed by the European Committee for Standardization (CEN) or those developed subsequently in corresponding national standards (such as those of the British Standards Institute (BSI)).

345 22 STIMULATING THE RE-USE OF DURABLE GOODS 22.1 Description of Policy The aim of the policy is to encourage the re-use of furniture as much as possible instead of households discarding it, and in particular, before a bulky waste collection takes material for disposal. To achieve this aim the local communities would receive the right of a “first call” upon used furniture. The local authorities could then exercise this right either on their own, or to those working on their behalf. A central information system would need to be set up - preferably at the local community level - functioning as the central contact point for citizens as well as second-hand stores, craftsperson, etc, who repair and sell furniture. Used furniture should be collected from private households, separately, before the furniture is dismantled, and placed in front of the house. It would be selected according to re- usability with or without being repaired, and delivered to community owned or private second-hand stores, if they are not entitled to collect the furniture on their own. That does not mean that charity or collections of local second-hand stores would be forbidden. On the contrary, they should be encouraged to extend their work, but they should be integrated in a central information system. The policy of “first call” should be supplemented by: • A free of charge collection for those households who want to discard used furniture; • Information for households through waste information leaflets, covering, amongst other things, the concept of “furniture re-use”, and the details of the local contact point. This could be enhanced by a directory for used products in the internet and/or as print-version; and • Potentially, targets for the collection and supply of re-usable furniture for the local authority. Further policy aims are: • The lack of knowledge regarding opportunities for re-use, and the awareness that used furniture is a valuable good, would be improved amongst possible discarders, collectors and buyers of used furniture; and • The policy could influence the social and economic situation in a city in many ways, e.g. improving the situation for local craftspeople, repairing furniture can help create jobs for people (particularly by community sector initiatives) and, last but not least, the initiative could enable citizens to acquire furniture of good quality at reasonable prices. The policy should focus on used furniture (not antiquities) but can be extended to other product groups, e.g. used clothes or electronic equipment. 22.2 Rationale CIPFA reports bulky waste collections in 2001/02 (England only) as being 2.7% of total household waste arisings, amounting to 621,050 tonnes. The figure varies between 1.4% for all non-metropolitan districts combined, and 5.0% for all metropolitan districts combined. This is equivalent to 15.8 kg/hh/yr and 59.8

346 kg/hh/yr respectively. 352 Reuse currently prevents approximately 85,000 tonnes of material from going to disposal, representing some 2 million items 353 . This is equal to a recovery rate of 12%. A stock of used furniture is retained in households, increasing the potential for re-use in the future. A trend to stylish furniture enhances the pressure on the waste generation and could hinder the re-use of furniture: • Low quality (faceplate/cardboard instead of massive wood) • Trendy (form, colour, material, surface) • Cheap and short product life

The Problems of second-hand furniture can be described as following: • Having a bad reputation • Facing insufficient market-mechanism (warranty for the furniture) • Cause logistical problems as transport and storage costs • Are more likely to be disposed of instead of re-used The co-operation of different actors, esp. local authority, households and second- hand shops concerning the value of used furniture and its "safe" collection (not to be further spoilt due to unprofessional dismantling or transport) throughout the UK is low. There are several big cities with functioning projects to solve the above- mentioned problems. Experts are of the opinion that easy to find contact points for used furniture in the local communities are necessary to foster professional structures (see the project of the city of Augsburg). 354 22.3 Scenario Development The amount of recoverable material present in bulky waste is a key factor in determining potential diversion rates. Table 84 shows approximate proportions of material estimated to be reusable.

Table 84. Estimated Recovery Rates of Bulky Items by Type Proportion Type of Bulky Item Reusable Hard FurnituFurniturererere: e.g. chair, table, chest of drawers, 49% bookcase, cupboard, shelves, sideboard etc. Soft FurnitureFurniture: e.g. bed, sofa, armchair, mattress etc 31% Other FurnishingsFurnishings: e.g. carpets, underlay, bath, sink, 18% toilet etc GeneralGeneral: e.g. bike, ironing board, seesaw, duvet, roof 49% felt, ladder etc.

352 Network Recycling (2005). Bulky Waste Collections: Maximising Re-use & Recycling. A step-by-step guide . Report for Defra 353 http://www.frn.org.uk/default.asp 354 Bayrisches Landesamt für Umweltschutz, Nachhaltigkeitsstrategien im Gebrauchtmöbelsektor, (Fachtagung Augsburg 23.1.2007), Augsburg 2007, http://www.lfu.bayern.de .

347 Large WEEEWEEE: e.g. cooker, washing machine, fridge, 30% tumble dryer, dishwasher etc. Other WEEEWEEE: e.g. lawnmower, record player, TV, 36% video, computer, fan etc. Source: Network Recycling (2005). Bulky Waste Collections: Maximising Re-use & Recycling. A step-by- step guide . Report for Defra The proportion of each of these materials in the waste stream is subject to substantial variation. Waste Analysis data suggests that by weight WEEE makes up approximately ¾ of bulky waste 355 . Overall the figures suggest that at least one third of bulky goods material is potentially reusable 356 . For the design of the scenario we have made the following assumptions (see

Table 85): • For both scenarios: Increase of the total amount of disposed furniture (main part of bulky waste) of 1% per year. • Scenario 1: 5% waste prevention by re-use of furniture (constant). 357 • Scenario 2: 12% waste prevention by enhanced re-use from 2015 (Cp. the City of Hagen) and 18% until 2025 358

Table 85: Furniture Re-use Under Modelled Scenarios Additional re-used Additional re-used Additional re-used Scenarios furniture furniture furniture Year 2008 Year 2015 Year 2025

Scenario 1: 31,400 33,600 37,100 Scenario 2:

Enhanced Re- 75,300 80,700 133,700 use

The comparison of both scenarios shows that, if 18% furniture re-use is implemented in all UK municipalities, the waste prevention in the year 2025 could account for a significant amount of furniture not disposed (approx. 134.000 t/per year). It should

355 Parfitt (2002) Analysis of household waste composition and factors driving waste increases . WRAP 356 This figure was confirmed as a reasonable estimate via personal communication with Jon Rolls, ReZolve. 357 The average rate of re-used furniture in Germany, see: Bayrisches Landesamt für Umweltschutz, Nachhaltigkeitsstrategien im Gebrauchtmöbelsektor (Fachtagung Augsburg 23.1.2007), Augsburg 2007. 358 So far the city of Hagen (200.000 citizens) has a re-use rate for furniture of 12% which represents the best re-use-rate in Germany. It is estimated that a re-use rate of 18% is the maximum achievable rate in Germany, see FN 1, Bayrisches Landesamt für Umweltschutz, 2007. Cp. Personal Interview with Werner Baumann, INFU, University of Dortmund, January 2007.

348 be noted that this is in addition to existing levels of recovery for reuse (estimated to be approximately 85,000 tonnes). For the rest of the furniture that cannot be re-used the recycling of the material components should be optimized (e.g. secondary fuels instead of waste incineration where appropriate) as the second best option. 22.4 Environmental Impacts of the Policy The environmental impacts of the re-use of furniture concentrate on the reduction of resources used for the manufacturing of new furniture. Table 86 shows the main components of furniture in Europe. 359 Table 86: Main Components of Furniture in Europe

Material Composition Wood 60.0% Metal 11.9% Plastics 5.9% Fittings 5.4% PU foams 4.0% Fabrics/textiles 3.4% Glass 2.0% Rubber 0.7% Others 6.7%

Furthermore enhancing the lifetime of furniture will reduce the pressure on the waste sector. If this composition is applied to the tonnage of material expected to be diverted from disposal through reuse the following tonnages result: Material Estimated Tonnes Wood 20,057 Metal 3,978 Plastics 1,972 Fittings 1,805 PU foams 1,337 Fabrics/textiles 1,137 Glass 669 Rubber 234 Others 2,240

In addition some 100,000 tonnes of metal could be potentially diverted through reuse of WEEE.

359 Cp.: European Furniture Manufacturers Federation (UEA) co-funded by the European Commission, Furniture waste and its treatment, http://www.ueanet.com/furniturewaste/ .

349 22.5 Economic Impact of the Policy For the establishment of local contact points for re-used furniture it is estimated that only few costs will occur for the local government concerning the administration and ongoing operational costs of such a contact point (one to two persons, an office). The costs for the implementation of the network (building up a network of local charity organisations, handcrafts, charity shops and waste authorities) as well as the dissemination of information on the contact point and the network will cause non- recurring costs. Households will clearly benefit from an improvement of the re-use of furniture. If the waste collection is cost-free households can profit from possible reductions in waste charges due to decreasing amounts of waste being discarded. Poorer households will profit from such a service in two ways: saving waste disposal costs and to afford furniture at lower prices. The competition with existing private collection systems (e.g. charity collections) for durable goods are possible and should be avoided through integrating them in a network of local companies with a central information point run by the local government. 22.6 Social Impacts The enhancement of the re-use system for furniture will support local handcraft (e.g. repairing furniture) and create jobs in the second-hand market. In the case of the local initiative “Möbel&Mehr” (City of Hagen and City of Iserlohn) over 200 unemployed citizens got jobs in the service system. 360 That shows the job potential of local re-use systems being established throughout the country. In the UK the furniture re-use sector employs around 3,000 staff provides training for over 5,000 trainees supports and occupies over 8,000 volunteers helps around ½ million low income households 361 If the number of personnel in the industry is pro-rated relative to the tonnage of material collected and extra 134,000 tonnes requiring handling and processing would suggest creation of an additional 4700 jobs, 7,800 trainee positions, and 12,600 volunteer opportunities in the sector. 22.7 Implementation & Design Issues The policy to enhance re-use of durable goods has the potential to address a wide range of consumers groups. To reach ambitious re-use targets the social acceptability of used furniture must be raised in order to improve the general image of used goods like furniture. The following issues are important to implement a large-scale re-use system: • The size of the second-hand warehouse must be large enough to be attractive (comparable to normal warehouses). 362

360 see FN 1, Bayrisches Landesamt für Umweltschutz, 2007. 361 http://www.frn.org.uk/ 362 In the case of the City of Hagen the warehouse has 4.500 square meters, see FN 1, Bayrisches Landesamt für Umweltschutz, 2007.

350 • Enough staff to ensure good quality and presentation of the displayed goods. • Minimization of risks concerning the warranty for used products • High logistic capacities to acquire and deliver used furniture • Used furniture must be cheaper than comparable new products • Marketing for the second-hand warehouse plays an important role, especially when entering the market • Partnerships with other second-hand warehouses to tackle demands and surpluses concerning single products are necessary to guarantee a consumer friendly service system • Internal quality standards for used furniture concerning pollutants in the furniture (used products) should be obeyed. 22.8 Other Impacts With the re-use system the risks that valuable furniture in good shape will be discarded is reduced. 22.9 Summary & Conclusions Enhancing the re-use of durable goods and thus improving the structure of the local market will strengthen the idea of sustainability in all its three dimensions. There are a couple of very positive examples in German Cities which prove that with intelligent re-use systems the re-use rate for furniture can increase remarkably. Following a scenario with nation-wide re-use systems the amount of bulky waste can be reduced considerably and valuable resources can be saved. The implementation of the policy will have to take place on the local level and does not need a complicated and time-consuming legislation process (e.g. on an EU or national level). Mainly a clear strategy and a good management are necessary to successfully implement the policy.

351 23 EXTENDED PRODUCT WARRANTIES (CONSUMER GUARANTEE) 23.1 Description of Policy The basis of this policy would be a requirement for extended product warranties for certain products groups. It must be noted that according to our research, such a policy does not exist in Europe. Therefore this “case study” gives basic background information and a first skeleton of a possible policy design. It is important to note that the aim of this extended product warranty policy would be to mandate “extended warranties” in contrast to "goods which are not in conformity with the contract". The legal background and differentiation between consumer rights concerning goods which are not in conformity with the contract and “extended warranties” / “guarantees” for a product should be explained in order to understand the policy: • Goods which are not in conformity with the contract For every product a consumer buys, the following legal rules apply: if goods do not conform with the contract at the time of delivery, the consumer has the right to claim (within a specified period) that the product should be repaired or replaced (unless it is disproportionate for the trader to do so), or to require the seller to reduce the purchase price. Concerning durability of a product, the judgement of conformity the contract relates to general standards for similar products, e.g. the product does not conform if it is not “ fit for the purposes for which goods of the same type are normally used ” or does not “ show the quality and performance which are normal in goods of the same type and which the consumer can reasonably expect ”. 363 The burden of proof of product defect and other non-conformity to contract will be reversed in favour of the consumer for the first six months of delivery. This right protects the consumer from products that are falsely produced or constructed because only after the consumer has received and used the product will he have the chance discover inherent defects. • Guarantees or extended product warranty These refer to any voluntary undertaking a person acting in the course of his business gives to a consumer without extra charge to reimburse the price paid, or to replace, repair or handle consumer goods if they do not meet the specifications set out in the guarantee statement or in the relevant advertising. 364 In contrast to non-conformity, in the case of an extended warranty a consumer does not have a burden of proof of defect if the producer has guaranteed a certain product specification, e.g. the durability of a product for a certain life span.

363 Cp. Art. 2, Para 2, lit c and d of Directive 1999/44/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 25 May 1999 on certain aspects of the sale of consumer goods and associated guarantees. OJ No. 171 from 7.7.1999, p. 12. 364 Cp. Definition in Art. 2 of the Sale and Supply of Goods to Consumer Regulation 2002, Statutory Instrument 2002 No. 3045, in force since 31 st March 2003.

352 Manufacturers or retailers can introduce extended warranties. The suggested extended warranty policy would apply only for new products not for used, and would ensure the durability of products in a product group through grading on several warranty levels. Reference for the baseline of the warranty period could be the minimum requirements for the durability of products, or an average durability level of that product group. For example, warranty periods could start with a minimum warranty of one year, and increase through further warranty levels, e.g. 2, 4, 6, etc. years of guarantee. In principle, while high level, life-long guarantees are possible, to produce legal certainty in an obligatory guarantee scheme, the maximum guarantee period should probably be limited, e.g. to 20 years. In addition to the extended warranty periods, it is recommended that a binding ‘cost per annum’ labelling of products should be introduced to “visualize” the durability of a product, and make the benefits clear to consumers. For example furniture producers would be able to state whether the warranty period was x, z, a, or b years and could then be required to label products in terms of price per year of warranty duration. The system of graduated extended warranties could be introduced on a voluntary or a compulsory basis. However, as it may be difficult to measure product durability and thus to categorize products into certain durability levels, a voluntary approach seems to be more promising. Moreover a compulsory system might be hard to police if it interferes with European and WTO Trade rules. This extended warranty policy should be primarily aimed at a small group of consumer goods, such as furniture, in order for policy makers to gain experience with the instrument. Furthermore, even for a specific group like furniture, it will be necessary to define warranties for each product group (chairs, couches, tables etc.) as each one will have different durability conditions. Finally, this policy is not suitable for products whose impact “in use” is greater than impacts associated with production (unless impact in use is “waste-related”). This is because in the former case, it remains desirable to allow innovation to reduce impacts in the use phase, making more frequent product substitution potentially desirable. 23.2 Rationale While the detailed content of the extended warranty policy was not explicitly defined when the idea was born in the project working group meeting, the intention was that an extended warranty would lead to products with longer life-spans (in terms of their functioning life). As this aim could be linked to criteria such as the “durability” of a product, a policy on extended product warranty interrelates with the policy proposed in Section 21 (on minimum requirements for household appliances concerning durability and weight). For example, minimum product requirements for durability could form the basis for the minimum warranty period. 23.3 Scenario Development Producers’ guarantees have existed for a wide variety of very different characteristics of products for a long time. The durability of a product is guaranteed for some products such as certain types of textiles or cars, but so far, a clear policy strategy covering extended warranty for all products in one product group has not been implemented. In Germany, the German Civil Code ((Bürgerliches Gesetzbuch – BGB)

353 contains legal rules for producers or retailers in relation to voluntarily guaranteeing specifications of a product, but there are no legally binding extended warranties, and no binding labelling schemes for product durability exist. Nevertheless, the Civil Code regulates conditions if producers and importers issue a warranty on a voluntary basis, as once issued, these voluntary warranties must be free of charge. Like the European Directive, the German Civil Code, also makes a difference between consumer rights concerning “goods which are not in conformity with the contract and “extended warranties” or “guarantees” for a product. 365 As there is no known experience with binding extended warranty policies, and reliable figures for the status quo are not at hand, the concrete design of this policy is quite open and it is not currently possible to provide a clear scenario. 23.4 Environmental Impacts of the Policy It is expected that warranties will influence the producers’ production patterns and consumers’ consumption patterns if the durability of a product is guaranteed. A consumer might buy a (potentially more expensive) product if it is guaranteed to last longer instead of a product with a shorter warranty. With a warranty system, consumers have a choice to buy a product according to their consumption needs, i.e. the consumer can match their expectations regarding the life span of a product with the product’s guarantee. If a consumer hopes to buy a product that lasts for a longer period of time, they might be willing to buy a product with a longer warranty-period since the product is protected by the warranty for that period. Assuming that products with longer warranties last longer, the overall consumption of these products will be inclined to decrease, and the possibility to re-use a product will increase. It is expected that less waste will accumulate as a result. 23.5 Economic Impact of the Policy A policy of binding extended product warranties for producers/importers or retailers will have an economic impact on businesses, as long as the policy affects consumer behaviour. For producers, there would be associated costs for improving the durability of products, and costs for the warranties and advertising. There might also be increased outlays associated with insurance for risks associated with warranties. The manufacturers may also sell fewer products as a result of the longer warranties. However, longer warranties may allow for higher pricing of products, and opportunities may arise for providing maintenance services beyond warranty periods. According to present law regarding extended warranties on a voluntary basis provided by manufacturers or retailers, a consumer charge for warranties is not always applied. It would be expected, where binding extended warranties were in place, that the costs of the warranty were incorporated into product pricing. Hence, an indirect “charge” to consumers through a higher pricing of durable products is possible and will be likely in the case of binding product warranties. This policy for binding extended warranties will cause implementation costs for central government, householders (higher product prices), producers and retailers (costs for improving the durability of products and costs for warranties, insurance for risks associated with warranties). The scale of these is not clear. Indeed, the idea

365 See infra.

354 seems so new there are no studies available on existing experience about the potential economic impact. Consequently it is not possible to quantify the economic impact of the policy at the moment. Further research would be required for this purpose. 23.6 Social Impacts If product prices should rise significantly due to producers including their warranty risks or other costs in the price of the product, social impacts for consumers might result, e.g. consumers with low income could not afford the higher prices for products. This policy might have work well in conjunction with the policy designed to increase re-use of durable goods (set out in Section 22). This might ensure that a wide range of products were available to lower income groups at favourable prices. On the other hand, the extended warranty approach might imply that discarded goods were older when they were discarded, potentially worsening prospects for re-use. 23.7 Implementation & Design Issues The implementation of a policy on extended product warranty could be introduced on the national level or the EU-level. As products are produced and sold worldwide, the EU-level would be most appropriate for successful implementation, and in order to solve possible problems within EU trade rules. For a binding extended warranty policy, the legal feasibility needs to be assessed and further research is necessary. In order to effectively implement this policy, all producers/importers or retailers of products in a certain product group must comply with the warranty regulations. Although the policy would intend to make producers either comply with the increased durability demands (or face higher costs for warranty claims), and thus to raise the life-span of products, binding warranties could lead to the discrimination against those producers who cannot guarantee certain life-spans for their products, simply because their products will not meet the targets. It will be a question for lawyers as to whether a binding warranty policy is in conformity with the legal principle of proportionality. Its acceptability could be enhanced by announcement several years in advance of implementation to allow product manufacturers to adjust their product lines accordingly. A voluntary warranty scheme, which already exists, but which could be accompanied by a binding labelling scheme for durability would be certainly much easier to implement and less burdensome for producers (this is also true compared with a policy for binding product minimum standards for durability - see Section 21). Discrimination claims are very likely to be raised by producers producing in a lower quality-segment of the relevant product group. Certainly a binding obligation to guarantee a minimum life span of a product would encounter similar opposition from producers (as in minimum product standards for durability and weight - see Section 21). Applying the extended warranty only to producers and retailers in the UK is not favourable, as they will be discriminated against relative to producers from outside the UK. An important aspect of the policy is to define the actors who are responsible for the guarantee, and the labelling of the products. This could be producers/importers or retailers.

355 23.8 Summary & Conclusions A policy requiring binding extended product warranties for certain products groups graded in several warranty levels (periods of time) to ensure the durability of products does not exist in Germany, nor elsewhere in Europe. Where the system was supported by mandatory ‘cost-in-use-over-lifetime’ labelling, it is anticipated that such a policy would have an influence on waste prevention for the targeted product groups, because with a warranty system consumers have a better chance of buying a product that fits to their consumption needs. This would lead to a decrease in the consumption of less durable goods, and consequently the amount of waste would decrease. Another effect could be that products with low durability performance which cannot meet the minimum warranty period might leave the market. The policy should be set on the EU-level in order to reduce interference with European and WTO Trade rules. At the moment an important restriction for the implementation of the policy is that it might discriminate against importers of products from outside the UK or Europe. It would be much easier to police if a binding labelling scheme for durability were added to the existing option of voluntary extended product warranties. The necessary information to set “durability-levels” for the labelling of products could be derived from the experience gained with eco-labels. This policy of extended product warranty could be linked to a policy on minimum requirements for household appliances concerning durability and weight, in as much as minimum product requirements for durability could form the basis for the minimum warranty period.

356 24 SUMMARY OF CASE STUDIES The case studies indicate that most of the measures could deliver waste prevention benefits, but in the cases examined, unsurprisingly, further work would be required to determine whether the measures proposed would deliver waste prevention in a cost effective manner. The first case study looked at Dutch experience with implementation plans for waste prevention. It is interesting to note that, because of the lack of experience with waste prevention policies, we have found ourselves having to speculate around what a policy for waste prevention, which was designed to deliver the desired changes, would actually look like. For that reason, one could imagine that the Dutch approach – bringing key stakeholders together to deliver the desired levels of prevention – might be an appropriate mechanism for developing policies designed to deliver the required benefits. Indeed, it could be applied to: • Low Waste Schools / Charging for Schools Waste • Prevention targets for Junk Mail • Increasing the share of rechargeables in the battery market; • Setting minimum standards for appliances; • Stimulating re-use of durable goods; and • Extending product warranties In other words, the approach could be adopted as part of the approach designed to deliver the objectives of several of the other case studies. Regarding the other case studies, some of their key characteristics are summarised in Table 87. Potential impacts have been estimated for some, but not all, of the policies. Some of the policies could be developed in the context of existing initiatives/ programmes. Examples include: • Co-operative Procurement, as part of the Government’s general approach to greening procurement; • Junk mail policies, as an extension of the existing voluntary measure (though probably requiring some non-voluntary approaches); • Increasing the use of rechargeables (as an additional dimension to the implementation of the Batteries Directive); • Minimum standards for product policy, which could be addressed (albeit possibly through European channels) in the context of the UK’s programme on sustainable consumption; • Extended product warranties, which again could be addressed (albeit possibly through European channels) in the context of the UK’s programme on sustainable consumption; and

357 Table 87: Key Features of Policies Examined in Case Studies Waste Streams Case Study Potential Impact Accompanying Measures? Key Issues Further Research? Targeted Implementation Plans Any Potentially significant To be identified in process for Waste Prevention Protocol for calculating Clarification of Inclusion of Home Estimated 1.4 million Biowaste contribution from home calculation method. Research is ongoing Composting in LA(T)S tonnes per annum composting Counterfactual scenario Structuring incentive scheme. Interaction with other instruments at Impact likely to be strengthened Clear merit in the Waste Prevention Depends on target set. local authority level. through legislating to allow approach. Additional Targets and Residual All household Possibly in excess of 3 Could be implemented household charging. Synergy with research seems Waste Levy million tonnes at County level in home composting policy justified England through amended recycling credits system Guidance on both separate collection systems (minimum service quality) and Appears justified in the charging structures. Estimated possible Need to include both legislation context of HWRA and Local authorities do not Low Waste Schools / reduction of 113,000 requiring quality segregation extension thereof. Schools waste (within report household waste Charging for Schools tonnes. Not all of this is systems at schools and Would support the household waste) quantities correctly at Waste currently counted as requirement to introduce DfES Sustainable present (because they household waste charging Development Action only report waste they Plan collect). Legal position not clear as to status of schools waste under HWRA This level if impact would result Existing voluntary Appears warranted to from implementation of a initiative is not understand the Junk mail and free Estimated potential of combination of policies. For some sufficiently focused on Junk Mail Policies potential for further newspapers 119,000 – 223,000 tonnes of these, forms of licensing of prevention. Key is to prevention in a cost- direct mail suppliers may be ensure the direct mail effective manner necessary supply chain has a

358 Waste Streams Case Study Potential Impact Accompanying Measures? Key Issues Further Research? Targeted greater incentive to reduce waste The implementation of Since the UK such measures would deliberations around A mandate to include occur in the context of implementing the rechargeables in appliances ongoing implementation Batteries Directive are Unclear – total market is could be easily sidestepped. May of the Batteries ongoing, early Mandatory Use of Primary portable 20,000 tonnes or so – require one or more of producer Directive. The most investigations to Rechargeable Batteries batteries focus is on both quantity responsibility targets and appropriate mechanism consider the and hazardousness measures to reduce switching to may be to incorporate possibilities in the more hazardous materials additional measures in context of the emerging scheme for implementation of dealing with batteries producer responsibility There appears to be reluctance to move Tonnage impact potentially beyond the minimum Packaging, WEEE, Deepening Producer significant in the case of requirements of EU batteries, and other Responsibility packaging (estimated at legislation and streams (direct mail) 250,000 tonnes) resistance to change systems which are, or are being, established Effectively, there is already ‘joint Whether the waste procurement’ in the Unclear – potentially prevention impacts will public sector. There is Materials / products / significant environmental Would benefit from state of the be significant. How much also ‘green Collaborative services procured by impact, but waste art information regarding what additional effort might procurement’. This Procurement public authorities prevention impacts may be might be technically feasible be required to make the measure relies upon small approach deliver an amalgamation of tangible benefits the two approaches in a sophisticated manner Minimum Standards for Good technical data is required. A Probably best addressed Durable goods Unclear Appliances range of possible options exists at EU level Stimulating Re-use of Furniture / white

359 Waste Streams Case Study Potential Impact Accompanying Measures? Key Issues Further Research? Targeted Durable Goods goods Uncertain, but a slower turnover of durable Extended Product products is the aim, and Requires policy on labelling to be Probably best addressed Durable goods Warranties this would be expected to effective. at EU level lead to prevention of household waste

360 • Stimulating re-use of durable goods, which could be given greater emphasis in the UK’s implementation of the WEEE Directive. The potential to address many policies through existing initiatives and programmes merely serves to reinforce the points made in Section 6 (concerning responsibility for aspects of waste prevention in the UK). There is plenty of potential for innovation in this policy area, and there are bodies in existence which already have, to a greater or lesser degree, mandates to either do similar things, or to implement related programmes and initiatives. All that needs to happen is that opportunities need to be created and seized more proactively than they have been hitherto. Regarding the potential for further investigation, a workshop was held when the case study work was close to completion. Five of the policies examined appeared to generate stronger support than others with three emerging as clear front-runners. These were as follows: 1. Front running policies a. Waste prevention targets alongside residual waste levy b. Extended warranties c. Deepening of producer responsibility 2. Other policies receiving substantial support a. Minimum standards for appliances b. Inclusion of home composting in LA(T)S In addition to these policies, the research team felt that the Waste Prevention Plans and Junk Mail policy tool areas are worthy of further consideration.

361

25 CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS This project constitutes one of the first attempts to understand the potential of policy tools to address the issue of household waste generation in the UK. Household waste quantities in England and the Devolved Administrations of Wales, Scotland and Northern Ireland have continued to grow over time, although there are some signs that the rate of growth may be slowing. The relatively high household waste growth rate that has been seen in recent years may be due to one-off changes in waste management services such as the methods of containment (an increase in the use of wheeled bins), and the increasing prevalence of garden waste collection services. Once these temporary factors are discounted, the rate of growth may be more fully accounted for by the increase in the numbers of households (accounting for the decline in household size). Despite the recent high rates of waste growth, waste prevention has been slow to make it onto both national and local agenda’s as a priority area. This is most notably the case in England, as there recently appears to be a degree of enthusiasm for pursuing waste prevention policy initiatives in Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland. However, the ability of the Devolved Administrations to implement a number of key waste prevention measures, such as variable charging and product labelling is limited by the power that has been devolved to them. The historically low priority placed on waste prevention is reflected in the fact that our research has uncovered very few policies that are designed to directly target household waste prevention. One exception is the Packaging Essential Requirements legislation - although its effectiveness has possibly been limited by the relatively low level of resourcing allocated to its enforcement, again reflecting the priority that has been attached to waste prevention. While there are few policies directed specifically at waste prevention, other significant waste management policy measures have in fact resulted in perverse effects which have probably increased household waste arisings. The impact of these policies has tended to revolve around the management of bio-waste. In particular waste recycling targets have incentivised local authorities to provide free garden waste collections, (despite the fact that much of the material that is collected was not previously in the household waste stream), and have reduced incentives to promote home composting. The administration of the Landfill Allowance Schemes, which uses a mass balance approach and accounts for biowaste as a constant fraction of the residual, similarly incentivises garden waste collections, and provides a reduced incentive to promote home composting. The analysis of responsibility for waste prevention policy in the UK showed that there is no shortage of organisations with responsibility for waste prevention policy, but that there is perhaps a lack of coordination and strategic focus in the delivery of policies and in the deployment of the necessary resources to follow through on their implementation. Similarly where there are powers available there has been a notable lack of innovation and resourcing put towards the use of these powers (for example the Packaging Directive Essential Requirements)

362 A review of waste prevention policies in other countries revealed that, although there are few significant waste prevention policies in the UK, the situation is not substantially better elsewhere in terms of polices that are shown to have measurable household waste prevention impacts. The exception is variable charging on household collected waste, for which there is clear evidence that it incentivises households to reduce waste. Of key importance is that household variable charging also works in synergy with other policies, such as landfill bans, landfill taxes, and other waste prevention initiatives such as packaging take back and home composting promotions, to support them and improve their impacts. The key is that it provides an economic incentive for behaviour change that is in line with other functions within a market-based economy. Although waste prevention has been slow to emerge as an area of significant policy action, there are signs that this focus is now starting to change. The prospect of ongoing waste growth and hence the need to manage ever increasing quantities of waste, not only has serious environmental impacts but significant cost implications as well. This is perhaps starting to focus attention on the issue of waste prevention and the effects of increasing household consumption. In addition to the developing economic drivers, the EU Thematic Strategy on Waste indicates that member states are to be required to have waste prevention plans in place, and this alone may serve to ensure that a continued focus remains on waste prevention. The work on this project has served to highlight the fact that waste prevention is a policy area that is still relatively young. Although there is a wide range of policy measures available, waste prevention policy does not appear anywhere to have been developed and implemented in a strategic manner that addresses the key facets of product design and delivery through the supply chain to consumer and householder behaviour in an integrated way. Following the research exercise, a series of workshops were held at which the results of the research were presented and the merits of potential polices discussed. From this ten policies were selected for more in depth analysis in the form of case studies. A further case study on ‘Collaborative Procurement’ was added at the request of Defra. Direct and Variable Charging for household waste was the strongest policy to emerge from the research but this was not considered in this context and substantial work is already being done on this through other Defra programmes. The eleven policies examined as case studies in this research were: 1. Implementation Plans for Waste Prevention 2. Inclusion of Home Composting in LA(T)S 3. Waste Prevention Targets and Residual Waste Levy 4. Low Waste Schools / Charging for Schools Waste 5. Junk Mail Policies 6. Mandatory Use of Rechargeable Batteries 7. Deepening Producer Responsibility 8. Collaborative Procurement 9. Minimum Standards for Appliances 10. Stimulating Re-use of Durable Goods 11. Extended Product Warranties A short summary of each of these is provided in section 24.

363 What is apparent from the research into these policies is that there is potential for a number of the policies to have strong effects and to embed waste prevention more fundamentally in the functioning of UK economy and society (e.g. Implementation Plans for Waste Prevention, Waste Prevention Targets and Residual Waste Levy). Importantly these policy initiatives need to be considered in terms of how they will act together in concert, and a programme of policy actions developed which will move the issue forward progressively on all fronts. This is an area that the research programme has not tackled specifically, and which will require further work. Also apparent from the research is that a number of policy mechanisms that have the potential to have a positive impact already have significant parts of the necessary structures in place, and may simply require decisions to extend targets and resource and enforce policy measures (for example Low Waste Schools / Charging for Schools Waste, Collaborative Procurement). While a number of policy areas (e.g. Waste Prevention Targets/Residual Waste Levy, Extended Product Warranties) are likely to require further research to properly determine their potential impact, there are other policy areas that could be implemented with little further research. These include: Implementation Plans for Waste Prevention, and Junk Mail initiatives. Overall, waste prevention policy is an area that has received relatively little attention in policy terms – not just in the UK but worldwide – and there remains significant scope for further innovation within this area. 25.1 Recommendations 1. The case study exercise suggests a number of policy tools that are worthy of further consideration. In particular the research team noted the following: a. Implementation Plans for Waste Prevention is a wide-ranging generic tool that can be used to target any particular waste stream or sector of the economy. The principle of bringing key stakeholders together to agree and design measures specific to the sector is a pragmatic approach which deserves serious consideration by Government. b. The adoption of Waste Prevention Targets potentially supported by a levy will not in itself be sufficient to bring about change but it will provide strong signals and clear incentive for action. Such a policy tool in combination with others is likely to be valuable in driving the issue of waste prevention forward. c. Taking further action on Junk Mail is one policy initiative that is likely to be both politically popular and relatively easy to bring about. As a ‘quick win’ therefore it deserves to be pursued further. d. A policy requiring Extended Product Warranties would lead to a decrease in the consumption of less durable goods, and consequently waste associated with these goods would decrease. Another effect could be that products with low durability performance which cannot meet the minimum warranty period might leave the market. The policy should be set on the EU-level in order to reduce interference with European and WTO Trade rules. e. Producer Responsibility legislation has had some success in terms of delivering enhanced levels of recycling, but up until now there is limited

364 proof that it has lead to significant prevention. The principle reason for this is that almost all systems have, as their central aim, improving the collection and the level of treatment/recycling. Logic dictates that the greater the proportion of the overall cost which producers have to bear, the greater will the motivation be for waste prevention. The incentive for ‘design for recycling’ or ‘design for prevention’ is more limited where producer responsibility limits the degree of financial responsibility of the obligated producers. The UK systems tend to be quite weak in this regard. Strengthening them is likely to improve the incentive for waste prevention, with a number of other positive consequences. 2. We believe there may be merit in establishing a waste prevention policy unit to coordinate the work on waste prevention across the organisations and institutions that currently deal with different aspects of waste prevention. The need for appropriate structures is likely to become of increasing importance with the Waste Framework Directive set to require waste prevention targets for EU member states and for member states to have waste prevention strategies in place. A waste prevention unit could also be responsible for coordinating development work on the national waste prevention framework (from which this project has derived).

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Websites http://ec.europa.eu/environment/ecolabel http://europa.eu.int http://home.hetnet.nl http://rais.ornl.gov http://wetten.overheid.nl http://www.anec.org http://www.aoo.nl

372 http://www.apeldoorn.nl http://www.arn.nl http://www.batteryuniversity.com http://www.bbma.co.uk/environment http://www.bitkom.org http://www.bmu.de http://www.breeam.org http://www.british-aggregates.com http://www.britishecologicalsociety.org http://www.carrierbagtax.com http://www.cen.eu http://www.ciria.org http://www.coelo.nl http://www.communities.gov.uk http://www.consumerdirect.gov.uk http://www.defra.gov.uk/environment/consumerprod/ecolabel http://www.defra.gov.uk/environment/statistics/wastats http://www.defra.gov.uk/environment/waste/aggregates http://www.defra.gov.uk/Environment/waste/localauth/lats http://www.diftar-stadskanaal.nl http://www.dinkelland.nl http://www.dma.org.uk http://www.duh.de http://www.energyalternatives.ca http://www.environ.ie http://www.ermelo.nl http://www.eu-milieubeleid.nl http://www.eunomia.co.uk http://www.fnli.nl http://www.forumforthefuture.org.uk/education http://www.frn.org.uk/default.asp http://www.grs-batterien.de http://www.gruener-punkt.de http://www.haren.nl http://www.hilversum.nl http://www.hmrc.gov.uk http://www.iso.org http://www.kringloopwinkels.nl http://www.LACORS.org.uk http://www.larac.org.uk http://www.leiden.nl http://www.letsrecycle.com http://www.lfu.bayern.de http://www.lma.nl http://www.maastricht.nl http://www.milieudefensie.nl http://www.minfin.nl http://www.mnp.nl

373 http://www.mpoweruk.com http://www.mst.dk http://www.mtprog.com http://www.nagus.din.de http://www.naturvardsverket.se http://www.nedvang.nl http://www.netregs.gov.uk http://www.nvmp.nl http://www.opsi.gov.uk http://www.reclamecode.nl http://www.roosendaal.nl http://www.rova.nl http://www.senternovem.nl http://www.sepa.org.uk http://www.sfenvironment.com http://www.sgu.se http://www.soest.nl http://www.statistikbanken.dk http://www.stibat.nl http://www.svm-pact.nl http://www.tremelo.be http://www.trend-abfall.de http://www.ueanet.com/furniturewaste http://www.uitvoeringafvalbeheer-tools.nl http://www.umweltdaten.de http://www.umweltrat.de http://www.uni-giessen.de http://www.vrom.nl http://www.wasteawarenesswales.org.uk/1487.html?diablo.lang=eng http://www.wasteonline.org.uk http://www.wrap.org.uk http://www.zaanstad.nl http://www2.din.de

374 27 Appendix I: Stakeholder workshop report Don’t waste it 6th June 2006 Meeting report

27.1 Introduction As part of their Waste and Resources R&D strategy, Defra commissioned research into waste prevention policy in the UK. This research aims to examine both existing and potential waste prevention policy by 2 key steps: 1.1.1. An analysis of responsibility for waste prevention in tthehe UK To identify the actors or organisations with responsibility or potential responsibility for implementing measures in respect of household waste prevention. 2.2.2. A policy tools review To provide a comprehensive overview of: a. Some policies already used in other European countries and could be used in the UK in future. b. Policies already in place in the UK, but either not filling their full potential for waste prevention or currently working to increase waste generation. c. Policies not in use anywhere and which show potential for generating waste prevention results.

This workshop was initiated to discuss this above research with key stakeholders, and achieve cross-sectoral input into potential waste prevention policies. The workshop was held at the stage when the responsibility analysis had been drafted, and the review of current UK and European policies had been completed.

27.1.1 Workshop aim To engage a cross section of the supply chain in taking a fresh look at household waste prevention policy and contribute to ongoing research to assist the development of future policy.

27.1.2 Workshop objectives 1. To share initial research findings, including international perspectives. 2. To undertake a ‘reality check’ of the responsibility analysis component of the research by discussing gaps and identifying the priority areas for further work 3. To take a fresh look at what policies could be introduced to reduce household waste

Appendix I: Don’t Waste It workshop , 6 June 2006 Page 375 of 412 27.1.3 Workshop agenda 10.00 Welcome, introductions, scene setting Responsibility analysis Coffee Responsibility analysis Lunch Policy tools 15.00 Summing up 15.30 Finish

27.1.4 Ground rules

1 Mobiles off 2 One person speaks at a time 3 Time and movement 4 No idea too wacky!

Appendix I: Don’t Waste It workshop , 6 June 2006 Page 376 of 412 16 18 23 27 32

27.2 Representation of attendance – Make your mark 19 24 28 33 3 A representation of th e workshop attendees by their positioning12 along the waste supply chain 25 25 4 1 3

1 5 7 3 6 7 7 20 29 34

26 Raw materials Design Manufacture Marketing Packaging Retail Use Reuse Disposal

2 2 6 2 9 10 14 14 21 8 6 30 1

2 9 9 15 35 22 14 2 2

11 15 9 31

See below for the key to link the numbers to the attendees.

Appendix I: Don’t Waste It workshop , 6 June 2006 Page 377 of 412 27.2.1 Make your mark - key

Box Organisation Area of work/comments 1 Confederation of Paper Industries Raw material paper for Packaging / Paper based packaging 2 INCPEN 3 Social Marketing Practice 4 Market Transformation Programme 5 Design Council 6 British glass – Ardagh Glass Group Designer/Innovation/Packaging Plc. Manufacturer 7 WRAP 9 Nappy Alliance Marketing / Packaging Retail / Reuse 10 Valpak 11 Trading Standard Institute 12 Environment Agency Regulator / Strategist / Waste planning / Influencer 14 Waste Watch 15 Oko Institut Effects of the “DSD” “Yellow bag” system Waste prevention / recycling / consumer 16 Defra - Local Authority Waste Funding Local authority, funding + governance and Governance team 17 EHS Northern Ireland Policy matter + regulator 18 Brook Lyndhurst Household behaviour (buy – use – reuse – dispose) 19 DTI 20 Defra - Waste strategy unit Policy adviser 21 CIWM Charging – Behaviour change – Reuse “Step toe + son” 23 Hackney Council (Home composting, real nappies, furniture reuse, no junk mail…) 24 Bath + NE Somerset Council Waste campaigns officer 25 LARAC 26 London Recycling Officers Group 27 Eunomia Research consulting 28 NLWA 29 CIWM UCN research 30 Essex County Council 31 London Borough of Richmond 32 Atlantic Consulting 33 Defra - Joint waste review Looking at costs + benefits of policy options particularly for local authorities 34 West Sussex County Council 35 Welsh Assembly Government Need to support waste policy targets and landfill directive needs

Appendix I: Don’t Waste It workshop , 6 June 2006 Page 378 of 412 27.3 Waste prevention responsibility gap analysis The responsibility analysis research had highlighted a number of areas where it appeared no one was currently taking responsibility for waste prevention. For the morning session, each table was given three of these responsibility gaps and set the following task:

1. On tables, consider the 3 gaps identified by research and others from yourselves 2. Answer 3 questions a. Is the gap significant? b. What would be the impact if it were addressed? c. How should addressing it be organised? 3. Record on flip chart

The potential gaps in responsibility for waste prevention --- taken from the UK responsibility analysis 1 Enforcement or regulations for eco-design as a measure of product durability 2 Design/manufacture for a repair society 3 Enforcement of SME waste in household waste stream – not significant Public engagement on raw materials extraction with respect to household waste 4 prevention 5 Recycling hindering prevention 6 Materials based producer responsibility 7 Advertising 8 Tax incentives 9 Waste prevention re-use credits 10 Increasing food waste standards 11 Waste min Targets 12 Best practice to coordinate LA and retail sector 13 Products for returnable deposit schemes 14 Regulation against business barriers 15 Evaluation of waste prevention schemes 16 Planning for prevention 17 Public education about the early supply chain 18 Marketing of low waste 19 Direct charging /incentives 20 Composting enforcement

Appendix I: Don’t Waste It workshop , 6 June 2006 Page 379 of 412 27.3.1 Flipchart comments from the tables Group 1 Gaps 1 Enforcement or regulations for eco-design as a measure of product durability 2 Design/manufacture for a repair society 3 Enforcement of SME waste in household waste stream – not significant For both (1 and 2) • Cultural change is essential • Need to think about ways to upgrade products rather than renew them, (e.g. computers) • Financial incentives • Product has to have the capacity to be repaired as well. Design • Needs for new skills • Consumer education / environmental education needed in primary school • Need for local/central joint- up thinking • Gap = education/ awareness raising. Then, once awareness is raised, there is potentially a huge impact. • Cost of the environmental impacts is not reflected into the price of the product. What is the actual cost of waste? • There is no real eco-product. It’s more important to understand how unecological it is. • One of the reasons given for the excess of packaging is the amount of information needed on the packaging. However, there is a need to communicate what impacts a product has in terms of waste. • Need to offer alternative solutions and not only focus on what people should not do. • Need to use design more profitably. Demonstrate how much can be saved thanks to innovations in terms of waste prevention. Other Gaps • Transport is a gap which was not identified in the analysis • In real life, costs/time are the main criteria not design.

Group 2 Gaps Public engagement on raw materials extraction with respect to household waste 4 prevention

Appendix I: Don’t Waste It workshop , 6 June 2006 Page 380 of 412 • Not significant • Industry will regulate itself • Essential requirements says you cannot use more packaging than necessary (a few exceptions e.g. Easter eggs) • Some room for work if producers think it increases 5 Recycling hindering prevention • Reusing isn’t always better than recycling • Unfair for LAs e.g. disparities in composting between areas. (1) some give bins and prevent waste, but it does not count towards their targets (2) some collect waste and it contributes to their recycling targets • More important to re-orientate focus to WP • People think they can throw away anything as long as they can recycle it so it can be important. • Lack of agreement on the table 6 Materials based producer responsibility • People know what you mean when you say recycle packaging, don’t know when you say recycling plastic (includes bottles, TV etc) • Product comes first and more useful • Move to materials could happen anyway as a natural off-shoot of producer responsibility • Not that significant and very complex Other ideas - thought to be more significant a) Coordination of LA effort for WP to avoid different situations as for recycling b) Key to it is charging. Linking costs to consumption e.g. Switzerland – not flat charging, but linked to quantities resulted in 30% reduction over 6-12 month period. The tools are effective, but politically unpopular c) Collection schemes and frequency e.g. fortnightly increasing recycling and reducing waste d) Packaging – ongoing innovation of packaging (will happen anyway) e) Shift consumption – experience not gifts e.g. gift of goats! f) Get people to consume less, No-one is looking at all at this. Refer to Sust RT report, I will if you will. Just identified the gap g) Niche for repair e.g. Munich Repair Day. But limited impact.

Group 3 Gaps 7 Advertising • Potentially significant if led to legislation • Measure resource input at product specific level (scooping out big issues/grading – prior) • Set standards. 8 Tax incentives

Appendix I: Don’t Waste It workshop , 6 June 2006 Page 381 of 412 • Responsibility for tax is already with Treasury but no link to environmental policy • Could be significant if set procurement standards or if linked to standards and hazardousness • Advanced disposal fees. Proper treatment/disposal 9 Waste prevention re-use credits • Law changed recently, should it mandatory? • WEEE furniture? (Stats) • May work anyway? Might benefit from good example. Needs to dovetail with WEEE Directive. Avoided disposal for LAs gone to zero

Group 4 Gaps 10 Increasing food waste standards • Not significant. Low impact • If adjusted through the FAS, but food waste is huge part of waste stream. • Therefore consider, increased support for initiatives such as food waste initiatives in the home • Introduce waste prevention target to avoid pulling in new waste e.g. green waste 11 Waste minimisation Targets • Yes is significant i.e. green waste • High impact • Target for LAs • Therefore need variable charging for the householder • Tighter central regulations on packaging. – targets / BAT (best available technology) • Must be linked to a good collection infrastructure available to households 12 Best practice to coordinate LA and retail sector • Significant gap, but v low impact. • Consider: see above as will be driven by variable charging.

Group 5 Gaps 13 Products for returnable deposit schemes • Not significant at the present on LCA indicates that re-use v recycling is close in overall terms. • Future cost of energy and transport may influence this. • Potentially high impact because of start up cost for infrastructure, transport and administration.

Appendix I: Don’t Waste It workshop , 6 June 2006 Page 382 of 412 • No gap in terms of research and availability of data. • Scope for research into distribution methodologies or like schemes e.g. milk.

14 Regulation against business barriers • It is not significant. This is because this legislative route is not best placed to address the issue. It would be too difficult to enforce, a system of incentives would be a better option. • The impacts are potentially high with no guaranteed return. Effort needs to be made to identify a lower impact route. • Address this through education, incentives and CSR. 15 Evaluation of waste prevention schemes • Evaluation is of prime importance • There are identifiable gaps (i.e. sectoral LCA/need to report) • The impact could be significant, as it should provide good data and reports upon which to benchmark and identify for additional research. Addressed by: • Legal responsibility for environmental reporting • Wider adoption of ISO 14001 / EMAS • Link evaluation to funding of waste reduction schemes

Group 6 Gaps 16 Planning for prevention • Not hugely significant unless other measures introduced as well (would only affect new build i.e. a % of household). • Single person households generate more waste per person – how can we address this? Only build communes?! • Needs other measures too • Create gardens that generate minimal waste e.g. conifers, concrete, cored lines! • Through the planning permission system? • Produce some guidance for architects and planners in local authorities 17 Public education about the early supply chain • Got potential, a long term issue, but worth acting on • Significant impact long term • How address – labelling, sale of goods act - mandatory product life spans and/or labelling - mandatory guarantees • Debate about whether we should inform people about products (only a very small % of people might act on that information) or is it better to focus effort on working with manufacturers to make all products waste preventive.

Appendix I: Don’t Waste It workshop , 6 June 2006 Page 383 of 412

Group 7 Gaps 18 Marketing of low waste • A gap, but low impact • Consumers make environmental choice only when products meets requirements in other respects • Products can market themselves (e.g. low pack pizza boxes to fit in freezer) • Series of incentives for different “resistance”. • Advertise “stay fresh” packaging 19 Direct charging /incentives • Yes – big difference • High impact • Awareness of leaving packaging at stores (not at home) • Deposit return – fundraising opportunities? • Self dispensing systems • Key codes for commercial areas • Retro-fitting on bins • Transparency • Awareness of volume /weight charging systems • Producer share costs of disposal at household level. • Very high costs of implementation 20 Composting enforcement • This can be a secondary effect of direct charging/financial incentives • WRAP done research in this area on quantifying home composting tonnages • Promote home composting • Discourage free garden waste collection • National scheme could deliver more effectively - Economy of scale • Council management costs

27.4 Waste prevention policy tools The waste prevention policy tools research aimed to examine current UK waste prevention policies, and look for further policies that show potential for generating results in a UK context. To input into this research, the tables were provided with different material types, and the workshop attendees given the following task:

1. Each table to consider one material 2. What might the waste prevention policies be for this material? 3. Each table to identify its 2 favourites

Appendix I: Don’t Waste It workshop , 6 June 2006 Page 384 of 412 4. Record on flipchart

Materials provided Food waste Garden Waste Furniture Non packaging paper Packaging Electrical equipment / Gadgets Hazardous waste (paint / batteries / pharmaceutical waste)

Appendix I: Don’t Waste It workshop , 6 June 2006 Page 385 of 412 27.4.1 Flip chart transcriptions from the table groups

FOOD WASTE (and other biodegradable waste)

• Food → Variable charging → Use of domestic animals to prevent food waste. (e.g. Everyone should have chickens and donkeys + pigs (guinea pigs!) lama! Rabbits, goats, geese, foxes…! → Ban 2 Easters in one L.A. year → Additional funding for household food digester – “at home” → All food to be processed into pellets and each family will have a daily pellet allowance → Ban supermarkets “Buy 1, get 1 free” deals → Dispel the myth of “Sell / Use by dates” → LATS inclusion for home composting (education, mentors, verification) → Install Food waste disposal units in all houses. Remove transport, treated to ABPR standards. Reuse to land. • Garden waste. → Variable charging at kerbside → Ban collection and / or excessive charges required → Ban 2x Easters in 1 year → Ban 1x Easter in 1 year • Nappies → Defined as clinical waste, charging → Terry (No way!) → One child policy

Appendix I: Don’t Waste It workshop , 6 June 2006 Page 386 of 412

GARDEN WASTE

• Free LA provided garden design service – advice on slow growing, low maintenance and home composting (provided by parks department – mandatory) • LA’s to license “smaller” community composting schemes • Shredding services – provided by LA’s to householders (mandatory) target for household served • Tree tax (leaf tax – variable tax by tree species – conifers attract less tax) • Targets for provision of home composters • Home composting included in LATS calculations • Total waste arising targets – BVPI 84 – decreasing over time (fines for exceeding targets) • Requirement for home composting education • Producer responsibility for garden centres • Requirement to take back green waste • Remove garden waste from recycling targets • Compulsory charging for garden waste collection for MBT • Requirement for community composting, number of sites per household with gardens (with duties placed on town / parish councils)

• All new developments to have space for community composting

Appendix I: Don’t Waste It workshop , 6 June 2006 Page 387 of 412

FURNITURE

• Acceptability • Capacity for delivery • Incentive – Social enterprise • Include in recycling targets (not residual waste targets – too much change) • Re-use schemes • Second hand Sundays • Product service • Standardise? • Cost? • Modularisation • Upgrade of warranty • Compulsory collection from house (not from outside) • Warranty periods (A-G, for life of furniture) Price per year? PAT test soft furn. • Cross borough / district • Incentives to reduce material impact of product provision (at the level of company) re efficiency measure • Furniture exports (bar coding safety) uniform across countries

• Re-use credit landfill tax • Subsidy? • 1st choice re-furb (LA offices) • 1st choice post collection • Ban on “direct to landfill” • Social gain

Appendix I: Don’t Waste It workshop , 6 June 2006 Page 388 of 412

NON ---PACKAGING PAPER (~ 8 ---9% of composition)

• Direct mail / junk mail ~ 3 / 4% of household waste • Paperless office hasn’t yet come to fruition → Printing paper less of a problem in households • Prioritise Waste prevention perhaps based on areas where you can’t readily recycle. • Policy to ban free newspapers? • Policy to charge newspaper producer → But what would it be for? • Real handkerchief campaign • Relatively unproblematic waste stream (i.e. can be recycled easy + rules should be aimed at those with greatest impact. • E-news. Subscribe to e-mail service for daily service • Listen in over the Internet • Newspaper / Library system • Policy / obligation on newspaper companies to provide aforementioned options • Companies to shred unused catalogues to use as packaging • Optional sections for newspaper (e.g. sport / travel / news etc…) • Prin ting + technology: modify so not 50 p extra to print 1000 extra copies. Address purchasing economies of scale • Service to collect magazines for hospitals • Regulation → On option in box for direct mail → Make it big + easy

PACKAGING

• Revisit packaging essential requirements • Take back schemes / deposits • Refills • Statutory obligations e.g. on large retailers – Who would be responsible for enforcement? • Learning excess packaging with the shop (customer to have the right to chain a deposit for return) • Statutory requirement for reusable bags • Incentives for people bringing their own packaging • Scoop away style shopping • Transportation designed to reduce both damage and packaging • Education • Targets with government incentives • Milkmen • Specifications for packaging to be made from particular materials • Local – central joined-up thinking Appendix I: Don’t Waste It workshop , 6 June 2006 • Deliveries to take back packaging • Retailer packaging responsibility Page 389 of 412 • Popcorn to replace polystyrene compost • Papier-mâché instead of polystyrene. Problem, once it’s squashed up does not have the same properties as polystyrene • E-shopping. Home deliveries of groceries

ELECTRICAL EQUIPMENT

• All electrical equipment in a similar category (i.e. mobile phones, cameras) to operate on standardised fittings and components (i.e. Batteries, cables, connectors). Reduce production needs, facilitate multiple use (energy using products directive, including waste prevention) Eliminate “stand by” and built in clocks wherever practical. Reduce components and power use. • Guaranteed product life spam and warranty. Fine against deposit for early disposal. Greater discount on new product for return of an older one. • Differential VAT for products that use reused parts or which can be most easily dissembled and re-used + on hazardousness of product • Promoting through education (funding) of community use of gadgets

• Community hiring / leasing

HAZARDOUSNESS

• All new products with → Rechargeable batteries → Reprocessing infrastructure for these • Batteries → We behind in EU directive → Collection schemes at retail outlets • Expense of replacement parts (including batteries, printer cartridges etc.) relation to products. Marketing schemes • Labelling policy what are the “hidden” costs of this product (replacement parts)? • Warranty / product quality • Minimum standard / life span for batteries • Refundable deposits for hazardous materials • Building regulations ensuring abilityAppendix to recharge I: bDon’tatteries Waste It workshop , 6 June 2006 • Standardisation of products across time frame. World standards for trading Page 390 of 412 • Substance bans Need more funding to find correct elements (gold to replace lead…) • Hazardous system expert hands • Export bans • Subsidise material for recovery

27.5 Workshop evaluation by stakeholders

A collation of the comments from the evaluation forms from the attendees.

- 27 Forms returned

1. Has the workshop met its objectives?

Not at all Completely

2. How confident are you tthathat the research will produce usefuluseful results?

Not at all Very

3. Did the facilitation and format of the workshop enable you to contribute effectively?

Yes Further comments Good interaction Small groups worked well.

Mike is an excellent facilitator

100%

Appendix I: Don’t Waste It workshop , 6 June 2006 Page 391 of 412

Appendix I: Don’t Waste It workshop , 6 June 2006 Page 392 of 412 4. Are there any other organisations that we should involve, which we have not yet? Retail sector Community sector - Furniture re-use schemes Retailers - Charities - More WDAs - GLA Manufacturers, particularly electronic goods - Consumers - Waste disposers – dismantlers - Recyclers Greater number of upstream supply chain partners Friends of the Earth - Retailers. Engage with them. Social enterprises - DTI Scottish Executive - Scottish/Welsh/NI equivalents of LGA Major retailers (although note that they were invited and Valpak were present) BRC if they can be persuaded NGOs - Public NAWDO - Compliance schemes not present - Retailers Some sort of referencing needs to be undertaken More retailers and orgs higher up the supply chain More involved discussion with British Glass - British Retail Consortium ProCarton - Packaging federation

5. Any other comments? Workshop feedback/suggestions Good sessions where direct input required Interesting, well run, and it finished on time! Good Interesting and enlightening Enjoyable and productive day well run and facilitated Would be useful to obtain copies of presentations please Thanks – A very useful day Shame no more producers/retailers in attendance – but know difficult to get them here. There is a clear gap between industry and council/NGOs. This style of workshop should assist in closing that gap. Thank you. Interesting

Research suggestions Waste strategy would be better implemented either by strategic waste authorities or unitary authorities. More detail on what the table actually showed in terms of gaps and responsibilities – key people/organisations that need to be influenced. It would be important to check that any policies on waste do not have perverse effects on other environmental issues.

Appendix I: Don’t Waste It workshop , 6 June 2006 Page 393 of 412