DOCSLIB.ORG

We Subscribe to No Label Studi Apologetici Per John Chipman Gray, Felix S

Total Page：16

File Type：pdf, Size：1020Kb

Download full-text PDF Read full-text
We Subscribe to No Label Studi Apologetici Per John Chipman Gray, Felix S TEORIA DEL DIRITTO E MONDO CONTEMPORANEO Luca Malagoli We Subscribe to No Label Studi apologetici per John Chipman Gray, Felix S. Cohen e Karl N. Llewellyn GENOVA RICERCA UNIVERSITY PRESS Teoria del Diritto e Mondo Contemporaneo 2 Teoria del Diritto e Mondo Contemporaneo 2 Collana diretta da: Pierluigi Chiassoni (Università di Genova) Maria Cristina Redondo Natella (Università di Genova) Giovanni Battista Ratti (Università di Genova) Comitato Scientifico Manuel Atienza (Universidad de Alicante) Mauro Barberis (Università di Trieste) Veronique Champeils-Desplats (Université Paris Ouest) Paolo Comanducci (Università di Genova) Michael Karlsson (Emerito Università dell’Islanda) Eric Millard (Université Paris Ouest) Riccardo Guastini (Emerito Università di Genova) Stanley L. Paulson (Emerito University of Kansas) Juan Ruiz Manero (Universidad de Alicante) Michel Troper (Emerito Université Paris Ouest) Collana diretta da: Luca Malagoli Pierluigi Chiassoni (Università di Genova) We Subscribe to No Label Maria Cristina Redondo Natella (Università di Genova) Studi apologetici per Giovanni Battista Ratti John Chipman Gray, Felix S. Cohen e Karl N. Llewellyn (Università di Genova) Comitato Scientifico Manuel Atienza (Universidad de Alicante) Mauro Barberis (Università di Trieste) Veronique Champeils-Desplats (Université Paris Ouest) Paolo Comanducci (Università di Genova) Michael Karlsson (Emerito Università dell’Islanda) Eric Millard (Université Paris Ouest) Riccardo Guastini (Emerito Università di Genova) Stanley L. Paulson (Emerito University of Kansas) Juan Ruiz Manero (Universidad de Alicante) Michel Troper (Emerito Université Paris Ouest) GENOVA UNIVERSITY PRESS GENOVA UNIVERSITY PRESS è il marchio editoriale dell’Università di Genova Il presente volume è stato pubblicato con il contributo dei fondi della Sezione di Filosofia e Sociologia del Diritto, Dipartimento di Giurisprudenza, Università degli Studi di Genova. Il presente volume è stato sottoposto a double blind peer-review secondo i criteri stabiliti dal protocollo UPI © 2019 GUP Gli autori rimangono a disposizione per gli eventuali diritti sulle immagini pubblicate. I diritti d’autore verranno tutelati a norma di legge. Riproduzione vietata, tutti i diritti riservati dalla legge sul diritto d’autore Realizzazione Editoriale GENOVA UNIVERSITY PRESS Via Balbi, 6 - 16126 Genova Tel. 010 20951558 - Fax 010 20951552 e-mail: [email protected] http://gup.unige.it ISBN: 978-88-94943-97-9 (versione a stampa) ISBN: 978-88-94943-98-6 (versione eBook) Finito di stampare dicembre 2019 Stampato presso il Centro Stampa Università degli Studi di Genova - Via Balbi 5, 16126 Genova e-mail: [email protected] INDICE Prefazione 9 CAPITOLO 1 Just a Name? Il realismo giuridico (e il formalismo) ai tempi del balanced realism 1.1. Beyond the Formalist/Realist Divide? Il «realismo bilanciato» secondo B.Z. Tamanaha 15 1.2. Una (modesta) proposta Materiali per una definizione del realismo giuridico americano 47 CAPITOLO 2 No Law Previous to Decision. Elementi (proto)realisti nella teoria del diritto di John Chipman Gray 2.1. Premessa 67 2.2. A Well-Nigh Insoluble Problem for Jurisprudence Gray critico della teoria della sovranità di Austin 70 2.2.1. The Social Whole, or True Sovereign Dewey critico della teoria della sovranità di Austin 91 2.2.2. A Sort of Mystic Monism Laski sul «problema della sovranità» 97 2.2.3. The Indeterminable Sovereign Un bilancio comparativo 106 2.3. A Mistake by sir Isaac Gray sulla teoria della decisione giudiziale 119 2.3.1. Justices and Umpires: una analogia pertinente? 137 2.4. The Words of Bishop Hoadly Elementi della teoria dell’interpretazione giuridica di Gray 148 2.5. To the Verge of Modernism Alcune considerazioni conclusive sulla collocazione teorico-storiografica dell’opera di Gray 159 CAPITOLO 3 The Elephant Called Law. Aspetti della Functional Jurisprudence di Felix S. Cohen 3.1. Premessa 175 3.2. A Social Event Riformulazione dei concetti giuridici fondamentali e teoria delle decisioni giudiziali nella «giurisprudenza funzionalista» di Cohen 176 3.3. Tales About the Elephant Il carattere pluralista e anti-riduzionista del funzio- nalismo coheniano 187 3.4. A Fashionable Idea? Brevi considerazioni sul funzionalismo di Cohen 200 CAPITOLO 4 The Henchman of Legal Realism. Karl N. Llewellyn e l'antropologia giuridica 4.1. Premessa 207 4.2. Thinking Like a Cheyenne La critica all'ideological approach 208 4.3. Cleaning Up Social Messes Il metodo dei casi problematici e la Law-Jobs Theory 217 4.4. A Short but Significative Step Llewellyn, Cohen e la Functionalist View 233 Riferimenti bibliografici 249 PREFAZIONE Come avverte il sottotitolo1 del presente volume, i sag- gi qui raccolti trovano il loro principale filo conduttore in un comune intento apologetico. I tre autori – Gray, Cohen e Llewellyn– su cui l’indagine si concentra, infatti, oltre ad essere accostabili (pur se a differente titolo, come si vedrà) al realismo giuridico americano, condividono altresì analoghe e talora ingrate sorti storiografiche. Indubbiamente, si tratta di autori non certo ignoti alla let- teratura giuridico-filosofica e, anzi, in qualche modo, ̔classici ̓ (l’aggettivo calza, in particolare, a Llewellyn). Tuttavia, piut- tosto curiosamente, tale status non impedisce, come si avrà modo di mettere in luce, che elementi significativi della loro opera siano oggetto di fraintendimenti, sottovalutazioni più o meno drastiche e, talvolta, liquidazioni più o meno sommarie. Ciò è particolarmente evidente nel caso di John Chip- man Gray. Dall’ammissibilità della sua (frequente) colloca- zione teorico-storiografica fra gli antecedents del realismo giuridico americano alla valutazione del suo apporto giusfi- losofico, svariate sono le controversie che circondano il suo lavoro, attorno al quale si registra un ben scarso consensus doctorum e su cui non mancano, peraltro, giudizi inclementi e bilanci impietosi. 1 Del quale, peraltro, sono debitore a Pierluigi Chiassoni. 9 Il capitolo dedicato all’autore ambisce, pertanto, a mettere ordine nel dibattito relativo e, dissipati taluni equivoci, a dar conto della (complessa) collocazione di Gray rispetto al realismo giuridico americano e alla sua genesi, nonché a mettere in risalto gli apporti della sua opera che, con buona pace di critici tanto severi quanto, forse, eccessivamente frettolosi, hanno maggior rilievo giusfilosofico. Critiche severe (e, a tratti, impietose) non sono man- cate neppure nei confronti di alcuni degli scritti più noti di Felix S. Cohen e del functional approach di cui l’autore si faceva ivi propugnatore. Come si vedrà, persino uno stu- dioso del realismo giuridico americano attento e sofistica- to quale Brian Leiter, nel riscattare i realisti dalle celebri critiche hartiane, afferma però che il solo autore a cui esse possono applicarsi sarebbe proprio Cohen medesimo, reo di aver proposto una versione platealmente indifendibile del rule-skepticism, nonché di aver mutuato con disinvol- ta superficialità e scarso profitto il metodo funzionalista dal dibattito nelle scienze sociali a lui coevo. Un “funzionalismo estremo” e ingenuo sarebbe al- tresì ravvisabile, a parere di studiosi come Hunt, nella law-jobs theory di Llewellyn, una delle cui più cospicue e ambiziose applicazioni è ravvisabile in The Cheyenne Way (1941), lo studio del diritto cheyenne che, a dispetto dello scetticismo di gran parte della comunità antropolo- gica, Llewellyn e l’antropologo Hoebel svolsero con suc- cesso negli anni ‘30. 10 Prefazione A dispetto delle critiche menzionate, i capitoli dedi- cati rispettivamente a Cohen e a Llewellyn si sforzano di mostrare che, sia pure con obiettivi ed esiti assai diversi, entrambi gli autori non si sono, in realtà, limitati ad una superficiale adesione al funzionalismo di matrice mali- nowskiana, bensì ne hanno proposto versioni rivisitate e acutamente consapevoli dei limiti e delle difficoltà che viziavano talune declinazioni del “primo” funzionalismo. In tal senso, riprendendo e sviluppando osservazioni for- mulate da Twining in merito alla law-jobs theory di Karl N. Llewellyn, nei capitoli in questione cercherò di porre in rilievo (con talune, inevitabili sovrapposizioni e ripeti- zioni che il lettore vorrà perdonare) quegli elementi del- le proposte dei due autori che paiono accostabili a talune delle critiche dell’hard functionalism successivamente svolte da Robert K. Merton2. Oltre che dei tre capitoli sin qui brevemente richia- mati, il volume consta inoltre di un capitolo introduttivo in cui, sulla scorta dell’analisi critica di un noto lavoro di Brian Z. Tamanaha sul (preteso) superamento della distin- zione fra «formalismo» e «realismo», si tenta un bilancio ragionato del vasto e complesso dibattito sulla nozione di «realismo giuridico americano», formulando altresì (a titolo di modesta proposta) alcune tesi che aspirano a evi- denziare un nucleo teorico minimo, comune agli autori ascrivibili all’american legal realism e, dunque, in grado di rendere meno fantasmatica tale etichetta. 2 In Merton 1968: 73-138. 11 Prima di concludere questa breve prefazione, solo al- cune righe per ingraziare almeno alcune delle persone che, in vari modi, mi hanno aiutato nella stesura del volume. In particolare, una prima versione del capitolo su Cohen è sta- ta presentata e discussa nel wokshop Fonti e Giurisdizione, coordinato da Vito Velluzzi e Giovanni Cosi nell’ambito del XXXI Congresso Nazionale della Società Italiana di Filosofia del diritto, tenutosi presso l’Università degli Stu- di di Bergamo nei giorni 13-15 settembre
Load more

Recommended publications
  • American Jurisprudence Between the Wars: Legal Realism and the Crisis of Democratic Theory Edward A
    digitalcommons.nyls.edu Faculty Scholarship Articles & Chapters 1969 American Jurisprudence Between the Wars: Legal Realism and the Crisis of Democratic Theory Edward A. Purcell Jr. New York Law School, [email protected] Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.nyls.edu/fac_articles_chapters Part of the Jurisprudence Commons, and the Law and Psychology Commons Recommended Citation 75 American Historical Review 424 (1969) This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Faculty Scholarship at DigitalCommons@NYLS. It has been accepted for inclusion in Articles & Chapters by an authorized administrator of DigitalCommons@NYLS. American Jurisprudence between the Wars: Legal Realism and the Crisis of Democratic Theory Author(s): Edward A. Purcell, Jr. Source: The American Historical Review, Vol. 75, No. 2 (Dec., 1969), pp. 424-446 Published by: Oxford University Press on behalf of the American Historical Association Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/1849692 Accessed: 13-12-2017 11:33 UTC JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact [email protected]. Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms & Conditions of Use, available at http://about.jstor.org/terms Oxford University Press, American Historical Association are collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to The American Historical Review This content downloaded from 132.174.250.77 on Wed, 13 Dec 2017 11:33:39 UTC All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms American Jurisprudence between the VWars: Legal Realism and the Crisis of Democratic Theory EDWARD A.
    [Show full text]
  • Judicial Genealogy (And Mythology) of John Roberts: Clerkships from Gray to Brandeis to Friendly to Roberts
    The Judicial Genealogy (and Mythology) of John Roberts: Clerkships from Gray to Brandeis to Friendly to Roberts BRAD SNYDER* During his Supreme Court nomination hearings, John Roberts idealized and mythologized the first judge he clerkedfor, Second Circuit Judge Henry Friendly, as the sophisticated judge-as-umpire. Thus far on the Court, Roberts has found it difficult to live up to his Friendly ideal, particularlyin several high-profile cases. This Article addresses the influence of Friendly on Roberts and judges on law clerks by examining the roots of Roberts's distinguishedyet unrecognized lineage of former clerks: Louis Brandeis 's clerkship with Horace Gray, Friendly's clerkship with Brandeis, and Roberts's clerkships with Friendly and Rehnquist. Labeling this lineage a judicial genealogy, this Article reorients clerkship scholarship away from clerks' influences on judges to judges' influences on clerks. It also shows how Brandeis, Friendly, and Roberts were influenced by their clerkship experiences and how they idealized their judges. By laying the clerkship experiences and career paths of Brandeis, Friendly, and Roberts side-by- side in detailed primary source accounts, this Article argues that judicial influence on clerks is more professional than ideological and that the idealization ofjudges and emergence of clerks hips as must-have credentials contribute to a culture ofjudicial supremacy. * Assistant Professor, University of Wisconsin Law School. Thanks to Eleanor Brown, Dan Ernst, David Fontana, Abbe Gluck, Dirk Hartog, Dan
    [Show full text]
  • Horace Gray and the Lost Law Clerks
    Washington and Lee University School of Law Washington & Lee University School of Law Scholarly Commons Scholarly Articles Faculty Scholarship 2007 Birth of an Institution: Horace Gray and the Lost Law Clerks Todd C. Peppers Washington and Lee University School of Law, [email protected] Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarlycommons.law.wlu.edu/wlufac Part of the Courts Commons, Judges Commons, and the Legal History Commons Recommended Citation Todd C. Peppers, Birth of an Institution: Horace Gray and the Lost Law Clerks, 32 J. Sup. Ct. Hist. 229 (2007). This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Faculty Scholarship at Washington & Lee University School of Law Scholarly Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Scholarly Articles by an authorized administrator of Washington & Lee University School of Law Scholarly Commons. For more information, please contact [email protected]. Birth of an Institution: Horace Gray and the Lost Law Clerks TODD C. PEPPERS Introduction In a vault hidden away in a downtown Boston bank rests a large silver loving cup. The cup was presented to Associate Justice Horace Gray on March 22, 1902 by his law clerks, and engraved on its tarnished surface are the names of the nineteen Harvard Law School graduates who served as Justice Gray’s law clerks.1 While the details surrounding the presentation of the cup have been lost to history, the gift was likely prompted by the failing health of Justice Gray and his future departure from the Supreme Court. The loving cup is still held by the Gray family, passing to the heirs of Professor John Chipman Gray, the famous Harvard Law School professor and half-brother of Horace Gray, upon the death of the childless Horace Gray.
    [Show full text]
  • Beyond Black Ink: from Langdell to the Oyez Project-The Voice of the Past
    BEYOND BLACK INK: FROM LANGDELL TO THE OYEZ PROJECT-THE VOICE OF THE PAST Paul R. Baier* [T]he law is a science; . all the available materials of that science are containedin printed books.--Christopher Columbus Langdell, ca. 18861 I am the Edison Phonograph created by the Great Wizard of the new world to delight those who would have melody or be amused. I can sing you tender songs of love. I can give you merry tales andjoyous laughter. I can transform you to the realms of music. I can call you to join in the rhythmic dance.. .- Sound recording, ca. 19062 Beyond Langdell's black ink, lies the Oyez Project. It adds the human voice to our pedagogy: * George M. Armstrong, Jr., Professor of Law, Paul M. Hebert Law Center, Louisiana State University. Judicial Fellow, Supreme Court of the United States, 1975-76. This was the year of my discovery of "The Supreme Court Tapes: Lively Conversations for the Classroom," as I captioned my archeological diggings in the Sound Recordings Division of the National Archives for a joint program of the Sections on Constitutional Law and Teaching Methods at the 1980 Annual Meeting of the Association of American Law Schools, Phoenix, Arizona-a pretty good place to launch a contemporary nova methodus, following Leipnitz (1667) and echoing Coke (1600): "Reading without hearing is dark and irksome." I owe thanks to Yale Kamisar, whose booming voice I first heard as a lowly Instructor in Law at Michigan Law School and whose loud objection at Phoenix to using the sound effects of Supreme Court tapes in teaching ("Why tapes, why not transcripts?") inspired me to keep at it for another quarter of a century, culminating of late in a reprise of sorts: "The Palm Beach Sound Machine," for the Southeastern Association of Law Schools Annual Meeting, Palm Beach, Fla., July 2008, with thanks to Russell Weaver for inviting me to join his coterie of SEALS friends.
    [Show full text]
  • Remembering the Civil War
    Number 100 / Summer 011 MHS Miscellany REMEMBERING THE CIVIL WAR Over the course of little more than a week in April 1861, now almost exactly 150 years ago, one event after another seemed to tug the nation inevitably into war: South Carolina troops clashed with the federal forces in Fort Sumter, a newly inaugurated president declared a state of insurrection and called for a substantial increase in the country’s armed forces, Southern states continued to secede from the Union, and the future commander of Confederate forces, Robert E. Lee, for- mally resigned from the U.S. Army. As spring and then sum- mer unfolded, each side consolidated its political status and its military forces, and a war took hold that would convulse the land for four more years, until the spring of 1865. The toll in lives, livelihood, and national well-being was tremendous, and its effects—positive and negative—reached far beyond the battlefields. Many consequences, revolution- ary in their time, made the country that emerged funda- mentally different from the one that had preceded the war: the combination of the Emancipation Proclamation and the 13th Amendment put an end to slavery, and the Union itself remained whole. For many Americans—African Americans and new immigrants—it provided the first opportunity to serve their country, and Lincoln became the icon of national politics that we still invoke today. To remember this turning point in American history, commemorations will take place across the country, and Massachusetts will not be an excep- tion. At the Massachusetts Historical Society, we feel a particu- lar sense of duty to create opportunities for our community to learn about the war, honor the memories of those who made sacrifices for a cause they believed in, and engage in discussions about what happened then and how these events are still with us today.
    [Show full text]
  • History in the American Juridical Field: Narrative, Justification, and Explanation
    History in the American Juridical Field: Narrative, Justification, and Explanation Christopher Tomlins* I. INTRODUCTION Law in the contemporary United States has achieved unchallenged ascendancy as the principal arena and discourse for decisionmaking in social and political affairs. Law's capacity to dominate in such decisionmaking is largely dependent on popular confidence in the legitimacy and efficacy of the rules it produces. Legitimacy is in turn grounded upon the repeated invocation over time of foundational values associated with the juridical form: law's objectivity in application (no one is above the law), universality in implementation (one law for all), and neutrality in outcome (the law does not take sides). Together, these values compose what I shall call law's meta-character-the normative idealization of the workings of law in society that emanates from "the world of the law." As resort to law proliferates, however, actual "legalities"-the legal conditions of social life-are produced not through the elaboration of holistic jurisdictional narratives, but from competitive struggles, adversarial or bureaucratic, to achieve specific, instrumental outcomes. Individuals, agencies, interest groups and social movements (including legal professionals themselves) make particular,self-serving investments in law. The availability of law for widespread use furnishes a practical quotidian basis for law's social efficacy, but use itself is indifferent to, and * Senior Research Fellow, The American Bar Foundation. This essay began as a paper written for a Colloquium, Sur la Portge Sociale du Droit: Usages et Lggitimit6 du Registre Juridique, convened November 2002 at the University of Picardy-Jules Verne, in Amiens. I wish to thank Liora Israel, Guillaume Sacriste, Antoine Vauchez and Laurent Willemez for their invitation to participate.
    [Show full text]
  • An Introductory History of Law in the Lecture Hall
    Digital Commons at St. Mary's University Faculty Articles School of Law Faculty Scholarship 1997 Casebooks, Commentaries, and Curmudgeons: An Introductory History of Law in the Lecture Hall Stephen M. Sheppard St. Mary's University School of Law, [email protected] Follow this and additional works at: https://commons.stmarytx.edu/facarticles Part of the Law Commons Recommended Citation Stephen M. Sheppard, Casebooks, Commentaries, and Curmudgeons: An Introductory History of Law in the Lecture Hall, 82 Iowa L. Rev 547 (1997). This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the School of Law Faculty Scholarship at Digital Commons at St. Mary's University. It has been accepted for inclusion in Faculty Articles by an authorized administrator of Digital Commons at St. Mary's University. For more information, please contact [email protected]. Casebooks, Commentaries, and Curmudgeons: An Introductory History of Law in the Lecture Hall Steve Sheppard* I. Introduction: The Sciences of Legal Pedagogy .............. 550 IT. Treatises, Commentaries, and the Monologue Lecture ........ 552 A. Foundations of Colonial Study ...................... 552 B. Eighteenth Century law Study: Three Examples ......... 553 C. Coke's and, of Course, Blackstone's Books ........•..•. 556 D. The Lectures of Litchfield ................•......... 564 E. The University Lecturer: Round One .......... •....... 567 F. The University Lecturer: Round Two ....•...•........ 573 G. The Fli'St American Legal Science ................... 583 H. Theodore Dwight Acme of University Lecturers ......... 583 I. The Lecture and Treatise in the Twentieth Century ...... 592 III. The Casebook and the Case Method ..................... 593 A. The Casebook: Its Predecessors ..................... 594 B. Langdell and His Science ........................•. 596 C. The Export of the Case Method ....................
    [Show full text]
  • The Geologic Strata of the Law School Curriculum Robert W
    Vanderbilt Law Review Volume 60 | Issue 2 Article 2 3-2007 The Geologic Strata of the Law School Curriculum Robert W. Gordon Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.vanderbilt.edu/vlr Part of the Legal Education Commons Recommended Citation Robert W. Gordon, The Geologic Strata of the Law School Curriculum, 60 Vanderbilt Law Review 339 (2019) Available at: https://scholarship.law.vanderbilt.edu/vlr/vol60/iss2/2 This Symposium is brought to you for free and open access by Scholarship@Vanderbilt Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in Vanderbilt Law Review by an authorized editor of Scholarship@Vanderbilt Law. For more information, please contact [email protected]. VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW VOLUME 60 MARCH 2007 NUMBER 2 The Geologic Strata of the Law School Curriculum Robert W Gordon* IN TRODU CTION ............................................................................... 340 I. ORIGINS OF THE BASIC STRUCTURE AND CONTENT OF THE MODERN AMERICAN LAW SCHOOL CURRICULUM ......... 340 A. The Bedrock: The Harvard Template and Its R ivals .......................................................... 340 1. Structure ....................................................... 34 1 2. C on ten t ......................................................... 34 1 B. The Chief Rivals of the Harvard School .................. 342 1. Education in Statesmanship ........................ 343 2. Law as Policy Science ................................... 344 3. "Social" Law and Progressive Economics ..... 345 II. STABILITY AND CHANGE
    [Show full text]
  • The Historical Origins, Founding, and Early Development of Student-Edited Law Reviews, 36 Hastings L.J
    Hastings Law Journal Volume 36 | Issue 5 Article 2 1-1985 The iH storical Origins, Founding, and Early Development of Student-Edited Law Reviews Michael L. Swygert Jon W. Bruce Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.uchastings.edu/hastings_law_journal Part of the Law Commons Recommended Citation Michael L. Swygert and Jon W. Bruce, The Historical Origins, Founding, and Early Development of Student-Edited Law Reviews, 36 Hastings L.J. 739 (1985). Available at: https://repository.uchastings.edu/hastings_law_journal/vol36/iss5/2 This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at UC Hastings Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Hastings Law Journal by an authorized editor of UC Hastings Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact [email protected]. The Historical Origins, Founding, and Early Development of Student-Edited Law Reviewst By MICHAEL I. SWYGERT* AND JON W. BRUCE** If we fail, we shall at least have the satisfaction of believing that our work has been honestly done in the interest of the law school and of its alumni.I The American law review properly has been called the most remarka- ble institution of the law school world. To a lawyer, its articles and comments may be indispensable professional tools. To a judge, ... the review may be both a severe critic and a helpful guide. But per- haps most important, the review affords invaluable training to the stu- dents .... 2 Most accredited law schools in the United States publish a student- edited law review containing scholarly writing about recent court deci- sions, unresolved issues of law, and other topics of interest to the legal community.3 Begun a century ago by law students as an academic exper- iment,4 law reviews have achieved a prominent and influential position in the legal profession.5 Much has been written both praising6 and criticiz- " © Copyright 1985 by Michael I.
    [Show full text]
  • Harvard Law School Faculty 20–​21
    Harvard Law School Faculty – 1 Professors and Assistant Professors of Law 3 Professors Emeriti and Emeritae 48 Affiliated Harvard University Faculty 55 Visiting Professors of Law 61 Climenko Fellows 73 Lecturers on Law 75 Endowed Chairs at Harvard Law School 95 2 HARVARD LAW SCHOOL FacULTY 2020–2021 Professors and Assistant Professors of Law William P. Alford Jerome A. and Joan L. Cohen Professor of East Asian Legal Studies Courses: Engaging China, Fall 2020; The Comparative Law Workshop, Fall 2020; Comparative Law: Why Law? Lessons from China, Spring 2021. Research: Chinese Legal History and Law, Comparative Law, Disability Law, International Trade, Law and Development, Legal Profession, Transnational/Global Lawyering, WTO. Representative Publications: An Oral History of Special Olympics in China in 3 volumes (William P. Alford, Mei Liao, and Fengming Cui, eds., Springer 2020) Taiwan and international Human Rights: A story of Transformation (Jerome A. Cohen, William P. Alford, and Chang-fa Lo, eds., Springer 19); Prospects for The Professions in China (William P. Alford, Kenneth Winston & William C. Kirby eds., Routledge 1); William P. Alford, To Steal A Book Is an Elegant Offense: Intellectual Property Law in Chinese Civilization (Stanford Univ. Press 1995). Education: Amherst College B.A. 197; St. John’s College, Cambridge University LL.B. 197; Yale University M.A. 1974; Yale University M.A. 1975; Harvard Law School J.D. 1977. Appointments: Henry L. Stimson Professor of Law, 199–18; Director, East Asian Legal Studies, 199– present; Vice Dean for the Graduate Program and International Legal Studies, 2002–2020; Chair, Harvard Law School Project on Disability, 4–present; Jerome A.
    [Show full text]
  • RESUME STEPHEN A. SIEGEL Office
    RESUME STEPHEN A. SIEGEL Office Address: College of Law DePaul University 25 East Jackson Boulevard Chicago, Illinois 60604 Telephone: (312) 362-8144 E-mail: [email protected] Home Address: 2219 Schiller Avenue Wilmette, Illinois 60091 Telephone: (847) 256-4116 Married: Susan Bandes Children: Daniel, Andrew Admitted to Practice: 1971, Massachusetts EDUCATION B.A., Columbia College, 1967 J.D., Harvard Law School, 1971 LL.M., Harvard Law School, 1972 LEGAL EMPLOYMENT 1972-Present DePaul University, College of Law Distinguished Research Professor (2003-Present) Associate Dean for Research, Scholarship and Faculty Development (2001-2009) Professor (1981-2003) Associate Professor (1976-81) Assistant Professor (1972-1976) University of Illinois, College of Law Visiting Professor (Spring, 2010) 1971-72 Ford Foundation Fellow in Urban Law, Harvard Law School BOARDS Editor, Law and History Review (1993-2000) TEACHING Constitutional Law (2002-Present) Supreme Court Litigation Seminar (1994-Present) Constitutional Torts and Section 1983 (2008-Present) Land-Use Planning (1972-77, 1981-Present) Property I and II (1972-77, 1979-2002) Legal History (1972-1994) Property Rights and Economic Liberties (1999-2002) Torts I & II (1977-79) SCHOLARSHIP PUBLICATIONS BOOK A Student's Guide to Easements, Real Covenants and Equitable Servitudes (Matthew Bender) (1st ed. 1988) (2nd ed. 1999) (3rd ed. 2012) BOOK CHAPTER The Death and Rebirth of the Clear and Present Danger Test, in Transformations in American Legal History: Essays in Honor of Professor Morton J.
    [Show full text]
  • John Chipman Gray and the Moral Basis of Classical Legal Thought Stephen A
    DePaul University From the SelectedWorks of Stephen Siegel August, 2001 John Chipman Gray and the Moral Basis of Classical Legal Thought Stephen A. Siegel, DePaul University Available at: https://works.bepress.com/stephen-siegel/32/ +(,121/,1( Citation: Stephen A. Siegel, John Chipman Gray and the Moral Basis of Classical Legal Thought, 86 Iowa L. Rev. 1513 (2001) Provided by: Rinn Law Library Content downloaded/printed from HeinOnline Tue May 14 09:09:01 2019 -- Your use of this HeinOnline PDF indicates your acceptance of HeinOnline's Terms and Conditions of the license agreement available at https://heinonline.org/HOL/License -- The search text of this PDF is generated from uncorrected OCR text. -- To obtain permission to use this article beyond the scope of your HeinOnline license, please use: Copyright Information Use QR Code reader to send PDF to your smartphone or tablet device John Chipman Gray and the Moral Basis of Classical Legal Thought Stephien A. Sieget I. INTRODUCT ON ...................................................................................1514 I. CLASSICAL LEGAL THOUGHT AND LANGDELL'S ORTHODOXY ............1518 A. CLASSiCAL LEGAL THOUGHT .........................................................1519 B. CHRRSTOP-ER COLUMBULAAGDEL .............................................1523 III. JOHN CHIPMAN GRAY ..........................................................................1527 A. A BRmE BIOGRAPHY .....................................................................1527 B. JOHN CummAV GRA: A CLASSICAL LEGAL SCHOL4R
    [Show full text]