Buy Now! Dramatis Personae Home Vice Adm. Wolfgang Wegener (1875-1956)

Wegener was born in Stettin, the son of a doctor. He joined the navy in 1894, where he became a gunnery offi cer. During he fi rst served as the chief of staff of 1st Battle Squadron, leaving that post to become captain of the light Regensburg, followed by a stint as commander of the Nurnberg. After the war he stayed on in the much diminished service, attaining the rank of vice admiral in 1926. He was the author of a series of essays that in totality became known as the “Wegener Thesis.” Those writings were a matter of controversy in Germany, and also had some impact outside that country. The thesis was published in the Soviet Union, where com- mentators praised it for recognizing the strategic importance of the Scandinavian peninsula. British commentators took a different view, maintaining any navy that couldn’t go where it pleased when it pleased was really no navy at all. They maintained – not surpris- ingly, given Britain’s naval preeminence in Europe at the time – that geography was never as important as having the brute battle line strength needed for outright sea control.

Adm. Erich Johann Albert Raeder (1876-1960)

Raeder was born to a middle-class family in Schleswig-Holstein, the son of a schoolmaster. He also joined the navy in 1894, and rose rapidly in the ranks. During World War I he fought at the Battle of Dogger Bank in 1914 and at Jutland in 1916. In 1920 he participated in the Kapp Putsch, a far-right coup attempt against the Weimar Republic aimed at preventing the new regime’s disbanding of the Freikorps. He was thereafter marginalized for his role in the Putsch and, as punishment, was transferred to the naval archives section, where, with nothing else to do, he threw himself into an intensive study of naval strategy and history, eventually receiving a doctorate from the University of Kiel. Through sheer persistence he hung on, surviving his internal exile and eventually rising to overall command of the navy in 1928, which was at that time rife with internal dissension as The Bismarck unleashing a salvo against HMS Hood. well as material problems. The navy was popularly blamed for fi rst prolonging and then losing the First World War. Its loyalty was also questioned due to the fact the general mutiny within it in the autumn of 1918 had turned out to be the fi rst step in the fall of the imperial government. In order to speedily reunify the service, Raeder set in place a culture of uniformity in which dissenting opinions simply weren’t tolerated. That approach led to Wegener’s forced retirement. Theory Into Practice: The opening of World War II saw Raeder win operational successes, including the invasion of Norway, the prosecution of a U-Boat campaign, and convoy raids around the world. After growing reversals of fortune, including the loss of the Bismarck and the failure German Surface Raider Strategy By David March of Battle of the Barents Sea, Hitler in turn forced his resignation in January 1943. After the war Raeder was tried and sentenced to life imprisonment for his part in plotting and fi ghting a war of aggression. The sentence was later reduced and, due to deteriorating health, he was granted early release in 1955. Background of the war’s loss. Finally, while it had British were able to maintain that been relegated to a small size by the blockade against the Germans. Adm. Raoul Castex (1878-1968) he post-World War I German Versailles Treaty, the navy was then The navy of the new Third Reich was Navy was limited by the further reduced by the still smaller therefore immediately confronted with Castex was a French naval theorist whose writings had a profound effect on Raeder and the T Versailles Treaty to no more budgets allocated to it by the Weimar three major problems: 1) a small num- development of the German navy between the wars. Castex joined the French Navy in 1896 and than six of 10,000 tons Republic, which precluded it from even ber of ships; 2) inherent strategic limits eventually became an instructor at the Ecole de Guerre Navale. After World War I he became each, six of no more than reaching the limitations imposed on it. due to the geographic relationship a rear admiral, and in 1936 he established the Institute for Higher National Defense Studies. 6,000 tons each, 12 destroyers of In the run up to the First World between Germany and her Allied oppo- Between 1929 and 1939 he wrote a series of papers titled “Theories Strategiques,” no more than 800 tons each, eight War, the navy had been developed in nents; and 3) a still limited budget that in which he discussed the links between land and naval warfare, concentrating on what light cruisers and 32 torpedo boats. accordance with the views of Grand had to be shared with the two other ser- nations that were primarily land powers should do in regard to naval strategy. His think- Fifteen thousand men would be Adm. . He advocated vice branches, the army and air force. ing included the idea of relocating France’s armaments industry and capital to Algeria, allowed to crew those vessels, and no a strategy in which the navy was to be At the same time, three inescapable as that locale could be more easily defended in case of a new outbreak of war. were to be allowed at all. made large enough to threaten British tasks would face the navy on the His strategy formed an important part of Raeder’s thought. The German was particularly After the conclusion of the war, pub- domination of the seas and, more outbreak of a new war: 1) protecting impressed by the Frenchman’s idea that opportunities for decisive naval battles were rare, lic opinion in Germany ran against the particularly, it was to be able to break Germany’s coasts from invasion; 2) and that attempts to create them were futile. He emphasized tactics that encouraged the navy. It was seen as having contributed any British by protecting German shipping within the development of what he called force organisée (organized forces). Such naval groupings would to the long duration of the war while forcing (and winning) a decisive battle nation’s coastal waters; and 3) attacking be task-organized and sent to sea temporarily, as needed, to fi ght limited offensives. He also itself having turned out to have been in the North Sea. When the British enemy ships and oceanic lines of stressed the need for commerce raiding, blockade, mines and amphibious warfare. ★ nothing more than a waste of resources subsequently established just such communication in some signifi cant, or during it and, ultimately—in regard a blockade at the English Channel even decisive, way. Further, given the to its overall nonperformance—it and between Scotland and Bergen, budgetary situation, those missions was also seen as one of the causes Norway, Tirpitz’s plan fell apart. The continued on page 42 »

40 World at War 26 | oCT–NoV 2012 World at War 26 | oCT–NoV 2012 41 but was unable to prevent them from Prussia and the likely intervention of being circulated within the service. France against Germany in that war via Wegner’s premise was that Tirpitz’s naval power. The naval raiders of the strategy wasn’t workable for Germany Deutschland-class, known as “pocket in that it didn’t threaten the one British battleships,” were originally intended vulnerability: oceanic trade. That the to fi ght that war. Their high endurance British economy was dependent on and heavy armament were intended the sea trade had been known since to enable them to hit and run French the turn of the previous century. The convoys headed toward Poland via German Navy was therefore play- the North Sea, while also breaking ing a weak hand by attempting to any attempted blockade of German match the Royal Navy’s battle line. ports by French combatant ships. Having identifi ed what he saw as There was one point on which the British weakness, Wegner suggested Raeder and Wegener agreed, but for there was an inescapable need for different reasons. That is, Raeder also the German Navy to acquire new advocated securing Norway in order bases from which it could threaten to protect the economically vital that British trade. He advocated an coastal transshipments of Swedish Kriegsmarine war badge for commerce raiding. Kriegsmarine war badge for offensive, either military or diplomatic, iron ore through that fi rst country’s service on the high seas. to acquire such bases in Norway, which coastal waters. He therefore sought an would allow German ships to simply invasion of Norway as an ultimately sidestep the Norway-Scotland portion defensive measure to secure German of the blockade. It would also allow trade, where Wegener had wanted it German ships to attack convoys headed as a geo-strategic steppingstone from toward Russia. Once those bases were which to strike against the British battle acquired, the British would be forced to line in a decisive engagement. Wegener deal with the German battle line under believed that once such a decisive battle operational and tactical situations that had been fought, the trade route the would no longer be under their control. Germans needed for ore transit would After the war Wegner published be secure simply as its byproduct. his ideas in an inclusive book, The Raeder was also a pupil of Adm. Naval Strategy of the World War. In it Franz von Hipper, who during he further expanded on his Norway World War I had advocated sending scheme by calling for the acquisition as a raiding force into of bases on the French Atlantic the Atlantic to attack British convoys. coast. He also argued that, in order Hipper had hoped doing that would to fully overturn British global naval force the British to send decisively large superiority, a strategic alliance with numbers of their best ships to chase the another partner would be necessary. cruisers, thus setting up the remaining blockade force to be defeated by the Raeder’s View main part of the German fl eet. Hipper A British propaganda poster from the era of the German surface raiders thus sought results through what had The man who would become the earlier been the classic French naval all naval theaters are ultimately of the aircraft carriers, 15 pocket battleships, commander of the Kriegsmarine, and strategy of guerre de course (commerce same global signifi cance; 2) cruiser 23 heavy cruisers and 22 destroyers. then force Wegener out of the service, war), by which an inferior fl eet fi rst operations in theaters distant from The ships were to be built with large Kriegsmarine war badge for blockade running. had other views. Adm. Erich Raeder concentrates on commerce raiding. the homeland are therefore just as diesel fuel bunkers to allow them to rightly pointed out the major fl aw Raeder’s thought was also important to overall naval strategy participate in extended operations » continued from page 40 Wegener’s Idea of Wegener’s thesis: the post-World infl uenced by that of contemporary as the main battle line’s role in home globally. For home waters, two War I German Navy simply couldn’t French Adm. Raoul Castex, who waters; and 3) successful attacks in dis- battlegroups would be formed, each were fundamentally at odds with each The fi rst theoretical papers by pull off his plans as he envisioned advocated what he called the “middle tant areas would lead to enemy forces around a core of battleships and one other. For example, coastal defense Wegener were published within the them. A direct confrontation with strategy.” Castex wrote that for a nation having to be diverted to them, thereby aircraft carrier, screened by destroyers called for different types of vessels navy in 1915. At that time the service the British battle line would still see that was primarily a land power to creating more favorable circumstances that would then be used exclusively than those best suited for attacking was just beginning to face increasing the Germans defeated, no matter defeat one that was primarily a naval in home waters. Instead of only caring to attain and maintain control of the enemy ships and disrupting his criticism for its failures in the ongoing the altered geo-strategic relation- power, an all-out fl eet action wasn’t about one piece of the global ocean, Baltic and North Seas. To supplement far-fl ung lines of communication. World War. It had been built at great ship between the two navies. necessary or desirable. Instead, a Raeder saw the whole watery portion those forces the navy was to coordinate The navy high command sought expense, mostly during the previous 15 Raeder was initially moved to his series of limited tactical victories of the planet as his battlefi eld. major efforts in mine and to develop ways to effectively carry years, and the growing belief, both by more pragmatic approach due to by the land power could eventually warfare while also working closely with out that three-pronged strategy, and the citizenry and the army, that it was the German situation on land close overturn the larger overall balance of Hitler & Plan Z the Luftwaffe’s land-based aircraft. two theses came into being. One was useless, was seemingly borne out by to home. That is, until Hitler’s rise to naval power. He argued that winning The home waters formations also supported by Adm. Wolfgang Wegener the fact its ships stayed in port, unable power, the Weimar Republic’s navy secondary battles in secondary With the rise of Hitler and the Nazis, had multiple operational roles beyond and the other by Adm. Erich Raeder. to break the British blockade. Adm. had concentrated on what seemed theaters could eventually achieve the Versailles Treaty was put aside and local sea control. They were to convoy Tirpitz was enraged by the papers, the most likely confl ict it would have results against a primary navy power. the navy was given a new construction the Scandinavian iron ore shipments, to face: a war with Poland over East Raeder’s amalgamation of all that plan and greater funding. The navy was facilitate the movement of raiders came to rest on three main points: 1) to be built up to 13 battleships, four continued on page 49 »

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The Admiral Scheer as laid down in 1934. Home

The Scheer’s Capt. Krancke.

Key Voyages

The HMS Jervis Bay was the sole escort for a convoy of 37 ships departing from Halifax, a time, except during battle, thus reducing Nova Scotia, on their way to Great Britain in the ship to a maximum speed of 22 knots. November 1940. She had originally been a On the 14th she again met with Nordmark, cruise ship, hastily converted into a convoy which took on the 150 prisoners Scheer was escort at the beginning of World War II. She carrying by then and transferred supplies. mounted 6-inch guns of World War I vintage. The most fortunate capture for the On 5 November she moved to head off a lone Scheer came in December, when she took the ship that was spotted approaching the convoy 8,500-ton refrigeration ship Duquesa. She was on an intercept course. The attacking vessel loaded with eggs, tinned food, beef, mutton turned out to be the German pocket battleship and bacon. That cargo was used not only to Admiral Scheer; so the Jervis Bay’s captain restock both Nordmark and Scheer, but also gave the order for the convoy to scatter while two other German ships, the Eurofi eld and his vessel tried to fi ght her off. He managed to Thor, who joined them on Christmas Day. The delay the battleship long enough to deny all but ships spent the holidays in the South Atlantic, fi ve ships as prizes to the Germans. The Scheer where they refueled three Italian subs while damaged three other ships while sending Jervis the Scheer’s engines were also repaired. Bay to the bottom. The “auxiliary cruiser” was welding techniques and triple-gun turrets to secondaries. Her fl ak batteries consisted of six Admiral Scheer completed repairs just armored cruiser. Krancke—alerted by B-Dienst, During that time Krancke met with Thor’s hopelessly outmatched by the purpose-designed save weight, and diesel engines to cut down 4.1-inch and eight 37mm and 20mm guns. Eight as France fell, and conducted sea trials the German Navy’s interception effort against skipper, Otto Kahler. They agreed it would raider’s 11-inch guns; her commander received on coal. Though the resultant vessels couldn’t 21-inch aft torpedo tubes were complemented during the Battle of Britain. By October, Raeder British naval transmissions—was told of those be best to continue to operate separately, the Victoria Cross posthumously for his effort. stand up to full-fl edged Allied battleships, by two fl oatplanes that could be launched managed to convince an increasingly reluctant deployments and so moved south, deeper into as the Scheer was likely to be immediately That was only the start of one of the German ships’ primary purpose was to from a single catapult. Her crew of 1,150 was Hitler to allow her a convoy-raiding cruise the Atlantic and away from his pursuers. recognized as a German warship and Thor the most successful raider sorties by the operate as commerce raiders. The maximum commanded by Capt. T heodore Krancke. in the Atlantic. Assisting her in the mission Over the next month Scheer had a number of couldn’t keep up with her combat speed. Kriegsmarine in all of World War II. Not speed of the class was 28.5 knots, which was The Scheer’s wartime career started inaus- was the supply ship Nordmark, a vessel encounters. On 12 November she and Nordmark On 8 January 1941 the Scheer began to only were two British convoys ordered back slower than the most advanced vessels of 1939 piciously when the Bristol Blenheim bombers whose participation proved invaluable. helped to refi t the German freighter Eurofi eld, hunt again, heading toward Freetown, hoping to Halifax, but the Admiralty also made but was still fast enough to be competitive of the Royal Air Force’s 107 Squadron attacked On 1 November 1940, Scheer passed which had been hiding out in T enerife (in Spain’s to fi nd a convoy that had eluded Admiral Hipper the crucial decision no convoy would move at the start of the war, and they had the her berth at Wilhelmshaven on 4 September through the Denmark Strait undetected and Canary Islands), and resupplied the Thor, a “Q several weeks earlier. Though Scheer didn’t without at least one battleship in escort. impressive operational range of 18,650 miles. 1939. She was hit by four bombs, which did was free in the Atlantic. On the 5th one of her Ship” (a raider disguised as a merchantman), fi nd those ships, she did capture Sandfjord, a Admiral Scheer was a Deutschland-class Fully loaded, Scheer weighed 16,000 tons, enough damage to send her into overhaul. She fl oatplanes discovered the convoy that led to the which was already operating in the Atlantic. Norwegian oiler, sending her and her 11,000-ton armored cruiser (a.k.a. “pocket battleship”), and even unloaded she barely made the revised spent the next several months in repairs, while action described above. In six hours Scheer sank On the 24th Scheer encountered the cargo back to Bordeaux with a prize crew. which had been built as a result of the treaty treaty limit of 12,600. She was 613.75 feet long others of her sister ships gained fame—as did Jervis Bay and 53,000 tons of other shipping. 7,500-ton Port Hobart and sank her. In early Three days later the Scheer encountered restrictions on German naval development. with a 71.25-foot beam, and had four diesel the Admiral Graf Spee at the Battle of the River The British reacted by recalling two convoys December she sank the 6,200-ton Tribesmen two other ships, and by pretending to be a Within those restrictions, all ships had to engines producing 56,800 horsepower for Plate—or ignominy—as did the Deutschland to Halifax and sending the battleships Nelson off the coast of Gambia. Shortly after that British vessel, captured both. One was the be kept under a 10,000-ton limit. In order her two propeller shafts. She had six 11-inch when she returned home from a cruise after and Rodney, along with the battlecruisers Hood, the Scheer developed engine trouble, and 5,500-ton Dutch Barneveld, and the other the to comply, German builders used the latest guns in two triple-turrets, and eight 5.9-inch having accomplished absolutely nothing. Renown and Repulse, in pursuit of the German Krancke ordered only one would operate at 5,100-ton British Stanpark. The latter was a

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