Introduction Political Security of Singapore

Political Security study guide SMC 2018: Singapore’s role as a small state

POLITICAL SECURITY COUNCIL Learning Outcomes Students should understand Singapore’s limitations as a small state and be aware of how it safeguards its position on the international stage by capitalising on its strengths.

[Topic 1: Singapore’s role in ASEAN] Introduction Political security of Singapore

The island state of Singapore is dwarfed by geographically larger countries on the international stage, yet our nation’s numerous diplomatic ties with other countries grant us considerable influence. This has helped cement our place in the global community.

Increasingly, though, Singapore’s political security is not as certain as before, given the unpredictability of relations between China and the USA, and Singapore’s close ties with both countries. At the same time, Singapore has added responsibilities as the current

ASEAN Chair, with aims to strengthen and sustain ASEAN’s relations internationally.

There is also a need to balance our role as a leader in the region with protecting national interests. Hence, maintaining our political security and deciding how this should be undertaken are issues that continue to be of great concern.

Singapore’s foreign policy

As outlined by the Minister for Foreign Affairs, Dr. Vivian Balakrishnan, there are two main guiding principles governing Singapore’s foreign policy:1 firstly, protecting our nation’s

1 Cheong, Danson. “Vivian Balakrishnan outlines core principles guiding Singapore's foreign policy.” The Straits Times, 17 July 2017, www.straitstimes.com/singapore/vivian-outlines-core- principles-guiding-spores-foreign-policy.

Political Security study guide SMC 2018: Singapore’s role as a small state

sovereignty and independence, and, secondly, transcending geographical borders to maximise Singapore’s opportunities. These key concepts are at the core of any foreign policy discussion, as we strive to protect the nation’s interests while balancing regional or even international interests. Other than these two main arcs, Singapore’s foreign policy also follows the following 5 key principles2:

1. Singapore needs to be a successful and vibrant economy

2. Singapore cannot become a vassal state

3. Singapore must aim to be a friend to all, an enemy of none

4. Singapore must promote a global world governed by the rule of law and international norms

5. Singapore must be a credible and consistent power

Singapore has always strictly enforced its own laws, even in the face of foreign pressure.

This policy allows its citizens to take pride in the country’s sovereignty, but, to foreign countries, it could possibly indicate Singapore’s unwillingness to compromise for the sake of cooperation. This was made starkly clear when Singapore followed through with the

2 Hermesauto. “Full speech: Five core principles of Singapore's foreign policy.” The Straits Times, 17 July 2017, www.straitstimes.com/singapore/five-core-principles-of-singapores- foreign-policy.

Political Security study guide SMC 2018: Singapore’s role as a small state

hanging of the two Indonesia bombers that bombed the MacDonald House during the period of Konfrontasi with Indonesia in 19683, despite the fact that Singapore had only recently gained independence and was vulnerable to the volatile external political climate.

Also, in 1994, Singapore enforced the sentence of caning on US teenager Michael Fay for the crime of vandalism, despite pressure from the US4.

Singapore was also a key player in the negotiations for the Law of the Sea Treaty

(UNCLOS) in 19825, cementing its belief for the need for laws to govern appropriate regional and international behaviour that balances national and overall interests. In addition, Singapore participated actively in the negotiations for the Paris Agreement6 on

Climate Change. This was driven by the need to protect Singapore’s national interests given that, as a low-lying city, Singapore is most susceptible to the dangers of rising sea levels due to global warming.

Singapore does not take sides7 in international conflicts, but adopts a principle-based and independent stand in its foreign policy driven by its own interests. Since 1989, Singapore

3 Ong, Sor Fern. “A primer on the MacDonald House bombing that shook Singapore in 1965.” The Straits Times, 20 Jan. 2016, www.straitstimes.com/singapore/a-primer-on-the-macdonald- house-bombing-that-shook-singapore-in-1965-0. 4 Adst. “Spare the Rod, Spoil the Child: Michael Fay's Caning in Singapore.” The Huffington Post, TheHuffingtonPost.com, 19 Aug. 2015, www.huffingtonpost.com/adst/spare-the-rod-spoil- the-c_b_8012770.html. 5 N.A. “Singapore becomes venue in Asia to settle disputes relating to law of the sea.” The Straits Times, 19 Jan. 2016, www.straitstimes.com/singapore/singapore-becomes-venue-in-asia- to-settle-disputes-relating-to-law-of-the-sea. 6 “Singapore Reaffirms Commitment to Paris Climate Agreement after US Pullout.” Channel NewsAsia, 2 June 2017, www.channelnewsasia.com/news/singapore/singapore-reaffirms-commitment-to-paris- climate-agreement-after-8905862. 7 Beng, Kor Kian. “Singapore Does Not Take Sides in Foreign Policy: Chan Chun Sing.” The Straits Times, 6 July 2016, www.straitstimes.com/asia/spore-does-not-take-sides-in-foreign-policy.

Political Security study guide SMC 2018: Singapore’s role as a small state

has taken part in 16 peacekeeper and observer missions for the UN, providing medical support and military advisors for national reconciliation, in countries such as Myanmar8.

More recently, in 2015, Singapore was chosen as a neutral venue for a meeting between

China and Taiwan, keeping good faith with China by supporting the “One China” principle while maintaining close relations with Taiwan9. This balancing act has been noted to be deftly and carefully done.

Furthermore, Singapore also helped establish an informal grouping of small states known as the Forum of Small States in 1992, to protect countries with similar interests10. The

Forum of Small States has grown to 107 countries, more than half the membership of the

UN. Singapore also contributed productively to the Alliance of Small Island States

(AOSIS)11. Singapore also established the Global Governance Group (3G) to empower smaller states and to better connect the G20 to the UN12. Singapore has gained observer status in the Arctic Council since May 201313 after participating actively in international maritime affairs. This was a successful end to the quest to gain representation in the

8 N.A. “International Peace Keeping Efforts.” International Peace Keeping Efforts, n.d. www.mfa.gov.sg/content/mfa/international_issues/intl_peace_keeping_efforts.html. 9 Pei , Shing Huei. “No surprises - Singapore's neutrality makes it venue of choice for landmark meeting between mainland China and Taiwan's top leaders.” South China Morning Post, 5 Nov. 2015, www.scmp.com/news/china/policies-politics/article/1875802/no-surprises-singapores- neutrality-makes-it-venue. 10Small States, www.mfa.gov.sg/content/mfa/international_issues/small_states.html. 11 Wai, Albert. “Singapore quietly helping developing nations, says envoy.” TODAYonline, 27 Nov. 2015, www.todayonline.com/singapore/singapore-quietly-helping-developing-nations-says- envoy. 12 N.A. “Singapore and other Global Governance Group nations welcome G20's commitment to inclusive growth.” The Straits Times, 4 Aug. 2017, www.straitstimes.com/world/singapore-and- other-global-governance-group-nations-welcome-g20s-commitment-to-inclusive. 13 Lee, Min Kok. “6 things to know about the Arctic Circle Singapore Forum.” The Straits Times, 19 Jan. 2016, www.straitstimes.com/singapore/environment/6-things-to-know-about-the-arctic- circle-singapore-forum.

Political Security study guide SMC 2018: Singapore’s role as a small state

affairs of the arctic trade route despite being a small state, given that it directly affects

Singapore’s financial interests.

It can be seen that Singapore has carefully calibrated its foreign policy over the years to ensure that it is not disadvantaged in spite of being a small state.

Singapore’s role in ASEAN

Singapore was one of the main founders of ASEAN, alongside Indonesia, Malaysia,

Philippines and Thailand14. The precursor agency to the ASEAN, called the Association of Southeast Asia (ASA), was formed in 31 July 1961 only consisting of Philippines,

Federation of Malaya, and Thailand. However, after the dissolution of the Federation of

14 N.A. “ASEAN.” UN, May 2017, www.mfa.gov.sg/content/mfa/international_organisation_initiatives/un.html.

Political Security study guide SMC 2018: Singapore’s role as a small state

Malaya once Singapore gained independence in 1967, the official first five members of

ASEAN were Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, and Thailand. The signing of the Bangkok Declaration on 8 August 1967, by the foreign ministers of each of these countries at the time, officially signified the establishment of ASEAN15.

ASEAN initially started out as a trade agreement, with the purpose of accelerating economic growth in the region through fostering better regional ties between powerful trade partners. The importance of ASEAN to Singapore hinged on the fact that it is a small island country, with a land area measuring a meagre 719.1 km². This means that it is dwarfed in comparison with its neighbours such as Malaysia and Indonesia which have land areas of 330,803 km² and 1.905 million km² respectively. Furthermore, while

Indonesia and Malaysia have rich natural resources, such as tin, rubber, palm oil, natural gas and crude oil, Singapore severely lacks such natural resources. To compensate for the lack of raw materials to export, Singapore capitalised on its available human capital by directing its manufacturing sector to produce lucrative final products and by providing a vital service of oil refinery. Singapore also took advantage of its geopolitical location in

Southeast Asia as the most convenient stop for trade and ships on the India-China trade route that passed through Southeast Asia. However, creating a port free of taxes was not sufficient enough to stimulate trade, which is why Singapore saw it vital to build lasting economic and political alliances with its powerful neighbours. The result was the founding of ASEAN.

15 http://asean.org/the-asean-declaration-bangkok-declaration-bangkok-8-august-1967/

Political Security study guide SMC 2018: Singapore’s role as a small state

ASEAN’s role eventually expanded from economic cooperation to socio-political cooperation as well, when the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in Southeast Asia was signed by the 5 official founding members in 197616. This aimed to promote peace and cooperation between all nations signing the document. The guiding principles for signatories are respecting sovereignty and territorial integrity of all nations, acknowledging the right of every nation to be free from external coercion, settle disputes peacefully, renounce the use of force and promote effective cooperation.

Singapore’s experience in handling territorial disputes

Of course, the members of ASEAN have occasionally had disputes with one another. For example, Singapore has had territorial disputes with Malaysia. Known as the Pedra

Branca dispute17, it spanned a period of over twenty years, from 1979 to 2008. Pedra

Branca is an outlying island located at the eastern entrance of the Singapore Strait. The dispute occurred when Singapore rejected Malaysia’s portrayal of Pedra Branca as being under its sovereignty on a map. In 2003, the matter was brought to the International Court of Justice (ICJ), with the submission of a Special Agreement, followed by court and public hearings. Eventually, this was largely resolved by 2008 after a hearing from the

International Court of Justice18 (ICJ). The situation was managed by splitting the question of sovereignty into different time periods, taking into consideration changes in

16 “Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in Southeast Asia Indonesia, 24 February 1976.” ASEAN | ONE VISION ONE IDENTITY ONE COMMUNITY, asean.org/treaty-amity-cooperation-southeast-asia- indonesia-24-february-1976/. 17 “Pedra Branca (Malaysia/Singapore)151 Ilr 453.” International Law Reports, pp. 453–614., doi:10.1017/cbo9781139568203.004. 18 Latest Developments | Sovereignty over Pedra Branca/Pulau Batu Puteh, Middle Rocks and South Ledge (Malaysia/Singapore) | International Court of Justice, www.icj-cij.org/en/case/130.

Political Security study guide SMC 2018: Singapore’s role as a small state

involvement in the infrastructure on the island, particularly with regard to the Horsburgh

Lighthouse. Significantly, this dispute was managed without straining relations between

Malaysia and Singapore, with both sides being pleased with the result, stating it was a fair judgement. Pedra Branca was ceded to Singapore while Malaysia claimed sovereignty over Middle Rocks. However, it should be noted that this conflict was relatively easily resolved due to the relative insignificance of this particular territorial dispute in relation to more complicated disputes. As such Singapore’s success in handling disputes should not rest solely on a successful outcome such as this. Furthermore, this case has recent developments, with Malaysia submitting a fresh challenge in 201719, rejecting the decision made by the ICJ in 2008.

19 Cheong, Danson. “Malaysia's Fresh Challenge on Pedra Branca 'without Merit': MFA.” The Straits Times, 1 July 2017, www.straitstimes.com/singapore/fresh-challenge-on-pedra-branca-without-merit-mfa.

Political Security study guide SMC 2018: Singapore’s role as a small state

Current situation

In recent years, there have been a series of events that have challenged Singapore’s ability to abide by its longstanding principles in foreign policy, the most significant and recent events being the South China Sea dispute and the clash of power between superpowers China and the United States (USA).

Overview of Singapore’s relations with China

Sino-Singapore ties have been officially established since 1990, when Singapore became the last of the original five ASEAN nations to normalise diplomatic relations with China, previously not doing so out of respect to Indonesia, then under the New Order government with their strong anti-communist stance20. Also, the two countries share a deep cultural and ethnic bond21 as the majority of the population in Singapore is Chinese. Still, political relations have not always been free of strain22, especially when bilateral ties were suspended by China in 2004, when Prime Minister Lee Hsien Loong travelled to Taiwan for a private visit, thus offending China. However, the next year, bilateral relations continued, and in 2010, President Xi Jinping visited Singapore to commemorate the 20th year of Sino-Singapore relations.

20 Chew, Hui Min. “Singapore-China ties: 7 things to know about 25 years of diplomatic relations.” The Straits Times, 19 Jan. 2016, www.straitstimes.com/singapore/singapore-china- ties-7-things-to-know-about-25-years-of-diplomatic-relations. 21 Huang, Cary. “What's really making Beijing angry with Singapore?” South China Morning Post, South China Morning Post, 6 July 2017, www.scmp.com/week-asia/opinion/article/2024089/whats-really- making-beijing-angry-singapore. 22 Chan, Irene. “Commentary: Singapore-China relations, and the art of communication.” Channel NewsAsia, 13 Oct. 2017, www.channelnewsasia.com/news/singapore/commentary- singapore-china-relations-and-the-art-of-9254194.

Political Security study guide SMC 2018: Singapore’s role as a small state

China is a dominant economic presence not only in Asia but also in the world, with China being recently regarded as the world’s number one economic superpower23. It is economically advantageous for Singapore to remain aligned with China. Indeed,

Singapore is China’s 9th biggest trading partner. The Suzhou Industrial Park and the

Sino-Singapore Tianjin Eco-city are some instances of economic cooperation between

China and Singapore. Nonetheless, the recent developments in the South China Sea dispute once again possibly threaten the peaceful relations between both countries.

South China Sea Dispute

The South China Sea dispute exploded into a full-blown crisis that flooded the news in

2016. Specifically, the territorial dispute involved the maritime borders China shares with

Philippines, Malaysia, Vietnam and Taiwan. The source of the dispute arose when China claimed ownership of the islands located within the South China Sea, basing their claims on a historical map which outline the territories that lie within the nine-dash line as a part of China. However, these claims directly conflict with the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS)24 which states that a state has special rights over what is known as an exclusive economic zone regarding the exploration and use of marine resources in a sea zone stretching from the baseline out to 200 nautical miles from its coast. This was what the other countries based their claims on. This has resulted in a

23 “Which Is the World's No. 1 Economy? Certainly Not the US.” The Economic Times, 18 Oct. 2017, economictimes.indiatimes.com/markets/stocks/news/which-is-the-worlds-no-1-economy-certainly-not-the- us/articleshow/61134623.cms. 24 Diplomat, The. “UNCLOS South China Sea.” The Diplomat, 28 Oct. 2017, thediplomat.com/tag/unclos- south-china-sea/.

Political Security study guide SMC 2018: Singapore’s role as a small state

conflict between the China and the other claimant states in Southeast Asia, as illustrated below.

25“Why Is the South China Sea Contentious?” BBC News, BBC, 12 July 2016, www.bbc.com/news/world- asia-pacific-13748349.

Political Security study guide SMC 2018: Singapore’s role as a small state

History of the dispute

1974: Chinese 2012: China and the January 2013: Manila said seized the Philippines engaged in a it was taking China to a UN Paracels from lengthy maritime stand- tribunal under the auspices vietnam, killing off, accusing each other of the UN Convention on over 70 people of intrusions in the the Laws of the Sea, to Scarborough Shoal. challenge its claims

1988: the two sides 2012: Unverified claims May 2014: the clashed in the that the Chinese navy introduction by China Spratlys, with sabotaged two of a drilling rig into Vietnam again Vietnamese exploration waters near the coming off worse, operations led to large Paracel Islands led losing about 60 anti-China protests on to multiple collisions sailors Vietnam's streets between Vietnamese and Chinese ships.

ASEAN Reactions of ASEAN members SG’s relation with the members country stance on issue

Claimant Philippines : Singapore and the states In 2013, Philippines resorted to international Philippines enjoy friendly arbitration. It announced it would take China to an bilateral relations, which arbitration tribunal under UNCLOS to challenge its were cemented by the claims. In July 2016, the tribunal ruled in favour of Philippines-Singapore Action the Philippines, stating that China had violated the Plan (PSAP), established in Philippines' sovereignty. However, China refused to 1997. As neighbours and participate in the arbitration and deemed the ruling trade partners Singapore ill-founded26 , refusing to adhere by it.Furthermore, obviously wishes to maintain the legitimacy of the ruling was questioned, given friendly relations with the that the court did not get to hear China's defence. Philippines. Therefore, in its capacity as Chair of ASEAN in 2018, while remaining neutral, it may still be expected to support

26 “Why Is the South China Sea Contentious?” BBC News, BBC, 12 July 2016, www.bbc.com/news/world- asia-pacific-13748349.

Political Security study guide SMC 2018: Singapore’s role as a small state

In the recent ASEAN summit27 , President Duterte Philippines and their claim in stated that he did not “want any trouble” with China. the dispute. This similarly He went on to elaborate that any discussion over applies for other claimant the fortification of the islands located within the states such as Indonesia, South China Sea would be in vain. However, the Malaysia and Vietnam. Philippines still backs its claim over the islands while upholding the 2013 decision taken by the international tribunal.

Indonesia: Indonesia also opposes China’s nine-dash-line claim. In fact, it recently renamed its Northern Territory located within the South China Sea, a manoeuvre that has been regarded by analysts as one of defiance that is expected to be “noticed” by Beijing.

Malaysia: In March of 2016, when around 100 Chinese vessels were found potentially trespassing in Malaysian waters, Malaysia’s defence minister stated in an interview that “appropriate law enforcement action” would be taken and that Malaysia would not remain quiet in front of what was perceived as a growing aggressive Chinese stance. This came after another incident where a Chinese coast guard ship apparently lay defiantly anchored at Luconia shoals located 84 nautical miles off the coast of Sarawak.28

Vietnam: Vietnam recently called for a code of conduct29 to be outlined in the South China Sea in its own attempt to possibly resolve the territorial dispute. However, this was not included in the joint declaration by the ASEAN member states in 2017 during a summit in Cambodia30, which called for non-militarisation in the disputed area and also raised concerns regarding “land reclamation”.

27 “Duterte Seeks Arms from China, May End Maritime Patrols with U.S.” The Japan Times, www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2016/09/14/asia-pacific/duterte-seeks-arms-china-may-end-maritime-patrols- u-s/#.WmV4ureWbIU. 28 Parameswaran, Prashanth. “Did China Vessels Encroach Malaysia's Waters?” The Diplomat, The Diplomat, 29 Mar. 2016, thediplomat.com/2016/03/did-china-vessels-encroach-malaysias-waters/. 29 Hermes. “Make S. China Sea Code of Conduct Negotiations Count.” The Straits Times, 11 Aug. 2017, www.straitstimes.com/opinion/make-s-china-sea-code-of-conduct-negotiations-count. 30 “Asean Nations Fail to Reach Agreement on South China Sea.” BBC News, BBC, 13 July 2012, www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-18825148.

Political Security study guide SMC 2018: Singapore’s role as a small state

However, Vietnam also suspended a gas-drilling project in the South China Sea, 31possibly to avoid upsetting Beijing. This could be because, unlike the Philippines and Japan, Vietnam is not a treaty ally of the United States, meaning Washington is not legally obligated to protect it in the event of an attack by China.

Non- Cambodia: Singapore and Cambodia claimant Cambodia has often clashed with other ASEAN enjoy rather friendly trade states claimant states in relation to the South China Sea relations. In fact, Cambodia dispute. In 2012, Cambodia’s foreign minister was one of the first countries accused Philippines and Vietnam of “hijacking” the to recognise Singapore’s joint communique released by ASEAN regarding independence. Having in the dispute. This apparently came as a response to common an important an official statement by the department of foreign political and economic affairs in the Philippines regarding the particular relation with China, both cabinet meeting. Both Cambodia and Laos have countries enjoy a certain been traditionally aligned with China and have often level of understanding. been viewed by other ASEAN states as However, with Cambodia representing Chinese interests. being a non-claimant state and yet a leader in ASEAN with regard to supporting China, Singapore must be Laos : careful to neither alienate In April 2016, China released a statement stating Cambodia and Laos and nor that it had reached a 4-point consensus32 with upset the claimant states by Cambodia, Laos and Brunei regarding the appearing too sympathetic to settlement of the South China Sea dispute. Laos the former. was in fact the chair of ASEAN at the time, which made the move even more surprising given that both Laos and Cambodia are non-claimant states.

31 Ives, Mike. “Vietnam, Yielding to Beijing, Backs Off South China Sea Drilling.” The New York Times, The New York Times, 4 Aug. 2017, www.nytimes.com/2017/08/04/world/asia/vietnam-south-china-sea- repsol.html. 32 Parameswaran, Prashanth. “What's Behind China's New South China Sea Consensus with Three ASEAN States?” The Diplomat, The Diplomat, 25 Apr. 2016, thediplomat.com/2016/04/whats-behind- chinas-new-south-china-sea-consensus-with-three-asean-states/.

Political Security study guide SMC 2018: Singapore’s role as a small state

Singapore’s current stand

As the chair of ASEAN in 2018, Singapore needs to help foster a consensus regarding

ASEAN’s collective response to the South China Sea crisis, while respecting the individual opinions and positions of the claimant states within ASEAN. Furthermore, while

Singapore is a not a claimant state itself, there has been friction with China over the dispute.

This was attributed to the fact that soon after the international tribunal ruling on the dispute in July 2016 that went against Beijing, Prime Minister Lee Hsien Loong voiced his support for arbitration as an ideal way33 to deal with territorial disputes. Observers noted that this may have angered China as it viewed the ruling as illegitimate and considered

Singapore’s action to be a slight on its position.

Also, in his National Day Rally speech in 2016, Prime Minister Lee Hsien Loong said that

Singapore must have its own principled and consistent stand on the South China Sea issue despite pressure from other countries to side with them. He said that while the country does not have any claims of its own in the South China Sea, and does not take sides on the specific claims of claimants, Singapore still has a lot at stake in three areas: international law, freedom of navigation and unity in ASEAN. He said that Singapore must support and strive for a “rules-based international order” and depends on words and

33 Jaipragas, Bhavan. “Singapore will not 'roll over' for China.” South China Morning Post, South China Morning Post, 19 July 2017, www.scmp.com/week-asia/politics/article/2103291/singapore-will-not-roll- over-china.

Political Security study guide SMC 2018: Singapore’s role as a small state

treaties. He said, “They mean everything to us.” This is as Singapore, as a small nation, cannot afford to have international relations work on the basis that might is right. Mr Lee said, “If rules do not matter, then small countries like Singapore have no chance of survival.” PM Lee also said that Singapore has a reputation to protect, with its own independent, carefully thought-out stand34. He said that the Government had to take a national point of view and decide what is in Singapore’s overall interests.

Following this, in September 2016, some Chinese officials alleged that the Singaporean representative to the 17th Non-Aligned Movement (NAM)35 Summit in Venezuela had insisted on adding contents which endorsed Philippines' South China Sea arbitration case and attempted to strengthen the contents on the South China Sea in the document. They expressed their displeasure with Singapore for these actions.

However, in his rebuttal to the Global Times, the Chinese newspaper36 which published the allegations, Mr Stanley Loh, the Singapore Ambassador to China, said the proposal to update the South-east Asia paragraphs in the document was not done at the last minute nor by any single Asean country. Laos, the ASEAN chair in 2017, had conveyed the group's common position through a formal letter to Iran, the former NAM chairman, in July

2017. Yet, Venezuela, the current NAM chairman, had refused Asean's request to update

34 “NDR 2016: Singapore must choose its own place to stand on South China Sea issue, says PM Lee.” Channel NewsAsia, 11 June 2017, www.channelnewsasia.com/news/singapore/ndr-2016-singapore- must-choose-its-own-place-to-stand-on-south-c-7884434. 35 Hermes. “Global Times: Singapore raises South China Sea arbitration at NAM summit of heads of state despite opposition.” The Straits Times, 26 Sept. 2016, www.straitstimes.com/opinion/global-times-spore- raises-s-china-sea-arbitration-at-nam-summit-of-heads-of-state-despite. 36 Ping, Chong Koh. “Singapore envoy refutes China report on South China Sea.” The Straits Times, 26 Sept. 2016, www.straitstimes.com/asia/east-asia/spore-envoy-refutes-china-report-on-s-china-sea.

Political Security study guide SMC 2018: Singapore’s role as a small state

the paragraphs related to the region. During the meeting, it was Laos, not Singapore, which had protested on behalf of all 10 Asean countries to Venezuela "on its improper decision to reject Asean's updates".

Relations between both countries were cool37 for a while as a result of this exchange of words. However, in early 2017, the situation seemed to have improved. Singapore said the Joint Council for Bilateral Cooperation (JCBC) – an annual bilateral forum featuring both countries’ deputy premiers – would take place. Senior officials from both sides also signed a number of major agreements in later that. The agreements on a range of issues, including intellectual property rights and a US$1.4 billion project38 aimed at boosting transport links between Chongqing and Southeast Asia, were signed after a meeting chaired by China’s Vice-Premier Zhang Gaoli and Singapore’s Deputy Prime Minister Teo

Chee Hean.

Finally, after much negotiation, in November 2017, at the 31st ASEAN Summit Meeting in Manila, the leaders of China and ASEAN formally announced the start of negotiations on the Code of Conduct in the South China Sea. How Singapore, as Chair of ASEAN, leads its ASEAN neighbours to resolve this issue satisfactorily with China will be watched closely39. Singapore has to tread very carefully when it comes to preserving friendly

37 Jaipragas, Bhavan. “Are China-Singapore Relations Ready to Thaw?” South China Morning Post, South China Morning Post, 7 July 2017, www.scmp.com/week-asia/geopolitics/article/2063656/are-china- singapore-relations-about-thaw. 38 “Have China and Singapore kissed and made up?” South China Morning Post, 7 July 2017, www.scmp.com/news/china/diplomacy-defence/article/2074648/china-singapore-sign-raft-agreements- amid-thaw. 39 Dancel, Raul. “Asean, China adopt framework of code of conduct for South China Sea.” The Straits Times, 6 Aug. 2017, www.straitstimes.com/asia/se-asia/chinas-foreign-minister-says-maritime-code- negotiations-with-asean-to-start-this-year.

Political Security study guide SMC 2018: Singapore’s role as a small state

relations with China, while satisfying the demands of claimant states within ASEAN as its chair.

Conclusion

It must be noted that ASEAN is mostly a regional trade cooperation organisation and has minimal effectiveness in gathering political consensus, given that it is not legally binding.

Furthermore, unlike the European union, it signs treaties which still need to be ratified based on the individual country’s approval instead of it immediately becoming law for all members. Therefore, ASEAN members are well within their rights to disagree with the general ASEAN stance. This worsens the divisions currently existing in the cabinet between claimant and non-claimant states and more significantly between countries aligned with China and those aligned against. As such Singapore’s role as the chair of

ASEAN40 will be rather difficult as it cannot compel any country to agree, but has to negotiate with each country in order to reach a consensus instead. Mediation may therefore be a sensible approach to this crisis.

To swiftly deal with the South China Sea dispute, it is necessary for ASEAN not to appear weak and an ineffective platform for consensus. As the chair of ASEAN, Singapore must be able to ensure that some form of compromise is reached within ASEAN, in order to present a united ASEAN front against China. Hopefully, Singapore will be able to lead

40 Yong, Charissa. “PM Lee Hsien Loong Outlines Singapore's Key Goals as Asean Chair.” The Straits Times, 14 Nov. 2017, www.straitstimes.com/asia/pm-outlines-singapores-key-goals-as-asean-chair.

Political Security study guide SMC 2018: Singapore’s role as a small state

ASEAN in negotiating the Code of Conduct in the South China Sea with China to reach a satisfactory conclusion for all.

Key Areas of Concern

- Maintaining Singapore’s position of leadership within ASEAN despite being a small

state

- Maintaining unity within ASEAN (mediation, consensus, resolution)

- Preserving the strength of ASEAN as a regional bloc which has considerably more

bargaining power when dealing with other countries

- Managing ties with China and the other ASEAN countries

- Acknowledging China’s economic might and how this has an impact on its dealings

with other countries

- Balancing the need for economic stability with the commitment to principles

Political Security study guide SMC 2018: Singapore’s role as a small state

Questions to Consider

1) How will Singapore’s position as a small state affect its role in ASEAN when dealing with

the South China Sea dispute?

2) Should Singapore prize economic and political stability over insisting on its principles?

3) Is it possible for Singapore to remain neutral in the South China Sea dispute without

compromising its position of leadership in ASEAN?

4) How should Singapore manage its relationship with China in the context of the South China

Sea dispute?

5) Given the volatile situation in the world, what should Singapore’s role in ASEAN be in the

future? What should Singapore hope for ASEAN to achieve?

Essential Reading:

1. Prime Minister Lee Hsien Loong’s National Day Rally Speech (2016): http://www.pmo.gov.sg/national-day-rally-2016 2. Qatar: Big Lessons for a Small Country (Professor Kishore Mahbubani) http://www.straitstimes.com/opinion/qatar-big-lessons-from-a-small-country 3. A response to “Qatar: Big Lessons for a Small Country” (Bilahari Kausikan) https://www.facebook.com/bilahari.kausikan/posts/1948237095433710 4. Minister Shanmugam, diplomats Bilahari and Ong Keng Yong say Prof Mahbubani's view on Singapore's foreign policy 'flawed' (The Straits Times)

Political Security study guide SMC 2018: Singapore’s role as a small state

http://www.straitstimes.com/singapore/prof-kishore-mahbubanis-view-on-singapores- foreign-policy-deeply-flawed-ambassador-at 5. Is Singapore a Small Country? (Professor Tommy Koh) http://www.straitstimes.com/opinion/is-singapore-a-small-country

Political Security study guide SMC 2018: Singapore’s role as a small state

[Topic 2: Managing International Relations (China and USA)]

Singapore’s relations with the USA

Since Singapore gained independence, there have been strong American-Singapore relations41. During the Vietnam War, American-Singapore defence cooperation took the form of Singapore repairing US military ships and aircrafts. American-Singapore relations remain largely very strong. The USA sells armaments to Singapore, and is Singapore’s most important strategic partner. This alignment of interests between the USA and

Singapore in the Asia-Pacific is the foundation of enduring bilateral ties between the two countries, with Singapore’s neutrality and its leading role in ASEAN being crucial to the

USA’s dealings in Southeast Asia.42

The Trans-Pacific Trade Partnership

41 N.A. “CNBC Transcript: Lee Hsien Loong, Prime Minister of Singapore.” CNBC, CNBC, 19 Oct. 2017, www.cnbc.com/2017/10/19/cnbc-transcript-lee-hsien-loong-prime-minister-of- singapore.html. 42 Chua, Daniel Wei Boon. “Singapore-US defence relations: Enhancing security, benefiting region.” The Straits Times, 19 Jan. 2016, www.straitstimes.com/opinion/singapore-us-defence- relations-enhancing-security-benefiting-region.

Political Security study guide SMC 2018: Singapore’s role as a small state

The Trans Pacific partnership (TPP)43 agreement is a trade agreement between Asian economies and Western economies. This agreement was originally signed on 4 February

2016, with the USA joining during the Obama administration. Given the large size of the

USA’s domestic market, this trade agreement benefited Singapore, opening markets to

Singapore’s domestic firms and boosting investment links. As of 2013, trade between

TPP countries and Singapore accounted for 30 percent of its total trade in goods and 30 percent of foreign direct investment.

The TPP also originally contained measures to lower both non-tariff and tariff (essentially taxes on trade be it on import or export) barriers to trade, and establish an legal dispute resolution mechanism to ease the possible burden on foreign investors. According to economists from the World Bank, the TPP was expected to yield financially positive outcomes to signatories involved44, although to different extents. Economist Michael Wan forecasted that by 2025, Vietnam would see a 10% boost to her economy, Malaysia would see a 5.5% boost, and Singapore, due to its current trade agreements with the USA, would only see a 1.4% boost. The TPP was also considered an important strategy in the

USA’s foreign policy in Asia, as it reduced the signatories’ dependence on Chinese trade in Asia by strengthening their trade alliances with the USA.

43 Min, Chia Yan. “TPP: What's in it for Singapore?” The Straits Times, 19 Jan. 2016, www.straitstimes.com/business/economy/tpp-whats-in-it-for-singapore. 44 Khan, Muhammad Aamir, et al. “Economic Implications of the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP) on Pakistan: a CGE Approach.” Journal of Economic Structures, vol. 7, no. 1, Oct. 2018, doi:10.1186/s40008-017-0103-x.

Political Security study guide SMC 2018: Singapore’s role as a small state

However, the TPP has its flaws45. It could lead to increased wealth inequalities, especially in high-wage countries such as Singapore. With increased cheaper imports, local firms are less able to compete. While TPP also protects patents and copyrights, safeguarding intellectual property, it can also raise the costs of pharmaceutical drugs.

For developing 46countries, the TPP set guidelines that can be viewed as unreasonable47 and even unfair. The domestic firms in underdeveloped countries would be much less competitive compared to those from developed countries, yet both are expected to comply to the same standards and regulations. Furthermore, it set limitations on the government's’ ability to intervene and aid their state enterprises.

USA pulls out of the TPP

However, one of President Donald Trump’s first policies after taking office on 20 January

2017 was to use his executive powers as president to pull out of the TPP. This detrimentally affected signatories involved, especially those countries which would have greatly benefited from low tariffs such as Japan. Subsequently, due to Singapore’s trade connections with other countries, slowing economic growth would hinder Singapore’s own trade and economic growth. This can also be considered a loss for the USA as it inadvertently sends the message to Asia and the rest of the world that the USA may no

45 Amadeo, Kimberly. “What Does Trump's Executive Order to Withdraw from the TPP Mean?” The Balance, www.thebalance.com/what-is-the-trans-pacific-partnership-3305581. 46 Rowden, Rick. “9 Ways the TPP Is Bad for Developing Countries.” Foreign Policy, Foreign Policy, 7 July 2015, foreignpolicy.com/2015/07/07/9-ways-the-tpp-is-bad-for-developing-countries/. 47 Summary of the Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement | United States Trade Representative, ustr.gov/about-us/policy-offices/press-office/press-releases/2015/october/summary-trans-pacific- partnership.

Political Security study guide SMC 2018: Singapore’s role as a small state

longer be interested in playing the role of a global leader as it begins to look more inward.

President Trump’s winning rhetoric and campaign titled “Make America Great Again” represented his protectionist48 beliefs that were inherently at odds with the spirit of globalisation and international cooperation that was embedded in the TPP. Observers wondered what implications this has for Southeast Asia as it seemed that the Trump administration attaches less importance to engagement with Southeast Asia.

Singapore’s initial response to the news was not to try and convince the USA to rejoin the negotiations, but rather to negotiate the treaty again with the remaining signatories, given the current changes. In fact, in May 2017, the 11 other signatories decided to revive the deal without the support of the USA, showing that the trade deal was clearly integral for the region and the remaining signatories49.

Other areas of cooperation between Singapore and the USA

Despite the TPP setback, there are other areas of cooperation between Singapore and the USA. The USA seeks to further develop the US-ASEAN Connect50, a new initiative that coordinates American regional economic engagement. Singapore will have a bigger role to play as one of its three designated ASEAN hubs. Furthermore, the volume of

48 Protectionism is defined as government actions and policies that restrict or restrain international trade, often done with the intent of protecting local businesses and jobs from foreign competition. https://www.ussc.edu.au/analysis/america-first-us-asia-policy-under-president-trump 49 Stevenson, Alexandra, and Motoko Rich. “Trans-Pacific Trade Partners Are Moving On, Without the U.S.” The New York Times, The New York Times, 11 Nov. 2017, www.nytimes.com/2017/11/11/business/trump-tpp-trade.html. 50 Hussain, Zakir. “Singapore-US Relationship Is Based on Strategic Congruence of Views, Deep Cooperation: PM Lee Hsien Loong.” The Straits Times, 19 Oct. 2017, www.straitstimes.com/singapore/pm-lee-singapore-us-relationship-is-based-on-strategic-congruence-of- views-deep.

Political Security study guide SMC 2018: Singapore’s role as a small state

trade between Singapore and the USA is fairly substantial, given that the bilateral goods surplus of Singapore with the USA totaled $9.1 billion in 2016, while the USA trade surplus in services with Singapore totalled $9.7 billion51.

On the economic front, the US-Singapore Third Country Training Programme (TCTP) – an initiative where both sides jointly assist less developed Southeast Asian states – is still hailed by US officials as a paragon of bilateral cooperation. More recently, economic collaboration has extended into areas like the digital economy and the creation of smart cities.

Furthermore, military ties have been forged between the two countries. In the international sphere, this is usually considered a sign of strengthening diplomatic ties between countries. In 2015, a defence pact was signed, the Defence Cooperation Agreement

(eDCA), which promised mutual transfer of aid, knowledge and technology in key sectors such as humanitarian assistance and disaster relief (HADR), cybersecurity, biosecurity and public communications52. A more recent example would be the inaugural bilateral exercise off of Guam, Pacific Griffin, which was carried out from 19 August to 2 September in 201753. This is particularly significant as it is the first joint military exercise between the

USA and Singapore, happening outside Singapore. It serves as an important signal to the

51N.A. . “Singapore.” Singapore | United States Trade Representative, ustr.gov/countries- regions/southeast-asia-pacific/singapore. 52 Nadarajan, Usha. “S'pore, US sign agreement on enhanced defence cooperation.” MINDEF, 8 Dec. 2015, www.mindef.gov.sg/oms/imindef/resourcelibrary/cyberpioneer/topics/articles/news/2015/dec/08dec15_ne ws2.html#.WnBzB66WbIU. 53 Parameswaran, Prashanth. “What's in the New US-Singapore Maritime Exercise in Guam?” The Diplomat, The Diplomat, 11 Sept. 2017, thediplomat.com/2017/09/whats-in-the-new-us-singapore- maritime-exercise-in-guam/.

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world that the USA considers Singapore an important security ally in Southeast Asia. It also suggests a willingness to cooperate with Singapore on various diplomatic levels.

Singapore’s relations with China*

*Delegates should note that they should refer to the information presented earlier on China as well for a more comprehensive view of Sino-Singapore relations.

China’s Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership

The Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP)54 can be regarded as the extension of ASEAN, being a free trade agreement between ASEAN members and other

54 Diplomat, The. “Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership.” The Diplomat, 12 Oct. 2017, thediplomat.com/tag/regional-comprehensive-economic-partnership/.

Political Security study guide SMC 2018: Singapore’s role as a small state

countries ASEAN has trade agreements with, with the major partner being China. It sets high rates of tariff removal of up to 95%,55 and is meant to be a form of regional cooperation, increasing China’s involvement in the region. Thus, similar to the TPP, it seeks to establish a free-trade area in the Asia Pacific.

The RCEP can be seen as an alternative to the TPP. However, there are key differences56. The RCEP does not cover regulatory coherence or foreign competition policy. Furthermore, the depth of tariff coverage upon implementation is likely to only be at 80%, and may not be complete, even at end of full implementation. This is because protectionism will still be applied to sensitive exports which countries are more reliant on.

This initiative is widely seen as part of China’s campaign to gain global dominance in international trade. Most political analysts believed that the USA pulling out of the TPP actually inadvertently helped China further this goal, as it painted China as a more willing and active economic force in the Asia. Given the protectionist nature of the USA’s foreign policy under the Trump Administration and China’s growing interest in the region,

Singapore will need to consider how to manage its relations with the two superpowers.

55 Chen, Lurong. “RCEP Is Not the Anti-TPP.” The Diplomat, The Diplomat, 3 Dec. 2016, thediplomat.com/2016/12/rcep-is-not-the-anti-tpp/. 56 “RCEP and TPP Compared.” Asian Trade Centre, www.asiantradecentre.org/talkingtrade//myvwg5yr21a93pkjc45bwzx3wtbc3z.

Political Security study guide SMC 2018: Singapore’s role as a small state

China’s One Belt One Road Initiative

Around the same time that the USA announced its withdrawal from the TPP, China announced its plans to increase its presence in Asia57. The highlight of these plans is the One Belt and One Road Initiative (OBOR). This was a developmental strategy advocated by the People’s Republic of China’s President Xi Jinping in 201358. It mainly targets increasing international cooperation between China and countries involved in the land-based Silk Road Economic Belt (SREB) and the Maritime Silk Road (MSR)59.

Analysts felt that China was cementing its position as an active economic force in the

Asian region through the One Belt One Road Initiative.

With respect to how this may affect Singapore, PM Lee commented that he believes

“there is (now an) opportunity for China to use Singapore as a base for financing, for regional headquarters, for all sorts of activities. And I see no reason why that shouldn't happen”60. This initiative is a part of China’s campaign to gain global dominance in international trade.

The question therefore is how Singapore can balance friendly relations with both countries to ensure stability in the region as well as its own continued economic prosperity. In response to these concerns, PM Lee commented that China “(is) a big

57Flynt. L. Leverett and Robert Sprinkle . “China steps up as US steps back from global leadership.” The Conversation, 30 Jan. 2018, theconversation.com/china-steps-up-as-us-steps-back-from-global- leadership-70962. 58 Hancock, Tom. “ China encircles the world with One Belt, One Road strategy.” Financial Times, 4 May 2017, www.ft.com/content/0714074a-0334-11e7-aa5b-6bb07f5c8e12. 59 Rowley, Anthony. “One belt, one road, one world.” The Business Times, 14 Oct. 2017, www.businesstimes.com.sg/brunch/one-belt-one-road-one-world. 60 N.A. . “CNBC Transcript: Lee Hsien Loong, Prime Minister of Singapore.” CNBC, CNBC, 19 Oct. 2017, www.cnbc.com/2017/10/19/cnbc-transcript-lee-hsien-loong-prime-minister-of-singapore.html.

Political Security study guide SMC 2018: Singapore’s role as a small state

factor in the world, they are successful, they are growing, they want to grow their influence and all the countries in Asia want to be their friend and want to benefit from

China's development and success.”61

However, it must be noted that Lawrence Wong, Minister for National Development was invited to represent Singapore at the OBOR summit in Beijing in 2017 instead of Prime

Minister Lee Hsien Loong. The Chinese decision to invite a lower-ranking government official may indicate their reservations about Singapore’s participation in the initiative.

This move might also have been due to lingering bilateral tensions, particularly after

Hong Kong’s seizure of Singapore’s nine Terrex vehicles in November 201662.

Singapore’s response has been to repeatedly emphasise that its participation in OBOR will be beneficial to all parties involved, and that it looks forward to working with China on this63.

American and Chinese Foreign Policy and Possible

Effects on Singapore

Since Trump’s election as President of the United States in 2017, there has been uncertainty over the coherence of the USA’s foreign policy, especially with regard to

China. During his recent visit to China in November 2017, Trump showed a nearly 180-

61 N.A. . “Not time yet to get US back into TPP, says PM Lee.” TODAYonline, 20 Oct. 2017, www.todayonline.com/world/asia/not-time-yet-get-us-back-tpp-says-pm-lee. 62 Tan, Jie Ying. “Why is China leaving Singapore out in the cold?” Why is China leaving Singapore out in the cold?, 3 June 2017, www.aseantoday.com/2017/06/why-is-china-leaving-singapore-out-in-the-cold/. 63 Liang, Lim Yan. “Singapore can 'partner China in One Belt, One Road initiative'.” The Straits Times, 11 May 2017, www.straitstimes.com/asia/singapore-can-partner-china-in-one-belt-one-road-initiative.

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degrees change in his attitude towards China as he praised President Xi Jinping for the impressive recent growth of the Chinese economy and even said he did not “blame

China for taking advantage” of the US financially. This is a fairly significant turn of events, given that Trump’s winning election rhetoric had comprised anti-Chinese sentiments where he had accused them of stealing American jobs.64 Then, he had even claimed that he wanted to outpace China financially, taking a strong position against them. However, this shift is not entirely uncommon as many presidential candidates make different claims during elections65 in order to please their voting pool and reverse their stance when actual diplomacy requires them to do otherwise.

Nonetheless, in the 2017 APEC summit in Vietnam, both President Trump and President

Xi offered competing visions in regards to global trade, where Trump resurrected his

“America First” protectionist beliefs, claiming that he would not allow any more “chronic trade abuses”, citing trade imbalances and alleging that the rest of the world had not reciprocated the USA’s manoeuvre to lower market barriers and end tariffs.66 However,

Trump did concede that these trade imbalances were not the fault of any singular APEC country but rather was a result of the alleged failure of previous US administrations. He also proved willing to negotiate a bilateral trade agreement with "any Indo-Pacific partner

64 Stracqualursi, Veronica. “10 Times Trump Attacked China and Its Trade Relations with the US.” ABC News, ABC News Network, abcnews.go.com/Politics/10-times-trump-attacked-china-trade-relations- us/story?id=46572567. 65 Hampson, Rick. “When It Comes to Campaign Promises, Presidents Usually Try, Often Fail.” USA Today, Gannett Satellite Information Network, 9 July 2016, www.usatoday.com/story/news/politics/elections/2016/07/06/campaign-promises-trump- clinton/86134898/. 66 Hirano, Ko. “Fear of 'losing out' may have prompted Trump to alter stance on TPP.” Japan Today, japantoday.com/category/politics/focus-fear-of-losing-out-may-have-prompted-trump-to-alter-stance-on- tpp.

Political Security study guide SMC 2018: Singapore’s role as a small state

here who abides by fair reciprocal trade", but only "on a basis of mutual respect and mutual benefit". The new term “Indo-Pacific”67 is representative of the Trump administration's new outlook on Asia, where he refers to the strategic alliance consisting of the USA, Japan, Australia and India to counter China’s rise.

The sending of mixed signals and inconstant foreign policy are also reflected in the USA’s relations with Singapore and the rest of Southeast Asia. It must also be noted that although the Obama administration paid much greater attention to Southeast Asia politics, the general trend has been for the USA to play a marginal role in Southeast Asian politics, unlike China’s interest in the region.

In contrast to Trump’s protectionist slant, President Xi reinforced his belief that globalisation was “an irreversible trend” that should be embraced and that APEC should continue to strive to be “more open, more balanced, more equitable and more beneficial to all68". Therefore, China appears to be the more diplomatic and lucrative option for a trade ally, as it paints itself as the new champion of free trade.

As of now, Singapore’s relations with China appear more stable. Prime Minister Lee Hsien

Loong’s recent visit to China had constructive overtones, with a mutual aim of maintaining

67 Jaipragas, Bhavan. “Why Is US Calling Asia-Pacific the Indo-Pacific? Trump to Clarify.” South China Morning Post, South China Morning Post, 7 Nov. 2017, m.scmp.com/week- asia/politics/article/2118806/why-us-calling-asia-pacific-indo-pacific-trump-clarify?amp=1. 68 “Apec Summit: Trump and Xi Offer Competing Visions for Trade.” BBC News, BBC, 10 Nov. 2017, www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-41937426.

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positive relations moving forward69. By making clear each sides’ mutual objectives and commitment to cooperation, it has allowed the relationship between both countries to withstand disagreements and disruptions. Furthermore, Singapore and China are set to deepen military ties with regular meetings and strategic consultation70. This suggests strong ties between the two countries.

Still, with other issues like the South China Sea dispute not resolved, it remains to be seen if an alliance with China will be as straightforward as it seems. As mentioned in the earlier section, with regard to the South China Sea dispute, some Chinese officials seemed to expect more support from Singapore for its policies and actions, or, at least, remain neutral and not state opinions which contradicted China’s actions. Thus,

Singapore has to assess China’s expectations of it as an ally and consider if meeting them will compromise its own principles when making sovereign decisions.

Conclusion

Thus, Singapore finds itself in a situation where it may have to choose between China and the USA as its main international ally, despite the stark contrast between the foreign policies of both countries. The USA has always had close ties with Singapore since the

Cold War, with its fight against communism, its strong support of capitalism and its policy

69N.A. . “Singapore-China ties are 'more than stable': PM Lee Hsien Loong.” Channel NewsAsia, 21 Sept. 2017, www.channelnewsasia.com/news/singapore/singapore-china-ties-are-more-than-stable-pm-lee- hsien-loong-9238290. 70 Parameswaran, Prashanth. “China, Singapore to Hold Naval Exercise.” The Diplomat, The Diplomat, 12 Sept. 2016, thediplomat.com/2016/09/china-singapore-to-hold-second-ever-naval-exercise/.

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of non-interference in Singaporean democracy.71 The height of Singapore and the USA’s friendship, was probably during the Obama administration when the USA turned its attention towards Asia and was negotiating the mutually beneficial multilateral treaty of the TPP.72 However, with Trump’s apparent disdain for globalisation, Singapore may be at both a political and an economic disadvantage if it chooses to ally itself with the USA instead of China. Singapore may end up losing out on many multilateral trade opportunities with China, which is without a doubt the most economically dominant and lucrative Asian trade presence.73 Furthermore, even in trade negotiations with the US

Singapore may end up being on the losing side of the bargain, given Trump’s “America- first” rhetoric. Yet, Singapore must consider what a closer alliance with China would mean and if it would affect political and economic decisions made in the future.

PM Lee noted the importance of the need for political will within Washington to recognise that “Asia is important to the U.S., that the U.S. will cultivate its relations with Asia and that the U.S. will continue to contribute to the peace and stability of Asia.” As such, when asked whether Singapore would ever need to choose between the two, he responded that “it depends on how the U.S. relationship with China develops”, noting it would be easier for Singapore if Sino-American ties improve. Nonetheless, he does believe that “if

71 Westcott, Ben. “The eagle, the lion and the dragon: Singapore's future in the age of Trump.” CNN, Cable News Network, 8 Aug. 2017, edition.cnn.com/2017/08/08/asia/singapore-trump-china/index.html. 72 N.A. . “PM Lee, President Obama make strong push for TPP ratification.” Channel NewsAsia, 11 June 2017, www.channelnewsasia.com/news/singapore/pm-lee-president-obama-make-strong-push-for-tpp- ratification-7882512. 73 Wong, Catherine. “From trade to trains, China and Singapore boost their economic ties.” South China Morning Post, 20 Sept. 2017, www.scmp.com/news/china/diplomacy-defence/article/2112051/trade- trains-china-and-singapore-boost-their-economic.

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there are tensions between America and China, Singapore will be asked to pick a side.”74

So, should the need arise for Singapore to choose to align itself with either the USA or

China, Singapore must ensure it makes the appropriate choice as the move would most have long-lasting repercussions. Delegates should carefully consider and weigh all possible options and their implications as Singapore’s future political security is at stake.

Key Areas of Concern

- The unpredictability of America’s foreign policy towards Singapore under the

Trump administration

- Preparation for further shifts in American foreign policy in the future

- China’s rising dominance economically and politically

- China’s expectations of Singapore as an ally

- Repercussions of being sidelined by either the USA or China

- Safeguarding Singapore’s interests

- Singapore’s foreign policy in the future: neutrality or alliance

74 Hussain, Zakir. “Singapore-US relationship is based on strategic congruence of views, deep cooperation: PM Lee Hsien Loong.” The Straits Times, 19 Oct. 2017, www.straitstimes.com/singapore/pm-lee-singapore-us-relationship-is-based-on-strategic-congruence-of- views-deep.

Political Security study guide SMC 2018: Singapore’s role as a small state

Questions to consider

1. Given the dramatic growth of China’s economy and its position in the region as well as

the USA’s uncertain foreign policy and relations in Asia, what should Singapore’s

position be in terms of forging alliances to ensure its own security?

2. Can Singapore continue to remain neutral when it comes the question of having to

choose between China and the USA as a main ally?

3. How can Singapore preserve its relations with both China and the USA at the same

time?

4. Should Singapore adhere steadfastly to its principles or is economic stability more

crucial?

5. What are the implications for Singapore, should it ally itself more closely with either the

USA or China?

6. What are the implications for Singapore, should it be sidelined by either the USA or

China?

7. What should Singapore do to safeguard its position in the immediate and distant

future?

Additional references:

1. “CNBC Transcript: Lee Hsien Loong, Prime Minister of Singapore.” CNBC, CNBC, 19 Oct. 2017, www.cnbc.com/2017/10/19/cnbc-transcript-lee-hsien-loong-prime-minister- of-singapore.html. 2. N.A. . “ASEAN.” ASEAN, www.mfa.gov.sg/content/mfa/international_organisation_initiatives/asean.html.

Political Security study guide SMC 2018: Singapore’s role as a small state

3. Dancel, Raul. “China lauds Singapore's 'positive', 'constructive' role as Asean coordinator.” The Straits Times, 6 Aug. 2017, www.straitstimes.com/asia/se-asia/china- lauds-singapores-positive-constructive-role-as-asean-coordinator. 4. Lee, Marissa. “Singapore 'has its special role in Asean'.” The Straits Times, 19 Jan. 2016, www.straitstimes.com/business/singapore-has-its-special-role-in-asean. 5. N.A. . “Donald Trump accepts PM Lee's invitation to visit Singapore next year.” Channel NewsAsia, 23 Oct. 2017, www.channelnewsasia.com/news/singapore/donald-trump- accepts-pm-lee-s-invitation-to-visit-singapore-next-9338520. 6. Hussain, Zakir. “PM Lee Hsien Loong, President Trump witness signing of Singapore Airlines-Boeing deal worth $19 billion.” The Straits Times, 24 Oct. 2017, www.straitstimes.com/world/united-states/pm-lee-hsien-loong-president-trump-witness- signing-of-singapore-airlines-boeing. 7. Lim, Yan Liang. “Singapore-China ties good but need to keep up with the times: PM Lee Hsien Loong.” The Straits Times, 23 Sept. 2017, www.straitstimes.com/asia/east- asia/singapore-china-ties-good-but-changing-pm-lee-hsien-loong. 8. Goh, Sui Noi. “The way forward for Singapore-China relationship.” The Straits Times, 22 Sept. 2017, www.straitstimes.com/asia/east-asia/the-way-forward-for-singapore-china- relationship. 9. Goh, Sui Noi. “The way forward for Singapore-China relationship.” The Straits Times, 22 Sept. 2017, www.straitstimes.com/asia/east-asia/the-way-forward-for-singapore-china- relationship. 10. N.A. “Why is the South China Sea contentious?” BBC News, BBC, 12 July 2016, www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-pacific-13748349. 11. Bader, Jeffrey A., et al. “U.S.-China relations, 6 months into the Trump presidency.” Brookings, Brookings, 27 Aug. 2017, www.brookings.edu/blog/order-from- chaos/2017/08/14/u-s-china-relations-6-months-into-the-trump-presidency/. 12. Parameswaran, Prashanth. “What's Next for US-Singapore Ties Under Trump?” The

Diplomat, The Diplomat, 23 Oct. 2017, thediplomat.com/2017/10/whats-next-for-us-

singapore-ties-under-trump/.

13. Parameswaran, Prashanth. “The Ticking Clock on Trump's Asia Strategy.” The Diplomat,

The Diplomat, 6 July 2017, thediplomat.com/2017/07/the-ticking-clock-on-trumps-asia-

strategy/.

14. Parameswaran, Prashanth. “Trump's Real ASEAN Test.” The Diplomat, The Diplomat,

31 Mar. 2017, thediplomat.com/2017/03/trumps-real-asean-test/.

Political Security study guide SMC 2018: Singapore’s role as a small state

15. N.A. . “Apec summit: Trump and Xi offer competing visions for trade.” BBC News,

BBC, 10 Nov. 2017, www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-41937426.

16. N.A. . “Trump China visit: US leader strikes warmer tone with Xi Jinping.” BBC News,

BBC, 9 Nov. 2017, www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-china-41924228.

17. Seok Hwai. “China should make Singapore pay over South China Sea dispute, says PLA

adviser.” The Straits Times, 1 Oct. 2016, www.straitstimes.com/asia/east-asia/china-

should-make-singapore-pay-over-south-china-sea-dispute-says-pla-defence-adviser.

18. N.A. . “Consider dedicated South China Sea commission to settle disputes.” The Straits

Times, 28 June 2017, www.straitstimes.com/opinion/consider-dedicated-south-china-sea-

commission-to-settle-disputes.