CHALLENGES TO THE EUROPEAN SECURITY ARCHITECTURE

Narratives of Control and Influence

Łukasz Adamski Emilija Pundziūtė-Gallois Šarūnas Liekis Viktorija Rusinaitė Ernest Wyciszkiewicz

VILNIUS 2021

Reviewers:

Prof. dr. Giedrius Česnakas, General Jonas Žemaitis Military Academy of Lithuania

Prof. dr. Mindaugas Jurkynas, Vytautas Magnus University

In collaboration with

Challenges to the European Security Architecture: Narratives of Control and Influence. Policy paper ISBN 978-609-8281-03-3 © 2021 Vilnius Institute for Policy Analysis © 2021 Łukasz Adamski, Emilija Pundziūtė-Gallois, Šarūnas Liekis, Viktorija Rusinaitė, Ernest Wyciszkiewicz

TABLE OF CONTENTS INTRODUCTION 2 CHAPTER I. A LAW-BASED APPROACH TO REGIONAL ORDER 6 Why international law matters 6 “Russian international law” 7 Between lawfare and lawtalk 9 Not only cynicism 11 Breaches of the international law as a problem in Russia’s relations with its neighbours 14 CHAPTER II. RUSSIAN NARRATIVES ON EUROPEAN SECURITY ARCHITECTURE 16 Putin’s rule and the return of great power ambitions 19 Tools for strategic narration 23 Narrative 1. European security architecture is in crisis 26 Narrative 2. The US / and NATO / are destabilising the region 29 Narrative 3. The Russian sphere of influence 31 Narrative 4. The irrational Baltic States and Poland 33 The way forward 34 CHAPTER III. EUROPEAN VULNERABILITY TO RUSSIAN NARRATIVES AND INFLUENCE ON EUROPEAN SECURITY ARCHITECTURE 36 A possibly lighter American engagement 36 France as a leader of the “European autonomy” initiative 40 Germany as a leader of dialogue on European security architecture 44 The receptiveness of Russian narratives on European security architecture in the West 48 Conclusion 51 CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 52

CHALLENGES TO THE EUROPEAN SECURITY ARCHITECTURE

INTRODUCTION

The European security order, based on commonly politicians and experts, open-mindedly welcoming agreed principles, norms and common institutions, “all sides concerned”, produce proposals that seem such as the EU, NATO, the OSCE and its acquis – to be much closer to the Russian vision than to a the Helsinki Final Act, the Charter of Paris, arms European one. Western representatives, approach- control agreements and confidence and security ing these debates with their democratic habitus, are building measures, is being increasingly challenged divided, questioning and compromise-prone, often today. Russia has emerged as a major contender: self-critical, and are not necessarily well prepared having disregarded international law and regional (in terms of coordination and clarification of con- agreements and having disrespected the sovereignty crete interests). The Russians, on the contrary, both of neighbouring independent states, it attempts to at the political and the expert level, seem to know drive wedges within the Euro-Atlantic community, very well what they are after. Their messages are exploits loopholes in arms control regimes and de- well formulated and verified, underpinned by well- ploys large efforts to influence and destabilise Eu- constructed narratives, their agenda is consistent. ropean democracies through information warfare Among these narratives, one will find a rationalisa- and election meddling. The United States, the tion for the illegal annexation of Crimea and war in strongest guarantor of security in Europe over the Donbass, where it is claimed that Russia had been past seventy years, is reassessing the merits of its “provoked by the West”. Military and economic involvement in the continent, while European na- pressure against the sovereign neighbouring states, tions are questioning themselves about the future of aspiring to join NATO or seek enhanced coopera- the institutions that bind them together. tive agreements with the European Union, is ex- The stakeholders in the European security order, as plained away with the claim for “privileged inter- constructed since the end of the Cold War, are in ests” in the “near abroad”. These rationalisations are need for solutions to bridge the growing divides, the reinforced by the argument that all states behave largest of which today is that between the West and egoistically in the anarchical international order, Russia. Any common ground for mutual under- that this is a matter of interests which must be re- standing and trust is slipping away. While Russia spected, and that Russia is not to be blamed for ag- advances across Europe, tightening its grip on the gressive behaviour any more than the West itself. neighbouring countries, nurturing conflictual grey Indeed, the assertion that both, the West and Russia, zones, annexing foreign territories, brokering deals are equally responsible for shattering the European in what it claims to be its zone of influence, Euro- security order is very strong. Finally, in order to pean powers have less and less leverage to deter avoid the blame-game, and disguise those instances Russia or to defend those nations which choose de- in which the Kremlin undermines European secu- mocracy and want to come closer to European insti- rity, the order itself is criticised as outdated, exclu- tutions. Meaningful dialogue on a majority of criti- sive, and out of sync with the “new realities”. cal security issues has stalled, room for compromise It is illustrative that many of the above-mentioned is shrinking, and trust-building is at its lowest. narratives appear in various “compromise-based” Efforts to reinvigorate thinking about an inclusive proposals for the future of European security. They European security order do not seem to deliver ade- agree to suggestions to reform the European secu- quate results. Most of the discussions among rity architecture, to activate European dialogue with

2 Adamski, Pundziūtė-Gallois, Liekis, Rusinaitė, Wyciszkiewicz

Russia and to bow to the politics of balance between democratic European nations should defend is power blocks, where the big states would guarantee imperative. security and economic welfare for small “states in This report is a joint effort by Polish and Lithuanian between” in their respective zones of privileged in- experts to examine how the European security ar- 1 terests. The principles and values that have been so chitecture and international law are challenged by dear to Europe are dangerously put aside: the under- strategic narratives2 promoted by Russian foreign standing that no security order can be sustainable policy elites who seek “great power” status for their without respect for human rights and freedoms, the country, pursue exclusive influence in Russia’s Eu- acknowledgment of sovereign equality between ropean neighbourhood, and are increasingly active states, the respect of agreements, the reckoning with in efforts to destabilise Western democracies. It also truth and the rendering of justice, refraining from explores how these narratives are perceived among the use of force, and the restraint of power by law. the allied partners and what consequences the shift Long years of experience within the Western secu- of perceptions towards those desired by the Kremlin rity community have taught Europeans that no last- might have for European security. ing cooperation is possible without basic bona fides and that communities do not last if they do not sub- We understand narratives as instruments to create a scribe to the minimum of common principles. In a shared meaning of the international system, and nar- self-defeating manner, Europeans seem to accept ration as an effort to shape and drive the perceptions not only the claim that reality has changed, but that of strategic elites in order to solve strategic issues in 3 the basic tenets, upon which the European security security and foreign policy. Narratives help to or- order had been constructed since the end of the Cold ganise seemingly separate events and their rational- War, have lost their validity too. isations into one coherent storyline, defining the concept of international security order, what posi- It has become clear that a critical assessment is tions different actors hold, and the priorities and ob- necessary not only of the current security chall- stacles for different states within this order. Alt- enges to the European security architecture, and hough narratives of the international security order the capacity of European states to respond to concern not only policy circles but also media and them, but also – the perception and the intellec- social networks, the main narrators analysed in this tual framing of these challenges and solutions report are policy elites and policy experts. proposed. This report argues that the discussions on the new European security order need to be We consider narratives to be part of strategic actions underpinned by a clear reinstatement of the fun- taken by a state. Narratives often go together with damental principles upon which this order has political, military and civil operations, both overt been built, and which are by no means outdated. and covert, promoted by state and non-state actors. A candid evaluation of the interests that They supplement, explain, rationalise and help push through acceptance of the actions undertaken.

1 Among others, see for example expert discussion pro- From’, 8 March 2018 ceedings that were supported by the Carnegie Corpora- https://www.rand.org/pubs/conf_proceed- tion of New York, the Swiss Federal Department of For- ings/CF382.html eign Affairs, and prepared in partnership with Friedrich 2 Ben O’Loughlin, Alister Miskimmon and Laura Ro- Ebert Stiftung - Samuel Charap et al., ‘A Consensus selle, Forging the World: Strategic Narratives and In- Proposal for a Revised Regional Order in Post-Soviet ternational Relations, (Michigan: University of Michi- Europe and Eurasia’, 8 October 2019, gan Press, 2017). https://www.rand.org/pubs/conf_proceed- 3 Ibid. ings/CF410.html Samuel Charap et al., ‘Getting Out

3 CHALLENGES TO THE EUROPEAN SECURITY ARCHITECTURE

While these narratives often appear in disinfor- analysis will illuminate the contrast which exists be- mation campaigns and are promoted by malign non- tween the Russian way of thinking and the thinking state actors, it is equally possible to come across that is fundamentally European, and optimistically them in all domains of policy practitioner and expert was thought to be shared with Russia. Having estab- circles, where Russian interests intersect with those lished this difference, we conclude with recommen- of the West. The Russian narration of the European dations, the thrust of which suggests that the right security order within diplomatic, civil, military and solution before diving into a dialogue with Russia is legal domains invites us to explore narratives in the to assess which elements of our own thinking we are context of hybrid, multi-domain or grey zone chal- ready to sacrifice in a compromise with Russia, and lenges. This is why our analysis will include not which elements are fundamental to our own integ- only the identification of the narratives themselves, rity. but also the description of the context in which they are promoted, and the actions which they underpin. This work is composed of three chapters. Competition of the visions for a European security In Chapter I, Ernest Wyciszkiewicz and Łukasz Ad- architecture occurs simultaneously across multiple amski focus on the significance of international law domains in local and global contexts. This is why in the shared European security environment and the preparedness of the Euro-Atlantic allies to show how Russia exploits international law in its ef- properly react to them is essential. forts to fulfil its political needs. There is a misalign- Do those to whom these narratives are tailored take ment between words and deeds in Russian foreign them at face value? Our report is of course deemed policy, as is shown by repeatedly stressing the im- to conclude negatively. The Russian strategic narra- portance of sovereignty in their own foreign policy tives collude with the strategic narratives of the documents, while at the same time pursuing wars in West, with the complex interests of states and alli- Georgia and Ukraine. In this chapter the authors ex- ances, and within the conditions that shape their re- plain the psychological mechanisms at work used to lations with Russia. Among the drivers of these re- reconcile words and deeds into coherent strategic lations are not only strategic security interests, but narratives. Throughout their work, the authors delve also the historical and cultural imagination of Eu- into the vocabulary used by Russia in order to forge rope and the West. The Western narratives rely not similar adversarial thinking about countries in Eu- only on the vision of Europe as a cradle of continu- rope through an imperial lens. ously developing democracies, their norms and val- In Chapter II, Viktorija Rusinaitė and Šarūnas ues, but also on the imagination of the role of the Liekis focus on an analysis of specific Russian stra- United States and the European states in the security tegic narratives promoted as part of high level dip- architectures of the past, their relations to Russia lomatic and expert policy advisory efforts. The au- both now and throughout history. These contexts in- thors explore the narratives used to undermine the fluence the acceptance of Russian narratives, and international security architecture and shift the the possibility to reconcile them with the European blame for the militarisation of Europe from Russia vision of security. to the West in general, and the US and NATO in This study is focused upon the following elements: particular. They analyse Russian narratives that pro- Russia’s own narrative of international law, its role mote claims about the crisis of the European secu- and its purposes, the narratives of Russia’s role and rity architecture, about the destabilisation of the re- interests in the international system, and the ways in gion by the US and NATO, the legitimisation of the which the West reacts to these narratives. The Russian spheres of influence, and discreditation of

4 Adamski, Pundziūtė-Gallois, Liekis, Rusinaitė, Wyciszkiewicz the “Russophobic” Baltic States and Poland. In their security architecture is facing are understood in Eu- analysis they look into how these narratives help to rope, especially in France and Germany. The author project Russia as a constructive and peaceful actor, also discusses how Russian strategic narratives are and the international system as biased against Rus- received in policy and expert circles in these coun- sia. tries and how they influence the future visions of European security that are being actively discussed In Chapter III, Emilija Pundziūtė-Gallois analyses today. the ways in which the challenges that the European

5 CHALLENGES TO THE EUROPEAN SECURITY ARCHITECTURE CHAPTER I. A LAW-BASED APPROACH TO REGIONAL ORDER

Why international law matters opt for vague concepts of “great power manage- ment”. The main Russian narrative today is that the International law matters when it is reflected in contemporary international system is in de- the political practice of states and, most of the cline. Apparently, the old rules are not valid an- time, most international actors wilfully comply. ymore, so new ones must be quickly installed to Some of them do so out of fear of sanctions (or avoid a world with no rules at all. Proponents of hope for profit), but a majority choose this path such thinking rarely, if ever, notice, that it was due to the need to behave according to mutually actually Russia that decided to undermine the accepted rules to resolve conflicts in an orderly normative foundations of international relations manner, to receive reciprocal treatment, or to as defined in the UN Charter or the Helsinki Fi- avoid criticism. In many countries that are usu- nal Act, to name just a few key documents. Ob- ally democratic and committed to the rule of viously, there were also other examples of law, proper international behaviour and an apt norm-breaching in recent decades by other assessment of misbehaviour needs to be in- countries, though rather different in scale and cluded into the political calculus of those in content. None of them, however, can justify power. But even autocrats dress their unlawful calls for a new normative architecture. actions in a quasi-legal costume to keep up the Recurring criticism of international law is that appearance of being law-abiding citizens. it fails to influence the behaviour of states due Nonetheless, one can often hear that interna- to the lack of central legislative or executive tional law does not work because it is violated power. This kind of view relies upon a superfi- regularly. Interestingly, similar concerns are cial comparison with domestic law, whereas rarely voiced about the Highway Code, which both domains are distinct and deserve a differ- is violated even more often. Due to selection ent approach. International law carries signifi- bias, serious transgressions of norms, though cant normative and political weight. Interna- quite rare, attract more public attention than tional law was, is and will be violated as any day-to-day obedience. Blunt violations of fun- other system of norms, but at the same time, a damental norms do still occur, as in the case of system of norms has always been constitutive the annexation of Crimea, yet the general track to any form of governance. Mutually accepted record of compliance looks quite positive. and internalised customary and treaty-based norms are an indispensable part of the stable in- Attempts to undermine the significance of in- ternational order. Obviously, they cannot elim- ternational law are driven either by ignorance, inate international crimes and misdemeanours naïve interpretation, misunderstanding or polit- once for all, but they significantly increase the ical agenda. But, flawed as they are, these at- political and economic costs of such actions. tempts to frame international law as useless or Furthermore, they provide for all actors a pro- dysfunctional do matter, as they might trigger a tective shield against the appetites of those who self-fulfilling prophecy and push international

6 Adamski, Pundziūtė-Gallois, Liekis, Rusinaitė, Wyciszkiewicz order down a slippery slope. For actors that do the Russian Constitutional Court approved the not aspire to play their power games at the ex- “accession” of Crimea to the Russian Federa- pense of others but are instead interested in tion without even thinking about the compati- rule-based cooperation and competition, such a bility of this decision with the UN Charter, in- scenario would be dangerous. The same applies voking historical rights and the supremacy of to the world order in general. The balance of domestic law over international law, just to sat- power between great powers – presented some- isfy its political needs.4 times as the preferable model for global govern- In Soviet and Russian political parlance, the ance – does not mean bringing stability to the meaning assigned to legal notions follows po- whole system, but rather transferring instability litical needs. So, legal concepts are re-invented from some regions to others, and consequently whenever authorities find it useful. There is a leading to even greater local and global uncer- great deal of purposeful mimicry to make things tainty and unpredictability. sound like their Western equivalents, but very often with the opposite meaning. Take these “Russian international law” two brief examples. In the past, the Stalinist constitution of 19365 strongly protected human Russia’s attitude towards international law is a and civil rights that were actually non-existent derivative of a specific understanding of the re- in the Soviet Union, as was vividly illustrated lationship between law and power, with the for- by the Great Terror. Today, the very title “Rus- mer seen mostly as an instrument of the latter. sian Federation” is confusing since Russia does It is a by-product of a long tradition of an au- not meet the basic criteria of a federation. The thoritarian system of governance. Past and cur- same quasi-postmodern game of shuffling with rent Russian leaders were not keen to accept concepts also applies to international law, any system of checks and balances that would which for Russian political elites has never had not be dependent solely on their will and discre- universal but rather instrumental value. So, un- tion. Nowadays in foreign policy, this purely in- surprisingly, it was in Tsarist Russia that the strumental approach is best illustrated by the concept of “Russian international law” was 6 lack of consistency between Russian statements coined. Later on – to fight Western predomi- and deeds. The Russian government strongly nance – Moscow invented “progressive” (in the supports the UN Charter while blatantly violat- Soviet, not the contemporary meaning) interna- ing its provisions (as in the case Crimea) with- tional law in opposition to its “bourgeois” coun- 7 out batting an eyelid. The rule of law has lost in terpart. Up to this day, Russian elites try to this competition to rule by law. For example, “nationalise” international law by twisting and

4 Lauri Mälksoo, Russian Approaches to International 6 Lauri Mälksoo, Russian Approaches to International Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015), p. 182. Law, p. 15. 5 Конституция (Основной закон) Союза Советских 7 For more see, Alina Cherviatsova, Oleksandr Социалистических Республик (утверждена поста- Yarmysh, ‘Soviet International Law: Between Slogans новлением Чрезвычайного VIII Съезда Советов Со- and Practice’, Journal of the History of International юза Советских Социалистических Республик от 5 Law 19 (2017): 296–327. декабря 1936 г.), http://constitution.garant.ru/his- tory/ussr-rsfsr/1936/red_1936/3958676/

7 CHALLENGES TO THE EUROPEAN SECURITY ARCHITECTURE turning well-known concepts for their own po- of international relations would work fine if litical benefit.8 peace and stability among a few could be As the legal continuator of the USSR, Russia equated with global peace and stability. Yet, inherited not only a permanent seat in the UN this has not been the case even in the midst of Security Council (UNSC), but also the charac- the Cold War, let alone today with many other teristically Soviet reluctance to accept the uni- weaker actors enjoying a relatively high impact versal applicability of international norms. It on world or regional affairs. Russian political quickly absorbed the classic great power atti- elites (and to be fair, also many representatives tude (with the problematic record of the US in of other real or self-proclaimed powers) have this field as a pretext) based on the presumption always had difficulty in accepting this change. that international law should work up to the There is a long tradition in Russia to perceive lines delimited by key actors, preferably the its own territorial conquests as normal, neces- US, Russia, UK, France and China, with sec- sary, or even defensive. Great power instincts toral/regional input from a few others (i.e., In- have not died out elsewhere, but at least they dia, Brazil, South Africa, Japan). Russia sees it- are kept at bay thanks to the internalisation of self as a veto power, not only when it comes to international law. For Russia it is still the bal- specific UN codes of conduct, but also more ance of power that constitutes a level-playing broadly at any time when it feels the existing field for key actors, whereas international law rules encroach its room for manoeuvre. Then it is a constructed level-playing field for the rest. simply violates them and invites others to ac- In Russia’s view, this kind of a normative order cept a redefinition of what it feels uncomforta- also hides behind such nicely framed concepts ble with. It is not about changing the rules as such as “Europe from Lisbon to Vladivostok” such, but seeking support for the claim that or “New Security Architecture”: these seem- those rules are for the others, not the major ingly inclusive concepts maintain the possibil- powers who are predestined to be political and ity of “privileged” zones, dependent on Russia legal trend-setters and enforcers. Use of force, as a great power. cyberattacks, interference in elections, and the Old Russian aspirations to have veto over use of chemical weapons are seen by Russian NATO enlargement, and ongoing irritation authorities merely as tools at the disposal of key over the increasing military capabilities of not- actors. The remainder are supposed to accept so-new members serve as a good illustration of this as a fact of nature. the deep conviction that some states should give Realists of all kinds typically argue in the same up control over their decisions to the more pow- style, claiming that international law simply re- erful. Such thinking can be found also in the so- flects the distribution of power, so great powers called “realist” circles in the West. It makes are to be followed voluntarily by others, either Russian elites believe that everyone treats the by necessity or by force. This comforting image law instrumentally, but some are just better at

8 Constitutional changes introduced in 2020 illustrate provision was expanded about precedence of the Consti- this attitude vividly. Apart from the most discussed is- tution over international law. The list of amendments: sue regarding the nullification of presidential terms, a http://duma.gov.ru/news/48045/.

8 Adamski, Pundziūtė-Gallois, Liekis, Rusinaitė, Wyciszkiewicz hiding it. Such cynicism refuses to take into ac- • When Russia thinks that existing rules re- count the essential understanding from which duce room for manoeuvre, it violates them and presents this as an opportunity to rede- the possibility of all-encompassing civilised co- fine international law. operation springs. It is not that mistakes and vi- • Russia has never accepted that interna- olations are made impossible by international tional law could be a regulatory force in the law, it is that the very existence of international post-Soviet area and views Ukraine, Bela- law allows them to be considered as violations, rus, Moldova and other states as protec- torates, rather than sovereign states. and not as the natural order of things. Western adherence to the rule-based order is real in gen- eral, nonetheless it needs to be supported by both words and deeds on a constant basis. Between lawfare and lawtalk Russia has never accepted fully that interna- If one were to take Russian foreign policy doc- tional law could be the valid regulatory force in uments and statements at face value, Moscow the post-Soviet area, as it would limit its room would be considered the major guardian of in- for political manoeuvre. Ukraine, Belarus, Mol- ternational law. Yet, in this case practice has not dova and others have never been treated as followed preaching. Among Russian elites, in- equal partners but rather as protectorates to be ternational legal doctrine has usually been a de- governed in a more or less subtle way. The term rivative of foreign policy. Thus, compliance ‘near abroad’ that for many years was used in with or breaching norms were treated as tricks official Russian documents to describe post-So- up one’s sleeve to be used when required. viet neighbours (now excluding the Baltic States) clearly depicted its post-imperial phan- For example, official praise for the sovereignty tom pains and conviction that there were other principle was accompanied by blatant acts of its ‘laws’, apart from those rooted in the UN Char- violation in the case of Georgia and Ukraine. It ter, that should regulate state interactions in the showed that it was more about Russia’s sover- area. This has always been the widespread and eign right to decide upon others, in particular to undisguised belief in natural spheres of influ- limit the sovereignty of neighbours in the name ence, as any higher normative order with inter- of self-declared entitlement to regional domi- national law has been subjugated. nance. Those who opposed were sometimes called irresponsible members of the interna- In a nutshell: tional community that did not grasp the proper code of conduct set by the most powerful, or • Russia views international law as an in- were too eager to follow the wrong ones.9 Rus- strument of power. sia undermined the principle of sovereign

9 Minister Lavrov produced plenty of comments about “the EU is so far unable to get the better of its Russo- Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia and Poland in this respect: phobic minority, which is taking advantage of the prin- “EU policy should not be placed at the disposal of some ciple of consensus and solidarity to block the more or marginal entities that are following instructions from less constructive approaches to the development of rela- overseas”. (Interview with the Sputnik, Echo of Moscow tions with Russia” (Interview with Sputnik, Komso- and Moscow Speaks radio stations, 22 April 2015); or molskaya Pravda and Govorit Moskva, Moscow, 14 Oc- tober 14 2020).

9 CHALLENGES TO THE EUROPEAN SECURITY ARCHITECTURE equality that it publicly cherished. Yet, it was Russian propaganda juggled with various types exactly this kind of peculiar game of contradic- of argumentation to target specific audiences. tions and inconsistencies that was meant to ‘Legal’ posturing was offered to the West so leave the West confused and unable to react that we could start public hair-splitting of Rus- properly. sian views instead of a quick rejection of rea- Russia firmly stood for the pacta sunt servanda sons born out of sheer cynicism. Russia has not principle, even when there was no treaty-based stopped presenting itself as a constant warrior obligation (see the alleged promise from 1989 for international law. In October 2014, Putin by the US to the USSR not to enlarge NATO),10 said “…international relations must be based on and at same time regularly violated ratified international law, which itself should rest on agreements (see Ukraine) and undermined key moral principles such as justice, equality and 13 political documents (i.e., the Budapest Memo- truth”. randum, NATO-Russia Founding Act). In Russia in the field of international law “noth- For decades in the USSR and in Russia, the pre- ing seems to be true and everything seems to be 14 dominant view was that the use of military force possible”. In international law, as in politics, is legal only in self-defence or when authorised the instrumental framing of issues is understood 15 by the UNSC. As Putin said in September 2013, as the process of creating reality. Russia’s of- “anything else is unacceptable and would con- ficial messaging about ‘international law’ has stitute an act of aggression”.11 And then, a U- been more intense than any other UNSC mem- turn in February 2014 happened, so that Russia bers. It is sufficient to read Putin’s remarks de- could rhetorically ‘legalise’ and ‘legitimise’ the livered half a year after the Crimean annexa- annexation of Crimea. So, there was no aggres- tion: “International law has been forced to re- sion, no annexation and no occupation of treat over and over by the onslaught of legal ni- Ukraine, only the ‘protection of compatriots’ hilism. Objectivity and justice have been sacri- and ‘care for self-determination’. Along with ficed on the altar of political expediency. Arbi- these ‘legal’ rationalisations, different kinds of trary interpretations and biased assessments 16 arguments came up as well, such as the ‘return have replaced legal norms”. It suffices to jux- of historical lands’ or ‘laws of geopolitics’.12 tapose this wording with the practice of the Russian state to reach the conclusion that any

10 Mark Kramer, ‘The Myth of a No-NATO-Enlarge- 14 Peter Pomerantsev, Nothing Is True and Everything Is ment Pledge to Russia’, Washington Quarterly, 32/2 Possible: The Surreal Heart of the New Russia, (Publi- (April 2009): 39-61. cAffairs, 2014). 11 Vladimir Putin, ‘A Plea for Caution From Russia’, 15 For a glimpse of how this reality is constructed, it is New York Times, 11 September 2013, https://www.ny- useful to read the column, published on 11 February times.com/2013/09/12/opinion/putin-plea-for-caution- 2019 by Vladislav Surkov, called ‘Putin’s Long State’, from-russia-on-syria.html?auth=login-google. https://www.ng.ru/ideas/2019-02- 12 Address by President of the Russian Federation, 18 11/5_7503_surkov.html?fbclid=IwAR0YyDI5ooq5Q5A March 2014 (accessed 20 November 2019), 7TGFzemFL91Fzt5RNsctsOHad9PySSxfrHx- http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/20603. cRT9ymtec. 13 President of Russia, ‘Meeting of the Valdai Interna- 16 Ibid. tional Discussion Club’, 24 October 2014 (accessed 20 November 2019), http://eng.krem- lin.ru/news/23137.

10 Adamski, Pundziūtė-Gallois, Liekis, Rusinaitė, Wyciszkiewicz serious conversation about international law as Not only cynicism seen in the West becomes useless given such levels of cynicism. The science of psychology has developed sev- eral notions that are useful to understand how For Russian elites, international law seems to be the rhetoric of justifications and manipulation instrumental just to keep its status as a perma- of meanings, attributed to the rules and their vi- nent member of the UN Security Council, seen olations, help to create the sense that a certain as a club of global managers who set rules for kind of behaviour is normal. Since few people the others. Any criticism of this de facto ‘oli- are morally ready to accept their own disrespect garchic’ Yalta-driven system is framed as his- for social norms, they seek to exculpate deviant torical revisionism aimed at questioning the re- behaviour. To explain this phenomenon, one sults of World War II. Recurring historical at- can refer to knowledge developed by social tacks against Poland, and also the Baltic States, psychology. The so-called defence mechanism have been closely related to this narrow and in- is at play here, which reduces the cognitive dis- strumental view of international law equated sonance felt after dishonest behaviour, such as with the global power arrangement of 1945. In- projection, rationalisation, denial or repression. ternational law is not about a code of conduct to sustain a stable environment, but to fight for Projection is about attributing your own way of status and to compensate for weakness in other thinking onto others. The Russian elites’ world domains. Legalistic Russian rhetoric is just part view is characterised by a dismissive attitude of lawfare, i.e., abuse of law for military and towards the law. They treat it not as a complex political ends. Peremptory norms, broadly ac- of binding directives, but merely as general sug- cepted by the international community as man- gestions. They think of it not as a specifically datory, such as the ban on use of force or sov- Russian phenomenon, but rather a universal ereign equality, are treated as flexible. one. Hence Russia’s breaches of international law are seen not as crimes but as misdemean- In a nutshell: ours that are committed from time to time by powerful states. The others (the West) are just • Russia views the principles of interna- better at hiding their real intentions or justifying tional conduct as something declarative, their actions in the eyes of public opinion, but but not necessary to follow. • Official praise of the sovereignty princi- they are alike when it comes to a selective ap- ple goes hand in hand with limiting the proach to international law. sovereignty of neighbours. Another mechanism is the post-rationalisation • Its official position on the use of military force only in self-defence does not pre- of decisions or actions. It is difficult to estimate, vent it from annexing part of Ukraine. inasmuch the annexation of Crimea is currently • It then shapes the perception of these assessed as a justified step in Russia. However, digressions from the norm by heavily re- without any doubt, the act of sending and sup- lying on targeted propaganda. porting armed bands of troops in Eastern Ukraine that resulted in international sanctions

brought no visible benefits to Russia or to the

11 CHALLENGES TO THE EUROPEAN SECURITY ARCHITECTURE regime. Russian politicians seem however to would arise to accept at least some of the Krem- believe that the decision taken in the spring of lin’s expectations with regard to foreign affairs, 2014 was fully justified and righteous and was which in turn would only increase incentives preceded by a rational analysis of the situation. for Russian leaders to further dismantle interna- The rationalisation of the past is supplemented tional law-centred order, knowing they could and enhanced by two other defence mecha- count on de facto impunity for their actions. Let nisms – denial and repression. They boil down us analyse some of the most widespread beliefs to ignoring thoughts which could cause painful with regard to Russia closer: reactions or threaten the cohesion of the person- The EU, NATO and Russia bear joint responsi- ality of an individual or of a group. In practical bility for instability, conflict and wars in East- terms, it means the repression of possible evi- ern Europe and the Caucasus. dence or arguments which could cast a critical This view, often heard during conferences or shadow on decisions made, e.g., in 2014. encountered in policy papers and op-ed pieces, There is a danger that taking at face value the clearly contradicts the reality, given the con- reasons for Russia-EU/NATO disagreements, stant efforts of the EU and NATO to provide presented by the Kremlin itself or many Rus- stability and prevent conflict and wars in the re- sian commentators, can result in giving recom- gion and, on the other side, the numerous ac- mendations detrimental to international and re- tions of Russia to bring instability, conflicts and gional security, in particular for Central and wars to the region, with the Georgian and Eastern Europe and the Baltic States. This may Ukrainian wars as the most obvious cases. In happen, since the subjective perception of real- searching for the reasons why this opinion is so ity, shared by Putin and his inner circle, also un- widespread, one can assume that it is either an der the influence of psychological defence expression of genuine belief, based on an anal- mechanisms, is often interpreted by many cir- ysis with fallacious assumptions, or a political cles in the EU/NATO countries as a description signal. of objectively existing and unchangeable Rus- In the first case, proponents of this view commit sian national interests. This false diagnosis, pre- a golden mean fallacy. Namely, they assume pared on the basis of logically fallacious argu- that truth “lies in the middle”, so its identifica- mentations, unconscious biases or deliberately tion requires making a compromise between politically motivated language, axiological rel- two opposite positions. The expression of this ativism and judicial carelessness, does not con- view might be preceded by reasoning resting on tribute to stable order in the region. Quite on the the assumption that one has to adopt a politi- contrary, those in Russia who wish to democra- cally motivated approach of a guilt-symmetry tise the domestic situation in their own country between Russia and the EU to help Russian can be demotivated, and those in Russia’s elites save face, in the hope that they would neighbourhood who desire to strengthen de- change their policy in future. In the other case, mocracy and the rule of law in their states to this approach, irrespective of any backstage in- increase their ties with NATO and the EU may tentions, becomes a form of crime denial. be discouraged. Moreover, the temptation

12 Adamski, Pundziūtė-Gallois, Liekis, Rusinaitė, Wyciszkiewicz

Avoiding terms supporting the claims of one aging prognosis that their work cannot succeed, party in the conflict is a form of abdication from since Russia is bound to be imperial and non- the normative roles of language. It exacerbates democratic. the feeling of injustice and grievances of one party, while in parallel confirming for the other All states behave the same and Russia is no ex- ception. party – the Kremlin – the view that cynicism and a rejection of ethical and legal norms is the This view is also analytically erroneous, being right strategy. Hence, stable order in the region a form of hasty generalisation. The politics of a cannot be built on euphemisms and axiological state hinges on various conditions, including relativism when diagnosing, whence the prob- the political system and values which the re- lems result. spective society shares, and the latter’s vision of national interests. Thus, certain actions may Russia was, is and will be a non-democratic indicate an ostensible similarity, but de facto country conducting policy based on an imperial they are motivated by various reasons. Moreo- approach (zone of influence, concentration of ver, the opinion that all states behave in the powers), hence the EU and NATO must come to same way, if applied consistently, is also a hid- terms with and accept the reality. den ‘whataboutism’ tactic, known also as a tu This view is a bright example of determinism, quoque fallacy. It aims at washing away one’s i.e., the belief that the future and present are crimes, sins or misdeeds by pointing to the mor- permanently bound by a cause-and-effect relat- ally dubious actions of others (i.e., NATO in ionship. Practically, it emphasises the weight of Kosovo) in the hope that it would change the existing conditions for predicting the future and legal and moral assessment of Russian actions. plays down the significance of random events Politically speaking, this kind of slogan only or changes in circumstances on the future be- discourages the Russian people to protest haviour of states. Hence, the analytically unjus- against the foreign policy of their state and di- tified, misleading diagnosis suggests that Rus- minishes support for the Western public opin- sia is a non-democratic country with, overall, a ion in favour of sanctions or other measures un- non-democratic and imperial past, and has no dertaken to condemn Russian breaches of inter- chances for a democratic, non-imperial future. national law that have been committed so far, To some extent, this approach also bears the as well as to prevent them in the future. hallmarks of one that could be called political The security architecture in the region is deter- racism, since it implies that certain societies or mined by an objective rivalry between NATO nations, due to their “inherent” features, are un- and Russia, which feels endangered and encir- able to establish democracy and implement rule cled. of law. It is redundant to say that this kind of This view is a classical mind-projection fallacy, approach diminishes the chances to change the occurring when someone’s perception of reality Russian political system from the inside. It de- is being confused with the reality itself. prives Russian civil society of belief in the sense of the struggle for freedom and democ- Putin’s perception that NATO’s activity in the racy, inasmuch as it offers them the discour- region constitutes a threat to Russian national

13 CHALLENGES TO THE EUROPEAN SECURITY ARCHITECTURE security starts to be taken for granted as an ob- jectively existing state. The solution is however In a nutshell: not a change in policy to satisfy the opponent’s • To explain its misdemeanours in inter- phobia-based expectations, but rather to assist national law, Russia uses ex-post ration- in combating the phobia itself. alisations. • It denies and represses any possible evi- We cannot oppose the reality, so we have to ac- dence or arguments which could cast a cept the natural inequality of states when it shadow on its past political decisions. • comes to their status and capacities to act. Some of the main narrative strategies used to cover up infringements of inter- This view assumes that policy based on interna- national law are: golden mean fallacy, tional law towards Russia is ineffective and the determinism, generalisations, mind pro- only alternative is to accept Russia ‘as it is’, jection, false alternative fallacies. along with its vision of foreign policy – the view that great powers have the natural right or Breaches of the international predisposition to decide about the choices of law as a problem in Russia’s less powerful middle and small countries. This relations with its neighbours kind of approach, resting on unproven premises and a false alternative fallacy, clearly contra- There are currently several cases of conflicts in- dicts both the spirit and letter of international volving Russia as a violator of international law, which asserts that all states are equal. Fur- law. The obvious case is Crimea which, accord- thermore, taking this view as a basis for strategy ing to Ukraine and almost all the UN countries, towards Russia would make stability and peace was annexed (illegally incorporated) to the even more remote, because only a particular Russian Federation and has been under Russian harmonisation of values and development mod- military occupation since then. According to els within the political culture of Russia, its Eu- Russia, it was incorporated based on the seces- ropean neighbours and Western countries could sion of the peninsula in March 2014 from remove the obstacles in the way of reducing Ukraine and as an exercise of the right to self- tensions and increasing mutual understanding. determination by the local population. Russia is The possible implementation of practical ac- undoubtedly also an aggressor under the Lon- tions derived from the above-mentioned views don Convention for the definition of aggression would lead to the limited sovereignty of minor (1933) in Eastern Ukraine (Donbass), since it is states, if not formally, then factually. Thus, a at least the state which “provided support to new Brezhnev doctrine of limited sovereignty armed bands formed in its territory which have would emerge. Since this kind of status cannot invaded the territory of another State, or refusal, count on popular acceptance in many states, notwithstanding the request of the invaded first of all in Central and Eastern Europe, which State, to take, in its own territory, all the is a conditio sine qua non to stabilise the situa- measures in its power to deprive those bands of tion, the strategy of ‘accepting reality’ will not resolve any of the existing problems.

14 Adamski, Pundziūtė-Gallois, Liekis, Rusinaitė, Wyciszkiewicz all assistance or protection,”17 if not the state 1944–1945 (Poland), and in 1940–1941 and which carried out “Invasion by its armed forces, 1944–1991 (Baltic States), nor is it intent on re- with or without a declaration of war, of the ter- turning the cultural objects and archives looted ritory of another State”. Russia also occupies – in this period. after war against Georgia – parts of the latter’s Overall, all these remarks should incline the internationally recognised territory in Abkhazia CEE states to: and South Ossetia. It is also a guarantor of de facto independence of the Moldavian breaka- ● Give due attention to the political power of way territory, from where it has failed to with- international law and a normative approach draw its troops, despite international obliga- to the international relations. tions going back to 1999. ● Combat analytically unsound descriptions When it comes to Russian-Belarusian relations, of the situation in the region in the political it is beyond any doubt that supporting a regime discourse, in particular when discussing Eu- with no social legitimacy and violating basic ropean security architecture. human and civil rights constitutes a delict under ● Use references to legal and moral obliga- international law, since it prevents the sover- tions (international law and international de- eign – the Belarusian nation – to exercise their cency) as leverage, which along with politi- right with regard to the composition of govern- cal correctness would contribute to stability ment, freedom of speech, assembly and many in the region and contain states from actions others. Russia has also legal problems arising that would endanger peace. from its history with Poland and the Baltic

States – it has refused to recognise the occupa- tion of these territories – in 1939–1941 and

17 Soviet-Lithuanian registration of the treaty in the https://treaties.un.org/doc/Publication/UNTS/LON/Vol- League of Nations Treaty Series ume%20148/v148.pdf (p. 81‒85).

15 CHALLENGES TO THE EUROPEAN SECURITY ARCHITECTURE

CHAPTER II. RUSSIAN NARRATIVES ON EUROPEAN SECURITY ARCHITECTURE

Russia18 has been among those players who ac- narrative of the global order. The National Se- tively pursue strategic narration of the global curity Concept of the Russian Federation 2000 order. Political actors employ strategic narra- and Foreign Policy Concept of 2000 both rein- tives to foster a shared meaning of the past, pre- force ideas of Russia’s greatness, by claiming sent and future of international relations and that it is a centuries-old country among the larg- their place within it. These narratives help to est of the Eurasian powers.22 situate events and causalities into a seemingly The desire to be recognised as great is a power- coherent linear order, while at the same time in- ful theme running through Russia’s foreign pol- fluence the behaviour of other local and inter- icy narrative. Its own narrative seeks to contain national actors, including strategic policy elites actors Russia sees as powerful, while simulta- and international organisations. The broad goal neously strengthening its own status and auth- of strategic narratives is usually to provide de- ority.23 sired outcomes for the states fostering those narratives.19 Russia projects itself as a key player within the international system and therefore as an integral Russia employs strategic narratives to shape part of the international framework of institut- perceptions and ensure the development of ions, organisations and systems that are gov- Russian political, economic and military inter- erned by international law and agreements. To 20 ests. In its strategic narrative, Russia projects project its centrality, it is essential for Russia to the international system as being populated by show itself as constructive, predictable, relia- “great powers working in concert, an elite ble, pragmatic, transparent and “oriented at re- group of states reinforcing a hierarchy to which solving problems”.24 But this is difficult to do, 21 Russia claims membership”. Russia occupies given Russia᾿s preference for enforcing its a central place in its foreign policy narrative and

18 Authors would like to thank Rokas Kriaučiūnas, Eli- of Global Order: Great Power Legacies in a Polycentric jah Liampert, Uladzislau Bass and their contributions to World’, Politics and Governance 5 (29 September Grey Zones Project in Vilnius Institute, some of the data 2017): 111, https://doi.org/10.17645/pag.v5i3.1017, collected was used in this chapter. Russian National Security Concept and Nuclear Policy, 19 Ben O’Loughlin, Alister Miskimmon and Laura Ro- 21 July 2020, https://www.armscontrol.ru/start/nsc.htm selle, Forging the World: Strategic Narratives and In- and The Foreign Policy Concept of the Russian Federa- ternational Relations, 2017. tion, Federation Of American Scientists, 28 June 2000, 20 Alister Miskimmon and Ben O’Loughlin, ‘Russia’s https://fas.org/nuke/guide/russia/doctrine/econcept.htm. Narratives of Global Order: Great Power Legacies in a 23 Ben O’Loughlin, Alister Miskimmon and Laura Ro- Polycentric World’, Politics and Governance 5 (29 Sep- tember 2017): 111, selle, Forging the World: Strategic Narratives and In- https://doi.org/10.17645/pag.v5i3.1017 ternational Relations, 2017. 21 Ibid, p. 115. 24 Ibid. 22 For more on Russia’s strategic narratives see Alister Miskimmon and Ben O’Loughlin, ‘Russia’s Narratives

16 Adamski, Pundziūtė-Gallois, Liekis, Rusinaitė, Wyciszkiewicz presence and influence through military means but it is also a pre-emptive tactic seeking to pre- and hybrid meddling. There are discrepancies vent any future exclusions. in how Russia projects itself as a constructive To deal with these discrepancies between activ- actor and its own illegal actions in Georgia and ities that do not correspond to the projection of Ukraine. While inside the country the archetype constructive and reliable actor, after the occu- of “Russia that cannot be grasped by the mind” pation of Crimea, Russia resorted to the idea of might be enough to explain these discrepancies, ‘guilt symmetry’ or golden mean fallacy, as de- it is not a sufficient working ground on which scribed in Chapter I. In multiple statements, the international relations can function. There is a Russian policy establishment called the West as strong need for narratives that would “soften” being responsible for war in Ukraine. For ex- the perception of Russia’s breaches of interna- ample, in his speech to the Youth Public Cham- tional law in the eyes of policy players in Eu- ber, Lavrov claimed that “The Ukraine crisis rope and the US. <...> is a direct fallout of our Western col- Some prefer the explanation that Russia is “act- leagues᾿ attempts to maintain and move east- ing out” because it has not been included in ma- ward the ‘dividing lines’ of the Euro-Atlantic jor security decisions concerning Europe. space”,25 while in his speech to the RIAC, Lav- Pushed forward by Russian state-funded think rov presented the situation in Ukraine as a tank experts, this rationalisation ignores all the chance for more improved relations, expressing factual steps that Europe and the US took and the hope that “the current crisis will become a continue to take, including the Russia-NATO kind of ‘refreshing storm’”.26 Founding Act, inclusion of Russia into the The guilt symmetry approach plays an im- Council of Europe, G8 Obama’s “Reset” pol- portant role in the Russian narration of the in- icy, etc. The “acting out” rationalisation is an ternational system. The line of lack of recogni- integral part of Russian strategic narration not tion of legitimate Russian interests and the guilt only providing a “political cushion” to mini- of the West runs through later policy documents mise the repercussions of international law in- and political statements.27 In their speeches, fringements – after all, the West started first – Russian officials often list instances of the

25 ‘Opening remarks by Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov TV Channel and “Vesti Nedeli” on “Rossiya” TV Chan- at a meeting with the Youth Public Chamber of Russia, nel, New York, 27 September 2014’, accessed 9 De- Moscow, 22 October 2014’, accessed 9 December 2020, cember 2020, https://www.mid.ru/press_service/minis- https://www.mid.ru/press_service/minister_speeches/- ter_speeches/-/asset_publisher/7OvQR5KJWVmR/con- /asset_publisher/7OvQR5KJWVmR/content/id/716014. tent/id/668812, or ‘Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov’s 26 For more analysis on this, see Alister Miskimmon and Interview to Zvezda TV Channel, December 30, 2015’, Ben O’Loughlin, ‘Russia’s Narratives of Global Order: accessed 9 December 2020, Great Power Legacies in a Polycentric World’, Politics https://www.mid.ru/press_service/minister_speeches/- and Governance 5 (29 September 2017): 111, /asset_publisher/7OvQR5KJWVmR/con- https://doi.org/10.17645/pag.v5i3.1017. p. 115. See: tent/id/2004143, Washington Post Staff, ‘Read Putin’s ‘Sergey Lavrov Meets RIAC Members’, 9 June 2014, U.N. General Assembly Speech’, Washington Post, ac- https://russiancouncil.ru/en/news/sergey-lavrov-meets- cessed 9 December 2020, https://www.washing- riac-members/. tonpost.com/news/worldviews/wp/2015/09/28/read- 27 See, for example ‘Interview given by the Russian For- putins-u-n-general-assembly-speech/. eign Minister, Sergey Lavrov, to the “Russia Today”

17 CHALLENGES TO THE EUROPEAN SECURITY ARCHITECTURE

West’s disregard for international law. With Russophobic conspiracy of the West, is the re- this Russia looks to “balance out” Russia’s own inforced conviction that the West is to blame for digressions with statements that all big players it all. exploit international law to ensure their own in- The guilt symmetry approach implies sacrific- terests. While Russia’s Foreign Policy Concept ing step by step the indivisibility of European of 2016 is not only more assertive in identifying security and normalising breaches of internat- 28 Russian interests than the earlier one, it also ional law. If we accept the idea promoted by includes a very peculiar definition of interna- Russia that with the annexation of Crimea or the tional law. Playing into the narrative of great Russo-Georgian war, Russia was only “react- power competition, the FPC 2016 defines inter- ing” to Western ignorance, we effectively elim- national law as “intended to ensure peaceful inate international law and the principle of the and fruitful cooperation among States while sovereignty of states from the picture. Ukraine, 29 seeking to balance their interests”. This em- Georgia and Moldova are already some of the phasis on balancing the interests of states is casualties of this kind of approach. Others may unique to Russia’s view on international law. soon follow if buying into the narratives of For example, the UN defines international law competition between great powers is continued. by placing an emphasis on the responsibilities, Instead, we should strongly rely on interna- and not the interests of states, as “legal respon- tional law and listen into the narratives from sibilities of States in their conduct with each separate states in Europe, which are rarely other, and their treatment of individuals within heard. They deserve to be heard both in the 30 State boundaries”. West, and in Russia as well. These relatively lo- Some political elites in the West show willing- cal strategic narratives do not have global reach ness to accept a guilt symmetry idea between and a holistic Euro-Atlantic effort is needed in- the West and Russia. According to this kind of stead of confronting individual Russian lines position, it is not only the fault of Russia, who separately and partially. For this to happen, an is strategically breaking the provisions of inter- understanding of Russian strategic narratives is national law, but also of the West, who did not crucial. take the Russian position on spheres of influ- The notion of the “West not recognising legiti- ence into account. Proponents might think that mate Russian interests” is reiterated in the state- by adopting such a position they are helping the ments of political elites, experts and state-spon- Kremlin to “save face” and thus de-escalate the sored media. Behind the “legitimate interests” situation. The actual effects for Russia, which and “privileged zones of interest” lie a number portrays itself increasingly as a victim of the of states, which the West perceives as

28 Alister Miskimmon and Ben O’Loughlin, ‘Russia’s Vladimir Putin on 30November 2016)’, accessed 9 De- Narratives of Global Order: Great Power Legacies in a cember 2020, https://www.mid.ru/foreign_policy/offi- Polycentric World’, Politics and Governance 5 (29 Sep- cial_documents/-/asset_publisher/CptICkB6BZ29/con- tember 2017): 111, tent/id/2542248. https://doi.org/10.17645/pag.v5i3.1017. p. 115. 30 ‘Uphold International Law’, 1 January 2014, 29 ‘Foreign Policy Concept of the Russian Federation https://www.un.org/en/sections/what-we-do/uphold-in- (Approved by President of the Russian Federation ternational-law/.

18 Adamski, Pundziūtė-Gallois, Liekis, Rusinaitė, Wyciszkiewicz sovereign, and Russia – as engaged in some sort Putin’s rule and the return of 31 of patron-client relationship, deprived of in- great power ambitions dependent decisions. Russian disregard for the position of the West lies not only on its own Over the years, Russian strategic narratives line, but on the overall perception and narration have undergone a transformation in the por- of the West. Stereotypical depictions of Euro- trayal of main players, geography and policy pean countries, especially those on the western ambition. In Kremlin-promoted strategic narra- Russian border, as being hostile and weak pre- tives, Russia is increasingly portrayed as a vic- vail in the Russian foreign policy discourse. tim of Western conspiracy, while the West is Russian government affiliated experts and described as an aggressor. There is a clear shift newsmakers narrate Europe overall as weaken- in the policy scope Russia wishes to influence ing, biased, ineffective and arrogant,32 while the too. Early Russian proposals were focused on EU is often depicted as on the verge of chaos curtailing NATO enlargement – namely, the and self-destruction. Western efforts to remedy possible new accession of Ukraine and Georgia the situation with non-confrontational counter- into the alliance. More recent concerns are fo- narratives of cohesion and stability are counter- cused on regional security arrangements and the productive. The lack of a coherent EU strategic control of specific NATO deployments. It is not narrative that would correspond to the actual likely that Russia has been discouraged by the processes in the member states33 and the EU’s failure of the European security Treaty to pur- foreign policy aggravates the situation. Discur- sue its containment policy against NATO, but sive emptiness in the strategic sphere creates that it found other, more effective channels to fertile ground for the fragmentation of positions directly address its concerns. Fostering wars on key security issues. The Russian perception and instability are among them. of the EU as weak and on the verge of collapse Right after the collapse of the former Soviet might encourage Russian leaders to adopt a Union, Russia chose a foreign policy approach confrontational approach. As is evident from towards the former Soviet republics that was the strategic narratives that will be further ana- different to that of the US and the rest of Eu- lysed, Russian national interests within these rope. Although after periods of bloodshed and narratives receive much more space than any struggle in some parts of the former Soviet Un- other issues, thus offering very little promise ion Russia did recognise the independence of that Russia will genuinely seek to improve rela- fourteen states, the Russian political establish- tions with the West. ment continued to treat these countries as not fully sovereign. Using vocabulary such as “the near abroad” (blizhnije zarubezhje), “pribalti-

31 Michael Leigh, ‘A view from the policy community: after Maidan’, Foreign Policy Analysis, 13 (2017): 480– a new strategic narrative for Europe?’, European secu- 499. rity, 28/3 (2019): 382‒391, DOI: 33 Michael Leigh, ‘A view from the policy community: 10.1080/09662839.2019.1648257. a new strategic narrative for Europe?’, European secu- 32 Chaban Natalia, Ole Elgstro and Olga Gulyaeva, rity, 28/3 (2019): 382‒391, DOI: ‘Russian Images of the European Union: Before and 10.1080/09662839.2019.1648257.

19 CHALLENGES TO THE EUROPEAN SECURITY ARCHITECTURE ka” (Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia) and even going with the presidency of Vladimir Putin and his as far as President Dmitri Medvedev, who ex- more assertive trajectory37 of Russian geopolit- plicitly called Georgia part of Russia’s region ical interests. During his first presidency, Putin of “privileged interests”,34 Russia continued to witnessed Bulgaria, the three Baltic States, Slo- portray these counties as failing to go down an vakia and Slovenia joining NATO. During the independent political path. In the political same period, the US war on terrorism was en- sphere, this vocabulary was rightfully not wel- gaging European partners; all of this went comed by Russia’s neighbours. It was seen as against the interests of the aims of Putin’s ad- an attempt to legitimise Russian imperial ambi- ministration to sustain Moscow’s influence in tions. the region. To preserve its influence in the region, Russia Russia’s anti-western sentiment grew exponen- founded institutions such as the Common- tially since Vladimir Putin assumed his presi- wealth of Independent States (CIS) and the Col- dency.38 With his dissatisfaction with Russia’s lective Security Treaty Organisation, mirroring place in the world in the past and even before the EU and NATO. These institutions were his first term, Putin has expressed concerns that meant to attract the newly independent states, Russia is sliding from the “first echelon of preserve Russia’s military influence and stop states” and that the West will leave Russia be- these countries from joining European and hind.39 Political elites and state-controlled me- transatlantic alliances. The CIS was a platform dia nurtured the development of this sentiment for Russia to push for joint armed forces and as it provided a purpose and justification for border control. When this proved to be of lim- Russia to launch international conflicts. Anti- ited success, Moscow relied on the Collective westernism is a source of dignity among ordi- Security Treaty Organisation (CSTO) and bilat- nary Russians. It means considering oneself eral agreements for military and security coop- more canny than wealthy westerners, being able eration between Russia and Armenia, Belarus, to circumvent obstacles, to bribe, and survive Kyrgyzstan, Kazakhstan and Tajikistan.35 The hardship in a country that provides an abun- CSTO allowed Russia to base its military in dance of the latter. This kind of sentiment helps participating states and at the same time to the public to focus on the outside culprit and avoid foreign bases, but organisationally con- foster national pride, instead of challenging the tinues to be weak.36 The relationship between corrupt state and governance problems inside the US and Russia became increasingly stale the country. It also assists the authorities to

34 William H. Hill, ‘Kennan Cable No. 57: Rethinking https://www.russiamatters.org/analysis/russia-and-col- U.S. Policy for Russia – and for Russia’s Neighborhood lective-security-why-csto-no-match-warsaw-pact. 37 | Wilson Center’, accessed 8 December 2020, Ibid. 38 See for example the growth of number of mentions of https://www.wilsoncenter.org/publication/kennan-cable- the word “Russophobia” in Russian MID, RT and Sput- no-57-rethinking-us-policy-russia-and-russias-neighbor- nik @DFRLab, ‘#PutinAtWar: How Russia Weapon- hood. ized “Russophobia”’, Medium, 15 February 2018, 35 Ibid. https://medium.com/dfrlab/putinatwar-how-russia- 36 Dmitry Gorenburg, ‘Russia and Collective Security: weaponized-russophobia-40a3723d26d4. Why CSTO Is No Match for Warsaw Pact | Russia Mat- 39 https://www.belfercenter.org/sites/default/files/leg- ters’, Russia Matters, 2020, acy/ files/electionbulletin1-00.doc.

20 Adamski, Pundziūtė-Gallois, Liekis, Rusinaitė, Wyciszkiewicz remain in power. In the end, they are the only ones who can act to address the Western con- spiracy against Russia.

The European security Treaty was a Russian proposal promoted and distributed in 2008-2009 to create a new treaty that would encompass all existing security-related organisations in Europe including NATO and CSTO. The goal of this initiative was to: • Undermine the role of NATO by creating a new security organisation of which NATO would part and only have a partial say in the security of its allied states. • Contain NATO enlargement by guaranteeing what Russia calls “equal security” for all. Any NATO enlargement could be treated as threatening “the security of other parties to the Treaty”. • Create the opportunity to hinder and retard any decisions of current Alliance partners and Russian adversaries by having to take into account the Russian position on any security devel- opments in the region and not “ensuring one’s own security at the expense of others”. • Decision-making in alliances is a slower process than within states. By engaging countries into additional organisation structures, in the case of conflict Russia would be able to slow down decision-making. NATO and the US reacted to this treaty by stating that existing treaties and agreements are enough to address Russia’s concerns.

Figure 1. The European Security Treaty

Putin’s Munich Security Conference speech in the Soviet Union. After the first ten years of in- 2007 is considered to be a milestone reflecting stability due to economic reforms and new po- Moscow’s increasingly antagonistic approach litical structures, ordinary Russians were towards the West. Putin invoked tropes that are searching for anchoring and stability, and Pres- still reiterated today by Russia’s high-level of- ident Putin was ready to offer this. In his 2005 ficials and experts, including those on the al- address to the nation, Vladimir Putin said that leged broken promises of NATO not to include the collapse of the Soviet Union “was the great- new members, shattering the foundations of Eu- est geopolitical catastrophe of the century” and ropean security architecture and arms control, that it had fostered separatist movements inside and so on. Russia (referring to Chechnya), while leaving In Russia, anti-westernism has gone in parallel other ‘countrymen’ outside the borders of the 40 with the return of positive sentiment towards Russian Federation. Positive sentiment to- wards the Soviet Union helped to reinforce the

40 ‘Putin: Soviet Collapse a “Genuine Tragedy”’, NBC News, accessed 8 December 2020, https://www.nbcnews.com/id/wbna7632057.

21 CHALLENGES TO THE EUROPEAN SECURITY ARCHITECTURE idea of spheres of influence and present this seek Western alliances. This did not play to the idea as a historic legacy of decades of Mos- favour of President Barack Obama Administra- cow’s rule. Moreover, it gave the grounds for tion’s ‘reset’ of relations with Russia. Although the narrative of ‘defending the rights of compat- the ‘reset’ produced outcomes, such as New riots’ that was actively used in wars in Georgia START – a nuclear arms reduction treaty, joint and Ukraine to legitimise invasions. According actions against Iran and North Korea and US to this narrative, those who were living in now support for Russia to join the WTO, it did not independent states were not their citizens, but resolve fundamental disagreements on the sov- descendants of Soviet rule, and thus subjects of ereignty of the states that Moscow considers its Russia. region of “privileged interests”.41 Putin’s strong ambition at Russia’s great power Russia’s efforts to control these states and their status, and therefore his discontent with EU and alliances quickly escalated from persuasion to NATO enlargement, led to new policy pro- coercion to war. In the decade after the Orange posals. By the time Russia had put forward the Revolution in 2004, Ukrainians proved that idea of the European security Treaty aiming to their pro-Western path was not some political limit NATO accessions (see Figure 1) in 2008, vision cooked up in political chambers, but that it was already clear that Russia was looking for it had genuine societal support. When in 2013 legal and illegal channels to undermine popular the President of Ukraine Viktor Yanukovich, pro-Western sentiment in Ukraine and Georgia without any prior notice, refused to sign the EU and retain its political grip. In 2003, Georgia Association Agreement in Vilnius, crowds de- was swept up by the Rose Revolution and manding his resignation poured into the streets. openly changed its course towards the West, In the coming month, protests escalated into pursuing Euro-Atlantic and European integra- what is now known as Euromaidan. Once the tion. Ukraine chose the same vector following Ukrainian Parliament voted to depose Yanuko- the 2004 Orange Revolution. The aspirations of vich, masked men without insignia captured the these countries to join NATO became a major Supreme Council of Crimea and main infra- problem for Russia. By 2008, Russia was at a structural points. An illegal referendum was crossroads with Georgia over the NATO Mem- held for Crimea to join Russia, and the rest as bership Action Plan, which Georgia was ready they say is history. to actively pursue. As a response, Russia in- Contrary to the Russian strategic narrative, vaded Georgia under the pretext of defending Russia did not resort to violence in reaction to South Ossetia and Abkhazia de facto controlled what the West has been doing in Europe, but by Russia. due to its own limited capabilities to match the The EU launched its Eastern Partnership format goals of great power domination and a lack of while Russia was grappling with its collapsed resources to achieve these goals. This discrep- policy efforts to persuade or force states not to ancy led to Russia’s overuse of coercion and

41 William H. Hill, ‘Kennan Cable No. 57: Rethinking https://www.wilsoncenter.org/publication/kennan-cable- U.S. Policy for Russia – and for Russia’s Neighborhood no-57-rethinking-us-policy-russia-and-russias-neighbor- | Wilson Center’, accessed 8 December 2020, hood.

22 Adamski, Pundziūtė-Gallois, Liekis, Rusinaitė, Wyciszkiewicz kinetic power resulting in the further fostering loans for much needed urbanisation. Forming of grey zones across Europe in Donetsk, partnerships based on collective security and Luhansk, Crimea and Transnistria.42 Without a good will has not been among Russia’s recognised legal status and amidst Russian strengths either, and its proposed unions did not meddling, all of these continue to be a source of attract sufficient interest among the states these political turmoil for the states to which these re- initiatives were directed at. Moreover, Western gions formally belong. Locked in frozen con- sanctions curbed Russia’s economic ambitions flict, these states cannot realistically pursue in Europe and its green course continues to military or economic alliances. challenge Kremlin’s influence through natural Lessons learnt over the competition of influ- fuels. ence on what Russia considers its zone of inter- Political actors in Europe and the transatlantic est were enshrined into strategic documents of space should be cautious when considering the Russian Federation. For example, the 2011 “Russian interests”, because frozen conflicts Military Doctrine of the Russian Federation are just one example of how strategic narratives considers events in other sovereign states as key transcend rationalisations and begin to consti- developments for the Russian Federation. Regi- tute reality. The narratives that Russia is con- me change that is not in Russia’s interests, structing are not based on historical legitimacy, NATO enlargement and any military reinforce- nor are they the natural course of things, but ra- ments43 that would challenge Russian aims for ther, the decisions of the Russian political es- strategic dominance are all considered signifi- tablishment. Decisions that were made, and cant threats to Russia. Not only are these threats have been echoed by the political apparatus for beyond the actual mandate of governance of the decades at the expense of international law, the Russian Federation, acting on them with mili- sovereignty of other states and the image of the tary force is against the UN Charter, which EU and NATO. In the following sections, we grants the right of self-determination. propose to take a closer look at four Russian Great power ambitions are deemed to leave strategic narratives on European security. Russia in discontent, if its offer for partnerships will continue to be limited to industries of war Tools for strategic narration and natural resources. Besides arms sales, mili- tary assistance and cheap oil, Russia has little In the following sections we will identify narra- else to offer to its clients and partners. This has tives relevant to the Baltic States and Poland become all the more evident amid the backdrop that Russia employs to explain its identity, por- of China’s growing role, for example, in Africa, tray the international system and problematise where it secured a strong foothold by providing different aspects of international relations. As

42 ‘Life in the Grey Zones’, ECFR, accessed 9 Novem- Обороны Российской Федерации’, accessed 9 No- ber 2020, https://ecfr.eu/spe- vember 2020, https://doc.mil.ru/documents/ex- cial/life_in_the_grey_zones/. tended_search/more.htm?id=10363898@egNPA#txt. 43 See 8, 9, 12 in ‘Военная Доктрина Российской Фе- дерации На Период До 2020 г. : Министерство

23 CHALLENGES TO THE EUROPEAN SECURITY ARCHITECTURE we saw in the previous sections, Russia uses discussed. The thematic aspects of these narra- strategic narratives to explain its role in interna- tives are central to this analysis, however the in- tional events, explain the nature of these events tegral parts of how these narratives enter into and the nature of their adversary, all for the pur- the living space of politics are their vocabulary pose of shaping the perceptions of policy elites. and internal structure, as well as where, when In this chapter, the topical structure of the Rus- and by whom they are promoted. sian narratives relevant to the Baltic and Polish . political landscape and defence will be

Figure 2. Number of English language papers and reports published by the main think tanks in 1998‒2019

Russian policy elites use loaded vocabulary, meant to shape the perceptions towards the which has an important role in shaping percep- states in question as generic territorial units, tions and putting political and military events stripped of identity, statehood and political sub- into contexts that serve in Russia᾿s favour. For jectivity, and thus unworthy of sovereignty and example, the Russian use of the term “NATO participation. It reinforces Russia’s general expansion” implies that NATO pursues expan- ideas about world order dominated by great sionist policies in Europe. In the Russian polit- power competition ical and historical discourse, expansion Outside Russia these ideas are promoted by the ‘экспансия’ often bears military and proactive highest-level officials, their ‘twiplomacy’, as connotations and thus helps to show NATO as well as a plethora of think tanks and security an aggressor. To further victimise its own posi- and foreign policy experts. Since 2014, Russia tion, Russia uses terms such as “Russophobia”, has also invested immensely in the internation- which reinforces the idea of Russia as a victim alisation of its think tanks and their networks. of Western conspiracy. To foster the idea of it- They are an important venue for Russia to shape self as a great power, Russia reinforces on oth- perceptions about itself, its perceived adversar- ers ideas encoded in the “zones of privileged in- ies, the world order as well as the main inter- terest” and “contact zones”. Such terms are

24 Adamski, Pundziūtė-Gallois, Liekis, Rusinaitė, Wyciszkiewicz national events. In Figure 2, where the number number of English language publications are of English language publications (reports and the RIAC (Russian International Affairs Coun- papers) in the Russian language are detailed, we cil) and the Valdai Club, whose output concerns can see that numbers increase firstly after the over two thirds of the overall English language 2009 Russo-Georgian war and a dramatic rise production among the main think tanks in Rus- can also be observed after the start of the 2014 sia. Russo-Ukrainian war. The main leaders in the

Figure 3. Proportion of English language reports and policy papers compared to other think tanks in Russia.

Repetition is an important tool in pushing for- seeking to curtail the activities of other actors. ward strategic narratives, so experts and policy The first narrative that we analyse deems Eu- elites promote these ideas not only through their rope to be in a security crisis, the following nar- own channels, but also through multiple plat- rative ascribes the blame for this crisis to forms and venues where representatives of the NATO. The third narrative that we will analyse West and Russia meet under the guises of en- helps Russia argue its ‘zone of influence’ con- gaging in an open evidence-based expert dis- ception, while the fourth helps to portray small cussion. states as incapable and unworthy of self-deter- Central to these narratives is the portrayal of the mination. international system as being in crisis and the aim to rehabilitate Russia as a constructive and peace-seeking actor, while at the same time

25 CHALLENGES TO THE EUROPEAN SECURITY ARCHITECTURE

Narrative 1. European security power, project positive intentions, portray the architecture is in crisis West as in crisis, muddle the discourse about Russian infringements of international law, and In different iterations of this narrative, pro- diminish trust in NATO.45 Kremlin political elites and experts claim that According to this narrative, the international arms control treaties, agreements and confi- system in Europe is infested with speedy mili- dence building measures were essential in tarisation, which jeopardises the entire political maintaining peace in Europe and the sphere of climate in Europe and increases unpredictabil- security predictable, but today they have either ity. When faced with this narrative on the inter- fallen apart or are in the process of disintegra- national system, it is important to remember the tion, thus Europe needs new treaties and/or con- sources of unpredictability in Europe. Namely, fidence building measures. If new arms control the Russian invasion of Georgia in 2008 and the regimes cannot be introduced, the spectrum of 2014 Crimean annexation and ongoing military political consequences in this narrative ranges support for armed formations in Donbass, as from the inadvertent collision between NATO well as fostering grey zones such as Transnis- and Russia,44 to failing to return to the golden tria, Donbass and Crimea. Greater unpredicta- age of predictable European security. bility is accumulating in Belarus, where in the Since Russia has either repeatedly broken the autumn of 2020, Russia flew in propagandists agreements in question or withdrawn from from the state-funded broadcaster RT to help them, to support the narrative it has put forward with information work and to rapidly increase new proposals. Among them were the European the scope and duration of the military exercises security Treaty, various adaptations of existing amid the 2020 political crisis. arms control treaties and Yalta 2. The latter is On the broader spectrum of political pledges an idea that has been reiterated multiple times and binding and non-binding commitments, by central Russian political figures in their Russia has repeatedly ignored principles of in- statements since 2014 for the US and Russia to ternational conduct, such as the NATO-Russia meet in a similar manner as they did after World Founding Act of 1997 and the Helsinki Docu- War II and divide spheres of influence amongst ment of 1992. Russian arguments about the themselves. need to return to these or other good-will inter- The main functions of the European security national order principles46 that it has already ig- Crisis narrative is to project Russia as a great nored seeks to establish Russia as a constructive

44Recommendations from an Experts’ Dialogue: De-Es- Miskimmon and Ben O’Loughlin, ‘Russia’s Narratives calating NATO-Russia Military Risks’, accessed 27 of Global Order: Great Power Legacies in a Polycentric January 2021, https://www.europeanleadershipnet- World’, Politics and Governance 5 (29 September work.org/group-statement/nato-russia-military-risk-re- 2017): 111, https://doi.org/10.17645/pag.v5i3.1017. duction-in-europe/. 46 For example, this kind of narrative is reiterated in the 45 In this and further analysis of particular strategic nar- introduction of this article: Rachel Ellehuus and Andrei ratives we employ the main elements of the analytical Zagorski, ‘Restoring the European security Order’, framework proposed by Ben O’Loughin and Alister CSIS, 2019 https://csis-website-prod.s3.amazo- Miskimmon. We analyse these strategic narratives tak- naws.com/s3fs-public/publication/190313_Ellehuu- ing into account Russian narration of the self, the inter- sandZagorski_RestoringEuropeanOrder.pdf national system and its issues or problems. See Alister

26 Adamski, Pundziūtė-Gallois, Liekis, Rusinaitė, Wyciszkiewicz and peaceful force, diverting attention from its modernising existing arms control arrange- malign actions. It portrays Russia as the party ments, confidence and security-building seeking order, justice and dialogue amid an in- measures. ternational system that is driven by unconscious It seems contradictory for Russia to violate fears and infested by anarchy and uncontrolled arms control agreements and then complain militarisation. about the lack of predictability in security archi- Concerns regarding European security architec- tecture.50 After all, Russia was suspected of in- ture help Russian political elites to portray Rus- fringing a majority of them. Among many ex- sia as a great power. Withdrawing from inter- amples is Russia’s undermining of the Vienna national agreements in the long term could Document. The Vienna Document, as a set of leave Russia without a stake in this architecture, confidence and security building measures, is thus it wants to be seen as pursuing new agree- the main document ensuring military transpar- ments. It is also eager to participate in New ency. Every year, 56 states exchange infor- START, which helps it to be seen as a peer to mation about their armed forces, major weapon the US,47 but also arguably might provide ways and equipment systems. Nevertheless, it is for Russia to influence the political situation, more complex than just an exchange of infor- especially if key agreements are to expire dur- mation. It provides for the inspection, notifica- ing the US election period, as was the case with tion and observation of major military activi- New START in 2020. ties, verification and risk reduction mecha- Despite the high-level Russian claims for the nisms. Russia has not updated its Vienna Doc- need to reform and safeguard the European se- ument since 2011 and has effectively under- curity architecture48 and provide “equal secu- mined its provisions in the past to conceal the rity guarantees for all”49 (see Figure 1. The Eu- real scope of deployments near the Ukrainian 51 ropean Security Treaty), Russia in fact limits its border in 2014. Russia continues to refuse to own transparency and refuses to discuss update the Vienna Document posing purely po- litical conditions for the EU and NATO to

47 Kristin Ven Bruusgaard, ‘Russia Killed Arms Con- https://www.mid.ru/web/guest/foreign_policy/news/- trol. Why Does It Want to Keep New START?’, Bulle- /asset_publisher/cKNonkJE02Bw/content/id/317770 tin of the Atomic Scientists (blog), 5 February 2020, and Dmitry Medvedev’s Speech at the Meeting with https://thebulletin.org/2020/02/russia-killed-arms-con- German Political, Parliamentary and Civic Leaders trol-why-does-it-want-to-keep-new-start/. http://web.ar- 48 For one of the early sources of this discourse, see Ser- chive.org/web/20080922031348/http:/www.krem- gey Lavrov’s speech for the European Business Associ- lin.ru/eng/speeches/2008/06/05/2203_type82912type82 ation in the Russian Federation: роль сотрудничества 914type84779_202153.shtml россия-ес и бизнес-сообществ сторон в условиях 50 Kristin Ven Bruusgaard, ‘Russia Killed Arms Con- финансово-экономического кризиса и оценка trol. Why Does It Want to Keep New START?’, Bulle- потенциала взаимодействия на европейском tin of the Atomic Scientists (blog), 5 February 2020, континенте на среднесрочную перспективу https://thebulletin.org/2020/02/russia-killed-arms-con- https://aebrus.ru/up- trol-why-does-it-want-to-keep-new-start/. load/iblock/222/2222825d72cbacf47e966f8927ee50ce.p 51 Ariana Rowberry, ‘The Vienna Document, the Open df Skies Treaty and the Ukraine Crisis’, Brookings (blog), 49 Ibid., and for similar wording, also see: Интервью 30 November 1AD, https://www.brook- Министра иностранных дел России С.В.Лаврова ings.edu/blog/up-front/2014/04/10/the-vienna-docu- финской газете «Хельсингин Саномат», опублико- ment-the-open-skies-treaty-and-the-ukraine-crisis/. ванное 9 ноября 2008 года

27 CHALLENGES TO THE EUROPEAN SECURITY ARCHITECTURE change their policy towards Russia adopted af- instrument to serve its best interests. It is very ter 2014, namely political and economic sanc- likely that Russia is pushing for new arms con- tions and NATO’s reinforcements in the Baltic trol regimes and with lower thresholds than cur- States and Poland. As Russia calls it – the ‘con- rently exist, in the hope that the European and tainment’ policy. Russia has also withdrawn American sides will honour them based on po- from the CFE in order to modernise its own litical culture and in anticipation of the political army and breached the INF by developing and costs within the alliance and inside countries, deploying missiles forbidden by the treaty.52 while Russia will continue its modus operandi Putin’s proposal on the moratorium for the de- of breaching international law and coming up ployment in Europe of intermediate and shorter with explanations later (see Chapter I, “Russian range missiles regulated by the INF serves only International Law”). to legitimise its already deployed weapon sys- In summary, the European security architecture 53 tems and curb possible NATO deployments in Crisis narrative is aimed to increase Russia’s 54 the future. prestige, portray Russia as a constructive peace- To foster a sense of emergency that is encoded seeking actor, expose the international system in the usage of the word “crisis” and increase as being caught up in a militarisation crisis, and perceived costs for the West for ignoring Rus- promote the need for Europe to become en- sia, supporters of this narrative communicated gaged in new arms control regimes with Russia. the increased danger of further arms prolifera- tion and the obstruction of means for the peace- In a nutshell: ful resolution of conflicts in Europe. However, • European security architecture is col- despite the differences in political culture in lapsing. Russia and the West, Euro-Atlantic countries • Termination of the main arms control and alliances should not succumb to these treaties is leading to rapid militarisation. threats. • This is a threat to the entire European political system and to peace in Europe. Given the recent history of Russia᾿s violation of • New Russian-proposed treaties must re- international agreements and exploiting loop- place dysfunctional treaties. holes in military transparency regimes, it is very Lobbying activities: proposal Yalta 2, Euro- likely that Russia is pursuing new arms control pean security Treaty, proposals for new regimes in its hopes to contain the West. While CBMs, communication using think tanks and the Euro-Atlantic block politically relies signif- expert forums icantly on law and the political cost of breeches, Forms of pressure: military intervention in Russia understands international law as an Crimea, military support for armed

52 ‘U.S. Withdrawal from the INF Treaty on August 2, России, accessed 15 November 2020, http://krem- 2019’, United States Department of State (blog), ac- lin.ru/events/president/news/64270. cessed 15 November 2020, https://www.state.gov/u-s- 54 Artur Kacprzyk, ‘Russian Proposal to Limit (U.S.) withdrawal-from-the-inf-treaty-on-august-2-2019/. Missiles in Europe’, PISM The Polish Institute of Inter- 53 ‘Заявление Владимира Путина о дополнительных national Affairs (blog), accessed 15 November 2020, шагах по деэскалации обстановки в Европе в усло- https://pism.pl/publications/Russian_Pro- виях прекращения действия Договора о ракетах posal_to_Limit_US_Missiles_in_Europe. средней и меньшей дальности (РСМД)’, Президент

28 Adamski, Pundziūtė-Gallois, Liekis, Rusinaitė, Wyciszkiewicz

formations in Donbass, non-compliance seizing foreign territories or markets and thus with the INF, selective implementation of has a negative connotation. By using such ter- the Vienna Document and Open Skies minology, Russia is trying to discredit the ac- Treaty, etc. tive and decisive role of national governments Possible effects: weakening NATO, sowing in seeking NATO membership, and in turn pro- disagreements between NATO allies, ob- motes the image of NATO actively seizing for- scuring the aims of Russian claims, mud- eign territories. The proponents of this narrative dling sincere diplomatic efforts. claim that while NATO promised not to “ex- pand” two decades ago, it did so nonetheless Narrative 2. The US / and and at the expense of Russian interests. NATO / are destabilising the Narrators claim that US withdrawal from the region INF is allegedly is “leading to a new arms race”,55 that US sanctions imposed after the an- This narrative claims that the United States and nexation of Crimea divide the world into do- NATO are destabilising the international order mestic (the West) and foreign (those under and the European security system by acting ag- sanctions) parties, and that sanctions against gressively towards Russia. The international Russia are detrimental to the West itself.56 Ac- system, and in particular the European Union, cording to this narrative, the US is allegedly are portrayed here as vulnerable and unstable. disrupting regional security by militarising the Some popular tropes of this narrative include Baltic States and Poland, using NATO as its “NATO expansion”, statements that sanctions puppet and, in violation of the NATO-Russia on Russia are detrimental for Europe, and the Founding Act, is deploying troops in East Cen- lack of dialogue with Russia. Using this narra- tral Europe, and is generally fuelling anti-Rus- tive, Russia seeks to weaken sanction regimes sian sentiment in Europe.57 and weaken Western alliances. This narrative communicates that Russia is the The “NATO expansion” trope is the most pop- alleged victim of aggressive Western foreign ular one behind the argument of destabilisation policy and wrong impressions, while all it is in Europe. The term ‘expansion’ deserves spe- truly seeking is to engage in a constructive dia- cial attention: while in English it has a rather logue.58 After the wars it started in Europe, Rus- neutral meaning, in Russian ‘экспансия’ means sia faces the problem of its own image, which it

55 Владимир Батюк, ‘Выход США Из Договора Profsoyuznaya St, Moscow, 117997, Russian Federa- РСМД Приведёт к Новой Гонке Вооружений’, Клуб tion, 2017), https://doi.org/10.20542/978-5-9535-0524- «Валдай», accessed 20 November 2020, https://ru.val- 6. daiclub.com/a/highlights/vykhod-ssha-iz-dogovora- 57 Софья Владимировна Астахова, ‘Страны Балтии в rsmd/. Противостоянии «российской Угрозе»’, Россия и 56 Primakov National Research Institute of World Econ- Новые Государства Евразии, Имемо. Хроника, со- omy and International Relations, Russian Academy of бытия, комментарии, 2015, 91–97. Sciences (IMEMO), 23 Profsoyuznaya St, Moscow, 58 Charap, Samuel, Alyssa Demus, Jeremy Shapiro, 117997, Russian Federation and A. Zagorskii, Russia in James Dobbins, Andrei Zagorski, Reinhard Krumm, et the European Security Order (Primakov National Re- al. ‘Getting Out From’, 8 March 2018, search Institute of World Economy and International https://www.rand.org/pubs/conf_proceed- Relations, Russian Academy of Sciences (IMEMO), 23 ings/CF382.html

29 CHALLENGES TO THE EUROPEAN SECURITY ARCHITECTURE tries to solve by shifting the blame onto the Europe. Against the provisions of international United States and NATO for alleged militarisa- law, its portrayal of the international system tion of the Baltic Sea Region. Looking at the serves the imperial narrative, claiming that the militarisation of Kaliningrad, it is clear that world revolves around the needs and ambitions Russia is not trying to hold on to provisions of great powers. Implicitly, this narrative seeks from the NATO-Russia Founding Act, such as to portray new NATO member states as lacking “refraining from the threat or use of force autonomy and historically dependent on so- against each other as well as against any other called big players. Some versions are directly state, its sovereignty, territorial integrity or po- aimed at discrediting NATO both inside and litical independence”.59 By doing so, Russia outside the alliance. aims to shift focus from its own digressive im- The proponents of this narrative reinforce the age and to stimulate divisions within NATO, Russian promulgated trope that the West needs the main security guarantor in Europe, whereas a dialogue with Russia. The main aim of this Russia is interested in diminishing trust in part- trope is to maintain all the benefits of the an- nerships and sowing disagreements. nexation and wars and to simultaneously This narrative portrays the international system weaken support for sanctions. In order to kick- as “Russophobic” and undeservedly hostile to- off this “dialogue”, Russian politicians have wards Russia. According to this narrative, it is been known to approach world leaders with not Russia who is the aggressor and revisionist lists of demands under which “dialogue” will be actor in Europe, but it is the West that is engag- possible.62 The fact is that the West has been in ing in historical revisionism using the Eastern dialogue with Russia since the 1990s. In these Partnership format.60 Other iterations literally circumstances, sanctions are a response to Rus- shift the blame for the annexation of Crimea sia, and should be also considered as dialogue. and war in Ukraine to the West, claiming that if Critical, painful, but a dialogue nevertheless, the West had been attentive to Russian needs, because it fulfils the major function of com- this never would have happened. According to municating the position of the West to Russia this narrative, the international system is actu- and invites Russia to respond. ally arranged by the needs and aspirations of great powers, as dictated by the narratives of In a nutshell: Brussels or Washington.61 • Shifting the blame for instability in Eu- The political goals of this kind of narrative are rope from Russia to the US and NATO. multifaceted. In particular, it seeks to challenge • Claiming that the US is destabilising the the unity of Western alliances and form a nega- international system by withdrawing from arms control treaties. tive opinion about the US and its motives in

59 NATO, ‘Founding Act on Mutual Relations, Coopera- 61 Brussels and Washington dictate are reacurring tropes tion and Security between NATO and the Russian Fed- in Russian state funded disinformation publications. eration Signed in Paris, France’, NATO, accessed 10 62 ‘D. Grybauskaitė: nuo pat pirmo susitikimo su V. December 2020, http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/offi- Putinu gavau Rusijos reikalavimų sąrašą’, DELFI, ac- cial_texts_25468.htm. cessed 16 November 2020, 60 Ibid. p. 9 https://www.delfi.lt/a/75646337.

30 Adamski, Pundziūtė-Gallois, Liekis, Rusinaitė, Wyciszkiewicz

• Sanctions on Russia are undermining se- “Russian substrate”. The narrative of its sphere curity in Europe. of influence regarding the Baltic States is his- • NATO ‘expansion’ is eroding European torically legitimised by conquests or trade-offs security architecture. with the Russian Empire and occupation by the Lobbying activities: the European security Soviet Union. The developmental argument is Treaty, a moratorium on INF range missiles. that the Baltic States became viable economi- cally and politically and their identity was con- Forms of pressure: expulsion of Western diplomats from Russia, support for anti-Eu- structed as a result of the benevolence of impe- ropean parties in the European Union, in- rial Russian policies. Finland᾿s affiliation with terference in US elections, etc. the Russian Empire and the Finlandisation nar- Possible effects: undermines confidence in rative function as a positive example of bilateral Europe in the US and NATO, sows disagree- relations between Russia and other states, and ment among allies. Proposes to doubt US serves as a precedence which has helped to sta- motives in Europe. Supports the Russian bilise the international situation. mantra – “The West and Russia need dia- logue “. This narrative primarily establishes Russia as a superpower, whose sovereignty transcends the sovereignty of other, smaller states and turns Narrative 3. The Russian them into spheres of influence. This type of sphere of influence identity narrative helps to project Russia as a great power. With the end of the bipolar world The narrative of Russia's sphere of influence order and the emergence of greater fluidity, and states that Ukraine, Georgia, Belarus, Moldova, in the last decade the strong growth of Chinese Azerbaijan, Armenia, etc. are historically influence and also the growing ambitions of within Russia's sphere of influence. Nostalgia Turkey, this kind of narrative projection helps for the long-gone international role and power Russia to maintain its position among the ranks of the Soviet Union is an integral part of this of great powers. This projection is of immense narrative. Its implied meaning is that the alli- importance for Russia under the current leader- ance of countries from the former USSR as well ship. In terms of GDP, the Russian economy is as the former satellites in East Central Europe smaller than the Italian economy and signifi- should compensate against the destructive role cantly smaller than the US economy. Unlike of the US and its allies. China or the United States, which can also For countries in the alleged Russian sphere of make strong use of economic tools to exert in- influence, Russia communicates that it has his- fluence, Russia, due to its limited economic torically always been so – some were patrons, power, is much more likely to use other meth- others were clients. When applied to Ukraine ods such as propaganda, coercion, persuasion, and Belarus, for example, this narrative is based blackmail and war. For Russia, one way to sus- on the idea of Trinitarian Russia, which states tain the narrative of Russia as a great power is that the three countries (Russia, Ukraine, and consistent disrespect of the sovereignty of Belarus) originate from a single ancient smaller, neighbouring states. However,

31 CHALLENGES TO THE EUROPEAN SECURITY ARCHITECTURE conventional wars are expensive endeavours. preparing for this transition by engaging in var- Coercion and meddling are much more finan- ious cooperation formats with China. cially viable for Russia. This narrative implies The main function of this narrative is to justify that the former Soviet states are an area of Rus- breaches of international law by Russia. It func- sian interest and therefore Russia is deemed to tions according to the psychological mecha- systematically seek to influence the ability of nisms of projection, which help to project this 63 these countries to join alliances. thinking onto others and ex-post rationalisation, In explaining the international system, this nar- which helps to justify Russian actions in rative takes the form of imperial geopolitics or Ukraine, Georgia, Belarus and other countries. so-called Realpolitik, which claims that this is (see Chapter I, “Not only cynicism”). the way superpowers act: “values are values, In summary, because the narrative incorporates law is law, but ability to exert power is more implicit agreements on the spheres of influence, decisive”. According to this narrative, it is cus- it is easy to draw parallels between this narra- tomary for great powers to decide the fate of tive and the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact, which other states. While some states succumb to this leaves many countries in Europe with a bad af- explanation, it directly undermines the interna- ter-taste. Dissemination of this kind of narrative tional law-based system and that’s why it does is particularly harmful for all multilateral West- not play into the hands of the transatlantic alli- ern formats, especially NATO and the Euro- ance, the US or the EU, not to mention the pean Union, because it undermines the funda- smaller states. In order for states to have confi- mental principles of international law and inter- dence in the international legal system and national relations – the sovereignty of all states. transatlantic alliances, states should in general It is hard to see how one can reconcile support resign from this narrative. Until now, the narra- for full independence and sovereignty on the tive of Russia᾿s sphere of influence has also one hand, and a self-asserted “privileged inter- helped to maintain the illusion of a bipolar or- est” on the other. The Russian sphere of influ- der, the US and Russia being on the opposite ence narrative also plays an important role in poles of this dichotomy. This is done to elimi- the Kremlin's legitimisation and sustainability, nate other influences from the power narrative, which is portrayed as being directed at restoring such as China. However, there are signs that Russian greatness. this narrative will have to integrate Chinese in- fluence in Europe in the future. Russia is

63 See for example how the following report explains ac- Zagorski-RestoringEuropeanOrder.pdf p.3; or how the cession of the Baltic States to NATO due to the grace of West and Moscow should supply other states with pro- Moscow – Alyssa Demus, Jeremy Shapiro, Samuel posals on their defined aligned/non-aligned status: Charap, James Dobbins, Andrei Zagorski, Reinhard Charap, Samuel, Jeremy Shapiro, John J. Drennan, Krumm, et al. ‘Getting Out From in Between’, 8 March Oleksandr Chalyi, Reinhard Krumm, Yulia Nikitina, 2018. https://www.rand.org/pubs/conf_proceed- Gwendolyn Sasse, et al. ‘A Consensus Proposal for a ings/CF382.html p. 7; or how the following article ex- Revised Regional Order in Post-Soviet Europe and Eur- plains how Moscow should be consulted if other states asia’, 8 October 2019. wish to join alliances: Rachel Ellehuus & Andrei Zagor- https://www.rand.org/pubs/conf_proceed- ski, ‘Restoring the European security Order’, 2019 ings/CF410.html p. 16 https://russiancouncil.ru/papers/CSIS-RIAC-Ellehuus-

32 Adamski, Pundziūtė-Gallois, Liekis, Rusinaitė, Wyciszkiewicz

are not meant to deter Russia, but are intended In a nutshell: to appease the militants in the Baltic States, and ▪ The Baltic States and other countries are that Washington is in fact afraid of the initiative regarded by the RF as sensitive regions, of small countries that can provoke war with a “contact zone”, or even zones of privi- Russia.64 Or that the Baltic States pursue anti- leged interest. Russian sentiments in order to cover their own ▪ All great powers have spheres of influ- 65 ence. poor internal governance. Although it is used ▪ Values are irrelevant in the face of Real- in international relations, this narrative is also politik. well represented in the pro-Kremlin media in multiple tropes of “anti-Russian hysteria” and Lobbying activities: European security Treaty, regional CBMs proposals, NATO has is spiced up with insinuations of the Nazism to reduce its military presence in “the con- that is allegedly popular in the Baltic States and tact zone”. Poland.66 Forms of pressure: a Russia-Belarus Union Promoting the angle of small states stirring con- State, annexation of Crimea, militarisation flict between major players, this narrative reit- of Kaliningrad, maintaining troops in Geor- erates on the main claims within the ‘European gia and Moldova. security architecture Crisis’ and ‘NATO is de- Possible effects: undermines confidence in stabilising the region’ narratives, just with an NATO, the European Union in Eastern Eu- additional twist. According to this narrative, rope and the Baltic States, seeks to impose surely enough, NATO is behind the European restrictions on the NATO presence in Poland and the Baltic States. security architecture Crisis, but it is being pushed by non-constructive Poland and Baltic States, who demand militarisation and alleged Narrative 4. The irrational Russophobia from their allies. This narrative ar- Baltic States and Poland ranges the hierarchy of inferiority in the inter- This narrative implies that small states such as national system, placing Poland and the Baltic Poland or the Baltic States act irrationally and States as inferior to Russia, and further pro- do not understand the logic of international re- motes imperial thinking that fuels the ‘spheres lations. It is alleged that these countries are run of influence’ narrative. It states that small states by militants and seek to poison NATO-Russian are not only non-constructive but are even a de- relations. Some narrative iterations state that bilitating force in foreign relations, and so im- NATO exercises in the Baltic States and Poland plies that to ensure order is maintained, decis-

64 Андрей Андреевич Сушенцов, ‘Союзники Бдят’, И. С Иванов et al., Глобальный прогноз РСМД 2019- Официальный сайт МГИМО МИД России, 2015, ac- 2024, 2019 https://russiancouncil.ru/up- cessed 16 November 2020, load/iblock/992/riac_forecast_2019_2024.pdf . https://mgimo.ru/about/news/experts/269910/. 66 ‘Anti-Russian Hysteria Gave Birth to Daemons Such 65 See for example Софья Владимировна Астахова, as Fascism and Banderism’, EU vs DISINFOR- ‘Страны Балтии в Противостоянии «российской MATION, accessed 16 November 2020, https://euvsdis- Угрозе»’, Россия и Новые Государства Евразии, info.eu/report/anti-russian-hysteria-has-born-such-dae- Имемо. Хроника, события, комментарии, 2015, 91– mons-as-fascism-in-the-baltic-states-and-banderism-in- 97 https://www.imemo.ru/files/File/magazines/ros- ukraine/. sia_i_novay/2015_01/Strany_Balt_Astachova.pdf and

33 CHALLENGES TO THE EUROPEAN SECURITY ARCHITECTURE ions could be passed on to more experienced ac- tors and stable actors (such as Russia, of Lobbying activities: Nord Stream II, the Eu- ropean security Treaty. course). This narrative communicates Russia as more Forms of pressure: historical revisionism to- wards Poland, accusing the Baltic States and worthy of pursuing sovereign foreign policy Poland of Nazism. than other states. To reinforce this narrative, Russia uses different manipulations and distor- Possible effects: marginalising and exclud- ing not only the Baltic States and Poland tions of history, such as, for example, President from security and political arrangements, Putin blaming Poland for provoking the start of but also other small players. World War II, while in reality Poland was crushed by two dictator-led armies: Nazi Ger- many from the one side, and the Soviet Union The way forward from the other. This narrative follows up on all All the above-mentioned narratives feed onto the other narratives mentioned above and ex- each other in order to help strategic elites to ploits the European security architecture Crisis, shape perceptions and foster imagery beneficial zones of influence and US/NATO destabilising to Russian strategic elites. In its narration, Rus- Europe narratives. sia seeks to constrain the decision-making of The aim of this narrative is to marginalise Po- whom it considers its main adversaries in Eu- land and the Baltic States and to dismiss their rope – NATO and the US, while also continuing post-Crimea security worries as exaggerated, to undermine the EU. driven by irrational fears and harmful ideolo- The desire to be recognised as a great power is gies. It seeks to shape EU, allied and US policy a theme running throughout Russian strategic towards these states, in order to discard security narration. It aims to gain regional dominance issues and thus avoid the strategic arms and mil- and prestige by establishing itself as a systemic itary presence of the US and NATO here, while competitor to the US, and thus communicating continuing its own build-up of these measures that its influence in Europe is at par to that of in Kaliningrad. the US. Contrary to Russian statements, the main requirement is not more attention from the In a nutshell: West in the form of engaging in new formats • Only great powers interests are legiti- and agreements, but broadening its influence mate in the international system. networks and factual control of sovereign states • Small states are unable to grasp the logics in what it considers its zone of influence. of an international system. • They are incapable of leading independ- In its strategic narratives Russia seeks to por- ent foreign policy and are dominated by tray itself as a constructive, peaceful and con- Brussels and Washington. cerned actor. It does so to manage its own im- • Political elites in these countries are in- age problem, constituted by numerous infringe- ept and short-sighted, in more radical ments of international law, be it wars, or the use versions - they are infested by Nazism and Russophobia. of forbidden chemical weapons. Russian

34 Adamski, Pundziūtė-Gallois, Liekis, Rusinaitė, Wyciszkiewicz political elites understand that the image of In Europe meanwhile, expressing “grave con- Russia as malign reinforces the support for cern” should no longer be enough. Infringe- sanctions in the West and the overall suspicious ments of international law must bear conse- treatment of Russia. Using strategic communi- quences, otherwise international order risks the cation tools, Russia seeks to shape its image naturalisation of territorial advances and the use abroad, in order to lessen the costs of its malign of chemical weapons, among other malign ac- actions. tivities that hostile actors perpetrate. As a re- Strategic narratives are used by Russia to ex- sponse to the Russian strategic narration of its plain wars and thus to deter both Western alli- malign activities, countries in Europe should ances from enlargement and countries from abandon the idea of guilt symmetry or the so- wishing to join these by pursuing the path of ac- called golden mean fallacy, which claims that cession. They are constituted in a way that en- all parties are equally responsible for the secu- courages doubting that Russia is intentionally rity situation in Europe. The Euro-Atlantic violating international law and the sovereignty community should identify violators of interna- principles of other states, but that rather this sit- tional order and deter them by not only denying uation is a gross misunderstanding and misin- benefits, but imposing costs. Stratcom and terpretation of Russian activities and that it has think tank work in Europe is increasingly im- been the situation created by Western partners portant. And thus, as a part of this work, the out- which pushed Russia to act so. comes of Russian strategic narration in Europe should be acknowledged. The European strate- The current focus of Russian strategic narra- gic narrative should already push beyond cohe- tives is curbing US and NATO military deploy- sion and strategic autonomy, reiterating ments in Europe, which Russia sees detrimental through words and deeds the importance of for its military-strategic position. While more Euro-Atlantic bonds, the primacy of interna- fluid narratives about the need to include Russia tional law and European values. in equal dialogue might have been more suc- cessful in the past, so far, the narrative about the need for demilitarisation has been of limited success.

35 CHALLENGES TO THE EUROPEAN SECURITY ARCHITECTURE

CHAPTER III. EUROPEAN VULNERABILITY TO RUSSIAN NAR- RATIVES AND INFLUENCE ON EUROPEAN SECURITY ARCHI- TECTURE

The narratives that Russia promotes concerning these two countries. Although the European the European security architecture are gaining public space is wider and goes beyond France traction within the Euro-Atlantic space at dif- and Germany, major ideas about the future of ferent levels. Some of the Russian ideas re- European security architecture can be found in sound with the existing thinking within the the debates going on in these countries. Western academic and political circles, others exploit the various geopolitical and societal A possibly lighter American vulnerabilities of the European states. The first vulnerability concerns the shift of American en- engagement gagement within the European security order, The rethinking of the European security order which has sparked debates about the necessity has primarily become relevant since the rise of to adjust the power balance in the continent, and Russian assertiveness in its neighbouring re- rethink alliances and partnerships that Europe gion, but also since the so-called American pol- should strengthen in the Euro-Atlantic area, in- icy of “pivot to Asia” or, today, increasing dis- cluding with one of the largest adjacent powers engagement from numerous theatres in which – Russia. The second vulnerability concerns the the United States had traditionally been present. openness and reception of Russian narratives Ever since President Obama came to office, the within the European academic, political and United States has shown decreasing willingness diplomatic circles. France and Germany are to engage in leadership in different security in- identified here as the two most important places itiatives within the international community. where ideas about the future security of Europe American forces are gradually retreating from are being actively generated. While France is the Middle East and Afghanistan; similarly, the assuming a leading role in the European Union, United States have been criticised for inaction especially since the election of President Em- or only reluctant action in Syria, Libya, Ukraine manuel Macron and after Brexit, Germany is and most recently – Belarus. Some analysts especially active in wider European security fo- suggest that this may be heralding a new era of rums, such as the OCSE or expert discussions, American isolationism or even the revival of also joining France on many initiatives within the Monroe doctrine.67 The presidency of Don- the EU. The future European security architec- ald Trump, marked by sharp criticism of Euro- ture will likely not be possible without taking pean allies, public disavowal of alliances and into account the positions generated within unpredictability, was another acute reminder to

67 Gérard Araud. Passeport diplomatique. Quarante ans au Quai d’Orsay, (Paris : Grasset, 2019), p. 359‒363.

36 Adamski, Pundziūtė-Gallois, Liekis, Rusinaitė, Wyciszkiewicz the European leaders that some kind of capacity capable to defend itself. Furthermore, pundits for autonomous action was necessary. Discus- argue, attempts to redefine NATO’s role have sions about European autonomy are not new, failed too: they have not succeeded to and have been raised since the strengthen a community of liberal and demo- European Union articulated its political dimen- cratic values (Hungary, Poland and Bulgaria are sion with the Maastricht Treaty of 1992. How- drifting away from the rule of law, NATO’s ever, previous European ideas of increasing re- partnerships have failed to substantially sponsibility for its own security and giving it- strengthen stability in Eastern Europe and in the self capabilities to act independently (e.g., the Balkans), nor have the expeditionary missions European security and Defence Initiative of NATO been a success. The continuing Ame- (ESDI), especially the French and British Saint rican engagement in Europe is considered to be Malo Agreement of 1998) were met with scep- a negative incentive for the latter to make an ef- ticism from the United States. Madeleine Al- fort for its own defence, while the expenditure bright, in her famous speech about the “three that the United States dedicates to European se- D’s” warned against de-linking of the ESDI curity guarantees is said to be needed else- 69 from NATO, duplication of existing efforts, where, especially in Asia. and discrimination of non-European allies.68 The official guideline, committing NATO allies Today, on the contrary, the general discourse on to concrete burden-sharing, is the requirement transatlantic relations is increasingly dotted for all to allocate at least 2% of GDP to defence with ideas that the United States should disen- spending. It was first formulated by the allied gage from Europe, especially if the latter does Ministers of Defence in 2006, and later politi- not step-up its responsibility for its own secu- cally confirmed by the Heads of State and Gov- rity. ernment at the Wales Summit in 2014,70 but has The idea of the United States not having to bear had little effect on the budget planning of most responsibility for protecting a rich Europe is NATO members. American dissatisfaction with gaining popularity within the circles of Ameri- the shrinking defence budgets of its European can opinion-makers. The argument is that allies has been voiced rather consistently, but it American engagement in Europe was necessary was most acutely and clearly expressed by Pres- after World War II, as the continent was being ident Donald Trump. He went as far as to in- voke the possibility of the United States to re- threatened by the domination of a single hostile 71 power – the Soviet Union. Today, as the argu- consider American engagement in NATO. ment goes, Russia is not an existential threat to Some Europeans read in these statements the Europe, which is both richer and more militarily

68 Secretary Albright’s remarks to the North Atlantic 70 Funding NATO. Council ministerial meeting, Brussels, 8 December 1998 https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_67655.htm, https://1997-2001.state.gov/state- accessed 20 September 2020. ments/1998/981208.html. 71 Barry Posen, ‘Trump aside, what’s the US role in 69 Barry Posen, op. cit. See also Stephen Walt in The NATO?’, The New York Times, 10 March 2019. Atlantic Council Debate “Should Europe go it’s own https://www.nytimes.com/2019/03/10/opinion/trump- way?”, 17 September 2020. https://www.atlantic- aside-whats-the-us-role-in-nato.html?partner=IFTTT. council.org/event/should-europe-go-its-own-way/.

37 CHALLENGES TO THE EUROPEAN SECURITY ARCHITECTURE fading of American enthusiasm for protecting is especially alarming, as it leaves Europe al- Europe.72 most without a credibly functioning mechanism The election of Joseph Biden to the office of the for arms control. For the Americans, continu- President of the United States is certainly going ous engagement in treaties such as INF or Open to reassure European allies, as the partnership Skies have become obsolete either because of 73 will be more predictable and dialogue will be numerous violations by Russia, and thus fac- normalised. However, it is unlikely that the tual ineffectiveness of the arrangements, or by United States will go back to the intervention- the rapid development of technologies else- ism of the Bush era, or that it will be easy on its where, as in the case of intermediate range mis- European allies concerning their share of resp- siles, which make a bilateral treaty between the onsibility for security in Europe. United States and Russia irrelevant. The neces- sity to involve China in the new generation of The rise of China has been another important arms control has been seriously evoked.74 After factor in reconsidering the American role in Eu- some tergiversations on behalf of the American rope. First, China is becoming a serious factor administration concerning the New START, it in the arms race, pushing the American admin- seems that there will be enough political will to istration to reconsider the arms control agree- try to safeguard this regime.75 Nevertheless, the ments which limit American military potential. question of the future of strategic nuclear arms Second, attention and resources are necessary control will likely remain open. to counter the Chinese potential in the area of emerging threats to security, such as cyber, in- Having said that, American engagement in Eu- formation and economic security. Europe is be- rope is not yet obsolete. Americans are actively coming less of a priority for the United States, working within NATO in looking for arms con- and increasingly – a burden. trol solutions for the European theatre. The Eu- ropean Deterrence Initiative continues to be ro- In parallel, Russia’s place in the American se- bustly funded,76 NATO’s Enhanced Forward curity strategy has been shifting as well. In Presence in the Eastern NATO allies is funct- some areas, such as arms control, this shift is ioning well and is a clear sign that NATO (and especially important to Europe, as it directly the US) is ready to ensure its credibility as a de- concerns its security. The dismantlement of the fence alliance for its members. The American CFE treaty, the INF and the Open Skies treaties

72 ‘Merkel: Europe can no longer rely on US to “pro- the-arms-control-era-washington-and-moscow-beijing- tect” it’, Euractive.com, 11 May 2018, axis-on-a-collision-course-2/#_ednref31. https://www.euractiv.com/section/future-eu/news/mer- 75 Robbie Gramer, Jack Detsch, ‘Trump Fixates on kel-europe-can-no-longer-rely-on-us-to-protect-it/ China as Nuclear Arms Pact Nears Expiration’, Foreign 73 https://www.state.gov/u-s-withdrawal-from-the-inf- Policy, 29 April 2020, https://foreignpol- treaty-on-august-2-2019/; Kingston Reif, Shannon Bu- icy.com/2020/04/29/trump-china-new-start-nuclear- gos, ‘US to withdraw from open skies treaty’, Arms arms-pact-expiration/. Control Association, June 2020 https://www.armscon- 76 Gerda Jakštaitė, ‘The effect of the United States of trol.org/act/2020-06/news/us-withdraw-open-skies- America on the dynamic of transatlantic relations’, in treaty. Česnakas, Giedrius and Statkus Nortautas. Eds. Lithua- 74 R.Lipka, ‘The Demise of the Arms Control Era: nia in the Global Context: National Security and De- Washington and Moscow-Beijing axis on a Collision fence Policy Dilemmas, (Vilnius: General Jonas Course’, Pułaski Policy Paper, 7 (2019), https://pu- Žemaitis Military Academy of Lithuania, 2020). laski.pl/en/pulaski-policy-paper-r-lipka-the-demise-of-

38 Adamski, Pundziūtė-Gallois, Liekis, Rusinaitė, Wyciszkiewicz deployments in Romania, Bulgaria and in Po- harmonious strategic autonomy.80 None of the land show that the United States is still serious European initiatives, conducted independently about the threat that Russia potentially poses to from the United States since the end of the Cold Europe. An alternative opinion in the American War, have produced substantial results (includ- expert community (compared to the one cited ing the meagre outputs of the ESDP and the un- above) is that the transatlantic partnership is certain future of the PESCO). This hypothetical based on a long-term grand strategy which is scenario supposes the risk of Europe becoming about defending a rules-based international or- a zone of instability, which in the long run der that respects democracy.77 Challenges to would become a threat to the United States. transatlantic security are multiple (economic, All these elements, adding to the dynamics of energy, cyber, and political-ideological, i.e., the the debate on transatlantic relations, will be im- rise of autocracies), and should instead trigger portant for the future decisions of European 78 a new transatlantic bargain with a potential re- states in relation to their security. Europeans 79 division of labour rather than a transatlantic may either decide to use the opportunity and divorce. “drift away” from the United States, as sug- Considering the costs of the American disen- gested by France, or to renew their fidelity to gagement from Europe, including symbolic the existing multilateral and transatlantic secu- ones, complete abandonment of Europe is not rity institutions, as wished by Germany. Russia, likely. However, some sort of rebalancing of re- as has been argued in previous chapters, enters sponsibilities is going to be necessary, and the the debate as an object for European discussion primary focus will be on big European powers, (whether it should be engaged or contained), whose military contribution should be more but also as an active participant, promoting its significant. It is good to have the Baltic States own vision of European security. It is important within the “2% GDP” club, but it is not they to see clearly what each of the proposed visions who will bear the burden of European defence. entails, in order to make decisions which would The leadership of the United States will also be best serve European interests. necessary. Some analysts are of the opinion that the Continent, if left on its own by the United In a nutshell: States, would not be able to organise a credible • The United States is increasingly wary of security and defence system, as the perceptions being the single strongest pillar of Euro- of threat and ambitions of different European pean security, but remains an important countries provide for a “strategic cacophony” in ally, still active in the European theatre. • European allies understand the need to defence matters, rather than a possibility for take on a bigger burden for their

77 Daniel Fried. The Atlantic Council Debate “Should Eastern Flank’, Vilnius Institute for Policy Analysis, Europe go it’s own way?”, 17 September 2020 webinar 11 September 2020. https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/event/should-europe- 80 Meijer Hugo and Wyss Marco, ‘L’impossible go-its-own-way/. renaissance de la défense européenne : généalogie d’une 78 Alexander Vershbow, in ibid. cacophonie stratégique’, Le Grand Continent, 9 May 79 Martin Svárovský, ‘Changing Nature of US Global 2019. Leadership: Implications for Resilience in the NATO’s

39 CHALLENGES TO THE EUROPEAN SECURITY ARCHITECTURE

security, although their capacity to do proposals within the EU confirm this idea. The that in the near future remains unclear. early versions of European independent self-or- • American leadership in the transatlantic ganisation go back to the “Confederation” of alliance is still indispensable. 84 Europe – an idea, formulated by François Mit- terand in 1989, of Europe “from Brest to Vladi- vostok”, excluding the United States, and in- France as a leader of the cluding the Soviet Union. Mikhail Gorbachev “European autonomy” at that time had proposed a similar wide-rang- initiative ing cooperation project, called a “New Euro- pean Home”. None of these initiatives, rather The hypothetical prospects of American disen- vague and ill-defined, took root, while the secu- gagement awakens the old discussion of the Eu- rity architecture of Europe started being built on ropean autonomy within the continent. France the existing foundations already anchored in in- is one of the main carriers of this idea, in part, ternational law: the CSCE, the Council of Eu- as a continuation of its Gaullist tradition. The rope, the CEE and NATO. latter suggests that the independent actions of France should not be limited by other external The new proposals of President Macron for Eu- powers, and supposes an inherent scepticism to- ropean security resume similar ideas: they refer wards a lasting American engagement (or tute- to the “sovereignty of Europe”, i.e., the capacity lage) in Europe. Nevertheless, one has to be of the European Union to be an autonomous in- 85 clear, if France has historically been a chal- ternational actor, especially being able to act lenger of the transatlantic relationship, and of- independently from the United States, and pro- ten a difficult one, it has always remained pose the “architecture of confidence and secu- 86 within the Western camp, and has been consid- rity”, involving Russia. These ideas contain ered as such by outsiders, especially Russia.81 several concrete initiatives, but are still suffi- In other words, France seeks to be “allied” but ciently vague to provide opportunity for further not “aligned”82 with the United States. definition and concretisation, leaving a possi- bility for European partners to influence the de- Independence and sovereignty for France trans- velopment of the project. As David Cadier ar- lates itself in different French proposals for in- gues, it is Macron’s typical proposal for a dependence and sovereignty for Europe. In an “work of ideas”, which does not necessarily aim astute analysis, already back in 1990, Ole for immediate results, but nurtures debate.87 Waever argued that France sees Europe as an Nevertheless, French diplomacy has been extension of its own power.83 Many French

81 See: Thomas Gomart, Double détente. Les relations 84 Roland Dumas, ‘Un projet mort-né : la Conféderation franco-soviétiques de 1958 à 1964. (Paris : Publications européenne’, Politique étrangère, 66/3 (Année 2001): de la Sorbonne, 2003). 687‒703. 82 “Amis, alliés, pas alignés” – a phrase attributed to 85 Macron’s speech in Sorbonne 2017: L’initiative pour Hubert Védrine, the French Minister of Foreign Affairs l’Europe. under J. Chirac and collaborator of President F. 86 Macron’s speech to the French ambassadors, 2019. Mitterand. 87 David Cadier, ‘The Macron initiative, the Biden pres- 83 See his ‘Three Competing Europes: German, French, idency and the future of EU-Russia relations’, EUREN Russian’, International Affairs, 66/3 (1990): 477‒493. Brief no. 21, December 2020.

40 Adamski, Pundziūtė-Gallois, Liekis, Rusinaitė, Wyciszkiewicz mobilised to carry the idea of European auton- different from the one often expressed by the omy forward and it is being raised in every-day Russian sceptics, that Russia has no intentions European discussions in Brussels and other Eu- to change, and that dialogue is in vain as long ropean capitals. The French-led European In- as Putin is in power. tervention Initiative, for example, is one such The gradual disengagement of the United States case of the active pursuit of concrete instru- from Europe, and especially the disintegration ments aimed at strengthening European auton- of the arms control regimes, which involve Rus- omous action. sia, and which directly concern European secu- Within the shifting configuration of European rity (especially INF, but also the CFE, and New security, Russia is seen by French decision- START) are cited by President Macron as addi- makers as an important factor. For the French tional evident and urgent reasons to engage political elite, Russia remains an element in the Russia in talks.88 The above-mentioned aver- European security architecture which is impos- sion of France to the processes in which issues sible to side-line. Dialogue is necessary for two that concern its own security are discussed basic reasons: on the one hand, the French do without its participation (i.e., between Russia not imagine a safe and secure Europe in which and the United States) drives the French leader- Russia is marginalised and hostile, and on the ship to be proactive. France as a regional power, other – the view is still alive that Russia is cul- and one with serious military capabilities (the turally close to Europe. President Macron has most important in the EU, after Brexit), includ- mentioned in his public speeches that Russia ing expeditionary capacity, and a nuclear deter- has a European vocation. For both of these rea- rent, also being a permanent member of the sons, according to the French policymakers, it United Nations Security Council, makes it feel is not in Europe’s advantage to alienate or iso- capable of assuming leadership of this kind of late Russia. mission in Europe. The traditional French re- The recently launched attempt to resume dial- serve towards the American role in Europe only ogue with Russia is seen as a necessity and an plays in favour of its current ambitions: France opportunity for an eventual rapprochement be- sees itself as a country which may “help” Eu- tween Europe and Russia, but also – as a basic rope to “distance itself from Washington,” in diplomatic process, which must remain in place the words of the French ambassador Gerard Araud,89 and strengthen European “strategic if war is not an option. The French diplomatic tradition maintains that the process of dialogue autonomy”. The latter, as discussed above, is a and negotiation involves dynamics in which the long-standing French idea, which is unlikely to interests of an opponent and therefore its inten- change even with the arrival of Biden at the tions and actions may be altered, if parties man- helm of the United States. age to enter into an acceptable bargain or seize This means eventually lessening European de- opportunities opened by changing international pendence from America, but not necessarily or domestic circumstances. This view is breaking off the transatlantic link. The trans-

88 Macron’s speech in Ecole Militaire, 2019. 89 Araud, op. cit.

41 CHALLENGES TO THE EUROPEAN SECURITY ARCHITECTURE atlantic alliance, in spite of everything, remains sceptical about Russia, and Emmanuel Macron important to France, and many cooperative pro- has referred to them as “deep state,” urging jects, where necessary, are in place, including them not to resist the presidential initiative to the fight against terrorism, intelligence sharing, re-engage Russia.91 Public opinion has also conducting common military operations, etc. In been largely hostile to Russia and to Putin (es- this sense, the security behaviour of the French pecially because of Russian involvement in is in no way naïve or irrational: on the profes- Syria, and human rights violations, including sional level, it is supported by a realistic and ro- the sorry state of LGBT rights in the country).92 bust assessment of the strategic environment The views within the French public sustain and and adequate planning. The French commit- often inspire French political positions. In gen- ment to the efforts of transatlantic security are eral, the French public is receptive to the human manifest in its return to the NATO military rights and democratic values narrative, alt- command structure in 2009, and in its military hough, at the same time it is critical of Ameri- engagement in the Enhanced Forward Presence can (neo)liberalism and nourishes empathy to- initiative among NATO’s Eastern allies, as well wards those who claim to have been “humili- as participation in the NATO Air Policing mis- ated” by American hegemony. The tradition of sion in the Baltic States. critical thought, importance of the political left, This is also valid in relation to the French pro- including the historical eminence of the social- fessional assessment of Russian resurgence. ist and communist parties in France, philosoph- The annexation of Crimea and the war in Don- ical openness of its elites towards Socialism bass have been considered by the French gov- (Soviet Union) as an alternative political sys- ernment as serious threats to the European se- tem (cf. the famous debate between Jean-Paul curity (although not necessarily seen as a prior- Sartre and Raymond Aron on the Soviet Un- ity). In addition, France is exposed to other ac- ion), makes the French public receptive to Rus- tions of destabilisation, orchestrated by Russia, sian narratives. In this sense, French opinion is in Syria (and in the United Nations on Syrian open to the Russian argument that some respon- issues), in the Central African Republic, in sibility for the failure of the current European Libya, and, not least, in domestic politics.90 security architecture is imputable to the West French diplomacy prides itself on leadership in (Europe, and importantly – the United States). imposing European sanctions on Russia after The narratives supporting the alleged exclusion the annexation of Crimea. Much of the French of Russia from decision-making about the con- diplomatic and military establishment are tinent’s security, and thus its “humiliation”,

90 One would mention here the communication hacks 92 In December 2018 only 27% of the French population during the presidential campaign in 2017, the aggres- had favorable opinion of Putin (only 20% in 2013); 81% siveness of the Russian-sponsored media, called by of respondents thought that the human rights situation President Macron as “agents of influence”, and the defa- was unsatisfactory in Russia, and around 70% thought mation attack on Macron’s candidate at the Paris munic- that Russia was responsible for distribution of “fake ipal elections in 2020. news” and perpetration of cyberattacks in France and 91 Macron’s speech to the ambassadors 2019. Marc elsewhere. Data : Institut d’études opinion et marketing Endeweld. Emmanuel Macron et l’« État profond ». Le en France et à l’international. Monde diplomatique, September 2020. https://www.ifop.com/publication/le-regard-des-fran- cais-sur-la-russie/.

42 Adamski, Pundziūtė-Gallois, Liekis, Rusinaitė, Wyciszkiewicz deception about NATO enlargement, prefer- driven by a pragmatic assessment of real possi- ence by the West of NATO as a military block bilities at different political and administrative instead of OSCE as a wider pan-European se- levels of the State. The foreign policy of France curity organisation, and “side-lining” of Rus- is clearly underpinned by a degree of realism, sian security interests, do find an audience. which is increasingly back in fashion. There- The French political elite has a number of influ- fore, if France is undoubtedly sympathetic to ential “Russophiles” and those who follow the the calls for democracy and freedom of nations Gaullist tradition, critical of American hegem- to choose their security arrangements (e.g., ony (the two positions are not always aligned Ukraine), it will not willingly sacrifice national but often complement one another: if American interests (including economic interests, but also hegemony is to be rejected, Russia may appear the possibility to manage partnership with Rus- as a possible partner for strategic balancing). sia on other international theatres in which Some of these intellectuals, for example, Hu- France is involved politically, economically bert Védrine or Jean-Pierre Chevènement,93 are and militarily) for the sake of an idealist vision considered to be close to Emmanuel Macron, of an expanded Europe. If, to continue with the and supposedly influence presidential policy on example, the problem of Ukraine can be suffi- Russia.94 Russia skilfully uses the French ciently contained with limited engagement, so highly informed and free public space, with its as not to pose a direct threat to French national inclinations for unorthodox thinking, and nour- security and to the cohesion of the EU, further ishes various positions potentially useful to action will not be undertaken. Russia. One of these positions, for example, de- Nevertheless, France is a negotiating partner, plores “occidentalism” – a notion, promoted by demonstrating its openness to dialogue. It often Védrine, according to which the current world acts alone, especially its current President Mac- order is dominated by American ideology and ron (as in the case of accepting dialogue, as a does not take into account the views of those matter of principle, on the Russian proposal of who come from weaker positions (i.e., Rus- the moratorium on intermediate-range missiles sia).95 Another faction of the French elite is fas- in Europe – a dubious suggestion by Putin, crit- cinated by the Russian self-proclaimed mission icised by NATO allies, and later shunned by to defend Christianity, yet others are simply France itself),97 and often appears to take driven by Realpolitik and the interest to pro- French interests for the interests of Europe as a mote economic cooperation.96 whole. However, these are flaws rather of style This being said, despite the loftiness of the than of substance, and many elements show that French ideas, much of French foreign policy is France maintains its pragmatic fidelity to the

93 J.P. Chevenement is identified by Cecile Vaissie as a 96 One such figure is Philippe de Villiers, a politician pro-Russian influencer. and a businessman. See: Cécile Vaissié, Les Réseaux du 94 Among others, Sarkozy and Pierre Vimont are cited. Kremlin en France. Paris : Les petits matins, 2016. 95 Galia Ackerman, Nicolas Tenzer, Françoise Thom et 97 Reuters. Macron prône le dialogue avec la Russie sur Cécile Vaissié, ‘Le discours de Hubert Védrine analysé la maîtrise des armements. 28 11 2019. par des spécialistes, www.political.fr, 18 October 2020. https://www.challenges.fr/top-news/macron-prone-le- dialogue-avec-la-russie-sur-la-maitrise-des- armements_687078

43 CHALLENGES TO THE EUROPEAN SECURITY ARCHITECTURE

Western alliance, and is open for dialogue with traditionally been in the sphere of France’s spe- its European allies if they are ready to propose cial interests. This opens additional opportuni- ideas or at least credibly challenge the French ties to build cooperation with France and, em- ones. ploying skilful diplomacy, to make those inter- French diplomacy is sometimes arrogant, but ests, vital to our region, heard. The opportunity the French political elite may yield to persua- should be seized. Other European allies, espe- sion and honest bargaining with its allies. The cially Germany, can be usefully mobilised for example of recent reactivation in French-Esto- success in this dialogue. nian relations is illustrative: Estonia is one of the rare European states contributing to the In a nutshell: French anti-terrorist operation in Mali, Bar- • France is demonstrating leadership in khane (to be distinguished from the EU mission the efforts for stronger European auton- EUTM). With this Estonia has gained special omy, but is open for input from other EU attention and important political dividends member states. • It harbours ambitions to distance Europe within the French political class. from the United States, although funda- Similar lessons may be drawn from the visit of mentally it remains faithful to the princi- ple of the transatlantic alliance. Emmanuel Macron to Lithuania and Latvia in • France sees Russia as an indispensable the autumn of 2020, where he demonstrated the factor in the European security order, openness of France to the security preoccupat- and prefers to have Russia as a friend, ions of the Baltic States. Countries in the region not as a foe. For this reason, dialogue is should capitalise on ties of positive dialogue es- thought to be indispensable. • The French domestic public is sensitive tablished with France, look for synergies, to Russian claims for an inclusive Euro- where they could work together, and promote pean security order, but is equally at- the ideas which are important to them. The tached to the fundamental democratic “declaration for protection of democracy”, liberal values, on which this order signed on the occasion of Macron᾿s visit, is a stands. case in point: not only does it propose concrete measures to more effectively address the exter- Germany as a leader of nal interference and destabilisation of demo- dialogue on European security cratic processes, but it also strengthens the nar- architecture rative in which democracy is proclaimed as the very foundation of European security. Germany is attached to the current European se- The French aspiration to assume the role of curity order and especially cherishes the trans- leadership in the European Union increases the atlantic link. Recent developments in the US relative importance, and potentially – leverage, and statements made by German leaders that of all EU members, and thus the Baltic States, there is a necessity to start thinking about au- and Poland. This is manifest through the grow- tonomous European action, do not (yet) mean a ing attention that France pays to these countries, paradigm shift. Defence planning documents which (especially the Baltic States) have not continue to reaffirm German reliance on the

44 Adamski, Pundziūtė-Gallois, Liekis, Rusinaitė, Wyciszkiewicz transatlantic link, and on a parliamentary pro- lay in the lack of dialogue with Russia and lack cess for endorsement of German military en- of mutual understanding, then the response gagement.98 This means that Germany remains must be more dialogue. If the real reason is the heavily reliant on American support for its se- Russian one-sided disregard of the established curity and is not ready to be a pro-active secu- rules, then the response must be principled and rity agent in Europe, as its military engagement strict.100 The German public opinion, the expert procedure is slow and military participation is community and the political elite is divided on conditioned on many caveats. In this sense, the the issue.101 German view is different from the French view: German foreign policy thinking is seriously the former is much less keen on distancing Eu- marked by the Ostpolitik tradition which main- rope from the United States. Germany shows tains that peace and stability can be achieved openness to the French proposal of European through dialogue and interdependence, includ- strategic autonomy, but does not seem to have ing advanced economic cooperation. Based on 99 a clear idea of its making. this, Germany has long been open towards dia- In a similar sense, Germany is also attached to logue with Russia, and has traditionally been a multilateralism and the existing elements of the privileged political interlocutor to Russia, not European security architecture, especially least, because of strong business links between OSCE. If France is ready to “think outside” the the countries. Among the political forces, the existing frameworks, for example, by envisag- Social Democratic Party, which is at the origins ing separate and new political-diplomatic plat- of the Ostpolitik, is most strongly attached to it. forms for discussion about European security, The Christian Democratic Union on the right, Germany maintains preference for the existing and especially its long-standing leader Angela international formats, and also, for effective Merkel, has been more inclined to be critical of multilateralism. Russian politics, but has also been an important The current German leadership tends to main- promoter (and participant) of diplomatic en- tain that it is Russia who has violated the rules gagement with Russia. of the European security order, and therefore is The “golden age” of German-Russian relations responsible for the failure of the European se- seems to have reached a tipping-point around curity architecture. The major challenge is to go 2012, when Putin announced his return to the back (bring Russia back) to rules-based security president’s office, which was perceived in Eu- behaviour, although the German elite is still in rope as a cynical and premeditated undemo- discussion over how this should best be done: if cratic plot to maintain power.102 The annexation the deep roots of the decay of the current order of Crimea and the subsequent war in Donbass,

98 Barbara Kunz, ‘Le débat allemand sur la sécurité: 100 Marco Siddi, (2020) ‘A Contested Hegemon? Ger- changement du discours, maintien du paradigme’, many’s Leadership in EU Relations with Russia’, Ger- Politique étrangère, 4 (2015): 91‒101. man Politics, 29/1 (2020): 97‒114. 99 Barbara Kunz, ‘The three dimensions of Europe’s De- 101 Tuomas Frosberg, ‘From Ostpolitik to ‘frostpolitik’? fense Debate’, GMF Policy Brief, 2018, no. 024. Merkel, Putin, and German foreign policy towards Rus- sia’, International Affairs, 92/1 (2016): 21–42. 102 Ibid.

45 CHALLENGES TO THE EUROPEAN SECURITY ARCHITECTURE of course, was a critical blow to German posi- cooperation between Germany and Russia”.104 tive attitudes towards Russia. Instances where This makes Germany one of the more active Russian politicians and diplomats lied to their promoters of dialogue with Russia on European German counterparts (e.g., on the presence of security order, particularly, in search for solu- Russian troops in Ukraine) additionally, and se- tions for arms control. Note, for example, the riously, undermined the relationship of trust. “Steinmeier initiative”, proposed by the social- The consensual politics in Germany makes it so ist German minister of foreign affairs in 2016 that political positions are not radical, but that and aimed at revitalising a structured dialogue they usually converge, even though divergent on conventional arms control within the OSCE. voices, as in any democracy, are always pre- The premise on which this and similar initia- sent. This way, after 2014, the leadership of An- tives are built, in line with the Ostpolitik tradi- gela Merkel in the critical stance on Russia has tion, is that cooperation brings forward more been followed by her social-democratic col- cooperation. This deep-seated conviction that leagues. Society, especially the business com- “to talk” is always better than “not to talk” munity, with the public leadership of the Feder- sometimes frustrates the German allies, who ation of German Industries (BDI), has lined up see few conditions for a fruitful conversation to support the official German policy of sanc- with Russia. Ironically, the letter, published in tions.103 Different strands of German society the Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, in which have reasons to be sceptical towards Russia: the Frank-Walter Steinmeier proposes the above- liberals and the greens criticise the decay of de- mentioned re-launch of arms control dialogue mocracy and the human rights situation in Rus- ends with fatalist words: “It is time to try the sia, while others are alarmed by the violation of impossible...”105 international rules or the blatant cases of prop- There is much to frustrate Germany’s allies in aganda, such as the famous “Lisa story”. The Europe and across the Atlantic. Russia does not recent case of poisoning of the Russian opposi- seem to be willing to cooperate because coop- tion figure Alexei Navalny and the critical reac- eration is simply not advantageous to it. Since tion of the German leadership has clearly the signing of many of the arms control agree- shown a shift in the German Russia policy to- ments in Europe, Russia has advanced in vari- wards stricter relations. ous “gains” in its favour, for example, the con- Nevertheless, the Ostpolitik tradition remains tinuous stationing of military troops in Trans- strong, and continues to be cultivated by differ- nistria, Moldova, the military bases in Abkha- ent German politicians and experts. For exam- zia and South Ossetia regions of Georgia, addi- ple, the agreement of the grand coalition, signed tional deployments in Kaliningrad, production between the CDU-CSU and SPD in 2013, in- of new weapons, and, not least, the annexation cluded a paragraph on the “tradition of of Crimea. Negotiating arms control would

103 Kim B. Olsen, ‘Diplomats, Domestic Agency and the 104 Frosberg, op. cit., p. 28. Implementation of Sanctions: The MFAs of France and 105 Frank-Walter Steinmeier, ‘More security for every- Germany in the Age of Geoeconomic Diplomacy’, The one in Europe: a call for a re-launch of arms control’, Hague Journal of Diplomacy, 15 (2020): 126‒154. Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 26 August 2016.

46 Adamski, Pundziūtė-Gallois, Liekis, Rusinaitė, Wyciszkiewicz mean opening these issues up for discussion, was the Russian proposal for a moratorium on and the discussion would be difficult as Russia the stationing of intermediate range missiles in does not show signs of willingness to go back Europe in 2019. It was proposed by the Presi- to the status quo ante. dent of Russia, thus, by default, had very little Another serious obstacle which makes the ne- concrete details, as is appropriate for high-level gotiations “impossible” (or, in the words of an- initiatives, and was not followed by further other proponent of the re-animation of dialogue specifications. Without these, the proposal with Russia, the French diplomat Pierre Vimont clearly seemed to lack credibility, and indicated – “the work of Sisyphus”)106 is the leverage that rather the Russian willingness to consolidate the European powers would have in such dis- the status quo, at present advantageous to Rus- cussions. If power politics is back in play, any sia, than to genuinely involve Europe in negoti- negotiator needs to strengthen his own position, ations. The response of the NATO allies, in- when engaging in talks with the adversary, or cluding the German government, was sceptical. wait until political conditions are in place to Unwillingness to make genuine and concrete reach a real compromise. Historically, major steps for dialogue from the Russian side, and its deals on arms control have been signed only insistence on maintaining the status quo as an 107 when political tensions were decreasing be- opening position for negotiations shows to tween the adversaries, and it was almost impos- many European practitioners that cooperation is sible to reach a compromise when confronta- not what Russia currently seeks. tion was high. Today, it seems, Europe is in the In addition to the promotion of dialogue with latter situation, and therefore, engaging in dia- Russia on the diplomatic level, Germany is also logue needs to be either based on robust posi- active in sponsoring second-track diplomacy tioning or should simply be postponed. discussions about European security architect- On many aspects of arms control, Russia has ure. The belief in the strength of second track shown unwillingness to reach a compromise, or diplomacy dates back to the Cold War, when is refusing serious dialogue. Russia is shunning the academic and expert community, through any substantial working-level talks on those building bridges, and “better understanding” of arms control arrangements which can be work- the parties, believed to have contributed to the able for all sides, and are not very difficult to thaw between the United States and the Soviet Union. The mechanism is widely supported in tailor to today’s needs, for example, the Vienna Document. At the same time, it dots its diplo- the current crisis of trust between Russia and macy on confidence and security building the West in the hope that the civil society dia- measures with public proposals, which lack de- logue could eventually offer a breakthrough. tail and credibility. One example, cited above, These discussions typically involve “all parties

106 Pierre Vimont, ‘20 ans après Poutine : une conversa- 107 Andrei Kortounov, ‘Contrôle de l’armement. Quatre tion entre Vimont, Tenzer, Ackerman’, Mardi du Grand conseils à Emmanuel Macron’, Le Courrier de Russie, Continent, 03 March 2020 : “…It seems to me that we 16 December 2019, should very modestly imagine a happy Sisyphus, and re- https://www.lecourrierderussie.com/international/2019/ sume our work unperturbed to try to push things for- 12/controle-de-larmement-quatre-conseils-a-emmanuel- ward”. macron/.

47 CHALLENGES TO THE EUROPEAN SECURITY ARCHITECTURE concerned”, and most importantly – Russia. The receptiveness of Russian The German government and the influential narratives on European German funds, such as Konrad Adenauer or security architecture in the Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, support numerous ini- tiatives, where the future of European security West is discussed. These debates include a wide The very openness to dialogue and the willing- range of representatives from expert and aca- ness to understand the deep roots of “Russian demic communities, and, in some cases, acting alienation” in Europe makes the Western public or former government officials. The purpose of receptive to Russian narratives about European such discussions is primarily to listen to all security, as has been largely discussed in previ- sides, to understand the rationale and deep roots ous chapters. As we have seen, Russia frames behind the arguments used in the current Euro- the discussed issues in a specific manner, and if pean confrontation. However, the assumption additional reflection is not done to ascribe ap- that polite talk between experts would escape propriate meanings to the Russian discourse, the politics of conflict, has not been confirmed. the debate can be very misleading. The struc- Second track diplomacy largely takes over and ture of the dialogue itself tilts the balance reproduces the same narratives that are preva- against the Europeans: it is most often con- lent in first track diplomacy, and vice versa. ducted at the initiative of the European side, the latter, represented by liberal democracies, has a In a nutshell: much more developed tradition and acceptance • Germany is attached to the existing mul- of self-criticism, and its political processes are tilateral institutions that underpin the European security order, and still seri- much more open to academic scrutiny than ously relies on American involvement in those in Russia. the Continent. Firstly, while there is agreement that the West- • In relation to Russia, Germany has a strong Ostpolitik tradition, which pro- ern and Russian narratives on European secu- motes dialogue and pragmatic coopera- rity are different,108 Western experts almost ex- tion as catalysts for peaceful relations. clusively take the burden of reconciliation of Therefore, Germany tends to choose di- these narratives upon themselves. For example, alogue even in the hardest of circum- stances. in December 2017, the OSCE network of Think • This makes the country one of the most Tanks and Academic Institutions prepared a active promoters for multi-track engage- study after the encouragement of the German ment with Russia, especially through 2016 OSCE chairmanship, and under the spon- civil society and expert-community de- sorship of the Austrian, German, Swiss, Slovak, bates. Irish and Serbian ministries of foreign affairs, called “The Road to the Charter of Paris. His- torical Narratives and Lessons for the OSCE

108 Wolfgang Zellner (ed.), Security Narratives in Eu- 2017) ; “Back to Diplomacy”. Final Report and Recom- rope: A Wide Range of Views (Baden‐Baden: Nomos, mendations of the Panel of Eminent Persons on Euro- pean security as a Common Project. November 2015.

48 Adamski, Pundziūtė-Gallois, Liekis, Rusinaitė, Wyciszkiewicz

Today”,109 with the aim of finding the historical arguing that the West has treated Russia as a reasons behind the fallout between Russia and loser of the Cold War, and, supposedly, ignored the West. The hypothesis of the study was that its security interests, especially through the “ex- the roots of the disintegration of the current Eu- pansion of NATO”. Any responsibility of Rus- ropean security order lay in the flaws at its his- sia since the 1990s is rarely considered.112 On torical foundations. Typically, the study essen- the contrary, the Russian narrative of its “hu- tially addresses the decisions made by the West, miliation” through the enlargement of NATO and not the Soviet Union or Russia (except for as an “illegitimate” vestige of the Cold War, is Gorbachev’s proposal of a “Common European widespread. home”). It also bases the historical analysis The very nature of these compromise-based mostly on Western historical archives. The ma- texts privilege neutral expressions that do not jor conviction of the authors is that “indivisible deny Russian responsibility for the current cli- security in Europe needs to be built on shared mate of confrontation, but assert that everyone values and objectives together with Russia, not has made mistakes,113 and therefore, everyone 110 against Russia”. This implies that the Euro- is equally responsible for the current situation. pean security architecture has been somehow This brings us back to the “golden mean fal- evolving against Russia, and not vice versa, i.e., lacy”, discussed in the first chapter, which is in- Russian politics evolving against the European evitably accepted by the actors involved. Fol- security architecture and the spirit of Helsinki. lowing this logic, the problem of the disintegra- The latter hypothesis lacks attention in such de- tion of European security architecture lies not bates. in the fact that Russia is breaking the existing Therefore, and secondly, the responsibility of rules, but in the generalised “missed oppor- alienating Russia after the end of the Cold War tunity after the fall of the Berlin wall to put in is overwhelmingly put on the West. Europeans place <…> conditions for real stability in Eu- willingly accept to explore the historical paral- rope”.114 This kind of proposition supposes, as lel of the Treaty of Versailles, and the alienation widely discussed above, that the rules them- of Germany in 1919, and the quote of George selves, upon which the current European secu- Bush Snr. saying “we prevailed, and they rity architecture is built, are somehow flawed didn’t”111 is commonly cited in documents, and should be re-considered.

109 Christian Nünlist, Juhana Aunesluoma and Benno 112 See Anne Marie Le Gloannec, ‘On Morality and Zogg, The Road to the Charter of Paris: Historical Mistakes : Did the West Provoke Russia over Narratives and Lessons for the OSCE (Vienna: OSCE Ukraine?’, American Institute for Contemporary Ger- Network of Think Tanks, 2017). man Studies, Johns Hopkins University. 14 April 2014, 110 Ibid. http://www.aicgs.org/issue/on-morality-and-mistakes- 111 Mary-Elise Sarotte, 1989: The Struggle to Create did-the-west-provoke-russia-over-ukraine/ Post-Cold War Europe, (Princeton: Princeton Univer- 113 For example: the Atlantic Council, European Leader- sity Press, 2009); Svetlana Savranskaya and Tom Blan- ship Network, Russian International Affairs Council ton, ‘NATO Expansion : What Gorbachev Heard’, De- ‘Managing Differences on European security in 2015. cember 2017. National Security Archive, Briefing Book US, Russian and European Perspectives’, March 2015. no. 613. https://nsarchive.gwu.edu/briefing-book/russia- 114 Pierre Vimont, Rapport pour le forum “Leaders pour programs/2017-12-12/nato-expansion-what-gorbachev- la paix”, 2019, p. 34, heard-western-leaders-early. https://normandiepourlapaix.fr/sites/default/files/2019- 08/Leaders-paix_ra_interieur%20Version%20FR.pdf

49 CHALLENGES TO THE EUROPEAN SECURITY ARCHITECTURE

Some narratives in compromise-based studies, Similar great-power bias can be found in such produced by think tanks, are flawed with a big- proposals for future European arms control, power bias, in the sense that they do not take which refer to “contact zones” between Russia into account the agency of small states in Cen- and NATO.117 Security arrangements, based on tral and Eastern Europe, which have historically this type of reasoning, and proposing arms lim- played an essential role in creating the current itations along the “contact zone” risk depriving European security architecture. This view plays entire countries, which find themselves within in favour of the Russian narrative that great the said zone, of reasonable defence capabilit- powers normally have zones of influence and ies. If this kind of view might be acceptable that the current European security architecture from the point of view of major middle Euro- is a result of the unbalanced expansion of pean powers, such as Germany and France, it American influence in the continent. It is evoc- runs completely counter the interests of small ative that the states in the European and Russian liminal states, such as the Baltic States and Po- neighbourhood in documents, elaborated in the land. It would be untenable to build the future spirit of compromise with the participation of European security architecture on such reason- both, Western and Russian experts, are often ing. 115 called “states in between”, thus referring to It appears that in many of their initiatives for them as simple objects of international politics, dialogue with Russia, European powers do not conducted by great powers. This does not only do much reflection on the process of dialogue evoke a realist vision, equally prevalent in the itself, and on the implications that this process West, as in the East, but is also an erroneous may have. Some proposals for dialogue, as in analysis of international politics as it does not the case of German Ostpolitik, come as part of take into account the dynamics of the diplo- political habitus, conditioned by historical ex- matic process, in which small powers are very perience when this kind of policy was success- often able to exert influence and have relevance ful. In other cases, as in France, alternatives are despite their size. Indeed, the sustained rele- seen as too unpredictable, and engagement, as a vance of NATO, and the importance of the lib- general principle, is preferred to isolation. Sec- eral democratic values at the foundations of the ond track diplomacy, which is often seen as a post-Cold War European security architecture panacea for trust-building between Russia and were largely desired and actively promoted by the West, does not escape the same flaws that the small states in Central and Eastern Eu- plague first track diplomacy. The definition of 116 rope. the European position within the multi-track

115 ‘OSCE paper on narratives – or time for dialogue’, https://www.osw.waw.pl/en/publikacje/analyses/2016- RAND corporation. 09-09/german-initiative-arms-control-time-dialogue- 116 For a rare example of scholarly research that gives russia; OSCE Network of Think Tanks and Academic agency back to the Central European states in the pro- Institutions. “Reducing the Risks of Conventional De- cess of NATO enlargement, see Amélie Zima, D’en- terrence in Europe. Arms Control in the NATO-Russia nemi à allié:L’adhésion de la Hongrie, de la Pologne et Contact Zones”, December 2018. https://osce-net- de la République tchèque à l’Alliance atlantique (1989‒ work.net/file-OSCE-Network/Publica- 1999), (Bruxelles : Peter Lang, 2019). tions/RISK_SP.pdf. 117 OSW analysis. The German initiative for arms con- trol: time for dialogue with Russia. 09 September 2016,

50 Adamski, Pundziūtė-Gallois, Liekis, Rusinaitė, Wyciszkiewicz engagement with Russia should be more seri- nomy”, the best scenario for European security, ously undertaken through clarification of the and that of the Baltic States and Poland, would conflicting positions, understanding of narra- be to increase the European share of burden tives, their origins and purposes, but also while maintaining the strong transatlantic link through a clearer definition of what Europe it- with the United States. Negotiations should aim self should defend in relation to Russia. at tailoring initiatives for greater European au- tonomy so that they do not decouple Europe In a nutshell: from the United States, and so that they can be useful not only for the French operational thea- • The openness for dialogue and willing- tres, but would also ensure the security of the ness to understand the root causes of Russian criticism of the European secu- easternmost allies. From what has been said rity architecture makes European politi- above, none of this should be contradictory, and cal and civil societies vulnerable to Rus- can be achieved through pragmatic negotiation sian narratives. among European allies. Germany in this sense, • The representatives of Western demo- cratic societies are generally open to the is a good ally for the Baltic States and Poland, criticism of their governments and have as it is equally attached to the transatlantic link, better access to verifiable facts, which and to anchoring the United States in Europe. makes European and American mistakes of the past more apparent than Russia’s Concerning Russia, it is important for the Euro- mistakes. pean states to reiterate the importance of the • Lack of a common vision about the inter- values on which the European security architec- est of the European nations to uphold ture was built: rule of law and the democratic the principles upon which the post-Cold organisation of government, freedom of peo- War European security architecture was built makes the Europeans doubt the valid- ples to choose their own destiny, including the ity of the principles themselves. security arrangements, solidarity and equality

of all members. The pragmatic wish of France and the traditional inclination of Germany to Conclusion maintain avenues for dialogue with Russia, in- cluding its grievances about its alleged “exclu- European powers have been sensitive to the sion”, will be hard to avoid, but vigilance current challenges to the European security or- should be maintained that the European good der and have been involved in considerations of will to hear “the Russian side” will not wash out its future. The process opens opportunities, but the vision that is closest to Europe’s own inter- also exposes certain vulnerabilities. It is im- ests. European powers should dare to actively portant to assess how these elements would af- defend their vision of European order, based on fect security and stability in Europe, and which international law and liberal democratic values, solutions are in the best interests of the Baltic as proclaimed in 1975 and in 1990. It is not so States and Poland. much about accusing Russia for breaching the In relation to the transatlantic link, and the agreed rules, but about protecting fundamental French proposals for European “strategic auto-

51 CHALLENGES TO THE EUROPEAN SECURITY ARCHITECTURE

European values that are challenged today by fundamental rights and liberties, should not be Russian narratives. thrown out with the “bathwater”. Similarly, the In this endeavour, there is room to capitalise on denunciation of power-structures, sustained by the French and German attachment to demo- the West, should not occult the lingering power- cratic, “Republican” values, and push European structures in other parts of the world, especially leaders for a clearer insistence on them in the those around post-imperial Russia. European diplomatic process, and in the discus- Inclusive multilateral forums must be maint- sion of European security architecture. ained, and proposals for special arrangements Anti-Americanism and anti “occidentalism” between great powers should be rejected. Ger- should be de-constructed as well: while it is many again appears as a good ally for the Baltic States and Poland in this endeavour. France worthwhile to critically assess the actions of one’s own government and deplore the histori- should be more actively engaged in discussions cal wrongs of the West, surely the fundamental on the future of arms control to build up a strong values that underpin the European regional or- and unified European position, which Russia der, such as the rule of law, democracy and could not forestall.

CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Reframe the Realpolitik is back debate. Concepts that legitimise power politics are not objective description of reality. International relations reach far beyond Realpolitik or great power politics. This version of Realpolitik is often boiled down to its most primitive vision of Darwinist struggle for power and survival, confusing the whole spectre of factors affecting the development of international order. Central to this spectrum is the primacy of international law. Empires are gone. The last European one collapsed in 1991 and there is no need to facilitate their return. It is not in the interests of Europe or the transatlantic community to invoke concepts that legitimise practices undermining the principles of sovereignty of states, their rights to choose alli- ances and lead independent defence and foreign policies.

The West as a community based on democratic values should strongly stand by them using the lan- guage of norms and values and avoiding the language of political technologists and autocratic leaders. Working within the framework of international law and multilateral institutions that reflect the pro- cess of democratisation of international relations is the foundation of transatlantic peace and stability. While following the ideas of great powers working in concert will only bring new land grabs, political meddling and regional conflicts, and thus more insecurity for Europe. Russia’s efforts to return to bilateral or exclusive multilateral formats (such as the UNSC Permanent Members’ Summit) are aimed at weakening law-based methods of conflict resolution in favour of arbitrary mechanisms, contradicting democratic principles of international order established in the 20th century and thus should be treated as such.

52 Adamski, Pundziūtė-Gallois, Liekis, Rusinaitė, Wyciszkiewicz

1. No new formats needed. The Western community should reject the practice of invoking arbi- trary workarounds of established institutions. Striving for stable relations between the great powers at the expense of others would mean simply transferring instability elsewhere and in- viting trouble. There is a sufficiently developed institutional architecture to manage risks to regional security. There is no need to invent the wheel again. It is enough to adhere to the international institutions and agreements that already exist. It is not a lack of agreements or their deficiencies that constitute security risks, but the lack of genuine intention of some states to comply with commitments. 2. Law-based order. Members of the international community should lead law-based interna- tional relations, which are rooted in the sovereign equality of states. It also means continued support for the territorial integrity of Ukraine, Georgia and Moldova, the democratic transfor- mation of Belarus and economic reforms in all of these countries. Respect for international law is about core security interests of cohesive West founded on democratic values. Alliances based on these values and on respect for international law protect against existential threats. Con- sistent support for international law has practical implications for security and well-being in the whole region. 3. “Declaration of international decency” (working title) to be adopted initially by the Central and East European states but open for other parties, interested in enhancing the political weight of international behaviour, based upon agreed and accepted principles and values. It may be a simple and straightforward code of conduct, defining not only what is legal or not under inter- national law, but also whether certain actions are decent or not. This would allow creating ad- ditional leverage for states and politicians not to ignore the violations of international law and promote a value-based order among states. 4. Calling spade a spade. In order to oppose the flawed power-based Realpolitik frame, it should be de-constructed on a daily basis using public diplomacy tools. This can be done through amping-up STRATCOM work, initiating support tracks for think tanks, NGOs and academic initiatives, as well as continuous efforts to initiate public debate, conferences and workshops on similar and related themes. Clear strategic messaging, free from falsely understood impartiality or what we called here guilt symmetry, is a must when it comes to proper description of Russian behaviour and the off-the- mark proposals framed in terms of “states in between”, “NATO expansion as the root cause of the conflict between the West and Russia”, “crisis in Ukraine” and “spheres of influence and legitimate interests”. 5. Set up a consultative mechanism among the CEE and the Baltic States open to those willing to participate in good faith about law-based order to identify threats and challenges, as well as to plan joint political initiatives. This mechanism might be also used to enhance cooperation in the field of memory politics to counter jointly current Russian historical propaganda and to mitigate conflicts existing among CEE and the Baltic States themselves. The mechanism could

53 CHALLENGES TO THE EUROPEAN SECURITY ARCHITECTURE be useful in facilitating and coordinating projects addressed to politically and socially active parts of Belarusian and Russian civil societies, interested in fostering serious dialogue about the past, present and future.

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