Studies on the Urban and Local Level Securement of Disaster Preparedness Functions of Coastal Cities and Towns After the Great Tohoku Earthquake

Proceedings of International Symposium on City Planning 2013

Studies on the Urban and Local Level Securement of Disaster Preparedness Functions of Coastal Cities and Towns after the Great Tohoku Earthquake

Nozomu Kiuchi*

Abstract In the Great East Japan Earthquake of March 2011, in Pacific coastal areas of Tohoku region in Japan, many of the public facilities such as fire department and municipal office, hospital, etc., were severely damaged by tsunami submergence and earthquake vibration. These facilities were supposed to function as disaster preparedness facilities in such occasions, and the result was such that many of the municipalities, during the crisis and the recovery process, lacked all or a part of the disaster preparedness functions and could not react to the situation autonomously. The main purpose of this study is, investigate, from city planning point of view, suggestions to locations and functions of disaster preparedness facilities, from studies of the Great Tohoku Earthquake experience. Many interviews, in addition to document investigations, in 4 tsunami-affected cities and towns were made to person in charge of these facilities on the deprivation and recovery process of the functions. This article will focus on the phenomenon, in urban and local level to secure disaster preparedness functions, that were clarified from investigation of 4 case study municipalities; Ishinomaki City, Minami-Sanriku Town, Ofunato City, and Kamaishi City. As a result, such types of responses were seen and the followings are the suggestion to disaster mitigation city planning. 1) Deprivation, substitution and relocation of functions. 2) Consolidation and dispersal of headquarter functions. 3) Hierarchy of stations for external disaster relief teams. 4) Centralization and decentration of distribution stations for aid supplies. 5) Hierarchy of shelter functions. 6) Easy and difficult of accesses to disaster preparedness facilities. 7) Different use of facilities according to locations.

Keywords: disaster preparedness facilities, tsunami disaster, Great Tohoku Earthquake

* National Institute for Land and Infrastructure Management, MLIT E-Mail: [email protected]

- 1 - 0. Introduction 0.1 Background and purpose of research Disaster preparedness facilities such as local government offices, firefighting and rescue facilities, etc., are important in case of disaster, as stronghold of post disaster activities to limit the extent of damage, support peoples life, and sketch the restoration plan for the future. However, in the case of tsunami disaster caused by the Great Tohoku Earthquake, of March 2011, many coastal municipalities to the Pacific in Tohoku had such facilities severely damaged by tsunami submergence (and also earthquake vibration) (Figure 1). Consequently, many of the municipalities, during the crisis and the recovery process, lacked all or a part of the disaster preparedness functions and experienced difficulty in self-directive disaster response.

Figure 1. Damage by Tsunami Submergence of Minami-Sanriku Downtown (aerial photograph of Geospatial Information Authority of Japan)

A countermeasure against such incidents, to avoid damage to the disaster preparedness facilities and secure their functions, is certainly their relocation to upland hills, with aseismic capacity, and also provide them with equipments such as emergency power generator, etc.. However, it is impractical for all municipalities to take all possible measures to all facilities, and all possible circumstances of diverse disaster types. Moreover, located in or adjacent to the downtown, many of these facilities have important role in citizens' daily-life sustainability and downtown vitalization. Especially in the local municipalities where population is old and declining, such approach as wave-resistant, water-resistant and quake-resistant refurbishment, relocation, and alternate-facility designation, should be taken in a organized manner in conformity with the future spatial vision of the municipality, so that individual approach to each facility, as a whole, will not to weaken the region. This article on the basis of such viewpoints, will focus on the disaster preparedness facilities and functions, illustrate the damage of facilities, interferences in functioning, and their recovery process, and then examine the actual spatial attempts to secure the preparedness function in urban and local scale.

0.2 Research Methods In this research, disaster preparedness functions and facilities taken in account are; disaster response and restoration command function to control various activities against disaster (municipal office building, in which disaster response headquarters is established), and

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management and operation functions of fire-fighting and rescue activities (fire department), disaster medical care functions (disaster base hospital), the accommodation function of the refugee (shelter), and acceptance function of external support (parks and other facilities). We overviewed the location, tsunami flood damage, and etc. of these facilities and functions in Miyagi and Iwate prefecture, and carried out detailed investigation, including interviews to officials and facility administrators, to selected case study cities.

1. Overview of Damage of Disaster Preparedness Facilities in Coastal Municipalities of Iwate and Miyagi Prefecture The situation of disaster preparedness facilities, in 28 coastal municipalities (including 2 Wards of Sendai City) of Iwate and Miyagi Prefecture, such as their damage, functioning and relocation were studied from published articles and internet information, and are summarized in Table-1.

Efficiency of Daily Use Low High High Group A : Facilities Group C : Facilities dispersed, outside the cumulated, outside the submergedarea submergedarea Group B : Facilities Group D : Facilities dispersed, inside the cumulated, inside the submergedarea submergedarea Safety to Disaster to Safety Low Group E : Downtown area was not swamped (excluded) ※In and around the central area of the municipality Figure 2. Typology of Municipalities by Locations of the Facilities and the Submerged Area

By such questions as, whether tsunami submerged the downtown area, are the disaster preparedness facilities are located within and around the downtown area, and whether the location of the facilities are Morioka dispersed or cumulated, the municipalities are divided into 5 groups of Kamaishi Figure 2 (types A-E). From these groups, types A-D were considered to Ofunato have a planning agenda, of conflict between tsunami submergence and Minami-Sanriku disaster preparedness facility location, and from each type, Ishinomaki Ishinomaki

City (type A), Kamaishi City (type B), Ofunato City (type C), and Sendai Minami-Sanriku Town (Type D) were chosen for case study and detailed investigation was worked out (Figure 3). Figure 3. Location of 4 Case Study Municipalities 2. Loss-recovery Situation of Disaster Preparedness Functions in Ishinomaki City (Miyagi Prefecture)

2.1 Overview of the City and the Damage Ishinomaki City is located in the east of Miyagi Prefecture, and the current municipality was born by amalgamation of former city with six adjacent towns of Monou, Kanan, Kahoku, Kitakami, Ogatsu, and Oshika in 2005, and the population is 160,826(1). This research focus in the former city region, which is situated in the mouth of the Kyu-Kitakami River.

- 3 - Table 1. Situation of Disaster Preparedness Facilities in 28 Coastal Municipalities Disaster Response & Fire-Fighting and Disaster Medical Care Acceptance of External Support Restoration Command Rescue Activities

Type Fire Fighting Head Main Municipal Office Disaster Base Hospital Oultline of Base Facility Office Hirono Town E ◎ No damage － ◎ No damage － Museum of History and Folklore (emergency fire Kuji City E ◎ No damage ◎ No damage ◎ No damage response team) Partially swamped Partially swamped (1st Noda Village D ○ － △ － (entrance hall) flr.) Fudai Village E ◎ No damage － ◎ No damage － Tanohata Village Ｅ ◎ No damage － ◎ No damage － Iwaizumi Town Ｅ ◎ No damage － ◎ No damage － Partially swamped (1st Partially damaged Miyako City Ｂ △ ◎ No damage ○ － flr.) (cracked) Yamada Pref. Hospital swamped Partially swamped Partially swamped (1st Touno City Sports park (accumulation base for relief Yamada Town Ａ △ (×) and ceased its function, now △ (basement) flr.) supplies) operates in a temporary building Swamped to 2nd flr. and shut down Completely damaged (after Otsuchi Junior High School Terano Baseball Ground (accumulation base for relief →temporary building at Otsuchi Town Ｄ × × aid station and Kamimachi Fureai × Completely damaged supplies) & Touno City Sports park (accumulation Otsuchi Primary School Center, moved to a temporary base for relief supplies) play ground building) Product & Craft Center (accumulation base for relief Partially swamped supplies) Iwate Prefecture Iwate Partially swamped (1st Partially unusable by vibration (basement & 1st flr. of Branch office of a transit operator (emergency annx. bsmt. & 1st flr.) Kamaishi City Ｂ × △ (reopened by antiseismic × 1st annex ) vehicle fueling base) →reopened in a reinforcement) →reopened in a Stationing base at Touno City Sports park and activity subsitute facility subsitute facility bases at Kamaishi Prefectural Office Complex and Osano Branch Fire Station Higashi Senior High School (emergency fire response team)、Setamai Primary School of Sumita Town (support team from UK & USA) Partially damaged Only small cracks of walls (did not Partially damaged Ofunato City Ｃ ○ ○ ○ Planned site for a sports park→former Agricultural (cracked) affect hospital function) (cracked) High School (self-defense force) Accumulation base for relief supplies designated to different sites according to types of supplies. In camp dispersedly among Takekoma I.C., Rikuzen-Takada Takada Hospital completely Ｄ × Completely damaged (×) × Completely damaged Takinosato Industrial complex, auto-camping sites, City damaged etc. (emergency fire response team) No damage Kesennuma City Ａ ◎ No damage ◎ ◎ No damage Municipal Baseball Ground (DMAT etc.) ※reconstruction in review Shizukawa Hospital completeley Completely damaged Bayside Arena (accumulation base for relief supplies damaged (including disaster Completely damaged and stationing base for external support) Minami-Sanriku → patients rescued and moved to Ｄ × prevention building) (×) × →reopened at Bayside (emergency fire response team depolyed, General Town Ishinomaki Red Cross Hospital, →reopened in substitute Arena Gymnasium of Tome City as stationing base and and a clinic was located in facility Bayside Arena as activity base) Bayside Arena. Completely damaged Completely damaged 1st flr. Of Onagawa Hospital Comprehensive Sports Park (accumulation base for Onagawa Town Ｄ × →reopened in a (△) × (reopened in a swamped relief supplies) temporary building temporary building) ◎ No damage Comprehensive Sports Park and Senshu Univ. (×) Ciy hospital swamped and ceased (stationing base for external support and Partially swamped (1st its function. Partially swamped accumulation base for relief supplies) Ishinomaki City Ａ △ flr.), partially damaged ○ (×) Ishinomaki hospital swamped 1st (basement pit) Comprehensive Sports Park (stationing base for (6th & 7th flr.) flr., continued its function by nearby municipality support team and junction heliport using 2nd flr. and higher flrs. for transporting patients) Higashi- Ａ ◎ No damage － ◎ No damage － Matsushima City

Matsushima Ｅ ◎ No damage － ◎ No damage － Town Prefectural Comprehensive Sports Park (emergency Rifu Town Ｅ ◎ No damage － ◎ No damage fire response team) No damage (ICU was temporarily Shiogama City Ａ ◎ No damage ◎ ◎ No damage － ununsable) Miyagi Prefecture Miyagi Shichigahama Ｅ ◎ No damage － ◎ No damage Town Hall 3rd flr. (self-defense force station) Town Tagajo City Ａ ◎ No damage － ◎ No damage － Miyagino Ｅ ◎ No damage － ◎ No damage － Ward

City Wakabaya Sendai Ｅ ◎ No damage － ◎ No damage － -shi Ward Partially damaged Natori City Ｅ △ (cracked and the ceiling － ◎ No damage Hakoduka Ground (emergency fire response team) fell off) Iwanuma City Ｅ ◎ No damage － ◎ No damage Civic Hall (emergency fire response team) Damaged (cracked and unusable) →continued operation in Watari Town Ｅ × － ◎ No damage Watari Fire Station (emergency fire response team) tents →in prefabricated building Play grounds of primary and junior high schools Yamamoto Town Ｅ ◎ No damage － ◎ No damage (emergency fire response team) ◎ Facility completely functioning without damage △ Facility partly unusable ○ Partial damage to the facility but functioning × Facility unusable

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The harms by the Earthquake were; 3,025 dead, 2,770 missing, and 28,000 buildings destroyed(2). Area of 5,654ha was submerged by the tsunami, of which 2,018ha was “A zone” where the most housing destruction was observed(3). The former city region, suffered catastrophic damage, by tsunami destruction and tsunami fire, mainly in the urban coastal area, and the downtown city center area was also swamped and the water did not recede for few days. In some areas, municipal disaster management radio system had defects, because of the earthquake vibration. Fixed and mobile telephone services were interrupted, and only satellite-based mobile phones were available. Of the “lifeline” supplies, water supply and electricity had totally stopped.

2.2 Situation Immediately after the Disaster Although there were some damage by the tsunami to disaster preparedness facilities (headquarters and head offices), the functions were launched in the original facility. The City Hall had its first floor submerged and was isolated, but as the floor was privately used, and the water storage tank and emergency power generator had survived from water exposure, and established the City's Disaster Response Headquarter in the building. Underground pit of the City's Fire-Fighting Head Office building was exposed to water, but there was no damage to the facility function. Ishinomaki Red Cross Hospital, neither damaged by tsunami nor vibration, had promptly set up Hospital's Disaster Response Office, and prepared for accepting injured people. On the other hand, such hospitals as Ishinomaki Municipal Hospital, located near the coast line, was struck by the tsunami, submerged, became isolated, and ceased its function, and many other hospitals had tried to continue their function in the submerged and isolated situation. In addition, in response to the tsunami inundation, many residents evacuated to upland and middle-rise public facilities (such as schools) in the neighborhood.

Launch of disaster preparedness functions (facilities not swamped LEGEND and the function could be launched Preparedness Facility promptly) (HQ Functions) Disaster preparedness facility No Damage swamped by tsunami (in lower - function floors) →isolated by submerged launched surroundings (which interfered Partially theoperation) Damaged - function Water exposure of downtown launched →Inhabitants evacuated to Damaged - function upland and nearby facilities relocated (some within submerged area) Relocation of HQ Function

Evacuation Area Main Evacuation 0 1,000 2,000m Destination

Figure 4. Disaster Preparedness Activities in Ishinomaki City Immediately after the Disaster

2.3 Situation until 1 Day after the Disaster Water exposure in the downtown was protracted and access to the city hall building was interrupted, and also due to the dispersed location of the facilities, communication and cooperation between the functions (head quarters and head offices) had been difficult. The City's Disaster Response Headquarter was isolated due to the water exposure of the building and

- 5 - surrounding area, and the Fire-Fighting Head Office had difficulty in carrying out rescue work due to the water exposure of the surrounding area and affected fire engines. Ishinomaki Red Cross Hospital, in cooperation with self-defense forces, DMAT (Disaster Medical Assistance Team), and emergency fire response teams, conducted acceptance of injured people and triage activities. Also accepted were the patients from the City Hospital, which ceased functioning. Additionally, in a wide area of the city, by the protracted flooding and deposition of debris, interfered evacuees to move by their own, and rescue of the refugees from some of the isolated shelters took place and they were sent to Ishinomaki Red Cross Hospital and neighboring shelters.

LEGEND Continuance of disaster preparedness function (facilities inunswamped area) Preparedness Facility (HQ Functions)

Ｈ HQ Functions Ｈ Sanriku Evacuation area was isolated Expressway bywaterandrubble HQ Connections →Somerescued byhelicopters (×: Blockade) →Otherareas with difficulty to Emergency rescue turned into shelters Gateway Ｈ Heliport

Shelter Launching ofHQfunction Rescue of Refugees & →Operation were interfered by Patients difficulty of access to other facilities andinformation sharing Main Shelter Shelter (Rescued & 0 1,000 2,000m Closed) Figure 5. Disaster Preparedness Activities in Ishinomaki City until 1 Day after the Disaster

2.4 Situation until 1 month after the Disaster Public facilities with large open space located in the peripherals of the submerged area, also with excellent access by and Sanriku Expressway and other arterial roads, became stationing base of external support for their disaster response activities. The Comprehensive Sports Park functioned as a major base to station various support troops such as Self-Defense Forces and

Large-scale facilities in the periphery functioned asassistance-accepting base LEGEND →Stationing of assistance teams and Preparedness Facility accumulation ofaiddelivery (Assistance- →Access byHeliports andSanriku EXP. accepting Function)

Shelter patrol initiated by Stationing Base disaster basehospital →improvement of sanitary Delivery Base conditions Environmental Aid Delivery Degradation of Shelters Preparedness Facility (Support-refugee Installation of main Function) aidstation toshelters HQ for medical Service Main Aid Station Medical 0 1,000 2,000m Treatment Patrol Figure 6. Disaster Preparedness Activities in Ishinomaki City until 1 Month after the Disaster

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emergency fire response teams, and to accept relief supplies. External support teams were sent to other municipalities from this base, and patients from neighboring municipalities were accepted here (and sent to Ishinomaki Red Cross Hospital). In addition, volunteer center was located in Senshu University and accepted external volunteers. Ishinomaki Red Cross Hospital initiated implementation of medical care patrol to the shelters, and also environmental assessment and improvement of the shelters.

2.5 Situation until 3 months after the Disaster During the prolonged evacuation period, inland large-scale public facilities were used to shelter refugees requiring assistance. Monou Sports Center, Yugaku-kan and other facilities substantially became welfare evacuation shelters where citizens requiring nursing care, and also patients who went through medical procedure were sent and accepted. In addition, some evacuation shelters were aggregated to inland public facilities as a process of reopening school classes, and some facilities were used as temporary school buildings.

Inland public facilities functioned as shelters →for the disabled (welfare shelters) →as a substitute to relocate refugees from LEGEND closed shelters

Preparedness Facility (Support-refugee Function)

Upper-level Shelters

Relocation of Refugees

0 1,000 2,000m

Figure 7. Disaster Preparedness Activities in Ishinomaki City until 3 Month after the Disaster

3. Loss-recovery Situation of Disaster Preparedness Functions in Minami Sanriku Town (Miyagi Prefecture)

3.1 Overview of the Town and the Damage Minami-Sanriku Town is located in the north east Miyagi Prefecture, and has a Rias coast (sawtooth coastline) facing the Isatomae Bay and Shizugawa Bay. The Town was born in 2005 by amalgamation of Shizugawa Town and Utatsu Town. The population of the Town is 17,429(1), and town's center is located by the Shizugawa Bay. The harms of the Great East Japan Earthquake were; 514 dead, 664 missing, and 3,877 buildings destroyed(2). Area of 1,142ha was submerged by the tsunami, of which 445ha was “A zone”, where the most housing destruction was observed(3). The central downtown, with the main functions such as the Town Hall, Disaster Control Center, and the Shizugawa Hospital, suffered catastrophic damage. Disaster Control Center building was affected, and the municipal disaster management

- 7 - radio system was out of control. Fire radio was working, but because the of the destruction of the fire department building, in which the base station was located, they could only connected through fire department building of adjacent Kesennuma City. Mobile phones were disabled during the next day of the disaster, because of the fell of battery at the base station, and satellite mobile phones were offered from Tome City and used. Of the “lifeline” supplies, water supply started temporarily in some districts (not drinkable), and in most areas in mid August supply of drinkable water restarted. Restoring of electricity, except for Tokura and Aramachi district, which survived the disaster, began in mid April and completed in end of May.

3.2 Situation Immediately after the Disaster In Minami-Sanriku town, because most of the disaster preparedness facilities were located in lowlands, and struck by the tsunami and destroyed, disaster preparedness functions had been relocated or established, and aggregated to upland around Bayside Arena. The Town Hall and Disaster Control Center building were completely destroyed, including the roof terrace, and the City’s Emergency Response Headquarter was moved to an office room in the Bayside Arena. Shizugawa Hospital was also struck to the third floor, ceased its function, and the patients who survived were rescued by the Self-Defense Force helicopters. A temporary clinic was provided in the training room of the Arena. Fire department was also completely destroyed, and the district commander crew also moved to the Arena. The residents evacuated to upland public facilities (schools, Bayside Arena, Shizugawa Nature House, etc.).

LEGEND

Preparedness Facility (HQ Functions) No Damage - function Water exposure of downtown launched →Inhabitants evacuated to upland Partially Damaged - function launched Damaged - function relocated Relocation of HQ Function Preparedness facilities affected by tsunami →Visitors and stayers evacuated upstairs Evacuation Area Main Evacuation 0 500 1,000m Destination Figure 8. Disaster Preparedness Activities in Minami-Sanriku Town Immediately after the Disaster

3.3 Situation until 1 Day after the Disaster By tsunami or debris, accesses within and to Town was interfered, and facilities remained isolated. The Bayside Arena, took advantage of water tanks of the facility and nearby houses against stop water outage. It was equipped with electric self-generator and was used (emergency power vehicles were also deployed 3 to 5 days afterwards). In each evacuation shelter, water storage tank or existing simple water-supply system were used and food stock from nearby houses were brought and cooked. Facilities' stock and equipments (such as blankets and tents of Nature House and judo hall tatami of senior high school) were effectively used.

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Traveling by foot between facilities and districts LEGEND (through forest roads, etc.) Preparedness Facility (HQ Functions) Relocation of functions to upland from damaged disaster prepared- HQ Functions ness facilities (through forest roads, etc. by foot) HQ Connections Upland public facilities (×: Blockade) became shelters Emergency Gateway Ｈ Heliport Rubbles were piled up after water exposure Shelter →car access to facilities Rescue of were blocked Refugees & Patients

Rescue and transpor- Main Shelter tation of patients Shelter (Rescued & 0 500 1,000m Closed) Figure 9. Disaster Preparedness Activities in Minami-Sanriku Town until 1 Day after the Disaster

3.4 Situation until 1 month after the Disaster The reopening of the roads brought support of people and goods from the outside, and the disaster preparedness facilities were highly utilized, enabling support of local recovery efforts in full swing. Emergency fire response teams (stationed in adjacent Tome City) arrived, and DMAT and other teams established occasional clinics (outside the Arena), brought in drugs and medical devices and installed storage spaces (inside the Arena), opened aid stations in hub evacuation shelters and implemented medical treatment patrol. In addition, grasping of the number of refugees in each shelter took place. In many cases, gathering of information and delivery of relief supplies and etc. were initiated by hub shelters staffed by municipal personnel.

Reopening of main roads →to secure access to facilities LEGEND Multi-functioning of upper-level shelters Preparedness Facility (Operation by local officials, and set up of (Accept-assistance main aid and aid delivery station. Function) Acceptance of external assistance Stationing Base →Functioning as stationing base and aid delivery base Delivery Base

Aid Delivery

Distribution of Preparedness Facility (Support-refugee aid supply from Support medical Function) upper-level treatment and aid shelters to other delivery to main shelters HQ for medical shelters and of the district Service home refugees Main Aid Station Medical Treatment 0 500 1,000m Patrol Figure 10. Disaster Preparedness Activities in Minami-Sanriku Town until 1 Month after the Disaster

3.5 Situation until 3 months after the Disaster Aggregation of disaster preparedness functions were carried out. Selection and reduction of the facilities put forward in parallel with the restart of school classes and original functions of the facilities, and the preparedness functions were closed eventually. Temporary building for the town hall was set up in parking area of Bayside Arena,

- 9 - headquarters moved inside, and routine work had resumed. In addition, a temporary clinic of Shizugawa hospital has opened in an adjacent site. Bayside Arena shelter had been closed, and restarting schools separated the use of space between students and refugees. Secondary evacuation of refugees to Naruto Onsen etc. were also made.

LEGEND

Coexistence of shelter and other Preparedness Facility (Support-refugee functions Function) (reopening of schools, construction Termination of of temporary houses, etc.) preparedness functions Upper-level Shelters

Construction and opening of Relocation temporary Town Office Building of Refugees

0 500 1,000m

Figure 11. Disaster Preparedness Activities in Minami-Sanriku Town until 3 Month after the Disaster

4. Loss-recovery Situation of Disaster Preparedness Functions in Ofunato City (Iwate Prefecture)

4.1 Overview of the City and the Damage Ofunato City is located in the south east of Iwate Prefecture along the Rias coast (sawtooth coastline). The City was born in 2005 by amalgamation of Shizugawa Town and Utatsu Town. The population of the City is 40,737(1), and city's center is located by the Ofunato Harbor to the north-south direction along Morikawa River. The harms of the Great East Japan Earthquake were; 317 dead, 150 missing, and 3,629 buildings destroyed(2). Area of 814ha was submerged by the tsunami, of which 561ha was “A zone”, where the most housing destruction was observed(3). The industrial area by the harbor and the central downtown where the shops and other facilities were accumulated suffered catastrophic damage. By the earthquake, municipal disaster management radio system in Sanriku district was out of control (broadcasting recovered 72 hours later), but the fire radio was available in all areas. Ofunato Fire Department owned satellite mobile phones, and they were available from the very early stage of the disaster. Fixed telephone services were unusable because the NTT office building and the lines were damaged (recovered gradually after April 10th), and the mobile phones were gradually disabled 1 week after the disaster due to power shortage of base stations (recovered gradually since March 20th). Of the “lifeline” supplies, water supply completely stopped due to the damage of supply plants, sewage disposal was unoperated due to the damage of sewage treatment facilities, and electricity was not supplied due to destruction of lines (supply of electricity gradually restarted after March 13th and mostly recovered by April 25th).

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4.2 Situation Immediately after the Disaster As the disaster preparedness facilities were situated on the hillside in periphery of the downtown area, they escaped the tsunami disaster and promptly launched a each facilities' preparedness functions. In the City Hall was established City's Disaster Response Headquarter on the second floor of the building, in the Fire Department Building a Head Office, and in the Ofunato Prefectural Hospital a Disaster Response Office. On the other hand, many of the residents of the down town submerged by tsunami, evacuated to upland nearby.

0 500 1,000m LEGEND

Preparedness Facility (HQ Functions) No Damage - function launched Partially Damaged Water exposure of downtown - function → Inhabitants evacuated to launched peripheral upland area Damaged - function relocated Relocation of HQ Function

Evacuation Area Main Evacuation Launching of preparedness functions Destination (no water exposure and quick launching was possible) Figure 12. Disaster Preparedness Activities in Ofunato City Immediately after the Disaster

4.3 Situation until 1 Day after the Disaster Disaster preparedness functions and activities were continued in each facility, and in addition, by such attempts as allocating liaisons to other facilities, disaster responses were carried out with information sharing and mutual coordination. Information sharing was efficiently promoted because of the proximity to the facilities each other, the adjacency to the submerged downtown, and the network by arterial roads (Route 45 and Sanriku Expressway) between the facilities.

0 500 1,000m LEGEND

Preparedness Facility (HQ Functions)

HQ Functions

HQ Connections (×: Blockade) Emergency Upland public facilities (ie. Com- Reopening of R45 Gateway munity centers) became shelters Ｈ Heliport

Shelter Continuance of preparedness Rescue of functions in unswamped facilities Refugees & Patients

Ｈ Main Shelter Shelter Allocate liaisons to share in- (Rescued & formation among functions Closed)

Figure 13. Disaster Preparedness Activities in Ofunato City until 1 Day after the Disaster

- 11 - 4.4 Situation until 1 months after the Disaster External support (i.e. support team and relief supplies) was accepted by multiple and dispersed facilities. As there were few facility with a large open space in the City, the stationing of external support had to be relied upon on other municipalities. The emergency fire response teams and Self-Defense Forces stationed in Tono city and as their operation base, the City's school facilities and facilities of Sumita Town were used. By lack of large public facility to accept and manage the relief supplies in an integrated manner, the management of relief supplies were carried out using multiple facilities. The acceptance and accumulation of relief supplies, in early stage, took place in basement meeting room of City Hall, and when it became full welfare center was used. As the amount of goods and places for delivery increased, to streamline the management and delivery process, different facilities were assigned for each type of relief supplies. Of the relief supplies rice and water were heavy and there was a trouble at Sakari Elementary School, of the floor of gymnasium crumbling. After then, these goods were accumulated in Chameria Hall, the floor of which is concrete.

0 500 1,000m LEGEND Preparedness Facility (Accept-assistance Function) Delivery base dispersed among facilities →by type of aid delivery Stationing Base →delivered directly to each shelters External support at Touno City Delivery Base →operating base dispersed →liaisons allocated to HQs Aid Delivery

Preparedness Facility (Support-refugee Function) HQ for medical Service Main Aid Station Medical Medical treatment patrol initiated by Treatment municipal office and disaster base hospital Patrol Figure 14. Disaster Preparedness Activities in Ofunato City until 1 Month after the Disaster

4.5 Situation until 3 month after the Disaster In parallel with the reopening of the school classes, and the original use of facilities, shelter function and accumulation and delivery function of relief supplies were moved and consolidated. The examples of relocation are; from Sakari Elementary School to Chameria Hall (above mentioned), from Dai-ichi Junior High School (gymnasium) to civic gymnasium (in submerged area), and then to Working Women's House (in submerged area) of morgue function. home of the women who work ( I was transferred to the same). Also facilities were flooded once, after performing a simple repair, etc., we have been (accepted) transfer function as goods expropriation facilities. Facilities located inside the submerged area and unsuitable for shelters, were also used as accumulation center after simple refurbishment.

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0 500 1,000m LEGEND

Preparedness Facility (HQ Functions)

HQ Functions

HQ Connections (×: Blockade) Emergency Upland public facilities (ie. Com- Reopening of R45 Gateway munity centers) became shelters Ｈ Heliport

Shelter Continuance of preparedness Rescue of functions in unswamped facilities Refugees & Patients

Ｈ Main Shelter Shelter Allocate liaisons to share in- (Rescued & formation among functions Closed)

Figure 15. Disaster Preparedness Activities in Ofunato City until 3 Month after the Disaster

5. Loss-recovery Situation of Disaster Preparedness Functions in Kamaishi City (Iwate Prefecture)

5.1 Overview of the City and the Damage Kamaishi City is also located in the south east of Iwate Prefecture along the Rias coast (sawtooth coastline). The population of the City is 39,574(1), and city's center is located by the Kamaishi Harbor and to the east direction along Kasshi River. The harms of the Great East Japan Earthquake were; 848 dead, 467 missing, and 3,723 buildings destroyed(2). Area of 777ha was submerged by the tsunami, of which 463ha was “A zone”, where the most housing destruction was observed(3). The urbanization spreads long from east to west direction, and the eastern part were mainly affected, where the City Hall and the Fire-Fighting Head Office were located. After the earthquake, municipal disaster management radio system and the fire radio were both available. Fixed telephone services were unavailable (gradually restarted operation after March 17th), and the mobile phones were also unavailable due to submergence of base station (gradually restarted operation after March 19th). Of the “lifeline” supplies, water supply completely stopped (gradually restarted operation after March 17th), sewage disposal was unoperated due to the damage of sewage treatment facilities (gradually restarted operation after April 19th), and electric supply was wholly interrupted (gradually restarted after March 15th).

5.2 Situation Immediately after the Disaster By the tsunami, some facilities in the coastal area were affected, and were forced to set up disaster preparedness function at the substitute facility. As for the City Hall, the building was not damaged, but most the basement floor of the first building was swamped, and although the water receded the next day, the surrounding area was piled with debris and was unwalkable. Kamaishi Fire Department Building (head office) was swamped of the first floor, and the communication room and the garage was destroyed and unusable, and also debris was deposited in the surrounding area. The old building of Kamaishi Prefectural Hospital (disaster base hospital) in inland, was

- 13 - scheduled for earthquake-resistant renovation, but damaged by the vibration, and after evacuating the patients outside, many of them were transported inland and responded to the disaster. The Kamaishi Nozomi Hospital, close to the coast, by tsunami and earthquake vibration, had its boiler broken down and lost electricity, and ceased operation. In addition, many of the residents of the submerged area by tsunami, evacuated to upland or inland.

Damaged of facilities by tsunami →visitors evacuated upstairs and upland

Water exposure of downtown →Inhabitants evacuated to upland or inland Damage of preparedness facility (hospital) by vibration →patients evacuated outside the building, and building partially closed

No Damage Damaged Main LEGEND Partially Damaged Relocation of - function -function launched - function Evacuation launched relocated HQ Function Destination Preparedness Facility (HQ Functions) Evacuation Area Figure 16. Disaster Preparedness Activities in Kamaishi City Immediately after the Disaster

5.3 Situation until 1 Day after the Disaster Affected disaster preparedness functions relocated inland.. The City's Disaster Response Headquarter, was decided to be relocated to Sea Plaza Kamaishi building on the day after next of the disaster, and the transportation of equipments began from the night. Fire headquarter function of (Kamaishi City and Otsuchi Town region) had moved to the Education Center building. Sea Plaza Kamaishi building and the surroundings where both functions relocated, were near the submerged area and also had a good to access by rail and car. Contact to the evacuation shelters of the coast, was done by foot. On the other hand, fire-fighting functions (activity units of fire department and external emergency fire response teams) were transferred to the inland Osano Branch Fire Station. To the prefectural office complex nearby, the Self-Defense Forces gathered the next day of disaster, and other external support teams of the police and fire-fighting gathered since then, which composed a form of local headquarters of external support teams. Construction industry union, who was in charge of road reopening was also in the complex building, and worked in cooperation. In Kamaishi Prefectural Hospital, patients were transported inland via Tono Prefectural Hospital etc., or to Kamaishi Senior High School (patients with moderate symptoms), and functioned as a relay base from submerged area to inland disaster base hospitals, in cooperation with Self-Defense Forces and emergency fire response teams. Thus, City's Emergency Response Headquarters (victims support), local response head quarter of the Prefectural Government and the external support (search operations and road reopening), and Kamaishi Prefectural Hospital (disaster base hospital) was dispersed but shared information and worked in coordination with each other, by such as sending liaisons.

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Relocation of preparedness functions from damaged facilities to inland substitute facilities (travel by foot through upland paths)

Upland and inland Rubbles piled up public facilities be- →car access to came shelters facilities were blocked

Accept injured and sick, and transport serious patients in- Head office of external land support (prefectural office complex and branch Travel between facilities fire station) and districts by foot Ｈ (through upland paths and elevated railroads) Ｈ Rescue of Shelter LEGEND HQ Connections Emergency Heliport Main HQ Functions (×: Blockade) Gateway Refugees & Shelter (Rescued & Patients Closed) Preparedness Facility (HQ Functions) Shelter Figure 17. Disaster Preparedness Activities in Kamaishi City until 1 Day after the Disaster

5.4 Situation until 1 month after the Disaster Disaster recovery and support activities continued under the multi-polar functional layout. Medical team was established in Sea Plaza (City's response headquarter), and doctors were dispatched from the Prefectural Hospital and implemented medical care patrol etc. to evacuation shelters and set up an aid station at Suzuko Square. The Sea Plaza building also functioned as an accumulation and delivery base for support supplies, and distributed supplies to the shelters. The local Prefectural Government office managed such as the road reopening. However, the operation teams stationed in Tono City, and they each day tripped via Sen-nin-toge road. The Prefectural Hospital, continued to accept and transport patients, and during the medical care patrol to evacuation shelters, refugees with high needs for medical care were encouraged to be sheltered nearby the Hospital. Dialysis patients were accepted by the Seitetsu Memorial Hospital and the Prefectural Hospital.

Municipal head office operated aid supply delivery and medical service to shelters

Upland and inland public facilities were used as shelters Reopening of main Prefectural head office streets operated road reopen- →secure access to ing work and etc. shelters Function coalition for medical service

Main Aid Medical LEGEND Stationing Base Delivery Base Aid Delivery HQ for medical Treatment Service Station Patrol Preparedness Facility (Accept-assistance Function) Preparedness Facility (Support-refugee Function) Figure 18. Disaster Preparedness Activities in Kamaishi City until 1 Month after the Disaster

- 15 - 5.5 Situation until 3 months after the Disaster Reopening of the damaged facilities, preparation for reconstruction using substitute facilities, and closure and aggregation of some of the shelters for school reopening were carried out. Examples of shelter closure are; Futaba Elementary School and Osano Elementary School (refugees moved to Tourism Center building), Kasshi Junior High School (refugees moved to civic gymnasium). Shelters were intended to be aggregated to the inland facilities with allowance of space, but the consciousness of the refugees to stay near their homes, and the perception gaps of the coastal and inland inhabitants, together prevented to do so. As a result, the implementations of relocation were mostly influenced by the intentions of the facility operator. Such day-to-day works and reception desks as, citizen's support of consultation, or issuing of disaster victim certificate in Sea Plaza, began in substitute facilities. In addition, seismic retrofitting of Prefectural Hospital also began.

Damaged facilities repaired and functions reopened Termination of preparedness functions

Continuance of substitute use Some shelters closed so as to restart school

LEGEND Upper-level Shelters Relocation of Refugees Preparedness Facility (Support-refugee Function) Figure 19. Disaster Preparedness Activities in Kamaishi City until 3 Month after the Disaster

6. Responses Observed in Securing the Disaster Preparedness Functions Such types of urban and local scale spatial responses, as the followings, were seen from the case studies of the 4 cities, and the suggestion to disaster mitigation city planning is considered.

6.1 Deprivation, Substitution and Relocation of functions In the affected cities, the substitute facilities were mostly not defined in advance, in case the primary facility were damaged by disaster. When the facility was severely damaged, they were forced to relocate the functions to substitute facilities (a). However, when the damage was such as only to first floor, different attitudes were taken as relocation (b) or continuance (c). Suggestion of countermeasure options are relocation of functions and facilities to upland, or otherwise, strengthening the functions such as water resistance, upward leveling, isolation prevention methods, and allocation of heliports, and predetermination of substitute upland facilities will also be necessary.

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a) relocation b) continuance c) continuance

Figure 20. Image of Function Deprivation, Substitution and Relocation

6.2 Consolidation and Dispersal of Headquarter Functions 3 patterns of layout of headquarter functions were seen. When functions are relocated to a large size public facility nearby the submerged area, it will result in consolidation of headquarter functions, where information sharing and coordination is smoothly carried out (a). When there are a number of options, they might compose a multi-polar headquarter location and necessitates effort to coordinate activities. However, some functions can be dispersed according to the types of services (b). When the headquarter functions are dispersed and isolated by access and communication interference, there will be difficulties in coordinating the function activities (c). Suggestions are that communication interference should be assumed and coordination and communication systems and accesses among the facilities, including substitutes should be secured.

a) b) c) relocation and consolidation multipolarity difficult to relocation cooperate continuance and isolation Figure 21. Image of Headquarter Function Consolidation and Dispersal

6.3 Hierarchy of Stations for External Disaster Relief Teams: When accepting external support teams, existence of large size open space public facilities within the municipality boundary, enables various teams to be stationed in a few number of stationing bases (a). When such facilities are nonexistent, they were accepted in a stationing base of adjacent municipality, and operation teams deploy. In such cases can be divided, to cases where they are deployed to a few number of facilities (b), and to cases where they are deployed to multiple dispersed facilities (c). Suggestions are that up-front work of, figuring out possible accepting facilities and their capacity, is necessary to accept relief teams without delay at the time of need. There are also options to coordinate with and allocate them to an adjacent municipality. a) b) c) operation single troops disperse station operation troops deploy

Figure 22. Image of External Disaster Relief Teams' Stationing Hierarchy

6.4 Centralization and Decentration of Distribution Stations for Relief Supplies When accepting external relief supplies, existence of large size public facilities (buildings), will enable unified management of receiving, storage and delivery through a single distribution station (a). In such cases, delivery can be made in a hierarchical system, through hub shelters (b). When such facilities are nonexistent, distribution can be made through dispersed stations

- 17 - assigned by type of supplies (c). Suggestions are that “integrated” (and not necessarily “unified”) management system of relief supply is important, and necessary facilities must be assigned. If there are plural distribution stations, systematic management system is necessary and should be created. a) b) c) hierarchical assignation by type single system station

Figure 23. Image of Distribution Stations for Relief Supplies' Centralization and Decentration

6.5 Hierarchy of Shelter Functions Due to the extent of the disaster which was never expected, more evacuation shelters were provided and assigned. It was difficult to provide the same level of support to all the shelters, and for this reason there were cases where hub shelters were assigned with provision of aid stations, and supply distribution functions, allocation of municipal personnel, etc. (a). In other cases, medical treatment patrol teams visited each shelter providing occasional medical care and management was carried out in a centralized manner(b). Suggestions are that it is important to with eyes to the whole citizens in refuge life (in shelters and also at home), and consider their medical care and relief supply systems, and assign the functioning and hierarchies of evacuation shelters. a) placement of b) medical aid stations treatment patrol

Figure 24. Image of Shelter Function's Hierarchy

6.6 Accesses to Disaster Preparedness Facilities In 3 case study cities (except Kamaishi City) had Sanriku Expressway constructed along the hill-side. Such disaster base hospitals with direct access to the highway (and equipped with heliport) could efficiently make use of the advantage, by carrying in necessary equipments, materials and fuels, accepting external support teams, and transporting patients to inland hospitals. In addition, easy access from arterial highway to stationing base of external support teams was also effective (a). Arterial roads providing mutual access between headquarters was effective in information sharing and activity coordination(b). On the contrary, when the roads through lowland were submerged, access routes to evacuation area or facilities were severed and forced through mountain trails (c).

a) access from b) mutual access c) access arterial highway via artery via trails Ｈ heliport

severed

Figure 25. Image of Access to Disaster Preparedness Facilities

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Suggestions are that disaster base hospitals and stations accepting external disaster relief teams should be easily accessible from arterial and high-grade highways. It is important to consider alternative access routes to evacuation area and shelters, in case primary access route is severed.

6.7 Different Use of Public Facilities according to Locations While many of the public facilities in coastal areas were used as evacuation shelters or morgue, inland facilities of big and middle size with good access were used to accept external support (supplies and teams), and hinterland facilities in large scale were used as transport destination of patients among disaster base hospitals, and in municipality scale were used as welfare shelters, aggregation shelter, or for temporary relocation sites of damaged schools, in different stages. Suggestions are that with consideration to positional relationship with supposed submerged area, traffic access, and surrounding environment, locations of evacuation shelters and accepting base of external support should be considered.

evacuation original func- stationing accumulation retreat tionrecovery aggregation

acceptance temporary andforwarding relocation Hinterland Inland Peripheral Figure 26. Image of Different Use of Public Facilities according to Locations

7. Conclusion Some of the urban and local scale spatial responses, to secure disaster preparedness functions could be picked up and summarized from the observation of 4 case studies cities, and the suggestion to disaster mitigation city planning were considered. It was found that spatial aspects of the preparedness functions had some important impact, not only to the damage but to the actual functioning of the disaster preparedness functions. The earthquake disaster this time was by all means exceeded pre-considered assumptions of the municipalities, and the persons in charge had to respond on a case-by-case basis apart from the local disaster prevention plans. But such responses can be divided to responses that might be more smoothly implemented, and responses that details can be flexibly applied according to the dimension and extent of the disaster. So, it is considered that as to the responses of disasters exceeding pre-considered assumptions, necessary items and contents should be narrowed and considered.

Notes (1) By the 2010 National Census. (2) From the Cabinet Office data. (3) From the survey by City Bureau of Ministry of Land, Infrastructure and Transport.

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