Murray Rothbard's Philosophy of Freedom.Pdf
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Murray Rothbard’s Philosophy of Freedom BY DAVID GORDON urray Rothbard (1926–1995) based his polit- viable alternative. A slave system in which slaves could ical philosophy on a simple insight: slavery is refuse to work, at the cost of not being supplied with Mwrong. Few, if any, would dare to challenge any provisions, would hardly strike us as much of an this obvious truth; but its implications are far reaching. improvement over simple slavery. It is Rothbard’s singular merit to show that rejecting And the income tax is far from the only area in slavery leads inexorably to laissez-faire capitalism, unre- which the state acts as a slave master. In the United stricted by the slightest govern- States, we do not now have a ment interference. compulsory draft. But the gov- If we reject slavery, then are we ernment in the past enacted not saying that each person owns conscription laws that directly his own body? Just what seems compelled people to serve in the immoral about slavery is that some armed forces, and may well enact people, the slave owners, have the such a law again. People serving right to control the bodies of those in the military must of course fol- under their domination.The own- low orders, even if doing so will ers can tell the slaves what to do end their lives. and force them to obey if they But once more, have we not refuse to comply. moved too fast? Measures such as One might at first think that the income tax and conscription, this point has little relevance to however much they interfere modern society. The Thirteenth with individual liberty, have been Amendment abolished slavery in enacted by democratically chosen the United States in 1865; surely it Murray Rothbard legislatures. How can we compare Mises Institute does not tell us very much of prac- a democracy with a system in tical importance today to reiterate that slavery is wrong. which a master compels others to labor, regardless of But are we not moving here too quickly? If the what they want? In a democracy, an individual may not essence of slavery is forced labor for others, it is a very be able to do what he wants, but the majority of the present reality today. When the government takes part people make the rules. of what you earn in taxes, it in effect forces you to labor Rothbard argues that this circumstance leaves the for the state. Just as the slave does not get to keep what essence of slavery unchanged. In a democracy, the major- he produces but must surrender it to the master, so must ity acts as the slave master. So long as the indi- the taxpayer give up part of what he makes to the gov- vidual cannot exercise full control over his own body, he ernment. One might object that someone can avoid David Gordon ([email protected]) is a senior fellow at the Ludwig von being taxed by refusing to work, but this is hardly a Mises Institute, which published his book, The Essential Rothbard (2007). 33 NOVEMBER 2007 David Gordon is to that extent a slave. The fact that he, along with his contending that the fact-value dichotomy of David fellow slaves, has a share in determining what he will do Hume and his many successors was an artificial con- still leaves him unfree. Democracy, in Rothbard’s view, is struction. Suppose, for example, that someone pushes a system in which each person owns a share of everyone you aside while you are waiting in line for a movie. Has else. It is merely a variant of slavery.The choice cannot be he not acted rudely? The judgment that he has acted evaded: one must either favor self-ownership or slavery. rudely is not a matter for subjective decision but is gov- In many books and countless articles, Rothbard car- erned by objective criteria. But surely “rude” is a value ried out his defense of self-ownership to its full logical, if term: what then has happened to the alleged dichotomy controversial, conclusion. If you own your own labor, you between fact and value? In the view favored by Roth- cannot be compelled against your will to support the bard and Strauss, value judgments are factual. If so, is it state, even if it confines its activities to protecting rights— not also true—though this is much more controver- other than, of course, the rights it violates by extorting sial—that if human beings need certain things in order resources through taxation. Further, people in a free soci- to flourish, this is at once a factual statement and a value ety are at liberty to establish competing agencies to pro- judgment? So, at any rate, Rothbard maintained. (I am tect themselves: they need not confine here offering only a sketch of his protection to a monopoly agency. Rothbard does argument, not a full defense of it.) So far the self-ownership principle Although his position is probably has been presented as an obvious truth indeed derive an a minority one among contemporary of common sense, but Rothbard was “ought” from an “is,” analytical philosophers, several lead- not content to leave matters at that. In ing lights support it. The influential arguing for self-ownership, Rothbard but he would deny British philosopher Philippa Foot relies heavily on a point of fact. Every- defends a view of the good quite one is in reality in control of his own that he is guilty of similar to Rothbard’s in her Natural will. If I obey another, I must always any fallacy. He Goodness (Oxford University Press, make the decision to do as he wishes; 2001). And even if, despite Roth- and the threat of violence on his part maintains that ethical bard’s urgings, one continues to should I follow my own course leaves principles follow from believe that an impassable gap sepa- the situation unchanged. I must decide rates fact and value, self-ownership whether to accede to the threat. the nature of man. remains a valid principle for anyone But, one might object, even if who rejects slavery. Rothbard is correct that one cannot alienate the will, how does he get to the conclusion he wants? From the Private Property fact that the will cannot be alienated, how does the eth- nce one accepts self-ownership the justification ical judgment follow that each person ought to be rec- Ofor private property soon follows. Each person ognized as a self-owner? Is Rothbard here committing owns his own labor. Does he not have a right, then, the fallacy of deriving an “ought” from an “is”? to what he produces by means of that labor? To deny To our imagined objector, Rothbard would demur. this is to revert once more to slavery; it is to say that He does indeed derive an “ought” from an “is,” but he other people have the right to control your labor. would deny that he is guilty of any fallacy. He maintains But once again, Rothbard must confront an objec- that ethical principles follow from the nature of man. tion: You may own your labor, but this does not suffice How is this claim about ethics, which defies much of to justify property rights. People, after all, do not create contemporary philosophical opinion, to be sustained? the land that they wish to appropriate. But this point Rothbard found persuasive an argument advanced by gives Rothbard little trouble. Land starts off originally Leo Strauss, a political philosopher with whom he was unowned. Parcels of land do not come into the world often at odds. Strauss appealed to ordinary language, with persons’ names attached; and Rothbard firmly THE FREEMAN: Ideas on Liberty 34 Murray Rothbard’s Philosophy of Freedom rejects the Georgist contention that everyone owns all We may imagine another objection at this point. land collectively. “Some critics,” he writes in his great Suppose Rothbard has successfully rebutted the con- treatise Man, Economy, and State, “especially the Henry tention of Georgists and others that first possessors of Georgists, assert that, while a man or his assigns may be land can in his system hold to ransom all others. Is not entitled to the produce of his own labor or anything the system, however logical, of no practical relevance? exchanged for it, he is not entitled to an original, Most property titles today do not stem by a clear line of nature-given factor, a ‘gift of nature.’ For one man to be transmission from a Lockean first owner. On the con- able to appropriate this gift is alleged to be an invasion trary,would we not find that many land titles go back to of a common heritage that all men deserve to use acts of violent dispossession? Would not an attempt to equally. This is a self-contradictory position, however. put Rothbard’s system into practice quickly lead to a A man cannot appropriate anything without the coop- war of conflicting claims to property? eration of original nature-given factors, if only as stand- As usual, Rothbard has thought of the objection ing room. Therefore, if property in land or other himself. He answers that the burden of proof lies on nature-given factors is to be denied man, he cannot someone who disputes a land title. If he cannot make obtain property in the fruits of his labor.” good his claim, the present possessor owns his land In Rothbard’s view, then, one acquires property legitimately. If land titles cannot be traced back to an through “mixing one’s labor” with unowned land, or original act of legitimate appropriation, speculation by acquiring such property in gift or about an original owner and his pres- exchange from someone else.