A Secure SOCKS5 Proxy
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Uila Supported Apps
Uila Supported Applications and Protocols updated Oct 2020 Application/Protocol Name Full Description 01net.com 01net website, a French high-tech news site. 050 plus is a Japanese embedded smartphone application dedicated to 050 plus audio-conferencing. 0zz0.com 0zz0 is an online solution to store, send and share files 10050.net China Railcom group web portal. This protocol plug-in classifies the http traffic to the host 10086.cn. It also 10086.cn classifies the ssl traffic to the Common Name 10086.cn. 104.com Web site dedicated to job research. 1111.com.tw Website dedicated to job research in Taiwan. 114la.com Chinese web portal operated by YLMF Computer Technology Co. Chinese cloud storing system of the 115 website. It is operated by YLMF 115.com Computer Technology Co. 118114.cn Chinese booking and reservation portal. 11st.co.kr Korean shopping website 11st. It is operated by SK Planet Co. 1337x.org Bittorrent tracker search engine 139mail 139mail is a chinese webmail powered by China Mobile. 15min.lt Lithuanian news portal Chinese web portal 163. It is operated by NetEase, a company which 163.com pioneered the development of Internet in China. 17173.com Website distributing Chinese games. 17u.com Chinese online travel booking website. 20 minutes is a free, daily newspaper available in France, Spain and 20minutes Switzerland. This plugin classifies websites. 24h.com.vn Vietnamese news portal 24ora.com Aruban news portal 24sata.hr Croatian news portal 24SevenOffice 24SevenOffice is a web-based Enterprise resource planning (ERP) systems. 24ur.com Slovenian news portal 2ch.net Japanese adult videos web site 2Shared 2shared is an online space for sharing and storage. -
Threat Modeling and Circumvention of Internet Censorship by David Fifield
Threat modeling and circumvention of Internet censorship By David Fifield A dissertation submitted in partial satisfaction of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in Computer Science in the Graduate Division of the University of California, Berkeley Committee in charge: Professor J.D. Tygar, Chair Professor Deirdre Mulligan Professor Vern Paxson Fall 2017 1 Abstract Threat modeling and circumvention of Internet censorship by David Fifield Doctor of Philosophy in Computer Science University of California, Berkeley Professor J.D. Tygar, Chair Research on Internet censorship is hampered by poor models of censor behavior. Censor models guide the development of circumvention systems, so it is important to get them right. A censor model should be understood not just as a set of capabilities|such as the ability to monitor network traffic—but as a set of priorities constrained by resource limitations. My research addresses the twin themes of modeling and circumvention. With a grounding in empirical research, I build up an abstract model of the circumvention problem and examine how to adapt it to concrete censorship challenges. I describe the results of experiments on censors that probe their strengths and weaknesses; specifically, on the subject of active probing to discover proxy servers, and on delays in their reaction to changes in circumvention. I present two circumvention designs: domain fronting, which derives its resistance to blocking from the censor's reluctance to block other useful services; and Snowflake, based on quickly changing peer-to-peer proxy servers. I hope to change the perception that the circumvention problem is a cat-and-mouse game that affords only incremental and temporary advancements. -
Style Counsel: Seeing the (Random) Forest for the Trees in Adversarial Code Stylometry∗
Style Counsel: Seeing the (Random) Forest for the Trees in Adversarial Code Stylometry∗ Christopher McKnight Ian Goldberg Magnet Forensics University of Waterloo [email protected] [email protected] ABSTRACT worm based on an examination of the reverse-engineered code [17], The results of recent experiments have suggested that code stylom- casting style analysis as a forensic technique. etry can successfully identify the author of short programs from This technique, however, may be used to chill speech for soft- among hundreds of candidates with up to 98% precision. This poten- ware developers. There are several cases of developers being treated tial ability to discern the programmer of a code sample from a large as individuals of suspicion, intimidated by authorities and/or co- group of possible authors could have concerning consequences for erced into removing their software from the Internet. In the US, the open-source community at large, particularly those contrib- Nadim Kobeissi, the Canadian creator of Cryptocat (an online se- utors that may wish to remain anonymous. Recent international cure messaging application) was stopped, searched, and questioned events have suggested the developers of certain anti-censorship by Department of Homeland Security officials on four separate oc- and anti-surveillance tools are being targeted by their governments casions in 2012 about Cryptocat and the algorithms it employs [16]. and forced to delete their repositories or face prosecution. In November 2014, Chinese developer Xu Dong was arrested, pri- In light of this threat to the freedom and privacy of individual marily for political tweets, but also because he allegedly “committed programmers around the world, we devised a tool, Style Counsel, to crimes of developing software to help Chinese Internet users scale aid programmers in obfuscating their inherent style and imitating the Great Fire Wall of China” [4] in relation to proxy software he another, overt, author’s style in order to protect their anonymity wrote. -
Vyprvpn Auf Einem ASUS Router Einrichten “Schritt Für Schritt”
8.11.2019 Anleitung: ASUS Router mit VPN in Betrieb nehmen "Schritt für Schritt" mit VyprVPN - dem besten VPN-Service für sicheres Sufen Menue Anleitung: VyprVPN auf einem ASUS Router einrichten “Schritt für Schritt” von Markus Hanf Letzte Aktualisierung: 12. September 2019 Approbierter Mathematiker und Netzwerkspezialist. Dozent an einigen Universitäten. Es ist ganz einfach einen ASUS Router direkt in Betrieb zu nehmen, ganz unabhängig davon welchen Internetrouter Du derzeit verwendest. Wir haben einen ganzen Vorgang der Inbetriebnahme in einer Anleitung beschrieben. VPN Router Schematische Darstellung Einen VPN-Service direkt über den ASUS Router zu verwenden bietet die folgenden Vorteile: Alle Geräte (auch SmartTV, FireTV, AndroidTV, xBox usw) werden zuverlässig über VPN verbunden ohne Softwareinstallation. Die Firewall und die zusätzlichen Schutzfunktionen die im Router vorhanden sind lassen es zu, auch Kinder und Jugendliche vor Bedrohungen aus dem Internet zu schützen. (Malwareschutz, Sperren von Webseiten, Zugriff für bestimmte Apps auf Smartphones usw) Die gesamte Familie wird zuverlässig vor Abmahnungen und sonstigen Fallen im Internet geschützt, ohne dass dabei Software oder Apps auf den Geräten zusätzlich installiert werden müssen. Die Benutzer des Routers werden “Anonymisiert” und nutzen damit eine nicht direkt zuordenbare Internetadresse für alle täglichen Aktivitäten. Zuverlässiger Schutz aller Nutzer vor Überwachung und Vorratsdatenspeicherung und damit auch eine aktive Maßnahme für eine bessere Privatsphäre. Hilfe & Beratung -
Analysis of Privacy and Security Risks of Android VPN Apps
An Analysis of the Privacy and Security Risks of Android VPN Permission-enabled Apps Muhammad Ikram1;2, Narseo Vallina-Rodriguez3, Suranga Seneviratne1, Mohamed Ali Kaafar1, Vern Paxson3;4 1Data61, CSIRO 2UNSW 3ICSI 4UC Berkeley ABSTRACT to request the BIND_VPN_SERVICE permission (for sim- Millions of users worldwide resort to mobile VPN clients to plicity, the “VPN permission”) to create such clients. either circumvent censorship or to access geo-blocked con- Android’s official documentation highlights the serious tent, and more generally for privacy and security purposes. security concerns that the VPN permission raises: it allows In practice, however, users have little if any guarantees about an app to intercept and take full control over a user’s traf- the corresponding security and privacy settings, and perhaps fic [60]. Many apps may legitimately use the VPN permis- no practical knowledge about the entities accessing their mo- sion to offer (some form of) online anonymity or to enable bile traffic. access to censored content [84]. However, malicious app de- In this paper we provide a first comprehensive analysis velopers may abuse it to harvest users’ personal information. of 283 Android apps that use the Android VPN permission, In order to minimize possible misuse, Android alerts users which we extracted from a corpus of more than 1.4 million about the inherent risks of the VPN permission by display- apps on the Google Play store. We perform a number of ing system dialogues and notifications [60]. A large fraction passive and active measurements designed to investigate a of mobile users may however lack the necessary technical wide range of security and privacy features and to study the background to fully understand the potential implications. -
Practical Countermeasures Against Network Censorship
Practical Countermeasures against Network Censorship by Sergey Frolov B.S.I.T., Lobachevsky State University, 2015 M.S.C.S., University of Colorado, 2017 A thesis submitted to the Faculty of the Graduate School of the University of Colorado in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy Department of Computer Science 2020 Committee Members: Eric Wustrow, Chair Prof. Sangtae Ha Prof. Nolen Scaife Prof. John Black Prof. Eric Keller Dr. David Fifield ii Frolov, Sergey (Ph.D., Computer Science) Practical Countermeasures against Network Censorship Thesis directed by Prof. Eric Wustrow Governments around the world threaten free communication on the Internet by building increasingly complex systems to carry out Network Censorship. Network Censorship undermines citizens’ ability to access websites and services of their preference, damages freedom of the press and self-expression, and threatens public safety, motivating the development of censorship circumvention tools. Inevitably, censors respond by detecting and blocking those tools, using a wide range of techniques including Enumeration Attacks, Deep Packet Inspection, Traffic Fingerprinting, and Active Probing. In this dissertation, I study some of the most common attacks, actually adopted by censors in practice, and propose novel attacks to assist in the development of defenses against them. I describe practical countermeasures against those attacks, which often rely on empiric measurements of real-world data to maximize their efficiency. This dissertation also reports how this work has been successfully deployed to several popular censorship circumvention tools to help censored Internet users break free of the repressive information control. iii Acknowledgements I am thankful to many engineers and researchers from various organizations I had a pleasure to work with, including Google, Tor Project, Psiphon, Lantern, and several universities. -
The Hacker Infrastructure and Underground Hosting: Services Used by Criminals
The Hacker Infrastructure and Underground Hosting: Services Used by Criminals Vladimir Kropotov, Robert McArdle, and Fyodor Yarochkin TREND MICRO LEGAL DISCLAIMER The information provided herein is for general information Contents and educational purposes only. It is not intended and should not be construed to constitute legal advice. The information contained herein may not be applicable to all situations and may not reflect the most current situation. Nothing contained herein should be relied on or acted 4 upon without the benefit of legal advice based on the particular facts and circumstances presented and nothing herein should be construed otherwise. Trend Micro Criminal Applications of reserves the right to modify the contents of this document Underground Hosting at any time without prior notice. Translations of any material into other languages are intended solely as a convenience. Translation accuracy is not guaranteed nor implied. If any questions arise related to the accuracy of a translation, please refer to 7 the original language official version of the document. Any discrepancies or differences created in the translation are not binding and have no legal effect for compliance or Current Underground enforcement purposes. Infrastructure Services Although Trend Micro uses reasonable efforts to include accurate and up-to-date information herein, Trend Micro makes no warranties or representations of any kind as to its accuracy, currency, or completeness. You agree that access to and use of and reliance on this document 38 and -
Detecting Probe-Resistant Proxies
Detecting Probe-resistant Proxies Sergey Frolov Jack Wampler Eric Wustrow University of Colorado Boulder University of Colorado Boulder University of Colorado Boulder [email protected] [email protected] [email protected] Abstract—Censorship circumvention proxies have to resist ac- to have no discernible fingerprints or header fields, making tive probing attempts, where censors connect to suspected servers them difficult for censors to passively detect. However, censors and attempt to communicate using known proxy protocols. If the such as the Great Firewall of China (GFW) have started server responds in a way that reveals it is a proxy, the censor can actively probing suspected proxies by connecting to them and block it with minimal collateral risk to other non-proxy services. attempting to communicate using their custom protocols [18]. Censors such as the Great Firewall of China have previously been If a suspected server responds to a known circumvention observed using basic forms of this technique to find and block protocol, the censor can block them as confirmed proxies. proxy servers as soon as they are used. In response, circumventors have created new “probe-resistant” proxy protocols, including Active probing can be especially effective at detecting sus- obfs4, shadowsocks, and Lampshade, that attempt to prevent pected proxies, because censors can discover new servers as censors from discovering them. These proxies require knowledge they are used. Previous work has shown that China employs of a secret in order to use, and the servers remain silent when an extensive active probing architecture that is successful in probed by a censor that doesn’t have the secret in an attempt to blocking older circumvention protocols like vanilla Tor, obfs2 make it more difficult for censors to detect them. -
Forest for the Trees for Adversarial Code Stylometry
StyleCounsel: Seeing the (Random) Forest for the Trees in Adversarial Code Stylometry by Christopher McKnight A thesis presented to the University of Waterloo in fulfillment of the thesis requirement for the degree of Master of Mathematics in Computer Science Waterloo, Ontario, Canada, 2018 c Christopher McKnight 2018 I hereby declare that I am the sole author of this thesis. This is a true copy of the thesis, including any required final revisions, as accepted by my examiners. I understand that my thesis may be made electronically available to the public. ii Abstract Authorship attribution has piqued the interest of scholars for centuries, but had historically remained a matter of subjective opinion, based upon examination of handwriting and the physical document. Midway through the 20th Century, a technique known as stylometry was developed, in which the content of a document is analyzed to extract the author’s grammar use, preferred vocabulary, and other elements of compositional style. In parallel to this, programmers, and particularly those involved in education, were writing and testing systems designed to automate the analysis of good coding style and best practice, in order to assist with grading assignments. In the aftermath of the Morris Worm incident in 1988, researchers began to consider whether this automated analysis of program style could be combined with stylometry techniques and applied to source code, to identify the author of a program. The results of recent experiments have suggested this code stylometry can successfully iden- tify the author of short programs from among hundreds of candidates with up to 98% precision. This potential ability to discern the programmer of a sample of code from a large group of possible authors could have concerning consequences for the open-source community at large, particularly those contributors that may wish to remain anonymous. -
Internet Blackout Toolkit
M Y freedom of information S T freedom of speech E R freedom of press I U M L A B S 2 0 2 0 INTERNET BLACKOUT TOOLKIT YOUR PASS TO INTERNET FREEDOM Censorship is a tool for keeping people in the dark, until nobody remembers how to turn on the lights again. Don’t let digital darkness take away your human rights. Use this Internet Blackout Toolkit to help keep you online and burning bright. Internet blackout toolKit 2020 TOOLS UNBLOCK websites & apps & RESOURCES to help you bypass censorship, internet shutdowns and MYSTERIUM NETWORK MASSBROWSER FIREFLY 萤⽕⾍ surveillance Decentralised VPN for An alternative for A proxy software to unblocking any website public VPNs and HTTPS help circumvent the proxies Great Firewall TAILS BROWSER PSIPHON LANTERN Portable operating system Award-winning Proxy software to protect against circumvention system application for desktop surveillance & censorship and mobile Internet blackout toolKit 2020 ULTRASURF RUNET CLOUDFLARE DNS Bypasses Internet Chromium extension for Alternative DNS server censorship and firewalls bypassing censorship in to get around DNS-based using an HTTP proxy Russia blocks [1.1.1.1] server FREEGATE (WINDOWS) SHADOWSOCKS GOOGLE PUBLIC DNS An app for viewing Encryption protocol Alternative DNS server websites blocked by project, widely used in to get around DNS-based governments China to circumvent blocks [8.8.8.8] Internet censorship Internet blackout toolKit 2020 TOR BORWSER ORBOT WHONIX SILENCE Access blocked Access the internet Software that can Encrypt your SMS and websites anonymously -
The Great Firewall's Active Probing Circumvention Technique with Port
The Great Firewall’s active probing circumvention technique with port knocking and SDN Pavel Liubinskii School of Electrical Engineering Thesis submitted for examination for the degree of Master of Science in Technology. Espoo 31.12.2020 Supervisor Prof. Jukka Manner Advisor MSc Markus Peuhkuri Copyright © 2020 Pavel Liubinskii Aalto University, P.O. BOX 11000, 00076 AALTO www.aalto.fi Abstract of the master’s thesis Author Pavel Liubinskii Title The Great Firewall’s active probing circumvention technique with port knocking and SDN Degree programme Computer, Communication and Information Sciences Major Communications Engineering Code of major ELEC24 Supervisor Prof. Jukka Manner Advisor MSc Markus Peuhkuri Date 31.12.2020 Number of pages 65 Language English Abstract This thesis observes the phenomenon of online censorship, both from blocking and mitigation perspectives. It enumerates and characterizes typical methods and types of Internet censorship, as well as effective circumvention solutions and strategies. Additionally, the study provides detailed observations of the Great Firewall, the ultimate weapon of a Chinese censor, and the Tor anonymity network, the broadly recognized anti-censorship and anti-surveillance tool. Furthermore, it illuminates the Tor network blocking and the firewall’s scanning engine (active probing), which is used to detect mitigating servers. The results of the study indicate that 1) The Tor network is heavily suppressed in China; 2) Active probing technique still contributes to blocking decisions; and 3) The Great Firewall successfully engages blocking against obfs4 Tor bridges. Finally, the work suggests a solution for bypassing the Great Firewall using a traffic engineering approach, i.e., software-defined networking and the well-known port knocking technique. -
Florida Socks5 Proxy
Florida Socks5 Proxy For more information about what our SOCKS 5 proxy server is and how to use it, see our SOCKS 5 Proxy article. Choose from contactless Same Day Delivery, Drive Up and more. OpenVPN is the world's most popular VPN protocol for all platforms including Windows, Mac OSX, Linux, iOS and Android. WinGate is highly capable web proxy software for Windows: caching, intercepting, forward and reverse proxy with https inspection and SSL offload, SOCKS server, email. Protect yourself with our secure VPN tunnel. I Netflix Keeps Detecting My Proxy Nordvpn tested different VPNs for 1 last update 2020/10/07 Netflix, BBC iPlayer and some events streaming. Packages starting at $3. 234:8080 79. Buy Private Socks5 & HTTPs Proxies from Proxy-Seller for any Purpose. org! Proxy Servers from Fineproxy - High-Quality Proxy Servers Are Just What You Need. They combine the critical security functions you need to safely adopt cloud and mobile technologies, while strengthening your security and compliance:. If are having difficulties. RFC 1928(SOCKS Protocol Version 5). Our proxy list service supports all systems, including Windows, Mac, Linux, Android, and iOS. This will create a proxy defaults at 127. There are two types of Socks proxy protocols: Socks 4 and Socks 5. Now I have a 2-year subscription for no reason. 0 a standard socks V5 server for POSIX System. Simply Socks Yarn Company is your online sock yarn store. 162:1080 12. Here is an article about socks proxy and http proxy. All our proxies use the socks5 protocol with strong encryption to ensure highest anonymity!.