Document of The World Bank

Public Disclosure Authorized Report No: ICR2790

IMPLEMENTATION COMPLETION AND RESULTS REPORT (TF-94475)

ON A GRANT

Public Disclosure Authorized IN THE AMOUNT OF US$6 MILLION

TO THE

REPUBLIC OF SUDAN

FOR A

ABYEI START UP EMERGENCY PROJECT

Public Disclosure Authorized

June 13, 2013

Post Conflict and Social Development Practice Group (AFTCS) Sudan Country Department Africa Region

Public Disclosure Authorized

CURRENCY EQUIVALENTS

(Exchange Rate Effective June 13, 2013)

Currency Unit = Sudanese Pounds 1.00 SDG = US$0.23 US$1.00 = 4.41 SDG

FISCAL YEAR January 1 – December 31

ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS

AAA Abyei Area Administration ASEP Abyei Start-up Emergency Project CIFA Country Integrated Fiduciary Assessment CPA Comprehensive Peace Agreement DA Designated Account DIPU Abyei Department of Infrastructure and Public Utilities EA Environmental Assessment ESMF Environmental and Social Management Framework FMFA Financial Management Framework Agreement FPP Final Project Proposal GoNU Sudan Government of National Unity GoSS Government of South Sudan ICB International Competitive Bidding IDPs Internally Displaced People IPP Initial Project Proposal ISM Implementation Support Mission JAM Joint Assessment Mission LIB Limited International Bidding MA Monitoring Agent MDTF Multi Donor Trust Fund MOFNE Ministry of Finance and National Economy MOU Memorandum of Understanding MTR Mid-term Review MWMP Medical Waste Management Plan NCB National Competitive Bidding NCP National Congress Party NGO Non Governmental Organization OC Oversight Committee OP/BP Operational Policy / Bank Procedures PAD Project Appraisal Document PER Public Expenditure Review PCU Project Coordination Unit PFM Public Financial Management PMP Pest Management Plan PO Procurement Officer PSC Project Steering Committee QCBS Quality and Cost-Based Selection

RRR Return, Reintegration, Repatriation SOE Statement of Expenditures SPLM Sudan Peoples’ Liberation Movement TA Technical Assistance TTL Task Team Leader UN United Nations UNMIS United Nations Mission to Sudan UXO Unexploded Ordnances

Vice President: Makhtar Diop Country Director: Bella Bird Sector Manager: Ian Bannon Project Team Leader: Abderrahim Fraiji ICR Team Leader: Yousif Elfadil ICR Primary Author: Anthony Finn

SUDAN Abyei Start Up Emergency Project

CONTENTS Data Sheet A. Basic Information B. Key Dates C. Ratings Summary D. Sector and Theme Codes E. Bank Staff F. Results Framework Analysis G. Ratings of Project Performance in ISRs H. Restructuring I. Disbursement Graph

1. Project Context, Development Objectives and Design ...... 1 1.1 Context at Appraisal ...... 1 2. Project Development Objectives and Key Indicators ...... 2 1.3 Revised PDO (as approved by original approving authority) and Key Indicators, and reasons/justification ...... 2 1.4 Main Beneficiaries ...... 3 1.5 Original Components (as approved) ...... 3 1.6 Revised Components ...... 4 1.7 Other Significant Changes ...... 4 2. Key Factors Affecting Implementation and Outcomes ...... 4 2.1 Project Preparation, Design and Quality at Entry ...... 5 2.2 Implementation ...... 6 2.3 Monitoring and Evaluation (M&E) Design, Implementation and Utilization ...... 8 2.4 Safeguard and Fiduciary Compliance ...... 10 2.5 Post-completion Operation/Next Phase ...... 11 3. Assessment of Outcomes ...... 11 3.1 Relevance of Objectives, Design and Implementation ...... 11 3.2 Achievement of Project Development Objectives ...... 12 3.3 Efficiency ...... 13 3.4 Justification of Overall Outcome Rating ...... 13 3.5 Overarching Themes, Other Outcomes and Impacts ...... 14 3.6 Summary of Findings of Beneficiary Survey and/or Stakeholder Workshops ... 14 4. Assessment of Risk to Development Outcome ...... 14 5. Assessment of Bank and Grantee Performance ...... 14 5.1 Bank Performance ...... 14 5.2 Grantee Performance ...... 16 6. Lessons Learned ...... 17 7. Comments on Issues Raised by Grantee/Implementing Agencies/Partners ...... 19 Annex 1. Project Costs and Financing ...... 20 Annex 2. Outputs by Component ...... 21

Annex 3. Economic and Financial Analysis ...... 22 Annex 4. Bank Lending and Implementation Support/Supervision Processes ...... 23 Annex 5. Beneficiary Survey Results ...... 24 Annex 6. Stakeholder Workshop Report and Results ...... 25 Annex 7. Summary of Grantee's ICR and/or Comments on Draft ICR ...... 26 Annex 8. Comments of Cofinanciers and Other Partners/Stakeholders ...... 27 Annex 9. List of Supporting Documents ...... 28

MAP

A. Basic Information Abyei Start Up Country: Sudan Project Name: Emergency Project Project ID: P116923 L/C/TF Number(s): TF-94475 ICR Date: 06/13/2013 ICR Type: Core ICR GOVERNMENT OF Lending Instrument: ERL Grantee: NATIONAL UNITY- SUDAN Original Total USD 6.00M Disbursed Amount: USD 2.46M Commitment: Revised Amount: USD 2.46M Environmental Category: B Implementing Agencies: ABYEI AREA ADMINISTRATION Cofinanciers and Other External Partners:

B. Key Dates Revised / Actual Process Date Process Original Date Date(s) Concept Review: 04/16/2009 Effectiveness: 10/06/2009 Appraisal: 04/27/2009 Restructuring(s): Approval: 05/01/2009 Mid-term Review: 10/13/2010 Closing: 06/30/2011 06/30/2011

C. Ratings Summary C.1 Performance Rating by ICR Outcomes: Highly Unsatisfactory Risk to Development Outcome: High Bank Performance: Moderately Satisfactory Grantee Performance: Highly Unsatisfactory

C.2 Detailed Ratings of Bank and Grantee Performance (by ICR) Bank Ratings Grantee Ratings Quality at Entry: Moderately Satisfactory Government: Highly Unsatisfactory Implementing Quality of Supervision: Moderately Satisfactory Highly Unsatisfactory Agency/Agencies: Overall Bank Overall Grantee Moderately Satisfactory Highly Unsatisfactory Performance: Performance:

C.3 Quality at Entry and Implementation Performance Indicators Implementation QAG Assessments Indicators Rating Performance (if any) Potential Problem Project Quality at Entry No None at any time (Yes/No): (QEA): Problem Project at any Quality of Yes None time (Yes/No): Supervision (QSA): DO rating before Moderately

Closing/Inactive status: Unsatisfactory

D. Sector and Theme Codes Original Actual Sector Code (as % of total Bank financing) Crops 20 20 Health 20 20 Sub-national government administration 40 40 Water supply 20 20

Theme Code (as % of total Bank financing) Conflict prevention and post-conflict reconstruction 75 75 Decentralization 2 2 Other rural development 10 10 Rural services and infrastructure 10 10 Water resource management 3 3

E. Bank Staff Positions At ICR At Approval Vice President: Makhtar Diop Obiageli Katryn Ezekwesili Country Director: Bella Bird Kenichi Ohashi Sector Manager: Ian Bannon Ian Bannon Project Team Leader: Abderrahim Fraiji Abderrahim Fraiji ICR Team Leader: Yousif Elfadil ICR Primary Author: Anthony Finn

F. Results Framework Analysis

Project Development Objectives (from Project Appraisal Document) To contribute in equipping the Abyei local administrations with the resources to oversee recovery of the conflict-affected region and to supply some basic services and rural livelihood support in targeted areas.

Revised Project Development Objectives (as approved by original approving authority)

(a) PDO Indicator(s)

Original Target Formally Actual Value Baseline Values (from Revised Achieved at Indicator Value approval Target Completion or documents) Values Target Years 60% of the Abyei Road Map 0 60 10 recovery plan achieved # Of representative inter-group/ cross-political planning meetings 0 4 2 held by the four local administration bodies. 50 % increase in use of Abyei 0 50 0 hospital. 60% of water sources delivered by project being maintained and 0 60 0 operated 12 months after delivery. 30% increase in agricultural production in targeted areas of 0 30 10 livelihood support. Beneficiaries Direct Project Beneficiaries 0 150,000 10,000 Direct Project Beneficiaries of 0 40,000 4,000 which female

(b) Intermediate Outcome Indicator(s)

Original Target Actual Value Formally Baseline Values (from Achieved at Indicator Revised Value approval Completion or Target Values documents) Target Years Component1: Local administration Support 12 IT users among the 4 administrations’ staff able to use IT 0 12 4 equipment frequency of meetings with community leaders increased by 0 50 0 50% visits to the local areas increased by 0 50 20 local authorities by 50% publication/ dissemination of local authority plans on a regular/ N y N quarterly basis Component 2: Water Supply 5 new water yards are constructed, providing access to 30,000 people 0 5 0 and 50,000 livestock 50 new hand pumps are constructed 0 50 0 providing access to 25,000 people 5 new hafirs are constructed 0 5 0 providing access to 50,000 livestock total number of water points in 0 60 0

Abyei increased to 60 Community water resource management committees are 0 60 20 implemented and trained to resource management A unit is implemented and trained for maintenance of water supply N Y N system). Reported cases of conflicts between N Y N farmers and herders decrease Component 3: Rural Development (Agriculture) 4 localities (12,500 households) are provided with hand tools, for a total 0 12500 0 of 62,500 beneficiaries. 750 sacks of sorghum seed have 0 750 750 been disseminated. 5,000 households or 25,000 people are provided with essential 0 10,000 0 equipment, leading to a community cultivation of 10,000 feddans Component 4: Contributing to the rehabilitation of Abyei Hospital (Health) Increase of the number of patients 50 250 0 treated to 250 outpatients/day Increase to 7-8 deliveries/week. 2 8 0 Improved treatment for 7-10 new 0 10 0 admissions/day. Component 5: Project management through the implementation of a Project Coordination Unit (PCU) PCU fully installed and equipped N Y Y PCU Staff trained on accounting, procurement and project N Y N management issues Frequent field visits on project sites N Y Y

G. Ratings of Project Performance in ISRs

Actual Date ISR No. DO IP Disbursements Archived (USD millions) 1 12/01/2009 Satisfactory Satisfactory 0.74 Moderately Moderately 2 05/20/2010 0.74 Unsatisfactory Unsatisfactory Moderately Moderately 3 02/06/2011 1.47 Unsatisfactory Unsatisfactory

H. Restructuring (if any) Not Applicable

I. Disbursement Profile

1. Project Context, Development Objectives and Design 1.1 Context at Appraisal 1. The Abyei Start-up Emergency Project (ASEP) is one of the interventions flowing from the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) directed at improving basic services, consolidating peace, and maintaining stability in conflict-affected areas of Sudan. The ASEP Grant Agreement was signed on August 8, 2009 and became effective on October 6, 2009, with an original closing date of June 30, 2011. 2. ASEP became effective four years after the signing of the historic CPA when Sudan was embarking on a slow transition from managing conflict to pursuing pro-poor development. This transition was characterized by high needs, limited and uneven capacity, as well as on-going security and stabilization risks. 3. The 2005 CPA made a provision for 70 per cent of National Development Reconstruction Funds to be targeted to the least developed states in Northern Sudan, reflecting the recovery and development needs of these areas, as well as their pivotal role in sustained peace and security. Within this group of least developed States, the particular status of the three areas (Abyei, Blue Nile, and South Kordofan) was recognized in the CPA through specific protocols. These protocols establish a special status under the Presidency for the three areas with their own constitution and legislative bodies. 4. The first Sudan Consortium, held in Paris on March 9-10, 2006, noted that since the signing of the CPA, the three transitional areas had not received the expected resources, thus aggravating the existing political instability in the region. The quick formulation and start-up of a recovery project – including quick impact interventions – was both expected and desired. 5. Abyei is one of the areas that suffered most from insecurity due to the conflict between the Misseriya and the Dinka tribes over natural resources (water and pasture).1 This conflict was exacerbated by the long civil war between the Government of Sudan (GoS) and Sudan People’s Liberation Movement/Army (SPLM/A) forces. Abyei is a key area in the transitional zone between the drought prone north and war affected south. 6. Abyei experienced relative stability during 1999-2001. Local leadership of the Dinka Ngok and Misseriya initiated and signed an Agreement in December 2001 to maintain peace and security in the area. This Agreement was relatively respected by both the GoSS and the SPLM, enabling both tribes to co-exist more peacefully. As a result, three resettlement villages, supported by UN agencies and local non-governmental organizations (NGOs), were established in March 2002, to accommodate 300 households each. IDPs returned to two villages in May and June 2003. Thousands of them returned to Abyei County from the north and other counties south of Abyei in 2002, 2003, and 2005.2 7. The situation in Abyei is characterized by political and security instability. This is mainly attributed to the delayed implementation of the CPA and the total absence of civil administration structures prior to the signing of the Abyei Road Map and its establishment of the Abyei Area Administration (AAA). At time of appraisal, people in Abyei continued to experience food deficits due to insecurity, restricted access to productive assets, and continuous population displacement that has escalated over the last 10 years. As a result, the Abyei population was almost totally dependent on external aid to meet food needs. ASEP sought to address the key development issues in the area,

1 Abyei has an estimated population of 315,500. The main ethnic group is the Dinka tribe, which is divided into several sub-groups including: Dinka Ngok, Alor, Jok, Twic, Malual, Rec Bor, Luac, and Abeim. The other main ethnic group is the nomadic Arab Misseriya represented by the main sub-groups Humur, Ajaira, Falayta and Zurug. 2 During 2007 as per the planning assumptions of the Return Reintegration Repatriation (RRR) group it was estimated that 41,000 households were expected to return from outside and within the state to their places of origin (6,000 organized returning IDPs, and 35,000 spontaneous returnees).

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particularly socio-economic issues including access to basic services, local government infrastructure, and the general economic development of the population through improved agriculture. 8. ASEP was designed to align with the priorities of the Abyei Road Map. The President, under recommendation from the Chief and Deputy Chief Administrators, appointed heads of departments and members of the Abyei Area Council to the following departments in local governance: Legislative Assembly, Agriculture, Infrastructure and Public Utilities, Social Services, Legal, Finance and General Secretariat. 3 This arrangement was replicated in the appointment of the four local administrations of Agok, Amethaguak, Majak and Alal in the Local Governance, Social Services, Financial and Administrative, and Executive Administrations. 9. The AAA was accorded special status and prior to its dissolution by the Government of National Unity (GoNU) on May 21, 2011, performed its functions as per the provisions of the Abyei Protocol of the CPA. When functional, it represented a serious attempt at North-South collaboration in the administration of the disputed Abyei region, and was jointly staffed by Dinka and Misseriya, as well as both ruling party representatives. 2. Project Development Objectives and Key Indicators

10. The original Project Development Objective was to contribute in equipping the Abyei local administrations with the resources to oversee recovery of the conflict-affected region and to supply some basic services and rural livelihood support in targeted areas. 11. The key PDO performance indicators at time of design were:

1. 60% of the Abyei Road Map recovery plan achieved; 2. number of representative inter-group/cross-political planning meetings held by the four local administration bodies;4 3. 50 % increase in use of Abyei hospital; 4. 60% of water sources delivered by project being maintained and operated 12 months after delivery; and 5. 30% increase in agricultural production in targeted areas of livelihood support. 1.3 Revised PDO (as approved by original approving authority) and Key Indicators, and reasons/justification

12. The PDO remained unchanged throughout the lifetime of the project. Following the Mid-term Review (MTR), substantial revisions were made to KPIs (both PDO and intermediate), including the removal of many intermediate KPIs. One rationale informing these revisions was alignment with Core Indicators.

3 The Abyei Road Map Agreement was signed by the GoNU and the Government of South Sudan (GoSS) in June 2008. The Agreement has four components: Security Arrangements, Return of IDPs, Interim Arrangements for Abyei Administration, and Arrangements for Final Settlements. 4 n = unspecified

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Table 1 - Revised PDO KPIs as per MTR Revised PDO indicators Change and rationale for change Direct project beneficiaries (number) of which are New indicator: Alignment with mandatory Core Indicator female (percentage)

Local governments that have resumed core Replaces: “number of representative inter-group/ cross- functions (number) political planning meetings held by the four local administration bodies.” Alignment with mandatory Core Indicator People provided with access to “improved water Replaces: “60% of water sources delivered by project sources” under the project (number) being maintained and operated 12 months after delivery.” Alignment with mandatory Core Indicator Farmers adopting new technologies (number of Replaces: “30% increase in agricultural production in households) targeted areas of livelihood support.” Revised as per MTR recommendations. Health facilities constructed, renovated and/or Replaces: “50 % increase in use of Abyei hospital”. equipped Alignment with mandatory Core Indicator. 13. Intermediate results indicators were also revised mainly in line with MTR recommendations and/or to align with mandatory Core Indicators. All indicators pertaining to the PCU were deemed irrelevant and dropped from the results framework.

Table 2 - Revised intermediate KPIs as per MTR Revised intermediate results indicators Change and rationale for change Administrative buildings built, rehabilitated or Revised from PAD. Alignment with mandatory Core equipped (number) Indicator Improved community water points constructed or rehabilitated under the project: hand pumps Revised from PAD. Alignment with mandatory Core constructed; water yards constructed; hafirs Indicator constructed. Number of water points recovering operation and Revised as per MTR recommendations maintenance costs (number) Farmers provided with new seeds (number) and Revised as per MTR recommendations. tools (number) Increase in number of patients visiting rehabilitated hospital facilities and receiving one or more of the Alignment with mandatory Core Indicator following basic package of health, nutrition or population services (percent increase based on number of people) 1.4 Main Beneficiaries 14. The main beneficiaries (direct and indirect) of the project are the general and conflict-affected population of the Abyei region. 1.5 Original Components (as approved) 15. The original Program had the following five components: 1. Component 1: Local Administration Support (US$1.197 million - Implementing Agency: PCU) was intended to make local authorities more visible and provide them with the basic physical means to function. The Component envisaged the construction of a headquarter (HQ) with four offices and one meeting room for each of the four local administrations, totaling 16 furnished offices and four meeting rooms across the four localities, as well as the procurement of supporting equipment and vehicles.

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2. Component 2: Water Supply (US$2.952 million - Implementing Agency: PCU) was intended to support the construction and rehabilitation of water sources throughout Abyei with the objective of improving access to potable water on a reasonable per capita basis for both human and livestock watering needs.

3. Component 3: Rural Development [Agriculture] (US$0.903 million - Implementing Agency: PCU and Agricultural Department of the AAA) was intended to contribute toward restoring productivity to the sector, which had been disrupted by 20 years of war and hampered by lack of equipment and resources. The Component envisaged the procurement of essential equipment which will raise productivity beyond subsistence levels.

4. Component 4: Contributing to the Rehabilitation of Abyei Hospital [Health] (US$0.4005 million - Implementing Agency: Abyei Social Services Department of the AAA and the PCU) was intended to contribute to the rehabilitation of the major departments in Abyei Hospital (laboratory, delivery room, operation and small theatres) and provide necessary basic equipment for all respective departments to function.

5. Component 5: Project Management (US$0.5475 million - Implementing Agency: PCU for sub-components) established a PCU within the AAA and provided for comprehensive technical assistance (TA), including in FM, procurement, project management, and monitoring. The established PCU staff, assisted by Bank staff, was responsible for ensuring efficient implementation of the Environmental and Social Management Framework (ESMF) in collaboration with relevant technical line Ministries and their international counterparts. 1.6 Revised Components N/A 1.7 Other Significant Changes 16. Due to the poor performance of the project, the Bank team considered closing ASEP early. Following the MTR follow-up mission in March-April 2011, the Bank agreed to extend the project to June 30, 2012 to ensure achievement of Bank conditions. A condition which remained unmet since December 2010 was that the AAA recruit a full-time experienced Procurement Officer (PO). Because the granting of the extension hinged on meeting these conditions, the Bank held off on processing the extension. During this time, the security of Abyei began to deteriorate and the State was placed under Sudan Armed Forces (SAF) administration, which led the Bank to close the Project as originally scheduled on June 30, 2011 (Bank projects cannot be administered with military counterparts). Although the Bank closed the project on the original date, agreement was secured for retroactive extension of the project if and when the political and security situation were to make it possible. This decision was taken because: (i) prior to security and political disruptions, the AAA had been taking steps to get the project back on track; (ii) of the special situation of Abyei; and (iii) encouragement by The Netherlands, DFID and Norway (the three main MDTF-N donors) who emphasized the need to show flexibility and readiness to engage in the fragile environment when it is possible to do so. 2. Key Factors Affecting Implementation and Outcomes 17. ASEP failed to achieve its PDO despite good project preparation, good project design, and the provision of close implementation support to the PCU by the Bank team and relevant specialists. Rather than direct stability/conflict-related challenges being the primary factors impacting the implementation and outcomes of the project, the very weak performance of the PCU and AAA constituted the primary barrier to project success. Regional instability and the eventual dissolution of the AAA are secondary factors negatively influencing the performance of the project.

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2.1 Project Preparation, Design and Quality at Entry 18. Project preparation and design were responsive to the emerging policy frameworks, new administration arrangements for Abyei, and aligned with donor and GoNU strategy in peace-building, stabilization and recovery. It followed similar projects in the other two transition areas (South Kordofan and Blue Nile State) and learnt from the preparation and implementation of both projects, particularly by ensuring that project preparation including the formulation of all key project documents was carried out in a timely and comprehensive manner. Implementation of ASEP differed from emergency projects in the other two transition States in that it did not include components to be implemented by UN agencies and (largely because the project was procurement-focused) it did not have the excessive counterpart funding requirements. The decision not to include a counterpart funding requirement was a response to the difficulties experienced by the Bank team around the two other transitional areas. GoNU voluntarily committed SDG 1 million (US$0.4 million) to meet ineligible expenses. 19. By design, the project was an emergency response in a highly fragile and conflict-affected environment which did not have a significant history of Bank engagement. The Bank re-engaged with Sudan in 2004 after a gap of nearly 10 years; however, normal financial support from IDA at the time of re-engagement was (and is currently) not possible due to Sudan’s outstanding arrears accumulated since 1993 and estimated at US$600 million. The project was located in a difficult emergency environment made all the more challenging by the risks and complexity of operating in a transitional area; that is, one which was under temporary administration pending resolution of constitutional status, and without necessary infrastructure, governance capacity, or Bank implementation experience. 20. The strategic context to project preparation and design included: (i) the 2005 CPA, in particular the Abyei Protocol between the Government of Sudan and the SPLM/A on resolution of the Abyei conflict; (ii) the 2008 Road Map for the return of IDPs and implementation of the Abyei Protocol; (iii) the 2005 Joint Assessment Mission (JAM) and subsequent GoNU 5-year Strategic Plan (2007-01); and (iv) Bank strategy in the country, specifically the Sudan Country Re-engagement Note (2003) and the ISN 2008-09. The project aligned with all instruments. 21. Strengths of project design include its alignment with the CPA, which set the stage for recovery, reconstruction and development efforts to sustain and consolidate peace. The project intended to address the socio-economic focus in the CPA through its activities, which sought to contribute to restoring productivity to the rural agriculture sector by the purchase and supply of agricultural equipment (Component 3). It addressed the institutional development component of the CPA by providing the AAA with the basic infrastructure and equipment in order to raise the profile of local authorities and contribute to their ability to function (Component 1, and partially Component 5). The project also intended to contribute to basic access to services, including potable water and medical care (Components 2 and 5). 22. The project also aligned with the priorities of the donor-led JAM, which assessed and identified the development needs of Sudan and emphasized eight sectors, thematic clusters and cross-cutting issues, and later the GoNU Strategic Plan. Specifically, the project addressed: (i) institutional development and capacity building; (ii) productive sectors; (iii) basic social services; (iv) infrastructure; and (v) livelihood and social protection. 23. The project was designed with strong fiduciary and environmental safeguards measures, including close monitoring by the Bank team to reduce fiduciary risks. The design of an M&E framework was weak, however, in that it focused on outputs rather than outcomes and eventual impacts, despite realignment with Bank Core Indicators during the MTR. KPIs were largely oriented toward measuring outputs that, while they assisted project monitoring (as evidenced in the reporting of the MA), are not accurate indicators of impact. A baseline was planned and the Bank recruited a consultant and support team to conduct the survey, but the Project Coordinator (PC) of the PCU did not cooperate with the study. As a result, the 2006 Household Survey was utilized for baseline measurement.

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24. Similar to other MDTF-N projects, the PDO for ASEP focused on what the project intended to do rather than what it intended to achieve. The PDO was too broadly configured to identify the expected contribution of the project to recovery and peace-building. As an emergency project, ASEP did not have a Quality at Entry review. 25. At design, the identification and management of risks was moderately satisfactory, but the risk of low government and public administration capacity was not explicitly identified in the PAD. The project was designed with strong and realistic risk mitigation measures. Overall, the risks to the project were rated substantial in the PAD, with three categories of risks as well as issues pertaining to project complexity and implementing partners identified during project design: (i) socio political (High), fiduciary (High), and project delivery (high). 26. Socio-political risks were largely beyond the control of the project. However, measures aimed at mitigating other risks would have contributed toward the management of instability inherent in the external environment. These measures include designing the project as an emergency intervention with the aim of a fast disbursements, focus on procurement, and achievement of results where the “quick wins” success of the project can mitigate the potential negative impact of slow project effectiveness on confidence and community buy-in, thus contributing toward stabilization. 27. The project achieved limited outcomes, and (at time of ICR) there is no fresh data regarding the condition of project outcomes as the PCU, Project Steering Committee (PSC) and AAA are dissolved, staff are dispersed and access to Abyei is restricted. It is very likely that given renewed violence between SAF and SPLM-N in Abyei any gains made by the project on the rehabilitation of infrastructure are marginal with limited if any sustainability. 2.2 Implementation 28. ASEP critically underperformed and failed to achieve its PDO. During implementation, the project experienced complex and challenging internal (project) and external (environmental) challenges that necessitated the Bank team to take remedial actions, closely monitor implementation, and attempt to mitigate the increasing fiduciary and reputational risks of the failing project. When the project closed, as scheduled (on June 30, 2011), the Bank team obtained RVP approval for retroactive extension should the security and political situation improve. The Bank showed significant flexibility to keep the grant balance on hold until September 11, 2012 before finally releasing this balance to the MDTF-N pool. By this time, the situation in Abyei had still not been resolved (and had it resolved, there was insufficient time remaining in the life of the MDTF-N to allow for project’s implementation). 29. Abyei (like Blue Nile and South Kordofan) was and is characterized by significant conflicts, lack of infrastructure and communications, as well as negligible governance and institutional capacity, all exacerbated by its status as a transitional area. During project implementation, Abyei’s complex environment was dominated by fragility and conflict, and toward the closing of the project the environment deteriorated further, resulting in the effective cancellation of the Abyei protocol through the removal of the SPLM chairman of the AAA, the dissolution of the authority under presidential decree and the appointment of an SAF administrator under direct supervision of the GoNU Presidential Affairs Minister. These events, which occurred on May 21, 2011, approximately six weeks before the formal proclamation of the Republic of South Sudan on July 9, 2011, exemplify the conditions in which the project was implemented, and the difficulties of implementing a project in this kind of fragile environment. Nevertheless, they do not fully account for the acute under-performance of ASEP. 30. ASEP underperformed from its early days until it was closed. Consequently, key questions are: (i) what progress was made in implementation? (ii) what were the implementation challenges experienced by the project?; (iii) to what extent was the Bank team aware of the challenges?; and (iv) what remedial action(s) did the Bank team take to address the challenges? When assessing Bank performance in

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implementation, it is important to assess whether steps taken by the Bank team to deal with the total lack of progress in the project were appropriate and timely. 31. ASEP achieved none of its PDO KPIs, its output was limited to the procurement and distribution of seeds to 10,000 (target: 150,000) farmers (the KPI for which is poorly formulated as “30% increase in agricultural production in targeted areas of livelihood support”). This output is tracked in the Bank M&E Framework but does not appear in any report produced by a monitoring agent (MA) under the project. The Bank team accurately tracked and reported poor implementation performance in official reporting and supervision notes. From the first and second implementation support missions (ISMs) and on to the MTR, the Bank team evaluated the project’s deteriorating performance in terms that characterize the project as going from “substantial accomplishments” to having “sub-optimal performance”.56 32. The project encountered the following implementation challenges: 1. Slow start-up of activities: within five months of becoming effective, the project required the Bank team to take over start-up duties normally executed by the PCU. 2. Weak and dysfunctional PCU capacity: the PCU required early TA in procurement and FM. Effectively, key staff members in the PCU (principally FM and procurement) were prevented from performing by the PC and the Unit became incapable of producing results and mired in conflicts of interest with severe fiduciary risk. This resulted in project implementation ceasing, despite tight monitoring and management by the Bank team. 3. Unstable political and security environment: the political and security environment in Abyei deteriorated throughout the project life cycle until final dissolution of the AAA.7 33. Slow start-up of activities. The project had a late disbursement of initial funds to the PCU in November 2009 (the GA was signed on July 9, 2009), but there were some initial outputs in advance of disbursement (October–November), including the recruitment and basic training of the PCU, as well as the hiring of two consultants to prepare various estimates for construction activities. During the five months following disbursement and up until the end of the first quarter of 2010, project activities continued to be only preparatory and limited to: (i) staffing of all key positions in the PCU; (ii) assessments for civil works; and (iii) procurement of laptop computers. By one year into the project (since signing of GA), it had achieved no real progress; rather, the PCU exhibited signs of internal dysfunction. In 2009, the PCU’s apparent progress in producing consultancy reports for civil works was actually a result of the Bank team commissioning two consultancies with Bank funds (normally done through project funds). Project output was its support of the 2010 agricultural season in through the distribution of seeds and the procurement of assets. Post MTR, the AAA became more involved in trying to improve project performance, and the project procured goods which, due to the outbreak of conflict, were returned to Khartoum to be stored by MoFNE. Contractors were also mobilized to engage in civil works (mainly water drilling) but this too was abandoned due to the deteriorating security situation. 34. Weak and dysfunctional PCU. The PCU required TA and capacity building at start-up, particularly in procurement and FM, which is common in a project with little capacity or familiarity with Bank procedures; similar support was given by the Bank team to the other emergency projects in Blue Nile State and South Kordofan. The procedure followed by the Bank team mirrored that applied in other projects and included direct TA and the hiring of an international procurement specialist to assist the PCU. By MTR, the Bank team had either jointly with MoFNE or separately (as did MoFNE) carried out two ISMs (December 2009 and April-May 2010) as well as numerous progress meetings and problem solving

5 ISM, November-December 2009. 6 MTR AM November 2010. 7 The dissolution of the AAA contributed to the PCU members leaving Abyei. Most are not contactable and only one was available for consultation to inform this ICR.

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sessions with the PC, all with little effect. Over time, the performance of the PCU deteriorated, staff contracts were not renewed on time (this occurred by September 2009), and the Procurement Officer (PO) was effectively removed by the PC from the PCU. This coincided with the Financial Manager moving to Khartoum, so all the key project activities in Abyei were being managed by the PC, with what would appear to be cursory support from a Procurement Assistant. Where possible, the “overwhelmed” International Procurement Specialist would assist (remotely), but in effect there was a clear conflict of interest whereby the PC was handling all coordination and procurement, while the Project Steering Committee (PSC) was “non-functional, denying the project the required close monitoring”.89 By Q1 (2011), the PCU was operating without work or procurement plans, revised budgets, disbursement forecasts, and was itself over budget by 32 per cent. 35. The situation, which deteriorated over time, was noted and monitored by the Bank team through ISMs and the MTR, and was raised in official correspondence with the AAA Governor on May 18, 2011. Beginning with the first ISM, the Bank team utilized revised action plans for the PCU and the AAA on implementation and fiduciary activities. The MTR noted the “sub-optimal” performance of the project in practically every area, and it proposed renewed action plans, project dashboards and monthly monitoring meetings between the Bank team, PCU, and MoFNE. The MTR follow-up mission of March-April 2011 was highly critical of the project, and in correspondence with the AAA Governor the Bank team noted the key barriers to project implementation as continuing unsatisfactory: (i) project management by the PCU, support and decision making by the AAA, and (iii) support and decision making by the PSC. 36. Critically unstable political and security environment. The environment in which ASEP was to be implemented was highly fragile and similar to that in the other two areas where emergency projects were being implemented. At appraisal, the project correctly identified that Abyei had a critically unstable political and security environment and rated socio-political risks to the project as High. The project identified that the non-implementation of the CPA and Abyei Road Map constituted the main political and security risks to the project. Key risks were realized and violence was ever-present, either through inter-ethnic conflict (between Dinka and Misseriya), banditry, or between SPLM and SAF. Eventually, GoNU effectively cancelled the Abyei Protocol following independence of South Sudan, dissolved the AAA, and took direct administrative control of the State. 37. Apart from the security situation resulting in the eventual closure of the project, it also appeared that during the project life cycle some contractors and suppliers were reluctant to engage with the project due to the presence of armed militia and armed nomadic herdsmen. Procurement was so badly compromised by the PC and the PCU that it is possible that in reality, contractors were not as reluctant as the PCU presented in its reporting. 38. The project did not achieve any PDO KPIs or intermediate KPIs throughout its life cycle. 2.3 Monitoring and Evaluation (M&E) Design, Implementation and Utilization 39. There are conflicting messages about the design, implementation and utilization between the official project documentation and the MA. On the one hand, the PAD identifies that “a strong monitoring and evaluation (M&E) function is critical to this project” and that this function will entail:

8 Throughout the MA reports for 2010 the relationship between the PC and Procurement Assistant is described as having a lack of adequate segregation of duties. During consultations for the ICR Bank, non-Bank specialists and the ASEP PCU FM all described the situation where the PO’s contract was not renewed and a Procurement Assistant was utilized as one where the PC removed the control of the procurement process (the PO) and installed someone he could control as Procurement Assistant. 9 The MA made the observation regarding the non-functional nature of the PSC in its report of Q1 2011: 61

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1. The implementing agencies (PCU, line departments) will prepare quarterly Progress Reports covering outputs, implementation progress, financial statements, as well as results against monitoring indicators. 2. The project will make use of existing data sources, supplemented by regular routine project data collection. 3. The PCU will compile the reports received from the implementing agencies into one overall Quarterly Report. Monitoring will focus on positive changes in key indicators.10

40. In its reporting, the MA notes that because of the emergency nature of the project it was not envisaged at design to have a comprehensive M&E system; and in MA reports throughout the project life cycle its performance under M&E is not rated. 41. The actual M&E framework put in place for the project is consistent with those for the other two area projects, both before and after alignment with Core Indicators. It is largely a monitoring framework without a significant focus on evaluation. However, there were plans at the design stage for a baseline study to set values for Components 2 and 3, and the Bank hired a consultant and support team to conduct the survey. However, the PC of the PCU did not cooperate with the team and so the 2006 Household Survey was used for baseline measurements. In the revised M&E framework following the MTR all baseline values were set to zero. Consequently, M&E framework results are largely output-oriented and do not evaluate impact. There is some coherence between M&E frameworks and those reproduced by the MA in its reporting, but the best correspondence is between the Abyei Monitoring Framework of June 30, 2011 (a document made available to the ICR mission but not part of project documentation) and the MA reporting. 42. The absence of a comprehensive M&E system with an evaluation component in Bank-financed emergency projects is common, but it constitutes a design flaw and it just so happened that ASEP did not achieve any outcomes; otherwise this would constitute another missed learning opportunity regarding achieving impact in FCS. Meanwhile, the lessons learnt by the Bank team from implementation, and particularly from working with a dysfunctional PCU, provide substantial insight regarding the management of future emergency projects. M&E Implementation and Utilization 43. Where possible, the Bank team utilized the monitoring frameworks appropriately to gauge implementation progress. In particular, MA reporting reproduces a concise summation of project progress toward achieving outputs, charts implementation delays, underperformance of the PCU, and adequately rates the performance of the project in FM, counterpart funding, procurement, administration and implementation in the broader context of the performance of the MDTF-N portfolio. However, the work of the MA was severely hampered by the PCU failing to report on time, or often at all. Similarly, the PSC was, as noted above, non-functioning for most of the duration of the project, and so the correct M&E oversight was not provided by the AAA. 44. The Bank team attempted close, on-the-ground implementation support and had an accurate formal and informal understanding of the nature of implementation challenges. On-the-ground monitoring by the Bank team was of good quality and frequency. Standard Bank instruments (ISRs and MTR) contain summaries of progress (or lack thereof) toward achievement of PDO KPIs, implementation or performance challenges, and actions taken to rectify the poor performance of the project.

10 PAD: 16

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2.4 Safeguard and Fiduciary Compliance 45. The project was prepared under OP 8.00 guidelines, which stipulate it could be processed under simplified procedures regarding social safeguard policies. The project triggered Environmental Assessment and Pest Management and was required to develop an ESMF that describes measures to mitigate negative project impacts and environmental monitoring arrangements, which it did by end-2009. The ESMF was financed by the Bank, and the Bank team hired the consultants on behalf of the project. 46. In project ISMs, compliance with social and environmental safeguards was rated satisfactory for the duration of the project, and indeed it was one of the few areas where ASEP did not appear to face problems. During 2010, an environmentally sensitive approach was used to limit the clearing of vegetation where civil works were planned; the Pest Management Plan (PMP) was prepared, as well as the ESMF, which was translated into Arabic and disseminated (as was the Medical Waste Management Plan for the proposed rehabilitation of Abyei hospital). In addition, the project recruited a safeguards specialist, and implementation focal points were identified in the AAA and in Abyei hospital. 47. The Bank team recognized that the project should also consider conducting a Social Assessment (SA) as early as possible to elaborate on the social impacts of project activities outside safeguards, and clarify how stakeholders and beneficiaries such as returnees, IDPs, rural women farmers and vulnerable groups could participate in project activities, including supply and distribution of farm inputs without any discrimination, but this was not carried out by the PCU.11 To partially address these concerns, the Bank team commissioned a Resettlement Policy Framework. 48. The main project risks were in FM and procurement. The Bank team approved total disbursement of US$2,457,030 (which included an initial cost overrun for Project Administration by the PCU, later rectified through counterpart funding of SDG 1 million to cover ineligible expenses), and closely controlled the flow of funds throughout the duration of the project. The Bank team successfully identified the procurement risks of the project and highlighted the successive failure of the PCU to comply with good practice in procurement, adhere to the basic planning and reporting for procurement, or have the appropriate staff in place. 49. By the MTR follow-up mission during March and April 2011, the Bank team communicated to the Governor of Abyei that it had raised FM risk to High (it had in fact been at High internally, from ISM reports). Three critical issues in FM were outstanding: 1. Ineligible expenditure identified in November 2010 had not been settled. 2. Component 5 (Project Management), particularly PCU costs had a 32 percent overrun three months before project closing (by March 31, 2011, the Component’s costs stood at US$726,000 compared to a total budget for the duration of the project of US$545,000). The Bank team identified that “an excessive amount of per diems” had been claimed by the PCU in contravention to the AAA-endorsed operation guidelines as recorded in the PIM and without adequate supporting documentation.12 3. Irregular and poor FM reporting, including informing the IPR for the MDTF-N. 50. Compounding the FM risk, the Bank team noted that the PCU awarded “a substantial” amount of contracts without prior Bank review. 13 The Bank team tracked and closely monitored the factors contributing to FM and procurement risks, but the question remains in light of the severe under- performance of the project and ongoing mismanagement by the PCU (including not renewing the PO contract, leaving the position vacant for over a year and trying to recruit an under-qualified replacement

11 ISM, April 2010. 12 Correspondence CM to Governor (AAA) May 18th, 2011. 13 Ibid.

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[to which the Bank declined to grant a no objection]), whether there was justification to close the project rather than agree to extend it. Without a doubt, Abyei’s special status, pressure from MDTF-N donors, Bank management, and GoNU all influenced the decision not to close the project sooner. 2.5 Post-completion Operation/Next Phase 51. There are no plans for future ASEP-linked operations. During the course of the project, the Bank team drew attention to the question of sustainability of sub-projects including water-points, and planned to have the PCU develop an action plan to address sustainability (by November 30, 2010), but this was not completed. 52. The lack of outputs from the project means that there was little to follow-up. Since the dissolution of the AAA, travel to Abyei has been restricted by GoNU, so no follow-up missions have been planned or conducted. Anecdotally, it is known that the few assets procured by the PCU as part of Component 5 have been either destroyed, looted, or moved out of Sudan (to South Sudan). Currently, MoFNE holds outstanding assets procured by the project in storage in Khartoum.14 The MDTF-N Oversight Committee requested that these assets be delivered to Abyei when the situation permits. MoFNE agreed is keeping assets in storage until they can be transferred and used in Abyei. The Blue Nile project made a request to MoFNE to utilize some of these assets but its request was denied). 3. Assessment of Outcomes 3.1 Relevance of Objectives, Design and Implementation Relevance of Objectives and Design 53. The relevance of the project’s objectives and design are rated satisfactory, but because of the lack of outputs, the relevance of project implementation is not rated. Issues pertaining to the performance of the parties to the project in implementation are discussed below. 54. The original was relevant to: (i) the 2005 CPA, in particular the Abyei Protocol between GoNU and SPLM/A on the Resolution of the Abyei Conflict; (ii) the 2008 Road Map for the Return of IDPs and Implementation of the Abyei Protocol; (iii) the 2005 JAM and subsequent GoNU Strategic Plan (2007- 11); and (iv) Bank strategy in the country (Country Re-engagement Note and ISN). 55. The objectives and design of the project were relevant to the CPA, which set the stage for recovery, reconstruction and development efforts to sustain and consolidate peace. The project sought to address the socio-economic focus in the CPA through its intended emphasis on rural development (Component 3) and to address the recovery of access to basic services including water (Component 2) and healthcare (Component 4). The project also sought to address the institutional development component of the CPA by providing local administration support (Component 1) as well as building the capacity of the PCU within the AAA.

14 The PCU procured 6 vehicles, 5 power generators, 6 computers and various other office equipment (ISR, May, 2011) all of which were destroyed or looted. The MoFNE currently has the following in storage in Khartoum: (i) 4 x complete executive office equipment; (ii) 4 x (meeting table + 12 chairs); (iii) 32 x office desks; (iv) 32 x low back office swivel chair; (v) 32 x storage cabinet; (vi) 64 x guest visitor chair; (vii) 32 x coffee table; (viii) 64 x waiting chairs; (ix) 768 x vertical curtains; (x) 3 x tractors; (xi) 4 x disc harrow; (xii) 4 x disc plough; (xiii) 1 x trailer; (xiv) 2 x furrows; (xv) 1 x leveller; (xvi) 5 x river boat bodies; (xvii) 5 x river boat engines; (xviii)12,500 grass slashers; (xix) 11,500 rakes; (xx) 8,500 sickles; (xxi) 11,400 wheelbarrows; (xxii) 8,500 weeding hoes; (xxiii) 6 rolls of meater deevay hose 3” (xxiv) 10 rolls of meater section hose 3”; (xxv) 30 x 3” non retand value; (xxvi) 90 x 3” clibs; (xxvii) 90 x 3” boory.

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56. The Abyei Protocol essentially covered implementation of the CPA in Abyei. The Abyei Road Map is an adjunct to the CPA to address the impact of fighting between SPLA and SAF in Abyei town during May 2008, which resulted in significant fatalities and the displacement of approximately 50,000 people. The Road Map also underlines the financing and commitment of GoNU and GoSS to ensure stabilization of Border States. As such, ASEP aligned with the social and stabilization objectives of both documents, as well as the priorities in the border areas of GoNU and GoSS. 57. By design, the project was relevant to the Bank-led 2005 JAM and the subsequent GoNU Strategic Plan, which itself also aligned with the objectives of the JAM. The key sectoral and thematic areas of the JAM which were addressed by the project are: (i) institutional development and capacity building; (ii) productive sectors; (iii) basic social services; (iv) infrastructure; and (v) livelihood and social protection. 58. The project was relevant to the Bank strategy in the country (2003 Country Re-engagement Note for the Republic of the Sudan, and the ISN 2008-09). The Bank’s Re-engagement Note set the tone for re- engagement and the eventual creation of MDTF-N and MDTF-S. The project aligned with the priorities set in the Re-engagement Note, many of which were carried into or informed the MDTF-N strategy and the Bank ISN. The design of the project aligned with the Bank’s ISN, which prioritized the following to consolidate peace in Sudan: (i) improving governance; (ii) increasing access to basic services; and (iii) ensuring sustainable, diversified and pro-poor growth, with primary attention to war-affected and marginalized areas. The Bank ISN identifies a focus on key provisions of the CPA to ensure stabilization. Relevance of Implementation 59. The relevance of the implementation of the project is non-evaluable as ASEP critically underperformed despite a highly flexible and engaged approach to implementation support, problem solving, and relationships management by the Bank team. 3.2 Achievement of Project Development Objectives 60. Based on the achievement of KPIs and on the overall performance of the project during implementation, project performance in the achievement of its PDO is rated highly unsatisfactory. 61. Bearing in mind the KPI deficiencies noted above, this rating is justified due to: (i) the project’s lack of progress toward achieving any clear or significant outcomes, including where some limited activities were carried out, mainly under Component 3; (ii) its lack of performance either effectively or efficiently; and (iii) it not ensuring that project design was translated into relevant implementation. 62. By closing, the project had received disbursements totalling US$2.457 million and US$0.40 million from MDTF and GoNU respectively, and expended US$2.457 million and US$0.15 million respectively, from the Designated Accounts. The project achieved a burn ratio (actual expenditure to disbursements) of 91 per cent (grant plus counterpart) and a turn-around ratio (disbursements to commitments) of only 40 per cent (grant plus counterpart) compared to a project maturity age of 100 per cent. Project assets that were en route to Abyei when the security situation deteriorated remain in storage in Khartoum and have been handed over to GoNU. The Bank team closed the project in line with Bank procedures and addressed outstanding procurement and FM issues--mainly, the transfer of assets to GoNU and the recouping of ineligible expenditures from the voluntary funding by GoNU (the project was 100 per cent MDTF Grant). 63. The project’s achievement of intermediary KPIs is limited to one of two indicators under Component 4: it distributed 750 sacks of improved seed. In the final MA reporting, it is noted that the project has impacted the lives of 10,000 beneficiaries (number of farmers who received seeds for the 2010 agricultural season) out of a total target of 150,000. The 10,000 (of which 40 per cent women), are the only identified beneficiaries from the project, in addition to the procurement of a limited number of assets (most for the PCU), production of various planning documents, and training of 20 community water

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resource management committees (with no construction or rehabilitation of water infrastructure). It is reasonable to assume that overall project impact, even on the 10,000 beneficiaries, was limited or non- existent. 3.3 Efficiency 64. The project efficiency in achieving its PDO is rated unsatisfactory based on a limited expenditure of 41 percent of the planned budget. The very low disbursement means that the analysis of project efficiency in the ICR is somewhat constrained. However, what can be concluded is that the social return on the investment of both disbursements (US$2.457 million) and the time spent by the Bank team managing the various crises of the project is likely to range from minimal to zero. 65. The rating is justified because: (i) the project failed to disburse the budgeted amount; (ii) it produced severely limited outcomes with the received disbursements; (iii) the project overspent on the management costs but was able to recoup some ineligible expenses through counterpart funding; and (iv) supervision costs that compare favourably with the majority of other MDTF-N projects. 66. Administration costs were high, totaling US$780,931 by project end. This constitutes a 30 per cent overrun from the initial project management allocation of US$545,000 (or a planned 9 percent of the US$6 million grant). Some of the overrun (including ineligibles) were met from counterpart funds. Therefore, out of a total disbursed amount of US$2.607 million (US$2.457 million Grant plus US$0.15 million CP), project administration was 30 percent. Project design was for a low-cost PCU to implement the project, as was the case for projects in the other two areas. However, due to the underperformance of the PCU, the potential of this model was not realized. 67. Supervision costs for the project are in the lower half of the table of MDTF-N projects (Table 3). Table 3 - Supervision costs in the MDTF-N Project CY05 CY06 CY07 CY08 CY09 CY10* CY11 CY12 Avg. ** CDF 355 153 189 139 151 357 113 175 204.0 Health 29 257 115 97 91 195 118 132 129.3 Education 68 226 130 155 73 130.4 Transport 30 196 200 312 262 225 70 100 174.4 PSCAP 92 107 217 155 158 110 110 135.6 TAF 164 166 75 57 115.5 Livestock 62 181 75 70 80 78 87 90.4 Gum Arabic 113 59 72 121 120 97.0 Micro Finance 28 84 113 72 96 103 100 85.1 S. Kordofan 42*** 75 105 70 63 0 59.2 Blue Nile 41 95 62 7 78 56.6 Abyei 50 183 97 70 100.0 68. As an emergency project, ASEP did not include economic or financial analysis for infrastructure sub-components to gauge the economic return on reconstruction of roads and other infrastructure. Similarly, there was no plan to conduct an analysis to gauge the impact on average household incomes of Component 3. KPIs do not contain a focus on the economic impact of the project. 3.4 Justification of Overall Outcome Rating Rating: Highly Unsatisfactory 69. The project is rated highly unsatisfactory because while it was relevant in its design to the needs of Abyei and the overarching Bank and non-Bank strategic frameworks, it had insufficient performance to rate the relevance of its implementation. The project is rated highly unsatisfactory in its attempt to achieve its PDO and unsatisfactory in its efficiency. In summary, the project encountered severe shortcomings in the achievement of objectives and in implementation.

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70. The Bank team was engaged and efficient in managing the project and attempting to remedy the barriers to implementation. The team followed proven strategies (including in projects in Blue Nile and South Kordofan) in the provision of TA and to attempt to build the capacity of the PCU. However, the PCU, PSC and AAA could not be transformed into transparent and efficient project implementers. 3.5 Overarching Themes, Other Outcomes and Impacts (a) Poverty Impacts, Gender Aspects, and Social Development Rating: Non-evaluable 71. As designed, the project had the potential to support the recovery and stabilization of the conflict- affected population of Abyei, particularly in terms of access to basic services (water and health) and improved agriculture productivity. However, given limited project outputs it is likely that there was no impact on poverty and social development. 72. The Bank team was aware of the need for the project to be gender-sensitive, and in the project ISMs and MTR identified a number of steps the PCU should take to ensure a gender focus in the project, including: (i) gender review of project operations; (ii) develop a system to ensure water supply projects adequately include women in all stages of the sub-project cycle; (iii) the need for the PCU to identify a gender focal point within the project implementation structure; and (iv) stakeholders to be trained in gender awareness and gender-sensitive planning and appraisal. The Bank also hired a consultant to conduct a gender assessment for the project with recommendations to inform implementation, engender project indicators and design a project gender action plan. The PCU did not act on these recommendations. (b) Institutional Change/Strengthening Rating: Non-evaluable 73. By design, the project had the potential to impact on institutional strengthening; however, any positive outcome of asset procurement and rehabilitation for the PCU/AAA was neutralized by the completely ineffectual performance of both, and the lack of transparency in the PCU and subsequent dissolution of the AAA. (c) Other Unintended Outcomes and Impacts (positive or negative) N/A 3.6 Summary of Findings of Beneficiary Survey and/or Stakeholder Workshops N/A 4. Assessment of Risk to Development Outcome Rating: High 74. There is insufficient outcome to ascribe a risk rating however throughout the project, the Bank team accurately rated the likely risk to development outcome as High, and any assets that were procured (apart from those now held in storage by GoNU in Khartoum) were destroyed or stolen. 5. Assessment of Bank and Grantee Performance 5.1 Bank Performance (a) Bank Performance in Ensuring Quality at Entry Rating: Moderately Satisfactory 75. The Bank’s performance in ensuring Quality at Entry is rated moderately satisfactory because: (i) while preparing an emergency project, the Bank managed to incorporate early learning from the implementation of previous emergency projects in the region; (ii) the team made justifiable design

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choices in an attempt to increase the likelihood of successful achievement of project outcomes, specifically: (a) ensuring simplicity of design of sub-components, and (b) 75 per cent of project activities were procurement-related i.e. where the implementing partner has significant capacity issues the loading up of procurement-related activities simplifies project design, reduces margin for error and the scope of capacity building inputs required; and (iii) the team targeted efficiency in implementation through the proposed use of a PCU. 76. This rating takes account of the fact that as an emergency project, ASEP did not benefit from a long project preparation phase. The project, unlike others in the MDTF-N portfolio, had no significant counterpart funding and as such by design avoided the critical weakness of many of the other projects, which dramatically overestimated the capacity of GoNU to meet counterpart commitments. 77. The project’s messaging around M&E was confused, simultaneously identifying that the project required tight M&E and that a rigorous M&E framework was not envisaged on the basis that ASEP was an emergency project. Generally, KPIs are poorly formulated and output-oriented; as such, had there been any output, the outcomes and impacts of the project would have been difficult to assess. 78. As seen above, the project had strategic relevance, and the approach was consistent with managing implementation risks in fragile or conflict-affected environments. The Bank team engaged with key stakeholders, and consistently tried to remedy implementation issues and poor project performance. Design of project oversight within the AAA appears to have been compromised by the presence of the PC as both coordinator of the PCU and a serving member of the PSC. The Bank teams own oversight was strong and it accurately and consistently tracked implementation challenges. It took an engaged approach to the project and the dysfunctional PCU and AAA, but it is hard to see how the failure of the project could have been prevented given the performance of implementing partners and senior stakeholders involved. It is highly unlikely the Bank team could have done anything else to rescue the project. (b) Quality of Supervision Rating: Moderately Satisfactory 79. Bank supervision is rated moderately satisfactory because while there was satisfactory identification and management of fiduciary, safeguard and implementation issues, the Bank team did not adequately resolve those issues and did not achieve the relevant development outcomes for the project. 80. As outlined above, there were serious implementation issues experienced by the project, most of which originated in how the PCU and AAA went about their respective roles. The PCU’s underperformance is, as previously mentioned, inseparable from how the PC operated and the high FM and procurement risks resulting from how the PC compromised procurement, ignored Bank protocols and guidelines, and did not report in a timely manner on either FM or procurement issues. 81. In hindsight, the Bank team appears to have been overly optimistic in the early stages of the project, as is evidenced in the reporting of implementation progress in the first 6-9 months of effectiveness. However, any progress during the early stages of implementation in an FCS is good progress because the environment (external, such as security and violence, and internal such as institutional capacity) is often so poor and challenging. 82. When the Bank team became aware of the nature of the implementation issues, most importantly that it was not a standard “capacity” issue but rather one where implementing agents were manipulating the procurement process, the team continued to strengthen controls to ensure that mis-procurement and misappropriation of funds could be prevented. The question then is not whether the Bank team identified and managed risk (in particular fiduciary and procurement risks), but whether the Bank acted most strategically by not closing the project sooner than June 30, 2011(original planned date on which the project closed). This however was a decision for management, donor and client rather than an issue of quality of the Bank team’s supervision which exerted all effort to turn the project around through both

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hands-on engagement and an appropriate and adequate level of interaction with key stakeholders. Ultimately, the project failed for reasons outside the Bank and Task Team’s control and there is little the Bank team could have done differently in project design and implementation that could have mitigated the political and security risks that were eventually borne out. 83. During Q2 (2011), and based on improved performance of the PCU and AAA in Q4 (2010), the Bank team expressed confidence that the project would procure contracts of US$3 million by the original closing date. Many of these contracts were signed (agricultural equipment, irrigation equipment, water and civil works), but the outbreak of conflict forced an end to this renewed progress in the project. 84. The Bank made no final decision on granting a project extension to June 30, 2012, which was predicated on the AAA’s commitment to hire a full-time PO and the signing of the above contracts. Regarding the PO, the candidate selected by the AAA (ignoring, the advice of the Bank team concerning recruiting from a wider pool of candidates) was under-qualified and under-experienced, and the Bank could not grant a no-objection to the hire. The team decided to close the project on the original date with RVP agreement in principle for retroactive extension should the situation recover/merit. 85. Undoubtedly, ASEP was strategically important and showed a Bank commitment to stabilization in the border areas between Sudan and South Sudan. It was also part of a wider and ambitious portfolio in MDTF-N with clear potential to impact on state and peace-building in the region. However, the PCU and AAA (although the AAA improved in the later stages of the project) were functioning in such a way as to make it impossible to fully implement the project. The Bank team was under pressure to resolve implementation issues, particularly from some MDTF Donors to facilitate quicker disbursement of funds to the PCU and keep the project effective. In an attempt to speed up the implementation of the Project the Bank TT requested the AAA to replace the PCU coordinator, a change which at the time proved impossible for them to implement due to political reasons to which the Bank needed to be sensitive. In response the Bank TT established and utilized a very tight performance monitoring system to oversee the work of the PCU coordinator and the AAA indicated that should the PCU coordinator continue to underperform they would consider replacing him at a future date. 86. In summary, Bank supervision was responsive to the needs of the project but failed to resolve the key implementation challenges. Bank MAs are succinct and to the point, and communications with key stakeholders, including the implementing agencies, the AAA and GoNU Ministries are clear and unambiguous. Despite implementation challenges experienced by the project, the Bank team maintained good working relationships with GoNU, which was critical given the Bank was starting to re-engage in Sudan and the expectations are that this relationship (with or without IDA lending in the short-term) is one that needs to be maintained and developed. (c) Justification of Rating for Overall Bank Performance Rating: Moderately Satisfactory 87. Overall Bank performance is rated moderately satisfactory. The Bank team identified and managed the main procurement, FM and other risks covered by Bank safeguards and which were associated with this difficult project, preventing those risks from materializing. The Bank team engaged in a hands-on manner in order to try to address (however unsuccessfully) critical implementation issues, and appropriately and adequately interacted with key stakeholders in an attempt to get the project on track. Ultimately, the dysfunctional nature of the PCU and AAA resulted in the project’s poor performance and despite the efforts of the Bank; there are no significant impacts or outcomes from the project. 5.2 Grantee Performance (a) Government Performance Rating: Highly Unsatisfactory

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88. GoNU performance is rated highly unsatisfactory, primarily because of its decision to dissolve the AAA and cancel the Abyei Protocol. 89. Originally, GoNU had created an enabling policy environment through coordination with the JAM and its Strategic Plan, as well as through the Abyei Protocol to the CPA and Abyei Roadmap. However, early in the project the Bank team assumed the role of the National Government and sponsored a consultancy under Bank budget to prepare a Project Implementation Manual (PIM). The Bank arranged and financed on behalf of the project the preparation of ESMF, Resettlement Policy Framework, gender assessment, baseline survey (discontinued), and designs and bill of quantities (BoQs) for all civil works. In doing so, the team was trying to avail TA to the PCU and to help give Project implementation a head- start. The Bank provided a senior implementation support consultant to offer orientation and on-the-job training to PCU on fiduciary, safeguards, M&E and project management. This consultant was available both on-site and remotely throughout the duration of the project. 90. Prior to cancellation of the project, MoFNE participated in support missions and problem solving sessions jointly with the Bank team and independently from the team. However, overall, GoNU performed in a highly unsatisfactory manner primarily due to its decision to dissolve the AAA and cancel the Abyei Protocol which provided the key framework within which the Project would contribute to the recovery of the area from conflict and from which the Project derived the original PDO indicator of “60% of the Abyei Road Map recovery plan achieved”. Fiscally, the National Government through MoFNE voluntarily contributed US$0.400 million to meet ineligible expenses and other charges. 91. The AAA, which administered Abyei up until it was dissolved by GoNU and which contained the PCU, was unable, unwilling or some combination of the two, to appropriately commit to the project and carry out the requisite oversight functions. It also performed in a highly unsatisfactory manner. (b) Implementing Agency or Agencies Performance Rating: Highly Unsatisfactory 92. The performance of the PCU is rated highly unsatisfactory. While the fragile and conflict affected environment was a factor negatively influencing the performance of the project, the primary cause of all implementation delays was the PCU. The PCU, PSC and AAA repeatedly underperformed in their respective duties and responsibilities, and despite the repeated intervention of the Bank team and MoFNE, any gains made in addressing implementation delays (usually following Bank missions) were quickly lost as the PC of the PCU attempted to obfuscate the procurement process; the AAA failed to perform any oversight role. 93. The PCU’s reporting throughout the project life cycle was erratic and unreliable, and it frustrated the Bank team’s monitoring role in relation to the project and in relation to the overall performance of the MDTF-N. In spite of this, the Bank team managed to eventually close the project successfully without incurring procurement, FM or reputational risks. (c) Justification of Rating for Overall Grantee Performance Rating: Highly Unsatisfactory 94. The overall rating for the Grantee performance is highly unsatisfactory based on a highly unsatisfactory rating for the performance of GoNU, a highly unsatisfactory rating for the performance of the implementing agent and an overall outcome rating of highly unsatisfactory. 6. Lessons Learned 95. ASEP was designed and implemented early in the Bank’s Sudan re-engagement, but after the start of other emergency projects in transitional border areas. The time during which ASEP was implemented was also a time when the Bank’s strategy on Sudan and Southern Sudan was emerging. ASEP was thus largely a learning-by-doing approach that drew from from early implementation

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modalities under MDTF-funded projects, and reflected an understanding of the low-capacity environment in which it was to operate and the need for design simplicity and flexibility. Although the project failed for reasons outside the Bank and Task Team’s control, there are some lessons that may be relevant for Bank engagement in FCS and highly uncertain environments. 96. The approach of relying on a PCU to both implement an emergency project and be the main channel for capacity building efforts is a viable but risky approach in FCS. At best, as the case of Blue Nile demonstrates, a strong and effective PCU can be a positive institution-building outcome of an emergency project, which can remain and continue to play a key development role after project closure. But since the PCU is appointed by government, it is also highly vulnerable to political capture and governance issues which can threaten overall project implementation. Once set up, changing individuals or the PCU structure becomes politically difficult and there is a tendency for Bank Management and Task Teams to try to make the existing organizational set-up work—even when it is clearly dysfunctional or politically captured. As in ASEP, this is still a risk even when the project design is largely procurement- based, and thus easier for the Task Team to monitor and manage fiduciary risks. 97. Capacity building in FCS needs to be an integral part of project design but local ownership and commitment are essential preconditions. When local ownership and commitment are absent or weak, capacity and institution-building efforts are unlikely to succeed no matter how well designed. Given the transitional and unresolved status of Abyei (unlike the other two border areas which were functioning states), the Bank’s approach was to focus on the core functions of the incipient PCU rather than the longer-term capacity-building needs required to enable the PCU to design, implement and monitor more complex project activities or monitor other downstream implementing agencies. Other emergency projects placed greater emphasis on institution building, not only for efficient project implementation but also in terms of stabilization and the transition from emergency recovery to development. Determining when there is sufficient local ownership and commitment is difficult, especially in FCS settings where the Bank is re-engaging. Nonetheless, the above discussion points to two additional lessons that can be drawn from this failed project. 98. In extremely difficult and politically volatile situations such as Abyei, alternative emergency project implementation arrangements should be considered even if they involve trade-offs with capacity building. Although it is highly unlikely that alternative project designs would have had any influence on project outcome, which was largely the result of external political factors, the Bank could have considered some type of hybrid design which retained the figure of a PCU but delegated greater implementation responsibility to other agencies, as was the case in Blue Nile. Over time, if the political environment is favorable, PCU capacity can be built up and issues of political capture or governance can be addressed without having to abandon the entire project, which may thus be able to continue to contribute to stabilization and deliver basic support to conflict-affected communities. 99. Emergency development interventions in unstable FCS are by nature high-risk, high- reward undertakings, but Bank Management (and donors) should be prepared to pull out and return to the drawing board when failure is evident. The fact that there was a high risk of failure in Abyei and that the risk did indeed materialize, is not a concern. If the Bank is to operate in unstable FCS it must raise its failure tolerance threshold. Moreover, this report finds that there is little the Bank could have done differently in project design and implementation that could have mitigated the political and security risks that were eventually borne out. At the insistence of donors, however, Bank Management agreed not to close what was clearly a failing project. Donors did not want to give up politically in Abyei and thus wanted to retain an existing instrument that could quickly channel support in the event political issues could be resolved. While this position was understandable, arguably, Bank Management could have been more forceful in trying to persuade donors to close a project that had little realistic chance of getting back on track, and instead offered to work with donors to put in place a stand-by instrument or mechanism that could been quickly deployed in the event of a political breakthrough.

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7. Comments on Issues Raised by Grantee/Implementing Agencies/Partners (a) Grantee/implementing agencies N/A (b) Cofinanciers N/A (c) Other partners and stakeholders N/A

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Annex 1. Project Costs and Financing

(a) Project Cost by Component (in USD Million equivalent) Actual/Latest Appraisal Estimate Percentage of Components Estimate (USD (USD millions) Appraisal millions)

Total Baseline Cost 5.92 2.61

Physical Contingencies 0.48 0.00 0.00

Price Contingencies 0.00 0.00 0.00 Total Project Costs 6.40 2.61 Front-end fee PPF 0.00 0.00 0.00 Front-end fee IBRD 0.00 0.00 0.00 Total Financing Required 6.40 0.00

(b) Financing Appraisal Actual/Latest Type of Percentage of Source of Funds Estimate Estimate Cofinancing Appraisal (USD millions) (USD millions) Grantee 0.40 0.15 37.5 Multi Donor Trust Fund for Northern 6.00 2.46 41 Sudan (MDTF-N)

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Annex 2. Outputs by Component

Original Target Actual Value Formally Baseline Values (from Achieved at Indicator Revised Target Value approval Completion or Values documents) Target Years Component1: Local administration Support 12 IT users among the 4 administrations’ 0 12 4 staff able to use IT equipment frequency of meetings with community 0 50 0 leaders increased by 50% visits to the local areas increased by local 0 50 20 authorities by 50% publication/ dissemination of local authority N y N plans on a regular/ quarterly basis Component 2: Water Supply 5 new water yards are constructed, providing access to 30,000 people and 0 5 0 50,000 livestock 50 new hand pumps are constructed 0 50 0 providing access to 25,000 people 5 new hafir are constructed providing 0 5 0 access to 50,000 livestock total number of water points in Abyei 0 60 0 increased to 60 Community water resource management committees are implemented and trained to 0 60 20 resource management A maintenance unit is implemented and trained for maintenance of water supply N Y N system). Reported cases of conflicts between farmers N Y N and herders decrease Component 3: Rural Development (agriculture) 4 localities (12,500 households) are provided with hand tools, for a total of 0 12500 0 62,500 beneficiaries. 750 sacks of sorghum seed have been 0 750 750 disseminated. 5,000 households or 25,000 people are provided with essential equipment, leading 0 10,000 0 to a community cultivation of 10,000 feddans Component 4: Contributing to the rehabilitation of Abyei Hospital (Health) Increase of the number of patients treated to 50 250 0 250 outpatients/day Increase to 7-8 deliveries/week. 2 8 0 Improved treatment for 7-10 new 0 10 0 admissions/day. Component 5: Project management through the implementation of a Project Coordination Unit (PCU) PCU fully installed and equipped N Y Y PCU Staff trained on accounting, procurement and project management N Y N issues Frequent field visits on project sites N Y Y

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Annex 3. Economic and Financial Analysis N/A

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Annex 4. Bank Lending and Implementation Support/Supervision Processes

(a) Task Team members Responsibility/ Names Title Unit Specialty Lending Abderrahim Fraiji Sr. Operations Officer AFTCS Task Team Leader

Supervision/ICR Yousif Elfadil Operations Officer AFTCS ICR TTL Richard Olowo Sr. Procurement Specialist AFTPC Procurement Financial Mohamed Yehia Abd el Karim Financial Management Specialist AFTFM Management Moustapha Ould El Bechir Sr. Procurement Specialist AFTPC Procurement Hiyam Fouad Gamal Abdoun S T Temporary AFMSD Team Assistant

(b) Staff Time and Cost Staff Time and Cost (Bank Budget Only) Stage of Project Cycle USD Thousands (including No. of staff weeks travel and consultant costs) Supervision/ICR

2010 13.06 187,846 2011 21.99 168,169 2012 10.2 54,375 2013 3.21 16,568

Total: 48.46 426,957

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Annex 5. Beneficiary Survey Results N/A

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Annex 6. Stakeholder Workshop Report and Results N/A

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Annex 7. Summary of Grantee's ICR and/or Comments on Draft ICR Government report was not received.

26

Annex 8. Comments of Cofinanciers and Other Partners/Stakeholders N/A

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Annex 9. List of Supporting Documents Grant 1. “MDTF-NS Grant Agreement” (correspondence) 29th June, 2009. 2. “MDTF-NS ASEP Declaration of Effectiveness” (correspondence) 15th October, 2009 3. “Completion Procedures for the ASEP MDTF Grant Agreement” (correspondence) 30th June, 2011. 4. “Extension and Restructuring for Ongoing MDTF-N Projects” (correspondence) 15th February, 2012 5. “ASEP Wavier to Make Payment Beyond Disbursement End Date for Eligible Expenditure” (correspondence) 17th May, 2012. 6. “Sudan MDTF-NS ASEP Notification of Credit Closure” (correspondence) 4th June 2012. 7. “Sudan ASEP Closure of Grant Account” (correspondence) 14th September 2012 8. “ASEP Closure of Grant Account” (correspondence) 11th September, 2012 9. “Agreement regarding Closure of ASEP MDTF Grant Agreement” (correspondence) 2nd August, 2011. 10. ASEP Subsidiary Grant Agreement Between the Republic of Sudan and Abyei Area Administration Sudan (n.d.) 11. ASEP Completion Procedures and Requirements (n.d.) Project Documents 12. Sudan MDTF-N Project Appraisal Document for a Proposed Grant in the Amount of US$6 Million to Abyei, Sudan for the Abyei Start-Up Emergency Project (April 27th, 2009) 13. Sudan Project Implementation Manual for the Abyei Start-Up Emergency Project (17th September, 2009) 14. Abyei Start-Up Emergency Project Environmental and Social Management Framework (ESMF) and Medical Waste Management Plan (MWMP) (2009) 15. “Sudan: ASEP Latest Developments in the Abyei Area and Implications on Project Implementation and Extension of Closing Dates of the Grant Agreement” (Office Memo), 22nd June 2011. 16. “Abyei Closure Procedures Meeting Minutes” (Office Minutes), 25th August 2011. 17. “Sudan: ASEP Blue Nile Additional Financing – Extension of Implementation Completion Report Deadlines” (Office Memo), 31st October 2012. Financial 18. ASEP Sources and Uses of Funds Statement Q3, 2011. 19. Limited desk review of agricultural hand tools shipment documents for the ASEP (Memo), 10th May 2012. 20. ASEP Statement of Uses of Funds Q3, 2012 21. 22. MDTF-N Budget Allocations for CY 2013 23. MDTF Project SPN CY05-CY12 including BNSEP (original and AF) and Abyei Project Monitoring (Internal and Monitoring Agent and MDTF-NS) 24. Aide Mémoire, MTR Mission October-November, 2010, 14th November 2010 25. Aide Mémoire MTR Follow-Up Mission (March-April 2011), 11th April, 2011 26. Aide Mémoire , ISM Mission November-December 2009 27. Aide Mémoire , ISM Mission 28th March through 14th April, 2010 28. ASEP Action Plan Dashboard, 20th March 2010 29. ASEP Project Dashboard, 1st November 2010 30. ISR December 2009 31. ISR May 2010 32. ISR November 2010 33. “ASEP – Implementation Bottlenecks and Delays” (correspondence) 18th May, 2011. 34. ASEP – A Summary of Progress Made (n.d.)

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35. ASEP Assets in Custody of MoFNE (List) as of Project Closure, 30th June 2012 36. Report to the National Sudan Multi-Donor Trust Find (MDTF-N) Q4, 2007 37. Report to the National Sudan Multi-Donor Trust Find (MDTF-N) Q1, 2008 38. Report to the National Sudan Multi-Donor Trust Find (MDTF-N) Q2, 2008 39. Report to the National Sudan Multi-Donor Trust Find (MDTF-N) Q3, 2008 40. Report to the National Sudan Multi-Donor Trust Find (MDTF-N) Q1, 2009 41. Report to the National Sudan Multi-Donor Trust Find (MDTF-N) Q1, 2010 42. Report to the National Sudan Multi-Donor Trust Find (MDTF-N) Q3, 2010 43. Report to the National Sudan Multi-Donor Trust Find (MDTF-N) Q4, 2010 44. Report to the National Sudan Multi-Donor Trust Find (MDTF-N) Q1, 2011 45. Report to the National Sudan Multi-Donor Trust Find (MDTF-N) Q2, 2011 46. Report to the National Sudan Multi-Donor Trust Find (MDTF-N) Q3, 2011 47. Report to the National Sudan Multi-Donor Trust Find (MDTF-N) Q1, 2012 48. Report to the National Sudan Multi-Donor Trust Find (MDTF-N) Q2, 2012 49. Country Portfolio Performance Review MDTF-N, 16th June 2010 50. MDTF-N Assessment of Program Sustainability, 23rd October, 2011 Studies and Capacity Building 51. Sudan MDTF: Resettlement Policy Framework (RPF) for Abyei Start-up Emergency Project, (June 2009). 52. Assessment on Vulnerable Groups for MDTF South Kordofan, Blue Nile and Abyei Emergency Projects. 5th May, 2009. Other 53. Country Re-engagement Note for Republic of the Sudan, 24th June 2003. 54. Road Map for the Return of IDPs and Implementation of the Abyei Protocol, 8th June, 2008. 55. Comprehensive Peace Agreement between the Government of the Republic of Sudan and the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement/Sudan People’s Liberation Army January 2005 (September 2005) 56. Joint Assessment Mission: Framework for Sustained Peace, Development and Poverty Eradication. 18th March, 2005

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