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Chapter 1: Macroeconomic Conditions and Outlook Chapter 1 EEAG (2017), The EEAG Report on the European Economy, “Macroeconomic Conditions and Outlook,” CESifo, Munich 2017, pp. 12–49. MACROECONOMIC CONDITIONS The political changes that have occurred over the past AND OUTLOOK eight months may have far-reaching consequences for the global economy in the years ahead and have cer- tainly already increased uncertainty. In a referendum 1.1 Introduction in June 2016, the United Kingdom decided to leave the European Union (see Chapter 3 of this report). The world economy remained in recovery mode last Negotiations over the conditions of this so-called year, despite a slight global slowdown. The initial de- Brexit between the new British government and the cline was mainly caused by disappointing growth in ad- European Union are due to start soon. In November vanced economies during the winter of 2015/2016.1 2016 Donald Trump won the presidential elections in During the second half of 2016, an increase in exports the United States. Also Trump’s victory came as a sur- accounted for a significant uptick in the pace of expan- prise to many and raises questions about the future sion in the United States. In Japan repeated postpone- orientation of economic policy in the United States, ment of fiscal consolidation and the implementation of and particularly of fiscal and trade policies. On several a new stimulus package supported economic activity. occasions during his campaign the newly elected presi- Furthermore, the moderate recovery in the euro area dent argued in favour of more expansionary fiscal and has continued. In major emerging countries like China, protectionist trade policies, together with a significant India and Indonesia, expansionary economic policies reduction in his country’s security commitments on stimulated growth in the summer of 2016. Finally, reces- the international stage. Finally, in December 2016 sionary trends in commodity-exporting emerging econ- Italy held a referendum on constitutional changes that omies like Russia and Brazil have weakened, especially was clearly rejected at the polls. These constitutional since the prices of many industrial and agricultural changes would have made this economically-troubled commodities have been creeping upwards again for sev- country more capable of political and economic re- eral months and the price of crude oil has been largely form. Instead its Prime Minister Matteo Renzi stepped stable over the summer and autumn at around 45 US down and a caretaker government took over. The dollars per barrel, after reaching a trough of below Italian president will most likely initiate new elections 30 US dollars in January last year. These relatively stable this year, ahead of the next regular elections scheduled oil prices were principally driven by two key effects: ris- for early 2018. The populist 5 Star Movement, which ing demand for oil from mainly China and India; and has been popular at the polls for over a year now, has negotiations amongst OPEC mem- bers that led markets to expect a Figure 1.1 limitation of future oil production. Inflation in the world and oil price movements In November 2016, and for the % change over previous year's month% change over previous year's month 7 140 first time since 2001, a global sup- 6 120 ply agreement was reached that Forecast 5 Inflation in the period 100 was also signed by Russia. Subse- world (left-hand scale) 4 80 quent ly, the oil price rose to over 3 60 50 US dollars per barrel. Both the 2 Inflation in the euro area 40 low oil price at the start of 2016 (left-hand scale) 1 20 and its increase by the end of the 0 0 year imply strong impulses for in- -1 -20 flation rates around the world, es- -2 Oil price changes -40 pecially during the first months of (dollar) (right-hand scale) -3 -60 2017 (see Figure 1.1). 07 08 09 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 1 This development is illustrated in Source: IMF International Financial Statistics, last accessed on 31 January 2017. Forecast based on a constant oil Figure 1.26, presented below. price assumption from January 2017 onwards. EEAG Report 2017 12 Chapter 1 announced a referendum on Italy’s exit from the euro still at a significantly higher level than at the beginning area should it win. Depending on how the current of 2016. This may in itself reduce willingness to invest caretaker government reforms election law, a relative and acquire more durable consumer goods, and there- majority of votes may suffice to win an absolute ma- by affect the economic performance over the forecast- jority in parliament. Given Italy’s economic weight ing period. and its high public debt levels, the announcement of a referendum, or even the increased awareness of such an outcome, is likely to cause major turbulence in fi- 1.2 The current situation nancial markets. Overall, none of these political developments have 1.2.1 The global economy triggered the adverse cyclical effects expected. After a brief period of turbulence, financial markets have by As in 2015, world trade declined during the first half and large staged speedy recoveries. Of the three events of 2016 only to subsequently recover again (see cited above, the Brexit referendum triggered the most Figure 1.2). Industrial production also picked up dur- visible market reactions. Nevertheless, in late summer ing the second half of 2016. However, whereas trade most stock market indices were already above their po- impulses were largely generated by advanced econo- sitions of May 2016. Similarly, Figure 1.2 consumer and producer sentiment Regional contributions to world trade in the United Kingdom and the and industrial production European Union only weakened temporarily during the summer, World trade Index (2008Q1=100) % but have improved steadily since 130 30 then. Finally, the British real 120 20 economy proved to be robust and 110 10 recorded a similarly high growth rate for the third quarter of 2016 100 0 as seen in the previous three quar- 90 -10 World tradea) ters. The US presidential election b) (left-hand scale) Advanced economies did neither negatively affect the fi- 80 (right-hand scale) -20 nancial markets, nor consumer or 70 -30 Emerging and developing producer confidence. Sentiment countriesb) 60 -40 even improved after Trump’s elec- (right-hand scale) tion probably thanks to expecta- 50 -50 tions that the newly elected presi- 08 09 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 dent will implement expansive fis- World industrial production cal policy measures. Index (2008Q1=100) % 120 20 115 15 Nevertheless, the election of Donald Trump as US president 110 10 and the rejection of constitution- 105 5 al reform in Italy may have major 100 0 negative consequences in the 95 Advanced economiesb) -5 World industrial (right-hand scale) short term too. Indicators of po- 90 productiona) -10 (left-hand scale) litical uncertainty in the United 85 -15 Kingdom, several other European 80 Emerging and developing countriesb) -20 countries and the United States (right-hand scale) 75 -25 increased sharply in June and 70 -30 have risen significantly again in 08 09 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 November after a previous tem- a) Three month moving average level. b) Contribution to annualised monthly growth rate thereof. porary decline. At the end of last Source: CPB Netherlands Bureau for Economic Policy Analysis, World Trade Monitor: November year, uncertainty indicators were 2016. 13 EEAG Report 2017 Chapter 1 mies, industrial production growth in the emerging What speaks for the structural story is the gradual re- and developing countries outweighed that of their ad- balancing of the Chinese economy towards greater vanced counterparts. From an overall perspective, af- consumption and the re-evaluation of the assets and ter a subdued first half of the year, the global econo- structural changes undertaken in several advanced my subsequently regained momentum. Advanced and economies towards less capital intensive sectors. These emerging economies alike have contributed almost might have translated into slower, but more sustaina- equally to revive the global economy. ble investment growth. By and large economic sentiment in most parts of the Secondly, growth in global value chains might have world remained stable. In Asia, America and Europe matured. This is supported by empirical studies sentiment remained at historically low levels, while in showing that this effect is especially strong in China Oceania the situation took a turn for the better at the and is also present to a smaller extent in the United end of last year. Africa, on the other hand, was on a States. As China moves up in the global value chain, downward path throughout last year (see Figure 1.3). in particular, the foreign content of its exports World trade and world GDP are expected to have in- diminishes. creased by 0.8 and 2.4 percent respectively last year (see Table 1.A.1). Finally, the slowdown in trade liberalisation, or even the adoption of protectionist measures in the after- Nevertheless, the global economy is still growing less math of the financial crisis, may also have depressed than it did in the years preceding the financial crisis. trade growth. It is difficult to predict whether the World trade in particular seems to have moved down change in political attitudes is temporary or of a more into a different gear since 2011. Whether this is a lasting nature. structural or a more temporary phenomenon is heavi- ly debated and will depend on which of the various theories turns out to bear more weight. We broadly 1.2.2 United States distinguish between three lines of thought. Momentum in the US economy was weak during the Firstly, growth in global investment has been rather first half of 2016 and remained below the potential subdued since the financial crisis.
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