The Labor Economics Case for the Diversity Visa Lottery
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Stanford Law Review Online Volume 71 October 2018 ESSAY The Labor Economics Case for the Diversity Visa Lottery Patrick Kennedy* Introduction Congress faces tough choices in the coming weeks and months about the design of our immigration system. Among those choices: the fate of the Diversity Visa (DV) lottery program, which grants up to 50,000 visas each year to emigrants from countries that do not traditionally send many people to the United States. President Trump has placed the DV program squarely in his crosshairs, claiming the lottery allows other countries to send “their worst people.”1 Furthermore, two of the five immigration proposals that were before Congress in recent months, but have not been acted upon lately, would eliminate the DV program entirely.2 The Goodlatte bill would eliminate the lottery without replacing it, in effect reducing the number of immigrants that come from low-admission areas every year by at least 50,000.3 The Grassley/Cotton bill would also eliminate the lottery but replace it with increases in family-based and employment-based visas.4 * J.D. Candidate, Stanford Law School, 2019. PhD Candidate, University of Illinois- Chicago Department of Economics, 2019. Thanks to my family for reading and suggesting changes to the piece, especially Denise DeArmond, Sean, Chris, Michael, and Joan Kennedy. Thanks to the Stanford Law Review Online staff for their helpful comments and guidance, especially David Hoyt and Andra Lim. 1. Rafael Bernal, What Is the Diversity Visa Lottery?, THE HILL (Jan. 28, 2018, 7:30 AM EST), https://perma.cc/EE9D-ZB35. 2. See Lisa Desjardins, Every Immigration Proposal in One Chart, PBS NEWSHOUR (updated Feb. 13, 2018, 6:17 PM EDT), https://perma.cc/C7RF-7UUA. 3. See id. 4. While it is tempting to assume this would not restrict the number of legal immigrants eligible for visas, the bill also restricts who is eligible for a family-based visa. See id. 159 The Labor Economics Case for the Diversity Visa Lottery 71 STAN. L. REV. ONLINE 159 (2018) Authors writing in many major political publications have spilled ink5 describing the diplomatic benefits and positive self-selection spurred6 by immigration programs like the DV, but there is a more fundamental economic case for keeping the DV lottery in place: Immigrants move to places where other immigrants live, so establishing a mechanism to encourage immigration from countries with few immigrants is critical. Without the DV program, America will lose an important advantage in the global war for talent over the long run. I. The Diversity Lottery: What Is It and Who Benefits? The Immigration Act of 1990 established the DV lottery system,7 which grants lawful permanent residence visas to up to 50,000 applicants per year from “low-admission” countries.8 Low-admission countries must have sent fewer than 50,000 immigrants to the U.S. in the five preceding fiscal years.9 Countries like Mexico, Canada, India, and China thus do not qualify for the DV lottery in a typical year.10 Instead, the program is targeted toward countries such as New Zealand, Angola, Mongolia, Libya, and many others.11 Prospective immigrants apply online or at an embassy, with a hard deadline set in advance each year. There is no cap on the number of applicants. Lottery numbers are then pulled from the applications submitted before the deadline. Unlike the employment-based and family-based preference categories, DV applicants cannot join a long backlog and wait their turn for a visa to become available; instead, applicants must reenter the lottery each year and hope that their number is pulled. 5. See, e.g., Abed A. Ayoub, In Targeting Diversity Visa Program, Trump Gets it Wrong Again, THE HILL (Nov. 2, 2017, 1:20 PM EDT), https://perma.cc/LGU8-4JQZ; Dara Lind & P.R. Lockhart, The Diversity Visa Trump Hates, Explained, VOX (updated Dec. 15, 2017, 1:29 PM EST), https://perma.cc/4E53-96HY. 6. Immigration produces a sorting function, in that people most likely to choose to migrate are those with high levels of unobservable motivation or similar characteristics, making them the most likely to succeed in business. See Barry R. Chiswick, Are Immigrants Favorably Self-Selected? An Economic Analysis 1, 2-7 (IZA Discussion Paper No. 131, 2000) (“[E]conomic migrants tend to be favorably ‘self-selected’ for labor market success. That is, economic migrants are described as tending, on average, to be more able, ambitious, aggressive, entrepreneurial, or otherwise more favorably selected than similar individuals who choose to remain in their place of origin.”). 7. Pub. L. 101-694, §§ 131, 104 Stat. 4978, 4997-99 (codified as amended at 8 U.S.C. § 1153(c) (2016)). 8. See 8 U.S.C. § 1153(c)(1)(B)-(E) (2016). 9. Id. § 1153(c)(1)(A)-(B). This is updated annually based on the previous five fiscal years. 10. See, e.g., Visa Bulletin for August 2018, U.S. DEP’T STATE (July 10, 2018), https://perma.cc/M9DX-NJP3. 11. See U.S. Dep't of State, Instructions for the 2019 Diversity Immigrant Visa Program (DV- 2019) 16-18 (2017), https://perma.cc/PA4C-ZMRJ. 160 The Labor Economics Case for the Diversity Visa Lottery 71 STAN. L. REV. ONLINE 159 (2018) Despite the Trump administration’s rhetoric, winning the lottery alone does not guarantee admission to the U.S.—it only makes one eligible to continue the visa application process.12 When an immigrant’s number is called, so to speak, they proceed to the nearest U.S. embassy or consulate to submit their supporting documentation.13 The prospective immigrant must then show she has either a high school diploma (or the equivalent), or at least two years of experience working in an occupation that requires at least two years of training.14 But the inquiry does not end there. Next, the review for suspected terrorist ties, criminal record, communicable illnesses, and the like is conducted. Courts grant consular officials significant deference in making these determinations, in a doctrine called “consular nonreviewability.”15 All this goes to show: The Trump administration’s description of the program does not comport with reality. II. What Role Does the DV Lottery Play in the Labor Market? The story of immigration is not just about family reunification; instead, more than half of the immigrant visa categories deal with employment-based or family-based eligibility.16 In other words, strengthening the labor market is one of the core goals of the immigration system.17 Many have dismissively suggested that the DV program has no role to play in this regard,18 but this is not the case.19 The DV lottery creates migration flows from areas where the 12. Diversity Visa Program—If You Are Selected, U.S. DEP’T STATE, https://perma.cc/GJ85-KRCF (archived Sept. 14, 2018). 13. The documents must be brought to the “visa interview at the U.S. Embassy or Consulate.” Diversity Visa Program—Prepare Supporting Documents, U.S. DEP’T STATE, https://perma.cc/XXF4-QLHP (archived Sept. 14, 2018). 14. See 8 U.S.C. § 1153(c)(2). 15. See Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753, 770 (1972) (refusing to look behind the executive branch’s decision regarding whether to grant a visa). 16. See generally 8 U.S.C. § 1101(15) (laying out the categories of immigrant visa, nearly all of which are either based on employment or family relationships, with the exception of the diversity visa and several other smaller programs). For a more accessible format, see Directory of Visa Categories, U.S. DEP’T STATE, https://perma.cc/488S-HFDH (archived Sept. 14, 2018). 17. JEB BUSH ET AL., COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, INDEPENDENT TASK FORCE REPORT NO. 63, U.S. IMMIGRATION POLICY 13-20 (2009), https://perma.cc/WTY5-89CQ (describing the broad goals of immigration policy, including, among other things, maintaining the U.S.’s economic dynamism). 18. See, e.g., Peter H. Schuck, Why the ‘Diversity Lottery’ Needs to End, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 2, 2017), https://perma.cc/5J3F-THFD. 19. See Kelly Virella, Diversity Visa Lottery Winners Defend and Critique Maligned Program, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 3, 2017), https://perma.cc/34RH-QBUP (showing that some DV lottery winners have far more than the minimum qualifications for the visa); see also Ryan Radia, A Highly-Skilled Opportunity for Trump on Immigration, COMPETITIVE ENTERPRISE INST. (Jan. 29, 2018), https://perma.cc/A5YC-5KRR (“[M]any immigrants who are admitted into the 161 The Labor Economics Case for the Diversity Visa Lottery 71 STAN. L. REV. ONLINE 159 (2018) U.S. would otherwise have virtually no immigration. Though not immediately obvious, these flows play a strong role as a “pull factor,” encouraging more settlement, particularly from countries where few migrants with significant skill or education typically emigrate. The DV program thus picks a random sample of trail-blazing immigrants who create the paths future high-skilled immigrants follow. The DV program creates pathways for future immigrants because it generates a critical mass of people seeking specific amenities and may signal the possibility of job opportunities to potential future migrants. The reasons for seeking a better life in a different country are as varied as the people who choose to make those decisions, but some common themes emerge from this human tapestry of resettlement. First, people tend to resettle in areas where there are other people that come from the same country.20 At a human level, this makes sense, because people tend to feel more comfortable in areas that feel familiar.21 It should come as little surprise, then, that labor economists confirm this intuition.22 Further, people tend to move to areas that have services and United States under visa categories that don’t emphasize skills are nevertheless college graduates.”).