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ISSN 2229 - 3361 VICE CHANCELLOR BABU SEBASTIAN EDITOR K.M.SEETHI BOARD OF ASSOCIATE EDITORS A.M. THOMAS R. GIRISH KUMAR C. VINODAN M.V. BIJULAL LIRAR P. BOARD OF INTERNATIONAL ADVISORY EDITORS JAMES PETRAS (Bartle Professor (Emeritus) of Sociology at Binghamton University, New York) MARK PHYTHIAN (Department of Politics and International Relations, University of Leicester, UK) KANTI BAJPAI (National University of Singapore) ACHIN VANAIK (Department of Political Science, Delhi University, India) V. SURYANARAYAN (Centre for Asian Studies, Chennai, India) ZHENG YONGNIAN (East Asian Institute, National University of Singapore) ITTY ABRAHAM (National University of Singapore) MOONIS AHMAR (Department of International Relations, University of Karachi, Pakistan) AMBASSADOR GEETHA DE SILVA (Regional Centre for Strategic Studies, Colombo, Sri Lanka) DELWAR HOSSAIN (Department of International Relations, University of Dhaka, Bangladesh) MATTHEW CRAVEN (School of Oriental and African Studies, University of London) EDITORIAL OFFICE K.P.S.Menon Chair for Diplomatic Studies School of International Relations and Politics Mahatma Gandhi University Priyadarshini Hills P.O., Kottayam, Kerala India PIN- 686560 e-mail: [email protected] Printed in India at Print solutions, Kottayam, Kerala, India ISSN 2229 - 3361 South Asian Journal of Diplomacy 2017 K.P.S.MENON CHAIR FOR DIPLOMATIC STUDIES CONTENTS Contents India: The In-Between Great Power 07 Immanuel Wallerstein Washington and Brussels: Running in Reverse 09 James Petras Chinese crisis and the art of slow riding an economy 17 K.N.Harilal Public Policy and Governance in China 23 D.S. Rajan Reflections on Ethnicity and Nation-Building 37 V. Suryanarayan China’s New Tributary System: The South Asian Lesson 53 Joseph Antony Indo- Sri Lankan Fishing Disputes under Postcolonial Statehood 71 Shereen Sherif Countering India’s North-East Insurgency and India-Bangladesh Relations 89 MD. Farijuddin Khan Confidence Building Measures Between India and Pakistan 107 G. Thanga Rajesh India-Sri Lanka Free Trade Agreement 125 Manikandan A.D. Reghunathan M About The Authors 136 6 India: The In-Between Great Power Immanuel Wallerstein I have the impression that, of all the “great powers” in the contemporary world- system, however one defines “great power,” India is the one that receives the least attention. I admit that this has been true of me, but it is true as well of the majority of geopolitical analysts. Why should this be? India after all is rapidly approaching the point where it will have the world’s largest population. It is respectably high on most measures of economic strength and improving all the time. It is a nuclear power and has one of the world’s largest armed forces. It is a member of the G20 which is the imprimatur of being a great power. However, it is not a member of the G7, which is a far more restricted group and a far more important one. It is one of the five countries known as the BRICS – Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa. But the BRICS, the rising force of “emerging” economies at the beginning of the new century, has now slipped in geopolitical significance, as their economies, with the exception of China, have suddenly weakened radically since the post-2008 decline in the world-economy. They are officially a member, with China and Russia but also with Pakistan, of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation, but this structure has never seemed to become a major force in world politics. India’s governments, whichever party has been in power, have spent much energy seeking a larger role in the world-system. In particular, they have sought to obtain support from other powers in India’s long-standing dispute with Pakistan over Kashmir. They have never seemed to achieve this goal. In the days of the cold war, India was officially neutral and de facto closer to Russia. Since the collapse of the Soviet Union, India has tried to improve its relations with the United States. But what it gained in terms of U.S. support, it lost in terms of Chinese policy. China has had serious armed conflicts with India over territory, and is angry about India’s hospitality to the Dalai Lama. 7 SAJD 2017 India has been a rare country in Asia to have a functioning parliamentary system, with shifts in electoral strength between the Congress Party (heir of the independence movement) and the Bharatiya Janata Party (a rightwing Hindu nationalist movement). This fact receives regular plaudits from analysts and political leaders in the pan-European countries, but doesn’t seem to have meant that they support India’s demands for greater recognition to any important degree. One question one should ask is, “who really needs India?” The United States, especially since Donald Trump has come to power, wants India to buy more from it without however investing too much in return. Indeed, at the moment, the return of Indian internet technology personnel to India from the United States (and other western countries) is threatening the United States with significant loss of employment in one of the few sectors where the United States has been doing well up to now. Does China need India? Of course, China wants the backing of India in any of its quarrels with the United States, but India is a rival for the support of countries in southeast Asia, not a partner in their development. Russia and Iran could use Indian support on Middle East issues, but India is hesitant to give too much support, even when they basically agree on questions concerning say Afghanistan, for fear of offending the United States. Southeast Asian nations believe that coming to terms with China will pay off more than coming to terms with India. The problem, clearly, is that India is an “in-between” state. It is strong enough to be taken into account by others. But it is not strong enough to play a decisive role. So, as the other powers constantly juggle their priorities, India seems fated to be one that reacts to their initiatives, rather than one to which others react to Indian initiatives. Will this change over the next decade? In the chaotic geopolitics of the present state of the world-system, anything is possible. But it does not seem too likely. (c) Immanuel Wallerstein 8 Washington and Brussels: Running in Reverse James Petras Washington and Brussels’ response to foreign affairs challenges, as they face their own political and economic disasters and decline, has been to impose economic sanctions, boycotts and issue increasingly reckless military threats against rival nations. The ruling and main opposition parties in the US and EU have taken over the major media, turning ‘news programs’ into propaganda campaigns promoting violent power grabs (‘regime change’) and self-defeating trade wars. Washington’s belligerency amounts to merely pounding on empty oil drums on behalf of the US oil giants. Overt hostility prepares for trade wars, military confrontations and possible regional conflagrations . where the US and EU will likely face even greater defeats. Economic warfare is designed to impoverish nations and create a pretext for sowing internal discord and sabotage, especially through buying political candidates, organizing street mobs and recruiting military vassals. Washington, hampered by its current internal divisions, is stumbling backwards and forwards towards major catastrophes. The oligarchs in Brussels face complex internal splits and even open rebellion, especially from the EU’s new members. The referendum around ‘Brexit’ revealed a popular rebellion against decades of deepening class inequalities and the blatant financial power grab by the speculator- banker elite. Central and Eastern European authoritarians are challenging the Brussels oligarchy. Powerful national bosses in Poland, Hungary and Slovakia have embraced Israel’s thuggish Prime Minister Netanyahu in a common move to weaken Brussels. The break-up of internal cohesion in Washington and Brussels has led to more frantic efforts to externalize their problems, through warfare, in order to retain state power – a kind of ‘building capitalism for a few countries’. In summary, the on-going break-up of the US-EU bloc has led to increasing reliance on economic warfare, with sanctions, boycotts and tariff walls to confront international trade competitors and regional rivals.Washington and Brussels have targeted four major countries: Russia, China, Iran and Venezuela. The build-up for 9 SAJD 2017 waging economic warfare includes daily hysterical demonization of these nations in the mass media, accompanied by the recruitment of regional clients, in order to buttress economic sanctions. The campaign of economic and ideological warfare is designed to provoke internal political divisions in the targeted country in the lead- up to a violent seizure of political power. Russia: Economic Sanctions and Peripheral Wars Washington and the European Union have pursued a two-pronged strategy against Russia: On the one hand, they have encircled Russia with NATO and US bases, ships, missile installation, cyberwar centers and communications/spy outposts and troop exercises from the Baltics to Ukraine, Georgia and beyond. On the other hand, they slapped draconian trade sanctions on Russian import and export of military and civilian technology, energy and mining companies, machine goods, agriculture and other commodities, as well as sanctioning individuals, their family members and confiscating Russian property. The openly stated strategic goal is to create such chaos and deprivation that the Russian people will violently overthrow the Putin presidency and restore Russia to vassal status. With a new pliable set of puppet oligarchs in the Kremlin, the West would resume pillaging the country’s resources and wealth, as it did so brazenly during the 1990’s. The sanctions and military threats have so far boomeranged back onto the West, with the possible exception of the US-EU organized coup in the Ukraine. Economic sanctions have convinced the Russian government and people to redirect their resources to reindustrialize and diversify the economy, substituting local production and increasing agricultural self-sufficiency: In other words, expanding and stabilizing the internal market.