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Philosophical Review Philosophical Review Leibniz's Phenomenalisms Author(s): Glenn A. Hartz Source: The Philosophical Review, Vol. 101, No. 3 (Jul., 1992), pp. 511-549 Published by: Duke University Press on behalf of Philosophical Review Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2186056 . Accessed: 24/01/2011 16:04 Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of JSTOR's Terms and Conditions of Use, available at . http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp. JSTOR's Terms and Conditions of Use provides, in part, that unless you have obtained prior permission, you may not download an entire issue of a journal or multiple copies of articles, and you may use content in the JSTOR archive only for your personal, non-commercial use. Please contact the publisher regarding any further use of this work. Publisher contact information may be obtained at . http://www.jstor.org/action/showPublisher?publisherCode=duke. Each copy of any part of a JSTOR transmission must contain the same copyright notice that appears on the screen or printed page of such transmission. JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact [email protected]. Duke University Press and Philosophical Review are collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to The Philosophical Review. http://www.jstor.org The PhilosophicalReview, Vol. 101, No. 3 (July1992) Leibniz's Phenomenalisms Glenn A. Hartz ocke's Essay is like a mail-ordercatalogue," writesP. T. Geach, "and you buy what suitsyou. To switchto a communication- theorymetaphor, the trouble is to make out which part is message and which is noise."' Something similarmight be said of the Leib- nizian corpus. It is large and diverse and rich-so rich that there are withinit tensions or outrightcontradictions. These force the commentatorto choose which items to purchase and which to let well alone. Message and noise are alarminglyoften set side by side in texts from the same or closely neighboringperiods of time, in differentdrafts of the same essay,and sometimesin the verysame draft. When one turns to Leibniz's views of matter,one is confronted withan astonishingcollection of distinctaccounts. One must adopt either (i) the so-called "Athenian" approach, drummingout all of the incompatibilityand presentinga single overarchinginclusive account, or else (ii) the "Darwinian" strategy,saying his views of 'The followingabbreviations are used in the text and footnotes:A = Robert Merrihew Adams, "Phenomenalism and Corporeal Substance in Leibniz," MidwestStudies in Philosophy8, ContemporaryPerspectives on the Historyof Philosophy,ed. P. A. French, T. E. Uehling, Jr., and H. K. Wettstein(Minneapolis: Universityof Minnesota Press, 1983), 217-57; AG = G. W. Leibniz:Philosophical Essays, ed. and trans.R. Ariew and D. Garber (Indianapolis: Hackett, 1989); C = Opusculesetfragments ine'dits de Leibniz, ed. L. Couturat (Paris: Alcan, 1903); G = Die philosophischenSchriften von GottfriedWilhelm Leibniz, 7 vols., ed. C. I. Gerhardt(Berlin: Weidmannsche Buchhandlung, 1875-90); GM = G. W. Leibniz, MathematischeSchriften, 7 vols., ed. C. I. Gerhardt (Berlin: A. Asher; Halle: H. W. Schmidt, 1849- 63); L = GottfriedWilhelm Leibniz: Philosophical Papers and Letters,2d. ed., ed. and trans.L. E. Loemker (Dordrecht,The Netherlands: Reidel, 1969); LA = The Leibniz-ArnauldCorrespondence, ed. and trans. H. T. Mason (Manchester, England: Manchester UniversityPress, 1967; New York: Garland, 1985); P = Leibniz:Philosophical Writings, ed. G. H. R. Parkinson, trans. M. Morris and G. H. R. Parkinson (Totowa, N.J.: Rowman and Littlefield,1975); R = Bertrand Russell,A CriticalExposition of thePhilos- ophyof Leibniz, 2d. ed. (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1937). The quo- tation is from P. T. Geach, "Identity,"Review of Metaphysics 21 (1967-68): 12. 511 GLENN A. HARTZ matterchanged significantlyduring his lifetime.2Though the Dar- winian view applies to some of his doctrines-for example, his views of space and time3-it does not apply to his metaphysicsof matter.Instead of runninga single doctrineof body throughmany mutationsand emerging with a completelynew doctrine,Leibniz allows several doctrines to coexist and flourishtogether. The viewsare scatteredthroughout the maturecorpus, but I will note the date of textsI cite because theirinterpretation is affected cruciallyby the nature of other doctrinesLeibniz held at that time. I will follow Leibniz in using 'body' as the most general term des- ignating material objects. But I will somewhat diverge from his usage of the term 'phenomenon' and its cognates. Leibniz tends to use this as a specific,pejorative label for such ontologicallylight- weightitems as illusionsand aggregatesof substances.I will argue thata more general meaning thatLeibniz sometimesattaches to the concept of phenomena is useful as a wayof characterizinghis over- all doctrine of body. At the outsetlet us set fortha pictureof Leibniz's overall system. From the perspectiveof perceivingsubstances ("monads" or "cor- poreal substances"),there are four possible objects of perception: (1) illusions:mere appearances that fail to cohere with other objects of perception. (2) aggregates:appearances thatare misleadinglyunified-they actuallyare collectionsof an infinitenumber of substances. (3) corporealsubstances: combinations of specially-organized groups of monads/corporealsubstances (formingthe "or- ganic body") and a perfect-unity-bestowing"dominant monad." (4) substantiallybonded corporeal substances: corporeal substances that have added to them a "substantialbond" that makes them perfectlycontinuous. (4) is not supported widely in the corpus, and (1) does not play a great role in the Leibnizian program. Thus I shall concentrate mainlyon (2) and (3). 2See Hector-Neri Castafieda, "Leibniz's Concepts and Their Coin- cidence Salva Veritate,"Nouis 8 (1974): 381-98. 3See Glenn A. Hartz andJ. A. Cover, "Space and Time in the Leibnizian Metaphysic,"No Ws22 (1988): 493-519. 512 LEIBNIZ'S PHENOMENALISMS In the firstsection I clarifyLeibniz's use of 'phenomenon'. The second section is devoted to settingforth the accounts that high- light perceptual featuresas the nature of body. I explore mereo- logical accounts in the third section, followed by a supervenience construal. Finally, I combine several of the accounts to derive various versions of Leibniz's sufficientconditions for body. For most of these accounts I will ask: What conditionsmust obtain in order for there to be (i) a body at a time, and (ii) a body that endures fora period of time?More familiarand accessiblepassages will typicallybe quoted only briefly,less familiarpassages more fully. 1. 'Phenomenon' In a seminal letterof 1687 to Arnauld, Leibniz uses 'phenomena' to referto illusionsand aggregates.He saysthat if matterlacked "true unity,"it would be "a phenomenon, lacking all realityas would a coherent dream" (G 2:99/LA 122). Of aggregates he writes that though there are various "degrees of accidentalunity," such unities "are made complete only by thoughtsand appearances, like colors and other phenomena. ." (G 2:100/LA 126). How does the mind dole out unity? Our mindnotices or conceivesof certaingenuine substances which have variousmodes; thesemodes embracerelationships with other substances,from which the mindtakes the opportunity to linkthem togetherin thoughtand to enterinto the accountone name forall thesethings together, which makes for convenience in reasoning.(G 2:101/LA126; cf. G 2:97/LA121; G 2:119/LA153) There are two senses of 'phenomenon' here, both metaphysically pejorative. Either ILL: x is a phenomenon = x is an illusoryappearance, which makes it quite ontologicallyflimsy; or MEN: x is a phenomenon = x is the appearance of an aggregate of corporeal substances or monads whose unity is only apparent, since it is manufacturedby the mind, 513 GLENN A. HARTZ which makes it a bit less flimsybut neverthelessfar from funda- mental since its unity is not genuine. We can call bodies cor- responding to ILL Illusoryphenomena, and those corresponding to MEN mentalphenomena. Illusory phenomena are ontologicallynegligible, since they are nothingover and above appearances in minds. Mental phenomena belong to a higher caste, since there is somethingextra-mental- aggregates of substances-that theyrepresent. In MEN I've allowed those aggregates to be composed of either corporeal substances or monads. Why? Because Leibniz allows for the disjunction.In the Arnauld correspondence and elsewhere the constituentsare called "corporeal substances,""animals," or "living bodies" and are clearlythought of as the constituentsof phenome- nal aggregates (G 2:120/LA 154). Each corporeal substanceis com- posed of a dominant monad plus an "organic body" or "machine." Organic bodies are best thoughtof as fancyaggregates-typically collectionsof organs-that are speciallysuited to the role of acting as the body of a corporeal substance after that organic body has been joined to a dominant monad. Frankenstein's"monster body" before it came to lifewould be an example of an organic body. Like ordinaryaggregates, the organic body-which in the Arnauld ex- change Leibniz calls the "body apart,without the soul" (G 2: 100/LA 125) or "the mass of [a person's] body" (G 2:120/LA 154)-is said to be composed of other smaller corporeal substances.
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