New York State School Safety Guide

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New York State School Safety Guide New York State School Safety Guide Revised 2013 2 Acknowledgements This document was created through a collaborative effort between New York State Education Department, New York State Police, New York State Office of Homeland Security, New York State Division of Criminal Justice Services and New York State Office of Emergency Management. 3 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY This document is for official use only. Unauthorized disclosure outside your organization is prohibited without prior written approval from the New York State Police and the New York State Education Department. 4 Introduction This guidance document replaces and updates the contents of the following documents: • New York State Education Department Bomb Threat Response Guideline (February 1999) • New York State Homeland Security System for Schools (April 2003) • Best Practices for School Safety and Security (December 2004) • New York State School Safety Guide (September 2007) This document contains guidance and suggested protocols for addressing the four phases of emergency management: prevention, preparedness, response, and recovery. This document includes a chapter on each of these phases. Many of the detailed suggestions included throughout this guidance document, although important, are not mandatory. Included in the Appendix of this document are reproducible forms that you are encouraged to use to address all stages of an incident. Also included are agency contacts and relevant websites to assist with questions or technical support you may need. 5 6 Table of Contents Prevention…………………………………………… 9 Threat Assessment 11 Building Safety and Security 18 Transportation Safety and Security 25 Crime and Terrorism Indicators 27 Preparedness……………………………………….33 Strategies for Preparedness 35 Planning for an Incident 39 Tabletop/Crisis Exercises 40 Communication Strategies 42 Response…………………………………………….45 Response Procedures 47 Lockdown 47 Lockout 52 Shelter in Place 53 Bomb Threat Guidelines 55 Recovery……………………………………………..59 Roles in the Aftermath of a Crisis 61 How Do Children Respond to Crisis? 66 How Can We Help Them? 66 Appendix……………………………………………..69 Gotta Go Bags A1 NYSP Threat Assessment Model A2 Student Assessment A3 School Safety Audit Checklist A4 NYSP Bomb Threat Card A5 Lockdown Procedures - Quick Guide A6 Lockout Procedures - Quick Guide A7 Shelter in Place - Quick Guide A8 Incident Command System Organizational Chart A9 Resources………………………………………….101 References…………………………………………111 7 8 Prevention 9 Situational Awareness: When you see something you think is “out of place” . ask yourself, “Does this person belong at this place at this time?” 10 Threat Assessment (Refer to Threat Assessment Tools, Appendix A2 & A3) • Designate a threat assessment coordinator and consider forming (and training) a multidisciplinary team. Benefits o Improves the efficiency and scope of the assessment process. o Provides diverse professional input. Prevention o Minimizes the risk of observer bias. • Adopt an “integrated systems approach” to threat assessment. Benefits o Recognizes the necessity of cooperation and partnerships between schools, local emergency responders, and community partners: law enforcement, social services, mental health providers, community agencies, and faith-based organizations. o Bits of information, inconsequential by themselves, may coalesce into a discernible pattern that indicates a threat of violence. • Identify “at risk” students (and staff). Assessing Specific Threats - Bombs Preventive Measures • Install a caller ID system on school telephone lines and/or tape record incoming calls. • Consider advising callers (electronically) that all incoming calls will be monitored and/or recorded. • Arrange to have the local telephone company provide for the immediate tap and trace of a telephoned bomb threat. (Cell phones are traceable). • Establish an immediate reporting system for students and staff to report the presence of “strangers” in the building and/or objects that may look out of place. • Establish a policy stating that all “lost time” due to disruptive hoaxes will be made up. 11 • To ensure testing integrity, develop contingency plans for bomb threats during times of academic examinations and other high profile events. • Train all persons in a school who would generally be the first recipient of a telephone bomb threat. Training should include the procedures established by the New York State Police. Law enforcement agencies are also a good training source. (Appendix A5 – NYSP Bomb Threat Card) • Conduct assembly programs on the school emergency plan procedures. • Invite law enforcement personnel to discuss with students and staff the legal implications of calling in false alarms and bomb threats. • Use trash cans that can be easily checked for suspicious objects – employ the use of wire-style trash cans and transparent trash bags. • Lock unassigned lockers with school locks turned backwards to identify those not occupied by students. • Lock custodial closets and rooms that are not occupied in order to limit access. • Keep lobby areas free of trash receptacles (other than wire mesh) and furniture that would allow for placing objects out of view. • Place fire extinguishers in recessed and alarmed cabinets equipped with glass or translucent doors. • If fire extinguishers are not of the hanging variety (preferred), use a black marker to outline the base of the extinguisher. This will assist in identifying an extinguisher that has been moved, tampered with, or used to secrete object(s) behind. • Have the building-level safety team meet with the State Police or the local law enforcement agency to discuss other measures to ensure the building safety and security. Pre-Clearance and Security Screening in Lieu of Evacuation (during testing) • It is strongly recommended that school officials carefully coordinate this option in cooperation with local law enforcement officials. • This option may only be implemented prior to the receipt of an actual bomb threat, And 12 • Only after building and grounds have been “cleared” at the start of the day and continually monitored throughout the day. • This option may be appropriate when a school reasonably anticipates the receipt of a bomb threat or if there is a particular concern over the possibility of a bomb threat. (During the administration of Regents examinations or during other school-wide events.) • School administrators who choose this option must ensure that all of the following steps are followed for ensuring the security of the building: Prevention o Staff must be assigned to do a “walk-through” of the buildings and grounds prior to the arrival of students in the morning to ensure that there are no suspicious objects in or around the building. o Staff who complete the “walk-through” must report findings to the school principal. o Monitors must be assigned to walk around the outside of the building if state examinations are being administered. o A single point of entry to each building for students and staff must be established, and monitored by school personnel. o School staff must monitor all exits. o In the case of state examinations, students must not be admitted to the building more than 30 minutes before the start of that examination. o Students may only be admitted to the building after passing through a checkpoint to ensure that they are bringing with them only pre- approved items. o Student book bags and knapsacks must be inspected. o It may be appropriate to send a notice home prior to the event to clearly state that book bags will not be permitted for that particular event. o During state examinations, testing locations are to be clearly marked. o Students must only be allowed in the areas of the building where exams are being administered. o All lockers, including unassigned lockers, must have locks. 13 o A reporting procedure must be in effect for sighting any unusual object or behavior. o Parking adjacent to buildings should not be allowed. • In the event it is necessary to evacuate the building, the steps outlined in the Response section pertaining to evacuation must be followed. School Employee Involvement • Schools may form teams of volunteers from administration, faculty, and staff to assist in sweeping a building or grounds for anything that looks out of place. • Prior to an incident, school officials should make certain that people who volunteer in the school building, such as parents or other community members, are trained and aware of their responsibilities. • School employees who volunteer or by job duty are assigned to assist, should have access to building keys, floor plans, and information about shut-off valves for heat, electricity, water, and ventilation (HVAC). Assessing Specific Threats – Violence / Shooting Pre-incident Behavior • Incidents of targeted violence at school are rarely sudden, impulsive acts. • Prior to most incidents, other people knew about the attacker’s idea and/or plan to attack. • Most attackers did not threaten their targets directly prior to advancing the attack. • There is no accurate or useful “profile” of students who engage in targeted school violence. • Most attackers engaged in some behavior, prior to the incident, that caused concern or indicated a need for help. • Most attackers were known to have difficulty coping with significant losses or personal failures – many had considered or attempted suicide. • Many attackers felt bullied, persecuted, or injured by others prior to the attack. 14 • Most attackers had access to and had used weapons prior to the attack.
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