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Introduction

Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik German Institute for International and Security Affairs

A Festival of Populism Slovakia after Its 2004 Presidential Election

Kai-Olaf Lang SWP Comments

Ivan Gasparovic, the controversial former president of parliament, has won the presidential election in Slovakia. In the final runoff ballot on 17 April 2004, he defeated his former political associate and former prime minister, Vladimir Meciar. Both of these politicians had been largely responsible for Slovakia’s international detachment during the 1990s. As Gasparovic is being supported by the most dynamic opposition power of the populist party Smer (“Direction”), the result of the election is a warning signal for Prime Minister Mikulas Dzurinda’s moderate-right coalition. A new axis in Slovak politics is looming on the horizon. In addition, this election is a forewarning to the newly extended European Union (EU). The outcome of the election has shown that some populist groups and politicians have joined the EU thinking that they are capable of winning elections. The EU must decide how to deal with these members if radical, populist, and Euroskeptical parties come into power.

In previous years Slovakia gained a positive 2. Ivan Gasparovic quite unexpectedly image because of its determined zeal in re- finished in second place and therefore forming economic policies. But this image qualified for the final ballot. is subject to interference by the new head 3. Eduard Kukan, who had been supported of state, who in the past has tended to be by his own and Prime Minister Dzu- a confrontational, populist politician. rinda’s party, the Slovak Democratic Further eroding this image are continuing and Christian Union (SDKU), as well as unsolved social problems and numerous the liberal governing party, the Alliance scandals within the governing coalition. of the New Citizen (ANO), unexpectedly missed qualifying for the second ballot. 4. Office holder Rudolf Schuster fell below The Results expectations and was only capable of The real surprise of the presidential convincing 7 percent of the voters. election in Slovakia were the results of 5. The turnout for this ballot was only the first ballot on April 4th: 48 percent—perceptibly lower than in 1. Vladimir Meciar received the most votes the 1999 presidential election and in the with nearly one-third of all votes. 2002 parliamentary election.

SWP Comments 9 May 2004

1 Table 1 Table 2 First ballot results, 4/4/2004 Second ballot results 17/04/2004

Nominees Votes % Nominees Votes % Vladimir Meciar 32.7 Ivan Gasparovic 59.9 Ivan Gasparovic 22.3 Vladimir Meciar 40.1 Eduard Kukan 22.1 Rudolf Schuster 7.4 self completely in the eyes of many Frantisek Miklosko 6.5 voters. In contrast to Meciar, Gasparovic Martin Butora 6.5 has distanced himself from at least a few Others 2.4 of the severe errors he had committed while president of parliament in the As none of the nominees could rally ’90s. He has emphasized that he never an absolute majority, a final ballot was belonged to HZDS’s inner circle of necessary. The two choices for this runoff power. That’s why he stated he had ballot left the Slovaks surprised, perplexed, only been partly responsible for their and even dismayed. Earlier polls had shown activities between 1994 and 1998. that Eduard Kukan was seen as the lesser of ! Gasparovic eventually profited from the evils. He therefore had been expected the support of Smer, currently the most to progress to the second ballot where he popular opposition group. Smer is would have easily defeated his main com- aiming at a “fruitful dialogue with petitor, Vladimir Meciar. representatives of the so-called ‘Third With the resulting duel between Gas- Way’ or the ‘New Middle’” and is estab- parovic and Meciar as a result of the first lishing contacts with social democratic ballot, the runoff was like Skylla vs. Charyb- parties in Europe. Even so, Smer’s presi- dis for most voters. Because the governing dent, Robert Fico, neither showed reser- parties had asked their supporters not to vations nor reluctance in supporting vote and had not offered recommendations Gasparovic, in spite of his past. Fico or advice, these tensions were heightened. wants to see Gasparovic as an “expe- The final ballot on April 17th resulted rienced statesman and a patriot.” in a clear victory for Ivan Gasparovic. Four These factors contributed to a turnout factors may have contributed to Gasparo- of 43.5 percent for the second ballot, which vic’s success: reveals that many supporters who voted on ! Meciar (and his party, the Movement for April 17th wanted to prevent a victory for a Democratic Slovakia, HZDS) has a con- Meciar. siderable number of reliable supporters A colorful heterogeneous electorate has on his side, but they are too few in num- gathered behind Gasparovic: ber with regard to the total electorate. ! Leftist protest voters of every shade, who Meciar could only mobilize 35 to 40 per- were mostly attracted by Rudolf Schuster cent of all voters. during the last presidential elections ! Gasparovic has a social bent. This trait ! Former supporters of the social demo- appealed successfully to the bulk of cratic leftist party those Slovaks demanding a reversal of to ! Voters of the Communist Party the current government’s severe reform ! And most notably, sympathizers policies. “I am in favor of reforms, but I of Robert Fico’s Smer am not in favor of poverty,” Gasparovic In addition, sympathizers of the nation- stated his socio-political credo immedi- al-populist alliance launched Gasparovic’s ately before the second ballot. nomination. These are disappointed HZDS ! Obviously, Gasparovic was a lesser evil supporters and tough nationalists, i.e., loyal than Meciar, who had discredited him- followers of the chauvinist national party,

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2 the Slovak National Party (SNS). In the end, successes for Smer, it will soon be forgotten many voters chose Gasparovic over Meciar that Fico did not succeed in a referendum on the second ballot despite their “tum- to force early reelections due to the small myache.” voter turnout on April 4th. Smer is now likely to be again the winner in the elections for the European Parliament in June. Winners Apart from Ivan Gasparovic, who made his way in a short time from being an apostate Losers of the unsuccessful Meciar to the holder of The big losers of this presidential election the supreme state office, Robert Fico (Smer) are the foreign minister, Kukan, and head is the big winner of the presidential elec- of government, Dzurinda, who are both tion of 2004. With Gasparovic, Fico has members of the same party. Before the first his man in the president’s chair. Though ballot, Kukan had good prospects of win- Gasparovic does not depend on Fico, it will ning the presidency. The real surprise of be important for Gasparovic to support his that first ballot was that Kukan did not mentor in his fight against the governing even qualify for the second ballot. He was coalition. For Fico who is the leader of the short by 3,600 votes. Kukan fully felt the strongest opposition party, it must be a voters’ frustration with the politics of the pleasant thought that a politician whose government and Prime Minister Dzurinda. views are close to his will nominate the Kukan’s chances were diminished consid- head of government after the next parlia- erably by the government’s strict reform mentary election. policies, by a high unemployment rate des- Fico may also benefit—as a consequence pite foreign investments, and by numerous of having supported Gasparovic—from the scandals involving Kukan’s governing failure of Eduard Kukan—who had been the party, SDKU. Under these circumstances main representative of the present govern- the inability of right-moderate groups to ing coalition—as well as from the defeat of agree on a mutual nominee for the election Prime Minister Dzurinda. In addition, it proved to be devastating. could prove useful for Fico if Gasparovic’s The liberal-conservative votes were split alliance strengthens. In that case, one or among three nominees: Kukan, the Chris- more pro-Gasparovic groups (the alliance tian democrat Frantisek Miklosko, and the itself or his own party, the Movement for former Slovak ambassador to Washington, Democracy (HZD), or a fusion of the HZD Martin Butora—who was running as an with other nationalists opposing Meciar) Independent. Even though this segment of could be represented in the next parlia- the political spectrum received 35 percent ment where Fico would have potential of the votes, none of the conservative or allies for a future governing coalition. liberal-conservative nominees were able Fico’s most important success, however, to win a place on the second ballot. True to was the defeat of Meciar and the HZDS. the voting trend of the past fifteen years, With his party, Smer, Fico proved to be the traditional fragmentation of the con- the dominant opposition. This was possible servative camp enabled national-populist because Fico established a strong alter- forces to win the election. The last par- native to the governing coalition and liamentary elections were simply another Meciar by supporting Gasparovic. More- exception confirming this rule. over, Gasparovic’s triumph over HZDS once It is doubtful whether the low turnout again triggered debates about Meciar’s really was detrimental to Kukan and helped viability and the party’s strategic orienta- Meciar and Gasparovic. Compared to the tion. So Fico made an attempt at driving a overall results, Kukan came out much wedge into HZDS. Considering all of the better in districts with a high voting absten-

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3 tionism, while both Meciar and Gasparovic the same time, several leading HZDS fared poorly there. A higher turnout might members were signaling their interest in therefore have helped both Meciar and developing good relations with the new Gasparovic to achieve higher returns. president, and they did not exclude con- Finally, the incumbent Rudolf Schuster, tacts with Smer. These moves by HZDS was among the losers. He had been ex- appear to have been initiated by Fico after pected to do well with socially-minded he declared that, from his point of view, all protest voters because he criticized the obstacles to cooperation with HZDS had government’s reform policies. However, been removed. these voters abandoned him. Perhaps Although HZDS now faces many debates Schuster had jeopardized his campaign about its future as a result of the election, from the very beginning by his hesitation it is unlikely that a revolt will be mounted to participate in the elections. Further- against Meciar. Rather, as has been a com- more, his inability to garner support mon occurrence, dissension could cause from influential political powers had an some party members, including members unfavorable impact on his campaign. of parliament, to leave the party and join Schuster’s natural ally would have been the Fico-Gasparovic groups. Fico’s Smer, since Schuster, just like Fico, had reproached the government for ex- cessive social hardships. However, in the Prospects end, Fico sided with Gasparovic, thus The EU and many in Slovakia are ill at ease leading to Schuster’s downfall. Several with the success of Gasparovic—a politician opinion polls showed a slump in Schuster’s who had recently disregarded fundamental popularity exactly when Gasparovic’s popu- standards of democracy and the rule of law. larity began to increase. Only in Schuster’s Without a doubt, his election to the presi- hometown of Kosice, in eastern Slovakia, dency will have consequences. But these along with a few southern Slovak districts consequences may be tempered by several with large Hungarian minorities, was factors. Schuster able to make a strong showing.

1. Limited Authority …and HZDS? Slovakia’s head of state does not have too The elections revealed that HZDS still faces much political power. During Rudolf its old problem: with Vladimir Meciar as Schuster’s tenure in office—and also that their candidate, the party is able to win of his predecessor, Michal Kovacs, who niche support but no overall majority of protected the president’s office against votes. With Meciar are being chairman, Meciar’s attempts at insubordination—one HZDS is isolated and has no chance to thing came clear: the head of state may be form a government. As president Meciar able to throw a wrench into the workings would have had the chance to approach of the government, but he cannot stop it the governing coalition by making himself from functioning. On the other hand, the and HZDS acceptable through a construc- president may have a significant influence tive “cohabitation” with Prime Minister over officials in many important public Dzurinda. However, his willingness to offices. For instance, he appoints members cooperate with the coalition, even selec- of the Constitutional Court as well as the tively, was questioned openly among party attorney general. Furthermore, he is the members after the failure on the second supreme commander of the armed forces. ballot. Meciar declined to cooperate with For the fragile minority government of his archrival, Fico, and he did not even Mikulas Dzurinda, the head of state’s right congratulate Gasparovic on his victory. At of veto against new laws could have

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4 negative repercussions. Such a veto can sary conflicts in Bratislava. But after some only be neutralized by an absolute majority time, Gasparovic could form a strategic in Parliament. But for the time being, alliance with the opposition. Over the relatively little will change, as the govern- longer term, there is a danger that Dzu- ment has already had to come to terms rinda will eventually start to have problems with president Rudolf Schuster who—apart with the presidential palace. from foreign policy goals—was not neces- sarily well-disposed towards the ruling coalition. 4. Impact on Foreign Policy Slovakia’s head of state is not in a position, nor does he have the will, to reverse current 2. Continued Weak Governing Coalition foreign policy. After1998, Slovakia’s foreign The coalition parties will try to unify policy has been designed and structured by against the apparent Fico-Gasparovic axis. reform-oriented governments which have As a consequence, pressure on Prime advocated membership in EU and NATO Minister Dzurinda could rise and force and have intended to be on friendly terms him to minor policy changes and some re- with the US. In Parliament, there is a stable organization of government offices. How- majority for both memberships. The same ever, Dzurinda’s hold on office is solid since goes for Ivan Gasparovic. When he declared his party has expressed confidence in him. that he favored Slovak troops remaining in Moreover, none of the governing coalition Iraq, this was meant to demonstrate con- groups is interested in new elections right tinuity towards the outside world, and also now because they might be defeated or find to dispel US concerns about his integrity. themselves in the opposition. It may be Also, his statement, according to which he expected, then, that the coalition will in- did not consider it necessary to seek a crease their efforts to gain popular support. referendum on the constitution of the EU, Prime Minister Dzurinda’s standings in the shows that Gasparovic aims at becoming a polls are weak while those of the populists reliable partner in foreign policy. are strong. Therefore, it is likely that Nevertheless, there are radical national- Dzurinda will attempt to add a touch of ists in the Confederation of the National patriotism to his and the party’s image. Forces of Slovakia (KNSS) who promoted Gasparovic’s run for president but who opposed NATO membership. On the Euro- 3. Gasparovic: pean level, KNSS orients itself with the an Awkward President for Dzurinda Union for a Europe of Nations, which is Meciar as president would probably have Euroskeptical. With respect to these inter- been a much more convenient partner for relations, it should be noted that the head Dzurinda than Gasparovic. Meciar would of state ratifies international treaties and have tried to get himself and his party back therefore will exert influence during the to normal and to get them out of their enactment and implementation of a Euro- political quarantine, both at home and pean constitutional treaty. But all in all, abroad. Accordingly, he would have tried concerning EU and NATO, Gasparovic will to be flexible and cooperative with the probably cooperate with the government. Dzurinda administration. In contrast, Gas- To do otherwise would risk too much parovic could endeavor to harm the govern- damage to his image during the sensitive ing coalition as much as possible. However, first phase of his period in office. in the beginning, he will direct his efforts President Gasparovic will certainly try toward creating a positive image for him- to intensify the country’s relationships self as a serious head of state. So, for the with the East, for instance with Ukraine or short term, he will not create any unneces- Russia. One of the reasons for this might be

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5 the fact that the governments in theses has tried to downplay the radicalism of the countries do not care about his political nationalists, at the same time highlighting biography. Relations with the Czech some of their achievements and successes. Republic will not play a dominant role, For example, he praised the mayor of but Prague will cooperate with him with- Zilina, who is also president of a nationalist out any complications. This is evidenced by party, for his commitment in convincing Czech president, Vaclav Klaus, and his South Korean car manufacturer Hyundai to predecessor, Vaclav Havel, having con- do a major investment in Slovakia. None- gratulated him immediately after his theless, it remains to be seen whether he victory. In fact, before the elections, Gaspa- will dissociate from his faux pas and abusive rovic had said that his first visit abroad attacks against the Hungarian minority and would bring him to the Czech Republic. the Slovak Romanies. The same cannot be said for Hungary, In the short-run, Slovakia’s European where shadows could be cast on Slovak- partners should maintain restrained and Hungarian relations if Gasparovic directs avoid publicity at bilateral meetings with verbal assaults at the Hungarian minority the new head of state. Zealous ignorance of or to Budapest. The parties that have sup- past sins would help other populist groups ported Gasparovic (not only the nationalists in Central Eastern Europe to gain accep- but also Smer) get people’s attention when tance as “normal” political actors. Thus the they promise to investigate and uncover populists’ prospects in other countries the true nationalist face of the Hungarian would improve. On the other hand, Gaspa- coalition party, or when they insist that rovic should not be outcast permanently. If there is a real danger in some “extremist he strives for an honest process of coming Hungarian policies.” to terms with the past, if he sticks to the rules of European democracy and the rule of law, and if he distances himself from A Wolf in Sheep’s Clothing ultra nationalists, he should gradually be or Rueful Sinner? integrated. The true test of Gasparovic’s How should Slovakia’s European partners rebirth, and the test case in the eyes of the deal with the new president? Recall that EU, will be his performance after the next also Ivan Gasparovic was responsible for parliamentary elections, where the new things going off course in Slovakia during political mix could force him to side with the ’90s. Although he was self-critical and the populist parties. admitted his errors, it is not yet clear if that To the newly extended EU, the Slovak was just a political tactic to absolve himself presidential election is a warning signal. of responsibility for these errors. In this The combination of disappointed voters, respect, Gasparovic will have to produce fragmented party systems, and dynamic evidence of his determination to make an populist movements may be smoothing the honest new beginning. way to power for radical politicians in new Apart from the posture he takes towards member countries like Slovakia. The EU’s the era of “Meciarism,” Gasparovic has to member countries should come to an im- be judged in terms of his programmatic mediate agreement on how to react to such orientation and the allies he will cooperate situations. Of course, such responses will with. As for his ideology Gasparovic has a need to review each case individually and blurred profile. Even though he claims to must be acceptable to all EU partners. be affiliated with the moderate left, he does Not all politicians labeled as “populists” not see any problems in cooperating with are equal, however. Their positions, their the far right. That’s why special attention ideological points of view, and their adapt- will have to be paid to Gasparovic’s rela- ability to change should thoughtfully be tions with extreme nationalists. So far, he taken into account early on.

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6 At the same time, influence should be exerted upon political groups and politicians who cooperate with radical parties. In the case of Slovakia, for instance, the EU partners of Smer would have to explain at length why their party supported Gasparo- vic, thereby giving the impression that they are approaching to extreme nationalists. After all, Smer is on good terms with the Party of European Socialists (PES). Already as observers in the European Parliament, Smer leaders Robert Fico and Monika Benova cooperated with the PES parliamentary group. After joining the EU, Smer representatives, now members, want to © Stiftung Wissenschaft und continue cooperating with PES. Since the Politik, 2004 two official Slovak PES parties failed in the All rights reserved past parliamentary elections, Smer is SWP striving to fill the vacuum in Slovakia’s Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik social democratic segment. But Smer con- German Institute for tinues to ally itself with radicals and to International and Security Affairs canvass with nationalist slogans against national minorities like Hungarians and Ludwigkirchplatz 3−4 10719 Berlin Romanies. It also continues to show un- Telephone +49 30 880 07-0 disguised skepticism toward the EU. As Fax +49 30 880 07-100 www.swp-berlin.org long as these activities continue, full inter- [email protected] national acceptance should be given with care.

SWP Comments 9 May 2004