DOCSLIB.ORG

CMU-ISR-08-124.Pdf

Total Page：16

File Type：pdf, Size：1020Kb

Download full-text PDF Read full-text
CMU-ISR-08-124.Pdf Destabilization of Adversarial O rganizations with Strategic Interventions Il-Chul Moon C M U-ISR-08-124 June 2008 School of Computer Science Institute for Software Research International Carnegie Mellon University Pittsburgh, PA Thesis Committee K athleen M. Carley, Chair Alexander H. Levis (George Mason University) James D. Herbsleb John M. G raham (United States Military Academy) Submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy Copyright © 2008 Il-Chul Moon This research was sponsored by CAPES project (FA8650-07-C-6769) of Air Force Office of Scientific Research (AFOSR), MURI project (FA9550-05-1-0388) of Air Force Office of Scien- tific Research (AFOSR), DNA project (N00014-06-1-0921, N00014-06-0104) of Office of Naval Research (ONR), Geospatial analysis project (W911NF0710317) of ERDC-TEC, Army Research Institute (ARI), and SPAWAR project (N0016403D6623) of Naval Warfare Center. Additional support came from Carnegie Mellon University’s Center for Computational Analysis of Social and Organizational Systems (CMU CASOS). Finally, George Mason University’s System Archi- tectures Laboratory (GMU SAL) provided valuable support. The views and conclusions in this thesis should not be interpreted as representing the official policies, either expressed or implied, of AFOSR, ONR, ARI or the U.S. government. CMU SCS ISR -1 - CASOS Report Abstract Destabilization of adversarial organizations is crucial to combating terrorism. The adversarial organizations are complex adaptive systems, which include different types of entities and links to perform complex tasks and evolve over-time to adapt to changing situations. Both the complexity and the adaptivity of the adversary make it difficult for friendly forces to destabilize the adversary and to damage the performance of the adversary’s organization. The commander desires to identi- fy the terrorists command structure, key leader; assess their capability; and identify weaknesses; current technologies do not support these desires. At best, the commander might know historic activities, and most of the web of connections among known terrorists. By taking a dynamic network analytic approach and focusing on how to identify, reason about, and break 1) the adversary’s decision making structure, 2) the likelihood that the adversary can engage in key tasks; and 3) the adversary’s over-time social and geospatial behavior, we can be- gin to make headway in reasoning about this complexity and adaptivity. I develop four different, interoperable approaches supporting this assessment and estimation on adversarial organizations. These four approaches analyze different aspects of an organization, i.e. the core decision making structure, the high level assessment of task completion likelihood and the micro level simulation of the behavior of adversaries. By unifying these approaches, we can grasp a complete picture of the target as well as the destabilization strategies against it. First, I estimate the decision making structure of the organization, apply dynamic analysis metrics to it, and identify critical terrorists to be removed. This decision making structure is a trimmed organizational structure expected to be the critical command structure of the adversaries. Second, I extract an influence network for the key tasks. This is an assessment about the organizational support for the adversaries’ mission. Third, I use a multi-agent simulation (JDynet) to analyze organizational change. I simulate the CMU SCS ISR -2 - CASOS Report adversaries’ social interactions and task execution behavior. Also, I create and test simulation scenarios of removing key adversaries over the course of simulations. This estimates the damage that we can inflict on the adversarial organization with interventions. Fourth, I augment a geospa- tial component to JDynet, so the relocations of personnel and resources are included in the desta- bilization analysis. I use the geo-spatial-JDynet to simulate the strategic intervention effects with a joint picture from adversaries’ social and geospatial behavior. To ground and demonstrate this research, I use, primarily, three adversarial organizations, the terrorist networks responsible for 1998 US embassy bombing in Tanzania and Kenya; 1998 US embassy bombing in Kenya; and a global terrorist network. These are adversarial organizational structures including a task dependency network for mission execution; geospatial terrorist, re- source and expertise distributions; and terrorist social networks. I regard these datasets as an ob- served target adversarial structure and provide analyses results that are basis for destabilization strategies. My research makes contribution at theoretical, technical and empirical levels. First, I provide a theory of how to create a joint picture from different organizational and computational theories. I create theories to merge various existing theories, i.e. merging multi-agent simulations and dy- namic network analysis, dynamic network analysis and Bayesian network, dynamic network analysis and decision making structure, etc. This theoretical advancement provides a joint thought and analysis process about reasoning organizational behavior to managers, commanders and intelligence analysts. Second, I develop and test an interoperable analysis framework sup- ported by the suggested joint theory. This analysis framework is realized by expanding an analy- sis system (Organization Risk Analyzer), so that real world analysts can apply the suggested theory to their target organizations. Third, I empirically analyze three adversarial organizations to demonstrate the usage of this framework and the newly enabled analysis results. For example, the CMU SCS ISR -3 - CASOS Report newly enabled analysis approaches estimate Bin Laden considered as a non-critical terrorist in the U.S. Embassy Bombing in Tanzania and Kenya based on the existing dataset and approach is an actual critical contributor over the mission execution. This unifying theory and framework for adversarial destabilization, a partially automated intelli- gence analysis capability, 1) provide intelligence analysis results that can meet the operation tem- po in the real world, 2) bridge dynamic network analysis and various inference theories, and 3) provide a better tool that human analysts may use to reduce their time and cost of destabilization analysis. CMU SCS ISR -4 - CASOS Report Acknowledgement I thank God for allowing me to complete this thesis. Supports for this work came in part from the below research funding of various agencies. CAPES project of Air Force Office of Scientific Research (AFOSR, FA8650-07-C-6769) MURI project of Air Force Office of Scientific Research (AFOSR, FA9550-05-1-0388) DNA project of Office of Naval Research (ONR, N00014-06-1-0921, N00014-06-0104) Geospatial analysis project of ERDC-TEC, Army Research Institute (ARI, W911NF0710317) SPARWAR project of Naval Warfare Center (N0016403D6623) Additional support came from Carnegie Mellon University’s Center for Computational Analysis of Social and Organizational Systems (CMU CASOS). Finally, George Mason University’s Sys- tem Architectures Laboratory (GMU SAL) provided valuable support. The views and conclusions in this thesis should not be interpreted as representing the official policies, either expressed or implied, of AFOSR, ONR, ARI or the U.S. government. This thesis is completed because I was able to get help from three predecessors. Dr. Kathleen M. Carley is my academic advisor, and she enabled this work by her previous work on the multi- agent social modeling, the dynamic network analysis approach, the meta-network concept, etc. She is also a mentor who I will thank during my life time. I thank her for her advice on various matters, academic, research, job, etc. Time-to-time, i.e. a long drive from DC to Pittsburgh, early morning at a hotel lobby or meetings in her office, I had chances to talk to her about research, personal life, etc. She is a very enthusiastic researcher and advisor with a warm heart. Dr. Alex- ander H. Levis is another predecessor who developed many models that I used in this thesis. I met him when the MURI project started about three years ago. He makes comments and questions that go directly to the center of a problem or a task. I am glad to have his comments and questions about my works because those improve my research a lot. Dr. Lee Wagenhals is the one who de- veloped the Influence Network Analysis approach, which is used heavily in this thesis. He is also a nice researcher who reviewed my work and advised me with potential usages. I enjoyed work- ing with him. I want to thank Dr. John Graham and Dr. Jim Herbsleb. They are my thesis committee members and provided me valuable comments. Dr. John Graham gave me good comments about the do- main that I discuss in this thesis. Dr. Jim Herbsleb gave me unbiased comments that enabled me to think about the potential applications of my work to industries. I thank CASOS members for every support that they gave to me. They have been great work col- leagues, team mates, reviewers, and friends. I thank for my family and friends. I know that they know that I love them. Also, they know that I know that they love me. CMU SCS ISR -5 - CASOS Report Table of Contents 1. Introduction ........................................................................................................................... 13 1.1. Integrated framework and potential applications ........................................................
Load more

Recommended publications
  • Assessing the Vulnerability of Kenyan Youths to Radicalisation and Extremism
    Institute for Security Studies PAPER Assessing the vulnerability of Kenyan youths to radicalisation and extremism INTRODUCTION country is also central to the region and thus deserves That there is an emerging trend of religious radicalisation in closer scrutiny. Although Kenya’s intervention in Somalia East Africa is not in doubt. Somalia, which has experienced served to incite a terrorist response, the experience of various forms of conflict since 1991, has often been seen Uganda, Ethiopia and Burundi, all of which have had troops as the source of extremism in the region, especially in Somalia since 2006, showed different trends. Only the following the attacks on the United States (US) embassies attacks in Uganda and Kenya were attributed to those in Dar es Salaam and Nairobi on 7 August 1998. Yet closer countries’ interventions in Somalia. And, despite the fact investigation reveals that Somali nationals were not behind that those directly involved in these attacks were Ugandan most of the incidents outside Somalia’s borders. Somalia nationals, Kenyans and Tanzanians helped plan and provides a safe haven, training camps and opportunities for execute the attacks, not members of traditional extremists to fight the ‘enemies of Islam’, but al-Qaeda and Somali communities. later al-Shabaab have executed attacks in the region by This is not to say that individuals within the traditional relying on local assistance and support. At the same time, Muslim community have not used frustrations and al-Shabaab managed to recruit Kenyan, Ugandan and vulnerabilities among the youth – Muslim and non-Muslim Tanzanian nationals to its ranks in Somalia.
    [Show full text]
  • 2013 Report of the Joint Committee on Administ
    REPUBLIC OF KENYA KENYA NATIONAL ASSEMBLY ELEVENTH PARLIAMENT – FIRST SESSION - 2013 REPORT OF THE JOINT COMMITTEE ON ADMINISTRATION AND NATIONAL SECURITY; AND DEFENCE AND FOREIGN RELATIONS ON THE INQUIRY INTO THE WESTGATE TERRORIST ATTACK, AND OTHER TERROR ATTACKS IN MANDERA IN NORTH-EASTERN AND KILIFI IN THE COASTAL REGION --------------------------------------------------------- CLERK’S CHAMBERS PARLIAMENT BUILDINGS NAIROBI DECEMBER, 2013 1 TABLE OF CONTENTS PAGE Preface……………………………………….……………………….….................. 3 Background on terrorism in Kenya….............................................................. 10 Joint Committee visit to the Westgate Mall site …………….……………… 23 Meeting with witnesses on terrorism…………………..……..……………….. 26 Meetings with Experts on intelligence gathering and counter terrorism... 30 First meeting with Cabinet Secretaries, Ministries of Interior and Defence, and the Director General, National Intelligence Service………. 33 Second meeting with Cabinet Secretaries, Ministries of Interior and Defence, and the Director General, National Intelligence Service ….…… 37 Meeting with the Managing Director, Nakumatt Holdings Ltd…..….……... 39 Presentations by Dr. Abbas Gullet and Mr. Abdul Hajji……………………... 40 Meeting with the Director, Immigration Services, Director, Registration of Persons and Ag. Commissioner, Department of Refugee Affairs…......... 42 Meeting with the Kenya Veterans Association……………………………..…. 44 Meeting with Althaus Services Ltd…………………………………………...…. 45 Meeting with Dixons Electronics Ltd…………….....………………………….
    [Show full text]
  • Updated List Is Attached to This Letter
    TERRORISM U.S. Department of the Treasury Office of Foreign Assets Control What WhatYou YouNeed Need To To Know Know AboutAbout U.S. The Sanctions U.S. Embargo Executive Order 13224 blocking Terrorist Property and a summary of the Terrorism Sanctions Regulations (Title 31 Part 595 of the U.S. Code of Federal Regulations), Terrorism List Governments Sanctions Regulations (Title 31 Part 596 of the U.S. Code of Federal Regulations), and Foreign Terrorist Organizations Sanctions Regulations (Title 31 Part 597 of the U.S. Code of Federal Regulations) EXECUTIVE ORDER 13224 - BLOCKING PROPERTY AND PROHIBITING TRANSACTIONS WITH PERSONS WHO COMMIT, THREATEN TO COMMIT, OR SUPPORT TERRORISM By the authority vested in me as President by the Constitution and the laws of the United States of America, including the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 1701 et seq.)(IEEPA), the National Emergencies Act (50 U.S.C. 1601 et seq.), section 5 of the United Nations Participation Act of 1945, as amended (22 U.S.C. 287c) (UNPA), and section 301 of title 3, United States Code, and in view of United Nations Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1214 of December 8, 1998, UNSCR 1267 of October 15, 1999, UNSCR 1333 of December 19, 2000, and the multilateral sanctions contained therein, and UNSCR 1363 of July 30, 2001, establishing a mechanism to monitor the implementation of UNSCR 1333, I, GEORGE W. BUSH, President of the United States of America, find that grave acts of terrorism and threats of terrorism committed by foreign terrorists, including
    [Show full text]
  • VERORDNUNG (EG) Nr. 881/2002 DES RATES Vom 27. Mai 2002
    VERORDNUNG (EG) Nr. 881/2002 DES RATES vom 27. Mai 2002 (*) über die Anwendung bestimmter spezifischer restriktiver Maßnahmen gegen bestimmte Personen und Organisationen, die mit den ISIL (Da'esh)- und Al-Qaida- Organisationen in Verbindung stehen, zuletzt geändert durch die DURCHFÜHRUNGSVERORDNUNG (EU) 2016/2262 DER KOMMISSION vom 15. Dezember 2016 (**) DER RAT DER EUROPÄISCHEN UNION – gestützt auf den Vertrag zur Gründung der Europäischen Gemeinschaft, insbesondere auf die Artikel 60, 301 und 308, gestützt auf den Gemeinsamen Standpunkt 2002/402/GASP zu den restriktiven Maßnahmen gegen Osama bin Laden, Mitglieder der Organisation Al-Qaida und die Taliban sowie andere Einzelpersonen, Gruppen, Unterneh- men und Organisationen, die mit ihnen in Verbindung stehen, mit dem die Gemeinsamen Standpunkte 96/746/GASP, 1999/727/GASP, 2001/154/GASP und 2001/771/GASP1 aufgehoben wurden, auf Vorschlag der Kommission2, nach Stellungnahme des Europäischen Parlaments3, in Erwägung nachstehender Gründe: (1) Am 16. Januar 2002 nahm der Sicherheitsrat der Vereinten Nationen die Resolution 1390(2002) an, in der er feststellte, dass die Taliban auf die in mehreren vorausgegangenen Resolutionen gestellten Forderungen nicht reagiert hatten, und die Taliban dafür verurteilte, dass sie die Nutzung Afghanistans als Basis für die Ausbildung von Terroristen und terroristische Aktivitäten zugelassen haben, und in der er ferner das Al- Qaida-Netzwerk und andere mit ihm in Verbindung stehende terroristische Gruppen für ihre terroristischen Handlungen und die Zerstörung von Sachwerten verurteilte. (2) Der Sicherheitsrat beschloss unter anderem, dass das nach seinen Resolutionen 1267(1999) und 1333(2000) verhängte Flugverbot und einige der Afghanistan auferlegten Ausfuhrbeschränkungen aufgeho- ben und der Anwendungsbereich des Einfrierens von Geldern und das Verbot der Bereitstellung von Mitteln, die nach diesen Resolutionen auferlegt worden waren, angepasst werden sollen.
    [Show full text]
  • United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit ______
    Case: 11-320 Document: 211 Page: 1 10/24/2013 1074066 40 11-320-cr United States v. Ghailani In the United States Court of Appeals For the Second Circuit ________ AUGUST TERM, 2012 ________ No. 11-320-cr UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Appellee, v. AHMED KHALFAN GHAILANI, a/k/a FUPI, a/k/a ABUBAKARY KHALFAN AHMED GHALILIANI, Defendant-Appellant, WADIH EL HAGE, a/k/a ABDUS SABBUR, FAZUL ABDULLAH MOHAMMED, a/k/a HARUN FAZHL, a/k/a FAZHL ABDULLAH, a/k/a FAZHL KHAN, MOHAMED SADEEK ODEH, a/k/a ABU MOATH, a/k/a NOURELDINE, a/k/a MARWAN, a/k/a HYDAR, MOHAMED RASHED DAOUD AL-’OWHALI, a/k/a KHALID SALIM SALEH BIN RASHED, a/k/a MOATH, a/k/a ABDUL JABBAR ALI ABEL-LATIF, USAMA BIN LADEN, a/k/a USAMAH BIN-MUHAMMAD BIN-LADIN, a/k/a SHAYKH USAMAH BIN-LADIN, a/k/a MUJAHID SHAYKH, a/k/a HAJJ, a/k/a QAQA, a/k/a THE DIRECTOR, MUHAMMAD ATEF, a/k/a ABU HAFS, a/k/a ABU HAFS EL MASRY, a/k/a ABU ABU HAFS EL MASRY E KHABIR, a/k/a TAYSIR, a/k/a AHEIKH TAYSIR ABDULLAH, MUSTAFA MOHAMED FADHIL, a/k/a MUSTAFA ALI ELBISHY, a/k/a HUSSEIN, a/k/a HASSAN ALI, KHALFAN KHAMIS MOHAMED, a/k/a KHALFAN KHAMIS, SHEIKH AHMED SALIM Case: 11-320 Document: 211 Page: 2 10/24/2013 1074066 40 2 No. 11-320-cr SWEDAN, a/k/a SHEIKH BAHAMADI, a/k/a AHMED ALLY, MAMDOUH MAHMUD SALIM, a/k/a ABU HAJER AL IRAQI, a/k/a ABU HAJER, ALI MOHAMED, a/k/a OMAR, a/k/a ALI ABDELSEOUD MOHAMED, a/k/a ABU OMAR, a/k/a HAYDARA, a/k/a TAYMOUR ALI NASSER, a/k/a AHMED BAHAA ADAM, AYMAN AL ZAWAHIRI, a/k/a ABDEL MUAZ, a/k/a THE DOCTOR, KHALED AL FAWWAZ, a/k/a ABU OMAR, a/k/a KHALED ABDUL KHALED ABDUL RAHMAN, a/k/a HAMAD AL FAWWAZ, HAMAD, IBRAHIM EIDAROUS, a/k/a IBRAHIM H.A.
    [Show full text]
  • Crimes Committed by Terrorist Groups: Theory, Research and Prevention
    The author(s) shown below used Federal funds provided by the U.S. Department of Justice and prepared the following final report: Document Title: Crimes Committed by Terrorist Groups: Theory, Research and Prevention Author(s): Mark S. Hamm Document No.: 211203 Date Received: September 2005 Award Number: 2003-DT-CX-0002 This report has not been published by the U.S. Department of Justice. To provide better customer service, NCJRS has made this Federally- funded grant final report available electronically in addition to traditional paper copies. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. Crimes Committed by Terrorist Groups: Theory, Research, and Prevention Award #2003 DT CX 0002 Mark S. Hamm Criminology Department Indiana State University Terre Haute, IN 47809 Final Final Report Submitted: June 1, 2005 This project was supported by Grant No. 2003-DT-CX-0002 awarded by the National Institute of Justice, Office of Justice Programs, U.S. Department of Justice. Points of view in this document are those of the author and do not necessarily represent the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. TABLE OF CONTENTS Abstract .............................................................. iv Executive Summary....................................................
    [Show full text]
  • ISS Paper 245 Kenya Youth.Indd
    Institute for Security Studies PAPER Assessing the vulnerability of Kenyan youths to radicalisation and extremism INTRODUCTION country is also central to the region and thus deserves That there is an emerging trend of religious radicalisation in closer scrutiny. Although Kenya’s intervention in Somalia East Africa is not in doubt. Somalia, which has experienced served to incite a terrorist response, the experience of various forms of conflict since 1991, has often been seen Uganda, Ethiopia and Burundi, all of which have had troops as the source of extremism in the region, especially in Somalia since 2006, showed different trends. Only the following the attacks on the United States (US) embassies attacks in Uganda and Kenya were attributed to those in Dar es Salaam and Nairobi on 7 August 1998. Yet closer countries’ interventions in Somalia. And, despite the fact investigation reveals that Somali nationals were not behind that those directly involved in these attacks were Ugandan most of the incidents outside Somalia’s borders. Somalia nationals, Kenyans and Tanzanians helped plan and provides a safe haven, training camps and opportunities for execute the attacks, not members of traditional extremists to fight the ‘enemies of Islam’, but al-Qaeda and Somali communities. later al-Shabaab have executed attacks in the region by This is not to say that individuals within the traditional relying on local assistance and support. At the same time, Muslim community have not used frustrations and al-Shabaab managed to recruit Kenyan, Ugandan and vulnerabilities among the youth – Muslim and non-Muslim Tanzanian nationals to its ranks in Somalia.
    [Show full text]
  • INDICTMENT A/K/A “Usamah Bin-Muhammad Bin-Ladin," : S(9) 98 Cr
    UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK -----------------------------------------x UNITED STATES OF AMERICA : - v. - : USAMA BIN LADEN, : INDICTMENT a/k/a “Usamah Bin-Muhammad Bin-Ladin," : S(9) 98 Cr. 1023 (LBS) a/k/a “Shaykh Usamah Bin-Ladin," a/k/a “Abu Abdullah" : a/k/a “Mujahid Shaykh," a/k/a “Hajj,” : a/k/a "Abdul Hay," a/k/a “al Qaqa," : a/k/a “the Director," a/k/a “the Supervisor,” : a/k/a "the Contractor," MUHAMMAD ATEF, : a/k/a “Abu Hafs," a/k/a “Abu Hafs el Masry," : a/k/a “Abu Hafs el Masry el Khabir," a/k/a “Taysir," : a/k/a “Sheikh Taysir Abdullah," a/k/a “Abu Fatima,” : a/k/a "Abu Khadija," AYMAN AL ZAWAHIRI, : a/k/a “Abdel Muaz," a/k/a “Dr. Ayman al Zawahiri,” : a/k/a “the Doctor,” a/k/a "Nur," : a/k/a "Ustaz," a/k/a "Abu Mohammed," : a/k/a "Abu Mohammed Nur al-Deen," SAIF AL ADEL, : a/k/a “Saif,” MAMDOUH MAHMUD SALIM, : a/k/a “Abu Hajer al Iraqi,” a/k/a “Abu Hajer,” : ABDULLAH AHMED ABDULLAH, a/k/a “Abu Mohamed el Masry,” : a/k/a “Saleh,” a/k/a “Abu Marium,” : MUHSIN MUSA MATWALLI ATWAH, a/k/a “Abdel Rahman al Muhajer,” : a/k/a “Abdel Rahman,” (Caption continued on next page) KHALID AL FAWWAZ, : a/k/a “Khaled Abdul Rahman Hamad al Fawwaz,” : a/k/a “Abu Omar,” a/k/a “Hamad,” : WADIH EL HAGE, a/k/a “Abdus Sabbur," : a/k/a “Abd al Sabbur," a/k/a “Wadia,” : a/k/a “Abu Abdullah al Lubnani,” a/k/a “Norman," : a/k/a “Wa'da Norman," a/k/a "the Manager," : a/k/a "Tanzanite," ANAS AL LIBY, : a/k/a “Nazih al Raghie,” a/k/a “Anas al Sebai,” : IBRAHIM EIDAROUS, a/k/a "Ibrahim Hussein Abdelhadi : Eidarous," a/k/a
    [Show full text]
  • Taliban: Verordnung Vom 2
    Federal Department of Economic Affairs, Education and Research EAER State Secretariat for Economic Affairs SECO Bilateral Economic Relations Sanctions Version of 27.08.2014 Sanctions program: «Al-Qaïda», Taliban: Verordnung vom 2. Oktober 2000 über Massnahmen gegenüber Personen und Organisationen mit Verbindungen zu Usama bin Laden, der Gruppierung «Al-Qaïda» oder den Taliban (SR 946.203), Anhang 2 Origin: UN Sanctions: Art. 3 Abs. 1 und 2 (Finanzsanktionen) und Art. 4 sowie 4a (Ein- und Durchreiseverbot) Sanctions program: «Al-Qaïda», Taliban: Ordonnance du 2 octobre 2000 des mesures à l’encontre de personnes et entités liées à Oussama ben Laden, au groupe «Al-Qaïda» ou aux Taliban (RS 946.203), annexe 2 Origin: UN Sanctions: art. 3, al. 1 et 2 (Sanctions financières) et art. 4 et 4a (Interdiction de séjour et de transit) Sanctions program: «Al-Qaïda», Taliban: Ordinanza del 2 ottobre 2000 che istituisce provvedimenti nei confronti delle persone e delle organizzazioni legate a Osama bin Laden, al gruppo «Al-Qaïda» o ai Taliban (RS 946.203), allegato 2 Origin: UN Sanctions: art. 3 cpv. 1 e 2 (Sanzioni finanziarie) e art. 4 e 4a (Divieto di entrata e di transito) Individuals SSID: 10-28473 Foreign identifier: TI.H.169.14. Name: Yahya Haqqani DOB: a) 1982 b) 1978 Good quality a.k.a.: Yaya Low quality a.k.a.: Qari Sahab Address: A Haqqani Madrassa, Afghanistan/Pakistan boarder region Nationality: Afghanistan Justification: Yahya Haqqani was listed on 31 July 2014 pursuant to paragraph 2 of resolution 2160 (2014) for “participating in the financing, planning, facilitating, preparing or perpetrating of acts or activities by, in conjunction with, under the name of, on behalf of, or in support of” and “otherwise supporting acts or activities of” those designated and other individuals, groups, undertakings and entities associated with the Taliban in constituting a threat to the peace, stability and security of Afghanistan.
    [Show full text]
  • B M155 COUNCIL REGULATION (EC) No 881/2002 of 27 May 2002 Imposing Certain Specific Restrictive Measures Directed Against
    2002R0881 — EN — 10.08.2011 — 050.001 — 1 This document is meant purely as a documentation tool and the institutions do not assume any liability for its contents ►B ►M155 COUNCIL REGULATION (EC) No 881/2002 of 27 May 2002 imposing certain specific restrictive measures directed against certain persons and entities associated with the Al-Qaida network ◄ (OJ L 139, 29.5.2002, p. 9) Amended by: Official Journal No page date ►M1 Commission Regulation (EC) No 951/2002 of 3 June 2002 L 145 14 4.6.2002 ►M2 Commission Regulation (EC) No 1580/2002 of 4 September 2002 L 237 3 5.9.2002 ►M3 Commission Regulation (EC) No 1644/2002 of 13 September 2002 L 247 25 14.9.2002 ►M4 Commission Regulation (EC) No 1754/2002 of 1 October 2002 L 264 23 2.10.2002 ►M5 Commission Regulation (EC) No 1823/2002 of 11 October 2002 L 276 26 12.10.2002 ►M6 Commission Regulation (EC) No 1893/2002 of 23 October 2002 L 286 19 24.10.2002 ►M7 Commission Regulation (EC) No 1935/2002 of 29 October 2002 L 295 11 30.10.2002 ►M8 Commission Regulation (EC) No 2083/2002 of 22 November 2002 L 319 22 23.11.2002 ►M9 Commission Regulation (EC) No 145/2003 of 27 January 2003 L 23 22 28.1.2003 ►M10 Commission Regulation (EC) No 215/2003 of 3 February 2003 L 28 41 4.2.2003 ►M11 Commission Regulation (EC) No 244/2003 of 7 February 2003 L 33 28 8.2.2003 ►M12 Commission Regulation (EC) No 342/2003 of 21 February 2003 L 49 13 22.2.2003 ►M13 Commission Regulation (EC) No 350/2003 of 25 February 2003 L 51 19 26.2.2003 ►M14 Commission Regulation (EC) No 370/2003 of 27 February 2003 L 53 33 28.2.2003
    [Show full text]
  • Executive Order 13224 Blocking Terrorist Property and a Summary Of
    EXECUTIVE ORDER 13224 - BLOCKING PROPERTY AND PROHIBITING TRANSACTIONS WITH PERSONS WHO COMMIT, THREATEN TO COMMIT, OR SUPPORT TERRORISM By the authority vested in me as President by the Constitution and the laws of the United States of America, including the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 1701 et seq.)(IEEPA), the National Emergencies Act (50 U.S.C. 1601 et seq.), section 5 of the United Nations Participation Act of 1945, as amended (22 U.S.C. 287c) (UNPA), and section 301 of title 3, United States Code, and in view of United Nations Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1214 of December 8, 1998, UNSCR 1267 of October 15, 1999, UNSCR 1333 of December 19, 2000, and the multilateral sanctions contained therein, and UNSCR 1363 of July 30, 2001, establishing a mechanism to monitor the implementation of UNSCR 1333, I, GEORGE W. BUSH, President of the United States of America, find that grave acts of terrorism and threats of terrorism committed by foreign terrorists, including the terrorist attacks in New York, Pennsylvania, and the Pentagon committed on September 11, 2001, acts recognized and condemned in UNSCR 1368 of September 12, 2001, and UNSCR 1269 of October 19, 1999, and the continuing and immediate threat of further attacks on United States nationals or the United States constitute an unusual and extraordinary threat to the national security, foreign policy, and economy of the United States, and in furtherance of my proclamation of September 14, 2001, Declaration of National Emergency by Reason of Certain Terrorist Attacks, hereby declare a national emergency to deal with that threat.
    [Show full text]
  • Com(2002)0117
    COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES Brussels, 06.03.2002 COM(2002) 117 final 2002/0059 (CNS) Proposal for a COUNCIL REGULATION imposing certain specific restrictive measures directed against certain persons and entities associated with Usama bin Laden, the Al-Qaida network and the Taliban, and repealing Council Regulation (EC) No 467/2001 prohibiting the export of certain goods and services to Afghanistan, strengthening the flight ban and extending the freeze of funds and other financial resources in respect of the Taliban of Afghanistan (presented by the Commission) EXPLANATORY MEMORANDUM (1) Further to Resolutions 1267(1999) and 1333(2000) of the Security Council of the United Nations, the Council decided to impose a number of sanctions in relation to Afghanistan by means of Council Regulation (EC) No 467/2001, including in particular a ban on flights to Afghanistan, a ban on certain exports to that country and a freezing of funds. (2) By means of Resolution 1390(2002) of 16 January 2002 the Security Council determined that the scope of both the financial measures and the prohibition to render services related to military activities, should be adjusted and that the remainder of these sanctions should be repealed. The adjusted financial measures and prohibition to render certain services target Usama bin Laden, the Al-Qaida network and the Taliban and a list of the persons, groups and entities concerned will be decided on by a UN Sanctions Committee. Taking into account that these measures are imposed in view of their role in international terrorism, without there being a link between the persons and groups concerned, and the new Government of Afghanistan, it is considered appropriate to adopt a new Regulation imposing such measures and to repeal the sanctionsinrelationtoAfghanistan.
    [Show full text]