Canadian Military History Volume 12 Issue 4 Article 3 2003 “Matters Canadian” and the Problem with Being Special: Robert T. Frederick on the First Special Service Force James Wood [email protected] Follow this and additional works at: https://scholars.wlu.ca/cmh Recommended Citation Wood, James "“Matters Canadian” and the Problem with Being Special: Robert T. Frederick on the First Special Service Force." Canadian Military History 12, 4 (2003) This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Scholars Commons @ Laurier. It has been accepted for inclusion in Canadian Military History by an authorized editor of Scholars Commons @ Laurier. For more information, please contact [email protected]. Wood: “Matters Canadian” “Matters Canadian” and the Problem with Being Special Robert T. Frederick on the First Special Service Force James Wood n 12 July 1942, the Canadian Army activation on 2 July 1942 until his departure Oauthorized the movement of nearly seven on 23 June 1944, shortly after Rome fell to the hundred officers and men to the United States Allies. for training as part of the First Special Service Robert T. Frederick Force (FSSF), a highly-specialized commando unit that was being organized for the purpose of Coast Artillery officer by training, Frederick’s conducting raids in the alpine regions of occupied Aappointment to command the First Special Europe.1 From the summer of 1942 until Service Force came about largely by default. disbandment in December 1944, this combined In the spring of 1942, while working as a staff “North American” force consisted of soldiers officer in the Operations Division of the US drawn from the armies of both Canada and the War Department, Lieutenant-Colonel Frederick United States. From the Aleutian Islands, to was assigned the task of completing a detailed Monte la Difensa, Rome, and ending in Southern assessment of Operation PLOUGH by Major- France, this élite US-Canadian infantry brigade General Dwight D. Eisenhower. Operation established a remarkable combat record and PLOUGH was a British scheme that called for the became a symbol of the lasting partnership creation of specialized commando detachments, between our two countries. Today, the First trained in winter warfare and equipped with Special Service Force is remembered both in armoured snow vehicles. The “PLOUGH Force,” Canada and the United States for its outstanding as it was called, would be capable of conducting achievements in combat as well as its unique, parachute or glider landings in occupied Norway, bi-national composition. where the mobility provided by the proposed snow vehicle would allow the raiders to sabotage Prior to 1942, Canadian soldiers had never German-controlled hydroelectric dams and served in such close association with the US power plants throughout the country. Although Army, and even the post-war era has seen Frederick’s report harshly criticized Operation no similar examples of such near-complete PLOUGH, noting especially that the plan made integration. Within the Force, Canadian and no adequate provision for evacuating the raiding American soldiers wore the same uniforms, force upon completion of its mission, his lack carried the same weapons, and answered to of enthusiasm failed to dissuade his superiors the same superiors regardless of nationality – from the project. Instead, Eisenhower appointed an American private could take orders from a Frederick to take command of the PLOUGH Force Canadian sergeant, who in turn answered to an itself. On 9 June 1942, Ike called the young staff American or Canadian lieutenant. At the top of officer into his office and told him: “Frederick, this bi-national chain of command stood Robert take this plough project. You’ve been over the T. Frederick, US Army, the man who organized whole thing. You’re in charge now. Let me know and led the First Special Service Force from its what you need.”2 © Canadian Military History, Volume 12, Number 4, Autumn 2003, pp.17-33. 17 Published by Scholars Commons @ Laurier, 2003 1 Canadian Military History, Vol. 12 [2003], Iss. 4, Art. 3 Forcemen pick their way down a ravine during a September 1942 route march near Helena, Montana. The walking sticks are being used as substitute ski-poles in preparation for ski training during the winter months. Modest and unassuming, Frederick always battle, the best place to look for Frederick was insisted that his selection to command the FSSF said to be “up forward somewhere with the men came as a result of other, more qualified officers who did the fighting.”6 Leading from the front, turning down the job.3 Indeed, Frederick’s even after his promotion to brigadier-general in initial reaction to Eisenhower’s offer was to January 1944, Frederick became the recipient protest that he was completely unqualified for of no less than eight Purple Hearts for wounds the position, noting in particular his complete sustained in combat, earning him the dubious lack of infantry training and his unfamiliarity distinction of being the most shot-at-and-hit with parachuting, mountain operations, and general officer of the Second World War. His winter warfare.4 These objections were duly wounds were a testament to his bravery and, to noted and ignored, perhaps due to the fact that a lesser extent, his proclivity to leave the day- Eisenhower was leaving for the UK in a few days to-day operation of Force Headquarters to his to take command of the US European Theater of subordinates. Operations and did not want to leave behind any loose-ends in Washington. Another possibility is Time away from headquarters is likely to have that Lord Louis Mountbatten, the British Chief provided Frederick with some respite from the of Combined Operations and a key proponent of daily complexities of administering the First Operation PLOUGH, had some influence in the Special Service Force, burdened as it was not decision and viewed Frederick’s appointment to only by the existence of a sizable foreign element command the Force as an ideal means of silencing in its ranks, but also having to contend with his criticism of the project.5 Regardless of the the designation of being “special”. The Second reasons, on 2 July 1942, the First Special Service World War generated a remarkable number of Force was activated by an order of the US War highly-specialized military formations – from Department, with the newly-promoted Colonel parachute infantry and glider troops to Royal Robert T. Frederick as the officer commanding. Marine Commandos and Ranger Battalions. As with many of these special units, higher In hindsight, Eisenhower would have been hard- commanders did not always make allowances pressed to select a more suitable candidate to for the unique strengths and weaknesses of command the First Special Service Force. From the First Special Service Force. For example, the unit’s baptism of fire atop Monte la Difensa although the brigade-sized FSSF was equipped to its mad-dash to the Tiber bridges during the with more light machine guns and light mortars liberation of Rome, this former War Department than a standard US infantry division,7 overall, the staff officer earned the respect and trust of his unit traded firepower for mobility by carrying no men by his near-constant presence on the front heavy machine guns and no mortars larger than lines. During the most critical stages of any given a 60mm. The Force was not originally intended 18 CWM 19900261-012 https://scholars.wlu.ca/cmh/vol12/iss4/3 2 Wood: “Matters Canadian” for frontal attacks against conventionally-armed Military Relations Between the United States opponents, the breakout from Anzio and the and Canada viewed the FSSF to be a model of battle of Artena notwithstanding. cooperation between the Allied armies, though he did offer the following conclusion to his As an added complication, although Canadian assessment of the Force: officers and men were evenly distributed among the three battalion-sized “Regiments” of the Throughout its combat history, the First Force, on paper, they remained grouped within Special Service Force engaged but little in the highly specialized types of operations for the 1st Canadian Special Service Battalion. This which it had been trained…. Furthermore, the Canadian element of the Force received its pay very nature and status of the force required and reinforcements from within the Canadian frequent attention of the Combined Chiefs of system and its officers and men remained subject Staff to proposals for employment of this group to the King’s Orders and Regulations.8 As a result of less than 2,000 men, as well as diplomatic exchanges to obtain Canadian acceptance of CWM 19900261-013 of this arrangement, the First Special Service proposals – all in all an inordinate amount Force operated within two military systems and of high-level consideration in relation to the answered to two very separate chains of authority. size of the force. But from the point of view of While the difficulties resulting from “matters Canadian-US relations, the unique experiment Canadian” and the special status of the Force was a remarkable success.9 were by no means so severe as to merit Frederick getting shot eight times in order to avoid In Canada, official historian C.P. Stacey was spending time at headquarters, one should not even less enthusiastic. Surveying the difficulties underestimate the frustration of a commanding involved in organizing the 1st Canadian Special officer who was forced to deal with not one, but Service Battalion and maintaining it in the theatre two military bureaucracies. of war, an effort that required the repeated attention of Canadian authorities in Ottawa, Washington, and London, Stacey offered the One Force, Two Official Histories following advice to his Canadian readers: n the 1950s and 60s, official historians in both The First Special Service Force was a fine ICanada and the United States devoted fighting unit, and the relations of Canadians and considerable attention to the First Special Service Americans within it seem to have left very little Force.