CHINA – JAPAN INLANDS DISPUTES AS the CHALLENGE in EVOLVING SECURITY ENVIRONMENT Krzysztof Załęski, Zdzisław Śliwa

1. SECURITY AND GEOPOLITICS CHINA – JAPAN INLANDS DISPUTES AS THE CHALLENGE IN EVOLVING SECURITY ENVIRONMENT Krzysztof Załęski, Zdzisław Śliwa

ABSTRACT DOI: 10.26410/SF_2/19/3 The paper portrays the overall political–military situation in East Asia with the focus on security challenges involving major regional powers, namely China and Japan. It out- lines the regional implications of current maritime disputes as one of major security concerns in the East Asia. The main attention is given to territorial disagreements over Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands involving China and Japan as a dominant players in the region. Also smaller nations are mentioned as the disputes are strongly influencing their foreign policy and forcing development of defense capa- Krzysztof Załęski [email protected] bilities. Additionally, the US position toward regional mat- WSB University Dąbrowa Górnicza1, ters is provided as the nation is playing a significant role Poland there as an ally or potential opponent. Zdzisław Śliwa KEYWORDS [email protected] East Asia, maritime disputes, China, Japan, Senkaku/Di- Baltic Defence College, aoyu Islands. Estonia Introduction The situation in Asia is still of interest of development, including military domain, the world based on economic develop- is causing some worries in Tokyo. At the ment of the continent, security concerns same time last changes in interpretation and the incoming decisions about future of Japanese law, close alliance relations of US presence after presidential elections with US and implementation of offensive in the Asia – Pacific region. The security weapon systems are observed carefully in domain of the continent is fragile and is it Beijing. What is important, history is playing worsened by bilateral and multilateral un- a significant role regarding relations be- solved territorial disputes. Currently rela- tween those two regional powers and that tions between China and Japan are among factor is used by both sides. The history challenges that could negatively influence is also related to ambitions of both to play the whole region. China’s multidimensional not only regional role but to be among

1 Opinions expressed by the author are his own views and they do not reflect in any way the official policy or position of the government of Poland. There is no potential conflict of interest related to the paper. 36 1.3. SECURITY AND GEOPOLITICS

global powers. The tensions are linked developments are especially visible in the with disputes between two nations over allocation of resources and weapon pro- islands:Senkaku in Japanese or Diaoy- curement in China, Japan, and Russia, but uin Chinese as those possesses military it is linked with the US strategic shift from importance,there are raw resourcesin the Europe into the Pacific region. The situation East China Sea and national prestige is after presidential election in US in Novem- playing a role. So, none of two actors would ber 2016 is evenmore unpredictable as ex- give it up. For China it is related with se- pectations that “U.S. allies and partners in curity concepts named a ‘two island chain’ the region may no longer be able to count and an ‘anti-access/area denial’. Recogniz- on the kinds of the reassurance about ing the high potential for a change in the Washington’s security commitment that current sensitive situation and carefully ob- they have grown used to” and “will instill a serving the region US is constantly present much greater sense of uncertainty – even there along with progressive investments anxiety – in U.S. allies and partners in the into military instruments of power. Russia is Asia-Pacific region” . The situation however currently preoccupied in Ukraine and Syria evolved during president Trump term in of- but is observing carefully both China and fice; there are also prediction that he could Japan as of economic and security rea- win another term. sons looking into the future and struggling The paper will focus on relations between with economic shortfalls. The overall secu- China and Japan and possible challenges rity is important for Beijing to ensure conti- related to those fragile relationships. It will nuity of economic reforms to meet leader- also mention the importance of territorial is- ship and citizens’ expectations. Especially, sues and history, which is important factor as the nation is undergoing transformation among Asian nations shaping their mind of economy model and it requires above but also used pragmatic way for political all stability. At the same time, the military reasons. In that context islands related power is a tool to preserve national position disputes will be analyzed deeper. The mili- within the political landscape of the conti- tary buildup will be discussed and role of nent requiring development of force projec- security related organizations and treaties tion capabilities to defend, to strengthen will be covered as important security fac- deterrence factor and also to possess long tor involving not only both regional actors, range attack abilities to strike an opponent as ‘outside powers’ and nations are playing from a distance. Japan is not eager to ig- a role. It will allow to provide conclusions nite a conflict but national pride is surfacing and to draw a picture of possible develop- again not allowing any step back asking ments between those nations and their in- to preserve firm stand toward China. It is fluence on Asian security. preserving strategic relations with US and parallel is strengthening regional alliances. Regional security develop- Maritime disputes among East Asian na- ments tions are a strong impetus for military build- The geopolitical changes in the East up and special attention is given to air force Asia are an important topic of debates as

and navy and other land based long-range weapon systems. There is furthermore Yuki Tatsumi, “Trump Wins: Implications for US Allies and Partners in Asia,” The Diplomat, November 09, 2016, nuclear component based in China and http://thediplomat.com/2016/11/trump-wins-implica- US being strongdeterrence factor. Such tions-for-us-allies-and-partners-in-asia/ (accessed: November 12, 2018). CHINA – JAPAN INLANDS DISPUTES AS... 37 of continuously rising China, more ambi- competitors for the leader’s position on tious Japan and US commitment to the the global arena. US presence is of critical region. Among regional concerns,maritime importance for Japan as for now as its mili- disputes and conflicts have been noted by tary security is relying on the superpower’s major news agencies as they have poten- capabilities and support. A few smaller na- tial to develop into struggle for power. It is tions are similarly looking for any reliable op- especially important, as China and Japan tion to enhance their security situation and areready to take the lead in the region when some of them have been in other islands their period will come and capabilities will disputes with Beijing (Spratly and Paracel be there to make it happen. The directions Islands – see fig. 1). The disputes must be of possible confrontation could be trig- treated in broader context, as China is afraid gered by internal and external factors and of vulnerability of its East Coast and wants they are not fully predictable. to push a possible threat out of its shoreline. There are other actors there, like Russia, It is paralleled by threat of being contained having good political and economic rela- by US as explained Henry Kissinger; he saw tions with China and an intent to keep calm such the endangerment already during Mao relations with Japan. It is an arena of US era. He mentioned it in relation to a Chinese interests, followed by building and rebuild- game ‘go’ or ‘weiqi’3 in which to win it is nec- ing alliances in the region to face potential essary to surround an opponent. Fig. 1. Maritime disputes in the East Asia and Pacific

Source: Based on: East Asia Political map 2011. Courtesy of the University of Texas Libraries, The University of Texas at Austin http://www.lib.utexas.edu/maps/middle_east_and_asia/txu-pclmaps-oclc-780028873-asia_east_pol-2011.jpg [accessed: October 26,2018].

3 Henry Kissinger, O Chinach (On China), Polish edition translated by M. Komorowska, (Wołowiec: Czarne Company, 2014), p. 115 38 1.3. SECURITY AND GEOPOLITICS

Among instruments of power, the military Regional substance of disputes one is very visible in the East Asia and is Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands are composed linked with armed forces modernizationin of just five uninhabited islands and three China causing accusations aboutaggres- rocks(the largest island- 4.32 km˛; the sive intentions toward neighbors. It is smallest 0.45 km˛). There are three nations speeding upan arms race in Asia. Is it the claiming their rights, as next to two major consequence of seeing a more powerful actors also Taiwan is involved. The geostra- nation advantage as potential source of tegic location is important among reasons threat and encouragement to forward na- to claim rights as having possessing them tional interests in expense of smaller and any of the three players is pushing potential weaker actors. In addition, Japan’s military threat far away fromown respective borders. build-up is observed with attention and On the other side, it is allowing deployment there are historically driven concerns in of military assets forward enhancing their it. Currently US involvement is stabilizing range causing a real threat for other claim- the security situation by building military ants (fig. 2). It is expressed by Akiyama Ma- bases and strengthened alliances. The sahiro, President of the Tokyo Foundation country has continued reinforcing capabili- claims that “should Japan lose sovereignty ties as stated by Washington’s leadership over the Senkaku Islands, however, China when discussing Asia – Pacific region: “its would gain considerable freedom for its na- development is vital to American strategic val activities in these waters. Japan’s Mari- and economic interests” . But the situation time Self-Defense Force, meanwhile, would about US involvement is not clear as find itself subject to major restrictions on its “during his campaign, Trump averred activities there due to China’s stance on its that U.S. allies needed to pay a greater EEZ. The impact on the United States, Ja- share of the costs of U.S. protection and pan’s ally, would be even greater”. suggested that it wouldn’t be so bad if Japan has been controlling islands from South Korea and Japan considered de‐ 1895 but in 1945 lost it for US as an out- veloping nuclear weapons of their own come of the World War II. Although the San as part of a regional deterrent strategy”. Francisco Peace Treaty of 1951 ended US Moreover, if US foreign policy will shift occupation of Japan, still Okinawa Prefec- “from an ideological model based on the ture, including its Senkaku Islands, were in promotion of democracy to a more isola- American possession in accordance with tionist model with a hint of mercantilism, the Article 3 of the Treaty. The islands proved country may be less inclined to intervene to be visible in 1968 when a UN Commit- in the affairs of emerging democracies”. tee for Far-East economy found oil fields Such the developments could significantly in the East China Sea area . It encouraged change the security map in whole Asia with The names of islands are as follow: Uotsuri-shima / Diaoyu Dao; Taishô-tô / Chiwei Yu; Kuba-shima / broader implications. Huangwei Yu; Kita-Kojima / Bei Xiaodao; Minami-Ko- jima / Nan Xiaodao). Michael Sprangler, “Rebalancing the Rebalance”, For details see: Akiyama Masahiro, “Geopolitical Parameters No 44 (2) summer 2014, US Army War Considerations of the Senkaku Islands”, The Sasa- College, Carlisle Barracks, 12. kawa Peace Foundation, August 7, 2013, pp. 7-10. Rodger Baker, “An Asian Perspective on the U.S. Read also: Akiyama Masahiro, “Geopolitical Consid- Elections”, STRATFOR November 16, 2016, “An Asian Perspective on the Tokyo April 13, 2016, http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/ U.S. Elections is republished with permission asia-paci/senkaku/qa_1010.html#q15 (accessed: of Stratfor” (accessed: November 16, 2018). November 16, 2018). Ibid. CHINA – JAPAN INLANDS DISPUTES AS... 39

Taiwan to claim their territorial jurisdiction in be trilateral challenge in May 1972 as US April 1971 and People’s Republic of China returned the Okinawa Prefecture and the in December 1971. The problem started to islands to Japan10.

Fig. 2.Geographical location of Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands

Source: AkiyamaMasahiro, “Geopolitical Considerations of the Senkaku Islands”, The Sasakawa Peace Foundation August 7, 2013, p. 3.

The 10 Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands issue was made by Japan as in June 1996 Japan discussed in September 1972 when estab- declares a 200 miles exclusive economic lishing diplomatic relations by Prime Min- zone (EEZ) around islands and in 2010 the ister of Japan Kakuei Tanaka and Chinese islands were declared as a part of Japan- Premier Zhou Enlai in Beijing. When asked US Security Arrangements which compli- about them, Zhou answered that “I do not cated political and security arrangements. want to talk about the Senkaku Islands is- China was especially disturbed when in sue this time. It is not good to discuss this September 2012 Japanese government now. It became an issue because of the oil bought three of the Senkaku islands from out there. If there wasn’t oil, neither Taiwan private owner. It raised China’s anti-Japa- nor United States would make this an is- nese sentiments and more attempts to sue”11. The next important decisions were penetrate established EEZ.

10 Omar Alkhalili, “Disputed Territory: The Senkaku/Di‐ aoyu Islands”, The Political Geography Now June 11, China and Japan – major regional 2013, http://www.polgeonow.com/2013/06/disputed- players in East Asia territory-senkaku-diaoyu-islands-japan-china.html, (accessed: January 19, 2019). Bilateral relations between China and Ja- 11 Shingo Yamagami, “Reflections on the Issue of the pan are a real source of possible conflict Senkaku Islands ‐from the field of practice on interna‐ tional law and politics”, Japan’s Territories Series, Ja- in the region and the dispute over Diaoyu/ pan Digital Library March 2016, 18. Jinping Guo, “Evi- Senkaku Islands is just one of many pos- dence shows Diaoyu Dao is China’s territory”, China Daily October 15, 2012, http://www.chinadaily.com. sible hot spots. The dispute is not only con- cn/opinion/2012-10/15/content_15816504_3.htm (ac- nected with natural resources (rich stocks of cessed: November 29, 2018). 40 1.3. SECURITY AND GEOPOLITICS

hydrocarbons and fisheries) and sea lines Second Sino-Japanese War in December of communication but also with national 1937. Those memories are still alive and prestige as both Beijing and Tokyo want they are cultivated, so remindingthat as- to be recognized as a capable regional pect of history would be rather easy and powers, strong enough to impose national could be exploited by propaganda. The will; Beijing has also global ambitions. The tensions are heated up by the US position prestige factor must be also taken into con- related to disputes, as the White House densation very seriously as national and has been treating Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands personal prides are very important in Asia. as territory administrated by Tokyo and is In relation to islands this is concerned about security there. The state- “their emotional significance for China ment is important for Japan as Russian ac- that defies rational calculation. Here the tions in Crimea and its annexation could be assumption is that Chinese perceptions a case used by China to do the same. born out of historical memories of mis‐ The bilateral relations between Beijing trust and animosity (Japanese imperial‐ and Tokyo started to deteriorate further ist aggression) contribute to the present after Shinzo Abe became the prime min- threat, that get translated directly into ister and initiated visits in the Yasukuni strong foreign policy behavior towards Shrine dedicated to Japanese who died Japan. That is, hidden agendas dictate during wars. The issue is that there are how one sees the other.... What explains many names mentioned there of soldiers China’s assertive behavior is its identity convicted of war crimes including as many vis-à-vis Japan, which is deeply embed‐ as 14 recognized as Class A war criminals ded in historical memories – dominated – a crime against peace. Such the visits by a sense of inferiority and the humilia‐ caused great dissatisfaction and criticism tion suffered during Japan’s invasion of of governments and populations in China China”12. and South Korea and other countries as those suffered during Japanese occupa- So, the tensions between two Asian nation during World War II. It was recognized tions are not new and both are recognizing as an attempt to make revision of history the possibility of confrontational scenario. trying to negate war crimes and to rewrite According to polls, 54% of Chinese popula- past. It was strongly criticized by Chinese tion and 29% of Japanese population was President Xi Jinping who mentioning the afraid of a war between those two powers rhetoric of ‘national humiliation’ said, “the in the nearest future13. The anti-Japanese war launched by the Japanese militarists in moods are linked with historical massa- modern times brought calamity to the peo- cres like the Nanking Massacre committed ple of China and other Asian countries. The by the Imperial Japanese Armyduring the facts cannot be denied. China will never al- 12 Amrita Jash, “Diaoyu/Senkaku islands dispute: iden‐ low any denial and distortion of this history tity versus”, Asia & the Pacific Policy Society, January of aggression or any return to militarism”14. 11, 2016, http://www.policyforum.net/diaoyusenkaku- islands-dispute-identity-versus-territory/ (accessed: It was also reminder for other Asian nations January 29, 2019). as those also suffered in the past, espe- 13 “Ponad połowa Chińczyków obawia się wybuchu wojny z Japonią” (Eng. More than half of Chinese is cially Korean nation. afraid of war with Japan), IAR, Polish Press Agency – PAP September 10, 2014, http://wiadomosci.wp.pl/ 14 Amrita Jash, “China still haunted by Japan”, Asia kat,1329,title,Ponad-polowa-Chinczykow-obawia- Times Online (Holdings), Ltd., September 19, 2014, sie-wybuchu-wojny-z-Japonia,wid,16874772,wiado http://www.atimes.com/atimes/China/CHIN-01- mosc.html(accessed: November 29, 2018). 190914.html (accessed: November 03, 2018). CHINA – JAPAN INLANDS DISPUTES AS... 41

Animosity is additionally linked with back into history and is suggesting Tokyo growing economy disproportion during last to make self-esteem, deeper look back into decades. China is developing much faster own aggressive history to do more to pre- than Japan and took the position of sec- serve stability in the whole region it wanted ond largest economy in 2010 and it was to subordinate in the past19. a matter of frustration in Tokyo especially The area has seen many incidents involv- as another nation – India has a potential to ing aircraft and vessels. It reached a new push it down in economic ranking. Accord- level when in November 2013 China uni- ing to Bao Xiaqin, the associate professor laterally announced establishing the East of international relations at the Fudan Uni- China Sea Air Defense Identification Zone versity, “the national anxiety about Japan’s (ADIZ), covering most of the East China status and future has been exacerbated by Sea, “with the aim of safeguarding state China’s fast rise. At a time when the glo- sovereignty, territorial land and air security, bal order is being reshaped, the Japanese and maintaining flight order”20 as stated are not sure what position their country will by defense ministry spokesperson. It was have in the new world system, hence they strongly condemned by many countries in- choose to support politicians that appear cluding: Japan, South Korea, Taiwan and tough enough to give the country a voice USA. Japan’s foreign affairs minister recog- that can be heard on the world stage”15. It nized that “setting up such airspace unilat- was one of reasons of more decisive stand erally escalates the situations surrounding in bilateral relations under Abe leadership Senkaku islands and has danger of lead- from 2012. On the other hand,according ing to an unexpected situation”21 warning to Mahmud Ali such the stand intensified about the possible threat to peace. Wash- assertive Chinese activities near Japanese ington did not recognize the ADIZ and two territorial waters and air space16. As Tokyo days after the announcement two strategic was not passive, it caused a few incidents bombers B-52 made an undisturbed flight and those could have had a potential to over it. The Chinese ADIZ irritated South cause a conflict situation. Many of them Korea as both nations are in an argument included fishing and combat naval ves- about Ieodo, a submerged rock inside a sels e.g. Japanese destroyer was tracked Korea’s territorial line. The rock as such down by Chinese navy vessel using its fire is not the main issue, but is related rather control radar. Such the incidents caused to an exclusive economic zone (EEZ) and the need to Japan to closely monitor17 all protection of Seoul’s interests as it is “stra- activities recognizing threat. Ali is claiming tegically important”22. that Beijingis trying internationally to cre- Both side are preserving hard stand as ate an impression that Japanese side is of domestic and international policy and advocating “Chinese threat”18 and is inten- it is further tightened up by US presence tionally generating tensions. He is looking and politics as the White House is treating

15 Bao Xiaqin, “Japanese must see China anew”, China 19 Ibid., p. 123. Daily, Beijing November 8, 2014, http://english.chi- 20 “China establishes ‘air-defence zone’ over East China namil.com.cn/news-channels/pla-daily-commen- Sea”, BBC News Asia, November 23, 2013, http://www. tary/2014-11/08/content_6218173.htm (accessed: bbc.com/news/world-asia-25062525 (accessed: November 03, 2018). November 03, 2018). 16 Based on: S. Mahmud Ali, US- China Strategic Com- 21 Ibid. petition. Towards a New Power Equilibrium, (London, 22 Kim Young-jin, “Why Ieodo matters”, The Korean Springer: 2015), pp. 120-122. Times, September 18, 2012, http://www.koreatimes. 17 Ibid., p. 121. co.kr/www/news/nation/2012/09/117_120266.html 18 Ibid., p. 122. (accessed: October 14, 2018). 42 1.3. SECURITY AND GEOPOLITICS

Diaoyu/Senkaku islands as an area admin- from historical lessons and adhering to istrated by Japan and an integral part of US- the path of peaceful development”27. New Japanese security treaty. To show willing- regulations were also a concern for South ness to contribute more in September 2015 Korea and it was expressed during a meet- the upper house of Japan’s parliament ap- ing of defense ministers Gen Nakatani and proved security bills allowing its self – de- Han Min-koo in October 2015. During dis- fense forces an “option of going into battle cussion to protect allies such as the United States “South Korea has expressed concern even if there was no direct threat to Japan or about Japan’s move to allow its troops 23 its people” . The specific conditions to em- to fight overseas in a shift away from the ployed armed forces were linked with: clear limits placed by its pacifist constitution recognition that an emerging conflict could drawn up after the war, saying Japanese be a danger for Japan, there is no other op- forces will not be allowed on to the Ko‐ tion left except using armed forces and use rean peninsula without its agreement”28. of force is to be limited to minimum.24It has It was linked with Seoul’s perception that changed bilateral relations as the previous the Korean Peninsula is under its jurisdic- security treaty from 1960 included declara- tion29 and in the context of historical memo- tion of only US support in the case of attack ry. It is reminding old saying ‘Those who do and it was formalizing the presence of US not learn from history is doom to repeat it’. military bases in Japan25. The decision was The concerns have been an outcome of made against population’s support as the changes in legislation paralleled by ongo- “Asahi Shimbun poll published this week ing military build-up of the he Japan Self- showed that 54% of voters oppose the bills, Defense Forces (JSDF). The important fact and 68% saw no need to push the legis- that has raised tensions was the sea trial of lation through”26. The population reaction helicopter carrier JS Izumo (DDH 183), be- for the new law was partially related to the ing the largest Japanese naval vessel since danger of escalation that could happen in Second World War; it is officially classified relation with China, as foreign affairs minis- as helicopter destroyer. It was condemned try spokesman Hong Lei said “we demand by China’s ministry of defense, as “this that Japan genuinely listen to just appeals trend is worthy of high vigilance by Japan’s from both at home and abroad, learning Asian neighbors and the international com-

23 “Japanese politicians brawl in parliament over bill to munity” and “Japan should learn from his- allow troops to fight abroad”, Agence France Presse, tory, adhere to its policy of self-defense and Tokyo September 17, 2015, https://www.theguardian. com/world/2015/sep/17/japanese-politicians-brawl- abide by its promise of taking the road of in-parliament-over-bill-to-allow-troops-to-fight- peaceful development”30. It was supported abroad(accessed: November 23, 2018). 24 Olga Podsiadło, „Parlament uchwalił ustawy bezpie‐ 27 Ibid. czeństwa”, Japonia-Online.pl, September 21, 2015, 28 “Japan tries to ease South Korea’s concern over military role”, http://japonia-online.pl/news/3475(accessed: No- Reuters, October 20, 2015, http://www.reuters.com/article/ vember 06, 2018). us-southkorea-japan-defence-idUSKCN0SE0WN20151020(a 25 The full text see: “Japan-U.S. Security Treaty”, Ministry ccessed: December 03, 2018). of Foreign Affairs of Japan, Tokyo http://www.mofa. 29 Ibid. go.jp/region/n-america/us/q&a/ref/1.html(accessed: 30 Hugo Gye, Anthony Bond, “It looks like an aircraft December 03, 2018). carrier, it sounds like an aircraft carrier... but the Japa‐ 26 Justin McCurry, “Japanese soldiers could fight abroad nese are adamant their biggest ship since WW2 is again after security bill passed”, The Guardian, Sep- a ‘flat-topped destroyer’”, Daily Mail Online, August tember 18 2015, https://www.theguardian.com/ 06, 2013, http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article- world/2015/sep/18/japanese-soldiers-could-fight- 2385430/Japan-warship-Izumo-aircraft-carrier-flat- abroad-again-after-security-bill-passed(accessed: topped-destroyer.html (accessed: December 06, December 14, 2018). 2018). CHINA – JAPAN INLANDS DISPUTES AS... 43 by an assumption that the JS Izumo could tions e.g. to seize disputed islands. be potentially considered as an aircraft The decisive position regarding the is- carrier, which would be against Japanese lands dispute is not to be changed but both constitution banning possession of ‘war are still not ready for open confrontation. potential’ (senryoku)31. It joinedthe Japan It is a result of internal and external con- Maritime Self-Defense Force (JMSDF) in straints, including: limited specific military March 2015 and its sister vessel JS Kaga capabilities to project power and hesitation (DDH 184)was operational in March 2017. to openly face each other, Chinese and US The vessels could carry up to 14 helicop- deterrence capabilities (including nuclear ters but also a navy infantry battalion (400 potential), the national populations’ fears troops) and 50 combat vehicles. There are and international pressure (expectations of some comments that it could be trans- stability) and economic interests. formed into a real aircraft carrier, as Japan was approved to acquire 105 aircraft Lock- The regional implications heed Martin Lightning II F-35 and some V- The other disputes on the South China 22 Osprey VTOL32. The first JSDF’s302nd Sea are creating new hazards for less fighter squadron equipped with F-35A was capable militarily players making them to operational in March 2019. What is impor- unite against commonly perceived threats tant in December 2018 “the cabinet of Jap- and that opportunity is used by Japan e.g. anese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe approved toward Philippines. The role of Manila is an increase of Japan’s existing order of 42 reinforced by Japanese decision to deliver to 147 F-35 aircraft including an additional weapon systems and provide training as- 63 F-35As and 42 F-35Bs”; the latter one is sistance for Philippian armed forces. It short take-off and vertical landing (STOVL) could be followed by a security agreement variant of the aircraft33. Nevertheless, there tightening cooperation and further encir- are shortages related to transferring it to clement of China. That fact could be of im- real aircraft carrier comparable to US and portance as it would strengthen Philippines Chinese designs. In the context of islands position in relation of islands disputes disputes, “China is thus likely to be most and would also encourage other smaller concerned about the Izumo enhancing Ja- nations as Vietnam, Malesia or Taiwan to pan’s ability to check Chinese naval power join the security arrangements if created. projection into Japan’s maritime defensive If idea would have any progress it would perimeter, rather than the possibility of it significantly strengthen Tokyo position as projecting military power onto the Chinese a regional leader able to unite efforts of mainland”34. This is based on assumption small nations. US would definitely support that those could support small joint opera- it politically by providing military support and guarantees within existing security ar- 31 Corey Wallace, “Japan’s war potential and the case of the Izumo ‘destroyer’”, EastAsia Forum, September rangements. On the other hand Beijing, be- 05, 2013, http://www.eastasiaforum.org/2013/09/05/ ing aware of possible consequences, will japans-war-potential-and-the-case-of-the-izumo- destroyer/(accessed: December 08, 2018). try to deny closer cooperation and divide 32 VTOL – vertical take-off and landing. nations using political, economic tools and 33 Franz-Stefan Gady, “Japan Air Self Defense Force Stands military deterrence but also playing histori- Up First F-35A Lightning II Fighter SquadronI” The Diplomat April 01, 2019, https://thediplomat.com/2019/04/japan-air- cal cards against Japan. Such the Tokyo’s self-defense-force-stands-up-first-f-35a-lightning-ii-fighter- approach should support national interest squadron/(accessed: June 15, 2019). F-35 B - the short take- off and vertical landing (STOVL) and F-35C is carrier variant. by engaging other nations into friendly ar- 34 Ibid. 44 1.3. SECURITY AND GEOPOLITICS

rangements gaining new partners against advanced anti-ballistic missile system ca- China. There could be accusations, based pable to destroy variety of short, medium, on history, that Tokyo could try to rebuild and intermediate ballistic missiles. Such its regional position and in the past, it was the option is heavily criticized by Beijing leading to aggression against nations lo- recognizing it as a threat but also claiming cated on the Asian mainland. The policy that it will speed up arms race in the whole of rather ambitious Prime Minister Abehas region escalating security situation. The been trying to enhance the role of the coun- maritime disputes’ dynamics are evolving try and one of crucial elements it rebuilding especially as “China has become increas- military capabilities.For Philippines, the ingly assertive of its claims to disputed Japanese support is much desired as it is maritime territories in the East and South linked with flow of new technologies and China Seas, and remains committed to equipment. The growing concerns among a relatively high rate of military spending to smaller nations about People’s Liberation project its power into the region in the com- Army (PLA) development were visible in a ing years”37. For China maritime disputes research performed by the Pew Research are part of larger concept, which is linked Centre; people in a few Asian countries in to the extension of control of sea lines of spring 2013 were asked if they thought that communication by enhancing friendly rela- “China’s growing military power is a good tions and building navy infrastructure and thing or a bad thing for [their] country”35. ports along Asian south coastline (‘String As many as 96% of Japanese and 91% of of Pearls’). Consequentially, it is resulting in South Koreans recognized it as the threat; the reaction of other actors linked with that however, when moving toward southwest subject of international relations. direction “Australia and the Philippines were This is the reason why also India is afraid next, at 71 percent and 68 percent. After of Chinese considerations related to the that, however, there is a marked drop-off Indian Ocean and is even recognizing in- in concern over China’s military. Indonesia volvement into antipiracy on Somali waters had 39 percent say China’s military power as an excuse to penetrate the ocean38. Rob- was a bad thing, Malaysia 20 percent, and ert Kaplan has written that China “wants to Pakistan (a longtime friend of China’s) secure port access throughout the South a mere 5 percent”36. China Sea and adjacent Indian Ocean, For Tokyo, Seoul is important as part- which connect the hydrocarbon-rich Arab- ner and it is related both to Pyongyang Persian World to the Chinese seaboard”39. nuclear program and also toward Beijing. The rivalry between Beijing and New Delhi Up to some extent, escalation of nuclear is peaceful, but the enlargement of navy tests will in the future reinforce Japanese and air force abilities to project power is air defensecapabilities to annihilate any an attribute that could cause willingness to rockets launched from North Korea and challenge the opponent in the future. China China. It will be the result of US plans to 37 Michael Sprangler, “Rebalancing the Rebalance”, op. deploy to South Korea the Terminal High cit., p. 13. 38 Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) being well- Toshi Yoshihara, James R. Holmes, Red Star over the Pacific. China’s Rise and the Challenge to U.S. 35 Shannon Tiezzi, “China’s Growing Defense Budget: Maritime Strategy, (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, Not As Scary As You Think”, The Diplomat, Febru- 2013), p. 174. 39 ary 5, 2014, http://thediplomat.com/2014/02/chi- Robert D. Kaplan, The Revenge of Geography: What nas-growing-defense-budget-not-as-scary-as-you- the Map Tells Us About Coming Conflicts and The think/(accessed: January 12, 2019). Battle Against Fate, (New York: Random House In., 36 Ibid. 2012), p. 199. CHINA – JAPAN INLANDS DISPUTES AS... 45

has made an effort during recent years to its relationship with India in a broad range of make agreements in relation to land bor- fields, including maritime security, through ders, and only the one with India remained joint training and exercises as well as joint not resolved. Those treaties were important implementation of international peace- for Beijing as precondition for the ‘shift to- keeping activities”42. The cooperation is ward maritime domain’. The border issues beneficial for both nations within economy, were recognized by Jakub Grygiel as for security, and exchange of intelligence in- him formation and by transfer of technologies. “the stabilization of China’s land bor‐ India is also continuing pragmatic politics ders may be one of the most important trying to avoid any open conflict as the fo- geopolitical changes in Asia of the past cus now is economic development but it is few decades. From a tense frontier simi‐ showing willingness and readiness to sup- lar to that of Ming China is turning into port regional efforts to enhance prepared- a stable one that does not require ness to face Beijing if it will be more asser- an enormous expenditure of military tive. It is concerned about Chinese efforts strength or political attention. This might to developed naval infrastructure within free China from having to devote re‐ ‘String of Pearls’. In that context Senkaku/ sources and attention to its land borders, DiaoyuIslands disputes are playing a role allowing it to pursue a more aggressive as it is preservation of continuity of free- maritime geostrategy”40. dom of navigation along seas linking Delhi and Tokyo. The cooperation with Japan is Japan is improving security cooperation visible by regular bilateral naval exercises with India and intensification of military and (JIMEX) from 2012 and by joining US -India non-militarycontacts was intensified in last ‘Malabar’ exercises in 2015. The latter is im- years. It is connected with Japan being portant as it “intends to strengthen coop- afraid that US support could be questioned eration with the ’JAI’ countries. (Note: The in the future, so other strong allies are high- Japan, America and India acronym of ‘JAI’ ly desired. India is afraid of Chinese fast means victory in Hindi”43. developments and it makes New Delhi and For Japan good relations between Rus- Tokyo closer friends. Abe speeded up such sia and China as ‘partners of convenience’ the relations as “under his leadership Japan are important especially as Tokyo and signed the Strategic and Global Partner- Moscow still have no peace treaty as of the ship with India in 2006. His historic speech Southern Kurils (Russian) or the Northern on the Confluence of the Two Seas and his Territories (Japanese). As Moscow is con- concept of Democratic Security Diamond sidering rebuilding military infrastructure underscore that India is perceived as an there, it would create direct threat for key important partner”41. It was reflected in the Japanese civilian and military locations. ‘National Defense Program Guidelines for The warmer relations with Russia would be FY 2014 and beyond’ released in Decem- desired by Tokyo as of economic reasons ber 2013 by stating, “Japan will strengthen 42 “National Defence Program Guidelines For FY 2014 40 Jakub Grygiel, Great Powers and Geopolitical and Beyond”, Tokyo, December 17, 2013, p. 11, Change, (Baltimore: the John Hopkins University http://www.mod.go.jp/j/approach/agenda/guide- Press, 2006), pp. 169-170. line/2014/pdf/20131217_e2.pdf(accessed: January 41 Titli Basu, “Shinzo Abe’s Visit to India: Reviewing the 12, 2019). Strategic Partnership”, Institute for defence Studies 43 “Japan-India Summit Meeting”, Ministry of Foreign and Analyses, Comment, February 27, 2014, http:// Affairs of Japan, New Delhi December 13, 2015, www.idsa.in/idsacomments/ShinzoAbesVisittoIn- http://www.mofa.go.jp/s_sa/sw/in/page3e_000436. dia_tbasu_270214(accessed: January 14, 2019). html(accessed: January 22, 2019). 46 1.3. SECURITY AND GEOPOLITICS

but those could allow Japan to focus on stakeholder in Asia-Pacific and could be Chinese direction as major issue of nation- a good counterbalance to China, playing al interest and prestige within Asia. The bi- a peace-making role in the region in gener- lateral relations between Russia and Japan al”47. It has also other geopolitical aspects, are also a factor shaping the dynamics on as “Kremlin should be more interested in international relations in the region creating establishing strategic cooperation with Ja- some sympathy among countries based pan because Russia needs to diversify its on pragmatic politics. The statement by partners in Asia-Pacific. In the case of Ja- Defense Minister Sergey Shoigu in 2016 pan, it is seeking to prove its independence that “should complete the formation of the in making foreign policy decisions from the whole infrastructure on the Kuril Islands”44 United States”48. is fixing Japanese military assets. Accord- Japan is observing relations between ing to Kremlin press service Putin and Abe Beijing and Russia enhanced by significant in 2016 “discussed in detail the develop- gas agreements and Moscow’s export of ment of the Russian-Japanese relations. weapon systems to their partner. It is re- They pointed to mutual interest in stepping lated to worsening relationship of Russia up cooperation in the political, trade, eco- with the Western nations forcing to cooper- nomic, humanitarian and other fields. An ate closer with Beijing. Thetwo nations are agreement was reached on continuing per- united in a collective security organization, sonal contacts”45. The situation between the Shanghai Cooperation Organization the nations was a matter of Prime Minster (SCO) and those are exercising together in Shinzo Abu visit in Russia in May 2016 in large-scale exercises codenamed “Peace spite of US administration suggestion not Mission”49. Abut although SCO is security to conduct it. During Japan-Russia Summit related body the military link is limited to Meeting Abe and Putin discussed potions exercises only and there are no common for further development of disputes over standing forces for combined joint opera- Northern Territories or Kuril islands “toward tions. The concerns for Japan have been the formulation of solutions acceptable to linked with Chinese – Russian naval exer- both sides through a new approach that is cises showing new capabilities. From 2005, not stuck in a traditional way of thinking in there were five major exercises within the order to overcome the current negotiation “First Island Chain” followed by ‘Joint Sea stalemate and make a breakthrough”46. It -2015 II’ on the Sea of Japan in August was agreed to continue high-level political 2015 with 23warships, two submarines, 20 dialogue and visits and to continue eco- aircraft and marines. They were coming nomic cooperation. There is as for now mu- from Russian Pacific fleet and from three tual interest to preserve peaceful relations Chinese fleets and the drill was “the largest as “Russia is becoming a very important in the modern history of cooperation be- 44 Sergei Fadeichev, “Russia plans to complete de‐ velopment of military facilities in Kuril islands in 47 Pavel Koshkin, “Better Russia-Japan relations would 2016”, TASS, January 12, 2016, http://tass.ru/en/de- be good for stability in Asia-Pacific”, Russia Direct, fense/848989 (accessed: January 22, 2019). September 13, 2016, http://www.russia-direct.org/ 45 Mikhail Klimentyev, “Japanese PM to visit Russia this analysis/better-russia-japan-relations-would-be- spring, meet with Putin — media”, TASS, February 5, good-stability-asia-pacific (accessed: January 23, 2016, http://tass.ru/en/politics/854705 (accessed: 2019). January 23, 2019). 48 Ibid. 46 “Japan-Russia Summit Meeting”, Ministry of Foreign 49 Yuri Smityuk, “SCO exercise Peace Mission 2014 Affairs of Japan, May 7, 2016, http://www.mofa.go.jp/ to involve 7,000 troops”, Shanghai August 19, 2014, erp/rss/northern/page4e_000427.html (accessed: http://en.itar-tass.com/world/745617, (accessed: January 23, 2019). February 02, 2019). CHINA – JAPAN INLANDS DISPUTES AS... 47 tween the [Russian and Chinese] navies”50. threats” within the exercise ‘Joint Sea 2019’ Zhang Junshe from PLA Naval Military in May 2029 in both East China Sea and Studies Research Institutedescribed it as Yellow Sea53. aiming to „improve the PLA Navy’s capabil- ity of defending and safeguarding national The Pacific shift of US – the time sovereignty, national security, and maritime for a new rebalance of Asian rights and interests. They are not targeted policy at any country, but will definitely exert deter- US commitment to Asia and attitude rent effects on countries harboring ill inten- toward islands disputes was highlighted tions against China”51. The drills were con- by Defense Secretary Chuck Hagel who tinued by China alone also in August 2016. said, that “it’s not about a rocky island or Such the maneuvers are recognized as a even the oil beneath the sea, he said, but danger as those are close to Japanese ter- rather is about sustaining the Asia-Pacific’s ritorial waters and both exercising nations rules-based order, which has enabled the are in disputes related to islands and those people of this region to strengthen their se- are requiring naval capabilities to seize and curity, allowing for progress and prosper- defend later. The exercises are continued ity”54. To achieve such security and pros- and it is obvious that Chinese naval ca- perity according to Hagel “From Europe to pabilities are growing and those are over- Asia, America has led this effort for nearly powering Russian navy in some categories seven decades..., and we are committed of combat ships. The think tank the Cen- to maintaining our leadership in the 21st tre for Strategic and International Studies century”55. Washington’s assurance is an estimated that possessing “300 warship important factor for Tokyo as it is relying on hulls, the PLAN is the largest navy in the US as security guarantor when facing an world, counting aircraft carriers, cruisers, unpredictable future. Nevertheless, “hav- destroyers, frigates, corvettes, submarines ing bound their fortunes inextricably to and amphibious assault ships”52. Such America, Japanese leaders monitor shifts the statements were linked with the “joint in U.S. policy and strategy carefully, look- maritime defensive operations” focused ing for signs of abandonment”56. The same on “strengthening the two navies’ capabil- applies to other nations, which are basing ity to commonly address maritime security their security on an alliance with the world’s 50 Matthew Bodner, “Russia, China Launch Largest dominant military superpower. For the US, Joint Naval Exercise in History”, the Moscow Times, the main goal has been to avoid being re- August 20, 2015, http://www.themoscowtimes.com/ business/article/russia-china-launch-largest-joint- jected from Asia by an antagonistic block naval-exercise-in-history/528346.html (accessed: of nations or just one nation, and the shift January 23, 2019). 51 “Comments: China needs more large-scale exer‐ to the Pacific has been just an adaptation cises”, China Military Online, August 3, 2015, http:// english.chinamil.com.cn/news-channels/pla-daily- 53 Franz-Stefan Gady, “China, Russia Kick Off Bilateral commentary/2015-08/03/content_6613183.htm and Naval Exercise ‘Joint Sea’”, The Diplomat April “China, Russia start joint military exercise at Japan 29, 2019, https://thediplomat.com/2019/04/china- Sea”, China Military Online, August 20, 2015, http:// russia-kick-off-bilateral-naval-exercise-joint-sea/ eng.chinamil.com.cn/news-channels/china-military- (accessed: July16, 2019). news/2015-08/20/content_6641468.htm(accessed: 54 Jim Garamone, “U.S. to Continue to Lead in 21st February 06, 2019). Century, Hagel Says”, American Forces Press Serv- 52 Kristin Huang, “China and Russia have been doing ice, Singapore, May 30, 2014, http://archive.defense. joint navy drills for years, and now Beijing ‘has gov/news/newsarticle.aspx?id=122373 (accessed: overtaken’ Moscow as a naval power”, South China February 02, 2019). Morning Post July 2019, https://www.businessinsider. 55 Ibid. com/china-overtakes-russian-as-naval-power-after- 56 Toshi Yoshihara, James R. Holmes, Red Star over the joint-drills-2019-7(accessed: July16, 2019). Pacific..., op. cit., p. 196. 48 1.3. SECURITY AND GEOPOLITICS

to new circumstances based on the well Trump team’”59 being afraid of future rela- rooted tradition that Americans are not only tions and security arrangements. Any at- Atlantic but also Pacific nation57. tempt of US to move back from East Asia In general, could be not appreciated by Tokyo causing “some countries, notably US allies, Ja‐ it to invest more in own security. Moreover, pan and the Philippines, have become any symptoms of pivot backcould cause more vocal in their objections to Chinese Beijing to exploit such the decision. This is maritime claims and more convinced of why Abe hurriedly visited president elect in their need for American military support November 2016 to discuss security relation as maritime disputes unfold. Indeed, US and possibly the Trans-Pacific Partnership allies appear to perceive the rebalanc‐ (TPP) as of great importance but useless ing as designed to put them on a more without Washington. Politically it was im- equal footing to resolve their disputes portant as “after the Trump-Abe meeting with China -- and not leave them to face in New York, Japan may publicize the re- rising Chinese power alone”58. sults and show off to the world how firm the US-Japan alliance is”60. Without that, Abe’s The US factor has been a game changer, policy could be endangered and nation’s however it must be linked with credible sup- position could be downgraded in the East port by purposeful and convincing build Asia. Therefore, the future was to show the capabilities in relation to all instruments of US policy priorities especially as the word- power to ensure that commitment is not ing could change in the benefit of Asian only temporary. Especially as any evidence nation generating again their confidence of weaknesses could result in rebalance of in the White House support.However, Ja- foreign policy of a small nation and could pan is still an important ally for US; it was harm alliances. The situation is complicat- presented during political statements the ed for USA as in the past the focus was on symbolic visit of President Trump on board containing Soviet Union, mainly in Europe, of Japanese warship JS Kaga im May 2019. and now it has reallocated focus to contain He said,“soon, this very ship will be up- Chinese expansion into Pacific. The war in graded to carry that cutting-edge aircraft. Ukraine is again asking the White Houseto With this extraordinary new equipment, reconsider the future of its presence in the JS Kaga will help our nations defend Europe as a credible and most powerful against a range of complex threats in the member of NATO. region and far beyond”61. That statement The last elections in US caused some was important for Japan and rather disap- concerns about the future policy, as the pointing for China. statements from the campaign were not China was also concerned about US promising for Japan. According to the stand toward the country particularly after Guardian “Trump’s victory had come as 59 Justin McCurry, Tom Phillips, and David Smith, “Shin‐ such a shock to Abe that his advisers zo Abe says Japan can have confidence in Donald ‘hastily went out to build contacts with the Trump”, The Guardian, November 18, 2016, https:// www.theguardian.com/us-news/2016/nov/18/japan- confidence-trump-president-shinzo-abe(accessed: January 25, 2019). 60 Ibid. 61 Michael Zennie, “President Trump Visited Japan’s 57 Henry Kissinger, O Chinach (On China), op. cit., p. Biggest Warship Since World World II. Here’s What to 532. Know About the JS Kaga”, The Time May 28, 2019, 58 Michael Sprangler, “Rebalancing the Rebalance”, op. https://time.com/5597046/japanese-aircraft-carrier- cit., p. 13. kaga-izumo/(accessed: June 15, 2019). CHINA – JAPAN INLANDS DISPUTES AS... 49

“drumming up headlines with his pledges to capabilities and has been created rather to slap 45% tariffs on imported Chinese goods improve security and to present abilities to and label the country a currency manipula- challenge in the nearest future other com- tor his first day in office”62. It was important petitors on the high seas. Taiwan and other statement as Beijing is continuing evolu- islands are an important factor for China as tion of economy model when facing eco- it is connected with its concepts of enforc- nomic slowdown so stabilization is much ing the protection of the vulnerable east desired. The security related statements coastline, which is of vital importance for about Japan and South Korea were show- national well-being. The maritime dispute ing as for now that that aspect of foreign in the South China Sea and the East China policy could be for China’s benefit if it will Sea are crucial to extend power within “two be followed. Nevertheless, the relations be- island chains”, underpinning broadening of tween Washington and Beijing are of great military reach, as according to PLA those importance for both so the policy will be re- “two key island chains as forming the geo- vised as soon as new leadership in US will graphic basis for expanding China’s mari- be fully selected. The President Xi Jinping time sphere of influence. While these have congratulatedPresident elect Trump saying, not been formally defined as such by PLA “I place great importance on the China-U.S. leaders, the “First Island Chain” is gener- relationship, and look forward to working ally thought to run from the Japanese main with you to uphold the principles of non- islands through the Ryukyus, Taiwan, the conflict, non-confrontation, mutual respect Philippines, and Borneo, thus roughly and win-win cooperation”63. The hope is bounding the East and South China Seas. that it will not be a turning point in bilateral The “Second Island Chain” stretches from relation as it is not desired by both nations the north at the Bonin Islands southward and stability would valuable for other Asian through the Marianas, Guam, and the players. Caroline Islands, encompassing the west- Conclusions ern Philippine Sea”64. In that context, all the disputes are making sense and the long- As for now those small disputed islands term visionary undertaking is acknowledg- and bigger ones such as Taiwan, Philip- ing that to achieve its aims. Beijing will fol- pines and Japan are significantly restrict- low the proactive policy towards regional ing freedom of movement of PLA Navy adversaries. For China, the US factor, (PLAN) giving strategic advantage to the connected with overwhelming navy capa- powerful US Navy and its allies. Currently bilities to impose maritime blockade, is the PLAN is under constant development, in- real concern but Beijing also has strategic vesting in aircraft carrier and capable sub- patience coming from the rich and long his- marine fleets, but it will take time to match tory of the Middle Kingdom. the capabilities presented by the US and Arms race in Asia is ongoing and sea the Japanese Navy. PLAN’s development and land borders territorial disputes are an as the part of the anti-access/area denial important dynamic, which has causedrise (A2/AD) concept could be defensive in of arms sales during last decade in relation nature but is also representing offensive to the continent. They have had differing 62 “Donald’s Trump’s Victory raises Questions in China”, Reuters, November 9, 2016, http://for- 64 Jan van Tol, Mark Gunzinger, Andrew Krepinevich, tune.com/2016/11/09/donald-trump-win-china/ and Jim Thomas,AirSea Battle: A Point of Departure (accessed: January 25, 2019). – Operational Concept, (Washington: Center for Stra- 63 Ibid. tegic and Budgetary Assessments, 2010), p. 11. 50 1.3. SECURITY AND GEOPOLITICS

background behind it and they are driven closer relations with the ASEAN, India and by respective nations’ strategies. For China, other smaller nations in the region, which it is linked with national ambitions and core is linked with their geostrategic location. interests; at the same time, Japan will not US involvement in the Asia-Pacific region stay behind in weaponry procurement and is “creating another intangible factor that will not give up any disputed territory, which could be both stabilizing and destabilizing is important for national pride and credibil- in contextual manner”66 and that statement ity of the respective governments. Other is very proper one after the last presidential smaller nations are unable to compete in elections in US.Continuous military pres- that rivalry and they have no other choice ence in Afghanistan along with partners is but to look for balancing options by closing a security factor causing other major play- ranks with outside powers (US)being inter- ers to observe the developments. It is also ested in building/enhancing regional alli- linked with observing allocation of reason- ances e.g. with Japan or with international able resources in Asia to stay involved there organizations (e.g. ASEAN)65. They are also in the long-term and to ground influence using any opportunity to promote their in- allowing the shaping of the security situ- terests and present possible threats using ation when facing other emerging powers other forums. The arms race is visualized looking for regional dominance. European by defense spending related especially to nationsare not real player as they are cur- air force and navy, in which PLA is in lead rently preoccupied with security and eco- compared to US regional allies, especially nomic tensions on the continent.They also Japan. Among spending: power projection, lack force projection capabilities allowing amphibious and expeditionary capabilities, decisive deployment in East Asia. Their which are not purely defensive in nature, involvement in Asian affairs is rather cau- are priority; they could be easily used to tious and there are limited tools to influence solve islands’ disputes by implementing them, but more attention should be given joint air – sea warfare concept. to that region as in every case Europe will For China,the US position is and will be be hit by and disturbances there. rather a challenge as the nation has no The role of Washington in the region is reliable and strong ally in Asia. Therefore, growing and the country’s leadership is the country has been rather silent toward not clear about which strategy to select: Moscow support for separatists in Ukraine a hawkish or ‘softer’ one. As for now, the as it is rather necessary as potential part- military build-up, strengthening alliances, ner not an enemy. Moreover, China needs supplying new weapon systems to friendly a modern weapon system for all the serv- nations is suggesting that harder policy ices and Russia has for them a reliable proponents are winning; nevertheless, the offer in relation to all the services. As for country is still trying to play the role of ar- now, China is observing the military reori- biter. The question is if US will be willing, entation of US armed forces in the Pacific in the case of escalation, to be involved a region and Washington’s effort to tighten conflict with China as of a few small islands relations with coalition partners there: Ja- in the East China Sea. The future involve- pan, South Korea, and Australia. It is paral- 66 leled with the White House attempt to make Sanu Kainikara, Security Challenges to South-East Asia and the Prospects of Conflict, (Perth: edited version of the paper presented at the 4th Annual Na- 65 ASEAN – the Association of South-East Asian Na- tional Security and Strategy Workshop, November tions. 9, 2012), p. 3. CHINA – JAPAN INLANDS DISPUTES AS... 51

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About the authors Dr hab. Krzysztof Załęski, professor of the University in Dąbrowa Górnicza, Poland. He completed education among others in: the Polish General Staff University in War- saw, the Polish National Defense Univer- sity in Warsaw, Air War College, Maxwell, Alabama, USA, University of Technology in Cracow (postgraduate studies). During the military service he served as the head of the Polish Air Force reconnaissance, deputy Chief of Staff of the Polish Air Force HQ, head of the Planning Center of the Polish Armed Forces Operational Command, deputy head of the Training Directorate of the General Staff of the Polish Armed Forces, Chief of Staff – Deputy Commander of the Polish Air Force, and finally, also temporarily acting as the Commander of the Polish Air Force. When working for Polish educational institutions he was professor Polish Air Force Academy in Dęblin and now he is professor of the WSB University in Dąbrowa Górnicza. He has published books and papers related to defense and security policy, armed forces development, as well global and regional situation in relation to security dimension.

Dr. hab. Zdzislaw Śliwa is the Dean of the Baltic Defense College in Tartu, Estonia, a cooperates with the WSB University Dąbrowa Górnicza. He completed education in: the Polish National Defense Uni- versity, the US Army Command and Gen- eral Staff College, and also in the Center of Strategic Studies of the People’s Liberation Army National Defense University. During the military service he served as the Chief of Operational Branch J-3 in KFOR Head- quarter in Kosovo and also the Chief of Op- erational Planning Branch J-5, Polish Armed Forces Operational Command in Warsaw. When working for Polish military educational institutions he served in the Mechanized Forces Military Academy and also National Defense University in Warsaw. He has published books and papers related to current developments in Asia and Europe, especially in relation to security dimension.