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Harald Bluhm WasLeo Strauss aZetetic Political ?

I

In recent years, the ideas of have receivedagreat deal of attention. They have alsobeen asourceofcontroversy.Strauss’sconcept of political philosophyand his interpretationofcanonicalphilosophical texts gained influenceinthe 1950s with the emergenceofthe Straussianschool and spread over the following decade as for- mer studentstook teaching jobs at major Americanuniversities. Several years after Strauss’sdeath in 1973,the academic writingsofhis disciples triggered the first wave of Straussianism. The wave’sswell was amplified by the entry of Straussians into top-level circlesduringthe first Reagan administration, where they served as political advisors, particularlyinthe State Department.In1987, Straussianism became known to the wider public through TheClosing of the Ameri- can Mind,the best-selling work by , Strauss’smostillustrious student.¹ As surprising as this public resonancewas, Strauss’steachings would rise to even greater prominencetwo decades later duringthe heated debate about the pivotal role Straussians were alleged to have playedinGeorgeW.Bush’sdecision to invade Iraq. Amid the ongoing disputes between Straussians, their opponents, and some more measured voices,contemporary scholars have begun to take acloser lookat Strauss’spolitical . Volumes such as TheCambridge Companion to Leo Strauss (2009) and Brill’sCompanion to Leo Strauss’ Writings on Classical Political Thought (2015) have since secured Strauss aplace in the academic pantheon. ‘Among the great philosophersofthe twentieth century,’ Heinrich Meier,aleading interpreter and the editor of Strauss’scollected works in German, wrotein2014, ‘po- litical philosophyhad onlyone advocate.’² Whether this assessment of Strauss is jus- tified—and whether his political philosophyisamere product of idiosyncratic read- ingsofother —will not be discussed here. Rather,Iam interestedina specific vein among the great variety of interpretationsofStrauss:³ the view that

 Allan Bloom, TheClosing of the American Mind (New York: Simon &Schuster,1987). The book grew out of an article he wrotefor in 1982; see http://www.nationalreview.com/article/ 218808/our-listless-universities-williumrex.  Heinrich Meier, “How Strauss became Strauss,” in Reorientation: Leo Strauss in the 1930s,eds.Mar- tin D. Yaffe and RichardS.Ruderman (New York: PalgraveMacmillan,2014): 13.  In addition to the usual distinctions between East Coast,Midwest,and West Coast Straussians,Mi- chael Zuckert also identifies rationalist,decisionist, zetetic, faith-based,Aristotelian, and Platonic

OpenAccess. ©2017 Harald Bluhm, published by De Gruyter. This work is licensed under the Creative CommonsAttribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 License. https://doi.org/10.1515/9783110527971-009 146 Harald Bluhm

he is asceptic, or,inGrecophile terms, azetetic, philosopher.Stephen B. Smith, Catherineand ,Daniel Tanguay, , LeoraBatnitzky, LaurenceLampert,and scholars have sought to define exactlywhat constitutes scepticism and zeteticism in Strauss’sthought.⁴ Moreover,they have used the label ‘zetetic’ labeltodistinguish him from the Straussians in the reception history of his work. In examining the aptness of this label, Iwill primarily consider On Tyranny (first publishedin1948) and Strauss’scorrespondence with Alexandre Kojève, because these sources contain the few passages in which Strauss addresses zeteticism direct- ly.⁵ Iwill arguethat Strauss’szeteticismisaninsufficientlyelaborated form of scep- ticism that builds on ancientmodels but whose philosophicaljumping-off point lies in the philosophyofNietzsche, Heidegger, and Husserl. The enduringmotifs of those philosophers are for the most part hidden in Strauss’swork, and as such can onlybe staked out,not systematicallyinvestigated.⁶ Like Nietzsche and Heidegger, Strauss was sceptical of modern philosophyand the philosophicaltradition, which he thoughtsclerotic and stale.⁷ Iwill begin by describing the meaning of ‘zetetic’ in antiquity and its use in lat- ter-day approaches (II). After taking an interlude to sketch out some of Strauss’skey ideas (III), Iwill turn to the role of the ‘zetetic’ in his interpretation of (IV). Iwill then discuss several passages in which Strauss uses the terms ‘zetetic’ and

approaches; see idem, “Straussians,” in TheCambridgeCompanion to Leo Strauss,ed. Steven B. Smith (Cambridge:Cambridge University Press, 2009): 267.  See Steven B. Smith, Reading Leo Strauss: Politics, Philosophy,Judaism (:University of Chi- cagoPress,2006); Catherine H. Zuckert and Michael Zuckert, TheTruth about Leo Strauss (Chicago: Press,2006); Daniel Tanguay, Leo Strauss: An Intellectual Biography (New Haven: Press,2005); Thomas Pangle, Leo Strauss (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2006); LeoraBatnitzky, Leo Strauss and :Philosophyand the Politics of Rev- elation (Cambridge:Cambridge University Press, 2006); and Laurence Lampert, The Enduring Impor- tance of Leo Strauss (Chicago:University of Chicago Press, 2013).  See Viktor Gourevitch, “Philosophyand Politics,” TheReview of : APhilosophical Quar- terly 22.1(1968): 59;and idem, “Philosophyand Politics, II,” TheReview of Metaphysics: APhilosoph- ical Quarterly 22.2 (1968): 281–325.  Foradiscussion of these motifs,see , HermeneuticsasPolitics (Oxford: OxfordUni- versity Press,1987) and ’sseminal “Introduction” to LeoStrauss, TheEarly Writings (1921–1932),trans. and ed. Michael Zank(Albany: StateUniversity of New York Press,2002):3–49.  In 1930,Strauss wrote: ‘The has been shaken at its rootsbyNietzsche. It has altogether forfeited its self-evidence,’ see idem, “Die religiöse Lageder Gegenwart,” in idem, Gesammelte Schrif- ten,vol. 2, ed. Heinrich Meier (Stuttgart: J.B. Metzler,1997): 389;translatedinLeo Strauss, “Religious Situation of the Present,” in Reorientation: Leo Strauss in the 1930s,234.Onthe relationship between Strauss and Heidegger, see RichardL.Velkley, Heidegger,Strauss, and the Premises of Philosophy:On Original Forgetting (Chicago:University of Chicago Press,2011) and Rodrigo Chacón, “ReadingStrauss from the Start: On the Heideggerian Origins of ‘’,” European Journal of Political Theory 9.3(2010): 287–307. WasLeo StraussaZetetic PoliticalPhilosopher? 147

‘sceptic’ in order to betterunderstand Straussian scepticism and its limits (V) before drawingsome conclusions about the kind of philosopher Strauss was (VI).

II

Zétesis (ζἠτηsις)isanancientGreek wordmeaning ‘open inquiry.’ Itsmost precise definitioncan be found in SextusEmpiricus’ Outlines of Pyrrhonism,inwhich four variants of scepticism are distinguished:

The Sceptic School, then, is also called ‘zetetic’ from its activity in investigation and inquiry,and ‘ephectic’ or suspensive from the state of mind produced in the inquirer after his search, and ‘aporetic’ or dubitative either from its habitofdoubtingand seeking, […]and ‘Pyrrhonian’ from the fact that Pyrrho appears to us to have applied himself to scepticism morethoroughly and moreconspicuouslythan his predecessors.⁸

SextusEmpiricus describes scepticism as:

An ability,ormental attitude, which opposes appearancestojudgements in anyway whatsoever, with the result that,owing to the equipollenceofthe objects and reasonsthus opposed, we are broughtfirstlytoastate of mental suspense and next to astate of ‘unperturbedness’ or quie- tude.⁹

Twofeatures of the ancient understandingofscepticism are striking from today’s perspective.For one, it is primarilypractical, not epistemological, and hence strongly associated with away of life.¹⁰ Foranother,manythinkers of antiquity,the , and the earlymodern eraunderstood as asceptic without much dif- ferentiation between his statements in the earlyaporetic dialogues and the later ones containing Platonic doctrines. ‘Zetetic’ was aknown term in modern bourgeois phi- losophy—Kant,for instance, would occasionallyuse it in his lecture announce- ments¹¹—but over time, it became obsolete. It wasnot until the late twentieth century that scholars took arenewed interest in the idea. In his 1990 monograph Zetetic Skepticism,Stewart Umphrey provides abroader account of the termand argues

 Quoted in RichardH.Popkin and José R. Maia Neto, eds., Skepticism: An Anthology (Amherst: Prometheus Books,2007): 58.  Ibidem,59.  TheCambridgeCompanion to Ancient Scepticism,ed. RichardBett(Cambridge:Cambridge Univer- sity Press, 2010) emphasises this point.  In his “Notice Concerningthe StructureofLecturesinthe WinterSemester 1765– 1766,” Kant writes that ‘the special method of instruction in philosophyiszetetic,assome ancients called it (from zetein), that is to say investigative. It onlybecomes dogmatic,that is to say decisive,invarious parts by well-practiced ,’ see ImmanuelKant, Akademie-Ausgabe,vol. 2(: Reimer,1900): 307. 148 Harald Bluhm

that in the Meno Socrates was azetetic but not asceptical philosopher.¹² In 2014 the ‘Zetesis Research Group’ was founded,¹³ made up mostlyofItalian philosophers de- voted to the studyofzetetic sceptical philosophyinantiquity and the modern era. The interpretation of Strauss as azetetic philosopher is part of this revival, but it is alsoaspecial case, for it simultaneouslyharkens back to the term’sclassical roots while seeing in it akey to understanding Strauss’sideas. To date, interpreters have soughttodefine Strauss’sscepticism in three different ways.¹⁴ Thefirst view locates his scepticism in his anti-utopianism and in his principled distrust of opinions in fa- vour of an unendingsearch for truth. The second sees his scepticism in his criticism of revealed religion. The third is formulated by Leora Batnizky: ‘Strauss’skind of skepticism also is skeptical of itself.’¹⁵ It is important to note that none of these def- initionscomes off the backofasystematic review of all passages related to zeteticism in Strauss’swritings.

III

In sketchingout the scepticism attributedtoStrauss—and assessing whether it can be called zetetic—Ifirst want to recall several of the basic ideas of Strauss’smiddle and late periods. It is well known that Strauss argues for antique political philosophy as the authoritative wayofdoing philosophy. ForStrauss, philosophising is aradical, stubborn interrogation of limits, asearch for wisdom that is not itself described as wisdom. Scholars—among whom Strauss counted himself—dwell in acavedeeper than the one that Platofamouslydescribes, wherethey can do no more than rear- rangethe discussions of great philosophers.¹⁶ True philosophyonlybegins in the first cave,but reachingitisimprobable giventhe dominant opinionsofthe day. As aresult,religion must provide the orientation that the masses are unable to ach- ievethrough philosophy, lacking as they do the mindset for aphilosophical form of life. In his 1953book Natural Rightand History,Strauss writes:

No alternative is morefundamentalthan this:human guidanceordivine guidance. The first pos- sibility is characteristic of philosophy[…]the second is presented in the Bible.¹⁷

 Stewart Umphrey, Zetetic Skepticism (Wakefield: Longwood Academic, 1990).  See http://zetesisproject.com/tag/zetetic-philosophy.  Iamdrawinghereonvarious ideas, especiallythose of Steven B. Smith and Michael Zuckert in TheCambridgeCompanion to Leo Strauss,ed. Steven B. Smith (Cambridge:Cambridge University Press, 2009).  Batnitzky, Leo Strauss and Emmanuel Levinas,129.  Formoreonthis and on other passages Ihavenot singled out individually, see Harald Bluhm, Die Ordnung der Ordnung: Das politische Philosophieren von Leo Strauss (Berlin: Akademie Verlag,2008).  LeoStrauss, Natural Right and History (1953; reprinted: Chicago:The University of Chicago Press, 1971). WasLeo Strauss aZetetic PoliticalPhilosopher? 149

In additiontohis return to ancient philosophy, two other areas are useful in ap- proachingStrauss’sscepticism: his interpretations of the ancientsceptics—Socrates, , and Xenophon—and his notion of political philosophy. Strauss’sscepticism can be characterised as an existential scepticism thatexamines fundamental - sophical questions. In the 1950s,Strauss publishedseveral tying his sceptical viewpointtothe political. Almost all of those essays have been collected in the in- fluential volume What Is Political Philosophy? And Other Studies (1959).¹⁸ There, Strauss describes political philosophyprimarilybystating what it is not: it is not the history of political philosophy, though it itself is philosophical; it is not political thought, for that also includes political opinions; it is not political theory,which con- tains ideas about the political order with the goal of policymaking;itisnot modern ,which Strauss associates with and ; and it is not , which seeks to link politics with divine . Instead, he locates political philosophyinthe attempt to safeguard the possibility of philos- ophythrough atenacious search for truth. This branch of philosophyresultsfrom the necessity of taking the conflict between politics and philosophyseriously, and doing this means safeguardingphilosophyasthe Socratic enterprise of searchingfor truth and ascertaining the best wayoflife. Strauss describes ancient political philosophy as classicalbecause it inquires into the natural attitude of the political order unad- ulteratedbyprevious tradition. Acrucial part of Strauss’sunderstanding of philosophyisits dual mode of pre- sentation: amanifest,exoteric messagedirected at the public and ahidden, esoteric messagedirected at true philosophers. This dual mode of presentation is necessary, Strauss maintains, because the masses are unable to absorb the truths of philosophy. The distinction between the massesand the philosophersisone that Platomade after the death of Socrates,which is reflected in the staged drama of the dialogues. By pitchingtheir ideas on two different levels, Plato and other philosophers can di- luteideas thatcall the existingsystem into question while allowing the sceptical search for truth to continue. Strauss’srhetoricisation of philosophyplaces the philos- opher in aprivileged position, an author who codes his text in different ways for dif- ferent readers. This not onlyhas consequences for how the philosopher lives, but also highlights his oppositiontonon-philosophers.¹⁹ An idea related to this dual mode of communication is Strauss’srarelyscruti- nised idea of teaching.Shaped by Heidegger’sown rhetoricisation of philosophy

 See LeoStrauss, What Is Political Philosophy?And Other Studies (Chicago:Chicago University Press 1959) and Rafael Major, ed., Leo Strauss’ Defense of Philosophic Life: Reading “What Is Political Philosophy?” (Chicago:The University of Chicago Press, 2013). Iwould like to thank Thomas Meyer for pointingout to me some additionsthat Strauss made in the English-languageedition of his Hobbes studyin1936(GS III, 184), including the distinction between classical and modern political philos- ophy. In letters datedNov.27, 1938 (GSIII, 558) and Feb. 16,1939(GS III, 566), Strauss mentionswork- ing on atextabout classical political philosophy, which he later published in February 1945.  See LeoStrauss, “Exoteric Teaching,” Interpretation 1.1(1986): 54f., written in December 1939. 150 Harald Bluhm

in his lecture on , especiallyinthe summersemester of 1923,Strauss uses the terminavariety of ways to describe atheory’sconcealedmeaning,that part of it that goes unsaid.²⁰ Teaching,too, is an effort to dilute philosophicalideas that transformsystematic constructions into problems of philosophicalinquiry. But unlikeHeidegger, who reinterprets and thinks largely in terms of language, Strauss assigns the philosopher an emphatic role as an author who con- sciouslyencrypts his writing with multiple meanings. The work of interpretation con- sists in understanding the philosopher’stextsinthe wayheunderstood them him- self. In What Is Political Philosophy, ‘zetetic’ appears onlyinthe “Restatement on Xen- ophon’s ,” Strauss’sresponsetoKojève’scritique entitled “Tyrannyand Wis- dom.” Strauss does not use the wordinanactive sense, but as acasual self-descrip- tion. He laid the groundwork for this zetetic inquiry in the manuscript of his 1932 lecture “The Intellectual Situation of the Present,” in which he writes:

Our freedom is the freedomofradical ignorance. The intellectual situation of the present is char- acterized by our knowingnothinganymore,byour knowingnothing. Out of this ignorance grows the necessity of questioning,questioning about right and good. And herethe following Paradoxpresents itself: while the present is compelled to question as any age, it is less capable of questioning than anyage. We must question without capable of questioning.²¹

Based on this briefest of sketches, Inow want to describe the path to Strauss’sscep- ticism in more detail.

IV

Strauss’snovel method of interpretation is closelylinked to his scepticism in his un- derstandingofpolitical philosophy. The obvious assumption—that Strauss encoun- tered the idea of the zetetic in his work on Platoand Socrates and developedhis scepticism from there—is partlycorrect,but it is not the entire story.Strauss’sunder- standing of the zetetic is initiallyinformed by the ideas of Xenophon,whose rhetoric, he argues, is simpler than that of Platoand, as such, provides aspringboard for un-

 See Stuart Elden, “Reading as Speech: Heidegger, Aristotle and Rhetorical Politics,” Philos- ophyand Rhetoric 38.4(2005): 281–301;also Chacón “ReadingStrauss from the Start: On the Heideg- gerian Origins of ‘Political Philosophy’.” Chacón shows that the Weimar period put Strauss on the path to Socrates via the ‘destruction of tradition,’ cf. ibidem,293.Heconcludesthat ‘Strauss’ bold venturewas to reclaim the land that Heideggerdiscoveredbut neglected to explore—and to call it Socratic “political philosophy”,’ cf. ibidem,302.Simon W. Taylor argues that Strauss’sturn away from Nietzschean led to his viewingofreligion and Zionism from azetetic vantagepoint; see idem, “LeoStrauss’sSkeptical Engagement with Zionism,” Journal of the HistoryofIdeas 78 (2017): 95 – 116.Velkley notes Strauss’snearlylife-long engagement with Heidegger’sideas;see idem, Heidegger,Strauss, and the Premises of Philosophy.  LeoStrauss, “The Intellectual Situation of the Present (1932),” in Reorientation,237–253. WasLeo StraussaZetetic PoliticalPhilosopher? 151

derstandingmore complicated Socratic dialogues.²² Strauss employs his new method of interpretationinhis first essayonXenophon, “The Spirit of Sparta and the Taste of Xenophon.”²³ In this now-famous text,hereads Xenophon’scomments on the “Con- stitution of the Lacedaemonians” as asatire, though they are often understood as a panegyric. Some remarks by LaurenceLampert help us to understand the role of Xenophon in Strauss’sthinking:

Over two months pass beforeStrauss again mentions his work in his letter, but the letterin which he does [February 6, 1939] is the most explosive of them all. He announces his intention to writethe essaythat appeared nine months later as “The Spirit of Sparta or the TasteofXen- ophon”: ‘Iplan to prove in it that his apparent praise of Sparta is in truth asatireonSparta and on Athenian Laconism.’‘Xenophon is my special Liebling,’ he says, ‘because he had the courage toclothe himself as an idiot and go through the millennia that way—he’sthe greatestcon man I know.’ The clothing, the con that so endears Xenophon to Strauss, leads him to conclude that what Xenophon does,his teacher did: ‘Ibelievethat he does in his writingexactlywhat Socrates did in his life.’ […]Strauss here elaborates the most radical aspects […]ofhis recovery of eso- tericism, and he revels in it: ‘In anycase with [Xenophon] toomorality is purelyexoteric, and just about every second word has adouble meaning.’ Socratesand his circle stand beyond .²⁴

Arguably, by 1939,Strauss had, for the most part,worked out his idea of political phi- losophy. Even if thereisnotalk of political philosophy per se in his Xenophon essay, Strauss’sremark that classical political science is based on foundationslaid by Soc- rates while modernpolitical science follows Machiavelli makes his meaning appa- rent.²⁵ In “Exoteric Teaching,” an essayfrom the sameyear,Strauss develops aspecific understanding of scepticism that significantlybroadens its scope to include morality, religion, political life, and even philosophy. Though Strauss considers philosophyto be an important search for truth, it is not wisdom itself, and cannot and should not provide direct guidance to politicians, scholars, and the masses. As Lampert correct- ly stresses, philosophersare not moralrole models like the prophets.Rather,they are, in Nietzsche’ssense,beyond good and evil. Anticipating apossibleobjection

 See LeoStrauss, On Tyranny:Including the Strauss-KojèveCorrespondence,ed. VictorGourevitch and Michael S. Roth (Chicago:The University of Chicago Press,2000): 26. On Tyranny is Strauss’s most important textonXenophon. It was originallypublished in 1948 and then expanded in 1961 to include the debatewith Kojève. The 2000 edition also contains the written correspondencebe- tween Strauss and Kojève.  LeoStrauss, “The Spirit of Sparta and the Taste of Xenophon,” Social Research 6.4(1939): 502– 536. See also Heinrich Meier, Die Denkbewegung von Leo Strauss (Stuttgart:J.B.Metzler,1996): 15.  Laurence Lampert, “Strauss’sRecovery of Esotericism,” in Cambridge Companion to Leo Strauss, 69.  Strauss, On Tyranny,23f. 152 Harald Bluhm

here, Strauss states that ‘the distinction between exoteric and esoteric speech has then so little to do with ‘mysticism’ of anysort that it is an outcomeofprudence.’²⁶ Strauss puts special emphasis on the definition of philosophyasasearch for wisdom, and from there drawsconsequences for the sceptical treatment of politics. He places wisdom in relation to the virtue of moderation, which comes to bear pri- marilyinone’spublic activity.Here, he uses Machiavelli to argueindirectlyagainst Nietzsche and Heidegger.²⁷ Likethem, Strauss thinksradically, but he does not try to dissolve the tensions between politics and philosophy. Forhim, political and philo- sophical life exists in permanent opposition, and it is preciselybecause the opposi- tion is unavoidable that philosophers must practice moderation. Their scepticism about political opinions and the gods can confuse the bodypolitic and destabilise its order; it is imperative,therefore, that philosophersconceal their radicalism and atheism. ForStrauss,radicalism in thought and moderation in politics operate in en- tirelydifferent spheres. The point of Strauss’snuanced studyistoreconstruct Xenophon’soriginal inten- tions, not to analyse his arguments. The distinction between form and representa- tions puts Strauss on the path that leads him to discover scepticism, the dialogue form, and the differencebetween what is said and what is alluded to.Recently, Xen- ophon scholars have raised anumber of objections to Strauss’sinterpretationof “Constitution of the Lacedaemonians” as satire.²⁸ Thanks to Strauss’ssurprising in- terpretative reversal—returningXenophon to the status of rousing, accomplished thinker thatheenjoyed before the eighteenth century—he manages to remain in the spotlight of current scholarship.²⁹ Strauss originallypublished his second studyonXenophondealingwith the dia- logue Hiero in 1948. Besides being an extraordinary contribution to the totalitarian- ism debate and exemplifying his position thatbig questions demand alternativean- swers, it is also methodologicallyinteresting,because in it he develops his understanding of political philosophy.³⁰ Strauss’sinterpretation of Hiero has been

 See Strauss “Exoteric Teaching,” 53.Other candidates for exoteric writingare Maimonidesand Lessing, the latter of whom plays aprominent rolein“Exoteric Teaching.” Strauss writes that Lessing, after ‘havinghad the experience of what philosophyisand what it requires’ (57), adoptedthe distinc- tion between the esoteric and the exoteric in his writing.  Strauss, On Tyranny,184.  See Vivienne J. Gray,ed., OxfordReadings in ClassicalStudies:Xenophon (Oxford: Oxford Univer- sity Press, 2010) and eadem, Xenophon’sMirror of Princes (Oxford: OxfordUniversity Press 2011). In the second book, Gray distances herself from Strauss’sreadingsofXenophon.However,she too stresses Xenophon’sremove fromthe Sparta of his time.  Forahelpful account of Strauss’sinterpretation of Xenophon, see RichardS.Ruderman, “‘Through aKeyhole’:Leo Strauss’ Rediscovery of Classical Political PhilosophyinXenophon’s Con- stitution of the Lacedaemonians,” in Brill’sCompanion to Leo Strauss’ Writings on Classical Political Thought,ed. TimothyW.Burns (Leiden: Brill, 2015): 213–226and Eric Buzzetti, “AGuide to the StudyofLeo Strauss’ On Tyranny,” in ibidem,227–257.  See chapter 5ofBluhm, Das politische Philosophieren. WasLeo StraussaZetetic PoliticalPhilosopher? 153

commented on by many. Iamonlyinterested in looking more closelyathis ideas on scepticism and theirtwo-pronged attack against the mostlypositivist,value-judg- ment-eschewingdiscipline of political science. In its place, Strauss favours anorma- tive practice of political science that resists , which, besides being relativ- ist,isshaped by ahubristic claim to understanding past authorsbetter thanthey understood themselves.³¹ The starting point for Strauss’sinterpretation of Hiero and the normative philosophyofXenophon is his understanding of the Socratic dia- logues. Like Plato in his dialogues, Xenophon hides his true meaning in Hiero. Un- derstandingitinvolvesaccessing his original intention. Strauss begins with abrief structural analysis of the two-part dialogue. Simonides, who plays the active role, vis- its the Hiero and strikes up aconversation. His intent—Strauss calls Simonides awise man—is not to give Hiero advice, but to develop an active discussion. Simo- nides wantstoshow what is wrongwith the tyrannis over which Hiero rules (its path- ology) and how to make thingsright (its therapeutics), but he can onlydothis if he proceedsindirectly. The idea is to make Hiero at least partiallyaware of the problems of tyrannical rule by letting him become caught in his owncontradictions. In this way, Strauss argues, the tyrant can be turned into the benevolent despot.³² Whether Simonidesachieves this is unclear,but he does manage to show thatHiero’sway of life is questionable and could changewerehetogivemore consideration to the polis. By moving the dialogue from wayoflife to the question of virtue, Xenophon puts tyr- annyand its problem into strongerrelief.But in doing so, he also, accordingto Strauss, employs aradical scepticism, one buried beneath the surface in an esoteric layerthat is onlyrevealedbywhat is not said: the silences,Xenophon’sconceal- ments, and Simonides’ omissions. Strauss first mentions the concept of the zetetic in his debate with Kojève—de- spite his stronglyopposed viewpoint,hewas one of the few people by whom Strauss felt understood—and onlyinhis “Restatement on Xenophon’s Hiero” (1950). Kojève, who was influenced by Heideggerinhis earlylife, not onlydefends Hegel, but,ashis own breed of Marxist,evenindirectlydefends Stalinism.³³ Kojèvetakes this position because he assumesthat the utopia of benevolent despotism described by Xenophon was achieved in the modern erausing different means. AFrenchman by choice, Ko- jéveuses historical arguments to claim thatthe expanding authoritarianregime, the comingworld-state, is agood, the highest form astate can achieve. Furthermore, he believes that are particularlyopen to the advice of philosophers, although their recommendations must first be adapted to the circumstances by intellectuals, in whose companyheplaces Simonides. Strauss rejects these extreme views, but he agrees with Kojèveonone point: that the understanding of de- mands areturn not to Machiavelli, as manycontemporaries believed, but to Xeno-

 Strauss, On Tyranny,24f.  Strauss argues that the compromise of the benevolent despot is strictlyopposed to the Athenians, whocategoricallyreject tyrannical rule in anyform. Hiero, of course,isnoAthenian.  Strauss, On Tyranny,188. 154 Harald Bluhm

phon’s Hiero. Machiavelli, who intentionallyavoids the term tyrannyinIl Principe, would presumablydismiss aruler like Hiero. But to Strauss, an ethicallyrich under- standing of tyrannyunfettered by arestrictive theory of power is the basic prerequi- site for understandingmodern tyranny. The crucial part of the dispute between Strauss and Kojèvefor our purposes con- cerns their respective concepts of philosophy. Kojève’shistoricalspeculation is fun- damentallyatodds with what Strauss, in the following passage, calls ‘zetetic philos- ophy’:

What Pascal said with antiphilosophic intent about the impotenceofboth dogmatism and skep- ticism, is the onlypossible justification of philosophywhich as such is neither dogmatic nor skeptic, and still less ‘decisionist,’ but zetetic (or skeptic in the original sense of the term).Phi- losophyassuch is nothingbut the awareness of problems,i.e., of the fundamentaland compre- hensive problems.[…]Yet as long as thereisnowisdom but onlythe quest for wisdom, the evi- denceofall solutions is necessarilysmaller than the evidenceofthe problems.³⁴

To Strauss, Kojèvevergesonsectarianism because he, like the Hegelofthe Phenom- enology of Spirit,decides for onlyone solution. Strauss believes his own position is open (though this might confuse readers givenhis conservative return to virtues, an- tiquity,and moderation). His “Restatement on Xenophon’s Hiero” marks adefinitive switch from political science to philosophy, to philosophical politics and the political actionsofphilosophers.³⁵ By the time of his debate with Kojève, Strauss had come to understand political philosophyasprima philosophia,grounded in the irrevocability of the human problem and the unavoidable conflict between philosophyand the polis.³⁶ Strauss continues his interrogation of these basic problems throughout On Tyranny,both in his interpretationofXenophon and in his debate and latercorre- spondence with Kojéve.³⁷ As Iwill argueinthe next section, Strauss’suse of zetetic to explain his own approach is at once arevival of an ancient Greek idea and an act of appropriationtoalter its original meaning.

 Ibidem,196.  On the philosophical politics of Strauss,see his On Tyranny,205f. Here,Strauss emphasises that part of philosophyconsists in convincingthe state that philosophers arenot atheists and that they do not put everythinginto question.  Strauss, On Tyranny,205.  Anew translation of the “Restatement of Xenophon’s Hiero” can be found in Emmanuel Patard, “‘Restatement’ by LeoStrauss,” Interpretations 36.1 (2008): 3–100.Patardalso published the unab- ridgedversion of Kojève’scontribution; see Emmanuel Patard, CriticalEdition of AlexandreKojève, “‘Tyrannie et sagesse’ and ‘Tyrannyand Widsom’,” in Philosophy,History, and Tyranny:Reexamining the Debate Between Leo Strauss and AlexandredeKojève,eds.TimothyW.Burns and Bryan-Paul Frost (Albany: StateUniversity of New York): 287–357. WasLeo StraussaZetetic PoliticalPhilosopher? 155

V

The interpreters of Strauss Imentioned at the beginning of this paper characterise his philosophyaszetetic. Iwillnow discuss this claim using passages from Strauss’s writings, especiallyfrom statements in letters in which he expresses himself freely.³⁸ Iwillconfine myself to those passages in which Strauss uses the term ‘zetetic’ or ‘sceptic’ to show what he means by this, which are rarelyconsidered collectively.³⁹ My takeonthose passages shows thatthey provide anumber of explanations but no systematic justification of zeteticism. Firstly, Iwant to recall the polemicalcon- text: since the late 1920s, Strauss fought against relativism, historicism, and positi- vism.⁴⁰ Notably, these are all movements associatedwith modern scepticism. As the following passagefrom 1931 shows, it is no surprise thatthe young Strauss dis- tanced himself from this kind of scepticism:

There is no teaching of Socrates.Socrates could not teach;hecould only question and through this questioninghelp others to gain understanding. First,hehelped them realize that what they believed they knew,inreality they did not know.Not that he himself knew what others did not know.Instead his wisdom—the famous wisdom of Socrates—meant that he knew that he did not know anything. Even this knowledge of knowingnothingisnot a teaching. Socratesisalso not a skeptic. Ateaching, at least aphilosophical teaching,isananswertoaquestion. But Socrates did not answeranything. The answerthat he appears to give (the knowledge of knowingnoth- ing)isonlythe most poignant expression of the question. Socratic philosophizing means to question […]. Why, however,does Socrates persist in questioning?[…]How can he persist in questioning despite his knowledge?The answeristhat he wants to persist in questioning [in der Frage bleiben], namelybecause questioningiswhatmatters, because alife without question- ing is not alife worthyofman.⁴¹

Iwill put aside for amoment the issue of aworthylife to stress again thatStrauss expresslydoes not call Socrates asceptic; his terminology would not undergo ase-

 As Thomas Meyer observes: ‘Strauss as an author of letters is almost completely undiscovered […] He has been underestimated in this capacity—and, by extension, in his thought.From the beginning, his letters possessed somethingunconditional: they directlyaddress the subject and its vis-à-vis,’ see Thomas Meyer, “‘Dass es mir nicht erlaubt ist,für einen Augenblick das Meer vonBlutzuvergessen’: Hans-GeorgGadamer and LeoStrauss in ihren erstenBriefen nach 1945,” in Nach dem Krieg–Nach dem Exil? Erste Briefe, FirstLetters: Fallbeispieleaus dem sozialwissenschaftlichen und philosophi- schen Exil,eds. Detlef Garz and David Kettler (Munich: edition text +kritik, 2012): 99–118.  Restrictingmyscopeinthis wayseems necessary sinceitissimplyimpossible to discuss all of the essays,lectures, and statements by Strauss and the mass of interpretations concerninghis view on Socrates and Platoinany one article.  In 1929,Strauss heavilycriticised Karl Mannheim for dissolvingtruth into ,the hallmark par excellence of relativism. He made asimilar attack on ’spositivism, though his apprais- al of him is different.Strauss makes no distinctionbetween axiological and methodological relativ- ism, all his post-empirical notwithstanding.  LeoStrauss, “Cohen und Maimuni,” in idem, Gesammelte Schriften,vol. 2(Stuttgart:Metzler, 1997): 411. 156 Harald Bluhm

manticshift until his later period. The passagealso shows Heidegger’sinfluenceon Strauss.⁴² Indeed, it is no exaggeration to saythat ‘to persist in questioning’—in der Fragebleiben—is downright Heideggerian in formulation. What is also interesting about this passageisStrauss’smultilayered remark that Socrates has no teaching. The Greek dialogical philosopher does not have adoctrine; he questions. Strauss’s later distinction between the esoteric and the exoteric for philosophers like Plato who relyonthe written worddoes not apply to such athinker.Nevertheless, while the earlyStrauss mayhavewanted to return to Socrates,his starting point was a modernone. He follows Nietzsche (apart from his criticism of Socrates) and is taken with Löwith, who reads Nietzsche as an author who ‘repeatsantiquity at the peak of modernity.’ In his 1931 review article on Julius Ebbinghaus, Strauss defines the purpose thatSocrates and his specific form of scepticism should serve:

The not-knowing[Nichtwissen]that is real in the present dayisnot at all the natural not-know- ing [Nichtwissen]with which philosophymust begin; then along detour and agreat effort are first needed in order even to return to the stateofnatural ignorance [Unwissenheit].⁴³

The emphasis on ‘natural’ in ‘natural ignorance’ should not be overlooked. In the sel- dom-remarked-on third chapter of his Natural Rightand History,Strauss alludes to a kind of epistemological explanation of his position: philosophical scepticism devel- ops from ‘pre-philosophical experience’ with hearsayand appearance. Drawing on Husserl’sidea of anatural, pre-philosophical attitude, Strauss defines anormative concept of —one opposed to the diversity of gods and mores—that establishes aframework for doing philosophy. An importantaspect of Strauss’sconcept of philosophycan be found in the 1945 “Farabi’sPlato,” an essayoften assigned special significanceinhis work. There, he writes:

It is the wayleadingtothat sciencerather than that science itself: the investigation rather than the result.Philosophythus understood is identical with the scientific spirit ‘in action,’ with σκέψις in the original sense of the term.⁴⁴

The term ‘political philosophy’ does not appear here—Strauss speaks onlyofpolitical science—but the phrase ‘scepticism in the original sense’ is one he will later use when talking about the sceptical character of his philosophy.

 As often observed, Strauss abandoned the impulses of and that weredirectedagainst philosophical systems and epistemic methodology.Likethese Jewish think- ers, he focused on ethical questions concerning man in general and open (oral) discussion; see Zank, “Introduction,” 35 f.  LeoStrauss, “On the Progress of Metaphysics,” in idem, Early Writings,215.  LeoStrauss, “Farabi’sPlato,” in Louis GinzbergJubilee Volume (New York: The American for Jewish Research, 1945): 393. WasLeo StraussaZetetic PoliticalPhilosopher? 157

Apeculiarfeature of Strauss’sscepticism is its preoccupation with alternatives. In Thoughts on Machiavelli (1958), Strauss writes:

We did assume that thereare fundamentalalternatives, alternativeswhich arepermanentorco- eval with man. This assumption is frequentlydenied today.⁴⁵

Similar anthropological claims can be found in Natural Rightand History:the perma- nent problems are not onlycoeval with man; they are always the same, independent of time and context.⁴⁶ Strauss frequentlyclaims that all fundamental problems have the character of an alternative.This is more than apreference for adual code; it re- calls CarlSchmitt’snotorious distinction between ‘friend and foe.’ But Strauss does not provide asingle argument why, for asceptic, all problems must assume the form of an alternative. Whyshould there not be three, four,orfivepossibilities? Why should unresolvable problems not be trilemmas or pentalemmas? Strauss’sfixation on alternativessignificantlyrestricts the scope of his scepticism, though he does con- cede in his debate with Kojève that multiple philosophical solutions can exist.⁴⁷ At anyrate,itisastrangeturn for someone who expresslyrejects problem histories in the neo-Kantian mould and who argues against Hans-GeorgGadamerthat the con- tent of problems and their solutions can change.⁴⁸ Despite tying the understandingof aproblem to the philosophisingsubject,Strauss remains tethered to the belief in eternal problems as such. Several passages from Strauss’scorrespondence with Karl Löwith shed more light on his conception of scepticism. In aletter from July 19,1951, he responds to an essaybyLöwith:⁴⁹

It is excellentlywritten and compared with the madmen whodominatethe world stage,Iagree with you1,000 percent.But compared with the real σκέψις,the Socratic-Platonic?You read Plato with Montaignean or Christian eyes. Socratesisnoskeptic in avulgarsense, because he knows that he knows nothing. To start,heknows what knowledge is—and that’snot nothing. Moreover,

 LeoStrauss, Thought on Machiavelli (1958;reprinted, Chicago:The University of Chicago Press, 1978): 14.  LeoStrauss, Natural Right and History (Chicago:The University of Chicago Press,1971): 32.  Cf. Strauss, On Tyranny,196: ‘Philosophyassuch is nothingbut genuine awareness of the prob- lems,i.e.ofthe fundamental and comprehensive problems.Itisimpossible to think about these problems without becoming inclined toward asolution, toward one of the very typical solutions. Yetaslong as thereisnowisdom but onlyquest for wisdom, the evidenceofall solutions is neces- sarilysmaller than the evidenceofthe problems.Thereforethe philosopher ceasestobeaphiloso- pher at the moment at which the ‘subjective certainty’ of asolution becomes stronger than his aware- ness of the problematic character of that solution. At that moment the sectarian is born.’  See Stephan Steiner, Weimar in Amerika. Leo Strauss‘ Politische Philosophie (Tübingen: Mohr Sie- beck, 2013): 209.  Strauss is most likelyreferring to the essay “Skepticism and Faith,” which appeared in the Jan. 1, 1951edition of Social Research. 158 Harald Bluhm

he knows that the problems are, the problems,the important problems—that is, what is impor- tant. In other words,heknows that philosophizingisaunum necessarium.⁵⁰

Strauss goes on to make adistinction between Socratic scepticism and the vulgar scepticism of Pyrrho. In Strauss’seyes, Pyrrho’sscepticism boils down to ataraxia, astate of philosophical equanimity which is both apolitical and individualistic. Soc- rates,bycontrast,knew that he knew nothing,but he also knew that this was aspe- cial form of knowledge.Socratic philosophisingisapolitical act because it seeks, through the interrogation of prevailing opinion, arenewal of the polis based on sound principles. The philosophythat Strauss talks about—the unum necessarium —is not compatible with stringent scepticism.⁵¹ It would be naïvetoassume that Strauss is unaware of the paradoxinhis position; as an expert in ancient philosophy, he was no doubt familiar with ’smaximthatwecannot even be certain that everything is uncertain. Strauss concludes his letter to Löwith by pointing to apar- ticular sourceofhis scepticism:

To be quitefrank, your article helps strengthen the sympathyfor Heideggerthat recentlyawoke in me, whoremained loyaltohimself by makingnoconcessions to belief.⁵²

Sixteen yearsearlier,Strauss wrote the following to Löwith:

But these lateantique philosophies arefar toodogmatic, even the skeptics,for someone like you to remain with them and not go back to their forefather,Socrates,who was not dogmatic.⁵³

Around amonth later,hewrote to Löwith again:

Whydid Inot respond to ‘The doctrine of the mean?’ Because Iknow who youmean, namely people like Burckhardt.Iwould liketobelieveyou that B. was the ideal representative of the moderation of antiquity in the nineteenth century.But the subjects of his philosophizing are

 Strauss, Gesammelte Schriften,vol. 3, 675. It should be mentioned in passingthat Strauss follows Schleiermacher’sinterpretation of Socrates.Schleiermacher wrote that Socrates’ not-knowingis based on aconcept of knowledge that includes knowledge on the path to knowledge,see Daniel Friedrich Schleiermacher, “Ueber den Wert des Socrates als Philosoph [1815],” in Daniel F. Schleiermacher, Kritische Gesamtausgabe,vol. I.11 (Berlin: De Gruyter, 2002): 201–228. Andreas Arndtiscritical of this view,however; see Andreas Arndt, Schleiermacher als Philosoph (Berlin and : De Gruyter, 2013): 285–295.Asanaside: Schleiermacher did not see Xenophon as aphilos- opher.  The formula ‘the one necessary’ (‘Das Eine, was not tut’)stems fromSøren Kierkegard and was made familiar by Heidegger; see Karl Löwith, Mein Leben in Deutschland vor und nach 1933.Ein Be- richt (Stuttgart: Metzler,1986): 28.Itisinterestingand alittle ironic that Strauss uses this decisionist formula—which Löwith explains in his “VonHegel zu Nietzsche,” in idem, Sämtliche Schriften,vol. 4 (Stuttgart: Metzler,1988): 195,especiallyinhis letters to Löwith.  Strauss, Gesammelte Schriften,vol. 3, 675.  Letter to Löwith dated June 23,1935, in LeoStrauss, Gesammelte Schriften,vol. 3, 650. WasLeo Strauss aZetetic PoliticalPhilosopher? 159

onlypossible on the basis of modern ‘immoderation’:noancient philosopher was ever ahistor- ian […]No, dear Löwith, Burckhardt—that reallywon’tdo.⁵⁴

Burckhardt,whom Löwith revered, did not figure similarlyfor Strauss. He associated Burckhardt,ahistorian, with relativism and sawnophilosophicalradicalisminhis doctrine of the mean, despite the aristocratic removefrom his contemporaries. To Strauss, Burckhardt’smoderation was nothing more thanatheory of the justemilieu. But while Strauss disagreed with Löwith about Burckhardt,they bothrejected the de- cisionism of Heideggerand Schmitt.

VI

Strauss redefines scepticism, or zeteticism, in contradistinction to modernrelativism with recourse to Xenophon and Socrates.Itisembedded in his political philosophy and in his notion of exoteric and esoteric writing.His rhetoricisation of philosophy, its reduction to zetetic questions, is meant to facilitate and protect political philoso- phy. Itscritical value is primarilypolemical; compared with otherforms of current political philosophy, it is unable to provide adetailed diagnosis of the present situa- tion beyond amirroringoftheory in antiquity and assuring itself of its impact in the modernera through self-reflection. Instead of being amere sub-discipline—a ‘branch,’ as Strauss calls it—political philosophyrises to first philosophy. In this ca- pacity,itisthe ceaseless, normative interrogation of fundamental human problems and of the political order.For Strauss, philosophyisthe onlyframework in which this can meaningfullyoccur. As Isuggested at the beginning,several levels of zetetic questioning can be found in Strauss’swritings. He is sceptical of modern philosophyand tradition—in- cludingsocial sciences, political theory,political science, and revealed religion—for being neither radical nor normative enough. The philosopher’sscepticism is directed at opinions in general and at the political in particular. Strauss argues again and again for moderation in politics and accusesother radical philosopherssuch as Nietzsche and Heideggernot onlyofself-instrumentalisation, but also of not doing enough to prevent misunderstandingsbydisciples, intellectuals, and the poorly edu- cated. Of course, it is doubtful whether Strauss did enough to prevent such misun- derstandings himself, giventhe later success of some Straussians. His central topos—the warning not to separate wisdom and moderation in On Tyranny and in other places—can hardlybeignored, yetheremains vague. Strauss’simplicit set of anthropological assumptions,his concept of political philosophy, and his belief in the insufficiency of reason form the basis of his conser- vative approach, which was noted by his disciples, political sympathisers, and oppo-

 Letter to Löwith dated July 17,1935, in ibidem,565 f. 160 Harald Bluhm

nents alike. Yetone must admit that his zetetic approach, while producing innovative interpretations of canonicalpolitical philosophers, yields few substantive guidelines. Strauss’sattempt to ground scepticism anthropologicallymay be interesting,but he can hardlyconceal its limited scope, the lovelyline about scepticism being aform of wisdom notwithstanding.Methodically,his philosophising is tied to the distinc- tion between exoteric and esoteric writing,with all its illuminating and surprising in- sights. AccordingtoStrauss’sinterpretative , the hiddenmeaningsin philosophical texts enable radical questioning while shielding the public from its ramifications. His political philosophydoes not aim at specific solutions;rather,it is meant to have humanising side-effects on the city,onthe political community, and on gentlemen. Strauss believes that philosophical scepticism, correctlyunder- stood, refuses instrumentalisation and, despite its radicalismintheory,ismoderate in questions affecting the political order more narrowly. Nevertheless,the limited scope of his scepticism means that his thinking can be called zetetic onlyinpart.That limited scope grows out of Strauss’scommitments to antiquity—to Socratic questioning,topersisting in questioning,and to understand- ing philosophyasawayoflife. At the sametime, Strauss wanted to elude criticism of the foundations of modern political philosophyand theory.His insufficientlyela- borated existential scepticism can problematise relativism, historicism, and positi- vism—the spectres,inhis mind, responsible for the crisis of modernity—but he can- not shake them systematically. His entire critique of and stands on feetofclay. InterpretingStrauss’sphilosophyassceptical does not do enough to address this or its scant epistemological underpinnings.