JANUARY 1971 SIXTY CENTS
THE MILITARY AS A MODERNIZING FORCE
Africa —Claude E. Welch, Jr.
Peru —Luigi R. Einaudi
Service Academies — Edward Bernard Glick
Executive Branch — Adam Yarmolinsky AMERICA ON $1.17 A DAY.
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STAFF 22 Should We Eliminate or Merge Our Military Academies? THOMAS S. ESTES, Executive Director Edward Bernard Glick MARGARET S. TURKEL, Executive Secretary CLARKE SLADE, Educational Consultant LOUISE H. FEISSNER, Personal Purchases 33 The Military and Progress in the Third World Luigi R. Einaudi JOURNAL EDITORIAL BOARD ARCHIE BOLSTER, Chairman AMBLER MOSS, Vice Chairman 34 The Military Influence within the Executive Branch CLINT E. SMITH M. TERESITA CURRIE Adam Yarmolinsky JAMES D. CONLEY JOHN F. LIPPMANN JAMES D. PHILLIPS JOHN D. STEMPEL OTHER FEATURES: Poems, by William A. Sommers, page 8.
JOURNAL SHIRLEY R. NEWHALL, Editor DEPARTMENTS DONALD DRESDEN, Editorial Consultant MCIVER ART & PUBLICATIONS, INC., Art Direction 2 In This Issue ADVERTISING REPRESENTATIVES JAMES C. SASMOR, 295 Madison Ave.. New York N.Y. 10017 (212) 532-6230 4 Editorial ALBERT D. SHONK CO., 681 Market St., San Francisco Calif. 94105 (415) 392-7144 5 Letters to the Editor JOSHUA B. POWERS, LTD., 5 Winsley Street, London W.l. 01-580 6594/8. International Representatives. 23 AFSA News ©American Foreign Service Association, 1970. The Foreign Service Journal is published twelve limes a year by the American Foreign Service Association, 2101 E Street, N.W., Washington, D. C. 20037. PHOTOGRAPHS AND ILLUSTRATIONS: Janet Fitch Sewall, Chinese Second-class postage paid at Washington, D. C. Gods, stained glass, cover; Flenry J. Paoli, photographs, page Printed by Monumental Printing Co., Baltimore. 4I; S. I. Nadler, “Life and Love in the Foreign Service,” page 52.
T HE FOREIGN SERVICE JOURNAL is the journal of professionals in foreign affairs, published twelve times a vear by the American Foreign Service Association, a non-profit organization. Material appearing herein represents the opinions of the writers and is not intended to indicate the official views of the Department of State, the United Stales Information Agency, the Agency for International Development or the United States Government as a whole. Membership in the AMERICAN FOREIGN SERVICE ASSOCIATION is open to the professionals in foreign affairs serving overseas or in Washington, as well as to persons having an active interest in, or close association with, foreign affairs. Dues are $30 annually for members earning over $15,000; for those earning less, dues are $15.00. For subscription to the JOURNAL, one year (12 issues); $6.00; two years, $10.00, For subscriptions going abroad, except Canada, add $1.00 annually for over¬ seas postage. IN THIS ISSUE
The Military as a Modernizing Force
The JOURNAL’S Question and | searching for effective ways to achieve economic and social progress, country after country has turned to the Papandreou’s Reply military to achieve results. Do military men use their technical training and their organizational skills to cut Do you believe that the military services are capable through the barriers which have thwarted less determined of bringing about economic and social progress in civilian regimes? Or do they take advantage of their new status simply to feather their own nests, dealing more countries where they are in power or exert a major harshly with their critics than did their predecessors? These influence? are the pros and cons of the military as a modernizing force, the theme of this issue. Charles Koburger, a Coast Guard officer, sets the stage "THE question is of interest only in the context of the for our discussion with a general look at the subject. He industrially underdeveloped societies. It can be argued concludes that while military regimes come to power on a with some force that in those societies the military platform of mobilization for progress, their authoritarianism represent the only available technocratic elite. Modern and their lack of political skill usually hamper the search for military technology does not stand alone. It is supported mass support and this brings about a new move for replace¬ by complex organizational structures involved in solving ment. complex problems characterized by sophisticated con¬ The US has consistently asserted civilian control over the temporary centralized planning. military when the issue has been joined, but military influ¬ The military combines this technocratic expertise with ence has become steadily more pervasive. This is the general theme behind the chapter from Adam Yarmolinsky’s forth¬ a commitment to serve the “national interest.” With coming book, “The Military Establishment: Its Impacts on impressive potential political power based on the fire¬ American Society.” power under its command, it is not surprising that the Luigi Einaudi of the Rand Corporation writes of the military often usurps the reins of government. military and the Third World, and has also contributed an When it does, the promotion of “modernization” of the article on the Peruvian military. He sees advantages in the industrially underdeveloped society is likely. But the military direction of countries which have not been able to military does so in a warped fashion. First, because it organize for progress, but in the specific case of Peru, he overemphasizes centralized organizational structures and believes that the “unmanageability” of the country and the administrative processes; secondly, because the national tendency of the military to be obsessed with the eradication of corruption and ineptitude have combined to frustrate plan it promulgates is essentially that of a society at attempts to become a truly modern nation. war, with all the implications for social and economic Africa has experienced many a military coup. The lack of growth that this carries with it. long-established institutions has encouraged societies there to It is especially important to stress that military coups call on any group prepared to “get the country moving”; and in the Third World are often not intended to serve the the group most often ready has been the military. In interests of the nations or of the peoples in whose name excerpts from his chapter in “Soldier and State in Africa” they take place—and this quite apart from the fact that (reviewed elsewhere in this issue) Professor Claude Welch the interpretation given to “national interest” by the of Northwestern concludes that military regimes in Africa military is unavoidably elitist. More often than not the can make but a slight contribution to political development military juntas represent an appendage of either one or because they are not effective in eliciting wide public support. the other of the two “international” military machines or Edward Bernard Glick takes a look at the military pyramids with apex in Washington or Moscow. In such academies in the US and comes up with the recommenda¬ cases, under the guise of a “national revolution,” the tion that we need a single National Defense Academy. nation experiencing the coup becomes effectively a People planning to serve in foreign affairs related jobs might satellite of either Washington or Moscow. Actually, such also go to such an institutions, which would cause students to coups or “national revolutions” are nothing more than think along government lines rather than in more parochial covert super-power interventions in anticipation of ei¬ terms. ther a true national revolution or of a similar interven¬ Andreas Papandreou could probably not be expected to tion on the part of the other super-power. give a completely objective opinion about militarism in Greece. In his brief comment which follows, in answer to In conclusion, then, the modernization brought to the the JOURNAL’S question, he states his belief that the junta is Third World by military juntas is often just an aspect of in power primarily to stay in power. neo-imperialism. ■
FOREIGN- SERVICE -JOURNAL, January, 1971 V
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FOBEIUN SERVICE JOURNAL, January, 1!>71 3 “I am unalterably opposed to having a woman officer at EDITORIAL that post,” and make it stick. Now the decision will go to much higher levels and, we are told, the exceptions to the equal opportunity policy will be rare. The practice of rejecting minorities by stipulating that a person of a given race, color, or religion was not acceptable for a given position had largely died out in the 1960s, and Another Step Forward Towards Equal Opportunity under the new regulations sex, too, will be dropped as the rationale for rejecting personnel, with rare excep¬ tions. THE policy of equal opportunity in employment with¬ It is hoped that the high level review will consider the out regard to race, color, religion, sex or national origin qualifications of the competing candidates for the posi¬ has been reaffirmed by the three major foreign affairs tions where minority and sex candidates are rejected, as agencies, and AFSA applauds this action. In going one well as the exceptions to the equal opportunity policy. step further, these agencies are instituting a new proce¬ If qualifications are not considered by a high level re¬ dure which provides for a high level review of any ex¬ view, the practice of adjusting the requirements of a ceptions to the policy of equal opportunity, with the position to eliminate candidates not wanted because of determination to be made by the Secretary of State, the race, color, religion, sex or national origin may continue, Administrator of AID, or the Director of USIA. Re¬ and the new policy may well be circumvented. quests for exceptions in overseas assignments must have The policy of equal opportunity in assignments could the concurrence of the chief of mission and will be denied be seriously undermined if those who make the decisions unless the evidence is compelling or the circumstances on individual cases give it only lip service. Some groups extraordinary. in the foreign affairs community, however, have been This is a fair and just policy and the foreign affairs outspoken on this issue. The feelings of the people most agencies are to be commended for pushing it forward. affected, women and minorities, are strong and we would In particular, Under Secretary Macomber deserves credit anticipate vigorous pressure to bring about additional for his efforts to obtain equality of opportunity for every¬ changes in personnel procedures should the new meas¬ one in the foreign affairs community. ures prove ineffective in bringing equality of oppor¬ Gone are the days when a country director could say, tunity. ■ Worldwide All-Risk Insurance Coverage For Government Employees Special rates for American Foreign Service Association members
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4 FOREIGN SERVICE JOURNAL, January, 1971 the foreign affairs community, I would been recognized as a serious profes¬ like to say why. sional problem. Bill talks about super¬ Bill uses strong language but under visors without telling us how he the rhetoric, I find the substance defines the term. In the same way, he weak. He is not talking about a Serv¬ dismisses “opposition to the Executive ice that many of us below the seventh Branch” for holders of presidential floor would recognize. He states, commissions as “particularly irration¬ for instance, that ever since joining al.” Was President Nixon irrational the Foreign Service he considered when he stated in the Executive Order himself a supervisor, identified his fu¬ that “effective labor management ture with that of the Foreign Service, relations within the Federal Service and therefore finds it “ridiculous and require a clear statement of the re¬ repugnant” to endorse an organization spective rights and obligations of labor that might place him in opposition to organizations and agency manage¬ E.O. 11491—Pros and Cons the management of the Foreign Serv¬ ment?” ice. Those presidential commission This definition of rights and obliga¬ V\/ ILLIAM BRADFORD’S resignation holders who disagree with him, Bill tions is a crucial part of any meaning¬ from the AFSA Board may be the considers “psychotic” and “irrational” ful reform of the administration of the first time a Board member has left because they would oppose “the Ex¬ Foreign Service. Only a few months because of a policy difference. He has ecutive Branch of which they are an ago a real supervisor introduced the introduced needed controversy in a integral part.” Task Force exercise with the memor¬ responsible way, and I salute him for No one disputes Bill’s right to his able phrase that “administration has it. own impressions of the Foreign Serv¬ not been our bag.” How can we make Bill opposes the Board’s decision to ice, but I wonder how many of us administration our bag if we rule out seek exclusive recognition under Ex¬ share the experience of having been serious dialogue between the adminis¬ ecutive Order 11941 to represent its FSO-8 supervisors, or FSO-6 supervi¬ trators and the rank and file members active members. I think he is com¬ sors or FSO-4 or even FSO-3 and of the Foreign Service by labeling it pletely wrong, and for those of our FSO-2 supervisors? For years, and irrational opposition? colleagues who have not yet signed most recently by the Task Forces, the What bothers me about the case the AFSA petition for an election to paucity of supervisory positions and Bill makes are the implications that determine whether it will represent the 15-year wait to get at them has we are all one happy family of super-
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But nothing will promote the One further point of AFSA’s “trad¬ —at least no problems that cannot be cause and perhaps the eventual ing its influence on most of the impor¬ waved away by incanting magic triumph of trade unionism in the For¬ tant matters” (by seeking exclusive phrases like “presidential commission” eign Service more than the this-is-the- recognition). In the crunch, AFSA and “integral part of the Executive best-of-all-possible-worlds approach. has had no influence on matters the Branch.” Bill Bradford is by no means The O-area request for exclusion of O-Area does not agree are important. the only senior officer who avoids the Foreign Service from the Execu¬ This is why the Board first requested issues by assuming them to be settled. tive Order has done more for AFGE’s exclusive recognition in 1969. The However, the time has passed when membership drive than anything crucial point then as today is whether the administration of the Foreign Serv¬ AFGE has done for itself, and the AFSA will have the right of consulta¬ ice could be based on myths, roman¬ number of our colleagues who see a tion and negotiation or whether it will tic notions and meaningless catch trade union as the only alternative to continue to speak only at the phrases. It is time to sit down and a wishy-washy AFSA is growing. sufferance of the O-Area. Unless define our professional responsibilities I am not sure what points Bill was AFSA can make its members’ inter¬ and rights in the way the President trying to make in his interpretation of ests felt in policy formulation, it will has directed us. I think we all agree the Executive Order, but I leave the continue to lose membership and in¬ that this is better done from within by fluence, and eventually AFGE or rebuttal to the AFSA Board. Let me Foreign Service people. Indeed, the some other effective organization will just say that the Order was intended Foreign Service may not survive much replace it. Only exclusive recognition to cover the entire Federal Service, longer unless it learns to manage it¬ under the order will give AFSA the including the Foreign Service, and self. Bill recognizes a Foreign Service clout it needs; it has no other realistic management; it is curious that he does that narrow legalistic interpretations alternatives. not see the implication of Foreign almost invariably are completely Finally, I agree with Bill on the Service “labor” and the need for effec¬ wrong. Once the Department realizes basic point that AFSA members tive dialogue between the two. Being its administration is more efficiently should be consulted on the decision to required by the Executive Order to served when the O-Area is in responsi¬ seek exclusive recognition, but his case formally call AFSA a “labor organiza¬ ble conversation with a representative for amendment of the by-laws is not tion” may offend some sensibilities but professional organization than when it clear. Unfortunately, AFSA will not it is a small price to pay for making deals with a company union or at¬ have polling procedures until we vote AFSA an effective professional orga¬ tempts to play off several employee on the JFSOC-proposed amendment nization. And the alternatives are dis¬ organizations against each other, the to the by-laws now before the mem¬ mal indeed. relationship under the Order can be bership. It is good to know Bill will be Bill is concerned with unionization. broad and creative indeed. on JFSOC’s side this time. Until then,
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6 FOREIGN SERVICE JOURNAL. Jai FOREIGN SERVICE JOURNAL, January, 1971 7 Five Imitations of the Vietnamese by William A. Sommers I In the frail light of rising against the night’s waning, I discovered a haze in the sky: obscure, morose, a changeling, lost between the end of one and the beginning of the other. II His regalia is plumed in darkness. He is strong in attack dispensing shrill echoes in the valley, then hovers, waiting: A hawk’s eye never sleeps though hawks do. My friend from the highland thinks he is the perfect predator of the mountain sky. FROM WASHINGTON TO KABOUL, through more than III 200 offices in over 80 countries, AIL) offers you superior service — with nearly 50 years’ international insurance experience to Most are mixtures with soft browns back it up. or blues, even a shade of black in the tail feathers. Only a few are white. 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In Washington, call (Area 202) 737-6855 (After Tran Te Xuong’s Licentiate Nhu) V AMERICAN I02 MAIDEN LANE The sun makes so white a facade INTERNATIONAL I NEW YORK of the Continental whose UNDERWRITERS 10005 hooped arches introduce travelers to the wonders of Saigon. And there, Offices, Agents, and Representatives throughout the world. when the rain comes you can drink and be dry and wonder about CHICAGO • CORAL GABLES • DALLAS • HOUSTON ' LOS ANGELES • NEW people getting drenched without ORLEANS • NEW YORK • PORTLAND • SAN FRANCISCO • SEATTLE • TULSA WASHINGTON, 0. C. ever feeling. 8 FOREIGN SERVICE JOURNAL, January, 1971 Today, every new state feels the need to build ten new idea of loyalty to one na¬ tion-state. It teaches one common an armed force of its own, usually over-size. language. It develops a national mil¬ This represents a national identity. itary uniform, ritual, and myth, thereby infusing a sense of national identity. Almost all armed forces foster integration; various forms of modern¬ ization are a corollary. The new, The Military as a - conscript learns proper personal hy¬ giene. He learns to wear shoes, to read and write. He learns to handle Modernizing Force modern tools and mechanical equip¬ ment, a valuable skill he easily takes with him when he leaves the mili¬ tary. The officer gains some mastery p of modern technology, he learns REECE, Pakistan, Burma, In¬ CHARLES W. KOBURGER, Jr. something of the techniques of mod¬ donesia, Peru, Syria, Egypt, Libya, ern management, and he develops the Congo, otherwise as diverse as Mr. Koburger, the author of “Tlte New Order of Admiralty,” in our some awareness of the necessary ra¬ countries can be, today all share one August issue, is a research analyst tional relation of cause and effect. characteristic: military rule. The list (naval affairs) with the Depart¬ The psychological impact of training is long. There are still others with ment of Defense. He has contrib¬ also is important. the same ruling elite. Why? What is uted articles to the U.S. Naval In¬ Despite many too-often repeated stitute PROCEEDINGS, the MILITARY the role of the military in these REVIEW, the NAVAL WAR COLLEGE opinions to the contrary, little mod¬ societies? Is the military really a REVIEW and the NAVAL ENGINEERS ernization can be accomplished modernizing force? Is there one JOURNAL. without law and order. One of the common explanation? preconditions to any real take-off The answer to this last key ques¬ toward economic maturity is the tion must be yes, there is one com¬ firm establishment of the centralized mon denominator. In each case, the Both the dimly remembered tradi¬ state. Both of these are contributions country is under severe political, tional societies and the better re¬ of the military, and result in estab¬ economic and social stress. Although called colonial ones exercised this lishing a climate where progress is at some of them are more developed monopoly through armed forces of least possible. than others, none has made the full their own. Today, every new state Rational social development de¬ transition from a traditional society feels the need to provide such a pends on internal order, often taken to a modern one. Transition releases visible symbol of its sovereignty, and for granted. Not all military forces many social frustrations without sooner or later builds an armed are capable of insuring law and or¬ providing one strong positive new force of its own, usually oversized. der, once challenged. affirmation as a steadying force. To This represents a national identity. “Civic action,” the conscious, de¬ this aspect of the problem in many All armed forces perform the sym¬ liberate attempt of the military to cases must be added the strain of an bolic function. get the various people of the new internal or external, real or imag¬ Because of inherent nature, any state to identify with them is a tech¬ ined, threat to their existence. These military organization (even one nique of counterinsurgency. It also manifold stresses are often more minimally effective) resembles to emphasizes the national modernizing than a fragile governmental struc¬ some degree a modern organization. role of the military. ture can stand. It must be rationalized, mechanized, The problem of the external But why does this lead to military secularized. The military image threat—real or imagined—is two- rule? To find even the beginning of being what it is, even in the most sided. Some developing nations are an answer requires a preliminary traditional societies, its moderniza¬ faced with significant external examination of the potential spec¬ tion meets relatively little resistance. threats to their existence or to their trum of military roles in a transition¬ When a state builds an armed other vital interests. These the mili¬ al society. In the broadest terms, the force, it draws from a cross section tary should be expected to counter. military here usually carries out four of the usually diverse elements of its In professing to do so, the military functions: it is an important visible society. This is especially true when helps the state identify a national symbol of sovereignty; it helps in¬ the force is based on country-wide enemy; all can rally to fight against fuse a feeling of nationhood in di¬ conscription. It forms a national that enemy. (The all too obvious vided peoples; it helps maintain in¬ officer caste, which rapidly adopts a advantages of such a unifying ac¬ ternal order; and in some cases it middle class outlook. In recruiting tion, however, can result in conjur¬ defends the people against external and educating this armed force, it ing up non-existent enemies, thus threat. But few of these military provides a new social mobility for distracting the people from more forces manage to perform all four. the best of the poor, offering an necessary constructive efforts.) Few Only a sovereign power may ex¬ escape from an otherwise hopeless of these armed forces are really ca- ercise a legal monopoly of force. future. It perforce inculcates the of¬ (Continued on page 49) FOREIGN SERVICE JOURNAL, January, 1971 9 Military dictatorship and perhaps even ultimately stagnation may thus be the price of the selfishness of past Peruvian elites. Peruvian Military Relations with the United States The armed forces of Peru consist of LUIGI R. EINAUDI The urgency about the need for fiercely independent air, navy and striking change also gained accept¬ Dr. Luigi R. Einaudi directs re¬ army establishments loosely coordi¬ search on Latin America in ance as a means of demonstrating nated by a small joint command RAND’s Social Science Depart¬ that October 3 had been more than (Comando Con junto). Together, the ment where he is currently com¬ “just a coup.” Finally, the difficulty budgets assigned the three service pleting a book on the Peruvian of carrying out even moderate re¬ ministries have accounted for just un¬ military. Einaudi, whose Pli.D. is forms became, given the initial com¬ der 20 percent of central government from Harvard, also lectures in Po¬ expenditures over the past decade. litical Science at UCLA and has mitment of institutional prestige, a consulted with the State Depart¬ Peru’s total active military officer source of pressure to produce signifi¬ ment since 1965. corps consists of approximately 5,000 cant results. (of which some 3,500 are army) and Although military isolation and approximately 50,000 soldiers oper¬ secrecy had combined with civilian ating what is in many cases antiquated intellectual suspicions of military military equipment of World War II motives to divide them, military and and Korean War vintage, and even civilian progressives actually had a then in limited quantities and dubious good deal in common. Already, be¬ quality. However, what military mate¬ riel Peru does have, it manages effi¬ disciplined hierarchical fashion by fore 1968, military and civilian in¬ ciently enough to be rated by most the three services, proclaimed the tellectuals had come together over military observers at or near the top assumption of executive authority in the petroleum issue, which often in Latin America. behalf of a Revolutionary Govern¬ seemed to make strange bedfellows, ment of the armed forces dedicated through a newspaper, El Comercio, to the eradication of an “unjust so¬ which espoused conservative nation¬ A NUMBER of commentators in¬ cial and economic order.” It is likely alism, and through two institutions, cluding Fidel Castro as well as Pres¬ that some military leaders, and cer¬ the National Planning Institute, ident Juan Velasco Alvarado, [a tainly most civilians, expected mat¬ founded originally by the military General in the Peruvian armed forc¬ ters to evolve along fairly traditional junta in 1962, and the Center for es] have taken to referring to the lines. The military government, that Higher Military Studies (CAEM), political process under way since the is, would hold power, maintain or¬ where civilians had for more than a military coup which deposed [Pres¬ der, bring about some necessary decade occasionally served as guest ident] Fernando Belaunde in Octo¬ changes, and would then return lecturers. Catholic-inspired social ber of 1968 as a “revolution.” Al¬ power to elected civilians after a and political activities formed still though it is not my intent to analyze decent interval. another point of contact between its program in this paper, I will Once in power, however, even military and civilian elites. briefly discuss some general consid¬ military conservatives have been With some of the barriers of mu¬ erations about the present military faced with arguments that what was tual suspicion lowered, a number of government. needed was not a coup, but a revo¬ attitudes common to both civilian There are many ways in which to lution. In other words, what Peru and military progressives emerged. look at what has happened since needed was basic change, starting This process of mutual discovery October 3, 1968, when the Peruvian with the elimination of the discred¬ accelerated in the months following military, acting institutionally, that is ited parliamentary system, and con¬ the coup, often with surprising re¬ to say, with the Commanding Gen¬ tinuing with all of the reforms Peru’s sults. Among many Peruvians politi¬ eral of the Joint Command leading “sham democracy” had “endlessly cally socialized since World War II the coup but supported ultimately in discussed, but never implemented.” the American Popular Revolution- 10 FOREIGN SERVICE JOURNAL, January, 1971 ary Alliance (APRA) seemed just and paternalism are matched by the ternational Petroleum Company’s another part of the Peruvian estab¬ intellectual’s fear of the masses oil fields and refinery shortly after lishment. [APRA, founded in Mex¬ which will neither vote for him nor the military coup d’etat on October ico in 1924 by Victor Raul de la support his guerrilla adventures. A 3, 1968] the basis of the political Torre, is the most famous of Latin second common attitude is dislike scandal that undid the Belaunde American Revolutionary nationalist for politics, hatred for congress and government. parties.] Dislike for APRA was no for the traditional political party Nationalists, of course, have no longer proof of conservatism. The system. From the military side, there monopoly on conspiracy theories. search for a progressive nationalist is the dislike for debate, disorganiza¬ Ever since it became clear that the solution to Peru’s problem often tion, and corruption. From the radi¬ Revolutionary Government intended seemed to be taking place in a po¬ cal intellectual side, the view asserts substantial changes, the accusation litical vacuum, occupied verbally by that politicians are “always selling has been voiced that somehow the all the major parties, but imple¬ out” to the Americans and to the military were being “dominated by mented by none. upper classes, that they play petty extremist civilian advisors,” pre¬ As the search developed after the politics instead of making a revolu¬ sumably Communists intent on mov¬ 1968 coup, a startling amount of tion. ing Peru into the Soviet (or shared ground appeared between of¬ For many military and civilian Chinese) orbit, or on emulating ten somewhat disenchanted left-wing intellectuals, therefore, there is an Cuba. These accusations reflect the civilian intellectuals and profession¬ element of hatred for the historical¬ fears and ignorance of their origina¬ als and military intellectuals and in¬ ly dominant Peruvian elites on the tors rather than any serious analysis telligence specialists. As my phrase grounds that they are anti-national. of the internal workings of the Peru¬ suggests, these were and are very The social and financial elites tend vian government. The suspicion that diverse groups. Many have been ed¬ to be whiter in skin, they tend to somehow all progressive intellectuals ucated in the United States, others have “foreign” attitudes—perhaps to are “red” and that if they are they in France and are receptive to mod¬ the point of betraying national hon¬ will automatically brainwash the ern social science, particularly as or. The often conspiracy-minded na¬ military does more than ignore re¬ represented by the economic views tionalists made of a reputedly miss¬ cent Peruvian history: it also reveals of the United Nations Economic ing “page eleven” in a proposed a characteristic Peruvian civilian Commission for Latin America settlement of the IPC matter [the upper class refusal—often shared by (ECLA). Most are strongly anti- seizure of the American-owned In¬ liberal Americans—to believe that Communist, though there is some the military can ever be expected to confusion over what that means in do anything competently on their the 1970s in a country with insignifi¬ own. cant Communist groups but a mount¬ In my view, in any case, the ing social problem. internal political diversity of the The political diversity of persons Peruvian armed forces as a whole associated with the regime is most will continue to block dominance by visible among the civilians, many of any narrowly partisan political whom had engaged in prior political group even if one existed. This mili¬ activity. Some, like the progressive tary diversity, in fact, may perhaps priests who have helped to obtain even prevent the adoption of consist¬ public endorsement by Peru’s Cath¬ ent development policies by the olic Church of the government’s military institutions as such over any agrarian reform program, had acted extended period of time. outside of the organized party chan¬ The possibility that the military nels. Other civilians in this relatively might adopt some form of “revolu¬ small but technically competent tionary” strategy has been fed in group included former Apristas, recent years by increased military Christian Democrats, and even a concern over the need for moderni¬ few who had belong to the Social zation of society as a whole as a Progressive Party (MSP) before it prerequisite to military survival as a dissolved after the 1962 elections. modern institution. Likewise, the Most, however, were political inde¬ possibility that the military might pendents whose political philoso¬ adopt a strategy with “anti¬ phies ranged from Marxism to con¬ imperialist” overtones has been fed servative Catholicism, and whose in recent years by increased military political views were often equally suspicion of United States military discordant. and economic policies. Through this diversity, however, Such language, by its very important common attitudes unite breadth and vagueness, generates military and civilian technocrats. confusion and uncertainty. The mili¬ One such attitude is elitism, or ac¬ tary government may, as it did with ceptance of revolution from above. the nationalization of the IPC petro¬ The military’s views of discipline leum complex at Talara, briefly take FOREIGN SERVICE JOURNAL, January, 1971 11 dramatic steps of considerable sym¬ within apparent overall government unheard-of introduction of time bolic significance. This is particular¬ stability, but repression and ultimate clocks for all public employees (to ly likely in those instances which are withdrawal from power are possible be punched by supervisors and em¬ apparently amenable to executive alternative outcomes of reliance on ployees alike) and the slogan “hora action and the issuance of decrees, military power for the resolution of exacta, hora Peruana” to replace the like that for agrarian reform. Similar political problems. traditional Peruvian habit of acts may even be called for by radi¬ Additional sources for skepticism tardiness accompanied by the state¬ cal elements of left and right who about the military’s capacity for sus¬ ment that the nobody who was on see the military as a means of out- tained revolutionary innovation de¬ time was operating on “hora maneuvering conservative and liber¬ rive from the nature of Peruvian inglesa.” al democratic political opponents. society rather than from the nature The incoming military ministers Policies adopted under such circum¬ of the military itself. I suspect that made a largely unprecedented (ex¬ stances may thus be the result of the revolution from above by the mili¬ cept for some members of the 1962 development strategy of a specific tary is likely to fail in Peru for junta) public accounting of their political group but they are most reasons similar to those for the fail¬ wealth upon assuming office, and decidedly not the strategies of the ure of guerrillas to lead revolution there can be no doubt that the military as an institution. from below. One of the most impor¬ government leadership as a whole Taken as a whole, it is unlikely tant of these common reasons is the has good intentions. Some ministers, that the military institutions as such unmanageability of Peru, whether it in fact, appear to be incorruptible to will be able to resolve what they are be measured in social, political or the point of fanaticism. Harsh and likely to see as a contradiction be¬ administrative terms. Peru, one third immediate legal proceedings were tween military discipline and the of whose people do not speak Span¬ instituted in the spring of 1969 partisan political activity required ish, has nearly twice the population against those officials of the Ministry for the organization of development. of Cuba spread out over an area of Finance and of the Central Bank, Internal political diversity consti¬ more than ten times as large, but military as well as civilian, who tutes an automatic internal self¬ with less than one-fifth as many could be charged with corruption or regulating mechanism ensuring the television sets per capita. With nei¬ incompetence in the granting of an development of internal counter¬ ther a charismatic leader nor an export license permitting the Inter¬ weights to controversial policies that overwhelming external enemy national Petroleum Company to threaten military discipline, unity, against whom to unite, can any withdraw funds from Peru. and hence institutional survival. Peruvian government hope to find The government’s severity sent a This dynamic makes it quite unlike¬ and communicate the emotional ce¬ shudder of fear throughout the civil¬ ly that the military can be bureau¬ ment necessary to hold a revolution¬ ian bureaucracy, and appears also to cratically controlled for long by any ary effort together? have frightened many private citi¬ single partisan clique. Should the The problem is all the greater if zens with the technical competence military officer corps produce indi¬ there is uncertainty over the pro¬ needed if Peru is to enlist intelli¬ vidual leaders with a personal vision grams required to implement the gence and knowledge to public serv¬ of the struggle for development, general principles of change. To ice. such men will in practice cease to be maintain momentum while the inter¬ Excessive zeal in the eradication military officers, becoming instead nal policy debates raged, the mili¬ of corruption and ineptitude can what Peru’s current leaders tary turned immediately after as¬ heighten the deficiencies of public denounce almost daily, “politi¬ suming power to their traditional administration. This irony is perhaps cians,” while the military institutions interest in “public morality.” Few most evident in an underdeveloped withdraw to a less partisan posture. things are more demoralizing than country with a large marginal popu¬ This analysis implies that if the public displays of habitual inepti¬ lation. In such a society, any edu¬ military is not the counter¬ tude and corruption. A major public cated man has means dispropor¬ revolutionary tool it is often painted scandal over smuggling implicating tionate to the environment as a to be, neither can it be regarded as a some officers as well as highly whole. A sensitive member of the guarantee of progressive develop¬ placed civilian friends of President middle or upper classes from which ment. The thesis of “military as sal¬ Belaunde had contributed in the senior public officials must of neces¬ vation”—for any partisan group— spring of 1968 to the atmosphere sity be drawn finds it almost impos¬ fails on the fact that the normal that later led to the military inter¬ sible to live in Peru without some¬ internal political diversity of the mil¬ vention. One of the first acts of the how feeling corrupt, if only because itary is heightened by the assump¬ new revolutionary government, he lives well while others subsist in a tion of responsible political power therefore, was to proclaim the need near-animal state. and the encounter with complexities to eliminate graft and corruption. To offset the shortages in admin¬ of government. This transfer of pol¬ The moralization campaign which istrative personnel automatically im¬ itics into the military institution it¬ ensued included a series of measures posed by the adoption of new gov¬ self is often shrouded with secrecy to increase efficiency, including a ernment programs such as agrarian because of the threat of fragmenta¬ reform of the basic structure of gov¬ reform, the government has at¬ tion and hence of possible danger to ernment, creating three additional tempted to turn to retired officers the very survival of the military ministries. and to church personnel. Again, a institution itself. The result can be The attempt to improve public quick consideration of the numbers sudden swings and shifts in policy administrative services included the involved reveals the poverty of 12 FOREIGN SERVICE JOURNAT,, January, 1971 Peru's resources compared to the to undertake the messy business of their civilian associates as they seek magnitude of the task. There are organizing or currying the favor of to lead Peru to an improved accom¬ fewer than 2500 priests in all of political parties. As a means of by¬ modation with the pressures of mod¬ Peru. Even assuming that most cler¬ passing the party system, which cer¬ ernity. ics are prepared (and free) to coop¬ tainly has not always been a para¬ erate with the authoritarian military digm of statesmanship, the military WHAT role can United States poli¬ in the common cause of develop¬ has enabled the nation to draw in cy play in this process? What role ment, this is simply not a very large more or less “routine” fashion upon should it play? For the United pool from which to draw. Finally, the intelligence of some of its more States, the extent and nature of mili¬ the limits on resources external to competent civilians. tary participation in the governing the military as a means of expansion Whatever the merits of such a of Peru since 1968 complicates the of the bureaucracy are underscored pattern (and to one raised in the already difficult question of the by the fact that there are even fewer United States they appear dubious), American role in events on foreign retired officers still young enough to the current military intervention, shores. be useful than priests. with its insistence upon military de¬ From an intellectual viewpoint As the time has passed, therefore, cisionmaking and military control of also, the recent history of the Peru¬ increasing numbers of officers have key positions, suggests that the Peru¬ vian military should underscore the been assigned to the non military min¬ vian military, under the leadership inadequacies of the often arbitrary istries, often occupying senior and of the army, is attempting to erect and uncertain distinction between even middle-level posts previously itself as a super-bureaucracy domi¬ “military” and “civilian” govern¬ occupied by civilians. This prolifer¬ nating the state in the search for a ments. ation of military officers in what modern nation. This attempt to run United States military relations would normally be considered civili¬ a government that is military to this with Peru were, with the exception an functions can be explained parti¬ degree is without precedent. It is a of a naval mission, minimal until the ally as attempts at reform and parti¬ marked change even with regard to Second World War. War time led to ally as a method of political control. contemporary military regimes in a vigorous US military policy The presence of many of Peru’s best other Latin American countries, as throughout Latin America, seeking young generals in the ministerial Brazil and Argentina, where civili¬ the ousting of Italian and German portfolios should also be considered ans have continued to exercise key military missions, and, with the col¬ a sign of the depth and likely con¬ policymaking functions. lapse of French missions, to their tinuity of military governmental For Peru, the ultimate problem gradual replacement by United commitment. may be that its strength may not lie States Army and later Air Force The assignment of officers to pre¬ in its bureaucrats and intellectauls, missions in an attempt to establish viously civilian administrative func¬ military or civilian (both of whom US regional military supremacy. tions may create tensions within the are generally looked down upon by The doctrine covering the military military itself, however. Officers social and economic elites), but in relation with Latin America, which holding administrative posts draw the private sector. The tragedy is arose during World War II, were extra basic pay allotments denied that this private sector has until now given institutional form in the Inter- those remaining on line duty in the acted in such a private manner as to American Defense Board, and led to barracks. This irritant may act as a discredit itself by appearing to deny the signing of the 1947 Rio Pact, catalyst for morale and other issues the national goals to which the mili¬ was that of hemispheric defense. contrasting military “politicians” un¬ tary, more than any other group in Defense of the hemisphere against favorably with military “profession¬ Peru, is dedicated. Military dictator¬ external attack, presumably from als.” ship and perhaps even ultimately the Soviet Union and its allies, Of greater immediate concern is stagnation may thus be the price of reached its height after the outbreak the possibility for demoralization of the selfishness of past Peruvian of the Korean War with the signing the senior civilian element of the elites. The extent of that price will be of mutual defense pacts with most bureaucracy. Many civilian public determined by the political wisdom Latin American countries. In Peru, servants have long practical experi¬ and flexibility of the military and this agreement was signed during ence in day-to-day management of the (elected by imposition) Pres¬ affairs in areas only vaguely under¬ idency of General Manuel A. Odria. stood by the military men who now who was later decorated by the not only block their chances for pro¬ Eisenhower Administration. motion, but seem, with their insist¬ The Mutual Defense Assistance ent demands for revision and Agreement of February 22, 1952 change, to imply that previous between the United States and Peru efforts were incompetent. Bureau¬ (3UST2890-2900) committed both crats know too well the difficulties of Governments to make available to innovation. each other: One of the political functions of “equipment, materials, services, the military in Peru has traditionally or other military assistance . . . been to act as a means by which designed to promote the defense ambitious and talented civilian lead¬ of the Western Hemisphere ... in ers could take office without having accordance with defense plans FOREIGN SERVICE JOURNAL, January, 1071 13 under which both Governments a new army mission agreement was the US missions be withdrawn by will participate in missions impor¬ signed in 1956, the naval mission July 1. tant to the defense of the Western agreement dated from 1940, the The ambiguity of function was Hemisphere.” military aviation mission agreement underscored when the United States Under the agreement, Peru under¬ from 1946. Peru traditionally shared indicated that such a withdrawal, took not to use such assistance for the cost of the missions with the unless Peru accepted a MAAG, “purposes other than those for which United States, leading Peru to con¬ would require the termination of all it was furnished” and committed it¬ sider the missions as in their service. MAP deliveries. Unwilling to lose self to “take all reasonable measures With the advent of MAP, however, all contact, the governments com¬ which may be needed to develop its military missions functions and re¬ promised on a MAAG attached to defense capacities.” sponsibilities were somewhat clouded the United States Embassy of three United States military grant assist¬ by their assumption of the duties of officers and four enlisted men super¬ ance to Peru under this and subse¬ supervision of use of American vising delivery of items already in quent agreements has been substan¬ supplied equipment normally per¬ the pipeline. tial. Cumulative grant materiel de¬ formed by military assistance ad¬ The reduction of US military ad¬ liveries from FY 1950 to 1965 in¬ visory groups (MAAG) in countries visory activity paralleled in many clusive were $59.3 million, equiva¬ where no missions had existed pre¬ ways similar reductions in the over¬ lent to about six percent of Peru’s viously. all military assistance program. Ac¬ military expenditures. This sum is This political, if not legal, confu¬ cording to information supplied to but one-third that provided to Brazil sion was compounded in the early the Senate Foreign Relations Com¬ during the same years, but otherwise 1960s by new US regulations de¬ mittee, the grant military aid pro¬ Peru is second only to Chile (and signed to ensure effective coordinat¬ gram for Peru for FY 1969 con¬ comparable to Colombia) in receipt ing of military policy with political tained no materiel grants and a total of US grant military assistance in and economic considerations. To of $800,000 for training only. Un¬ dollar value. Public breakdowns of this end the US missions were to be delivered materiel from prior these deliveries by item rather than brought under a single head, who years plus amounts delivered to by value are not available. All three would himself be a member of the Peru after the coup of October 3, services have apparently benefited, US country team under the ambas¬ 1968 included vehicles ($138,000), though it is likely that the navy has sador. The missions were thus col¬ maintenance equipment ($40,000), had the most success over the years lectively redesignated a “Military aircraft support equipment ($12,- in obtaining desired equipment. De¬ Group” although the Peruvians nev¬ 000), ship support equipment ($13, liveries under hemispheric defense er recognized the Military Group 000) and other spares and support concepts appear to have peaked and continued to operate under the equipment. Grant assistance was with support for antisubmarine war¬ terms of the individual mission thus down to less than one percent fare operations leading in agreements. of the Peruvian military budget. The 1959-1960 to loans to Peru of US Since 1966, when the Military absolute amount is placed in some naval vessels, including a floating Group (or three missions, depending perspective when compared to the dry dock and a destroyer. In the on to whom one talked) had 66 order in March 1970 by the Peruvi¬ mid-50s, the United States Export- members, including 32 officers, 33 an Air Force of 16 de Havilland of Import Bank had provided credit for enlisted men, and one civilian, the Canada Buffalo STOL transports for the purchase of two submarines. numbers of US military personnel development purposes at a cost of This program, however, did not ex¬ serving in advisory capacity in Peru $60 million. In FY 1970, US grant clude continuing Peruvian purchases has steadily declined. In part, this military assistance, for all of Latin of important equipment, including has been due to a general reduction America, was $21.4 million, down for example two naval cruisers ob¬ of the US military presence in Latin from the FY 1966 peak of $80.7 tained from Great Britain in 1958. America. Increasing Peruvian mili¬ million. A similar pattern held for the other tary disappointment at the failure of Behind the changes in both services. the US missions, as we shall see amounts and types of assistance lies This development of the military presently, to provide access to a story many of whose details are assistance program (MAP) brought equipment suitable for external de¬ still unclear, although its lessons about a subtle change in the US fense functions, or other services de¬ may have implications for United military missions to Peru. Previous¬ sired by the Peruvians, also con¬ States policy that far exceed either ly, US missions, like those of other tributed to the decline. By early Peru or the purely military sphere. foreign powers, were contracted on 1969, the Military Group was down Beginning under the Kennedy Ad¬ a service-to-service basis. The Peru¬ to a level of 19 officers and 19 ministration, after the Soviet Union’s vian ministries of air, navy or war enlisted men, as officers whose terms discovery of the potential autonomy (army) would separately contract of duty had expired were not re¬ of the “Third World” from the with the appropriate foreign military placed. Finally, in May 1969, after former colonial powers, and given department, often also at a service US military sales to Pern were added immediacy in Latin Ameri¬ level, for individual officers and halted by application of the Pelly ca by the rise of Cuban-inspired training services. American military Amendment after Peruvian navy guerrilla activities, the United States missions had been operating in this enforcement of 200 mile claims at adopted a military policy in support fashion in Peru since the naval mis¬ the expense of US tuna boats, the of what came to be known as “coun¬ sion of 1922. By the mid-50s, when Peruvian government requested that terinsurgency and civic action,” to 14 FOREIGN SERVICE JOURNAL, January, 1971 capable of breaking the sound barri¬ er unloaded, but which would have amply replaced the FAP’s disinte¬ grating F-80s), the US government procrastinated under Congressional pressure until it was too late to prevent the angry purchase of more expensive and sophisticated French Mirages capable of twice the speed of sound. After Peru’s elected civilian gov¬ ernment had made this purchase in provide the security for the Alliance This new emphasis unfortunately 1967, with the unanimous support for Progress. This virtual abandon¬ coincided in Peru (as in most other of Peru’s Congress, the United ment of the hemispheric defense Latin American countries) with the States, which had resumed economic doctrines in favor of new internal increasing obsolescence (and hence assistance in 1966 after freezing it in security doctrines was also partially danger and costliness) of much mili¬ 1965 over the ever-present uncer¬ based on the desire to give a new tary materiel obtained after World tainty over the status of the Interna¬ orientation to United States military War II and Korea. So long as the tional Petroleum Company, reduced policies, which had in the late 1950s United States considered itself a mil¬ economic assistance again because come under increasing attack from itary ally with an interest in hemi¬ of legislation and pressures emanat¬ American liberals critical of military spheric defense, there was the possi¬ ing from Congress. First, Peru’s dictatorships, particularly those of bility it would defray, through assist¬ elected civilian government was Generals Fulgencio Batista in Cuba ance programs, some of the expense forced to spend more than it (or its and Marcos Perez Jimenez in Vene¬ associated with the increasingly so¬ air force) wanted to spend. Then, zuela, but including also that of phisticated equipment the United Peru’s elected civilian government General Manuel Odria in Peru. States and other superpowers were was weakened by a fine from the At a programatic level, the doc¬ building for their own use (but leaders of the Alliance for Progress. trinal shift led to US support for which tended to be the only equip¬ Civilian and military leaders were mobility, communications, and “na¬ ment available, thereby forcing united in baffled resentment at a tion-building” activities designed to smaller states to either opt out or to United States policy which refused win popular support for the military escalate even if merely replacing to sell them aircraft the US was and thereby deny it to potential in¬ one aircraft with another). The shift simultaneously providing to Ethiopia surgents. In Peru, after 1961, the in the Latin American military doc¬ on a grant basis. military assistance program helped trine of the United States dashed Before exploring the implications equip four engineer battalions. AID hopes of cushioning the economic of these views, however, it seems and Export-Import Bank loan funds and political impact of military necessary to consider other aspects were also made available to pur¬ “modernization,” and seemed even of US military relations with Peru. chase road-building equipment to deny validity to the hemispheric The F-5 case suggests that consider¬ which the Department of Highways regional or other external defense ations characteristic of general Al¬ turned over to the military to oper¬ functions of the Latin American liance for Progress policy were ap¬ ate. military. Implicitly, “counterinsur¬ plied to arms sales, whether or not The United States switch from gency” doctrine also tended to this was in the long run interests of hemispheric defense concepts to the confirm the military as wardens in the United States. Did the same hold newer internal security doctrines their own societies, an aspect of true for US mission and training was also accompanied by a subtle their traditions few officers relished, activity? One of the chief sources of reversal of the United States’ implic¬ and which (at least in Peru) they Congressional concern over arma¬ it position on military expenditures. were increasingly coming to ques¬ ments was the fear that US military Under the mutual defense agree¬ tion. policies were contributing to the mil¬ ments, countries had accepted the Under these circumstances, the itarization of Latin America in di¬ responsibility of maintaining certain changed emphasis seemed to suggest units for the common defense. This to many (including both military rect contradiction of the Alliance for effectively associated the United men and anti-American radicals of Progress. States by international agreement left and right) that the United States We have already seen that diffi¬ with an obligation to maintain cer¬ sought to deny the very institutional culties of definition, accounting, and tain expenditures. The internal secu¬ being of the Latin American mili¬ secrecy, make it hard to draw an rity emphasis now was accompanied tary by making of them a special accurate picture of the specific con¬ by pressure to reduce military ex¬ political police. These suspicions tent of the military assistance pro¬ penditures to free additional funds were heightened by US delays and gram, whether in deliveries or train¬ for development purposes. Suddenly later refusals to allow acquisition of ing, and even less so in results. A liberal US congressmen in particular “sophisticated” military weapons. review of the nature and impact of pictured the Latin American mili¬ When the Peruvian air force sought the foreign training of Peruvian mil¬ tary as engaged in massively un¬ to purchase Northrup Aviation’s F-5 itary officers, for example, reveals necessary military expenditures. (a relatively cheap jet fighter barely both how little is actually known FOREIGN SERVICE JOURNAL, January, 1971 15 about the relevant details and how tablished as a result of these Peruvian military, acting under the infinitely complex any assessment of bilingual courses is a matter of pride chairman of its joint staff, installed a the effects of training must be. to both the FAP and the U5AF. It is military junta, the United States re¬ Generally speaking, it is clear difficult to assign major political im¬ fused to recognize the new govern¬ that increased professional educa¬ portance to this training effort, how¬ ment and suspended both military tion, whether within Peru or abroad, ever, other than the maintenance of and economic assistance. This act has obviously not taken the military cordial working relations between shocked many military leaders who out of politics. On the contrary, by similar components of Peruvian and believed they had acted out of pro¬ promoting self-confidence and inter¬ American society. gressive and nationalist sentiments national awareness, training may ac¬ During approximately the same essentially in harmony with the social tually increase the military’s desire period, from 1947 to 1967, some and economic reform goals of the and capacity for political participa¬ 324 Peruvian officers, 80 percent of Alliance for Progress. In fact, given tion. Incomplete quantitative data them lieutenants or captains, attend¬ their own constitutional mandate “to suggest that the more highly trained ed courses at the United States guarantee the fulfillment of the con¬ officers are, the more likely they are Army School for Latin America at stitution and the laws” (Art. 213, both to attain the top ranks and to Fort Gulick on the other side of the Constitution of 1933) most officers participate in politics. Isthmus of Panama. Initially, course were probably no more ethnocentric Of the army general officers serv¬ offerings appear to have been stand¬ in their belief that they acted dem¬ ing in Peru in the period from 1960 ard World War II type weapons ocratically than were the Americans to 1965, some 49 percent had re¬ and logistics courses. From the early who criticized them for not living up ceived foreign training of some ’60s on they centered increasingly to the precepts of the United States kind. This training had varied from on unconventional warfare oper¬ Constitution. brief orientation sessions in the ations and communications, subjects Peruvian military criticism of the Canal Zone to attendance at techni¬ which were also taught to some 127 United States tends, nonetheless, to cal courses of some months’ duration enlisted specialists from Peru in the be more realistic on most issues than in the United States to etages of up 1964-67 period. Not until the 1980s that of many civilians. Most Peruvi¬ to two years “on assignment” with a will significant numbers of the junior an officers know too much through unit in the French army before officers taking Canal Zone courses their visits and training to harbor World War II. occupy senior command positions in many illusions about the extent of By comparison with previous the Peruvian Army. By 1990, how¬ American power. Officers may not, periods, the 1960s saw the rise to ever, about one field grade officer in however, be as sophisticated about numerical predominance of general three may have had at least a cadet economic relations with the United officers whose training had taken orientation from the United States. States as success in the rather cos¬ place in the United States as com¬ Seen against the background of mopolitan world of international pared to France. Of those who had substantial and improving Peruvian finance may require. Past US policy studied abroad, often in more than military educations, the assessment reversals under pressure, particular¬ one country, 75 percent had done so of the impact of this American ly after the 1962 coup, may have in the United States, 30 percent in training would suggest that it is rela¬ convinced some Peruvian military France and 10 percent in other tively marginal on most matters of leaders (possibly erroneously) that countries, principally Italy, Britain day-to-day behavior, and that its the United States will change its and Belgium. Although the absolute effects must be sought at the level of policies, and even ignore US legisla¬ numbers were larger, on a relative technical skills and general values tion, like the Hickenlooper Amend¬ basis, foreign-trained officers were rather than in support of specific US ment, if challenged firmly enough. fewer in the 1960-65 period than policies or operations. Relations between the United previously. In 1940, for example, 8 If any broad generalizations can States and Peru since the 1968 coup out of Peru’s 9 army general officers be made on the basis of individual can be described as on the whole had received training in France and conversations, they would include cool, but with varying degrees of even in 1950 three-fourths of army the likelihood that in addition to hostility kept generally under con¬ general officers had received foreign supplemental competence in the trol. The recognition of the Soviet training compared to but one-half in specific (generally technical) sub¬ Union was a clear demonstration of the 1960s. ject matter studied, the officers de¬ a desire to assert Peruvian independ¬ Actual numbers for individual velop more realistic assessments ence of the United States. The ex¬ students and types of training are (negative as well as positive) of the pulsion in May 1969 of the United difficult to obtain in global terms United States than if they had never States military missions from Peru except from individual installations. been exposed. Indeed, US training, was primarily an attempt to retaliate The single largest block I know of is while often producing admiration for politically for suspension of US mili¬ made up of 562 Peruvian Air Force many things American, is more likely tary sales under the Pelly Act, but (FAP) enlisted specialists (not to produce critics than supporters of was also a sign of the prior deterio¬ officers) trained in the 20 years specific US policies toward Latin ration of military relations between from 1950-1969 in aircraft mainte¬ America. the two countries. This deteriora¬ nance and related skills at the Inter- Such mixed emotions have been tion, it seems clear, was probably American Air Force Academy at more common than not among more the result of political consider¬ Albrook Air Force Base, Canal Peruvian officers since at least the ations, (IPC, 200-miles, etc.), than Zone. The technical proficiency es- early 1960s. In 1962, when the (Continued on page 46) 16 FOREIGN- SERVICE JOURNAL., January, 1971 What role did African armies play in nation-building and state-building before seizure of control became widespread? The Roots and Implications of Military Intervention IOLITICAL violence is no stranger CLAUDE E. WELCH, JR. disobedience, or other techniques of to Africa. One scholar recently esti¬ This is excerpted from the chapter political violence, in most cases. Al¬ mated that 300 to 400 acts of politi¬ of the same title in the book ‘‘Sol¬ geria provided the exception, and cal violence occurred in the sub- dier and State in Africa," edited by the tensions born of revolution Saharan region from 1946 to 1964. Claude E. Welch, Jr., published by greatly disrupted post-independence Northwestern University Press, In few of these, however, were Afri¬ 1970. Reprinted by permission. political change. can soldiers the direct initiators. The Copyright © 1970 by Northwest¬ As a result of the peaceful trans¬ “man on horseback” familiar to stu¬ ern University Press. fer of power, pressed by nationalist dents of Latin American history or movements, African leaders tended the military president common in to ascribe extraordinary powers of Middle Eastern history did not social, economic, and political trans¬ play any significant role in African formation to political parties. They states in the 18 years after World were to function as “mobilization War II. It seemed as though the new systems,” recreating African society countries of post-colonial Africa and its economic underpinnings would escape the dreary round of along new lines. The political king¬ coup and counter-coup typical of dom offered the key to further ad¬ Latin America, the Middle East, vance, for “all things shall be added and Southeast Asia. Such, at least, to it,” according to the slogan popu¬ was the hope. larized by Kwame Nkrumah. In Students of African political Most African states gained inde¬ such a setting the military appeared change almost totally neglected the pendence through constitutional ne¬ unessential, perhaps irrelevant. role of the military until the upris¬ gotiation, through pressure exerted However, the failure of political ings noted earlier made the omission by party leaders against colonial parties to achieve their objectives of distressingly obvious. Writings on powers relatively willing to with¬ change and to maintain widespread African armies were practically non¬ draw. Self-government did not come popular enthusiasm helped prepare existent. The armed forces were not through military action. Tropical Af¬ the way for army intervention. considered to have the potential to rica (leaving aside the territories Broadly speaking, African lead¬ become a meaningful independent still under Portuguese control) had ers confronted two major post-inde¬ political force. Major emphasis no Bolivar, San Martin, or Ho Chi pendence challenges, nation-build¬ rested, rather, upon “charismatic Minh. The so-called “African revo¬ ing and state-building. Nation¬ leadership,” “institutional political lution” thus differed from many oth¬ building required the inculcation of transfer,” “mass parties,” and simi¬ er great political changes: hegemony political loyalties to the system as a lar slogans used by political scien¬ was handed over without large-scale whole, transcending the bounds of tists. civilian uprisings, campaigns of civil kinship, language, and locale. “The FOREIGN SERVICE JOURNAL, January, 1971 17 African nationalist,” Rupert Emer¬ the coups d’etat does not do justice the military leaders has been na¬ son wrote in 1960, “still has before to the unique combinations of cir¬ tional reconstruction.” Though word¬ him almost the entire task of cumstances. Rather than search for ing varies, the import remains creating the nations in whose name a sole cause, we must examine a identical: Politicians have failed to he professes to speak.” National series of factors, the salience of resolve the fundamental economic, unity became the “supreme value whose components differs from one political, and social problems con¬ and goal.” Since political parties had African state to another. fronting the state; only a transitional demonstrated their efficacy in the Significant factors that helped period of military rule can purge the achievement of independence, why promote military intervention may political system of its inadequacies. not continue to rely upon them in be summarized in this form: And, of course, only a period of military rule can restore the profes¬ the post-independence reforging of 1. Declining prestige of the ma¬ sional autonomy of the armed forc¬ society? The task of state-building jor political party, as exem¬ es. involved a distinct series of chal¬ plified by lenges. Here, emphasis rested upon a. increased reliance upon Rhetoric must not be confused efficient administration, economic de¬ force to achieve compli¬ with probability of action, however. velopment, further specialization ance, The promises of renovation and re¬ and expansion of the civil service— b. a stress upon unanimity in building may prove hollow. Can a not upon fealty to the major politi¬ the face of centrifugal for¬ military-based government cope any cal leader or mobilization of popular ces, and more successfully with the difficul¬ enthusiasm within a political party c. a consequent denial of ties which civilian regimes encoun¬ framework. Nation-building ap¬ effective political choice. tered? Are some of these problems peared to rest largely upon the po¬ 2. Schism among prominent po¬ susceptible to solution by means litical party, state-building upon the liticians, thus weakening the congenial to the governing military bureaucracy. broadly based nationalist junta, in ways that escaped the What role did African armies movement that had hastened preceding civilian regime? What are play in nation-building and state¬ the departure of the former the ways in which a military back¬ building before seizure of control colonial power. ground might contribute to nation¬ became widespread? The answer is 3. Lessened likelihood of exter¬ building and to state-building? simple. They usually remained on nal intervention in the event To answer these complex ques¬ the sidelines. African leaders de¬ of military uprising. tions, we must examine the process pended upon parties and adminis¬ 4. “Contagion” from seizures of political change—its directions, trative hierarchies, not upon the of control by the military in its causes, its implications. Using a relatively small forces inherited from other African countries. threefold definition of political de¬ the departed colonial power. 5. Domestic social antagonisms, velopment (“purposeful political Resentment against colonial rule most obviously manifested in change in certain directions”), I was thus channeled through political countries where a minority shall consider how military rule parties, not through military upris¬ group exercised control (e.g., could theoretically contribute to po¬ ings. Wishful thinking may also have the Arabs in Zanzibar, the litical development, then illustrate contributed to the lack of attention. Watusi in Burundi). how the difficulty of building politi¬ No doubt many scholars hoped Afri¬ 6. Economic malaise, leading, to cal legitimacy complicates the tasks ca might avoid, in its political “austerity” policies most of military-based governments. change, the vicious cycle of coup affecting articulate, urbanized The constituent elements of politi¬ and counter-coup that earlier had sectors of the population cal development have been subject rocked Latin America, the Middle (members of labor unions, to heated debate among scholars. East, and Southeast Asia. What they civil servants). Three major aspects recur in most forgot for the moment was the 7. Corruption and inefficiency of definitions: lesson expressed by Thomas Hob¬ government and party offi¬ 1. An increased centralization of bes: Politics resembles a game of cials, a corruption especial¬ power in the state, coupled cards; hence, players must agree ly noticeable under conditions with the weakening of tradi¬ upon trumps. In politics, if no other of economic decline. tional sources of authority. card is agreed upon, clubs become 8. Heightened awareness within 2. The differentiation and spe¬ trumps. Such was the case in tropi¬ the army of its power to influ¬ cialization of political institu¬ cal Africa in the mid-1960s. ence or displace political lead¬ tions. ers. The military seizures of control 3. Increased popular participa¬ that rocked the sub-Saharan area Once civilian governments have tion in politics, and greater from mid-1965 on cannot be at¬ been ousted, the leaders of military identification with the politi¬ tributed to a single factor. The com¬ intervention seek to justify their sei¬ cal system as a whole. plexity of events belies simple, uni- zure of control. To “prove” that causal analysis. Many political sys¬ installation of an army regime was As organizations, armed forces tems were involved, each with dis¬ necessary is a first order of business. are characterized by centralization, tinct heritages and problems. To as¬ But the newly installed rulers must discipline, hierarchy, communica¬ sume that “popular discontent” or go a step further, and proclaim their tion, and esprit de corps. To func¬ “economic stagnation” or “neocolo¬ goals for the country. Possibly the tion effectively, they require a clear¬ nialist interference” brought about most important theme sounded by ly defined chain of command, with 18 FOREIGN SERVICE JOURNAL, January, 1971 ular structures (institutions) for their accomplishment. Clearly, the armed services epitomize such dif¬ ferentiation of function and speciali¬ zation of structure. The high degree of specialization within the armed services contrasts not only with the “fused” traditional social setting, but also with other “modern” groups. Few political par¬ ties in Africa, for example, can match the centralization, discipline, hierarchy, esprit de corps, and speed of communications manifested by even the smallest professional ar¬ mies on that continent. Many commentators on the role adequate communications to ensure nificantly; should intervention occur, of the military in developing coun¬ that orders are carried out, and with the leaders of the coup will attempt tries have focused upon the impact means of disciplinary control. Effec¬ to convert their power into authori¬ of army training upon both officers tive military organization, almost by ty. Their prospects for success de¬ and recruits. It stands to reason that definition, demands a high degree of pend upon developing political insti¬ extended military service, under cer¬ centralization. tutions with a capacity for effective tain conditions, will weaken an indi¬ In organizational terms, thus, the change—a point to which we shall vidual’s primary identification with armed forces appear to be a para¬ return. his village, region, and ethnic group. gon of a “modernized” political sys¬ Weakening of traditional sources Author Morris Janowitz speaks of tem. of authority does not necessarily re¬ the military offering training for Such an appearance is deceiving, sult from centralization of govern¬ technical and administrative skills, however, unless one realizes that ment functions. To replace tradition¬ as well as basic literacy and citizen¬ centralization is effective only if the al, religious, familial, and ethnic po¬ ship. Authors Daniel Lerner and right of the central entity to rule is litical authorities by a single, secu¬ Richard D. Robinson note that the widely accepted. Authority may be lar, national political authority obvi¬ Turkish army became “a major defined as the acceptance of certain ously requires time, favorable condi¬ agency of social change” precisely individuals or offices as possessing a tions, communications based upon because it spread among Turkish legitimate right to leadership. The similar values and a growth in mu¬ rural youth “a new sense of [nation¬ exercise of authority presupposes “a tual confidence. In the absence of al] identity—and new skills and community of opinions, values and favorable conditions, attempts at concepts as well as new machines.” beliefs, as well as of interests and centralization may touch off major But do these observations apply with needs,” as author Carl J. Frederich Countervailing forces. Tensions may equal force to tropical Africa? says. Applied to the context of mili¬ be exacerbated; would-be centrali¬ To answer this question, we must tary intervention in politics, the zation can bring disintegration. distinguish between the overall orga¬ question of authority centers on the To put the matter simply, the nization of the armed services and act of seizing control: Is this regard¬ “modern” organizational character¬ the effect upon individuals of ex¬ ed as usurpation, or as a rightful istics of the armed forces— perience within them. The armies of act? In other words, by their ousting centralization, discipline, hierarchy, tropical Africa are small and rela¬ of the civilian government, do the communications, and esprit de tively simple in organization. Con¬ armed forces become the legitimate corps—may readily break down un¬ trasted with the large, complex wielders of authority? Can the mili¬ der the stresses of military interven¬ standing armies of many states of tary develop the “community of tion. Clearest evidence for this col¬ Southeast Asia, Latin America, or opinions, values and beliefs, as well lapse comes from what may be the Middle East, the armed forces of as of interests and needs” that con¬ deemed “second-stage” coups d’etat, sub-Saharan Africa currently exist stitutes authority? in which junior officers turn against at a completely different order of For a tentative answer, let us turn those senior officers who previously magnitude. Taking eastern, western, briefly to Hobbes’s analogy between had seized political control. Three central, and black-ruled southern Af¬ politics and a game of cards. In such coups in West Africa rica together, only two states (Con- both, Hobbes suggested, the partici¬ manifested the collapse of effective go-Kinshasa and Ethiopia) had ar¬ pants must agree upon what consti¬ military discipline. mies larger than 19,000 in 1966— tutes legitimate power—what is au¬ In a traditional setting the many and both countries had received ex¬ thority, which cards are trumps. If functions carried out within a society tensive external assistance to build no card is agreed upon, then clubs— may be “fused,” in author Fred W. these forces. . . Putting the matter in force of arms—become trumps. Riggs’s phrase. A modern setting, on another way, the ratio of military to Where confusion prevails over the the other hand, is characterized by civilian population in tropical Africa source of authority, the possibility of differentiation among these func¬ is about 1 per 1,131—compared to military intervention increases sig¬ tions and the development of partic¬ 15 per thousand in the United FOREIGN SERVICE JOURNAL, January, 1971 19 States, 10 for the United Kingdom and other unpopular politicans relations with civilian political and the Middle East, and 5 for the would appear to indicate widespread groups. There are no other paths Maghreb states. Further, African approbation for various coups. toward political development. Mili¬ armed forces consist almost entirely Harlley, Kotoka, and their cohorts tary governments will confront the of infantry. The few specialized profited from “popular exhaustion same problems of ethnicity and units (air forces, paratroop units, and tacit or active support for the economic stagnation that confronted navies) are highly dependent on dismantling of sclerosed political in¬ civilian governments. The central¬ foreign military assistance and train¬ stitutions,” the AFRICAN RESEARCH ized authority and functional spe¬ ing, if not on expatriate personnel. BULLETIN said. By removing venal cialization of armies may promote intervention, but they do not en¬ It has frequently been stressed and autocratic rulers—whether by incarceration, assassination, or exile hance the possibilities for effective that African states are riven with governance based upon legitimate differences arising from conflicting —the military rulers emphasized the governmental strength. The military “primordial sentiments.” As the sub¬ break with the past. Political parties rulers of Africa often lack bargain¬ title of a recent book inquired, were banned, on the basis of the ing skills. Their impatience with pol¬ should Nigeria be considered in corruption and authoritarianism of iticians—their “politics of wanting terms of tribes, people, or race? The their previous leaders. One may ask, however, whether this distaste to be above politics” as author Mor¬ fact is often expressed in the antino¬ ris Janowitz says—leads them to my of “tribalism” and “national¬ for politicians and support for the military will persist for more than a distrust the slow, difficult process of ism”—admittedly inadequate and coalition-building. Having banned possibly misleading terms to charac¬ few months. political parties, and likely lacking terize complex phenomena. More No groups of rulers can long base the abilities to build parties afresh, appropriately, one should say that their claims for legitimacy on acri¬ the African military may well not ethnic loyalties for most Africans mony and memory of previous in¬ justices. If the new military gover¬ promote political development. They are not yet fully complemented by cannot build legitimate political in¬ identification with the country as a nors of African countries intend to stitutions through the use of force; whole: Aizo, Fon, or Bariba rather remain in power for an extended they cannot transplant their organi¬ than Dahomey; Bamileke, Bassa, or period they must seek to build the zational style to the civilian realm; Bulu rather than Cameroon. Recog¬ capacity of governing institutions, in they are not equipped to bring sta¬ nizing the limited extent of “nation¬ terms both of legitimate organiza¬ bility, modernization, or political al” loyalties, or, in somewhat differ¬ tional strength and skillful use of resources. There are three interlock¬ participation; and they lack suffici¬ ent terms, the low level of national ent flexibility and innovativeness to political integration, African politi¬ ing ways that African military rulers might seek to achieve legitimacy: govern effectively. Indeed, once cal leaders have often viewed the (1) gain or create social and politi¬ members of the armed services rec¬ state, or a dominant party, as the ognize their inherent limitations in “architect” of the nation. cal basis for support; (2) avoid recourse to excessive use of force; governing, the prospects for a return Obviously, it would be preposter¬ 3) build effectiveness over an ex¬ to civilian rule brighten. ous to assert that nationalism as a tended period. factor underlying political authority It is notoriously easier for the Given the contemporary charac¬ armed forces to seize control than to in African states cannot be en¬ teristics of both African states and hanced. The major question, rather, give it up. Having taken the reins their military establishments, none of power in order to bring certain is whether African governments un¬ of these means will likely bring der military auspices will have changes—an end to political med¬ about legitimacy. dling in military affairs; a govern¬ greater likelihood than their civilian To rule effectively, having once predecessors in developing national¬ ment freed from corruption; an op¬ achieved power, military leaders portunity for wider political choice— ism as a basic support for political must develop political organizations authority. the ruling officers may be reluctant of civilian types, or work out viable to return to the barracks without The answer, simply, is No. The strong assurance the civilian regime copious literature on integration will not revert to its previous ways. generally argues that nation-building requires extended time and favor¬ Military withdrawal from political able conditions. As a process, na¬ involvement, in simplest terms, tion-building cannot be unduly hur¬ comes about in two ways. First, gov¬ ried. Ethnic and cultural divisions ernance leads to division within the appear remarkably durable, be they armed forces. Torn between a pro¬ in Belgium or in Congo-Kinshasa, in fessional ethic that respects civilian the United States or in Nigeria. supremacy and a desire to protect Granted that the ethnic divisions professional autonomy by forestal¬ of African states impede the growth ling political interference, officers of political legitimacy based upon may fall into two camps, those who nationalism, are there other bases on would carry forth the duties of the which military-dominated govern¬ armed services by eschewing direct ments might seek to achieve legiti¬ political involvement, and those who macy? The jubilation that accom¬ would retain military autonomy by panied the overthrow of Nkrumah precluding significant civilian con- 20 FOREIGN SERVICE JOURNAL,, January, 971 trol. As this split is resolved, so is techniques—a concern, as noted for the president prescribed by the the extent of military involvement in previously, with “state-building.” constitution. Mobutu thus appears to politics. When the advocates of The organizational structure of the be attempting to make a personal withdrawal gain the upper hand, civil service accords with the organi¬ transition from military hero to withdrawal may occur. Second, over zational structure of the armed for¬ charismatic president—a tortuous time, a military-dominated govern¬ ces: both are bureaucracies. Similar¬ transition that cannot, in and of ment may so transform itself as to ity of outlook thus makes alliance itself, protect Congo-Kinshasa from become practically indistinguishable easy. A close working relationship dissension within the ranks, popular from a civilian regime. with the civil service has the further discontent, and the other difficulties To chronicle the transformation advantage, for the officers, of bring¬ officers face in confronting political of a military-dominated government ing in a relatively uncorrupt group responsibilities. into a civilian-controlled govern¬ long overshadowed by politicians. The main obstacle to conscious ment would take us outside Africa. Government employees threatened civilianization—like the major barri¬ As noted earlier in this chapter, by party machinations have, in er to voluntary withdrawal—lies in intervention in the political life of many African states, furnished tensions and rivalries internal to the African states has occurred relative¬ strong support to newly installed armed forces. Coup begets counter¬ ly recently, for the history of these military juntas. What more suitable coup. The meteoric rise of a lieu¬ countries as independent entities pact than between groups that tenant colonel to unchallenged mili¬ covers, in most cases, scarcely a chafed under the inept control of tary and political power does not decade. Conscious civilianization, venal politicians? pass unnoticed. Those who seize con¬ contrasted with voluntary with¬ At a different level, the ruling trol risk arousing jealousies, there¬ drawal, takes place over an extend¬ officers may ally themselves with by becoming victims of the whirl¬ ed period of time. Although recent traditional chiefs, particularly in lo¬ wind they unleashed. Legitimacy African history offers no instances of cal governance. The chiefs represent once broken, cannot readily be re¬ this subtle shift to “civilian” control, a mixed blessing, for the support stored. in which generals become presidents they command in rural areas must Civilian replacement of military- and base then authority upon public be weighed against the antipathy dominated governments thus de¬ support rather than force of arms, they arouse in some urban areas. pends ultimately upon the attitudes the modalities of such a change Lacking from this constellation of of influential members of the armed must be examined. forces, however, are highly signifi¬ services. The military must choose The starting point for this process cant social groups, notably trade to go, or they must choose to stay, is the establishment of close ties be¬ unionists. As the turbulent history of with its attendant risks. They are the tween civilians and military leaders Dahomey illustrates, such groups ultimate arbiters of the nature and following the seizure of control. The must not be disregarded in the civili¬ pace of a return to civlian rule. extent of civilian participation in a anization of the regime. Without There are certain advantages po¬ military-dominated government ad¬ meaningful participation, they may litical leaders in Africa may use to mits of many degrees. The spectrum turn to active opposition. It is simple their benefit in staving off military ranges from complete army control, for officers to seize control, difficult intervention, even where the scope in which all key governmental posts to withdraw. for such intervention may be very are occupied by officers, to behind- If they are to go, members of the great. First, the current international the-scenes manipulation, in which military must distinguish between climate of opinion, of which heads figurehead politicians carry out their the areas of civilian supremacy and of state in Africa (and, hopefully, activities under military surveil¬ professional autonomy. Members of their chiefs of staff!) are acutely lance. Most African states currently the ruling military junta may divest aware, condemns naked seizures of under military control fall near the themselves of their soldierly regalia power and denial of democratic pro¬ center of this spectrum. Officers and demeanor, to become full- cesses. must make alliances with civilians to fledged civilians. At this point in time, African exercise and maintain control. When Probably the closest imitator of armies are proportionately the smal¬ an army as minuscule as that of Ataturk’s actions in tropical Africa lest in the world. The peaceful as¬ Sierra Leone only (0.06 per cent of now is General Joseph Mobutu. sumption of independence by Afri¬ the total population) takes power, it Since seizing control in November, can countries, unlike the armed sei¬ can fill only a few top administrative 1965, Mobutu has engaged in a zure of independence that character¬ posts with officers, without risking subtle effort to draw the nationalist, ized Latin America, did not en¬ diluting its energies or neglecting Lumumbist mantle to himself. He shrine the military as the corner¬ army command functions. The rul¬ has announced his intention of lead¬ stone of significant political change. ing junta must exercise its would-be ing a “revolutionary” mass political Would-be parallels drawn from Lat¬ power through civilians, whether movement. A draft constitution ap¬ in America or the Middle East, by civil servants, traditional chiefs, or proved in June, 1967, stipulated omitting the differing circumstances some other group. Alliances are parliamentary elections in 1968 and of independence and the interna¬ both natural and necessary. a presidential election at the end of tional context, are as likely to Civil servants and officers may 1970. Several observers have point¬ mislead as to illuminate. share an instrumental outlook, a be¬ ed out that timing of this election Yet the danger remains that the lief that society can be altered by would allow Mobutu to reach the coup d’etat or similar wielding of application of certain administrative ripe age of 40, the minimum age (Continued on page 48) FOREIGN SERVICE JOURNAL, January, 1971 21 Do we really need our military academies? Or do we just have them because we have them and because other countries have them? Should we Eliminate or Merge our Military Academies? of our attitude there will not be any IN a time of rising domestic anti- EDWARD BERNARD GL1CK public hearings during the inquiry of militarism, there is surprisingly little Copyright © Edward Bernard this committee. civilian, and especially college, criti¬ Click, 1971. Dr. Glick is professor of political cism of America’s military academ¬ science at Temple University in By contrast, the military critics of ies. Perhaps after using so much Philadelphia, where he specializes the military academies have been energy against ROTC and on- in the politics of national defense far less generous and solicitous. campus military recruiters, profes¬ and Latin American affairs. He has also taught at the University Well over a century ago, General sors and students have little left to of Florida, City College of New John A. (“Black Jack”) Logan, who direct against Annapolis, Colorado York, Hunter College, School of was one of the North’s few volunteer Springs, and West Point, where International Service at American general officers in the Civil War, some of our highest uniformed de¬ University, George Washington University and as a visiting pro¬ had this to say about the United fense officials come from. fessor at the Hebrew University in States Military Academy and its There is something even more Jerusalem. products: surprising. When Americans criticize Adapted from Prof. Glick's forthcoming book, “Soldiers, West Point has for years, taken posses¬ their military academies, the harsh¬ Scholars and Society” to be pub¬ est critics are usually military men lished soon by Goodyear Publish¬ sion of the military interests of the —many of them academy alumni— ing Company. The research for Government and has conducted those and not civilians. For example, in this article was made possible by interests as the sole property of the a grant from Temple University. 1968 a Special Subcommittee on select circle which by the decrees of West Point has been constituted the Service Academies reported to its committee are men who have served only true exponent of the art of war parent body, the House Armed upon the American continent. Services Committee: “On the basis a long time in the service, who have been dedicated to the best interests of this careful review, the subcom¬ The Air Force Academy, the na¬ mittee is pleased to report that in of the military, and who have proven themselves time and time tion’s newest one, got one of its its considered judgment the three biggest blasts from Lieutenant Colo¬ service academies are being op¬ again the best friends a man in uniform had”; or nel Charles Konigsburg in a letter he erated and administered in com¬ wrote in 1967 to Representative F. plete accordance with existing law Edward Hebert, chairman of the and are fulfilling, in a satisfactory Now, may I say this, and just in a brief capsule form, that our objective Special Subcommittee on Service manner, the mission assigned them —we are not coming to the Academy, Academies. In his letter the colonel by the Congress.” The Subcommit¬ the Naval Academy, as well as the charged, among other things: tee’s report of nearly a thousand other two sister Academies, with a “First, ... no young man, however pages is replete with such reassur¬ chip on our shoulder. We are coming capable and intelligent, can handle ances to the testifying military per¬ in the most cooperative spirit we can the total academy program in the sonnel as: “I am not asking these muster. We both want to attain the proper manner and spirit. . . . questions in any unfriendly sense same goal. We want to know exactly whatsoever”; or “Because on this what is going on. And as an indication (Continued on page 31) 22 FOREIGN SERVICE JOURNAL, January, 1971 AFSA’s Chairman Resigns The 1971 Harriman, Rivkin and Herter Awards Charles W. Bray, III, Chairman of The Awards Committee of the The Christian A. Herter Award (for the AFSA Board of Directors, an¬ American Foreign Service Associa¬ senior officers—FSO/FSR-1 and 2 nounced on December 15 that pres¬ tion is happy to announce the 1971 or equivalent, with the exception of sure of work made it necessary for Awards Program. The intent of the officers now holding appointments him to step down from his post. program is to give service-wide rec¬ as Chiefs of Mission). William C. Harrop, Vice Chairman, ognition to individuals displaying Submission of Nomination will move up to the chairmanship. courage in all its dimensions, inde¬ pendence of spirit and service dedi¬ AFSA is now engaged in a host of The Harriman, Rivkin and Herter cation— qualities manifested in important activities: our "openness” Awards should not be regarded as such abundance by Ambassadors super-efficiency reports designed to campaign to build improved commu¬ Flarriman and Rivkin and Secretary nication links among Americans in¬ recognize a conventional perform¬ Fferter. The awards will be granted ance no matter how outstanding. terested in foreign affairs; personnel in recognition of extraordinary ac¬ The three awards are made to iden¬ and management reform; improve¬ complishment involving initiative, tify and reward the special qualities ment of the working conditions of integrity, intellectual courage, and and special achievements noted our membership; resolution of the creative dissent. above. labor / management question, to The Flarriman, Rivkin and Herter Two copies of each nomination, name a few. It has become extreme¬ Awards are open to State, AID, USIA unbound on regular size paper, ly difficult for the Board of Directors and Peace Corps Foreign Service marking each page with the name of to do the job AFSA requires on a personnel, FSO, FSIO, FSR, FSSO, the nominee and numbering each moonlighting basis. Charlie Bray whether serving abroad or in the page, should be forwarded to: took a year of leave without pay in United States—and in the case of American Foreign Service 1968-69 to work at the Association. the Flarriman Award, to Civil Service Association Bill Flarrop will also spend the next employees as well. Each award will Awards Committee year on leave without pay to work carry a $1,000 prize. 2101 E Street, N.W. full time for AFSA. The Judges Committee of the Washington, D. C. 02037 Charlie Bray’s contributions to the AFSA will consider nominations for American Foreign Service Associa¬ the Flarriman and Flerter Awards. A in time to be received by February tion over the past four years cannot separate committee has been estab¬ 28, 1971. be measured in terms of reference lished by the William R. Rivkin Fund The format for nominations is as to consider nominations for the Riv¬ available to associations. Under his follows: kin Award. The Awards Committee inspirational leadership, and that of PART I: Biographic Data Lannon Walker, AFSA became the of AFSA will act as the secretariat for the two Committees of Judges. NAME motor force behind reform of the BIRTHDATE State Department. Fie has led AFSA Nominations for all three awards may be made by any officer in sup¬ GRADE to play a central, constructive role AGENCY in the community of national organi¬ port of any other officer in any of the eligible categories. Because of the zations interested in American for¬ PART II: Association with Candidate special nature of these awards, we eign affairs. Fie has built AFSA into (Strictly limit to 250 words) would like to point out that peers an effective and vigorous advocate and subordinates of deserving indi¬ PART III: Justification for Nomina¬ of the welfare and pocketbook inter¬ viduals may be in the most favor¬ tion (Strictly limit to 500-750 ests of its members. Charlie has em¬ able position to observe achieve¬ words) Summary of specific rea¬ phasized that there are no philo¬ ments of special merit. sons for nomination. The narra¬ sophical or policy differences under¬ Nominations are solicited for tive should discuss lying his resignation. The problem is each of the following: a. Qualities of mind and spirit simply time. The W. Averell Flarriman Award which qualify the nominee for The Association is deeply indebt¬ (for junior officers—no higher than the award. ed to Charlie Bray. Fortunately, he FSO-6 or equivalent. Civil Service b. Examples of the candidates’ will continue to be available to as¬ employees are included). accomplishments, particularly sist with AFSA programs and the The William R. Rivkin Award (for evidence of outstanding initia¬ Board will continue to draw upon mid-career officers—FSO-5, 0-4, 0-3 tive, integrity, and intellectual his experience and fine judgment. or equivalent). courage. SCHOLARSHIP WINNERS Gregory Joseph Gonzalez; Embassy Lawrence Francis McAuliffe; Ameri¬ Wives in Quito; Fullerton Junior can Women’s Group of Bonn/Bad The following are the names of College. Godesburg; Boston College. the 1970-71 AFSA Shcolarship recip¬ Paul Raymond Gonzalez; American Mary Ellen Miller; Anne S. Burrows ients, their respective award, and the Government Ladies of Jidda; U. of Memorial; Rosary College. school they will be attending. Southern Cal. William Murray Miller; George Allen Kristie Louise Ackerman; Charles E. Kathleen Patricia Graves; Charles B. Memorial; Xavier University. Merrill Trust; U. of Santa Clara. Hosmer Memorial; Barnard Col¬ Marcia Diane Milton; Janet A. Dulles David Frederick Armstrong; New lege. Memorial; U. of Vermont. York TIMES Foundation; U. of Christy Ann Gronert; William M. Tait Elizabeth Anne Montavon; AAFSW; Pennsylvania. Memorial; Macalester College. Barat College of the Sacred Heart. Clark Richard Barrett; Maurice L. Sally Jo Gronert; William M. Awad Peter Nicholas Munsing; American Stafford Memorial; Virginia Com¬ Memorial; Ripon College. Women’s Group of Bonn/Bad monwealth U. John Pierre Hatcher; Sydney B. Red¬ Godesburg; U. of Michigan. Jeffrey Edward Barth; American Con¬ ecker Memorial; No. Carolina Robert Bernard Nolan; John F. sulate Women’s Group of Munich; State U. Buckle Memorial; Villanova U. Luther College. Marie-Claire Hatcher; Charles E. Mer¬ John Edward Ormasa; George H. de- Elsie Louis Beck; Bruce; US Inter¬ rill Trust; East Carolina U. Mange Memorial; Yale U. national College. Harrison Mark Holland; John Farar Devon O’Neill Parr; AAFSW; Mich¬ Julia Feme Beck; Bruce; Wilson Col¬ Simmons Memorial; Georgetown igan State U. lege. U. Eric Clement Patch; AAFSW; Temple William Walter Bennett, Jr.; Ameri¬ Suzanne Elizabeth Holland; James U. can Wives of Yaounde; Harvard B. Stewart Memorial; Prescott Col¬ John Cunningham Patterson; Harry College. lege. Raymond Turkel Memorial; Har¬ Anne Elizabeth Berlin; William Ben¬ Judith Diane Horner; AAFSW; Mc¬ vard U. ton Scholarship; Indiana U. Pherson College. Paul Manning Price; AAFSW; U. of Robert Matthew Berlin; William Ben¬ Lynn Marie Ivy; FS Wives in Iran; U. No. Carolina. ton Scholarship; Indiana U. of Utah. Elizabeth Kendall Ranslow; Douglas Thomas Ernest Booth; Bruce; George¬ Estrellita Jones; Charles E. Merrill W. Coster Memorial; U. of Wiscon¬ town U. Trust; Smith College. sin. Margarita Andrea Brown; Abe Kram¬ Franklin Douglas Jones; J. Alan Robin Stephanie Rick; AAFSW; Reed er Memorial; Northwestern U. Maphis Memorial; U. of Pennsyl¬ College. Patricia Elizabeth Bush; Charles E. vania. Allyn Banks Robertson; Vietnam Merrill Trust; Sacred Heart Col¬ Holly Ann Kannenburg; AAFSW; Memorial; Women’s College— lege. Westhampton College (U. of Rich¬ Duke U. Willard Linwood Chase II; AAFSW; mond). Charles McKendree Robertson; Harvard. Daniel Karp; William Benton; Duke American Consulate General Albert Gerald Ciaffone; AAFSW; Vir¬ U. Ladies Club of Frankfurt; U. of ginia Polytechnic Institute. Eileen Kelly; Walter S. Robertson Tennessee. Michael Wayne Conner; Charles E. Memorial; U. of Cal. at Santa Bar¬ Jose Angel Rodriguez, Jr.; AAFSW; Merrill Trust; Wichita State U. bara. U. of Florida. Joan Ann Cook; Bruce; Saint Mary’s Kevin Kelly; Edwin L. Smith Me¬ Andrew Leslie Roman; New York College. morial; U. of Cal. at Santa Bar¬ TIMES Foundation; New College. Catherine Marie Creane; William Ben¬ bara. Barbara Ann Rotundo; AAFSW; U. of ton; Georgetown U. Rebecca Susan Kelly; Charles E. Mer¬ Florida. Pamela Jean Eilers; Charles E. Mer¬ rill Trust; Bryn Mawr College. Diane Elizabeth Ruyle; John Foster rill Merrill Trust; U. of Maryland. Thomas Matthew Kelly; Charles W. Dulles Memorial; U. of Washing¬ Barbara Virginia Fossum; Bruce; Thayer Memorial; Southern Ore¬ ton. Northwestern U. gon College. Judith R. Sillari; AAFSW; Kirkland Rolando Rene Garces; James M. E. Francis Patrick La Rocca; American College. O’Grady Memorial; U. of Texas. Women’s Club of Berlin; Fordham Christopher Towne Smith; Julius C. Mary Anne Gawf; Wives of the Ameri¬ U. Holmes Memorial; College of can Embassy; Chatham College. Teodor Roger Lopatkiewicz; Embas¬ Marin. Brian Charles Gendreau; Oliver B. sy Wives’ Club in Mexico City; U. Whitney Smith; AAFSW; U. of Cali¬ Harriman; Foreign Service; North¬ of Virginia. fornia at Davis. western U. Lorene Elizabeth Ludy; New York Mary Joann Springer; AAFSW; U. of Gerard Joachim Gendron, Jr., TIMES Foundation; Kenyon Col¬ So. Carolina. AAFSW; Virginia Polytechnic In¬ lege. Mercedes Suzann Stirling; Margaret stitution. James Headley Maish; Benton F. Berger Memorial; U. of Arizona. David Hunt Gibbons; John Gordon Scholarship in honor of James Robert Bruce Stirling II; Charles E. Mein Memorial; U. of Southern Riddleberger; U. of Arizona. Merrill Trust; U. of Arizona. Cal. Patricia Lynn Malchow; Arthur B. Phillip Jay Stout; AAFSW; U. of Min¬ Gregory Richard Gilchrist; John Emmons Memorial; Pima Commu¬ nesota. Campbell White Memorial; Virginia nity College. Susan Deane Turner; Charles E. Mer¬ Polytechnic Institute. Kevin Leese Mannix; AAFSW; U. of rill Trust; Knox College. Stephen Wayne Gilchrist; J. F. Begg; Virginia. Elizabeth Ann Wagner; AAFSW; Key¬ Virginia Polytechnic Institute. Catherine Denise Marshall; Bruce; stone Jr. College. Carlos Richard Gonzalez; Embassy Bryn Mawr College. Andrew Blanchard Watson; given in Women’s Group, Stockholm; Ful¬ Laure Emily Mattos; Charles E. Mer¬ memory of Thomas E. Tait by an lerton Junior College. rill Trust; Brandeis University. anonymous donor; Columbia U. George William Wellde, Jr.; AAFSW; Assignment of Group Life Policies The World of Foreign Service Art Randolph-Macon College. Now Possible Our January issue features a new Daniel Collier Whitaker; AAFSW; Am¬ AFSA's Members’ Interests Com¬ form of cover art for the Journal. herst College. mittee noted an item in the New Janet Sewall, wife of John Kirk Sew- Diane Eyre White; Edward Thompson York Times regarding assignment of all, AID, long a painter and illus¬ Wailes Memorial; U. of California group life insurance, which stated trator, is now working in stained at Berkeley. that such insurance can now be glass. For the New Year, Mrs. Sewall Stevan Kelly Wolcott; AAFSW; Reed transferred to dependents, under an and the Journal offer you two Chi¬ College. IRS ruling, so that its benefits are nese gods, the god of good fortune, not taxed to an estate. This puts upper left, and the god who wards Foreign Service Day, 1970 group insurance in the same cate¬ off evil, with the hope that the gen¬ AFSA President Theodore L. Eliot, gory as the usual life insurance. The tleman at the top left will remain Jr., presided at the luncheon on transfer can be made only if the in the ascendancy for all of you. Foreign Service Day, November 19, policy and the applicable state law Mrs. Sewall has contributed an 1970, at which Ambassador James permit such assignment, including earlier cover to the Journal and her C. Dunn was awarded the Foreign all rights of changing the bene¬ work appears frequently in the Na¬ Service Cup, and Ambassador Wil¬ ficiary, surrendering the policy, bor¬ tional Geographic. Her new work is liam R. Tyler was awarded the Di¬ rowing against it, pledging it as col¬ described in a recent issue of rector General’s DACOR Cup. lateral and assigning the policy. Stained Glass magazine. The long day began in the Inter¬ The Members' Interests Commit¬ A recent exhibitor at the Foreign national Conference Area with Reg¬ tee asked the American Foreign Service Club was Helga Weisshappel istration—and coffee—at 8:30 A.M., Service Protective Association Foster. Mrs. Foster, wife of Carl D. as old friends greeted each other. whether it had developed an assign¬ Foster, VOA, is among the best Then Deputy Under Secretary Ma- ment procedure. It should be noted known painters in Iceland. She has comber, Ambassador Riddleberger as that the Protective Association is exhibited in Vienna, New York, Acting President of DACOR, and Wil¬ separate from and independent of Washington, Copenhagen, Jutland, liam C. Harrop, Vice Chairman of this Association. AFSPA replied that Bergen, Helsinki, Lubeck and Ber¬ it had been working on this problem the AFSA Board of Directors, acting lin. Mrs. Foster will be included in for many years and finally obtained on behalf of Mr. Eliot, welcomed the next edition of the reference participants to this year’s event. agreement on assignment of its group life insurance effective July work, International Directory of Arts. Mr. Macomber led off with an in¬ In January, the walls of the For¬ formal but most informative account 15, 1970. AFSA is pleased to be able to eign Service Club will be decorated of the work of the Task Force, and with the paintings of Earl J. Wilson. the general direction of their recom¬ bring this good news to the attention of its members. Those who are in¬ Mr. Wilson’s work has appeared on mendations. The panel members Journal covers in black and white and participants engaged in a spir¬ sured with the Protective Associa¬ and four-color, as well as on inside ited and interesting examination of tion and who have not received the pages over the years. A career USIA the subject. Equitable Life Assurance Society’s officer, he has served in Shanghai, Throughout the day there were rider to be attached to Group Policy panel sessions, led by ranking offi¬ No. 2962 should notify the Protec¬ Manila, Paris, Bangkok, Mexico City, cers of the Department, on Africa, tive Association, c/o Department of Hong Kong, Madrid and Kuala Lum¬ Inter-American Affairs, the United State or Suite 1305, 1750 Penn¬ pur. He is now on the faculty of the Nations, East Asia, the Near East, sylvania Ave., N.W., Washington, National War College. An exhibit of and Europe. In the plenary session, D.C. 20006. Careful reading of the his batiks was shown at the FDIC the hard-pressed moderators en¬ certificate is recommended. Building this fall. deavored to summarize the day’s discussions and principle reactions. At 6:00 P.M., Secretary and Mrs. Rogers were hosts for all partici¬ pants in the Diplomatic Functions Area. At 8:00 P.M. the hardy ones went to the West Auditorium to hear Assistant Secretary De Palma give the first DACOR lecture of the sea¬ son. To no one’s surprise, he dis¬ cussed the United Nations! It was a full but rewarding day. Its success was, in large measure, the result of the tremendous work done by a large number of people in several areas of the Department— including the Office of Public Serv¬ ices, Visual Services, General Serv¬ ices, and the office of the Director General. The staffs of AFSA and DACOR contributed their time and energies in numerous ways to ensure that their members, as well as oth¬ ers, had an enjoyable and instruc¬ Ambassador William R. Tyler receives the Director’s General's DACOR Cup from tive day. Ambassador James C. Riddleberger on Foreign Service Day, November 19. INCOME TAX TIPS Limitations 1. Distance: The move must be a minimum of 50 miles for costs to be New Legislation lowing list of typical examples of deductible moving expenses in for¬ deductible. Tax legislation effective January eign service transfers has been 2. Dollar maximum: There is a 1, 1970 has expanded tax deduc¬ cleared by the Internal Revenue $2,500 limitation on deductions al¬ tions for out-of-pocket moving ex¬ Service. lowed for indirect costs, including penses resulting from job transfers. 1. New employees coming to premove house hunting trips, 30 Most foreign service employees of Washington on first assignment can days temporary living expenses, and State, AID, and USIA who trans¬ deduct the first 30 days of tempo¬ disposing of and acquiring houses ferred to or from overseas locations, rary lodging, including meals, for and leases. Within this limitation, or within the US during 1970 should the entire family. expenses for house hunting trips be able to benefit from these new 2. Temporary lodging allowances and temporary living expenses may deductions. A special advantage of cover hotel costs for the first 90 not account for more than $1,000. moving expense tax deductions is days after arrival at each overseas There is no limitation on deductions that you can take them even if you post, but not meals, which are de¬ for direct costs, including expenses normally take the standard deduc¬ ductible for the first 30 days. (If of transporting effects above weight tion in lieu of itemizing. Moving ex¬ your family has three or more per¬ allowances, and hotel and meal ex¬ pense deductions are subtracted di¬ sons you are eligible for the supple¬ penses while in transit which are rectly from your gross income and mentary Post Allowance while in not completely covered by per diem do not preclude taking the standard temporary lodging. Since this allow¬ payments. deduction also. ance is for meals, reduce your ini¬ 3. Time: In order to be eligible tial 30-day meal cost deduction ac¬ for these deductions, you are re¬ What costs are deductible? cordingly if you are granted this al¬ quired to be a full time employee for at least 39 weeks during the 12- Out-of-pocket expenses related to lowance.) month period immediately after your the following costs of moving to a 3. Household effects are subject new job location, either on transfer to maximum weight allowances. Ex¬ arrival in the new location. If you or to take new employment, are de¬ cess costs paid out-of-pocket are de¬ are planning voluntary retirement or resignation within 39 weeks of ar¬ ductible. ductible. rival at the new location, the moving Direct costs: Moving yourself, fam¬ 4. Unreimbursed car shipments expense deductions may not be ily, car, household effects and per¬ are deductible. If you shipped a for¬ taken. However, if departure in less sonal belongings to the new loca¬ eign car in 1970 (before the ban than 39 weeks is unexpected and/or tion, including meals and lodging in was lifted) or a second car at your involuntary (i.e. death, involuntary' transit. own expense, it’s deductible. separation), the deductions are Indirect costs: (added by Tax Re¬ 5. If you so Id a house or termi¬ nevertheless allowed. form Act of 1969) nated a lease departing Washington (a) Traveling, meal and lodging for overseas on transfer, the costs Schneider Resigns from expenses for premove round trip are deductible. Editorial Board house hunting trips to the new loca¬ 6. If you terminated or acquired tion. leases arriving at or moving between David Schneider has resigned as (b) Expenses for temporary lodg¬ overseas posts, the costs are de¬ Chairman of the Journal Editorial ing and meals in the new location ductible. Board and has been replaced by the for the first 30 days after arrival. 7. If you were assigned to a US Vice Chairman, Archie Bolster. Dave (c) Expenses incident to the sale location from overseas, and expect to has been with the Board for two of a residence or the settlement of go abroad again at a later date, the a lease at the old job location, or to Government pays 30 days temporary years, and during that time has led the purchase of a residence or the lodging, but not meals, which are the Board in devoting a great deal acquisition of a lease at the new deductible. If you do not expect to of time to improvement of both the job location. Examples of deducti¬ go overseas again (for health, pend¬ format and the content of the Jour¬ ble expenses in this category are at¬ ing retirement or other reasons), you nal. Shortly after he became Chair¬ torney fees, real estate agent com¬ can deduct 30 days lodging and man, he began the process of a missions, title costs, appraisal fees, meals neither of which are reim¬ complete reappraisal of the Journal escrow fees, loan placement charges, bursed by the Government. by the Editorial Board, and as a re¬ and penalties for terminating a lease 8. If you are stationed in Wash¬ sult the Journal dropped some reg¬ prematurely or with insufficient no¬ ington and are assigned elsewhere in ular features, simplified and spruced tice. Not deductible are tax, inter¬ the US for training, POLAD, univer¬ est or rent payments. “Points” are sity, or details to other agencies, or up its graphic presentation, and considered interest. Also prohibited vice versa, you can deduct the cost placed greater emphasis on the pro¬ are charges for storage, refitting of roundtrip house hunting visits to fessional quality of its articles. The rugs and draperies, and repairs de¬ the new location, including travel, result has been a heavier stream of signed to make a house more sal¬ hotel and meal costs, for the entire first class articles submitted for pub¬ able family. lication, and letters of praise both 9. If you are transferred back to from Foreign Service readers and the Examples of Deductible Foreign the US from abroad, or within the general public. Dave has made a Service Moving Expenses US, you can deduct costs of buying lasting contribution to the efforts of a house or acquiring a new lease. Virtually all our direct costs of recent years to improve the profes¬ moving, and many indirect costs are 10. While in transit between posts sional status of the Journal, and the paid by the Government in foreign of assignment, deduct out-of-pocket service transfer. But many costs costs for hotels and meals if your Editorial Board joins in expressing are not paid or reimbursed. The fol- per diem allowance is insufficient. its appreciation. Mrs. Elbert G. Mathews, President, AAFSW, presents a check for $18, 203.66 to ton. Miss Law joined the State De¬ AFSA President Theodore L. Eliot, Jr., as AFSA's Executive Director, Thomas S. partment in 1946 and served in Estes, and Book Fair Chairman, Mrs. Edward E. Masters, look on. Hamburg, Ankara, Hong Kong, Sing¬ apore, Bonn, Vienna and Washing¬ ton. She retired in 1968. She is sur¬ vived by her mother, Mrs. Mattie Lawitzke, of Port Hope, Michigan, a brother and two sisters. MONTGOMERY. Edmund B. Mont¬ gomery, FSO-retired, died on No¬ vember 15, in Santa Barbara. Mr. Montgomery entered the Foreign Service in 1919 as vice consul at Port Limon. He became a Foreign Service officer in 1924 and served at Madras, Habana, San Luis Potosi, Asuncion and Washington. He re¬ tired in 1947. He is survived by three step-children, John S. Yates of New York, Reid Yates of Hono¬ lulu and Natalie Yates El Skeikh of Alexandria, Egypt, a sister and a brother. AAFSW Book Fair Sets New Record This year’s big, beautiful and busy RAVOTTO. Joseph D. Ravotto, USIA- could know personally of the tre¬ retired, died on November 9, in Ge¬ Book Fair brought record returns to mendous amount of work you ladies the AAFSW Scholarship Fund. On neva. He joined the OWI in 1942 gave to this project. Certainly, the and served at Rome, Paris, Bonn, December 2, Mrs. Elbert G. Mathews, parents and students who are grant¬ Mexico City, Tel Aviv, Madrid, and President, AAFSW, presented a ed these scholarships have good check for $18,203.66, the proceeds Barcelona with that agency and its reason to be especially grateful to of the five-day fair, to Theodore L. successor. He retired in 1969. Mr. you, and all of us should be.” Eliot, Jr., President of AFSA. Ravotto is survived by his wife of Avenue de Bude 25, Geneva, Swit¬ President Eliot, in a letter to Mrs. Mrs. Edward E. Masters, chair¬ zerland. Mathews, said, “I know that for man of the Book Fair, and her com¬ every one of you, the satisfaction mittee expressed gratitude for the you have in providing what will help and cooperation of GSA, the ROMAN. Paul Roman, FSO-retired, died on November 25, in Silver probably be nearly half of the schol¬ Audio-Visual Services Division and Spring. He entered on duty with the arships awarded this year, is your the Office of Security, and especial¬ Department in 1948 and served at reward. But, I wish that there were ly to Fernleigh R. Graninger, Chief, Bratislava, Vienna, Frankfurt and some way that we could be sure that Audio-Visual Services, who designed Bangkok before his retirement in the entire Foreign Service, whether special book cases for this year's serving under State, AID or USIA, 1967. He is survived by his wife of Fair. 500 Waterford Road, Silver Spring, Maryland and two sons. ROSS. Robert Holmes Ross, Jr., son Marriages by his parents of the American Em¬ of Jo Anne Dieckman Ross and the late Robert Holmes Ross, died on ABBOTT-ERNSTOF. Sidsel-Anne Ab¬ bassy, Ottawa, and three brothers. August 31, in Mexico City. He is sur¬ bott, daughter of FSO-retired and vived by his mother of the American Mrs. George M. Abbott, was married DONNELLY. Walter J. Donnelly, re¬ Embassy, Mexico, three brothers on August 12 to Joseph Milton Ern- tired Ambassador, died on November 12, in Bogota. Mr. Donnelly en¬ and a sister. Memorial contributions stof, in London. tered on duty with the Bureau of may be sent to the Leukemia So¬ Foreign and Domestic Commerce in ciety of America, Inc., c/o H. Grant Deaths 1923. He served at Ottawa, Mon¬ Taylor, MD, M. D. Anderson Hospi¬ CARTER. James R. Carter, USIA-re- treal, Bogota, Habana, Rio de Ja¬ tal of the University of Texas, Hous¬ tired, died on March 13 in Fairfax, neiro, Panama, Lima, as Ambassa¬ ton, Texas 77025. Virginia. Mr. Carter entered govern¬ dor to Costa Rica, Venezuela and ment service with the OWI in 1942 Austria. He resigned from the For¬ WILLOUGHBY. Amea Willoughby, in Lebanon and served with USIA in eign Service in 1952. He received widow of FSO Woodbury Willoughby, Lebanon, Turkey, Egypt, Morocco the US Government Medal of Free¬ died on November 23, in Washing¬ and Washington. He is survived by dom and was honored by the gov¬ ton. Mrs. Willoughby was the author his wife of 516 Creek Crossing Road, ernments of Brazil, Venezuela and of "I Was on Corregidor,” a book Vienna, Virginia, three daughters and Colombia. Mr. Donnelly is survived about her and her husband's escape a granddaughter. by his wife of 1912 Palmer Avenue, from the Japanese during World New Orleans, Louisiana, three sons War II. She is survived by a brother, JANTZEN. Brian Jantzen, son of and a daughter. Andrew Brewin of Ottawa and two FSO and Mrs. Robert Jantzen, died sisters, Judith Vivian of Fort Hope, in an automobile accident on No¬ LAW. Pauline J. Law, FSS-retired, Canada and Rosalind Meridith of vember 5, in Canada. Fie is survived died on November 23, in Washing¬ London, England. representation while Civil Service personnel could enjoy the benefits of the Executive Order. The Junior Foreign Service Officers Club representatives also took strong exception to Mr. Macomber's course of action. Representatives of JFSOC suggested that AFSA/AFGE/JFSOC publicly announce a coalition against the action taken by the “0” area. The Chairman said that forms of cooperation have been discussed and plans are being made to deal with Mr. Macomb¬ er’s action, as well as to prepare for any other developments. For example, AFSA’s legal counselors, Covington & Burling, are filing petitions to intervene against the AFGE petitions which that organization has filed as a step toward obtaining exclusive recognition in units in State and AID. Mr. Harrop circulated the draft of an insert reporting the Department’s action, which will be sent to the membership with the ma¬ terial previously prepared explaining the Executive Order and seeking the support of the membership for the Board's recom¬ Minutes of the Meeting of October 20, 1970 mendation that AFSA seek exclusive recognition to represent the personnel of the foreign services. The material will be in The Chairman welcomed Mr. Thomas M. Tracy to his first the mail by this coming weekend. meeting as a member of the Board of Directors. Mr. Tracy has been assigned to work on membership, with emphasis on organization of a permanent network of keymen in Washington Staff Corps Advisory Committee; The appointment of John and abroad. K. Ivie to succeed Miss Barbara J. Good as Chairman of the Staff Corps Advisory Committee was unanimously approved. Mr. Ivie is in OM/DIR, Room 905, SA-11 (Extension 23874). Financial Status AFSA Community Action Committee; Mr. John A. Ulinsky, Jr. The Executive Director outlined some of the recommenda¬ will be invited to report to the AFSA Board on the activities of tions which will be contained in a detailed memorandum to the Community Action Committee of which he is the chairman. be circulated to each member of the AFSA Board. It was His report is tentatively scheduled for Tuesday, November 3. emphasized that membership is the key to overcoming the present cash deficit in general operating funds. A number of Minutes of the Meeting of October 27, 1970 other procedures will be suggested. A memorandum was distributed, listing keymen overseas Attention centered on a memorandum, October 22, “Budget who have not reported to the Association on the Membership and Cash Flow Situation,” previously distributed to the Board Campaign. by the Executive Director. Action was taken on the following Separate meetings will be set up for keymen in each of the recommendations made in the memorandum. three foreign service agencies in the Washington area. Messrs. 1. A finance committee is to be appointed to monitor im¬ Nevitt, Heginbotham, and Lambrakis have scheduled meetings plementation of approved recommendations. of keymen in USIA, AID, and State respectively. After the pre¬ liminary meetings in the agencies an open meeting will be Action: Mr. Eliot, President, in cooperation with the Ex¬ scheduled. Tentative date; November 4. ecutive Director. 2. The membership recruiting campaign will be intensified, Mr. Harrop reported that AFSA has been invited by Mr. Ma- with emphasis on gaining 1000 Staff members and an addi¬ comber for consultation on the program to centralize personnel tional 2000 from AID. and to discuss implementation of the Hall Task Force recom¬ Action: Mr. Tracy mendations. Messrs. Harrop and Tracy will represent the As¬ 3. (a) Membership in AFSA will include membership in the sociation. Other interested members of the Board were invited Foreign Service Club without further payment of dues for to attend the meetings. Club membership. Mr. Lyman has prepared a paper on the Peterson Task Force (b) The Executive Director was empowered to negotiate which will be sent to all members of the Board. with present management contractors of the Club (Automatic Retailers of America) to modify the contract, eliminating the The Chairman announced that Deputy Under Secretary Ma- 5 percent “management fee.” The 5 percent gained would be comber informed AFSA yesterday that he had written to the used to employ a part-time supervisor of services and food, but Federal Labor Relations Council on behalf of the Secretary, primarily to plan attractions and functions for the Club. In to recommend that Executive Order 11491 be amended speci¬ the event the percentage reduction cannot be obtained from fically to exclude Foreign Service personnel of all categories ARA, the Executive Director was empowered to explore alterna¬ in the Department of State, USIA, and AID. Mr. Macomber’s tives. letter proposed creating a consultation mechanism whereby (c) Recommendations to handle club transactions on a organizations including Foreign Service personnel could con¬ cash basis are being studied. sult with the management of the three agencies. He also re¬ 4. Book Club and personal purchases will be handled by the quested that the AFGE petitions for election, already filed AFSA staff until these services can be transferred. The position with the Labor Department, be held in abeyance. of Club Discounts Secretary will be abolished. At the present Mr. Bray replied immediately to Mr. Macomber’s announce¬ time it is not feasible to abolish the position of Membership ment by saying that it is unfair to deny personnel in the Secretary as originally recommended. Foreign Service rights to organize which are granted to Civil Service personnel. 5. It was pointed out in the memorandum that the Scholar¬ After discussion of the implications of Mr. Macomber’s ac¬ ship Fund should bear its fair share of AFSA’s operating cost, tion, a motion was unanimously carried authorizing the Chair¬ as in any normal business operation, but that by resolution of man, or members of the Board appointed at his discretion, to a previous Board payments from the Scholarship Fund to the inform Mr. Macomber that the Association is unhappy with Association are limited to 10 percent of new contributions. this action and hopes that in notifying others of it Mr. Ma¬ There was discussion of the recommendation to charge a comber will not give the impression that the Association is management fee based on a proportionate share of AFSA’s in agreement with his recommendations. The Chairman was operating expenses (mortgage, utilities, taxes, etc.) and the also authorized to advise him of the Board’s extreme concern salaries of the Executive Secretary and the Educational Con¬ that Foreign Service employees could be left without rights or sultant. 6. Secretariat/Journal Staff: Recommendation on these proj¬ 2. Staff Corps Advisory Committee: A letter to the Chair¬ ects were held in abeyance pending dicussions with the Edi¬ man of the Board from Mr. Macomber on October 23, sum¬ torial Board. marized action taken on a number of recommendations in 7. Reduction in costs of Foreign Service Journal: Subject AFSA’s letter of August 19 to improve morale and status of Foreign Service Staff Corps employees. The letter stated that to reservations or objections of the Editorial Board, the AFSA response will be made in the near future to recommendations Board concurred with recommendations made to dispense with made October 14 by the AFSA Staff Corps Advisory Commit¬ items of marginal benefit and interest. The recommendation tee. A report on Mr. Macomber’s letter will be carried in the was accepted to change By-Laws in order to present member¬ AFSA News. ship subscription rate ($5.00) to a more realistic rate of $6.00. 8. Although at the present time the Association cannot 3. Luncheon Committee: The Board discussed a memo¬ afford to staff the room allocated, it was suggested that the randum from Andre J. Navez, Chairman of the Luncheon Com¬ Executive Director explore the possibility of maintaining an mittee, to Mr. Eliot, November 2, on inviting the President to option to use the room offered by the Department of State to address the Association in January. It was suggested that a AFSA in the Foreign Service Lounge. The possibility of having reception might be a better forum than a luncheon for this direct telephone connections between the Lounge and AFSA occasion. neadquarters will also be investigated. Meanwhile, arrange¬ ments have been made with AAFSW to display AFSA material Following Ambassador Parker T. Hart’s address on the Middle and to direct inquries to the AFSA receptionist. East at the AFSA luncheon October 30, a reporter representing the Jewish Telegraph requested a copy of his speech. Am¬ 9. Services of our investment counselor have been termi¬ bassador Hart said he would first want to consult with the nated. The Secretary-Treasurer and the Executive Director in Middle East Institute and with the AFSA Board. The AFSA consultation with a member experienced in investments, will Board decided that they would prefer to have the address deal directly with AFSA’s brokers regarding changes in the carried first in the Foreign Service Journal if Ambassador Hart portfolio. Services of our auditors have also been terminated wishes to release the text. and a larger firm will be employed. 5. AID-Reorganization: The AFSA Task Force on AID Re¬ On behalf of the AFSA Board, the Chairman expressed ap¬ organization met on Thursday, October 29, at the Foreign Serv¬ preciation to the Executive Director for his careful and forth¬ ice Club. It is anticipated that by mid-November a draft will right presentation of the Association’s financial position. be prepared from the reports of the sub-committees. 6. Openness: Officers of the Association and members of The first meeting of the AFSA Task Force on AID Reorganiza¬ the AFSA Board will receive copies of the latest draft of a tion was held on Friday, October 16, at the Foreign Service proposal for foundation funding, prepared by Mr. Destler, who Club. Mr. Howard Parsons was appointed Chairman of the will present this subject at next week’s Board meeting. Task Force and subcommittees were established to study issues of policy, staffing, organization and problems of trans¬ In accordance with the Board's discussion last week, of the ition. Sub-committees will report to the Task Force at a meet¬ management fee to be paid by the Scholarship Fund to the ing to be held on Thursday, October 29, at the Foreign Service Asociation, the following resolution was passed: Club. Purposes of the Task Force are twofold: (1) to advise the AFSA Board of Directors on substance, structure and per¬ “Be It Resolved: sonnel in the proposed reorganization of the AID program; and (2) to advise AFSA how to represent members’ interests during “That to meet the expenses incurred by AFSA in the man¬ the reorganization. agement of the scholarship program a proportionate share of AFSA’s operation expense (Mortgage, utilities, taxes, etc.) be paid by the Scholarship Fund; Mr. Harrop reported that subsequent to the Board’s motion on October 20, representatives of the AFSA presented Mr. “That an equitable percentage of the Executive Secretary’s Macomber with specific proopsals offsetting Mr. Macomber’s salary, up to 75%, should be paid by the Scholarship Fund; recommendations to the Federal Labor Relations Council that foreign service personnel be excluded from Executive Order “That the salary and costs of the Educational Consultant 11491. Mr. Harrop emphasized the importance of establishing should be paid by the Scholarship Fund in proportion to the institutionalized relationships with management. A conference time spent and expenses incurred by him on the scholarship on the position to be taken has been scheduled for October program.” 28 with representatives of JFSOC, AFGE, and AFSA. With reference to petitions filed by AFGE for Exclusive Announcements have been posted of an Open Meeting of Recognition under the Executive Order and AFSA’s petitions AFSA in the East Auditorium of the Department of State to intervene, the following developments were noted: (Room 2925), November 4, 1970, at 12 noon. The agenda: (a) Executive Order No. 11491; (b) Personnel Reform. 1. A letter from Mr. W.J.R. Overath, Regional Administrator, Department of Labor, to Mr. Ackerman of Covington and Bur¬ ling, denied the request for intervention on technical grounds. Minutes of the Meeting of November 3, 1970 Subsequently, required documents were filed and a discussion held with Mr. Dow E. Walker, Area Administrator of the Labor- Management Services Administration. On November 2, a letter COMMITTEES was delivered to Mr. Walker referring to the discussion and 1. Members’ Interests Committee: Responding to AFSA’s presenting rebuttal to Mr. Overath’s denial of the intervention letters on employee benefits, Mr. Macomber wrote to the Chair¬ requests. Copies of this letter, together with items submitted man of the Board on October 22, stating: (a) that an increase under the rules and regulations implementing the Executive in overseas transfer allowance is being studied, but action Order were sent to Mr. Alan Strachan, Chief, Welfare and will depend on budget considerations, subject to concurrence Grievance Staff, AID, and to Mr. Samuel Mitchell, Chief Do¬ of Congress; (b) that recommendations made by the Associa¬ mestic Career Branch, PER, Department of State. tion concerning first-class air travel and travel by foreign flag 2. A letter from Mr. Strachan to Mr. Dow Walker was sent ship cannot be approved; (c) that the joint working group pro¬ under date of October 30, officially lodging objection to the posed by AFSA as a means to implement recommendations in AFGE’s petition for exclusive recognition in two units of AID Task Force V does not seem to be the best vehicle for mutual (the Bureau of Africa and the Office of International Training). consultation and the he would prefer to continue the ex¬ A copy of the letter was sent to the AFSA for information. changes and meetings with the Association which have been useful in the past. In closing, Mr. Macomber invited the As¬ 3. In a letter dated November 3, the Area Administrator, Mr. sociation’s recommendations on implementing proposals of Dow E. Walker, notified State, AID and AFGE that AFSA has Task Force V. intervened in all the petitions submitted by AFGE and will be permitted to participate in the hearings. In other words, AFSA’s William G. Bradford, whose resignation was received with contention that the “units” proposed by AFGE are "not ap¬ regret. propriate” has been sustained and AFSA has been recognized Howard B. Schaffer, Chairman of the Awards Committee, is by the Department of Labor as being qualified to intervene in organizing the 1971 Awards Program. this matter. 4. Conferences with Mr. Macomber: In response to the De¬ Meeting of the Board of Directors, November 17. A statement partment's proposal to exclude foreign service employees (in¬ of the present financial condition of AFSA was presented and cluding those of AID and USIA) from the Executive Order recommendations were approved, including the appointment of 1491, four keystone principles were presented by the Board a Finance Committee to include an experienced retired mem¬ to Mr. Macomber. He was informed that unless these prin¬ ber, the Secretary-Treasurer and the Executive Director, to ciples which provided rights were granted for Foreign Service keep the Board currently informed on finances. personnel equal to those the Civil Service employees would The Chairman of the Board will make tentative appoint¬ enjoy, since the Order would still apply to them, his proposal ments to the Steering Committee on the “openness” proposal. would be opposed by AFSA. The Board accepted the proposed course of action and time After a series of conferences, agreement was reached on table for November and December. three of the four points: (1) the right of consultation; (2) that Mr. Tracy, Chairman of the Committee on Reform, has ap¬ both labor and professional organizations will have access pointed sub-committees to study the recommendations of the to agency officials; (3) the right of appeal to the Board of the Task Forces on Foreign Service Staff Corps and FSRU Pro¬ Foreign Service. However, no progress was made on a pro¬ gram,- Management and Interagency Relations; Personnel. vision for written agreements between AFSA and the Depart¬ Problems in these areas should go to these sub-committees to ment which would establish permanent institutionalized rela¬ be studied and reported to the Board. The Committee on Re¬ tionship, and assure exclusivity for AFSA to represent the for¬ form is responsible for seeing that plans for reform meet the eign services. Failing to gain this point, the Board concluded needs of foreign service personnel. there was no alternative except to advise the Department of The Board requested complete transcripts of all testimony Labor of AFSA’s opposition to the Department’s exclusion pro¬ given before the Federal Labor Relations Council on Novem¬ posal. Mr. Lambrakis distributed the draft of a statement of ber 16 on Executive Order No. 11491. In addition to AFSA’s principles which will be left with Mr. Macomber this afternoon. chairman, those testifying included Mr. Macomber, JFSOC, It was reported that the Federal Relations Council has re¬ AFGE’s national president and AFGE locals in USIA and State/ quested Mr. Macomber to explain his position on November AID. It was noted that AFGE has filed an Unfair Labor Prac¬ 10. (Subsequently it was learned that there will be no “hear¬ tice suit against AFSA. Mr. Lambrakis suggested that AFSA ings” at the November 10 meeting of the Council. The purpose build up legal ability for the future by using AFSA’s lawyer of the meeting is to consider a number of proposals to amend members as understudies on this problem and others. the Executive Order, including that submitted by the Depart¬ ment of State.) The Undersecretary invited members of the Board to meet with him at lunch on November 23 to discuss issues of interest. Points to be covered at the open meeting of the Association tomorrow were discussed. Meeting of the Board of Directors, November 24. Mr. Destler reported on the first meeting of the Steering Committee where Meeting of the Board of Directors, November 10. Mr. I. M. several members agreed to write short papers proposing spe¬ Destler presented his proposal for foundation funding for a cific activities. If the Board concurs on new proposals for four-year program to expand communication with groups out¬ funding sources and contacts, Mr. Bray will travel to New side of government through a coalition of U. S. foreign affairs York to discuss and stimulate interest in the proposal. organizations sponsored by AFSA, ISA and other professional Mr. Lyman reported that he is drafting a position paper on organizations. The Board agreed on further discussion on No¬ the AID reorganization based on papers submitted by sub¬ vember 17 with recommendations to be made for members of committees. the Steering Committee. Mr. Tracy reported on the Reform Committee on Staff Corps The need for more effective communication with overseas problems, specifically the proposed Foreign Affairs Specialist chapters was stressed with the recommendation that letters category. He will compose a letter based on the Committee’s supplementing AFSA News be set out each month. suggestions, which will be sent to the Director General with a copy to Mr. Lionel Mosely (USIA). Mr. Tracy was appointed Chairman of a Reform Implementa¬ tion Group on the Task Force Reports. Mr. Henry Cohen, as Chairman of the Members’ Interest Committee, will follow upon the implementation of Task Force V, but the Reform Imple¬ mentation Group will cover all others. The Chairman will re¬ port on this at the November 17 meeting. Action on E.O. 11491 was reported as follows: A letter was written by the Chairman of the Board to Robert E. Hampton, Chairman of the Federal Labor Relations Council, urging the Council not to comply with the request to exclude foreign service employees from the provisions of the Order. The De¬ partment of State has sent formal replies to the three peti¬ tions filed by AFGE, stating that the proposed units are not “appropriate." Open meetings on the Order will be held in USIA on November 19. AFSA has been invited to confer with other professional organizations in the National Federation of Professional Organizations on legislation to be drafted on the status of such organizations under the Executive Order. Mr. Philip M. Oliver, Director of the Job Evaluation and Pay Review Task Force of the CSC, has requested an opportunity to meet with the AFSA Board this month to clarify some of the problems relating to foreign service personnel. Mr. Nevitt will prepare a background paper. Ambassador James C. Dunn receives the Foreign Service An ad hoc committee of Messrs. Nevitt and Easum will re¬ Cup from AFSA President Theodore L. Eliot, Jr., on Foreign ceive nominations for Secretary-Treasurer of AFSA to replace Service Day, November 19. MILITARY ACADEMIES its most persistent critic, if not its because of proven military necessity (Continued from page 22) most beloved graduate, is Vice Ad¬ in the light of present-day methods miral Hyman G. Rickover, who has of waging war and peace? Is the [The] average cadet has an aca¬ often spoken out about academic United States Marine Corps officer demic schedule and workload in ex¬ shortcomings at our civilian colleges less of a fighting man than his col¬ cess of that required at the best col¬ as well. Testifying before Congress leagues in the other services because leges. ... To the academic program, in 1968, he said: “Naval Academy he usually is not an academy prod¬ which demands 75-80 percent of the midshipmen generally lack poise, uct, but a graduate of a civilian cadet’s time and preoccupation, add self-confidence and maturity. They university and the Corps’ Platoon a mandatory military training pro¬ give the appearance of having these Leaders Course? And if we cannot gram, a required athletic program, qualities, but it is a superficial ap¬ or should not do away with the cadet squadron duties, and other pearance with little depth.” Admiral academies, should we merge them requirements. Rickover’s unhappiness goes beyond into a single institution, at least at “[Second, if,] as most cadets soon Annapolis. He once said of all the the lower levels of instruction? come to understand, the object of academies: Before we can answer any of the ‘game’ (recognized and de¬ “No institution can depart too much these questions intelligently and scribed by them as such) is to pur¬ from the norms of its particular soci¬ affirmatively, we ought to compare sue the image of ‘instant academic ety and function effectively as part the American practice with that of a excellence’ in terms of its popular of that society. The service academ¬ foreign democratic country that symbols (test scores, grades, extra ies have set themselves apart from maintains one of the finest fighting courses, major programs, scholar¬ their society. This has resulted in forces in the world and yet does not ships, postgraduate study, academic strains, and is one of the chief rea¬ have a college-level military acade¬ conference image-building, etc.) and sons why officers are not able to my. We ought also to know some¬ not primarily to acquire substantive identify with the new forces which thing about American military understanding of subject matter or are exerting influence on the mili¬ academy dropout figures and about to develop attitudes and habits of tary. The academies should, as soon officer production and retention conscientious dedication to max¬ as possible, stop setting themselves figures from these academies. And imum effort in all assigned and up as a higher ethical society by the we ought to compare these figures related tasks—then, why not cheat? use of honor codes, etc. If they meaningfully with analogous figures “[Third,] criticism has simply not continue to do this they will inevi¬ for American officers who are not been tolerated at the Academy, on tably broaden the gulf between the graduates of West Point, Annapolis, the faculty. It is equated with military and reality. . . . Senior or Colorado Springs. ‘disloyalty’ and ‘subversion.’. . . The officers at the academies ... are so The foreign democratic country ‘mortal sin’ at the Academy, one anxious to prove their own integrity whose experience may have some soon learns, is not in wrongs com¬ and their ability to create a perfect transfer value for the United States mitted or overlooked: the mortal sin society under their auspices that is Israel. She has no military acade¬ lies in raising questions about the they forget their responsibilities as mies on the college level and no situation, especially in talking out¬ adults; their responsibilities to do all ROTC-type program at her civilian side of the family—ns I am doing they can for the youth in their universities. This is so because most here. charge, to sacrifice themselves if Israeli men are not permitted to “[Fourth, one] who has served a need be for the youth. Instead, they enroll in college before they have tour of duty at the Air Force Acade¬ impose standards . . . which proba¬ completed their three-year tour of my under the original assumption bly they themselves have never met obligatory service, which starts at that he would help to train the fu¬ and which are not practicable in the age 18. What the Israelis do have, ture ‘creative leadership’ of the services. Such standards are not set for a small number of their future USAF is led to the following conclu¬ up by the colleges from which the career officers in the unified Israel sion: that at the AF Academy it has Army, Navy, and Air Force draw Defense Force, are two pnimiot been forgotten that its mission is to by far the great majority of their tzvaiot (military boarding schools) produce dedicated and enlightened officers, nor are they used among at the high school level. One is in young officers, not prospective can¬ officers in the services themselves.” the Tel-Aviv area, the other in the didates for scholarships and gradu¬ (Italics supplied) Haifa area. ate schools or practitioners of aca¬ Though they are called in He¬ demic gamesmanship. We ought If these charges against the mili¬ brew military boarding schools, they surely to do whatever is necessary to tary academies are even only partly are really military-civilian schools, enhance the intellectual calibre of true, they are serious enough to and this is the important point. our officer corps—in this I yield to raise some questions. Do we really Cadets attend classes in the morn¬ no man!—but if it is scholars, etc. need our military academies? Or do ings and early afternoons at the fa¬ we want, let us send these fine young we just have them because we have mous Herzliah High School in Tel- men to the best universities, give them and because other countries Aviv and the equally prestigious Re- them military training during the have them? Do we keep them at ali High School in Haifa. They fol¬ summers, an active duty commit¬ great Federal cost, only because of low the same regular curriculum and ment afterward, for one-fourth the history, habit, tradition, and the po¬ standards as civilian boys and girls cost.” litical unthinkability of doing away at these schools, and they wear civil¬ And as for the Naval Academy, with them? Or do we keep them ian garb. Cadets change into uni- FOREIGN SERVICE JOURNAL, January, 1971 31 Doesn’t this prove their superior training and devotion?” Not necessarily. At first glance, academy graduates appear to re¬ main in the services for a much longer period than do other officers. But J. Arthur Heise, in his book “The Brass Factories,” argues that this is illusory. He contends that in two of the three services there is little difference in the departure rate of ROTC men who enter the services as regular, rather than re¬ serve, officers, and the departure rate of academy graduates, who can only enter with regular commissions. He cites a 1964 study which showed that 23.7 percent of the West Pointers who entered the Army be¬ tween 1950 and 1960 resigned, compared with 24.5 percent of the ROTC-produced Distinguished Mili¬ tary Graduates (DMGs) who en¬ tered the Army with regular com¬ missions during the same period. He says that in the Air Force the depar¬ forms and begin the military portion performance. For economic, physi¬ ture rate for the first three classes of of their studies and training as well cal, and political reasons, the three the Air Force Academy was 27 per¬ as their civilian homework, when academies are “not easily expanded cent, compared with a 37 percent they return to the pnimia about 2 or contracted to meet emergency rate for DMGs from AFROTC. p.m. After four years at the pnimia, expansion needs or to counter the Only in the Navy does the NROTC- for which their parents pay 750 Is¬ lessened needs,” the Department of trained officer leave at a much high¬ raeli pounds ($214) yearly, the Defense reported in 1969. In 1968, er rate than his Annapolis counter¬ boys graduate with the rank of cor¬ at the height of our involvement in part. For the Naval Academy class¬ poral and go on to Officers Training Vietnam, Secretary of Defense Rob¬ es of 1959-1961, the rate averaged School. Leaving the pnimia with the ert S. McNamara issued a statement less than 30 percent; for regular lowly rank of corporal tells us some¬ to Congress projecting America’s de¬ NROTC men who had finished their thing about the Israeli approach to fense posture and needs for the obligated service, the departure rate officership and to the intended rela¬ fiscal years 1969-1973. Despite our during fiscal years 1959-1961 was tionship between officers and men. heavy military manpower commit¬ 60 percent. An Israeli—-even a military board¬ ments and losses in Vietnam, Two points can be made about ing school graduate — becomes an McNamara talked about enlarging the argument that the academies officer only by climbing the ranks West Point’s and Colorado Springs’ prove their usefulness and are worth from the bottom to the top. The enrollment to only 4,400 each, and their cost if only because the vast road is from enlisted man to non¬ keeping Annapolis’ enrollment at majority of America’s generals and commissioned officer to regular or about 4,100. admirals are academy graduates. reserve officer, and for the talented Moreover, what the military calls First, academy graduates dominate and motivated, the road can be a “disenrollment” from the three the selection boards that choose the rapid one. academies is not low. In the classes people to be promoted to these The whole purpose of not having from 1958 to 1970, the dropout rate ranks, just as they favor “wearers of a military academy as we know it for all reasons has ranged from 19.4 the old school tie” when they choose and for making officers first serve in to 33.9 percent for the Military people for assignments to the presti¬ the enlisted or NCO ranks is to Academy, 22.3 to 35.7 percent for gious senior service schools. Second, maintain and reinforce the “citizen’s the Naval Academy, and 15.4 to the apparent lack of opportunity army” character of the Israel De¬ 40.2 percent for the Air Force non-academy personnel has for ad¬ fense Force. Academy. vancement to general and flag As for American military officers “But,” some may say, “even if the officer rank may help to account for who come (or do not come) from academies’ officer production figures their lower retention rates. If non¬ the military academies, the plain are low, and their dropout rates are academy officers feel that they have fact is that West Point, Annapolis, high, look at the higher retention a much lower chance of making and Colorado Springs just do not rates of academy men after they are general or admiral than their col¬ and cannot produce enough gradu¬ commissioned and look at the high leagues from the academies, why ates, even if we were all satisfied percentage of academy graduates in should they stay? with their education, promise, and the upper ranks of the services. (Continued on page 47) 32 FOREIGN SERVICE JOURNAL, January, 1971 Consequences of any attempt to assert a dominant often irrelevant to political prac¬ role in development by the military are tice. Throughout the Third World, governments are likely to be the likely to include a return to quarters. products of delicate civil-military coalitions, regardless of who occu¬ pies the presidency or other formal positions of authority. During periods of social tension, The Military and Progress when the coercive basis of the state is particularly evident, the role of the military becomes particularly in the Third World emotional. If the military obeys the orders of the political elite and maintains order, then it automati¬ cally becomes “reactionary.” If, on the other hand, the military replac¬ es the political elite in an attempt D to alleviate popular pressures, then I \ EPEATED seizures of power by LUIGI R. EINAUDI it is likely to be considered “revolu¬ military forces in Latin America, The RAND Corporation tionary.” Africa and Asia in recent years Santa Monica, California Again, however, the complexities have come as something of a shock of even the simplest social struc¬ to those who felt that history Views expressed in this paper tures and the almost infinite sub¬ evolved smoothly toward “civil are those of the author. They tleties of political situations render rule” away from “military barbar¬ should not he interpreted as re¬ these judgments also rather superfi¬ ism.” The military government in flecting the views of The RAND cial. The military of most nonin¬ Corporation or the official opinion power in Peru since 1968 even dustrial countries, regardless of ide¬ seems committed to national devel¬ or policy of any of its governmen¬ tal or private research sponsors. ology, operate within constitutional, opment, using authoritarian means economic and social contexts which, to restrain consumption and to im¬ though they have little enough in pose “law and order” on local radi¬ common with each other, generally cals and foreign investors alike. have even less in common with the While not new, this reemergence To understand the nature of mil¬ United States. United States and of military rule in Peru and else¬ itary participation in government in Western European values are not where raises the more general ques¬ a given situation, therefore, we the most useful guides for disen¬ tion: Are the military services in must get down to cases. Much tangling Third World political com¬ less industrialized countries capable United States commentary on the plexities. of bringing economic and social political activity of the military in Nor are military expenditures on progress? Sometimes, of course, they other countries seems unconsciously “sophisticated” modern hardware a are. But they are also capable of to project the values of American- reliable indicator of whether the preventing it. The task of the ana¬ style constitutional democracy. military is assisting or inhibiting lyst, whether scholar or policymakj If military services seem under progress: Even leaving aside India, er, is thus to determine what ele¬ civilian control, if officers do not Pakistan, and certain countries in ments contribute to each outcome. participate in “civil” government Southeast Asia and Middle East, This is not easy, as both revolution matters, or if they justify whatever most military forces still have some and reaction may be present to¬ they do with the language of “civic modern military equipment (though gether, along with stagnation and action” and anti-communism, then often in token amounts). irrelevance. we are likely to say that the mili¬ Acquisition of modern aircraft Military forces may, for example, tary is contributing to social and (jets and helicopters) or anti¬ contribute to social mobility by economic progress. aircraft (missiles) weapons may or their social composition and train¬ On the other hand, suppose mili¬ may not be justified in given in¬ ing. But they may simultaneously tary forces exercise direct formal stances: In themselves, apart from also support controls over “strateg¬ authority over what in American abnormal quantities, equipment ic” resources in ways that divert constitutional practice are civilian purchases are probably neither them from more productive alter¬ functions. Add to that their adver¬ avoidable nor a useful criterion of native uses. Service chiefs, mean¬ tising national defense functions or the political nature of the military while, may be engaged in Byzantine coveting modern military equip¬ forces in question. We cannot ex¬ conspiracies of no interest to anyone ment in the absence of what we pect military services to overlook outside the military. In other situa¬ consider a clear and present dan¬ their own needs in the moderniza¬ tions, precisely the opposite may ger. Under those circumstances we tion of their countries. hold true—on each point—and are likely to consider that military a Sometimes a trend appears to critical national events may hang “reactionary” obstacle to progress. overshadow the political diversity on the acts of small unit command¬ However sound the values that ers. inspire them, these judgments are (Continued on page 45) FOREIGN SERVICE JOURNAL, January, 1971 33 The Defense Department’s extensive domestic involvement gives it an advantage apart from the relative strength of constituencies. The Military Influence Within the Executive Branch IN the oval office of the President of the United States ADAM YARMOLINSKY little less than two weeks after his inauguration, President Based on Chapter 3 in the forthcoming book, “The Richard M. Nixon was apologizing for the barrenness of Military Establishment,” by Adam Yarmolinsky, a the office; his books and other personal belongings were Twentieth Century Fund Study, to be published by still in New York. But the office was not devoid of Harper & Row in 1971. Copyright 1970 by Adam Yar¬ molinsky. Reprinted by permission of Harper & Row, panoply. He pointed to the flags of the four services off to Publishers, Inc. one side of his desk. “They” had sent them over that very Adam Yarmolinsky, born in New York City in 1922, is day, when they discovered that Lyndon Johnson had a graduate of Harvard University and Yale Law School, removed his service flags. There were no emblems or and has been a professor at Harvard Law School since banners from any other branch or department of govern¬ 1966. He was law clerk to Associate Justice Stanley Reed ment, nothing to represent the Foreign Service or the of the United States Supreme Court, and an associate in judicial branch or the Congress—but there were the prestigious New York and Washington, D. C. law firms. In the 1960s, he was Special Assistant Secretary of De¬ emblems of the military, richly symbolic of the relation¬ fense and Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for ship of the President to the armed services. It is a role all International Security Affairs; in World War 11, he too often forgotten when one mentions the power of the served in the USAAF. He received the Distinguished military establishment, for the military is at no time more Civilian Public Service Award from the Department of powerful than the President of the United States—the Defense. His literary work includes being public affairs editor for Doubleday & Co., a book, “Recognition of Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces—is prepared Excellence," editing, special correspondent for the LON¬ to allow it to be. DON ECONOMIST, and articles in periodicals. There have been other societies in which the military establishment played a more influential, if not a com¬ pletely dominant role, from ancient Sparta to some parts letter from Roosevelt to an Army Chief of Staff ran: of present-day Latin America. Communist China spends “Ought we not sometimes to practice our cavalry in a larger percentage of a much smaller gross national charging? If so, would it not be practicable to arrange a product on its military budget. But the United States and row of dummies so that at the culminating moment of the the Soviet Union are the only industrialized societies in charge the cavalry could actually ride home and hit the which the military establishment is the largest single dummies? ... I wish you would see if this dummy idea feature in the economic and political landscape. could not be worked up.” It has not always been thus. The growth of military In Woodrow Wilson’s time, more memoranda from the influence within the executive branch has been gradual, service staffs went to the White House as problems of the advancing in periods of war and military crisis until it period—trouble with Japan, civil war in Mexico, and war came to dominate by its own accumulated mass. Histori¬ in Europe—seemed to call more urgently for military cally the tradition of the American military has been an commentary than had most issues of the McKinley- apolitical one. Early in this country, a professional soldier Roosevelt-Taft era. But President Wilson resisted recom¬ recalled how the military “. . . lived apart in their tiny mendations from the General Board and Joint Board secluded garrisons much after the manner of military when they suggested transferring the fleet to the Pacific monks and . . . rarely came into contact with the mass of during a crisis with Japan. He decided not to do so, and our citizens.” when the Joint Board asked him to reconsider, he re¬ The military was only indirectly influential in executive plied: “When a policy has been settled by the Adminis¬ decision-making—in matters of defense as well as foreign tration and when it is communicated to the Joint Board, policy—up to World War I, and even then its influence they have no right to be trying to force a different was largely apolitical. course.” To his Navy Secretary he said, “I wish you President Theodore Roosevelt and President William would say to them that if this should occur again, there Howard Taft felt free to contact senior officers without will be no General or Joint Boards. They will be abol¬ bothering their service secretaries, but their communica¬ ished.” For a time, Wilson forbade the Joint Board even tions were scarcely on matters of high policy. A typical to meet. And, although he gave great discretion to his 34 FOREIGN SERVICE JOURNAL, January, 1971 military commanders in World War I, Wilson kept in his cies. They attempted to forecast postwar trends and to own hand all matters which he regarded as political, analyze such subjects as future relations with the Soviet particularly preparations for peace negotiations. Union. But, by and large, the officers involved did not In 1920 and 1921, the military made further efforts to relish working on intangible problems with little relation acquire a voice in policy. Neither President Warren G. to the war in progress. They always took care to write Harding nor his Secretary of State, Charles Evans that their judgments reflected a strictly military view¬ Hughes, paid heed to strong objections from military point. As far as possible, they tried to shift responsibility proposals to the Washington treaty decisions which lim¬ to the State Department. After 1945, this reluctance ited military expansion. Nor did the military regain power ceased. in the thirties. In the crisis of 1931 following Japan’s Truman, for his part, viewed the military with some seizure of Manchuria. President Herbert Hoover took mistrust. Roosevelt’s first military contacts had been with charge himself. He consulted with the service heads only admirals and social register naval officers whom he had once, and then not about what he ought to do but merely first met as Assistant Secretary of the Navy, but Truman about what they could do if necessary. recalled his experience as a National Guard officer in Civilians in the military establishment had access to World War I when he ran afoul of Regular Army red and influence on the White House, however, during the tape. Later, as chairman of a Senate committee scrutiniz¬ years just before World War II. Theodore Roosevelt, ing the military conducts of World War II, Truman saw Taft, Wilson, the Republican Presidents of the 1920s, and abundant evidence of the services’ expensive inefficiency. Franklin D. Roosevelt, all made use of service secretaries He did not instinctively think of the military as a source or assistant secretaries in discussions on policy. By and of wisdom on issues of high national policy. large, these civilians acted as little more than conduits for advice prepared by professional officers. Through much civilian liaison, therefore, the military possessed a contin¬ uous—if limited—voice in presidential decision-making M s in the years immediately after World War I, the despite the lack of overt power. professional military after World War II again sought a recognized place in the policy advisory process. This time they succeeded. For, like FDR, Truman found himself facing situations in which he felt need for military coun¬ VV ITH the approach of World War II, the relationship sel; for example, the Soviet Union’s failure to evacuate between the military and the Executive changed signifi¬ Iranian Azerbaijan and the withdrawal of British support cantly. Successive crises—war between Italy and Ethio¬ from Turkey and Greece. As he felt compelled to consult pia, Hitler’s remilitarization of the Rhineland, civil war in the military, he acquired more and more confidence in Spain, and a Japanese drive to conquer China—drew them. In contrast to wordy, vague, and inconclusive Roosevelt’s attention away from domestic affairs. He memoranda so often sent from State, papers from the turned for advice to generals and admirals as well as to Pentagon on foreign policy issues appeared to him terse, diplomats. He decreed that the Chiefs of Staff have direct thorough, reliable, and clearly focused on requirements access to him, without going through the civilian secre¬ for action. In 1947 Truman agreed that, at least in form, taries. During difficult periods after 1940, when he pon¬ the military establishment should have an institutionalized dered the destroyer deal, Lend-Lease, Atlantic convoys role in advising him on foreign policy. He sponsored a and submarine patrols, aid to Russia, and economic National Security Act which, in addition to making Air sanctions against Japan, he frequently sought military Force a separate service and providing for a Secretary of advice and, after Pearl Harbor, he leaned even more Defense, set up a statutory National Security Council heavily on the military. designed as an inner cabinet to deal with issues of foreign Prior to World War II Chiefs of Staff saw Presidents and defense policy—“Mr. Truman's Politburo,” as John occasionally, but had no higher standing as presidential Fischer called it. advisors than senior civil servants in, say, the Interior and The same act was amended in 1949 to guarantee in Labor departments. Certainly, on foreign policy issues, law the practice, previously carried on de facto, of they did not have status comparable to that of Assistant “legislative insubordination” by the Joint Chiefs. The act Secretaries of State or ambassadors. With World War II, provides that “no provision of this Act shall be so their position changed dramatically. In terms of entree to construed as to prevent a Secretary of a military depart¬ the White House and influence on a broad range of ment or a member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff from presidential decisions, members of the Joint Chiefs presenting to the Congress, on his own initiative, after outranked cabinet secretaries. Roosevelt sought advice first so informing the Secretary of Defense, any recom¬ from the Joint Chiefs on a range of issues that he and his mendations relating to the Department of Defense that he predecessors would have regarded, before 1938, as pri¬ may deem proper.” marily State Department business. The President gave the Nevertheless, President Truman did not revert to Roo¬ Chiefs decisive responsibility, for example, for devising sevelt’s practice of depending on the military as primary surrender terms and occupation plans, even involving policy advisors. After a period of collaboration between them in arrangements for a postwar United Nations the State Department and the Pentagon under George C. Organization. Marshall, Truman exhibited some concern about the Although the military had previously sought a role in policy role of the military and encouraged a full-scale policy-making, they showed some reluctance to assume as review of American commitments and the forces required much responsibility as Roosevelt thrust upon them. The to sustain them. But with the outbreak of the Korean Joint Chiefs and their staff committees dutifully prepared War, he was obliged to bring military men back into the plans dealing with political as well as military contingen¬ inner circle of policy-making. General Omar N. Bradley, FOREIGN SERVICE JOURNAL, January, 1971 35 as chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, began to function to Radford’s under Eisenhower. The President’s relations much as had Admiral William D. Leahy during World with other professional military men remained at best War II, briefing the President almost daily. Truman met cool, distant, and wary. For practical purposes, Kennedy occasionally with some or all of the service chiefs to received military advice only as it filtered to him through discuss not only military plans and weapons requirements his civilian Secretary of Defense. In his brief thousand but also such issues as how, by diplomacy, to keep the days, he never faced a test comparable to Truman’s in Chinese out of the war and how to persuade Europeans 1951. He did, however ask the military establishment for that the United States government still gave their conti¬ help in some close battles on Capitol Hill. He judged it nent first priority. Even during the hottest phases of the indispensable for Senate ratification of the limited test- Korean War, however, he never went as far as Franklin ban treaty that the Joint Chiefs certify the treaty as not Roosevelt in relying on the uniformed military for policy contrary to American interests; he devoted almost as advice. Military professionals functioned as presidential much effort to negotiations with the Chiefs as to negotia¬ advisors, but for the most part at a secondary level. tions with Moscow. During the presidency of his successor, the pattern of Because of his own five-star rank and his personal caution and wariness was at first preserved. As a long¬ popularity, President Eisenhower had less need than time member of the Armed Services Committee, Lyndon Truman for clear support from the military. If anything, Johnson brought to the presidency attitudes somewhat his military background made him less responsive to the similar to Truman’s. “The generals,” he once said, “know services. He felt qualified to judge as well as to discount only two words—spend and bomb.” On Vietnam and the advice. Recognizing that political opponents might charge Dominican Republic, Johnson treated the professional him with allowing the military excessive influence, he military as agents of doubtful reliability. He decided on a took pains to keep his former colleagues at arm’s length. bombing campaign against North Vietnam, and would He accepted and put into effect early in his administra¬ not let the Chiefs add any bombing targets without his tion a task force report which had the apparent effect of personal approval. During the Dominican occupation, he giving the civilian Secretary of Defense larger powers. In sent a succession of high-level civilian officials to check practice, Eisenhower depended on the Joint Chiefs less on and oversee the operations of the forces landed there. than had Truman. During the 1954 crisis over Indochina, To be sure, Johnson could not be characterized as trustful for example, he considered ordering air strikes in support in his relations with any group; still, he showed somewhat of the French even though the service chiefs had advised greater suspiciousness of the military than most groups. against such action. In subsequent crises over the Chinese Nevertheless, in a pattern by now familiar, war forced offshore islands, Suez, Hungary, and renewed Soviet an alliance between the Executive and the military. As threats to Berlin, he showed similar independence. But at the war in Vietnam wore on and came under more and the same time, Eisenhower used one military man in the more criticism at home, Johnson developed a closer kind of top-level advisory role that Truman had reserved relationship with the professional military. By 1968, the for his civilian secretaries. From 1953 to 1957, Admiral Arthur W. Radford, the JCS chairman, occupied a place in Eisenhower’s foreign policy councils second only to that of Secretary of State John Foster Dulles. His period as chairman and Marshall’s as Army Chief of Staff probably mark the two points at which professional military men have had the biggest voice in presidential decisions. Kennedy assumed the Presidency after having read such books as those of General Matthew Ridgway, “Sol¬ dier,” and General Maxwell Taylor, “The Uncertain Trumpet,” James M. Gavin’s “War and Peace in the Space Age,” and reports by various analysts charging that the Eisenhower administration had sacrificed to the sacred cow of a balanced budget the military wherewith¬ al for a forceful, flexible, and effective diplomacy. Kennedy intended to give generals and admirals freer access to the oval office. His first dealings with the Chiefs of Staff, however, came with the Bay of Pigs. The next was with Laos. In the first case, the President felt that he had been deceived—the Chiefs had not made plain the probability that the landing would fail unless given overt American military support. On Laos, Kennedy asked the hard questions he had neglected to ask about the Cuban operation. He emerged from both experiences mistrusting not only the judgment of the Chiefs but also their competence. For self-protection, Kennedy called Maxwell Taylor out of retirement to serve on the White House staff and, in 1962, appointed him chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Even so, he never gave Taylor a status comparable 36 FOREIGN SERVICE JOURNAL, January, 1971 crucial choice before him, one that affected almost all States ambassadors abroad have to ask for rides in the international and domestic problems, was whether to step military attaches’ aircraft, and State Department officials down or to step up the scale of air operations in Vietnam. at home have to ask for rides in their Pentagon col¬ The Joint Chiefs and the American commander in Viet¬ leagues’ official automobiles. nam inevitably formed part of the circle from which he Not only is the Defense Department much bigger, but sought advice. it is much more pervasive. The State Department has Johnson, like Truman at the time of Korea, attempted embassies and consulates girdling the globe, and in most to counter waning popularity by demonstrating that his of those posts foreign service officers are matched by policies commanded support from the military establish¬ members of United States military missions. ment. For a time he kept McNamara so much in the As of June 30, 1969, there was a total of 8,264 foreground that reporters spoke of the war as “McNa¬ representatives of the Defense Department, compared mara’s war. When this tactic failed, the President turned with only 5,166 representatives of State at these overseas more to the professionals. In the winter of 1967-68 he missions. At least one ambassador to a Latin American summoned the field commander, General William C. country asked that the military mission in his country be Westmoreland, to address a joint session of Congress. reduced substantially but his request was never acted on. Johnson emphasized that his own actions accorded with The military presence extends also into the heartland advice from Westmoreland and the Joint Chiefs, although of the United States. Where the State Department has there is some reason to suppose that he used the military established only a few toe- and fingerholds in the local more as advocates in defense of his position than as councils on foreign relations in the largest urban centers, counselors on his choice of options. military establishments and defense plants mark the The Nixon administration appears to be establishing a length and breadth of the country. Thus the influence of pattern of civil-military relations which reverses that of the Defense Department, as measured by its presence and the Kennedy and Johnson years. While Secretary McNa¬ its spending power, is diffused throughout the United mara and Clark M. Clifford kept the uniformed military States, somewhat unevenly, but very widely; while the on a comparatively tight rein and permitted civilian much more limited potential influence of the State De¬ Defense staffs to proliferate, Secretary Melvin R. Laird partment and its ancillary agencies is limited to the nearly seems to be granting the military more autonomy and voteless District of Columbia and to voteless constituen¬ reducing the role of civilian staffers. Simultaneously, cies overseas. Henry A. Kissinger’s highly structured National Security The Defense Department’s extensive domestic involve¬ Council staff, and the new Defense Policy Review Com¬ ment gives it an advantage apart from the relative mittee suggest that President Richard M. Nixon may be strengths of constituencies—it sensitizes the department to substituting rigorous civilian institutional procedures for domestic political realities. It is spending taxpayers’ dol¬ the rigorous civilian systems analysis of his predecessors, lars. It is drafting the sons of citizens and voters. It is as his means of assuring civilian control. making decisions that affect the economic climate of American communities and the economic welfare of American companies. By contrast, the State Department is generally observing and reporting on a bewildering A s the military establishment has grown, the relative jumble of activities beyond the reach of the sovereign strength of the State Department and the Pentagon has power of the United States. At least until recently, shifted. Defense is now usually dominant. The most Defense has had a good deal less difficulty gaining obvious and perhaps the most important difference be¬ congressional approval for its enormous budget than State tween the Department of Defense and the Department of has had with its small one. But the Pentagon’s budgetary State is one of size. Expenditure for defense is now victories were as much a measure of its involvement in running at a rate some twenty times the rate for all other domestic politics as the State Department’s budgetary international activities, including foreign aid and the defeats are a measure of its estrangement from domestic United States Information Agency (if Vietnam expendi¬ politics. Pentagon policy-makers are much less likely than tures are excluded the ratio might be down to fifteen to State Department planners to ignore the primacy of one, although a large part of foreign aid expenditures also American domestic politics in making calculations about go to Vietnam). Even in terms of physical plant, the new the political behavior of their own government. It may State Department building in Foggy Bottom does not seem paradoxical yet be a reflection of its strength that by begin to compete in size with the Pentagon itself, quite far the stronger of the two departments should be more apart from the Little Pentagon in the redevelopment area responsive to domestic political pressures. on the Washington side of the Potomac. The fact that the Defense Department is primarily The size of the military establishment not only provides responsible for the management of its huge resources economies of scale, but also makes resources available at gives it still another advantage over the State Depart¬ the top, in manpower, in expertise, and in the variety of ment. The Secretary of State, under at least three Pres¬ services that can make the difference between crisply idents, has seen it as his primary responsibility to advise executed operations and constantly cramped and cur¬ the President, rather than to direct the affairs of his tailed operations. It may not be true that overseas department. The under secretaries and the assistant secre¬ commercial telephone conversations between State De¬ taries see their primary role as furnishing policy advice to partment officials and embassies abroad have been cut the Secretary, rather than carrying out the policies he and off in mid-ocean because appropriations were exhausted; the President establish. The bureau chiefs, the section but it is true that only the Defense Department (and chiefs, and the branch chiefs in turn see themselves through it, the White House) has effective immediate primarily as policy advisors, looking up toward their voice communications throughout the world. United superiors rather than down toward the management of FOREIGN SERVICE JOURNAL, January, 1971 37 their own departments. Whatever criticisms can be made parallel functions in the Plans and Policy Directorate of of Defense management—and current evidence indicates the Joint Staff, complete with its own regional desks, like they can be made with considerable effectiveness—it the regional desks in the Secretary’s office and the must be recognized that Defense Department officials, regional bureaus in the Department of State. Here, as military and civilian, regard the management of the elsewhere, imitation proved to be the sincerest form of defense establishment as their primary and ultimate re¬ flattery. sponsibility. The Department’s orientation toward the management of men and machines in turn puts an emphasis on speed and efficiency in Defense operations MILITARY considerations and military logic have domi¬ which State fails to match, even making allowances for nated United States foreign policy in part because the the relative strengths in resources available to manage¬ American people, in the period after World War II came ment. Somehow the responsible officials in Defense have to repose special trust in the judgment of professional tended in recent years to learn about a new crisis before military men and also because this trust arose out of fear the State Department officials got the word. The State of a cold war antagonist. Department memorandum reaches the White House a That this assertion had some basis in reality is demon¬ day or two after the Defense Department memorandum, strated, paradoxically, by an episode often cited as prov¬ and the staff work in the State memorandum is frequently ing the vitality of the principle of civilian supremacy—the not as crisply or as effectively done. A former White MacArthur crisis of 1951. Dissenting publicly against House staff officer noted that when he called for briefing rulings by the President, General Douglas MacArthur had papers on short notice from State for a presidential called for enlarging the Korean War and backing a overseas trip, his first deadline passed without any re¬ Chinese Nationalist campaign against the mainland Com¬ sponse. He then turned to the office of International munists. After repeated instances of insubordination, Security Affairs at Defense, which responded with a Truman relieved the general of his command. There complete concise, and thoroughly indexed briefing book. followed an outcry in the press and on Capitol Hill, a State finally crashed through with several cardboard hero’s welcome for MacArthur in Los Angeles and New cartons of unsorted cables on the countries listed in the York, and a two-month hearing conducted jointly by the President’s itinerary. These are clearly differences that do Foreign Relations and Armed Services Committees of the not go to the merits or to the wisdom of the recommenda¬ Senate. Since this hearing ended with all members of both tions emanating from the two departments. They do go to committees agreeing that the President had not exceeded the likelihood that the first recommendations will be acted his constitutional powers, the result was hailed at the on and acted on favorably. time, and has been hailed since, as a reaffirmation that One of the consequences of this military-civilian com¬ the elected civilian representative of the people retains petition in the area of weapons development was first the ultimate control over policy and strategy. creation of a (primarily civilian) office of Systems Analy¬ Yet, if one looks more closely, another conclusion sis within the Office of the Secretary of Defense, and then might be drawn. The President’s party held majorities in the creation of matching capabilities by the Joint Chiefs. both houses of Congress. Of the twenty-eight Senators on Similarly, in the foreign policy area, the office of Interna¬ the two committees that conducted the hearings, only tional Security Affairs developed almost as a miniature eight sided openly with MacArthur on the question of State Department, and this development was followed by how the war should be fought. One would suppose that an outcome favorable to the President might have been predictable from the beginning. Evidently, however, ad¬ ministration supporters on the two committees felt an intensive investigation was necessary. During the hearings they interrogated fourteen witnesses, including the Secre¬ tary of Defense, four members of the JCS, and five additional generals or admirals. The friends of the admin¬ istration pressed each representative of the military estab¬ lishment to say that the President had had their advice on the relevant issues of strategy and policy before he overruled a recommendation from MacArthur. It cannot be proven, of course, that the outcome of the hearings would have been different if this parade of military witnesses had not appeared in support of the President. On the other hand, it is not hard to surmise that the verdict in the two committees, in Congress, and in the country might have been much closer, or indeed have gone against Truman, had Secretary of Defense Marshall, Chairman Bradley, and the other Chiefs sided instead with MacArthur. Of course, it can be said that the issues of 1951 were partly military issues. It can also be argued that Marshall, the Chiefs, and Eisenhower be¬ lieved they owed loyalty to President Truman, regardless of whether he had accepted their recommendations. (Continued on page 44) 38 FOREIGN SERVICE JOURNAL, January, 1971 Congo, grappled with several attempts to find a definition of the term merce¬ nary, but he failed to find anything satisfactory either to himself or the general reader. He admits, however, that he “makes no claims to be definitive and aims rather at entertain¬ ment than instruction.” The heart of the book, the chapters The Military Complex velopment of the Christian Dem¬ on the Congo, is a poorly organized MILITARISM, USA, by Col. James A. ocratic movement, maintained that collection of rumors, superficial de¬ Donovan USMC (Ret). Scribners, $6.95. history moves simultaneously in oppo¬ scriptions of skirmishes, plots and site directions. In short, two counter¬ counter-plots. He seemed to find the CIA behind just about every bush and T o most of us, faithful to the con¬ vailing forces are to be found in most cept of civilian authority over the societies. One is creative, and gives mysterious Frenchmen involved where he could not implicate the CIA. He military, "Militarism, USA” will come history its dynamic quality. The other as a shock. Perhaps it’s just that wars is static and, while it too may shape never quite made up his mind as to the are coming closer together, and that history, this force invariably leads to combat effectiveness of the merce¬ we during “peacetime” have felt too stagnation. naries and his entire text is filled with inaccuracies, poor editing and undocu¬ compelled to maintain a strong deter¬ The American community of schol¬ mented assertions. He also touched rent force to avoid wider conflict, but ars is divided in its assessment of the the result is that the military establish¬ upon the limited use of mercenaries in likely contribution of the African mili¬ the Yemen in 1963 and Biafrain 1968- ment has been steadily growing in tary to the development of local socie¬ 69. power and influence. It is also growing ties. There is some acknowledgement At best, the book might be of inter¬ more inflexible in doctrine. In his that, following the achievement of chapter on Careerism, for example, est to JOURNAL readers who served in independence, the first generation of or near the Congo during its succes¬ author Donovan cites the period of civilian leaders was far from success¬ service in the rank of colonel or cap¬ sion^ crisis and are interested in pick¬ ful in its efforts to create variable gov¬ ing up a few new rumors. The only tain (Navy) as the dangerous years erning institutions. However, the forc¬ when the pressure to conform with real substance in the book is contained ible removal of these leaders has been in the concluding chapter which exam¬ the service’s standards in order to be treated with considerable reserve. In one of the few promoted further can ines the prospects for mercenaries in addition to the frailties of Africa’s future wars. Mr. Mockler concludes stifle originality and independence of military “establishments,” the limited thought. Furthermore, the author that it is likely that mercenaries would “competence” and erratic political be useful only as technical advisers gives some glimpses behind the scenes style of army chieftains are held to which suggest that the briefings on and instructors who can explain to un¬ diminish prospects for the avoidance tutored natives the intricacies of mod¬ which senior officers base their deci¬ of political stagnation. sions are not the objective presenta¬ ern weapon technology. It appears un¬ The contributors to “Soldier and likely that many countries can afford tions one would hope for. This is State” are divided in their assessment. particularly true of the statistical data to recruit outside help in sufficient But, if the experiences of Algeria, numbers to be decisive in future en¬ coming out of Vietnam, which he Ghana, Nigeria, and the Congo are an ruthlessly dissects to show how tenu¬ gagements; the brains rather than the adequate guide, we can assume that a ous the information compiled in pa¬ brawn and daring of a limited number basis for optimism exists. The message pers such as the Bomb Damage As¬ of foreigners remain the only market¬ of this study is that the military al¬ sessment Reports really is. able qualities unemployed or under¬ most certainly will continue to involve employed military men will have to It is of course the Vietnam war itself in the nation-state building proc¬ which triggered the critical analysis of offer the highest bidders. ess—and could produce results that —JOHN W. STEPHENS which this book is a prime example. bring African societies into a state of Donovan is not really breaking new grace. Varieties of Revolution ground when he concludes that “1) there are limits to the power of the —WILLIAM H. LEWIS INSURGENT ERA, by Richard H. Sanger, US, and 2) the US is strategically Potomac Books, Inc., $7.50. For Congo Hands essentially an air/sea power—not a PDINTING out that political-social in¬ land power.” What is particularly note¬ THE MERCENARIES, by Anthony Mockler. surgencies have been occurring on an worthy is that this is a book written Macmillan, $6.95. average of one a month since World by a military officer who takes a good War II, this book, updated from a hard look at his colleagues and is THE book is primarily concerned with 1967 version, examines and categor¬ alarmed both at the degree of influ¬ the exploits of the motley bands that izes their primary characteristics. ence which they have and at their fought in the Congo under the loose The major revolutions examined in preparation for their huge responsibil¬ and erratic leadership of Messrs. Den- this book are categorized as either ities. ard, Hoare, Peters, Schramme, Muel¬ societal revolutions (Russia, China, —A. W. BOLSTER ler and Puren during Katanga’s quest Egypt, Cuba); independence rebellions for independence. To introduce the (Indochina, India); and Cold War The Opposite Ways of History reader to the mentality of the white conflicts (The Congo, The Philippines, SOLDIER AND STATE IN AFRICA, edited by adventurers in the Congo, the author Vietnam). These analyses are pre¬ Claude E. Welch, Jr. Northwestern Uni¬ spent the first half of the book racing ceded by an excellently-done chapter versity Press. through six centuries of exploits of entitled “The Life Cycle of a Revolt,” various mercenary groups. In the in which the successive revolutionary J ACQUES MARITAIN, the French phi¬ process, Mr. Mockler, a former corre¬ stages culminating in manipulated tur¬ losopher whose views inspired the de¬ spondent for THE GUARDIAN in the moil in the streets are laid out for the FOREIGN SERVICE JOURNAL, January, 1971 39 reader with clarity and succinctness. Arab-Israeli settlement. But these are Although there are indeed other local This chapter usefully sets the stage for merely illustrations of the truism conflicts and tensions which, as Mr. the ensuing country case studies. that no two people see the problem in Kleinman points out, would have cre¬ In general, the author, a retired the same way. Wilson’s book will be ated instability in the area and prob¬ FSO, has turned out a concise (172 of interest to both the general and the ably made major power intervention pages-plus a compendium of postwar specialized reader, and includes the inevitable in any event, these conflicts incidents of political violence), well- texts of important documents on the would not have given the Soviets the researched and well-written study of Middle East in an appendix. vehicle which the Arab-Israeli struggle political, economic and social convul¬ Robert Silverberg is an American has given them. Nonetheless, Mr. sions which inevitably beset develop¬ Jew who discovered to his surprise on Kleinman has analyzed quite acutely ing countries early on. Parenthetical¬ June 5, 1967 that he felt personally the present uneasy alliance between ly, its textbook potential is affected by involved in the Arab-Israeli war, and the Arabs and their Soviet benefactors a few minor proofling errors, which set out to probe the reasons for this (or is it vice versa?), although I presumably will be corrected in sub¬ involvement. “If I Forget Thee, O would challenge some of his assump¬ sequent printings. Jerusalem” is a history of Israel and tions on Arab motivations and poli¬ The author, however, does appear of American Zionism. The author tics. He concludes with a call for a to get somewhat off the track in a wrote it with his eyes wide open. The strengthened US presence; militarily, brief wind-up discussion of the inevi¬ more cynical and unpleasant parts of in cooperation with our Mediterranean tability of continued political violence the story are not glossed over. The allies, and in terms of a more under¬ in developing countries, and of their story has two villains—the British and standing policy toward the Arabs. The implications for the US. The US the State Department—but no real first elements are part of our current should not preempt the action, as the heroes. The parts on the rise of Amer¬ concerns, but the last is very much a author advocates in selective cases, ican Zionism are particularly valuable. facet of the Arab-Israeli conflict which simply to preclude the “Communists” The book is marred by a few errors Mr. Kleinman has attempted to avoid. from doing so. Hopefully, the Nixon of fact, most of them not very impor¬ —GORDON S. BROWN Doctrine means what it says, the Cam¬ tant for the “big picture.” Somewhat bodian example notwithstanding; hope¬ more serious-—and more surprising— The Race in Latin America fully, our interests will in fact shape is the author’s misrepresentation of THE UNREVOLUTIONARY SOCIETY — The our commitments, rather than the re¬ Israeli nationalism: he is quite mistak¬ Power of Latin American Conservatism en in viewing the fairly common dis¬ in a Changing World, by John Mander. verse. If US preemption takes place Knopf, $6.95. on this basis, in full appreciation of taste for customs and personality the economic, military, social and po¬ traits which made up the stereotype of HERE are very few intellectual the Diaspora Jew, as a “rejection of T litical consequences, this may be as it books written in English about Latin should be and as the author intended. Judaism.” But these are minor irrita¬ America. There are fewer intellectuals tions; Silverberg’s book is both worth¬ But, if so, he needs to make the point who write books in English about while and eminently readable. more clearly. Latin America. John Mander and —C. ARNOLD FRESHMAN —M. TERESITA CURRIE “The Unrevolutionary Society” do much toward filling that gap. Mander, Israel—Two Conflicting Rights The Uneasy Alliance JERUSALEM, KEY TO PEACE, by Evan M. a contributing editor of ENCOUNTER, SOVIET RUSSIA AND THE MIDDLE EAST, takes the typical 90-day or 180-day Wilson, Middle East Institute, $5.95. by Aaron S. Kleinman. The Johns Hop¬ IF I FORGET THEE, O JERUSALEM, by kins Press (Studies in International Af¬ trip around the hemisphere but Robert Silverberg, Morrow $12.95. fairs), $2.45. presents his findings in a most enlight¬ ening and untypical manner. Present- 0 HAIM WEIZMANN once said that the THE dramatic growth of Soviet po¬ day Latin America is seen not through story of Israel’s establishment was not litical and military presence in the the eyes of the present-day traveler the story of right confronting wrong, Middle East has been the stuff of but as an outgrowth of its culture, its but of two conflicting rights. It is many a news report over the three colonization, its traditions and its writ¬ refreshing indeed to come upon two years since the 1967 Arab-Israeli war. ings. Ideas are presented by Borges, books, from very different sources, Mr. Kleinman has attempted in this da Cunha, Gallegos, Sarmiento, Fuen- which make room for this dilemma. short and useful book to put the So¬ tes, Neruda and Vargas Llosa much Evan Wilson was the US Consul viet role in its proper historical and more than they are presented by General in Jerusalem during the 1967 political perspective, and to trace some Mander. war. His book grew out of years of of the landmarks along the Soviets’ “The Unrevolutionary Society” is involvement with the Palestine prob¬ route to their present position. In not necessarily an easy book to read. lem. “Jerusalem, Key to Peace” is pointing out that the primary Soviet It is even a bit heavy at times. This is part travelogue and part history as motive is to gain comparative advan¬ probably because Mander has filled it seen through the eyes of a participant. tage over its big power adversaries in with so much. The normal facts and The moving spirit behind the book is this geopolitically important area, he figures are not present, but rather Wilson’s captivation with the city and properly concludes that the Kremlin provocative thoughts, ideas, theories its people. This same fascination is at policymakers have followed a course and philosophies are employed to the heart of the proposal for a determined as much by opportunism bring current political, social and Jerusalem settlement which winds up as by conscious design. Unfortunately, economic situations into perspective. the book. Mr. Kleinman does not address him¬ Perhaps a few examples of Mander’s His account of the history of the self adequately or even directly to the statements might best provide a feel¬ Arab-Israeli conflict gives rather more most important of the opportunities ing for the kind of thinking that is weight to the various international offered by the area’s instabilities; stimulated by his book. “The United commissions and the UN than I would namely the unresolved Arab-Israeli States will be mature when she has learned to guard against the alternat¬ have done. I am also unable to share conflict, which has allowed the Soviets the author’s hope that a settlement in to capitalize on the Arabs’ perceived ing pessimism and optimism that Jerusalem could precede a general need for a major power supporter. have bedevilled her Latin American 40 FOREIGN' SERVICE JOURNAL, January, 1971 policy in the past.” “Chile’s exposed reconnaissance. The title, “Unarmed class job sorting out arms control position in international trade gives and Unafraid,” is taken from the mot¬ problems as they affect the Soviet rise to a profound feeling of impo¬ to of US reconnaissance pilots Union. Though one (especially one tence among her intellectuals. What “Alone, Unarmed, and Unafraid.” with some special knowledge of results is a kind of paranoid night¬ Infield traces the history of aerial SALT) may disagree with occasional mare, in which the local Oligarchy, reconnaissance all the way back to specifics, this effort is especially useful and Army, the CIA, the Pentagon and 1794, when a French balloon was for understanding some of the motiva¬ the World Bank have become fused used for observation, through similar tions and thinking behind Soviet ap¬ into a single monster, ever ready to activities during the Civil War and proaches to SALT. swoop and smother the helpless into the age of heavier-than-air recon¬ Although work for the book appar¬ dreamer.” “The blame for the obsta¬ naissance aircraft in World War I. ently was finished before the Spring cles to reform that are built into Latin Most of the book concerns itself with 1970 SALT session in Vienna, nothing American society is imputed—and this such reconnaissance during World that evolved over the summer suggests is psychologically understandable—to War II and the Korean War. Cold there has been a shift in attitudes that an outside force, the United States of War activities and the Vietnam War would change the book’s basic conclu¬ America. Yet this can only compound are also covered. Unfortunately, secu¬ sion: the feeling of impotence.” “Peron was rity classification did not permit a "Realistic analysis suggests that a Nasserist ten years before Nasser.” complete run-down on the ubiquitous even at their most productive point, spy satellites. “Americans should at least be aware Soviet-American arms control negoti¬ of this possibility: that if there is a Within the restrictions imposed by ations will not profoundly alter their race in Latin America, it may not be a national security, the book is reason¬ adversary relationship, nor will they race between Communism and de¬ ably informative and may be of some measurably affect the range of their mocracy, but between democracy and use to those concerned with the prob¬ traditional political interests and ob¬ authoritarian technocracy.” lems of reconnaissance from the sky jectives. The negotiations would, how¬ This is not a book of the Left nor and space. ever, stabilize and formalize Soviet- of the Right, but rather a thinking —AL STOFFEL American relations and thus affirm man’s book on Latin America and some new rules of the game for the should be read by serious students of superpower in the 1970s.” the area. SALT: The Eastern Perspective Though the book doesn’t spell it —A. IRWIN RUBENSTEIN THE SOVIET UNION AND ARMS CON¬ out, one of the more suggestive TROL: A Superpower Dilemma, by Ro¬ I Spy From Above man Kolkowicz and others. Johns thoughts arising from the analysis is UNARMED AND UNAFRAID, by Glenn B. Hopkins Press, paper: $2.95. that arms control problems for super¬ Infield. Macmillan, $7.95. powers have some interesting similari¬ ties which transcend the nature of GLENN B. INFIELD, a former USAF T HE collaborating authors of this their internal political system. Major, has written a history of aerial short, pithy volume have done a first¬ —JOHN D. STEMPEL STATUARY RAPE ly Henry J. Paoli “IS§€I I think III send Vice-Consul Ballino to Lower Wattai(The Consul thinks he's sending me to Lower Wattci. The Pacific Future closely related in a number of mula of the class struggle, imported different projects, policies and ar¬ into Latin America, has no applica¬ THE EMERGING JAPANESE SUPERSTATE: tion. Change and revolution here, he Challenge and Response, by Herman eas, and they are going to be Kahn, Prentice-Hall. deeply concerned with each oth¬ says, are not brought about by the er’s intentions and prospects.” urban workers or the peasants but by the intellectual and middle class lead¬ HERMAN KAHN believes that before The book tells why this is so and contains many suggestions for both ers eager for power. Their ambitions we reach the year 2000 Japan will fit the Iberian Peninsula ideal of the have equalled, if not surpassed Ameri¬ American and Japanese leaders which should not lightly be disregarded. Al¬ social pyramid and they seek the top ca and the Soviet Union in terms of so as to control the levers of decision GNP, that she will be an economic, though there will be much disagree¬ ment with many of Mr. Kahn’s state¬ making, not to help the unwashed technological giant or superstate and achieve their rising expectations. that it is likely she will want to be¬ ments, policy makers in both Japan come financially and politically pow¬ and America can benefit from reading The would-be leaders, the “orga¬ erful in international affairs and will this far from silly book. nizers,” bring about change or revolu¬ probably endeavor to become a mili¬ —JOHN M. ALLISON tion with the aid of their clientela, tary superpower, possessing at least a presently the urban workers and peas¬ defensive nuclear capability. He has American Forces in Europe ants, but in former days made up of written a book to prove his point but THE MIGHTY ENDEAVOR, American Armed the rural workers attached to each is frank to admit he may be wrong Forces in the European Theater in World hacienda or fazenda. These lower so¬ War II, by Charles B. MacDonald. Oxford cial orders he describes as the “avail- and he outlines arguments against his University Press, $12.50. thesis. However, while he admits all ables,” always hopeful, always used by these arguments have some substance CHARLES B. MACDONALD, having the organizers who, Mercier feels, he believes none of them are suffici¬ written wholly or in part, some twelve turn out to be the only beneficiaries. ently strong completely to invalidate histories of World War II in Europe is Mercier also introduces a novel his case. well qualified to do another one. He concept with regard to the familiar John Leonard of the NEW YORK should also know whether another one classes of society, adding “the state” TIMES has called this a “silly book” is needed. as a class. The state, he feels, contin¬ apparently because Mr. Kahn doesn’t In “The Mighty Endeavor” he has ues to assume new powers because the speak or read Japanese and cites as his produced a good readable one-volume oligarchy will not assume new respon¬ favorite book on the Japanese charac¬ history emphasizing the role of Amer¬ sibilities, or the middle class are un¬ ter “The Chrysanthemum and the ican forces in that vast campaign. As able to fulfill society’s new demands or Sword” by Ruth Benedict, who also befits a Department of the Army because either class would rather have had no knowledge of the Japanese historian, his book concentrates on the state take on new powers than a language and had never been to Japan the role of the ground forces. His rival class. The operators of this new when she wrote her book. Mr. Leon¬ bibliography and documentation ap¬ “state class” are the technocrats who ard seems to believe such a person pear to be complete and accurate. use their skills and the rubric of revo¬ cannot know enough about Japan to His account of the battle of the lutionary ideology to build the state justify the extreme views he puts for¬ Ardennes, described as the greatest power for their own benefit. ward. Yet, former Ambassador Rei- single battle ever engaged by Ameri¬ Mercier sees social conflicts not as schauer, generally considered to be can forces, inspires one to read more fundamental class struggles but ten¬ one of the leading American experts on that subject, perhaps John Eisen¬ sions between static and dynamic so¬ on Japan, and who does have a thor¬ hower’s “The Bitter Woods.” cial structures. He feels the solution ough knowledge of Japanese, has —AL STOFFEL lies neither in Marxism nor capitalism characterized Miss Benedict’s book as but by integrating a community politi¬ The Mirage of Revolution “a classic on the Japanese personali¬ cally, keeping its over-all problems ty.” Mr. Kahn’s book may seem to ROADS TO POWER IN LATIN AMERICA, by continually in sight. He would appear some a bit silly here and there but it is Luis Mercier Vega. Praeger, $6.00. to favor the Social-Christian concept not as silly as Mr. Leonard’s review. of seeking to create a great internal LUIS MERCIER VEGA has taken an mystique oriented towards develop¬ Mr. Kahn makes clear in his Fore¬ iconoclastic approach to various of ment and accompanied by “properly word that “the main purpose of this the doctrines long applied to revolu¬ conceived” international aid from de¬ book is to open up discussion rather tion and change. His study leaves veloped countries. However, Mercier than settle it.” This he certainly ac¬ something to be desired in its organi¬ complishes and anyone who is inter¬ zation and presentation of its conclu¬ ends on a somewhat despondent note. ested in the future of American- sions, but it is stimulating and offers He feels the political party leaders’ efforts are “directed towards the con¬ Japanese relations and how they will several helpful leads for those analys¬ affect the whole Pacific area in the ing and seeking to indicate the out¬ struction of machines with which to next two or three decades will find come of socio-political change in Lat¬ seize power, not towards the slow and difficult task of creating associations much in this short book to stimulate in America. Although Mr. Mercier in the work places and neighbor¬ thought and argument. Mr. Kahn is uses the term Latin America in his hoods.” Furthermore, he feels it would certainly correct when he points out title and although he does seek to that despite present indications of develop a generalized approach, he be foolish to believe that the new holders of state power will remain wanting to be less dependent upon recognizes the individuality of the true to the moral principles which America and irrespective of choices Latin American nations and deals originally inspired them and will be which the Japanese may make in the with seven specific countries in terms unable “to resist the exhilarations of next few years on economic, political of his own theories. and defense policies, Mercier makes a series of interest¬ power, the taste for rapid and spec¬ tacular public works, and the all too “. . . the future is going to find ing observations particularly with re¬ gard to change, who brings it about, easy confusion between public power the United States and Japan with and the welfare of the citizens.” many things to say to each other; why and how. they are further going to be He argues that the European for- —JOHN M. CATES, JR. 42 FOREIGN SERVICE JOURNAL, January, 1971 Not Just Gold—Everything Mr. Hemming devotes the rest of Only Government Employees qualify.. . THE CONQUEST OF THE INCAS, by John his work to the first centuries of Span¬ that’s why you get more money and a Hemming. Harcourt, Bruce & Jovanovich, ish rule, the conflicting policies of the better deal! 1970 500 pp. with Notes and Bibliogra¬ Spanish crown—torn between human¬ phy. itarian aspirations and greed for gold and the resistance and rebellions of TIE conquest of Peru by one hun¬ the surviving Inca leaders. The whole dred and fifty armorclad Spaniards, book is fascinating and can be unre¬ CASH led by a 55-year-old illiterate Spanish servedly recommended. adventurer named Francisco Pizarro, —CHARLES MAECHLING, JR. is one of the most extraordinary dra¬ by jet to you! -r mas of history. Anyone who has Dialogues with the Great traveled by air to Cuzco—or better INTERPRETING AMERICAN HISTORY: Con¬ yet, taken the Central Railroad of versations with Historians, by John A. Garraty. Macmillan. Peru to La Oroya and Huancayo— can testify to the indomitable courage MAGINE, after having read the major *5000 and limitless reserves of endurance which must have been present for men works on American history, being able and horses to traverse the bleak desert to engage some of the best American of the coastal plain and scale the historians in discussions on their writ¬ towering western wall of the Andes. ings, on their views of history, on their fellow historians. Or better, imagine Prescott’s “The Conquest of Peru,” which still remains the classic treat¬ reading a standard work and being ment of the subject, was a work of able to determine if the author has such transcendent literary merit that it changed his position since the writing. has daunted every newcomer since its Few have the opportunity to do this. No one has done it with the care, publication in 1847. Yet Prescott nev¬ Fast airmail service er visited Peru, confined his researches method and skill of Professor Garraty of Columbia who has collected his worldwide ... complete to the Spanish archives—then the only discussions in his latest book. He in¬ source available—and ended his story i&X privacy! in 1548 with the termination of the terviews twenty-nine major historians about American history from the bloody internecine struggle between founding of the colonies to the You get money fast from TWS without need¬ rival Spanish factions. Thus, he did present. The reader is treated to well- less delay. Airmail service anywhere in the not concern himself with the fate of edited, informal and informative con¬ world puts money in your hands as rapidly the Incas and their subjects for the versations which begin where the as you could get it locally. There are no next 250 years of Spanish rule. books leave off: Commager on na¬ embarrassing investigations and you enjoy Mr. Hemming, a young Canadian complete privacy. You have full freedom to tionalism, Morris on constitutional in¬ historian, has now produced the first move anywhere in the world. Compare our terpretations, Elkins on slavery, low rates. comprehensive study of the Inca Em¬ Woodward on the Negro, Link on pire and its conquest which draws on SAMPLE TWS PAYMENTS Wilson, Ferrell on foreign policy, etc. archaeological findings and documents Each reconsiders his own writings and that have come to light since Prescott. comments on the interpretations of 29.00 i 696.00 To these new sources he brings an others. It constitutes a different and intimate knowledge of the terrain and valuable approach in historiography. a crisp and lucid narrative style. The Among the most interesting com¬ Shorter repayment periods are result is an exciting book, replete with ments are those on the New Left available if desired. new information and insights. For full information contact TWS. historians, none of whom, unfortu¬ From Prescott one gets the impres¬ Phone (214) 638-2840. Or cable: nately, were interviewed. It is the Transworld, Dallas, Texas. sion that by supernatural feats of book’s only flaw that in looking for prowess, the Spaniards overthrew the “the best man in each field,” Garraty’s MAIL COUPON TODAY! You get complete details by return airmail. Incas almost at a stroke. Hemming criteria needlessly produced a homo¬ shows that the reality was far more geneous “establishment” collection of TWS is affiliated with complex. The Spaniards hit Peru just historians. Twenty interviewers are The Continental Corporation after the conclusion of a dynastic civil from the northeastern seaboard, five war. Their success in reaching the from the same campus as Garraty. Trans World Services, Inc. heart of the Inca empire and captur¬ This good book would have benefited Suite 404, Stemmons Tower West, Dallas, Texas 75207 ing Atahualpa was attributable partly from at more varied selection. NOTE: Only civil service employees GS-8 and to the smallness of their force—which Besides this self-imposed limitation, up are eligible for TWS service. was regarded as an expedition of gold- the book accurately reflects a general hungry marauders, not an invasion— failing of American historical scholar¬ Position and partly to apathy and disaffection ship, neglect of the colonial period. Yrs. in Civil Service among the defeated elements of the Until 1945 we had spent more time as Gov't. Organization (be specific) Inca’s subjects. Their military exploits colonies than as an independent na¬ against incredible odds were largely tion. Yet American historians have the result of cohesion and ruthlessness lopsidedly written of and studied the Resident address born of desperation, coupled with the second half of our history. Only two immunity afforded by their armor. It historians interviewed in this book was not until after the murder of have specialized in the colonial peri¬ Atahualpa that the Incas realized that od. Garraty probably would have in¬ FOR FAST SERVICE—attach resume of your the Spaniards were not just after gold, cluded more, if he could have found financial requirements, bank reference, and list of all creditors. F-01-1 but the kingdom that produced it. them. —TED MCNAMARA FOREIGN SERVICE JOURNAL, January, 1971 43 MILITARY INFLUENCE (Continued from page 38) When pressed as to whether he would himself speak out In retrospect, the militarization of American foreign publicly if he believed presidential decisions to be militar¬ policy appears almost inevitable. The wartime atmo¬ ily wrong, Bradley replied, “No sir. ... I have been sphere soon resumed after World War II. The Soviet brought up a little differently.” Nevertheless, the conclu¬ Union from 1945 onward seemed to many observers sion is almost inescapable that Harry Truman had to aggressively expansionistic and implacably hostile. have demonstrable support from the military establish¬ Awareness of advances in weaponry and delivery systems ment. It was a political necessity. It may have been a made Americans newly apprehensive about their own prerequisite of his survival as President. safety. It is hard to conceive, under the circumstances, how reasonable men in the executive branch could have developed or espoused any policies other than those IN part, hero worship, carrying over from World War II, emphasizing military security, enemy capabilities, and explained the extraordinary public confidence enjoyed by readiness for worst contingencies. In any event, they did the military. The popularity that attached after the Revo¬ not, despite periods of vacillation and sporadic attempts lutionary War and the Civil War to George Washington, at applying civilian checks and balances. Ulysses Grant, and other generals attached after World The large role played by the military establishment in War II to Marshall, MacArthur, Eisenhower, Bradley, framing and executing foreign policies was merely one and a few others. In part, the preoccupying issues of the by-product of the forces that produced the policies them¬ period accounted for public attitudes, for the citizenry selves. Civilians like Dean Acheson, Dulles, and Dean would, under the circumstances, have looked to military Rusk did not speak lines written for them by the Joint men for some counsel. Also the unusual position occupied Chiefs or by Secretaries of Defense. They spoke their by the military was due to the weakness of the competi¬ convictions in the language most likely to persuade Con¬ tion. A long-term secular trend had diminished the stature gress and the public. They framed their proposals in such of the clergy; the Depression had shaken people’s faith in a way as to justify open support by military men. It is fair businessmen, Roosevelt’s duel with the “nine old men” to say that if American foreign policy became partially and controversies aroused by the Earl Warren court cut militarized, the blame should not be laid primarily on the into the prestige of the judiciary and by extension, the military establishment but on Presidents, civilian policy¬ legal profession. Of national political leaders after FDR, makers, the Congress, and the American people. only Eisenhower commanded blind trust among large Whether the military is preserving its dominant role numbers of citizens. (The Kennedy magic developed under the Nixon administration—at a time of tightening largely after his assassination, not before.) And Eisen¬ controls and declining military popularity, yet with a hower came from the military. continuing and expanding war—remains to be seen. ■ WHERE DIPLOMATS DINE THE FOUR GEORGES RESTAURANTS—Four distinctively designed dining rooms, each created in a mood and motif re¬ flective of its culinary achievements. Located in the famous Georgetown Inn in the heart of Georgetown—luxurious accom¬ modations. 1310 Wisconsin Ave., N.W. Free Parkinq, 333-8900. LA FONDA, 1639 "R" St., N.W., AD 2-6965. For years the favorite of true aficionados of delectable Spanish and Mexi¬ can food served in a romantic atmosphere. Complete bar. Lunch and dinner parties. Credit cards honored. Open daily 11:30 to midnight, Sunday, 2 to 10 p.m. ☆ it ☆ THE SKY ROOM . . . Hotel Washington, Penn. Ave. 4 15th ... A panoramic view of the Washington scene is a breath-taking backdrop to sophisticated atmosphere here . . . International menu, with a French accent, includes flaminq sword medallions of beef tenderloin bourquignonne. ☆ ☆ ☆ FOREIGN SERVICE CLUB, 2101 E St., N.W., 338-5730. Membership open to all members of the American Foreign Service Association. Open weekdays for lunch, 12-3. Reser¬ vations accepted for lunch, dinner, cocktail parties for twelve or more. Continental menu and daily buffet. Phone 338-4045 for membership information. 44 FOREIGN SERVICE JOURNAL, January, 1971 MILITARY PROGRESS manently established bureaucracies, viability of the military institutions continued from page 33 may be expected to follow. themselves. The military profession of military forces in the Third My own research on Peru suggests and institutions must be preserved World. In a number of countries, these longer term institutional con¬ from excessive political adventur¬ observers recently claim to have cerns there have included, since ism. No single partisan clique can identified a “new” military assert¬ before the 1968 coup: 1) Institu¬ normally control the military for ing leadership in a search for so¬ tional Autonomy and Survival, 2) long, even in the name of progress. cial and economic progress. Mili¬ Public Order and th; Control of For the military institutions tary regimes may, in given circum¬ Remote Areas, 3) Foreign Policy themselves, therefore, the longer stances and for brief periods, play a and Boundary Questions, and, par¬ run consequences of any attempt to progressive role in overall social and ticularly in the last decade, 4) Na¬ assert a dominant military role in economic development. tional Development, including un¬ the political search for develop¬ Particular executive acts may be der that rubric education, industri¬ ment are likely to include a return called for by radical elements of alization, control of strategic mate¬ to quarters. The return may come left and right who see the military rials (petroleum, telecommunica¬ later rather than sooner in some as a means of out-maneuvering tions), and general national plan¬ cases, and may be as transient as conservative and liberal democratic ning and support for central govern¬ the attempt to assert the enlarged political opponents. In the near ment authority and administration. role. But it is inevitable. term, such policies, like agrarian The internal political diversity of For the country as a whole, the reform, may thus correspond to the the armed forces in Peru, as in all consequences of changes in military development objectives of specific moderately developed countries, participation in government are political groups. Normally, howev¬ may prevent the adoption of consis¬ likely to be determined by the er, these policies must always be tent development policies by the nature of the civil-military coalition differentiated from the longer-run military as such, however. The very in power. It is to the identification objectives of the military as an in¬ bureaucratic complexity of the mili¬ of that coalition and its characteris¬ stitution. tary acts as an internal self-regulat¬ tics, rather than to consideration of To determine long term military ing process inhibiting policies whose “military” or “civilian” dominance orientations, we must consider the effects, directly or indirectly, might in themselves, that political-military historic institutional policy prece¬ threaten to increase internal diver¬ reporting and analysis should be dents that the military forces, as per¬ sity to the point of endangering the directed. | Before... After... 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The United States often has participated in a coup attempt continued from page 16 seems to ignore Peru and its prob¬ merely because of his US training is a reflection on the technical military lems, but it is nonetheless the as arbitrary as to claim that this record of US advisors. world’s leading military power. training has made him more dem¬ Relations between US military Peruvian officers, therefore, while ocratic. Worse, such claims betray personnel in the missions and their often happy to turn toward France, an arrogant refusal to take seriously Peruvian counterparts had histori¬ England or Japan for the acquisition the internal resilience and resource¬ cally been cordial, though increas¬ of armaments and for certain types fulness of Peruvians. When such at¬ ingly distant. Much of the American of training, nonetheless would like to titudes become translated into poli¬ military personnel’s activity was continue to have access to the cies, as with the F-5, the result is to dedicated to the maintenance of United States for equipment and ad¬ provoke unnecessarily the hostility complicated records in Lima on mil¬ vice when necessary, despite the of a critical segment of Peru’s politi¬ itary assistance program support. United States’ continuing relegation cal class. The F-5 case did not of Peruvian officers who valued their of Peru to second or third class itself change the direction of Peruvi¬ American contacts and training in status militarily. an government policies. But it went the United States nonetheless point¬ Under these conditions, US mili¬ into the equation that did. ed out that US military personnel tary policies are likely to be mar¬ Each situation, of course, must be assigned to Peru never exceeded the ginal except for the rare occasion examined on its own merits, for the rank of colonel and had not, to their where they effectively preclude an subleties of politics are such that knowledge, ever included officers action beyond appeal. The attempt even a marginal impact may be deci¬ who ultimately later attained gener¬ to prevent Peruvian acquisition of sive in a given instance. Our consid¬ al officer rank before retiring. Peru¬ supersonic military aircraft revealed eration of the place of future mili¬ vians who attended regular US that the US could deny its own tary policy in overall United States- officer training in the United States suppliers, and perhaps even delay Peruvian relations, however, will be knew their best American class¬ the ultimate acquisition from significantly aided by the realization mates were not assigned to Latin France. But despite punitive legisla¬ that we have as a nation and gov¬ America. tion and previously good military ernment frequently lacked the ca¬ Professionally, Peruvian military relations the US was unable to pre¬ pacity for such subtle analyses in the officers often seem to feel a love- vent the purchase in the long run. past. ■ DESTINATION WASHINGTON? 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January, 1B71 MILITARY ACADEMIES public would probably all combine Perhaps such an institution would continued from page 32 to defeat any such move. require a five-year program, during So if we can’t eliminate West the last two years of which the stu¬ If there really isn’t a great dispar¬ Point, Annapolis, and Colorado dents would opt for or “major in” ity in retention rates between acade¬ Springs, should we then merge them the Army, Navy, or Air Force and my and non-academy officers; if the into a single National Defense transfer to the present Military disparity would be even smaller if Academy? Academy, Naval Academy, or Air the non-academy officers did not There would be a great deal of Force Academy. At the very least, feel discriminated against in top pro¬ good, I think, in an institution in the first three years together might motions; if the cost of an academy which during the first two or three cause the students to think along education to the Federal Govern¬ years the students would wear a wide government lines rather than ment is so high; if there is no evi¬ single uniform—or no uniform— along narrow, single service lines, as dence that academy officers perform and would take common courses in at present. And when some of these better than other officers; and if we both military and civilian subjects. students become generals, admirals, are truly worried about isolating our There would be advantages to a and senior diplomats, these same professional officer corps from civili¬ learning situation that would de- three years of study might enhance an influences—then shouldn’t we emphasize service rivalries and that broad outlook that they must eliminate the academies altogether? stress the interrelationship of air, have to work well together in the Perhaps we should, but we won’t. sea, and land forces and doctrine, as best interests of the nation. For one thing, it seems highly un¬ well as the intimate connection be¬ We ought at least to experiment likely that we can eliminate the mili¬ tween political and military factors with a National Defense Academy. tary academies at a time when there in making and executing the nation’s If it fails, then all that we have lost is so much pressure from the col¬ foreign and domestic policies. Per¬ is some money and time. But if it leges to eliminate ROTC as well. We haps people wanting to enter the succeeds, we may gain something can’t do away with both of these State Department’s Foreign Service, much more precious than money sources of officer procurement, cer¬ the United States Information Agen¬ and time. We may gain well- tainly not simultaneously. For an¬ cy, the Agency for International De¬ educated officers oriented toward other thing, history, tradition, nostal¬ velopment, and the Central Intelli¬ the nation and the world rather than gia, the armed services, the veterans gence Agency would also enroll in to themselves and their services. It organizations, the Congress, and the such a National Defense Academy. is certainly worth a try. ■ FOREIGN SERVICE JOURNAL, January, 1971 47 MILITARY INTERVENTION meddlesome, inefficient, unpopu¬ tion, nor can it eliminate primordial lar, and dictatorial political parties sentiments in the interest of greater continued from page 21 and governments. The conception of national unity. In short, coup lead¬ civilian supremacy has not taken ers face the same difficulties over force to achieve political ends will firm root in most African states. As which their civilian predecessors increasingly characterize African a result, few constraints operate to stumbled—without necessarily ben¬ politics. Coups may be institutional¬ preclude military intervention. efiting from greater advantages. ized as the means for bringing in Contrasted with the relative ease The building of political institu¬ new personnel—not for changing of seizing control are the manifold tions requires time, caution, and ex¬ the basic constraints within which problems of effective governance. emplary skill. The mass-based party the political systems must operate. Though military governments may helped arouse political awareness In order to stave off discontent embark upon control with the assur¬ and participation; in the tasks of within the armed forces, political ance of widespread popular enthusi¬ nation-building, it made a clear con¬ leaders may turn to the time- asm, little can guarantee the mainte¬ tribution. Military governments, honored tactic of expanding budget nance of this climate of enthusiasm. owing to their “technocratic” orien¬ commitments to obtain ever more The moment of rejoicing at the fall tation, may make greater contribu¬ and better military equipment. But of an unpopular civilian regime may tions to state-building. But both na¬ the relationship is two-sided, and quickly give way to resentment tion-building and state-building are may turn into a form of blackmail against the policies military leaders requisite to political development. against political leaders fearful of feel compelled to adopt—just as the Effective political institutions cannot dismissal. Increased military spend¬ moment of rejoicing with the be created de novo by coups d’etat. ing may be viewed as a form of achievement of independence was The political development of Afri¬ preventive action by a government. followed by growing disenchantment can states depends upon the creation Let us draw together the threads with the dominant party. Economic of effective, widely supported instru¬ of the argument. Military interven¬ policies may undercut popular sup¬ ments of government. To this de¬ tion has become commonplace in port of military governments, partic¬ velopment, military leaders can tropical Africa as members of the ularly through deliberate deflation, make only a slight contribution. armed services became more con¬ unemployment, and cuts in civil ser¬ Such is the sobering lesson this scious of the power they could wield vice perquisites. Military rule does chapter and this book attempt to in overturning what they saw as not automatically stamp out corrup¬ convey. ■ FRANCIS SCOTT KEY HOTEL The Nicest Small Hotel in Washington 600 - 20th St., N.W., Washington, D. C. 20006 628-5425 Why Foreign Service Personnel prefer the Frnncis Scott Key Hotel (1) It is only two blocks from the State Department (2) It offers family accommodations (3) One room, kitchen, dinette and bath, completely furnished efficiency suites (4) Completely air>conditioned (3) Restaurant with excellent food at moderate prices ROOMS One Person $10.00—Two Persons $13.00 Efficiency Suites—Double Beds or Twin Beds One Person $11.00 & Up—Two Persons $14.00 & Up Additional persons $1.50 each. 10% discount for weekly occupancy. Rowena F. Ward, Mgr.—Gladys L. Warner, Asst. Mgr. 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Catalog: Director of Admissions, 325 Iwo Jima Blvd. Harlingen, Texas 78550 48 FOREIGN SERVICE JOURNAL, January, 1971 AS A MODERNIZING FORCE hope of any solution other than in¬ into the twentieth century, to put down dissident minorities, and to continued from page 9 tervening directly in the political process, which they know they can drive out external enemies. The mil¬ pable of defending against deter¬ do, but that by Western standards itary itself spent half of its time as a mined opposition. they should not do. training school, teaching Turkish to Armed forces are nonetheless It is only in the political arena Kurds and modern skills to all. And, dangerous creations for any newly that values are allocated authorita¬ having created the infrastructure of structured society, or even any old tively for the whole society. This the a modern centralized state, Ataturk one under the tensions of great and military soon come to learn. So died. His successors were able to rapid change. In a society where the eventually they intervene. The mili¬ begin the practice of modern de¬ old order is crumbling and there is tary’s organizational resources, pro¬ mocracy. yet no strong new order, the politi¬ fessional commitments, and their The problems attendant to the cal situation is fluid. There are many sense of national identity almost military acting as a modernizing new needs and few apparent ways guarantees initial success. But ordi¬ force are not uniform throughout the to satisfy them. Rarely is there a narily in the long run they are lim¬ developing world. Yet there is one firmly established central govern¬ ited by their natural authoritarian¬ common denominator: the inability ment, a stable electorate or a trained ism, lack of political skill, and con¬ of weak governments to cope with bureaucracy. In such a situation, the sequent inability to mobilize or re¬ the strains of transition in leading military often appears as the only tain mass support. Paralysis again their people into the twentieth cen¬ strong, stable organization and the ensues, and the process is repeated. tury. The strong, rational military— natural repository of the as yet only There are exceptions. A great symbol of sovereignty, integrating partly formed national spirit. And charismatic military leader, one who force, guarantor of internal order they have the guns. can gain and retain the support of and external security—often cannot In such a situation the military the people and who can and will use resist the urge to “clean up the technocrats are in a difficult posi¬ his political power for national de¬ mess” and “throw the rascals out.” tion. They feel that they know what velopment, tramples limitations. It occasionally succeeds. Even when is right, and they see that it is not Such a benevolent dictator is best it avoids direct political activity, it being done. They see little social represented by Turkey’s Ataturk. continues throughout the develop¬ justice and much corruption. They Ataturk used the power of this new ing world as probably the largest see much bungling. They see no centralized state to force his people single modernizing force. ■ REAL ESTATE Specialists in TOWN HOUSES CAPITOL HILL • GEORGETOWN FOGGY BOTTOM 202-546-2676 RHEA RADIN.Inc. 220 SEVENTH ST., S.E. OLGA VAN OYEN, INC. REALTOR Associates: Mrs. Jose Dumoulin Mr. M. Marshall Marslon Mrs. Robert L. Gordon Mr. Stuart 8. V/arwick Mrs. Vera Clay Higgins Mrs. James McS. Wimsatt Mr. Kenneth A4. Hoeffel Mrs. Mary C. Woodville Complete service for sales, rental and full management. Washington, D. C. & Maryland 5122 MacArthur Boulevard, N.W. Washington, D. C. 20016 362-8766 FOBIIUN SERVICE JOURNAL, January, 1971 49 that “there was considerable discus¬ IN the November and December is¬ Letters sion by members.” sues of the JOURNAL, letters from the J. K. PENFIELD—FSO ret. resigning Secretary-Treasurer of the Longbranch, Washington AFSA Board and several retired gen¬ tlemen, use the charge of “trade to the I believe that the old, gentleman’s unionism” to condemn the Board’s club, type of management for the recommendation to seek “exclusive Foreign Service is gone beyond re¬ recognition” under Executive Order trieval. I believe that, where once a 11491. The issue is a deeply felt one Editor gentleman’s agreement was sufficient for some older officers; it, therefore, today’s Foreign Service needs a codifi¬ requires a serious attempt at reply. cation of the rights and duties of our Of course, language presently used terms of employment. Unfortunate as in the Order would require AFSA to continued from page 7 this trend of civilization may be to Board stating its belief that “it is vital be formally referred to as a “labor or¬ many of us, it makes it necessary that ganization” for purposes related to the that it be authorized to act now” (by the right of collective bargaining be only 30% of the membership this Order. The language of the Order “thrust” upon the Foreign Service. after all reflects the predominant role time) to apply for exclusive recogni¬ Many positive arguments have been tion and urging everyone “to lose no played by the trade union movement made for the need for collective bar¬ in defining the position and rights of time in sending us your authoriza¬ gaining. I would cite only the growth tion.” Furthermore, the Board threat¬ organizations representing employees of our bureaucracy, with the increas¬ of the Federal Government. That lan¬ ens that it may have “to take steps ing complexities of our civilization. I without this authorization or without guage will change as other groups see—perhaps too optimistically—the further consultation. . .” These are work for revision. role of a union in tomorrow’s world of strong words to apply to a subject The question posed AFSA members which was sufficiently controversial over-organization as that of an om¬ by the Order, however, relates not to within the Board itself to inspire the budsman—with clout. labels, but whether the Order’s provi¬ resignation of one of its members. On the negative side, the arguments sions can aid AFSA in shaping the How high-handed can a “representa¬ that we are professionals, that we Department of State into a more ef¬ tive” Board get? enjoy a special relationship with the fective organization and in making This appeal is based on a report White House which would be endan¬ the Foreign Service a more satisfying which, despite considerable detail, gered if we should discuss the terms of career. Those officers who cannot leaves this reader, at least, uncon¬ our employment with “management,” grapple with this question because of vinced. It makes several comments to seem to me without merit. I see no their “abhorrence,” “deep personal which Mr. Bradford takes persuasive incongruity between professionalism convictions,” “personal repugnances,” exception. It also dismisses, on the and organized representations to man¬ etc., etc., against calling an organiza¬ basis of debatable argument, action agement. I refuse to believe that the tion to which they belong a “labor or¬ similar to that planned by the Nation¬ White House will be deeply concerned ganization” raise a shibboleth which al Society of Professional Engineers/ with or antagonistic to representations serves only to cloud serious examina¬ Professional Engineers in Government concerning our terms of employment. tion of the Order. Selectively sharing —the creation of an entirely separate Further, I would deny that all FSOs the fruits of domestic trade union ef¬ sister organization of AFSA to seek are managers (we are 3,000 now, not forts is after all not a new phenom¬ recognition under the Executive Or¬ 300), and even those who “manage” enon for those in foreign service. We der. It further makes the important three officers and a secretary cannot have adjusted with few perceivable point that a mass organization of civil believe that they have had any real problems to being required to accept servants affiliated with the AFL/CIO input into the decisions of “manage¬ salary increases obtained through the would hardly be qualified or inclined ment.” efforts of government labor organiza¬ to represent foreign service interests tions. We do not react in horror and It seems to me that the best inter¬ effectively. But instead of welcoming label participants in that practice ests of all members of the foreign the Department’s answer to this point trade unionists. Why, therefore, can affairs agencies, specifically including —a recommendation that EO 11491 we not determine if Executive Order be amended to exclude Foreign Serv¬ most Foreign Service officers, and the 11491 has anything to offer the par¬ ice Personnel from coverage—the longer range interests of the Depart¬ ticular needs of those in foreign serv¬ Board, in an addendum to its plea, ment, will be served best by a regular¬ ice without confusing the issues by the gives it only grudging approval con¬ ization of the relationship between use of class slogans (or pretensions)? tingent on underlined ifs, and again “management” and “labor,” and I Those who have examined the Or¬ urges members to give the asked for would hope that continued attachment der with care have concluded that its authorization. to a day now past would not blind us mechanisms and procedures make In this situation members should be to the fact that for purposes of collec¬ good managerial sense for the Depart¬ particularly grateful to learn from Mr. tive bargaining, most of us now be¬ ment. Three key Macomber Task Bradford that there are two sides to long in the latter category. Forces (I, V, & XIII) dealing with the question. This member, for one, THERESA A. HEALY personnel management recommend hopes that the Board will follow its Washington use of the Order to improve the way communication precept and give the P.S.: I would like to add, although in which the Department manages it¬ membership a little less father-knows- it should not be necessary, that a dis¬ self and its personnel resources. Sim¬ best and wolf-wolf, and a little more cussion of terms of employment be¬ ilarly, all organized groups in the De¬ rounded picture. A good start would tween elected representatives of an partment which have studied and tak¬ be a report on the flavor and sub¬ employees organization and a small en a position on the Order have rec¬ stance of comments at the Associa¬ group of administrative specialists in ommended its use: JFSOC and the tion’s general business meeting, about no way does violence to the very sol¬ various AFGE Lodges early on; AFSA which the AFSA NEWS tells us only emn obligations of our oath of office. after long study of the Order. 50 FOREIGN SERVICE JOURNAL, January, 1. Strong support in Washington for A Correction gested two year course in that subject the AFSA Board’s recommendation to for Junior Officers. seek “exclusive recognition” was clear I HAVE the honor to refer to my Mr. Davit possesses both experience at the Board's November 4 meeting. “New Problems of Social Develop¬ and the style required to communicate Motions passed at the meeting by ment,” November issue. that experience to others. He ran an votes of over 90 percent of the some Putting to one side our amiable dif¬ excellent Course, the few dull 500 AFSA members present, requested ferences about (i) certain terms, (ii) stretches of which occurred when he the Board to cease negotiating any placement of commas and parenthe¬ was out of the room for a minute. possible alternative to exclusive rec¬ ses, and (iii) the use of numbered Those dull moments were probably ognition under the Order and to chal¬ enumerations, I should very much ap¬ the only ones in which we learned lenge the attempt to exclude those in preciate your letting JOURNAL readers nothing. foreign service from the Order. know that the first sentence of the WILLIAM R. SALISBURY, Support for the Order focuses on its last paragraph of the first column on Attorney-Adviser (FSO) provisions formalizing an on-going page 45 should have read: Office of the Legal Adviser dialogue between a single organiza¬ “There has been great shrink¬ Washington age in the area of ‘Inviolable Na¬ tion representing those in foreign serv¬ The Hatch Act ice and the administrative apparatus tional Privacy’ in the past few of the Department. The Order’s pro¬ decades.” To the end of encouraging investiga¬ vision for negotiating written agree¬ COVEY T. OLIVER tion of the interrelationship between ments on personnel policies, with im¬ Philadelphia restraints on foreign service personnel passes referred to an impartial outside speaking out on substantive issues and Time for a Valentine body for arbitration, would help in¬ the Hatch Act I refer you to an article sure the seriousness of the dialogue. A s one of Alexander J. Davit’s published in July, 1970 in BUSINESS Operationally, this dialogue or feed¬ “crop” of Junior Officer trainees, I LAW. back mechanism would simply make would like to comment on his recent I happen to agree with the thrust of permanent the ad-hoc effort repre¬ letter to the JOURNAL (“The Return of the article—that the Hatch Act type sented by the Macomber Task Forces Ichabod,” August, 1970). restrictions are inconsistent with mod¬ studying personnel policy. Function¬ Mr. Davit writes that if as Smith em constitutional thinking—but ap¬ ally, the provisions of the Order would Simpson has suggested, Junior Officers preciate the difficulties in drawing the offer AFSA the exceedingly important were not “leveled with” during the necessary guidelines that will protect right to require the “O” Area to bring Davit Era at FSI, he would feel that federal employees from political pres¬ into the light, discuss, and justify, he had “failed miserably.” He asked sures. personnel policies and procedures for us to be the judges of whether he had. By the by I thought John Tuthill’s implementation. Mr. Davit did indeed level with us. dissent to George Kennan’s advice By seeking to exclude those in for¬ His candor in recounting his own For¬ (November 1970) applicable to this eign service from the provisions of eign Service experiences and in outlin¬ topic. An available alternative career Executive Order 11491, the “O” Area ing what might lie ahead for us nov¬ will certainly buttress “integrity, per¬ of the Department has indicated its ices was, together with his ability to sonal balance, courage.” preference for the predictability of an speak in complete English sentences, authoritarian organizational structure PAUL L. GOOD one of Mr. Davit’s most refreshing Albany, Calif. over the creative dynamism generated characteristics. That, after being by the real participation of those mak¬ leveled with, we didn’t immediately One Sure Thing—Taxes ing up the foreign service in its man¬ resign in panic may be regarded as a I WOULD like to refer to the item in agerial decision-making process. The further tribute to Mr. Davit’s amused the October 1970 JOURNAL entitled: Macomber Task Forces presented a and infectious enthusiasm for Foreign State and DC Income Tax Liability— half-step toward reform; the handling Service life. Domicile vs. Residence. of the Executive Order will make While I don’t intend this letter to be In view of the arbitrary way in clear the extent of the Department’s a Valentine to Alex Davit, I do think which this matter has been handled by real commitment to effective manage¬ that the personality of a Course the various jurisdictions, I might be ment. Chairman goes far to determine the interested in joining in a test case in The procedures and mechanisms usefulness of the Course to new Virginia, presuming this is the wise open to AFSA under “exclusive rec¬ Officers. Mr. Davit is quite right in thing to do. I am making this caveat ognition” will be necessary to insure observing that most incoming officers because some of my friends who that the recommendations made by don’t think they need more education. merely ignored the “continuing in¬ the Macomber Task Forces do not What they think they need, and do in die in the bureaucracy—and that fact need, is experience. First-hand come tax liabilities” found that the senior officers affected by Task Force experience can only be got on the job, problem solved itself in this manner, recommendations are treated humane¬ of course, but second hand—shared— which would be better than a lost law ly. Those in foreign service have experience is necessary' to both reas¬ suit. Of course, they had no property often not been so treated in the past. sure and elighten the new officer as to in Virginia. Others were less fortu¬ The AFSA Board’s efforts to defeat what he should expect over the long nate. exclusion of the Foreign Service from run. It seems to me that the Virginia Executive Order 11491 deserves our A good Basic Officers’ Course re¬ case is the weakest of all. Suppose one support; its collection of the signatures quires a good Course Chairman. I is assigned to a job which requires required to seek “exclusive recogni¬ would think it impossible to devise a long hours in Rosslyn (the Vietnam tion” our active aid. literally fool-proof Course. I don’t be¬ Bureau) and one moves to Virginia NORMAN L. ACHILLES lieve that lengthening or deepening merely for expediency to avoid the Chairman. the curriculum would necessarily im¬ bridge traffic, does not vote in the JFSOC's Committee on Executive prove matters, and as the holder of a State, does not buy property with the Order 11491 LLM degree in International Law I specific intention of not setting up any Washington regard with horror Mr. Simpson’s sug¬ permanent residence, advises the local FOREIGN SERVICE JOURNAL, January, 1971 51 tax authorities with respect to this textile plant to replace one destroyed scraping the last visible remnants of “temporary sojourn,” etc. It would by the guerrillas we had an interest in that architectural eyesore Tempo E seem to me that in this case a good helping the plant get into production. into mounds for trucks to cart away argument can be made for non¬ The management complained that be¬ to wherever they bury the remains of residence. After all the question of cause of the lack of adequate housing temporary buildings. I thought to my¬ domicile vs residence is largely based they were unable to recruit help from self how nice it would be to see my on intent. I would not be surprised the surrounding area. The year must Greek friend again. It would give me that if the local tax authorities knew have been 1950 or perhaps 1951. great satisfaction to inform him that in advance of your intended action, After reviewing the situation, the word “temporary” had real mean¬ they might well back off from trying which was bad, even by Greek stand¬ ing in the United States even if it to force a clearcut decision in which ards, I told the owner that the best took over 50 years to prove it. case they would stand to lose even we could do would be to supply tem¬ D. ALAN STRACHAN their hold on all those innocents who porary relief such as Quonset huts. Washington are now hooked by what frequently Thanking me for the offer to help he Reform! amounts to loose threats. was, nevertheless, reluctant to accept I AM writing a thesis concerning re¬ At any rate, since so many people it as “in Greece temporary things form in the State Department—the were drawn into the Vietnam Bureau have a habit of becoming perma¬ search for organizational effectiveness during the past two years, I think nent,” he said. Amused at his reply I —from World War II up to the pres¬ there should be no dearth of inter¬ countered by telling him I knew ex¬ ent time. I would appreciate receiving ested parties. I would like to thank the actly what he meant for on the Mall any material that readers might have association for bringing this matter in Washington, D. C. there was a on this subject. into the open since the opportunistic building called Tempo E which had HARRIS H. BALL and undignified way in which this been there since World War I. Washington, D. C. matter is being handled in practice is Yesterday, as my bus made its way Editor’s Note: The Journal will rather repulsive. down Fourth Street, S.W. it passed he pleased to forward material and/or C. H. ZONDAG the Mall just as a bulldozer was references to Mr. Ball. Kabul For More Useful Home Leave Life and Lqpve in the Foreign Service By S. I. Nadler IVIY family and I are just back from home leave and consultations. I have not before served in a post as distant and isolated as this one is, and so we found this home leave particularly useful in giving us an exposure to all that has happened at home over the past two years but about which we had only read. I think, however, that we might have had a better exposure if we had had the benefit of a seminar such as I understand is available to returning USIA personnel. My PAO colleague tells me that the seminar, which runs for five days, makes available to these persons lectures from a broad spect¬ rum of current American thinking, in¬ cluding spokesmen from elements a good deal left and right of center. I can appreciate why USIA might be ahead of State in this respect but it seems to me that returning FSOs could also well use some of this kind of “instant Americanization.” L. BRUCE LAINGEN Kabul EDITOR’S NOTE: AFSA has contacted training offices in USIA and State and they view this suggestion favorably. We will hope to have a further report in an early issue of AFSA NEWS. Long Term Temporary T ED OLSEN’S comments in the June issue on the disappearance of Wash¬ ington landmarks reminded me of the time I was sent by the USAID to Naousa in the north of the country "Darling, you mustn't torment yourself with ethics, moral considerations, and such to look into a manpower problem. things. Look at it this way: you did a Performance Evaluation Report on him, he Having supplied a loan to build a new ended up in the lowest ten per cent, and you’re selecting him out.” 52 FOREIGN SERVICE JOURNAL, January, 10 Your best buy in overseas personal effects and liability travel-pak insurance TRAVEL-PAK is a comprehensive personal effects and lia¬ WHY DO YOU NEED TRAVEL-PAK? bility insurance plan specially designed for businessmen, govern¬ You need specialized insurance coverage while living over¬ ment employees, students, servicemen and others living overseas. seas because: • Your property is exposed to hazards not normally en¬ countered at home. The ordinary marine or residence policy is not adequate and may leave significant perils CONFIDENCE—Travel-Paic is underwritten by Lloyd’s of uninsured, London and administered by the James W. 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BARRETT CO., INC. every claim is subject to a $50 deductible. 1140 Connecticut Ave. • Travel-Pak covers shipment of baggage and household Washington, D.C. 20036 goods. You get a renewal credit for each year this coverage isn’t used: 1-year policy—20% credit of original premium; (202) 296-6440 2-year policy—10% per year; 3-year policy—VA% per year. reduce or eliminate inequities between Officer and Staff corps personnel, including overtime, free entry, allow¬ ances, quarters, etc. As a result of the Staff Corps Ad¬ visory Committee recommendations the next inspector vacancy will be filled by a member of the Staff Corps. Champions Proposed Legislation • Health Insurance. AFSA urged that legislation be passed that would increase the Government’s share of health plan insurance programs up to 100% instead of the 40% don’t belong to just approved. • Overtime. The Association asks that 10% overtime be this Association! pard to employees on standby duty. This would partic¬ ularly benefit mail, file, security, cryptographic and secre¬ tarial personnel. Also, AFSA recommended payment for overtime to all Staff Corps personnel overseas at the ora FSSO-5 level and below. belongs to YOU! • Retirement for AID Personnel. The Association holds that AID people should have the same retirement bene¬ fits as other members of the foreign affairs community. Voice of Foreign Affairs Community Scholarships and Counseling The Association is the only professional-employee organiza¬ More than $73,000 in scholarships went to children of for¬ tion—completely independent of the U.S. Government— eign service people last year. AFSA’s Scholarship Fund ac¬ that articulates the aims of the foreign affairs community. counted for $63,000 of the total. In a vigorous and organized way it acts to achieve those aims Educational counseling continues as an important part of on behalf of everyone in that community, regardless of rank, AFSA’s service to members: some 300 families a year take status, category or agency. Thus, U.S. Government action, (laws, policies, rules) that affect AFSA members, immedi¬ advantage of this free service rendered by AFSA through a highly skilled specialist. The unusual needs of handicapped ately engages the Association's talents; it proceeds forcefully. children are covered in this service. Activist in Achieving Important Goals for the Membership Provident Fund AFSA does more than react. It initiates moves that benefit This fund is being established with a substantial initial loan the membership; in the process, non-members also benefit. from the Bonn/Bad Godesberg American Community Asso¬ But the more members we have, the stronger our voice and ciation. Its purpose is to provide immediate financial help to the greater the benefits. Thus all personnel should carefully anyone in the foreign affairs community overseas confronted consider the following examples of AFSA initiatives, specu¬ by an emergency that cannot be met by government assist¬ late how much and more could be achieved if all foreign ance. Loans have also been received from other posts and affairs personnel supported AFSA. the Fund will be operative in the near future. • Ombudsmen. AFSA recommended that these welfare Various Insurance Programs and grievance officers be appointed in AID, State and USIA. The result; approval. AFSA’s Members’ Inter¬ AFSA has arranged with insurance agencies to write short¬ ests Committee collaborates with the Ombudsmen, or term automobile insurance for personnel on home leave; be¬ works separately, on a wide variety of pocketbook and fore such coverage was virtually unobtainable. other issues. AFSA also has low-rate group insurance programs available • Health Insurance. Premiums for the U.S. Government- only to its members; high limit accidental death and specific American Foreign Service Protective Association health loss; long-term income protection; and extra cash hospital- plan were greatly reduced at AFSA’s instigation. The indemnity plan. saving to an AFSA member who is a participant in that The Foreign Service Protective Association provides group plan is three to six times his annual AFSA dues. life insurance, family coverage and accidental death. • Travel and Transfer Allowances. This is another area in which AFSA made the will of its members felt. Travel advances now are paid in full, travel and transfer allow¬ ances substantially increased. AFSA has also recom¬ mended transfer allowances of up to $800 and has the This outline of AFSA’s activities is designedly brief, but the Department’s approval. The necessary legislation and Association will gladly expand on any point. AFSA wel¬ budgetary machinery has been set in' motion. comes suggestions from members as to what it should be • Support for Staff Corps. Staff Corps personnel have the doing in addition to its ongoing programs and proposed strongest possible backing of AFSA in promoting their courses of action on new issues. interests to the end of retaining the Staff Corps as a powerful and effective arm of the foreign service and to