The Kuhn-Loss Thesis and the Case of Phlogiston Theory
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Science Studies 1/2000 Discussion The Kuhn-loss Thesis and the Case of Phlogiston Theory Rein Vihalemm The Kuhn-loss thesis arguing that scien- cause phlogiston, which may not be a tific revolutions, alongside gains, involve paradigm at all, is at least not a clear- cut case of such an entity (Verronen, losses (e. g. those of explanatory power 1992: 49). and of problem-solving ability) occupies quite an important position in the I think that Verronen is right as far as the Kuhnian theory of the development of Kuhn-loss thesis is concerned, i.e. I agree science. Notice that in the title of his ar- that the loss phenomenon does not ticle on the topic in Science Studies, Veli characterise paradigm change in mature Verronen (1992) called the Kuhn-loss science but a transition from a pre-sci- thesis ‘Kuhn’s regal argument’. That par- entific natural philosophical period ticular article became a direct impetus “guided by something much like a para- to write the present paper. Veli Verronen digm” (Kuhn, 1970a: ix) to a proper para- states that the Kuhn-loss thesis (Kuhn, digm. However, there is still no reason 1961: 184; 1970a: 107, 148, 169), a model to doubt the scientific nature of the phlo- example of which characterises incom- giston theory. As we are going to see be- mensurability between the phlogiston low, the question is how to understand paradigm and Lavoisier’s paradigm, is the meaning and existence of phlogis- unsatisfactory because it seems to him ton. If we understand phlogiston as a “principle” of pre-scientific chemistry very odd to consider phlogiston as a and not as an idealised object intro- paradigm because that would declare the phlogiston theory as an instance of duced into a scientific theory, then in- mature science ... the pair (phlogiston, deed “Lavoisier’s reform ... ultimately did Lavoisier) which nicely pictures – and away with chemical principles, and thus may be most nicely of Kuhn’s examples ended by depriving chemistry of some – the nature of the loss phenomenon, actual and much potential explanatory does not, however, univocally at all lend support to the Kuhn-loss thesis be- power” (Kuhn, 1970a: 107), but this does Science Studies, Vol. 13(2000) No. 1, 68–78 Discussion not concern the transition from the For example, one cannot speak, as Kuhn phlogiston paradigm to Lavoisier’s para- does, about Aristotle’s mechanics as a digm, which was a paradigm change in science, comparing it with Galileo’s or scientific chemistry. Newton’s mechanics. Aristotle’s (and mediaeval) mechanics was speculative: The Conception of Kuhn’s Paradigm it was a natural philosophy, not an em- as a Criterion of Science pirical science. We can speak about Ar- istotle’s paradigm only as a metaphysi- The conception of Kuhn’s paradigm, al- cal paradigm, showing, like Kuhn does, though it needs some specification, can that it is incommensurable with Galileo’s be used in order to differentiate between or Newton’s metaphysical part of para- science and non-science since they are digm (e.g. Kuhn, 1970a: 118-129). How- incommensurable. It can also be applied ever, it remains unnoticed for Kuhn that to answer the question in the history of Aristotle’s mechanics actually was not a science, when (and in what sense and to paradigm (or disciplinary matrix) char- what extent) an area of research, for ex- acterising a mature science according to ample, chemistry, became a science? Kuhn’s own criteria. The same should be The scientific world picture is one but said about the Cartesian metaphysical only one component (Kuhn called it the paradigm. This cannot be considered a metaphysical part of paradigm or shortly component of the paradigm character- the metaphysical paradigm, which con- istic of a mature science either (cf. sists of ontological and heuristic mod- Verronen, 1992: 49-50). els) in the integral paradigm or discipli- As we know, Kuhn’s paradigm is a no- nary matrix characterising science tion compatible with the notion of the whose other components, as we know, scientific community, which, like the are symbolic generalisations, shared val- notion of scientific revolutions, is appli- ues and shared examples (Kuhn, 1970a: cable at numerous levels, from the most 174-210; cf. Hoyningen-Huene, 1993: ch. global level of natural science in general 4). In my treatment I still stick to the term to very specific achievements in some scientific world picture instead of the narrow branch of science (Kuhn, 1970a: metaphysical part of paradigm because, 176-178; 1970b: 249-251). It is my opin- in my opinion, Kuhn is not quite consist- ion that when studying the birth of sci- ent, particularly because of the too lib- ence historically, then, from the view- eral interpretation of the metaphysical point of the paradigm conception, we part of paradigm, in defining science should determine the establishment of through the notion of paradigm (and the first paradigm that would also be normal science). I find that, according generalisable for the whole science as a to Kuhn’s own criteria, before Galileo one paradigm (i.e. not its concrete contents cannot speak about an established para- but as a certain type of a manner of cog- digm with its all four mutually con- nition, the practice of obtaining knowl- nected components and a normal sci- edge). Without specifying the date of the ence functioning on its basis with its birth of science and discussing it in the puzzle-solving tradition and other fea- present paper, I rely on the quite gener- tures characteristic of mature science. ally accepted viewpoint that science was 69 Science Studies 1/2000 born in the form of physics (mechanics) myself to a few explanatory notes only. established by Galileo and Newton in the Actually, the problem lies in the differ- 17th century. I assert that the general ence between the ways of thinking in cultural precondition for it was that the different eras, in the difference between metaphysical paradigm as the scientific the aims of the natural philosophy of the world picture, which Kuhn characterised antiquity and the Middle Ages, and the as a component of the paradigm, could Galilean-Newtonian science. A. Koyré be taken into use as the general interpre- (see Koyré, 1995) has analysed the emer- tation of the world. gence of the Galilean-Newtonian sci- The scientific world picture provides ence in connection with the develop- a basis for treating the world as a mod- ment of metaphysical systems, with elled reality and making it natural to changes in the categorial structure of treat it so. The world is understood, in thinking. This caused the replacement of the direct sense of the word, through a the cosmos as described in Aristotle’s certain picture which expresses a con- philosophy, characteristic of the antiq- struction or a mechanism based on a uity and the Middle Ages, by the mod- known project (cf. Heidegger, 1977: 115- ern universe, which characterises the 182). Further, scientific vision of the scientific world picture. The main differ- world means viewing phenomena under ence between them is that the former such conditions where these phenom- was a world of quality, a world which re- ena behave as idealisations: they can be sembled a big living organism in which reproduced and described mathemati- the humans also had a certain place and cally since they are subject to the uni- where the ideas based on values, perfec- versal quantitative laws of nature. Such tion, beauty, harmony, meaning, aim, conditions are determined experimen- etc. were considered natural. The latter, tally. In this sense, a science itself deter- however, is a quantitative and exact mines which aspects of the world it in- world, subject to mathematics; it resem- vestigates and how. For science there bles a mechanism, a machine. There is exist no phenomenon that could be no place for humans or human charac- given for observation independently of teristics in it, although it is understand- the scientific way of treating it. Galileo able for the humans because it works and Newton began, in principle, to con- according to the experimentally discov- nect mathematics and experiment. They ered objective laws, according to a ra- began to study through experiment tional construction. things that are subject to mathematics, posing the problem so that it would be Phlogiston Theory as the First simultaneously experimental and math- Paradigm in Chemistry ematical, consequently mathematically visible and provable. According to my conviction, the birth of In ancient or medieval culture the sci- scientific chemistry is connected with entific world picture was not objectively the establishment of the phlogiston conceivable. Unfortunately it is impos- theory that became the first paradigm in sible to substantiate or analyse this the- chemistry (Vihalemm, 1981; 1975; cf. sis here in detail and I have to confine also Schütt, 1974). Chemistry became a 70 Discussion science, in other words, the incommen- ciples of the scientific world picture surability between science and chemis- should be equally essential or find ap- try was overcome in these respects and plication in the case of each concrete degrees where the paradigm which had paradigm. On the other hand, it is the become established in chemistry was most invariant component to the effect similar to the paradigms established in that the scientific world picture changes physics. Incommensurability between only if there is a change in the global scientific paradigms and other types of paradigm. inquiry can be characterised through Chemistry deals with qualitative Kant’s “Copernican revolution” (see his changes of the substance and the pro- famous Preface to the 2nd ed. of Critique duction of new substances from other of Pure Reason).