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Discussion

The Kuhn-loss Thesis and the Case of Phlogiston Theory

Rein Vihalemm

The Kuhn-loss thesis arguing that scien- cause phlogiston, which may not be a tific revolutions, alongside gains, involve paradigm at all, is at least not a clear- cut case of such an entity (Verronen, losses (e. g. those of explanatory power 1992: 49). and of problem-solving ability) occupies quite an important position in the I think that Verronen is right as far as the Kuhnian theory of the development of Kuhn-loss thesis is concerned, i.e. I agree science. Notice that in the title of his ar- that the loss phenomenon does not ticle on the topic in Science Studies, Veli characterise paradigm change in mature Verronen (1992) called the Kuhn-loss science but a transition from a pre-sci- thesis ‘Kuhn’s regal argument’. That par- entific natural philosophical period ticular article became a direct impetus “guided by something much like a para- to write the present paper. Veli Verronen digm” (Kuhn, 1970a: ix) to a proper para- states that the Kuhn-loss thesis (Kuhn, digm. However, there is still no reason 1961: 184; 1970a: 107, 148, 169), a model to doubt the scientific nature of the phlo- example of which characterises incom- giston theory. As we are going to see be- mensurability between the phlogiston low, the question is how to understand paradigm and Lavoisier’s paradigm, is the meaning and existence of phlogis- unsatisfactory because it seems to him ton. If we understand phlogiston as a “principle” of pre-scientific very odd to consider phlogiston as a and not as an idealised object intro- paradigm because that would declare the phlogiston theory as an instance of duced into a scientific theory, then in- mature science ... the pair (phlogiston, deed “Lavoisier’s reform ... ultimately did Lavoisier) which nicely pictures – and away with chemical principles, and thus may be most nicely of Kuhn’s examples ended by depriving chemistry of some – the nature of the loss phenomenon, actual and much potential explanatory does not, however, univocally at all lend support to the Kuhn-loss thesis be- power” (Kuhn, 1970a: 107), but this does

Science Studies, Vol. 13(2000) No. 1, 68–78 Discussion

not concern the transition from the For example, one cannot speak, as Kuhn phlogiston paradigm to Lavoisier’s para- does, about ’s mechanics as a digm, which was a paradigm change in science, comparing it with Galileo’s or scientific chemistry. Newton’s mechanics. Aristotle’s (and mediaeval) mechanics was speculative: The Conception of Kuhn’s Paradigm it was a natural philosophy, not an em- as a Criterion of Science pirical science. We can speak about Ar- istotle’s paradigm only as a metaphysi- The conception of Kuhn’s paradigm, al- cal paradigm, showing, like Kuhn does, though it needs some specification, can that it is incommensurable with Galileo’s be used in order to differentiate between or Newton’s metaphysical part of para- science and non-science since they are digm (e.g. Kuhn, 1970a: 118-129). How- incommensurable. It can also be applied ever, it remains unnoticed for Kuhn that to answer the question in the history of Aristotle’s mechanics actually was not a science, when (and in what sense and to paradigm (or disciplinary matrix) char- what extent) an area of research, for ex- acterising a mature science according to ample, chemistry, became a science? Kuhn’s own criteria. The same should be The scientific world picture is one but said about the Cartesian metaphysical only one component (Kuhn called it the paradigm. This cannot be considered a metaphysical part of paradigm or shortly component of the paradigm character- the metaphysical paradigm, which con- istic of a mature science either (cf. sists of ontological and heuristic mod- Verronen, 1992: 49-50). els) in the integral paradigm or discipli- As we know, Kuhn’s paradigm is a no- nary matrix characterising science tion compatible with the notion of the whose other components, as we know, scientific community, which, like the are symbolic generalisations, shared val- notion of scientific revolutions, is appli- ues and shared examples (Kuhn, 1970a: cable at numerous levels, from the most 174-210; cf. Hoyningen-Huene, 1993: ch. global level of in general 4). In my treatment I still stick to the term to very specific achievements in some scientific world picture instead of the narrow branch of science (Kuhn, 1970a: metaphysical part of paradigm because, 176-178; 1970b: 249-251). It is my opin- in my opinion, Kuhn is not quite consist- ion that when studying the birth of sci- ent, particularly because of the too lib- ence historically, then, from the view- eral interpretation of the metaphysical point of the paradigm conception, we part of paradigm, in defining science should determine the establishment of through the notion of paradigm (and the first paradigm that would also be normal science). I find that, according generalisable for the whole science as a to Kuhn’s own criteria, before Galileo one paradigm (i.e. not its concrete contents cannot speak about an established para- but as a certain type of a manner of cog- digm with its all four mutually con- nition, the practice of obtaining knowl- nected components and a normal sci- edge). Without specifying the date of the ence functioning on its basis with its birth of science and discussing it in the puzzle-solving tradition and other fea- present paper, I rely on the quite gener- tures characteristic of mature science. ally accepted viewpoint that science was

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born in the form of physics (mechanics) myself to a few explanatory notes only. established by Galileo and Newton in the Actually, the problem lies in the differ- 17th century. I assert that the general ence between the ways of thinking in cultural precondition for it was that the different eras, in the difference between metaphysical paradigm as the scientific the aims of the natural philosophy of the world picture, which Kuhn characterised antiquity and the Middle Ages, and the as a component of the paradigm, could Galilean-Newtonian science. A. Koyré be taken into use as the general interpre- (see Koyré, 1995) has analysed the emer- tation of the world. gence of the Galilean-Newtonian sci- The scientific world picture provides ence in connection with the develop- a basis for treating the world as a mod- ment of metaphysical systems, with elled reality and making it natural to changes in the categorial structure of treat it so. The world is understood, in thinking. This caused the replacement of the direct sense of the word, through a the cosmos as described in Aristotle’s certain picture which expresses a con- philosophy, characteristic of the antiq- struction or a mechanism based on a uity and the Middle Ages, by the mod- known project (cf. Heidegger, 1977: 115- ern universe, which characterises the 182). Further, scientific vision of the scientific world picture. The main differ- world means viewing phenomena under ence between them is that the former such conditions where these phenom- was a world of quality, a world which re- ena behave as idealisations: they can be sembled a big living organism in which reproduced and described mathemati- the humans also had a certain place and cally since they are subject to the uni- where the ideas based on values, perfec- versal quantitative laws of nature. Such tion, beauty, harmony, meaning, aim, conditions are determined experimen- etc. were considered natural. The latter, tally. In this sense, a science itself deter- however, is a quantitative and exact mines which aspects of the world it in- world, subject to mathematics; it resem- vestigates and how. For science there bles a mechanism, a machine. There is exist no phenomenon that could be no place for humans or human charac- given for observation independently of teristics in it, although it is understand- the scientific way of treating it. Galileo able for the humans because it works and Newton began, in principle, to con- according to the experimentally discov- nect mathematics and experiment. They ered objective laws, according to a ra- began to study through experiment tional construction. things that are subject to mathematics, posing the problem so that it would be Phlogiston Theory as the First simultaneously experimental and math- Paradigm in Chemistry ematical, consequently mathematically visible and provable. According to my conviction, the birth of In ancient or medieval culture the sci- scientific chemistry is connected with entific world picture was not objectively the establishment of the phlogiston conceivable. Unfortunately it is impos- theory that became the first paradigm in sible to substantiate or analyse this the- chemistry (Vihalemm, 1981; 1975; cf. sis here in detail and I have to confine also Schütt, 1974). Chemistry became a

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science, in other words, the incommen- ciples of the scientific world picture surability between science and chemis- should be equally essential or find ap- try was overcome in these respects and plication in the case of each concrete degrees where the paradigm which had paradigm. On the other hand, it is the become established in chemistry was most invariant component to the effect similar to the paradigms established in that the scientific world picture changes physics. Incommensurability between only if there is a change in the global scientific paradigms and other types of paradigm. inquiry can be characterised through Chemistry deals with qualitative Kant’s “Copernican revolution” (see his changes of the substance and the pro- famous Preface to the 2nd ed. of Critique duction of new substances from other of Pure Reason). In science proper we can substances. The scientific world picture, suppose that objects must conform to however, does not belong to the world our knowledge, not our knowledge to of quality. It was already Boyle’s and the objects. It is noteworthy that, while char- Cartesian chemists’ goal to show how, on acterising the revolution that led to sci- the basis of the general scientific world entific cognition and applying its coin- picture of the time originated from the cident basic scheme to different fields of corpuscular mechanical world view, it research, Kant also referred, among was possible to understand the proper- other things, to Stahl’s theory of phlogis- ties, quality and nature of the substance, ton (See Kant, 1929: 20 (B xii-B xiii)). i.e. everything that enables the scientist On the world picture level phlogistic to differentiate a particular substance chemistry was included in the general from other substances or to describe the scientific world picture of the time – the transformation of a substance in a new Newtonian world picture. In the case of way avoiding a discussion over the qual- chemistry as a science (like in the case of ity or nature as a specific reality, substan- any proper science), it is impossible that tial form, mystic capability or power. the scientific world picture as a compo- However, Boyle’s and the Cartesian nent of the paradigm would constitute chemists’ speculative natural philo- a specific chemical world picture (cf. sophical approach was not able to con- Vihalemm, 1982). The scientific world structively fulfil the task of founding sci- picture is the most universal and the entific chemistry. Another way had to be most invariant component of the para- found in order to get rid of mystic capa- digm, existence of which, as it has been bilities and powers as well as substan- admitted above, is the criterion of tial forms, a way of following the exam- whether we have to do with a science or ple of mechanics as a science but not not. It is the most universal component treating chemistry mechanistically. And in the sense that, in principle, the scien- this was the Newtonian way. tific world picture is common to science The Cartesian mechanical world pic- as a paradigm on the global level as well ture proceeded from the action-by-con- as to a paradigm that characterises a very tact principle. But, differently from this narrow trend of research in a particular approach, the Newtonian scientific branch of science. This, however, is not world picture was built on the principle to say that all the models, ideas and prin- of action at a distance, interpreting the

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links between bodies on the basis of the without any influence over longer dis- “mathematical forces” between them. tances. It is essential that he did not try Originally, the notion of force or power to guess the nature of that force, but ap- seemed to suit scholasticism solely. Still, plied the term solely to express an ex- Newton applied that notion in the perimentally determined selective mu- meaning of an experimentally deter- tual reaction between the substances, mined quantity, but not in the meaning thus drawing the attention of chemists of a substantial form, a certain mystic to the necessity for experimental re- power or capability. This approach search on the manifestations of that turned out to be mathematically ex- force. He made it evident that between pressed by a functional relation, to be substances there was an objective link experimentally tested and repeated as a whose inner nature was still unknown. relation between the cause and the ef- Newton’s programme proved to suit fect. chemistry; it changed the manner of In order to clarify the difference be- cognition in chemistry, thus leading to tween those two approaches, let us dis- the development of phlogiston theory, cuss for a moment the issue of chemical the first scientific theory in this realm, affinity, also studied by Newton himself. and to the compiling of empirical tables Boyle and the Cartesians understood of chemical affinity, i.e. to a systematic chemical affinity mechanistically, claim- study of which substances could com- ing that since substances had a corpus- bine with each other and what was the cular structure, it was simple to imagine relative strength of the force holding the mutual reaction between them as a them together. Unfortunately the forma- manifestation of a better correspond- tion of scientific chemistry cannot be ence, worse correspondence or non-cor- analysed in detail here. My analysis can respondence between the shape and be found in earlier publications (see structure of the particles. It is clear that Vihalemm, 1975; 1981). this way enabled them to avoid mystic powers in interpreting chemical proc- Transition from the Phlogiston esses, but their concrete imaginations Paradigm to Lavoisier’s Paradigm over the suitability of the particles re- mained arbitrary. The revolution in chemistry – the re- Newton approached the issue differ- placement of phlogiston chemistry by ently, stripping aside mechanic imagina- Lavoisier’s chemistry – has often been tions. The fact that chemical substances dealt with in the Kuhn-loss thesis and reacted with each other selectively indi- incommensurability discussions. The cated the principle that the universal present analysis attempts to interpret gravitational force which was known not several misconceptions in understand- to act selectively, did not account for ing this revolution, showing that, regard- chemical processes. Therefore it was less of changes in the paradigm, supposed by Newton that chemical im- Lavoisier’s chemistry is more commen- pact could be explained by force of at- surable with phlogiston chemistry than traction acting between small particles it is usually believed (or as Kuhn thought, of the substance over short distances too!) (cf. also Perrin, 1988a; 1988b; 1990;

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Gough, 1988; McEvoy, 1988). ship between the part and the whole as Admittedly, a specific feature of the the whole equalled the sum of its parts. phlogiston theory is its qualitative char- In order to introduce that scheme into acter, which poses an obstacle to the rec- practical chemistry, Stahl obtained ognition of its scientificity and corre- qualitative criteria to judge what consti- spondence to the Newtonian paradigm. tuted the whole and what constituted its Usually, Lavoisier is undoubtedly con- parts as well as when the whole disinte- sidered the founder of modern quanti- grated into parts and when the parts tative scientific chemistry. Indeed, it is combined into a whole. indisputable that, on the one hand, Having created his theoretical scheme Lavoisier introduced the Newtonian of phlogistication-dephlogistication, quantitative scientific paradigm into Stahl was able to “synthesise metals”, in chemistry. I would still like to emphasise other words, to construct metals from that, on the other hand, one should rec- their component parts. He also provided ognise the point of view claiming that, a theoretical explanation for the prob- by doing this, Lavoisier completed the lem of metal loss and indicated a way for elaboration of the first scientific, yet, retrieving “lost metals” in practice. Phlo- qualitative paradigm of chemistry giston had to be added to the metal calx, formed by the phlogiston theory (cf. i.e. the latter had to be processed with a Gough, 1988). It should be added that substance rich in phlogiston. In practice, Lavoisier performed measuring in units this meant that charcoal, oil, resin or fat of weight and volume that were non- was put into the melting-pot. His theory specific of chemistry. made it possible to “synthesise” not only With the help of the notion of phlo- metals but also all inflammable mixed giston, Georg Ernst Stahl (1659-1734) bodies (mixta). For instance, sulphur worded an idea known today as the re- and phosphorus were produced from versibility of reduction and oxidation their acids (really oxides) by that reactions. Stahl posed the problem of method. practical chemistry as a problem of the Certainly, the phlogiston theory, espe- composition of metals and the residues cially its central notion “phlogiston”, also of their . And besides, he has a connection with the views of tra- made use of the then applied experi- ditional chemistry, alchemy, and ancient menting technique of a qualitative char- philosophy. Phlogiston was the inflam- acter which meant that no quantitative mable principle. However, “phlogiston” methods were applied to determine the as a “principle” in pre-scientific theories composition of a substance. Conse- and as a theoretical term in scientific quently, it was still impossible to express chemistry are radically different. “Phlo- these issues in mathematical terms. giston” indicates, as it is usual for theo- Nevertheless, the problem of practical retical scientific terms, an idealised ob- chemistry was logically also a math- ject that could not directly be set into ematical one since it concerned the loss correspondence with any existing real of a metal in a certain quantity. The object. It was determined by the terms mathematical starting point for Stahl “element”, “corpuscle”, etc. through the was the formally interpreted relation- scientific (concretely: the Newtonian

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corpuscular-mechanical) world picture (or metaphysical part of a paradigm in as well as by the idealised scheme of the Kuhn’s terminology) of the phlogiston reversible opposite processes of com- theory was principally Newtonian (as bustion and reduction. By no means was opposed to the views of Descartes and phlogiston understood to be an object Boyle), yet, qualitative like the traditional that could be directly observed during treatments of chemistry. As a qualitative the experiment. I agree, for instance, theory it was characterised by the expla- with Alexander Bird that nation of the properties and the change of the properties of chemical substances A straightforward Putnamian theory could not work for the meaning of in chemical reactions on the basis of el- “phlogiston.” But the phenomenon in ementary composition of substances, question, combustion, does exist, and comprehended qualitatively since the so phlogiston could be hypothesised as elements were identified according to that thing which explains combustion, the properties whose permanent pri- as a substance contained in inflamma- ble materials, and given off by combus- mary causes they were. The principle tion (Bird, 1998: 110). can be called the principle of the con- servation of matter comprehended It meant that to consider the phlogiston qualitatively. theory fantastical because phlogiston The world picture of the para- could not be separated and bottled was digm (i.e. the metaphysical part of the much the same as to consider classical paradigm by Kuhn) was Newtonian not mechanics fantastical because its term only in terms of its general principle, but “material point” or “particle” could not it also essentially proceeded from New- be displayed either. ton’s ideas of matter as mass that can be A peculiarity of the phlogiston theory, qualified by weighing. as I have pointed out, lies in its quali- While explaining the properties of tativeness. In other words, the ideali- substances, Lavoisier’s paradigm also sations supporting the theory have been proceeded from their composition, but derived on the basis of the qualitative in order to determine the composition transformations of substances only. It is the quantitative criteria and the princi- clear that as long as the qualitative ap- ple of the conservation of the quantity proach in chemistry was sufficient, the of matter served as the consistent bases. phlogiston theory wholly met the needs In other words, the principle of the con- of chemistry. servation of matter was understood Now let us take a look at the quantita- quantitatively. This quantitative crite- tive approach of Lavoisier that replaced rion rendered it possible to clearly dif- the phlogiston theory. The phlogiston ferentiate elements from compound theory and the oxygen theory can indeed substances. be treated as different paradigms in The common and different features of terms of Kuhn. Let us examine in some the methodological principles of the detail the features characteristic of both phlogiston theory and of the oxygen the phlogiston theory and the oxygen theory generally arise from the common theory as different paradigms. and different features of the world pic- As we know already, the world picture tures (metaphysical paradigms) of those

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theories. Therefore their difference transfer of not only the physical (“non- manifests itself in their attitude towards chemical”) measurement technique but the quantitative methods of investiga- also of physical (“non-chemical”) units tion. However, it has to be stated here of measurement to the field of qualita- and now that it would be wrong to ac- tive research in chemistry. Therefore, the cuse the proponents of the phlogiston Lavoisier quantitative approach in paradigm of ignoring quantitative meth- chemistry was, regardless of a paradigm ods. “Phlogistonists”, Cavendish for one, change, a continuation of the earlier frequently conducted very accurate qualitative investigations with more ac- quantitative investigations. It does not curate and sensitive means. matter whether quantitative investiga- After all, the Lavoisier paradigm did tions were carried out or not and how not produce any quantitative law in precise those measurements were. What chemistry. The weighing of substances, matters is whether the starting point of the measuring of the volumes of gases chemical research was either a qualita- and the application of the law of the con- tive or a quantitative scheme. servation of mass made it possible to Owing to the differences in the scien- merely differentiate between chemical tific world picture and the methodologi- substances and to determine the nature cal starting points of the above para- of the processes (e.g. whether it was a digms, “symbolic generalisations” also decomposing or combining reaction) differed in them. The basic equation of even when it was impossible to deter- chemical reactions was understood by mine it in another way. Lavoisier had no Lavoisier in the light of the law of the clear theoretical answer to the question conservation of the weight of the react- of what a particular chemical substance ing substances. However, “the symbolic in fact was and how to measure its generalisations” of the phlogiston theory amount? The chemical units necessary were derived from the phlogistication- for determining the amounts of sub- dephlogistication scheme. stances could be introduced only with Among the concrete examples one the creation of the atomic-molecular could also detect obvious differences theory founded by John Dalton. that, generally speaking, depended on their relative importance in the quanti- Conclusions fying (or measurement) operations with the substances. First of all I would like to emphasise that Now, if we consider the transition Verronen’s main argument in his criti- from a paradigm based upon the phlo- cism of the Kuhn-loss thesis in this jour- giston theory to a paradigm based on the nal (Verronen, 1992) proves to be accept- oxygen theory, we can, first of all, state able. Indeed, Kuhn himself failed to es- that the phlogiston paradigm was based tablish the so-called Kuhn-loss thesis. on a qualitative approach whereas Verronen argued rightly that this thesis Lavoisier based his paradigm on a quan- presupposes the existence of mature sci- titative approach. Still, I would like to ence and a transition from one succes- emphasise that the Lavoisier paradigm sive paradigm to another so that the was formed in the course of a direct achieved solutions to some problems get

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lost, while Kuhn’s case examples of the loss thesis because in the transition from loss phenomenon do not characterise the real phlogiston paradigm (i.e. inter- paradigm change in mature science but preting the phlogiston theory as a proper a transition from a pre-scientific natu- scientific theory belonging to a specified ral philosophical period to a normal sci- Kuhnian paradigm) to Lavoisier’s para- ence or, in other words, from a pre-para- digm, there were simply no real scien- digm to a paradigm. Nevertheless tific achievements that got lost. It goes Verronen’s argument needs following without saying that we should, then, specifications. keep understanding phlogiston as a Model examples presented by Kuhn “principle” of pre-scientific chemistry, were the transition from the Cartesian but as an idealised object introduced view to Newton’s paradigm and espe- into a scientific theory. cially the transition from the phlogiston I hope I have proved in this paper that theory to Lavoisier’s chemistry. Verronen the conception of Kuhn’s paradigm, al- held that both of them – the Cartesian though it needs some specification, can view and the phlogiston theory as well – be used to discriminate between science were not instances of mature science, and non-science since they are incom- and for that reason these examples could mensurable. The main point in which not support the Kuhn-loss thesis. How- Kuhn’s notion of paradigm needs speci- ever, concerning the phlogiston theory, fication is its component called by him Verronen is right as he takes the phlo- the metaphysical part of paradigm. In my giston examples for analysis from Kuhn’s opinion, Kuhn was not quite consistent, texts i.e. in the presentation and inter- particularly because of his too liberal in- pretation given by Kuhn. Kuhn’s presen- terpretation of the metaphysical part of tation and interpretation of the phlogis- paradigm, in defining science through ton theory and the , the notion of paradigm (and normal sci- however, prove to be non-acceptable. ence). Namely, Kuhn occasionally con- The phlogiston theory as a scientific tradicts his own criteria of scientificity, theory and paradigm was unsuccessfully according to which, science was born in presented and analysed by Kuhn, even the form of physics (mechanics) estab- from the point of view of his own theory. lished by Galileo and Newton. Before the For that reason Verronen was able to Galilean-Newtonian science one cannot demonstrate that the phlogiston theory speak about an established paradigm was not a scientific paradigm according with its all four mutually connected to Kuhn’s own criteria, and therefore the components and a normal science func- Kuhn-loss phenomenon could not be tioning on its basis with its puzzle-solv- supported by the case of the Chemical ing tradition and other features charac- Revolution. By applying Kuhn’s theory in teristic of mature science. I have speci- a somewhat specified form to the re- fied that the general cultural precondi- spective studies of the history of chem- tion for scientificity is that the meta- istry, I show in this paper that the phlo- physical paradigm as the scientific world giston theory in fact is a scientific theory picture, which Kuhn characterised as a and paradigm. But the Chemical Revo- component of the paradigm, could be lution still does not support the Kuhn- taken into use as the general and natu-

76 Discussion

ral interpretation of the world. The sci- an Introduction by William Lovitt. New entific world picture is the most univer- York: Harper & Row Hoyningen-Huene, P. sal and the most invariant component 1993 Reconstructing Scientific Revolutions: of the paradigm. Thomas S. Kuhn’s Philosophy of Sci- Phlogiston chemistry and Lavoisier’s ence. Chicago & London: The Univer- chemistry are based on the same gen- sity of Chicago Press. eral Newtonian scientific world picture. Kant, I. 1929 Critique of Pure Reason. Translated by They are not incommensurable like pre- Norman Kemp Smith. London: Mac- scientific and scientific conceptions. millan. Nevertheless, they can be treated as dif- Koyré, A. ferent paradigms in terms of Kuhn. Ad- 1995 “The Significance of the Newtonian mittedly, a specific feature of the phlo- Synthesis.” Pp. 58-72 in I.B.Cohen and R.S.Westfall (eds.) Newton: Texts, Back- giston theory is its qualitative character, ground, Commentaries. New York: and Lavoisier’s approach introduced the Norton. Newtonian quantitative scientific para- Kuhn, T. digm into chemistry. It must be stressed, 1961 “The Function of Measurement in Mod- however, that this physically quantita- ern Physical Science.” Isis, 52: 161-193. 1970a The Structure of Scientific Revolutions. tive approach in chemistry was, regard- 2nd ed. Chicago: University Press. less of a paradigm change, a continua- 1970b “Reflections on my Critics.” Pp. 231- tion of the chemical qualitative investi- 278 in I.Lakatos, A.Musgrave (eds.) gations, formed in the framework of the Criticism and the Growth of Knowl- phlogiston theory, with more accurate edge. Cambridge: University Press. McEvoy, J. G. and sensitive physical means. 1988 “Continuity and Discontinuity in the Chemical Revolution.” Pp. 195-213 in Acknowledgements A.Donovan (ed.). The Chemical Revo- lution: Essays in Reinterpretation I would like to thank Ilmar Anvelt and (Osiris, Second Series, 4). Georg Allik for editing the English lan- Perrin, C. E. guage and a referee of this journal for 1988a “Research Traditions, Lavoisier, and helpful suggestions and criticisms to the the Chemical Revolution.” Pp. 53-81 in earlier version of this paper. A. Donovan (ed.). The Chemical Revo- lution: Essays in Reinterpretation (Osiris, Second Series, 4). References 1988b “The Chemical Revolution: Shifts in Guiding Assumptions.” Pp. 105-124 in Bird, A. Donovan et al. (eds). Scrutinizing Sci- 1998 Philosophy of Science. London: UCL ence: Empirical Studies of Scientific Change. Dordrecht: Kluwer. Press. Gough, J.B. 1990 “Chemistry as Peer of Physics: A Re- 1988 “Lavoiser and the Fulfillment of the sponse to Donovan and Melhado on Stahlian Revolution.” Pp. 15-33 in Lavoisier.” Isis, 81: 259-270. A.Donovan (ed.). The Chemical Revo- Schütt, H.-W. 1974 “Was hat Chemie zu einer Naturwissen- lution: Essays in Reinterpretation (Osiris, Second Series, 4). schaft gemacht? Eine wissenschafts- Heidegger, M. theoretishe Betrachtung zur Phlo- 1977 The Question Concerning Technology gistonlehre von Stahl und zur Oxi- and Other Essays. Translated and with dationslehre von Lavoisier.” Die Chemieunterricht, 5, 2: 56-70.

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Verronen, V. 1992 “A weakness in Kuhn’s regal argument.” Science Studies, 5, 1: 47-51. Vihalemm, R. 1975 “Concept of Scientificity and Formation of Scientific Chemistry.” Acta et Com- mentationes Universitatis Tartuensis, 361: Proceedings in Philosophy XVIII: 20-42 [in Russian]. 1981 The History of Formation of a Science: On the Development of Chemistry. Tallinn: Valgus [in Estonian]. 1982 “Is a Chemical Picture of the World Pos- sible? (On the Particular Scientific Pic- tures of the World.)” Filosofskie nauki, 1: 148-151 [in Russian].

Rein Vihalemm Department of Philosophy University of Tartu Tartu, Estonia

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