Ensuring Strategic Stability in the Past and Present: Theoretical and Applied Questions By Andrei Kokoshin Foreword by Graham Allison Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs Harvard Kennedy School 79 JFK Street Cambridge, MA 02138 Fax: (617) 495-8963 Email:
[email protected] Website: http://belfercenter.org Copyright 2011 President and Fellows of Harvard College Ensuring Strategic Stability in the Past and Present: Theoretical and Applied Questions By Andrei Kokoshin Foreword by Graham Allison June 2011 This paper was commissioned by the Nuclear Threat Initiative. The Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs would like to thank the Nuclear Threat Initiative for its support and financial sponsorship of this work. Table of Contents Foreword by Graham Allison: 2 Introduction: 4 Chapter 1: On the Path toward Defining Strategic Stability 10 Chapter 2: On the Principles and Parameters of Strategic Stability 20 Chapter 3: Challenges of Ensuring the Capability for a Guaranteed Response Strike and Demonstrating Such a Capability 26 Chapter 4: Challenges of Preventing Accidental or Unsanctioned Use of Nuclear Weapons 29 Chapter 5: The Goal of Preventing Escalatory Domination 30 Chapter 6: On Tactical and Operational-Tactical Nuclear Weapons 33 Chapter 7: Nuclear Deterrence as a Combination of “Vulnerability-Invulnerability” 34 Chapter 8: A Set of Measures for Ensuring Strategic Stability as an Example of an “Asymmetric Response” to Ronald Reagan’s Strategic Defense Initiative 36 Chapter 9: Latest Trends in the Development