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THE VASSAR COLLEGE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY EDITORS-IN-CHIEF Derek Butterton • Clement Stormes EDITORIAL BOARD Samuel Allen Louis Cheng Spencer Davis Sophie Koeller Henry Krusoe Erin Leahy Thomas Wolfe FACULTY ADVISOR Giovanna Borradori Authorization is granted to photocopy for personal or internal use or for free distribution. Inquiries regarding reproduction and subscription should be addressed to The Vassar College Journal of Philosophy at [email protected]. THE VASSAR COLLEGE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY Issue 2 Spring 2015 CONTENTS Acknowledgments iv Introduction 1 Rationality Revisited: A Critique of Kymlicka and Donaldson’s Animal Legal Subjectivity Nikolaas Deketelaere Catholic University of Leuven 3 Do Androids Deem Us Electric Sheep? Jorin Lee University of Houston 19 Double Mourning: Civility, Man and Animal Louis Cheng Vassar College 29 A Review of Brian Christian, The Most Human Human: What Artificial Intelligence Teaches Us about Being Alive Sophie Koeller Vassar College 41 A Review of Michael Marder, The Philosopher’s Plant: An Intellectual Herbarium Samuel Allen Vassar College 45 The Flesh of the Visual: An Interview with Mauro Carbone Sophie Koeller & Louis Cheng Vassar College 49 Call for Papers 67 ACKNOWLEDGMENTS The Vassar College Journal of Philosophy owes its success to a number of exceptional individuals and organizations. The Journal would not be possible without the support of the Vassar College Department of Philosophy, in particular Chair and Faculty Advisor Giovanna Borradori and Administrative Assistant Elizabeth Kucharek. The Journal is also grateful to the Vassar Student Association for its generous financial contribution; to Professor Mauro Carbone for his insightful interview; and to Tilhenn Klapper for her elegant cover design. Finally, the Journal offers a special thanks to the undergraduates who submitted their thoughtful essays on the topic of nonhumans. 1 INTRODUCTION The Vassar College Journal of Philosophy aims to provide a platform for undergraduate thought and engagement with compelling themes of philosophical interest. It annually invites essay submissions from undergraduates around the world, and it strives to include voices from diverse philosophical disciplines. Now in its second year, the Journal has substantially increased both the number and geographical spread of its submissions, receiving papers from undergraduates on four different continents. This year’s theme, “Nonhumans,” engages with exciting recent work in a variety of philosophical traditions. The notion of “nonhumans” sits at the intersection of debates in ethics, the philosophy of mind, and social and political philosophy in both the Analytic and Continental approaches. The three essays in this issue represent this diversity of thought, as well as high-quality philosophical argumentation. The Editors hope that the Journal will provoke thought, discussion, and further exploration of the questions raised by the essays, book reviews, and interview. 2 3 RATIONALITY REVISITED: A CRITIQUE OF KYMLICKA AND DONALDSON’S ANIMAL LEGAL SUBJECTIVITY Nikolaas Deketelaere Catholic University of Leuven Abstract This essay argues that Kymlicka and Donaldson’s critique of the traditional conception of legal subjectivity as grounded in reason is unsound. They argue that this traditional conception is inadequate because it does not cover the entire range of human diversity. An adequate conception of legal subjectivity would then also allow for it to be attributed to domesticated animals. However, as I demonstrate, the traditional conception does cover the entire range of human diversity, as it is not grounded in the factual exercise of reason but the essential capacity to reflect reasonably. Introduction In their 2011 book Zoopolis Sue Donaldson and Will Kymlicka present their political theory of animal rights. In a recent essay, “Animals and the Frontiers of Citizenship,” the authors respond to the main criticisms of that theory.1 They argue that when we think about animal protection, we do so from a presupposed relationship between humans and animals: for example, how we can improve animal welfare within the meat industry. When animals take part in our society, however, the authors say we should recognise them as members of that society and think about how we can enter into a relationship with animals that is mutually beneficial. They believe achieving this new relationship is possible by granting domesticated animals citizenship, including the corresponding civil rights that citizenship entails. Their main argument supporting this thesis is that domesticated animals are fully dependent on humans 1 Sue Donaldson & Will Kymlicka, Zoopolis: A Political Theory of Animal Rights (Oxford: Oxford UP, 2011); Sue Donaldson & Will Kymlicka, “Animals and the Frontiers of Citizenship”, Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 34 (2014): 201-219. 4 in their everyday life, and therefore share a society with them. On these grounds they deserve to be fully recognised as integral members of that society, and consequently they deserve civil rights: “Through domestication, humans have brought [domesticated animals] into our society and incorporated them into our schemes of social co-operation, and so we owe them rights of membership, which we can illuminate through theories of citizenship.”2 However noble I think the authors’ project is, here I criticise one of their presuppositions: that animals are subjects of law, or the mere idea that it is possible for them to possess rights, since, as the authors indicate, citizenship is a collection of civil rights. I first explain what legal subjectivity is and how Kymlicka and Donalsdon argue implicitly that domesticated animals are subjects of law. Subsequently, I demonstrate how a recent ruling of a New York court denies this.3 Finally, I present a possible argument the authors might bring against this ruling and explain why this argument is conceptually problematic. 1. Kymlicka and Donaldson’s Animal Legal Subjectivity 1.1. Objects and Subjects of Law We should distinguish objects and subjects of law. Subjects of law possess legal subjectivity, in order words, they can be the bearers of rights and duties. They can enforce their rights through a judicial body, and that same body can sanction the legal subject when its behaviour is not in accordance with its duties. Objects of law, on the other hand, do not possess legal subjectivity but are the objects of legal applications. One can for example exercise property rights over the legal object that is the house. Traditionally, animals are considered to be objects of law: they cannot possess any rights or duties. One could think of this doctrine as the legal articulation of Descartes’ philosophy, in which 2 Donaldson and Kymlicka, Animals and the Frontiers of Citizenship, 208. 3 THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK ex rel. NONHUMAN RIGHTS INC. v. PATRICK C. LEVERY [State of New York, Supreme Court, Appellate Division (Third Judicial Department): 04/12/2014 (case nr. 518336)]. 5 the animal belongs completely to the res extensa as a soulless automaton.4 Animals therefore cannot be considered citizens because they lack the capacity to be the bearers of civil rights.5 Since they are legal objects, their legal protection takes the form of prohibiting certain actions from humans, as subjects of law, and not that of attributing rights to animals that they can enforce autonomously. Humans have, for example, a legal duty not to torture animals, but animals do not, unlike humans, have a right not to be tortured which other legal subjects have a duty to respect. Kymlicka and Donaldson’s objection against this kind of protection is that it presupposes a certain functional relationship between humans and animals. They argue for the recognition of animals as autonomous members of society, as citizens, and thus, implicitly, as subjects of law as they would possess certain rights and duties. 1.2. The Domesticated Animal’s Rights Kymlicka and Donaldson observe that we have extracted animals from the wild and domesticated them to serve as pets. Because of this extraction they have become completely dependent on humans in their everyday lives. Moreover, humans control animals’ entire lives, but do not take their interests into account when it comes to the organisation of society. The authors compare this hierarchical relationship with the relationship between masters and their slaves. Animals are, just like slaves, a dominated caste that nonetheless is part of society. Such a caste, whether composed of slaves or animals, ought to be recognised as a part of that society out of motives of justice. The hierarchical relationship ought to be replaced by one of equality. This is made possible by granting animals or slaves citizenship, including the corresponding civil rights. 4 Rita Gielen, Dier en recht: Mensenrechten ook voor dieren? (Antwerpen: Maklu, 2000), 22. 5 Pamela D. Frash, Katherine M. Hessler, Sarah M. Kutil & Sonia S. Waisman, Animal Law in a Nutshell (St. Paul: West, 2011), 228-229. 6 According to the authors, however, this reasoning only applies to domesticated animals since it is only domesticated animals that are members of our society, that take part in a cooperative structure together with and alongside humans. They give the example of the oxen Bill and Lou: Bill and Lou contributed labour to a sustainable farming project of a local college. They thus depended for their basic needs on the college, but also contributed to one of its projects. Because they take part in this cooperative structure they do not, according to the authors, deserve protection against certain actions from humans, but civil rights that can be enforced autonomously. 1.3. The Domesticated Animal’s Duties As previously mentioned, being a subject of law means not merely being the bearer of rights, but also of duties. The capability of domesticated animals to be the bearers of rights is deduced by the authors from moral intuitions: based on the cooperative structure in which both animals and humans take part, humans ought to recognise certain rights of animals. The animal on its part is obliged to comply with certain duties.