Eleventh Public Hearing of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States: Day One, Morning Session

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Eleventh Public Hearing of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States: Day One, Morning Session ELEVENTH PUBLIC HEARING OF THE NATIONAL COMMISSION ON TERRORIST ATTACKS UPON THE UNITED STATES: DAY ONE, MORNING SESSION CHAIRMAN: THOMAS H. KEAN VICE CHAIRMAN: LEE H. HAMILTON SUBJECT: EMERGENCY RESPONSE WITNESSES: STAFF STATEMENT NUMBER 13; PANEL I: ALAN REISS, FORMER DIRECTOR, WORLD TRADE DEPARTMENT, PORT AUTHORITY OF NEW YORK AND NEW JERSEY; JOSEPH MORRIS, FORMER CHIEF, PORT AUTHORITY OF NEW YORK AND NEW JERSEY POLICE DEPARTMENT; PANEL II: BERNARD B. KERIK, FORMER COMMISSIONER, NEW YORK POLICE DEPARTMENT; THOMAS VON ESSEN, FORMER COMMISSIONER, FIRE DEPARTMENT OF NEW YORK; RICHARD SHEIRER, FORMER DIRECTOR, NEW YORK CITY OFFICE OF EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT LOCATION: New School University, New York City TIME: 9:00 A.M. DATE: TUESDAY, MAY 18, 2004 MR. THOMAS H. KEAN: Good morning. As chair of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States, I hereby convene the eleventh public hearing of this commission. Today and tomorrow we will be examining how local, regional and federal authorities 1 responded to attacks against the United States on September 11th, 2001. We will focus on what confronted civilians and first-responders during the attacks, how they made decisions under adverse conditions, and what first-responders communicated to civilians and to each other. We will also explore the state of emergency preparedness and response today. What steps have been taken since 9/11 to improve our preparedness against terrorist attacks and other emergencies, and whether we should establish national standards of preparedness. In the course of this two day hearing we will hear from people who directed agencies who were in the front lines of the 9/11 attacks both in New York and in Arlington, Virginia. We will also hear from some who will help the Commission to look at emergency response issues nationwide. We intend to use what we learn in the course of the next two days to guide us as we consider recommendations to make our country safer and more secure. Today's session will run until nearly 4 p.m. with a lunch break for one hour. Tomorrow we will reconvene at 8 a.m. and adjourn around 12:45. I'd like to mention just one administrative matter. I'd like to ask all those who are present to refrain from public expression during the hearing. We would ask you to refrain from applause, or for the matter, the opposite of applause. This is the second hearing we'll be holding in this great city of New York and the third in the New York region. We held our very first hearing at the Alexander Hamilton Custom House, not far from here, and our seventh at Drew University in Madison, New Jersey. So it's fitting that we return to the city that bore the greatest impact of the 9/11 attacks. New York City and all its vitality symbolizes everything that is great about our United States of America. That's why the terrorists singled out this city for attack. New Yorkers endured a terrible catastrophe and New Yorkers prevailed, with the resilience and determination we have come to expect from those who make their homes and livelihoods in this great city and its surrounding regions. Before we begin, I want to thank the New School University and our fellow commissioner, New York University president Bob Kerrey, for inviting us to hold this hearing at the New School University. The New School bore witness to the 9/11 attacks and felt the heavy impact of that day. The New 2 School provided solace and comfort, not only to its own students, faculty and staff, but to the wider community. Along with St. Vincent's Hospital, the New School ran a makeshift family information center from September 11th to 14th, 2001 where over 6,000 people came for help. This sense of service exhibited by the school during those very trying times was truly extraordinary. So on behalf of the Commission I want to say, thank you. Today will be a very difficult day as we relive the loss and the terrible devastation. Some of what the staff will be presenting shortly will be graphic and vivid. Some may find it very difficult to watch. Our purpose in presenting this information is to obtain the perspective of those who responded to the attacks. We want to know how and why they made the decisions they made, and often in the absence of good information, and sometimes under the most adverse of conditions. We want to understand what happened that morning so that we can learn and that we as a nation can be better prepared. We honor the bravery and courage of civilians and the first-responders who saved so many lives that morning, and we honor all those who gave their own. We will now hear from the staff, and I call on Dr. Philip Zelikow, the Commission's executive director, who will begin the first staff statement on emergency preparedness and response. He will be followed by John Farmer, Sam Caspersen and George Delgrosso. MR. PHILIP ZELIKOW: Members of the Commission, with your help, your staff is prepared to report its preliminary findings regarding the emergency response in New York City on September 11, 2001. These initial findings may help frame some of the issues for this hearing and the development of your judgments and recommendations. This report represents a summary of our work to date. We remain ready to revise our current understanding in light of new information as our work continues. We encourage those whose understanding differs from ours to come forward. Sam Caspersen, George Delgrosso, Jim Miller, Madeleine Blot, Cate Taylor, Joseph McBride, Emily Walker, and John Farmer conducted most of the investigative work reflected in this statement, and Allison Prince assisted with the audio-visual components. Much of this work was conducted in conjunction with the National Institute of Standards and Technology, NIST, which is 3 studying the building performance issues. We are indebted to NIST for its cooperation. We have also received cooperation from the Port Authority of New York and New Jersey and from the City of New York. We have spoken with hundreds of people about the most painful moments of their lives. We thank them for their willingness to help us. As we have relived their stories, and the records left by those who no longer can help us, we have joined in the mourning for all those who were lost that day. On the morning of September 11, 2001, the last best hope for the community of people working in or visiting the World Trade Center rested not with national policymakers but with private firms and local public servants, especially the first-responders: fire, police, and emergency medical service professionals. As we therefore focus on the choices they made on the morning of 9/11, we will not offer much commentary. We will offer more analysis and suggest some lessons that emerge for the future in Staff Statement No. 14, which we will present tomorrow. Today we concentrate just on presenting a reliable summary of what happened, to explain the day in its complexity without replicating its chaos. We wish to advise the public that the details we will be presenting may be painful for you to see and hear. Please consider whether you wish to continue viewing. MR. JOHN FARMER: Building Preparedness on 9/11. Emergency response is a product of preparedness. We begin with a brief discussion of measures taken to enhance safety and security at the World Trade Center after the 1993 bombing. The World Trade Center complex was built for the Port Authority of New York and New Jersey. Construction began in 1967, and tenants began to occupy its space in 1970. The Twin Towers came to occupy a unique and symbolic place in the culture of New York City and America. The Trade Center actually consisted of seven buildings, including one hotel, spread across 16 acres. The buildings were connected by an underground mall one level below the plaza area. The Twin Towers were the signature structures, containing 10.4 million square feet of office space. On any given work day up 4 to 50,000 office workers occupied the towers, and 40,000 visitors passed through the complex. Both towers had 110 stories and were about 1,350 feet high. Both were square; each wall measured 208 feet in length. The outside of each tower was covered by a frame of 14-inch-wide steel columns; the centers of the steel columns were 40 inches apart. These exterior walls bore the majority of the weight of the building. The interior core of the buildings was a hollow steel shaft, in which elevators and stairwells were grouped. Each tower contained three central stairwells, which ran essentially from top to bottom, and 99 elevators. Generally, elevators originating in the lobby ran to "Sky Lobbies" on upper floors, where further elevators carried passengers to the tops of the buildings. Stairwells A and C ran from the 110th floor to the mezzanine level and Stairwell B ran from the 107th floor to level B6. All three stairwells ran essentially straight up and down, except for two deviations in Stairwells A and C where the staircase jutted out toward the perimeter of the building. These deviations were necessary because of the placement of heavy elevators and machine rooms. These areas were located between the 42nd and 48th floors and the 76th and 82nd floors in both towers. On the upper and lower boundaries of these deviations were "transfer" hallways contained within the stairwell proper. Each hallway contained "smoke doors" to prevent smoke from rising from lower to upper portions of the building.
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