Peace under Fire:

Building the Media Agenda in Post-

A dissertation presented to

the faculty of the Scripps College of Communication of Ohio University

In partial fulfillment

of the requirements for the degree

Doctor of Philosophy

Sally Ann Cruikshank

May 2013

© 2013 Sally Ann Cruikshank. All Rights Reserved.

This dissertation titled

Peace under Fire:

Building the Media Agenda in Post-Genocide Rwanda

by

SALLY ANN CRUIKSHANK

has been approved for

the E. W. Scripps School of

and the Scripps College of Communication by

Yusuf Kalyango, Jr.

Associate Professor of Journalism

Scott Titsworth

Dean, Scripps College of Communication

ii ABSTRACT

CRUIKSHANK, SALLY ANN, Ph.D., May 2013, Mass Communication- Journalism

Peace under Fire: Building the Media Agenda in Post-Genocide Rwanda

Director of Dissertation: Yusuf Kalyango, Jr.

Following the 1994 genocide, in which the media played a significant role, the government enacted strict media laws that have led to a climate of self-censorship and government influence on the media. This study examined the processes of agenda building and frame building in the media from the perspective of Rwandan and media professionals. It further examined the media within the framework of . The study used both a qualitative and quantitative approach. A series of 35 in-depth interviews were conducted with Rwandan journalists and media professionals, along with a survey of 101 journalists.

Results showed that journalists and media professionals in Rwanda face several challenges, including indirect government censorship, few opportunities for training, and a lack of resources including low pay. According to the respondents, the government strongly influences the media agenda. Particularly in , the country’s capital and center of government business, politics drives the media agenda. In the rural areas, however, journalists report stories focused more on the community than politics.

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Dedicated in memory of:

My mother, Carolyn, my first and greatest teacher

My beautiful friend, Sabrina, and our many adventures, including that cricket book

iv ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

First and foremost, I would like to offer my deepest gratitude to my chair and mentor, Dr. Yusuf Kalyango, Jr. “Dr. K.” has been there from the beginning of my graduate career. Besides also chairing my master’s thesis, my first quarter in graduate school began in his class. Working with him has provided me with unending opportunities. I am forever grateful to have been able to work with an internationalist and scholar of his caliber, and I look forward to our future collaborations.

Every graduate student should have the opportunity to learn from someone as caring and thoughtful as Dr. Carson B Wagner. In his class, I first realized the practicality of a good theory, and I have been fortunate to be able to pick his super-computer brain these last five years. Special thanks to Dr. David Mould, who agreed to be part of my committee even though he was “retiring.” As this dissertation began in his class, it is only fitting that he is here for its end. His career advice and guidance has been invaluable, and

I will always count our SUSI adventure in Atlanta as one of the most memorable events of my time at Ohio University. I would also like to thank Dr. Peter Brobst, from the

Contemporary History Institute, for being part of my committee. His insight into the historical context of this research helped bring the whole study into focus.

I certainly would not have been able to accomplish any of this if it were not for the support of the entire E.W. Scripps School of Journalism faculty and staff, especially its director, Dr. Robert Stewart. Besides being part of my master’s thesis committee, he somehow found a way to fund my research trip to . His enthusiasm for journalism and education is unparalleled, and the school is fortunate to have him at the helm.

v Murakoze cyane to all the journalists in Rwanda who shared their inspirational stories with me. I would especially like to offer my heartfelt thanks to Julien Niyingabira

Mahoro. I will always be grateful for his friendship and the warm welcome he and his family gave me in Kigali. In the interest of his safety, due to recent events in Rwanda, I will not name my research assistant here. He deserves so much credit, however, as his hard work and dedication helped turn this dissertation idea into reality. I will say that as a , he represents the bright future that is possible for Rwanda.

Of all the blessings I have been given, I perhaps feel most fortunate for my family. I am especially indebted to my Aunt Brenda and Uncle Jim for adopting me and giving me so much love and affection. My (sometimes) caring brother, T.G. had the good sense to marry the lovely Angie, and then produce two of the most incredible nieces,

Alexandra and Paige, an aunt could want. Besides her constant support, my Aunt Doris also passed along to me her sense of adventure, a necessity for navigating any graduate degree. No acknowledgement would be complete without mentioning my best friend,

Rebecca, who has been there for me through everything. Here is to another 20 years of road trips and good times.

Finally, I would like to thank my Scripps family, the group of fellow grad students that pulled me through all this. Our Thursday nights at Jackie O’s made all the hard work and sleepless nights worth it in the end.

vi TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

Abstract...... iii Acknowledgments...... v List of Tables ...... ix List of Figures...... x Chapter 1: Introduction...... 1 1.1 Research Objectives...... 2 1.2 Organization of the Study...... 3 Chapter 2: The Media and the Genocide ...... 4 2.1 The Media in Rwanda...... 6 2.2 Defining Genocide...... 10 2.3 The Genocide Begins...... 12 2.4 The Genocide Ends...... 14 2.5 “The Media Trial”...... 16 2.6 Commemoration and Reconciliation ...... 19 2.7 The Hate Media’s Legacy...... 21 Chapter 3: Agenda Building, Frame Building, and Peace Journalism ...... 26 3.1 Agenda Building...... 26 3.2 Frame Building ...... 30 3.3 Peace Journalism...... 32 Chapter 4: Methodology ...... 38 4.1 In-depth Interviews...... 39 4.2 Survey ...... 44 4.3 Research Questions...... 46 Chapter 5: Critical Case Study of Rwandan Media...... 48 5.1 Media Decisions and Sources...... 48 5.1.1 The Rise of Community Journalism ...... 51 5.1.2 Wary Sources ...... 55 5.2 Censorship in the Media ...... 58 5.3 Media Challenges ...... 72

vii 5.3.1 “A Culture of Hiding”...... 73 5.3.2 Education and the Media ...... 80 5.3.3 A Digital Divide...... 88 5.3.4 Scarce Resources ...... 91 5.3.5 Women in the Media...... 94 5.4 Moving Forward ...... 99 5.4.1 Understanding Media...... 100 5.4.2 Non-traditional Media...... 101 5.4.3 Overcoming the Digital Divide...... 102 5.4.4 A Sense of Hope ...... 104 Chapter 6: Survey of Rwandan Journalists...... 106 6.1 Survey Demographics...... 106 6.2 Decisions Concerning Content ...... 112 6.3 Journalists’ Sources ...... 116 6.4 Censorship in the Media ...... 120 6.5 Challenges facing Journalists...... 123 6.6 Elements of Peace Journalism ...... 126 Chapter 7: Conclusion...... 129 References...... 132 Appendix: A...... 143 Field Interview Questions...... 143 Appendix: B...... 144 Survey Instrument...... 144

viii LIST OF TABLES

Page

Table 3.1: Peace Journalism vs. War Journalism ...... 33

Table 3.2: Violence in Society...... 35

Table 6.1: Formal Journalism Training by ...... 108

Table 6.2: Formal Journalism Training by Age Bracket ...... 108

Table 6.3: Use of Government Story Ideas and Statements by Province ...... 114

Table 6.4: Types of Sources Used by Province ...... 117

Table 6.5: Types of Sources Used by Ownership of Media Outlet ...... 118

Table 6.6: Attitudes toward Censorship by Province ...... 121

Table 6.7: Challenges Facing Journalists by Province ...... 124

Table 6.8: Elements of Peace Journalism in the Media by Outlet Ownership ...... 127

ix LIST OF FIGURES

Page

Figure 2.1: Map of Rwanda ...... 16

Figure 3.1: Agenda Building Models...... 27

Figure 6.1: Challenges Facing Journalists ...... 123

x CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION

Nearly two decades after the 1994 genocide that left Rwanda in ruins, Rwandese are still coping with its legacy. This is particularly the case for journalists and other media professionals, because of the role media played in the genocide. Prior to and during the genocide, propaganda that became known as hate media fueled tensions between the two major ethnicities of Rwanda, the Hutus and the . The hate media, published and broadcast by extremists, focused on the differences between Hutu and

Tutsi and pushed “the disproportionate share of wealth and power held by and the horrors of past Tutsi rule” (Des Forges 2007, 45). The hate media further denigrated moderate Hutus who refused to join the extremists in their plan to eradicate Tutsis.

Following the genocide, which left at least 800,000 Tutsi and moderate Hutus dead, the government used the hate media’s participation in the genocide as justification for restrictions on press freedom (Des Forges 2007).1 Media laws enacted to suppress hate media have been used by the government to persecute journalists for criticizing the ruling elite, and journalists have created a culture of self-censorship, not only to escape government harassment, but also in the fear of causing ethnic tensions (Frère 2007).

1 The generally cited death toll is 800,000, although some estimate that number could be as high as 1,000,000. As mass graves are still being recovered in Rwanda, it is unlikely that an accurate number will ever be established.

1.1 Research Objectives

Restrictions on press freedom in Rwanda and other East African countries have created an environment where the media adopt agendas and frames originating from the government (Frère 2007; Kalyango 2011). This study examines the current situation in

Rwanda using agenda building and frame building as the theoretical framework. One aspect of the agenda building process involves determining the way issues become known to the public, and frame building ascertains how the media attach frames to those issues (Cobb, Ross, & Ross 1976; Gamson 1989; Kalyango 2011).

In post-genocide societies such as Rwanda, some scholars proposed a peace journalism approach to media, which involves giving a voice to all parties within a conflict in order to consider non-violent solution (Lynch & McGoldrick 2005). This approach to journalism, and media in general, is problematic in the current situation in

Rwanda. If media are unable to approach and investigate certain issues, such as ethnic tensions and government corruption, the principles of peace journalism become impossible to achieve. Media oppression has created an environment where an agenda of peace has come under fire (Frère 2007).

Although scholars (Des Forges 2007; Kabanda 2007; Kimani 2007; Mironko

2007) have researched the role of hate media in the genocide extensively, few studies

(Frère 2007; Kalyango 2011) have examined the current media landscape in Rwanda.

This study conducted field research involving in-depth interviews with journalists and other media professionals along with a larger survey of journalists. Both the in-depth interviews and the survey sought to determine how agenda building and frame building

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processes work in the Rwandan media. Research questions include the following: How do media professionals make decisions when determining content? What topics, not specifically prohibited by law, are either not covered or covered only with great care?

What are some of the challenges media professionals face? What sources do media professionals use when determining content? What elements of peace journalism, if any, are already being incorporated into the media?

1.2 Organization of the Study

This study continues in chapter two with an examination of Rwanda’s history, including the events surrounding the 1994 genocide and the media’s part in the violence.

Particular focus is given to the hate media; its legacy shapes the media to this day.

Chapter three reviews relevant literature associated with agenda building, frame building, and peace journalism and explicates how each contributed to this study. Chapter four describes the methodology used for both the in-depth interviews and the survey conducted. In the fifth chapter, the results of the in-depth interviews are used to conduct a case study on the Rwandan media. Chapter six reports and discusses the empirical results, and chapter seven addresses the future of the Rwandan media within the framework of this study’s findings.

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CHAPTER 2: THE MEDIA AND THE GENOCIDE

The tension between the Hutus and Tutsis that culminated in the 1994 genocide brewed for decades, underpinned by history and colonization. The people known as

Hutus and Tutsis began to settle in Rwanda 2,000 years ago, eventually developing a

“complex state” with “a single and highly sophisticated language, Kinyarwanda” (Des

Forges 1999, 31). The commonly accepted version of Rwanda’s history contends that the

Hutu, a Bantu people, settled first, with the Tutsi migrating later from the northern and eastern regions of Africa. A lack of written records, however, means this account depends

“more on legend than on documentable fact” (Gourevitch 1998, 47). Prior to the arrival of the Hutus and Tutsis, the Twa, a forest-dwelling, hunting and gathering people, called

Rwanda home. The Hutu and Tutsi were cultivators who developed what could be considered a class system based on the number of cattle a person owned. The Tutsis owned cattle and land; the Hutus typically worked for the Tutsis as laborers in the fields.

The groups were nearly indistinguishable from each other, and sometimes even intermarried, unlike the Twa, who typically stayed segregated from both the Hutu and

Tutsi.

Besides establishing a language and a way of life, the Hutus and Tutsis also developed a system of communicating their history and ways of life. Stories passed between generations orally; the culture “valued song, dance, poetry, and rhetoric” (Des

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Forges 1999, 31). Instruments, particularly drums and the flute were an essential part of storytelling, and there was not a tradition of written history (Mutsinzi 2007).

That changed after 1916, when, during World War I, Belgium colonized the region, creating schools and establishing a written press (Mutsinzi 2007). The Belgians also colonized the neighboring area that was then known as the Belgian Congo (currently the Democratic Republic of the Congo), an area rich in natural resources. Although

Rwanda did not share the same natural resources, Belgian officials “sought to rule

Rwanda with the least cost and the most profit” (Des Forges 1999, 34). This policy, which the Belgians also used in the Congo, left behind a path of destruction. Hochschild

(1999) argues that millions of people died in the Belgian Congo from mass murders, starvation, and exhaustion due to Belgian policies concerning indigenous people.

Certainly Belgian strategies in Rwanda contributed to the genocide ideology that was to come in Rwanda (Des Forges 1999).

During the early years of colonization, the so-called “Hamitic myth,” that the

Tutsis descended from more civilized northern people, the ancestors of Noah’s son Ham, took root; colonizers wrote this version of history, teaching it in schools in Europe and widely distributing it throughout Rwanda as well (Gourevitch 1998). The Belgian rulers established identity cards, forcing people to register as ethnic Tutsi or ethnic Hutu. Prior to this period of ethnic identification, there had been no real recorded way to distinguish between the two groups. The issuing of identity cards would prove devastating following

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Rwanda’s independence. At the time about 15 percent of the population registered as

Tutsi, 84 percent Hutu, and one percent as the Twa (Des Forges 1999).2

At first, the Belgian policy was to strengthen Tutsi control; however, following

World War II, the Hutus began to demand that the political and social inequalities in

Rwanda be abolished. The favoritism toward Tutsis shifted in 1959, in the so-called

‘Hutu Revolution.’ Hutu groups responded to an attack on a Hutu sub-group by attacking

Tutsi officials; hundreds died before the Belgians could control the situation (Des Forges

1999). The Belgians responded by replacing half of the local Tutsi leaders with Hutus.

The policy may have been changed, but the initial favoritism “set the stage for future conflict in Rwanda” (Des Forges 1999, 36). Rwanda stayed under Belgian rule until its independence on July 1, 1962.

The Hutu government that assumed power following independence quickly sought to ensure its domination in Rwanda politics that was centered on ethnicity. Tutsis were given quotas that entitled them to only 9 percent of spaces available in schools and the workforce; thousands of Tutsis fled to neighboring countries to escape violence, and a group of rebel Tutsis formed with hopes of retaking the country (Des Forges 1999). The identification cards were used by the new regime to discriminate against Tutsi. In 1991,

Tutsi only accounted for 8.4 percent of the population.

2.1 The Media in Rwanda

One of the ways the ruling Hutu government enforced its supremacy following the 1959 revolution was through the media. Although the colonizers had introduced a

2 Belgian colonization in Africa 6

written press through the Catholic Church in the 1920s, infrastructure and the oral kept from gaining popularity. Radio, however, gained popularity much faster, due to its low cost and availability (Mutsinzi 2007). Following independence, the state-owned Radio Rwanda, which aired both on AM and FM bands, notified people of government appointments and dismissals; broadcasts also included messages from the president encouraging people to “work hard and live, clean moral lives” (Des Forges 2007, 42). Until Radio-Télévision Libre des Milles Collines (RTLM) began broadcasting in 1993, Radio Rwanda was the only radio station in the country. It was the official voice of the state, and above all, its purpose was to broadcast propaganda for the ruling president’s political party (Des Forges 2007).

Radio operated as, and remains, a particularly important and effective propaganda tool in Rwandan society (Des Forges 1999; Des Forges 2007; Kimani 2007, Chrétien

2007; Frère 2011). Due to low literacy rates and the affordability of radio, Rwandan citizens relied heavily on radio programming for and entertainment. Lt. Gen.

Roméo Dallaire, who was in charge of UN peacekeeping troops in Rwanda at the time of the genocide, described the radio as the “voice of God” in some villages (Dallaire 2007,

16). A study by the National University of Rwanda demonstrates the pervasiveness, and perceived importance of radio in Rwanda; it declared 100% of the population in Rwanda listens to the radio (National University 2009). Although an entire country listening to the radio is impossible, the study indicates the reliance on radio in society. In 1992, Radio

Rwanda was effectively used to incite violence against the Tutsi. An alert that claimed to be from a human rights group was broadcast on Radio Rwanda in Bugesera, a town south

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of Kigali. The message reported that a group of Tutsi was planning to attack Hutus there and urged Hutus to strike first. The Hutus listened, and a militia, along with citizens of the town, murdered hundreds of Tutsis (Des Forges 2007).

In 1993, as Rwandan President Juvena Habyarimana engaged in peace talks with

Tutsi rebel leaders, Radio-Télévision Libre des Milles Collines (RTLM), the flagship station for hatred began to broadcast. A Hutu extremist party, the Coalition for the

Defence of the Republic (CDR), founded RTLM in July 1993 to rally against these meetings. RTLM could only be heard in Kigali and nearby areas when it began broadcasting on FM; but it soon spread throughout Rwanda and even neighboring countries by using one of Radio Rwanda’s transmitter frequencies for a few hours in the evening (Mironko 2007). As more people managed to listen to RTLM, its popularity grew.

RTLM began as a radio station that promised to be the voice of the people, airing a mix of official news and popular music requested by listeners. Quick-witted, colorful, and lively announcers commanded the airwaves (Kimani 2007). Eventually, RTLM took a darker tone and would become known by the grim nickname ‘Radio Machete.’ It began to air propaganda against Tutsis and sensationalized the conflict between Hutus and

Tutsis in neighboring Burundi. Like Rwanda, Burundi suffered the consequences of the racial segregation of Belgian colonial rule. In late October 1993, the first Hutu president of Burundi was assassinated. Hutus responded by attacking Tutsis across the country.

The events in Burundi were reported by RTLM in a “way to underline supposed Tutsi brutality and heighten Hutu fears of Tutsi” (Kimani 2007, 45). The CDR “became

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known by its rallying cry ‘’ and its voice became the RTLM” (Kimani 2007,

44). The Tutsis were referred to as ‘inyenzi,’ or cockroaches, and as a ‘sickness’ plaguing

Rwanda; a plague that needed to be eradicated.

Before RTLM took to the airwaves, another medium intent on hate surfaced. The bimonthly , established in 1990, published anti-Tutsi propaganda with “hysterical hatred” (Kabanda 2007, 62). Kangura is a Kinyarwanda word meaning to ‘wake him up,’ and despite being printed in small numbers it “spread like wildfire”

(Melvern 2006, 49). The publisher of Kangura told the director of the Office Rwandais d’Information that the paper sold between 10,000 and 30,000 copies, although the director doubted those figures (Vianney Higiro 2007). Before the genocide, only about

66 percent of the population was literate, but it was common for someone who was illiterate to buy the newspaper and ask someone to read it to him or her (Kagwi-Ndungu

2007). The newspaper then passed along to several other people to be read (Kagwi-

Ndungu 2007).

Kangura claimed Tutsis were taking opportunity for wealth and privilege away from Hutus and published reports of a secret plan by Tutsis to lead a revolution. The paper notoriously published a report called “The Hutu Ten Commandments” in

December 1990. It called on the Hutu to “be firm and vigilant” and to “take all necessary measures to deter the enemy from launching a fresh attack” (Ngeze 1990). A year later, an illustration of a machete was pointed to as the solution to the Tutsi problem in

Rwanda, along with an ironic title calling Tutsi the ‘Race of God’ (Kangura 1993). The editor of Kangura, , also played a part in the Bugesera massacre in 1992. In

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February and March, Ngeze visited the region several times, distributing brochures and leaflets warning of infiltration by ‘inyenzi’ (Eltringham 2004). These events foreshadowed the grim future for Rwanda, as the country moved toward the 1994 genocide.

2.2 Defining Genocide

The 1994 genocide gained Rwanda a place in history as the location of a terrible atrocity in human history. have been woven into the fabric of human existence; governments and people in positions of power have targeted groups for extinction due to their religion, ethnicity, or political stance throughout recorded history

(White 2012). For centuries, however, this crime against humanity went without name or definition. During of World War II, a Jewish scholar decided that the crime of targeting a group of people for annihilation deserved a distinction from other crimes.

Raphael Lemkin escaped Poland after the Nazi invasion, moving first to Sweden before coming to the United States. After laboring over what it should be called, he derived the word genocide from the Greek geno, or race, and the Latin cide, or killing (Power 2002).

Giving the crime a name, however, was only the beginning of Lemkin’s battle.

Defining genocide became a much more difficult task than naming it. On the international stage, critics argued genocide did not need to be further defined or separated from other ; it was already covered under human rights laws.

Numbers were also at the crux of the argument. Questions arose over just how many people needed to be targeted in order to constitute genocide. Policymakers expressed

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fears that if a certain number were specified, “perpetrators would be granted a free reign up to a dastardly point” (Power 2002, 65). In the United States, some senators voiced concerns the definition was too general, which might implicate the United States in the deaths of Native Americans, or not general enough, which would mean the Soviet Union would face no repercussions for political killings (Power 2002). Lemkin soldiered on, lobbying anyone with any kind of power to sway the vote. The core of his argument was the idea that “the destruction of foreign national or ethnic identities would bring huge losses to the world’s cultural heritage. All of humankind, even those who did not feel vulnerable to genocide, would suffer” (Power 2002, 53).

In 1951, the United Nations convened the Convention on the Prevention and

Punishment of the Crime of Genocide and finally defined genocide in a resolution.

The declaration affirmed that genocide “whether committed in a time of peace or in a time of war, is a crime under international law” (United Nations 1951). Five acts

“committed with intent to destroy, in whole or part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group” constituted genocide (United Nations 1951). Those five acts included: “Killing members of the group,” “Causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group,” “Deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring about its physical destruction in whole or part,” “Imposing measures intended to prevent births within the group,” and “Forcibly transferring children of the group to another group”

(United Nations 1951). More than 60 years later, the parameters of genocide established in this resolution still stand.

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This definition of genocide would be used in the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR), which convened following the genocide to hold the perpetrators of the genocide accountable for their crimes. There are other reasons, however, to consider the United Nations’ convention on genocide in regards to Rwanda. Power (2002) argued that this concrete definition of genocide actually kept countries such as the United States from intervening in Rwanda. She contends the U.S. officials avoided calling the events in

1994 genocide, because “they were afraid that using it would have obliged the United

States to act” under the convention’s terms (Power 2002, 359). It would take until June 8 for the U.N. Security Council to pass a resolution referring to “acts of genocide” in

Rwanda (United Nations 1994). It would later be nearly universally acknowledged that the United Nations and the rest of the international community utterly failed in regards to preventing or ending the (Uvin 1998; Des Forges 1999; Thompson

2007a). The international definition of genocide, and the world’s failure to recognize and acknowledge it, inform the legacy of the genocide in Rwanda.

2.3 The Genocide Begins

Tensions between Hutus and Tutsis boiled over in the evening hours of April 6,

1994, when a plane flying over the Rwandan capital of Kigali was attacked. Air missiles launched near the Kigali airport shot down the plane carrying President Habyarimana.

The plane fell to the ground in flames, killing the president and everyone on board. The

Hutu extremists responsible for the hate media used the death of the Hutu president as an excuse to begin the massacre of the Tutsis. Within hours of the assassination, the

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genocide was underway. The next morning, shooting was heard in the street and Tutsi children told their neighbors, “‘Mother and father are dead’” (Gourevitch 1998, 112).

Over the course of the next 100 days, at least 800,000 Tutsis and even Hutus that sympathized with the minority group were brutally murdered (Des Forges, 1999).

Understanding the origins and the events of the genocide are imperative to any research regarding Rwanda. The genocide, as demonstrated by this study, still pervades all facets of life of culture in Rwanda, including the media.

By the time the genocide began, Kangura stopped publishing. The small number of other newspapers, particularly papers in favor of a peace agreement, stopped publishing as well. Many of the journalists working for those papers were killed. A total of 53 journalists were killed during the genocide, half of them Hutu (Kalyango 2011).

That left RTLM and Radio Rwanda, which had been taken over by the extremist party, as the main sources for information, and both broadcast calls from leaders to ‘exterminate’ the Tutsis. RTLM urged Hutus to kill all Tutsis, including grandparents, children, and even unborn babies (Khan & Robinson 2000). Both stations were also used to mobilize killing militias, sometimes even giving the names of Tutsis and Tutsi sympathizers that needed to be murdered (Des Forges 2007).

The broadcast messages became increasingly incendiary as the massacres progressed. Broadcasts advised listeners to ignore ID cards and to murder anyone who simply looked Tutsi. On June 4, 1994, one announcer said, “Look at a person, notice his height and physical appearance, if you only see his pretty little nose, smash it” (RTLM

1994a). One Rwandan remembered hearing “how well the killing was going” on RTLM

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(Gourevitch 1998, 134). In another incident, dramatized in the film Hotel Rwanda, the

United Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda tried to evacuate a group of Tutsis and sympathizers from the Hotel Milles Collines. Before the group had even left the lobby of the hotel, their names were broadcast on RTLM. The militia waited for the convoy and attacked it on the way to the airport. In the end, the group was forced to return to the hotel (Kamilindi 2007). This incident effectively demonstrates the role of the media in the genocide.

Understanding the media’s participation in the genocide is particularly important in the context of this study, because of the lingering effects of the hate media. Waldorf

(2007) argued the Rwandan government uses the media’s history as a means to censor and cower journalists into avoiding into abuses of power.

Furthermore, as this study demonstrates, journalists keenly feel the weight of the media’s past; the genocide still influences their practice.

2.4 The Genocide Ends

The (RPF), the Tutsi opposition army that had pushed into the country from Uganda, finally ended the genocide in July 1994, after taking

Kigali. RPF soldiers marched down the eastern side of Rwanda, before sweeping west toward Gisenyi (See Figure 2.1). As they moved, they stopped the killing campaign and allowed Tutsis and moderate Hutus to come out of hiding. It is estimated that RPF soldiers saved tens of thousands of people from attackers, although they were not innocent of killing themselves. The RPF executed thousands, including some civilians, as

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they “sought to establish their control over the local population” (Des Forges 1999, 692).

The leaders of the RPF have never been prosecuted for any crimes committed in their takeover of the country.

As the RPF took control of the country and the government, its rebel leader,

General , was installed as vice-president of the country as part of an agreement to end the civil war. The Hutu president under that agreement, Pasteur

Bizimungu, resigned from office in 2000, and Paul Kagame became president in a secret ballot vote by government officials (Lacey 2003). Kagame won the presidency in a landslide victory in 2003, in the first elections held since the 1994 genocide. In 2010,

Kagame was re-elected, receiving 93% of the vote (Kron 2010). In both elections, however, Human Rights Watch and other international watchdog organizations questioned the legitimacy of the ballots. The government banned opposition parties, and the two main independent newspapers were suspended in 2010. In the six months leading up to the 2010 election, Human Rights Watch “documented a worrying pattern of intimidation, harassment and other abuses — ranging from killings and arrests to restrictive administrative measures — against opposition parties, journalists, members of civil society and other critics” (Human Rights Watch 2010).

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Figure 2.1 Map of Rwanda

Note: The arrows represent the progression of Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) during the genocide. RPF troops arrived in Kigali April 11, 1994 and took the capital on July 4, 1994 (Des Forges 1999). Map courtesy of http://geography.about.com/. 2.5 “The Media Trial”

In 2003, the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) tried men identified as being the architects of the hate media propaganda machine, in what would be deemed “the Media Trial.” Hassan Ngeze, the publisher of Kangura, was put on trial, along with the directors of RTLM, Ferdinand Nahimana and Jean-Bosco Barayagwiza.

The trial raised questions about the media’s role in criminal activity that had not been addressed since Nuremberg (Monasebian 2007). ICTR Deputy Prosecutor Bernard Muna drew parallels between the hate media in Rwanda and the propaganda created by

Heinrich Himmler during the holocaust (Eltringham 2004). Scholars have also pointed 16

out similarities between the 1923 anti-Semitic publication, Der Strürmer, and Kangura.

Both were filled “with scandal and crime” and graphic images meant to proliferate a message of “morbid psychological antagonism” against Jews and Tutsis (Kagwi-Ndungu

2007).

The trial included excerpts from “The Ten Commandments” published in

Kangura, along with other editorials written by Ngeze. One witness, a Hutu who worked at the Ministry of Information, testified that the “The Ten Commandments” had even been read on RTLM. Ngeze further argued that he was not the first to publish the article, and cited his publication of the Tutsi “19 Commandments,” which promoted Tutsi superiority, in 1990 as an effort to show balance. Another witness, however, stated on the stand that the “19 Commandments” had also been in circulation for decades, and that

Ngeze had even altered the language of the article. Ngeze denied writing “The Ten

Commandments” and condemned both articles in his testimony. He told the court that publishing did not amount to endorsement, saying, “We published them so that the public and the officials can see them, get to know them, and denounce them - or, condemn them” (Prosecutor v. Nahimana, Barayagwiza, and Ngeze 2003, 49).

Hassan Ngeze’s behavior outside the also came up at the trial.

Witnesses testified that Ngeze took part in roadblocks and helped distribute weapons to the killers. Ngeze defended himself by pointing out that he had also published the Tutsi

“19 Commandments” in 1990, in an effort to show that he published balanced coverage.

His defense, however, failed. The Chamber found that Ngeze intended Kangura to convey “contempt and hatred for the Tutsi ethnic group” (Prosecutor v. Nahimana,

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Barayagwiza, and Ngeze 2003, 51). Ngeze was found guilty of several crimes, including genocide, direct and public incitement to commit genocide, and crimes against humanity.

He was sentenced to life in prison for his crimes (Prosecutor v. Nahimana, Barayagwiza, and Ngeze 2003).

Several hundred tapes of RTLM programming were introduced in the trial as evidence. The ICTR actually split its examination of RTLM into two parts, before and after April 6, 1994. The broadcasts used in court after April 6, 1994, served as an almost play-by-play of the genocide, as callers and radio personalities described the slaughter. In an RTLM broadcast on May 31, 1994, played during the trial, a speaker described the death of Tutsi child, saying, “Last night, I saw a Tutsi child who had been wounded and thrown into a hole 15 meters deep. He managed to get out of the hole, after which he was finished with a club” (Prosecutor v. Nahimana, Barayagwiza, and Ngeze 2003, 141).

Witnesses described living in fear and being harassed after being named or identified on

“Radio Machete” (Prosecutor v. Nahimana, Barayagwiza, and Ngeze 2003, 150).

The combination of playing a selection of those broadcasts and witnesses proved effective for the prosecution. In its judgment, the Chamber called RTLM a “drumbeat, calling on listeners to take action against the enemy” and the enemy was the Tutsi and moderate Hutus (Prosecutor v. Nahimana, Barayagwiza, and Ngeze 2003, 342). RTLM, according to the Chamber, whipped Hutus “into a frenzy of hatred and violence that was directed largely against the Tutsi” (Prosecutor v. Nahimana, Barayagwiza, and Ngeze

2003, 166). The members of the tribunal went on to point out the “power of the human voice,” and decided “the denigration of the Tutsi ethnicity was augmented by the visceral

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scorn coming out of the airwaves- the ridiculing laugh and the nasty sneer” (Prosecutor v. Nahimana, Barayagwiza, and Ngeze 2003, 343).

Just as blame for Kangura fell on Ngeze, the ICTR held Ferdinand Nahimana and

Jean-Bosco Barayagwiza responsible for RTLM’s programming. Both were found guilty of the same charges as Ngeze. Nahimana was sentenced to life in prison; Barayagwiza received 35 years. The members of the ICTR wrote in their ruling: “The power of the media to create and destroy fundamental human values comes with great responsibility.

Those who control such media are accountable for its consequences” (Prosecutor v.

Nahimana, Barayagwiza, and Ngeze 2003, 317). The outcome of the Media Trial still influences the media today, and the government cited the media’s role in the genocide in its drafting of the various media laws that have been enacted since the genocide (Waldorf

2007). The hate media and the Media Trial, although not the focus of this study, still need to be taken into account, given their influence on the current media landscape.

2.6 Commemoration and Reconciliation

Rwanda now observes April 7th of each year as Genocide Memorial Day, and the week around it is an official week of mourning. During this time, commemorative ceremonies are held. Mass graves are still being discovered all over the country, and it is also during this week that those bodies are officially laid to rest in public services.

During this time, the special reports are broadcast on radio stations and published in newspapers.

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The journalists murdered in the genocide have received attention as well. In

February 2011, the Media High Council (MHC) began a survey to identify the journalists killed in the genocide, to find out where they were killed and buried, to identify the families of these victims, and to find the articles these journalists wrote that might have led to their deaths. The MHC pointed out that the previous list of fallen journalists compiled by Reporters without Borders named only 50 journalists, including people that had been identified as participating in the genocide (Media High Council 2011).

The MHC survey respondents consisted of six groups: journalists working before and after the genocide, genocide survivors from the families of journalist victims, internet and phone contributors, organizations that fought against genocide ideology, media outlets that operated during and before the genocide, and other institutions. The survey confirmed that there were 53 journalists killed in the genocide. Of those 53, the greatest number of journalists killed at one media outlet, 15, worked for the Rwanda Bureau of

Information and Broadcasting (ORINFOR), which was and still is owned and operated by the government. Most other media outlets had anywhere from one to six journalists killed. The survey further reported that ten journalist victims still had surviving family members (Media High Council 2011).

The MHC also collaborates with media outlets, journalist groups, and the families of journalists killed in the genocide to hold a special commemoration day during the

Genocide Memorial Week each year. The ceremonies not only include a walk to remember the journalists killed, but also feature presentations on the journalists who participated in the hate media, including Hassan Ngeze, Jean-Bosco Barayagwiza, and

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Ferdinand Nahimana. The ceremonies further incorporate testimonies from journalists and family members who survived the genocide, on how Tutsi journalists were treated before they were killed (Media High Council 2011).

2.7 The Hate Media’s Legacy

The role of the media in post-genocide Rwanda is an understudied topic. Most of the research available about Rwandan media now is by media watchdog groups, rather than academics. In its 2011-2012 Press Freedom Index, Reporters without Borders ranked Rwanda 156 in the world, up several spots from its previous list, where Rwanda fell in the bottom ten countries in the world (Reporters 2012). In its 2009 report, the

IREX Media Sustainability Index scored Rwanda a 2.9 out of 4, remarking it is still

“haunted” by the genocide (IREX 2009). Although these reports can be easily skewed due to their limited scope and indicators, it is apparent the media are still coming to grips with their contribution to the genocide.

Due to the changing nature of the media in Rwanda, and the lack of comprehensive research on the present-day media in Rwanda, detailed information about the Media High Council’s policies and resources available to journalists is not readily available. Unless otherwise cited, much of the basic information provided here came from in-depth interviews conducted for this study. Included in these interviews were three Media High Council employees, the director of the National University of

Rwanda’s School of Journalism in Kigali, and several practicing journalists and media professionals.

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The government uses allegations of ethnic ‘divisionism’ against dissenting voices in the media, and passed laws that greatly limit press freedom. Several Rwandan journalists have been forced into exile, murdered, or thrown in jail without cause

(Kalyango 2011). A media law passed in 2002 created the Media High Council (MHC), which licenses media outlets, monitors the media, and handles complaints against the media. Prior to the genocide, media outlets in Rwanda were not licensed. Currently 33 print media organizations are licensed with the MHC, along with 27 broadcast stations, including the state run Rwanda Television, Radio Rwanda, and five subsidiaries of Radio

Rwanda located around the country (Media High Council 2011).

Print outlets are not required to pay a license fee, but broadcast media outlets do.

The fee depends upon the type of radio station. Community radio stations pay Rwf

500,000 (USD 800), regional stations pay Rwf 1.5 million (USD 2,500), and commercial stations pay Rwf 5 million (USD 8,000) over five years. Commercial television stations are charged double, Rwf 10 million (USD 16,000). To date, the state-owned Rwanda

Television is the only licensed television station, although two private stations, one from

Kenya and one from Tanzania, are in the process of being established.

The BBC is also registered with the MHC, although the Voice of America

(VOA), which airs programs in Kinyarwanda, was not listed as having a license in the

2011 Annual Report. The report did note that the MHC monitored both the BBC and

VOA, “because they are mostly used by people from the opposition to spread their hostile propaganda against the Government of Rwanda” (Media High Council 2011, 19). The online news organization, IGIHE, is not listed as being licensed or mentioned by the

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report, despite growing in popularity since being established in 2009. According to an editor interviewed for this study, IGIHE receives up to 100,000 visitors a day, up from just 1,000 a day when it first began to publish. Its exclusion from the report suggests the government has yet to address online media, as the Internet, although growing, is still not widely accessible.

A media law passed in 2009 added a new license for journalists. A media outlet can apply for a press card on behalf of journalists it employs or freelance journalists can apply on their own. To apply the following must be presented: a detailed curriculum vitae, police clearance, two passport photographs, ID statement, employee ID card, payment voucher of Rwf 7,000 (about USD 11), and proof of academic qualifications in the field of journalism. Besides the cost and the police clearance, the real roadblock to the press card is the last requirement (Media High Council 2011). The National University of

Rwanda only established a in 2000, and although a few other journalism schools have been started since then, many journalists in Rwanda work without formal training. The MHC established a five-year grace period for journalists to receive training, but, as one journalist interviewed for this study pointed out, with that comes additional problems of cost and sacrificing work to attend school. At the end of

June 2011, 469 journalists were accredited with the MHC, 260 in broadcast, 141 in print, and 68 freelancers (Media High Council 2011).

Despite restrictions, there have been some positive developments for the media in

Rwanda in the last few years. The Great Lakes Media Center (GLMC) opened in 2005 in order to provide training to practicing journalists through evening classes. In November

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2011, 60 students were enrolled in the GLMC, mostly to fulfill the government’s education requirement. According to the director of the school, some journalists were sponsored by the media organization that employs them; others sponsor themselves. The

MHC and GLMC partnered in 2011 to provide a series of media development forums, one specifically for media managers. The MHC further established a press center in

Kigali for accredited journalists, where they can access the Internet for free and hold meetings.

The National University of Rwanda’s School of Journalism also moved to Kigali from Butare in 2011, giving its students easier access to media internships and hands-on experience. The move, however, caused a problem as far as resources are concerned. One student said that in Butare, he had access to computers and Internet, but that technology was not accessible in the new building in Kigali. Another student laughed incredulously as he explained how a professor had suggested going to a local café for Internet access, which he said was much too expensive for most students. Overall, however, many students reported the change in venue had helped them as they began their career. Several students were already working at local media outlets as both interns and paid employees.

Another positive development for the media was a declaration by President Paul

Kagame that public officials must be available to journalists for interviews. Dozens of journalists working in all five of Rwanda referenced the declaration as making their jobs a little easier. One journalist said, “What I love with Rwanda is, there is a rule that any government official who refuses to give you an interview is punished.” Another journalist, who had worked in radio for nearly a decade, spoke about the difficulty he

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used to have in accessing government officials before saying, “but now they are open.”

President Kagame pledged to increase his own openness as well, and now holds monthly press conferences that are available as podcasts on his website.

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CHAPTER 3: AGENDA BUILDING, FRAME BUILDING, AND PEACE

JOURNALISM

As Rwandese continue to rebuild their society and culture, they must reconcile with the media’s role in the 1994 genocide. The hate media that fueled the genocide were deliberately designed by the Hutu Power party to disseminate its agenda of violence and blame (Des Forges 2007). Now, with the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) in tight control of the government and media, understanding how the public receives messages is important to determining how messages reach the public in post-genocide Rwanda. Are journalists able to enterprise and investigate issues pertinent to their audience, or are they simply fed the government’s agenda? Using agenda building and frame building as its theoretical basis, this study examined the factors that influence the decisions Rwandan media professionals make.

3.1 Agenda Building

One of the ways the agenda building process works is determining the way issues become known to audiences and the subgroups within those audiences. Cobb, Ross, and

Ross (1976) posited that there were two agendas: the public and the formal. The public agenda consists of issues with high visibility to the public, and the formal agenda includes issues that decision makers are considering. There are three models that explain how issues reach the public and formal agendas: the outside initiative, mobilization

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model, and inside initiative (See Figure 3.1). In the outside initiative, issues begin with a group outside of the government, move into the public view, and then eventually become part of the formal agenda. In both the mobilization model and the inside initiative, issues begin with the formal agenda. In the mobilization model, the issues eventually move to the public agenda, but in the inside initiative, issues are not meant to be expanded to the public agenda (Cobb, Ross, and Ross 1976). These models inform this study by explaining where issues originate, before it reaches media professionals. By interviewing and surveying media professionals about the sources they use when deciding content, this study determines which of these models is more commonly employed in Rwanda.

Outside Initiative Model

Group Outside the Government Public Agenda Formal Agenda

Mobilization Model

Formal Agenda Public Agenda

Inside Initiative Model

Formal Agenda Prevented from Reaching the Public Agenda

(Cobb, Ross, & Ross 1976)

Figure 3.1: Agenda Building Models

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Agenda building further explains how certain issues do not become salient with the public. The process of agenda building includes how the media identify and develop content, including the sources and background research involved (Len-Rios, Hinnant,

Park, Cameron, Frisby, & Lee 2009). Governments, advocacy groups, and firms are in competition with each other to push their agendas in the media. In media systems, certain groups may be more powerful than others. In the case of East

African countries, for example, the government is the dominant agenda builder

(Kalyango 2011). In Rwanda, the prevailing medium is the radio, and the state-owned

Radio Rwanda is the main for information and news. Moreover, the government enacted strict media laws, which are enforced by the Media High Council.

Smith, McCarthy, McPhail, and Augustyn (2001) explored the competition of groups to garner media attention. They argue that social movements “often seek to draw attention to issues they deem important by organizing public demonstrations with the aim of attracting mass media coverage” (Smith, et. al. 2001, 1397). Only a few of these movements, however, are actually successfully receiving coverage. The authors further found that even when groups were given attention, the media sometimes framed the movement differently than the groups intended. The Rwandan government’s tight control on the media, and its dominance of ownership, could mean that outside groups have an even more difficult time receiving coverage than in a system with more press freedom.

Tracking the coverage and frames attached to social movements and advocacy groups is especially relevant in post-genocide Rwanda. Non-governmental organizations, including Search for Common Ground and La Benevolencija, advocate for reconciliation

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and peace through media campaigns. The question then becomes, do the intentions of these campaigns and social movements translate into the mainstream media?

Furthermore, how does the government’s control of the media influence these media campaigns and coverage of those campaigns? By interviewing media professionals working as both journalists and communication specialists for NGOs, this study answers those questions.

Agenda building is particularly suited for comparative research, because it can be found in any media system (Cobb, et. al. 1976). Wanta and Kalyango (2007) used the agenda building model to examine how the terrorism frame influenced U.S. policy toward African nations. They found that presidential emphasis of a country’s involvement or experience with terrorism led to increased coverage and helped set the political agenda for aid. Therefore, policy agendas “could indicate the success of the

President to get his views on nations and terrorism covered in the news (Wanta &

Kalyango 2007, 447).

Other studies have further supported the U.S. president’s ability to build an agenda with the media. Fahmy, Wanta, Johnson, and Zhang (2011) used agenda building to examine former President George W. Bush’s five rationales for the war in Iraq. The found that the “media clearly paid attention to the message” (Fahmy et. al. 2011, 330).

The three media outlets included in the study stressed the threat of weapons of mass destruction. Although these studies can inform research in Rwanda, the two situations are not necessarily comparable. In Rwanda, for example, the media do more than just pay

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attention to the president. The president often sets the agenda through state-run media and other channels of influence (Frère 2007).

Politics and its interaction with the media is often the focus of agenda building studies. Wirth, Matthes, Schemer, Wettstein, Friemel, Häggli, and Siege (2010) combined interviews with campaign managers with a content analysis and a public opinion survey to determine the flow of agenda building. The authors found that groups that were successful in gaining media coverage for their particular cause also increased saliency with the public. Although this study was comprehensive in scope, it overlooked the role of the journalists themselves, who determine what receives coverage and how that coverage is crafted. This study will fill that gap, by discovering how Rwandan journalists find and investigate the stories they report in the news.

3.2 Frame Building

Agenda building explicates only one step of the process involved in how issues and stories reach the audience. Once issues reach the media, the media then attach frames to a story. Frame building is the process in which these frames, which eventually become salient to the audience, are created by journalists and media professionals

(Scheuefele 1999). Agenda building and frame building inform this study by explicating the process in which issues reach Rwandan journalists and media professionals, and the way they then attach frames to those subjects.

Entman (2007) defined framing as “the process of culling a few elements of perceived reality and assembling a narrative that highlights connections among them to

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promote a particular interpretation” (164). Journalists gather facts and organize a storyline that allows the audience to interpret the information. Gamson (1989) argued that facts alone have no “intrinsic meaning,” and framing is necessary to make those facts significant (157). By choosing the frame, however, the media limit the telling of a story and, in some cases, create a bias toward one aspect or another (Gamson 1989). How

Rwandan media professionals frame stories and content is important, considering the media’s role in the genocide. Furthermore, determining the pressures that influence media professionals could assist in explaining how contemporary issues are framed in

Rwanda.

Frames are built through the interaction of the same players involved in agenda building: policymakers, journalists, other stakeholders, and the audience (Scheuefele

1999). These frames are then passed to the audience, leading to public discourse involving those frames (Kalyango 2010). Gitlin (1980) argued that the frames attached to a story legitimizes or denounces it in the eyes of the public. Kalyango (2011) argued that in East African countries, including Rwanda, the media often act as mouthpieces for the government agenda. This creates a situation where the media frames that are passed onto the audience are heavily influenced or in some cases created by the government or spokespersons for the government. Using this as a basis, this study, through interviews and a survey with media professionals, examines if the media’s role as a mouthpiece for the government is the result of self-censorship, overt government censorship, or a combination of both.

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Lim and Seo (2009) used frame building to examine public opinion of North

Korea in the United States. The authors found there were three competing frames presented in different newspapers, and that public awareness of those frames shifted as

U.S.-North Korean relationships shifted. They argued that the shift caused the U.S. public to support economic sanctions over military intervention, which would demonstrate the importance of framing on audience salience and support. Kothari (2010) interviewed journalists and used frame building to analyze the development of frames concerning

Darfur in the U.S. media. She argued that the newsgathering process and biases of journalists contributed to the dominant frames presented to the audience. By discussing the newsgathering process with Rwandan journalists and other media professionals, this study determines if a similar situation is taking place in Rwanda.

3.3 Peace Journalism

Understanding the agenda building and frame building processes in the media directly informs how the concept of peace journalism could operate in that system. Peace journalism developed from the work of Galtung and Ruge (1965), in which they argued the are ubiquitous, and “first rate competitors for the number-one position as international image-former” (64). They argued for a more responsible, balanced approach, including more of an emphasis on non-elite people and nations, was necessary.

In conjunction with this, the authors called for more investigation into the background of a story, coupled with fewer event-based reports.

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Scholars have since used Galtung and Ruge’s (1965) work to develop ways to put peace journalism into practice. Lynch and McGoldrick (2005) define peace journalism as when “editors and reporters make choices about what stories to report- and how to report them- that give society at large opportunities to consider and value non-violent responses to conflict” (5). Peace journalism is often juxtaposed against what Lynch and

McGoldrick call “war journalism,” the traditional way of covering conflict (See Table

3.1). Lynch and McGoldrick argue that peace journalism goes beyond just ‘good news;’ it is about understanding the underlying causes of violence and conflict.

Table 3.1

Peace Journalism vs. War Journalism

Peace Journalism War Journalism

Peace/Conflict Oriented War/Violence Oriented -Giving a voice to all parties -Us vs. them

Truth oriented Propaganda oriented -Expose untruths on all sides -Expose ‘their’ untruths

People Oriented Elite Oriented -Suffering on both sides of conflict -‘Our’ suffering

Solution oriented Victory Oriented -Reports on resolution, reconstruction, -Leaving after the conflict is aftermath over

Note: Adapted from Lynch and McGoldrick (2005)

There are many criticisms of peace journalism, including questions over what is meant by being “truth-oriented” versus “propaganda oriented.” Determining the

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difference between the two can be problematic for journalists (Hackett 2006). Hanitzsch

(2004) argued that peace journalism suffered from “naïve realism” (483). Both of these criticisms are valid, and the purpose of this study is not to implement all of the above elements of peace journalism. Instead, understanding the challenges media professionals face could determine which elements of peace journalism are practical and beneficial for

Rwanda.

At the heart of peace journalism is an emphasis in understanding the root cause of violence. Peace journalism argues that violence is never wholly its own cause, that there are always underlying issues and causes for conflict (Lynch & McGoldrick 2005). Peace journalism pays particular attention to structural violence, or the harm caused through societal structures and the behavior promoted through those configurations. Galtung

(1980) argued that there “is no reason to assume that structural violence amounts to less suffering than personal violence” (7). Moreover, structural violence can in fact lead to direct violence. Alia (2004) positioned “nonviolence” on one end of a spectrum with

“direct violence” on the other end; “structural violence” was positioned in the middle

(See Table 3.2).

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Table 3.2

Violence in Society

Non Violence Structural Violence Direct Violence

Mediation Oppressive Cultural Genocide Culture-wide War, Genocide Structures patterns of suicide

Conflict Legal Sanctions Forced Relocation Collateral Deaths Legal Executions Resolution (both formal and informal)

Note: Adapted from Alia (2004).

Structural violence can include the oppression of one particular group in a society, such as an ethnic group or religion, or an entire class of citizens who are demoralized through policies created by a ruling party. According to peace journalism scholars (Uvin

1998; Alia 2004; Lynch & McGoldrick 2005), understanding the root cause of violence and conflict is key to determining how to approach the story responsibly and present a clear picture of the situation at hand. This understanding creates opportunities for the idea of peace journalism to increase the media’s role as the watchdog in society and develop a thriving public sphere. By examining issues facing Rwandan journalists, this study determines what elements of peace journalism could advance the media’s positive influence in society. It also ascertains if any elements of peace journalism are already present in the Rwandan media.

Alia’s (2004) spectrum of violence and structural violence are applicable to pre and post-genocide Rwanda. Uvin (1998) argued that structural violence was one of the underlying causes for the public’s participation in the genocide. The elite, ruling class had long marginalized Hutu peasants. The oppressive structures mentioned by Alia 35

(2004) kept most Hutus from owning land or even relocating to a place where there were more opportunities. As the government lost support due to economic hardships and hunger among this class, the ruling elite pointed to the Tutsi as the reason for the Hutus’ oppression (Uvin 1998). These societal structures did not vanish overnight with the end of the genocide. Now it must be determined how structural violence influences contemporary Rwanda.

To date, scholars have not used the peace journalism model to examine the media in Rwanda, but studies from other post-conflict societies could give some indication of how it can be used. Bratić (2008) argued that the media’s role in conflict is heavily studied, but the post-conflict media are rarely the focus of research. To close this gap, he examined 40 media projects in 18 countries, including two case studies. One of those case studies included Studio Ijambo, a radio station founded in Burundi in direct response to the conflict in Rwanda. The Washington, D.C. based non-governmental organization

Search for Common Ground created Studio Ijambo, which is Kirundi (Burundi’s national language) for “wise words.”

Studio Ijambo produces and broadcasts social affairs, news programs, and soap operas, using the concepts of peace journalism. Many of the programs focus directly on ethnic conflicts. The most popular soap opera, Umubanyi Niwe Muryango, “Our

Neighbors, Ourselves,” dramatizes the problems facing two families, one Hutu, one

Tutsi, living in a rural area (Bratić 2008). The programs have been successful, with up to

90% of the population listening to the drama regularly (Radio Netherlands 2003).

Furthermore, the audience appears to be absorbing the messages within the programming.

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Studio Ijambo surveyed a Burundi audience about the messages they received when listening to the broadcasts. “Reconciliation” was the word 63% mentioned, and 53% of the people surveyed said “peace” (Hagos 2009).

Although not particularly dedicated to reconciliation or peace, the success of the non-governmental organization Urunana in Rwanda suggests that such an approach could be successful. According to the director of Urunana, who was interviewed as part of this study, the mission of Urunana “is to contribute to the involvement and well being of communities in Rwanda through innovative, creative, and interactive social services.”

Founded in 2004, Urunana is best known for its radio soap opera, which addresses health issues such as malarial prevention and reproductive health. Set in a fictional village of

Nyarurembo, the program focuses on these issues while portraying the daily life of

Rwandese in a rural setting. The managing director of the NGO said studies have found

94% of Rwandans listen to the program on a regular basis, although it is unlikely the percentage is that high. In addition to the radio program, Urunana hosts live viewings and town hall type meetings around the country; anywhere from 5,000 to 15,000 people attend such events. These live performances sometimes include a chance for people to give personal testimonies about how the program has helped them. According to

Urunana’s director, these testimonies “are very powerful, because other people in the audience end up changing some of their bad behaviors.”

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CHAPTER 4: METHODOLOGY

Scholarly research on Rwanda has generally focused on the events leading up to the genocide or the genocide itself. Post-genocide research that focuses on the media is an understudied topic (Longman 2004). King (2009) examined education practices in

Rwanda and proffered some of the challenges of conducting research in post-genocide

Rwanda. She pointed out that research methods from a Western perspective often assume a “conflict-free environment” (King, 2009, 127). Scholars that have examined the media in post-genocide Rwanda have typically focused on media and democratization as part of a larger study on the region (Hyden, Leslie, & Ogndimu 2003; Frère 2007; Kalyango

2011). In regards to agenda and frame building in Rwanda, Kalyango (2011) conducted research to determine how these theories influence audiences.

No known studies have examined the media’s role in post-genocide Rwanda from the perspective of journalists and media professionals, which this study does by employing both qualitative and quantitative research, through the use of in-depth field interviews and a survey. The research was conducted in two phases. The in-depth interviews were conducted in the first phase and used as the basis of this critical case study. The in-depth interviews were then used to create a survey instrument, which was used to draw empirical data for the second phase.

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4.1 In-depth Interviews

A total of 35 interviews were conducted with media professionals, which includes the following categories: journalists, citizen journalists, radio presenters (also referred to as disc jockeys or DJs), public relations workers, and non-governmental communication specialists working in Rwanda. Drawing from the following scholarship, Shoemaker and

Reese (1996), Durity (2006), Hayes, Singer, and Ceppos (2007), and Hutton (1999), the following categories were conceptualized and adapted to fit the media landscape in

Rwanda:

• Journalists: trained professionals working for an established news organization,

including newspapers, radio news programs, and television news programs. An

established news organization includes licensed news organizations, regularly

published newspapers, such as The New Times, and state news organizations, such

as Radio Rwanda.

• Citizen journalists: people who publish their own stories through a newsletter or

other form of media, but have not been formally trained at the National University

and are not part of an established news organization.

• Radio Presenters (Disc Jockeys): radio program hosts who are not necessarily

responsible for news content. However, many radio presenters typically discuss

current affairs and news they extract from the newspapers and from the Internet.

• Public relations workers: people who work to advance causes or issues on behalf

of organizations, groups, the government, or private companies.

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• Communication specialists: people who work on non-governmental organization

(NGO) communication campaigns, including health and reconciliation initiatives.

The interviews were conducted from November 18, 2011, through December 28,

2011. Initial interviews were set up with the help of a journalism student at the National

University of Rwanda’s School of Journalism in Kigali, and snowball sampling was used to determine further possible participants.

Snowball sampling involves starting with a small sample of participants and selecting new participants based on information from the original sample (Goodman

1961). Snowball sampling was the most appropriate way to achieve the target number of participants, because of a lack of information about the journalists and media professionals working in Rwanda. Using information provided by media professionals also ensured participants in each category could be located (Webber & Byrd 2010).

Although this excludes media professionals that are not immediately known to the other participants, snowball sampling provided the appropriate number of participants in each category of media professional and region. The snowball sampling method has further been used in previous media studies both in the United States and internationally (see

Yang 2000; Mutshewa, Grand, Totolo, Zulu, Sebina, & Jorosi 2010; McDaniel 2003).

All interviews were conducted according to the guidelines of Ohio University’s

Institutional Review Board (IRB). Interviews were conducted in private, by the principal researcher. In one case, another journalist translated for his editor, who did not feel comfortable speaking English. All other interviews were conducted in English. Before the interviews began, the participants were presented with a consent form that made it

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clear that participation was completely voluntary. The participants did not sign the consent form, in order to ensure their anonymity.3 Participants were not compensated for the interviews.

The interviews were recorded and stored as audio, which allows the research to refer to exact quotes of the participant. Participants were given the option to not have the interviews recorded, but all but one gave their consent. The interviews were recorded with no identifying information and were kept in password-protected folder on the primary researcher’s computer to protect the participants’ identities. The researcher also took notes during the interviews, which were expanded within 24 hours (Mack,

Woodsong, MacQueen, Guest, & Namey 2005). The interviews included questions about the work the media professional engages in and the limitations and influences they believe affect their work (See Appendix A). Interviews lasted an average of one hour.

The interviews were fully transcribed after the researcher returned to the United States.

Rather than focus solely on the capital of Kigali, media professionals working in the rural areas of Rwanda were interviewed as well. Most of the country’s population live in rural areas. Therefore, the rural perspective is important for the purpose of this study.

In order to extricate the decentralization of places with the stigma of the genocide, the

Rwandan government merged 12 former provinces into five new provinces in 2006:

North, South, East, West, and Kigali (Briggs & Booth 2011). Each province was divided into administrative districts, and the centers of those districts were renamed. Right now, the new names seem to be used in conjunction with the old names.

3 Although the IRB insisted that all participants remain anonymous, it should be noted that with one exception, the participants, when told their names would be used, informed the primary researcher that they would not mind if their names were used. 41

For the purpose of determining participants, the new districts were used, along with the new and old names of each of the administrative centers. Using population, media outlet information, and the time constraints of the study, a target number of 30-35 participants was decided. Numbers of each category of media professionals were chosen based on the “specific qualities that they bring to the study” (Webber & Byrd, 2010, 7).

Due to the focus on peace journalism, journalists were the main focus of this study. Other media professionals were also chosen, based on the variety of influential media sources in

Rwanda, in order to give a more complete picture of the media landscape (Waldorf,

2007). A lack of previous research and limited demographic information makes it difficult to determine locations of journalists.

Kigali Province, which is home to the capital and largest city in Rwanda, Kigali, is the center for many media organizations. A total number of 23 media professionals were interviewed here, including eight journalists, one journalism professor, two journalism students, one citizen journalist, four radio presenters, three public relations workers, one non-governmental organization (NGO) media specialist, and three members of the Media High Council. The journalism professor and students were from the

National University of Rwanda’s (NUR) school of journalism; the students were working as interns at local media outlets. As Kigali is the center of media, it was the only province where non-journalists were interviewed. The public relations workers included one person from a government-funded business organization, a ministry worker, and a police officer.

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In the North Province, the main location for journalism is in Ruhengeri

(Musanze), one of the two administrative centers in the province. Byumba (Gicumbi) does not have a media outlet. Most of the surrounding area receives their news from RC

Musanze, which is the state-owned community radio station for the North Province. One journalist working here was interviewed.

The South Province includes four administrative centers, but two of them were combined due to their proximity and a lack of media outlets in Gikongoro (Nyamgabe). It was included with Butare (Huye), which is the second-largest city in Rwanda and home to NUR’s main campus.4 Butare is home to two media outlets, the NUR-run Radio Salus, which was out of operation at the time this research was conducted due to a technical problem. No journalists from Radio Salus were available; therefore, one journalist from the state-owned RC Huye was interviewed. Also located in South Province are Gitarama

() and Cyangugu (Rusizi). One journalism student at the Catholic University of

Kabgayi in Muhanga was interviewed, along with one journalist working at RC Rusizi.

The East Province contains only one administrative center Kibungo (Ngoma).

Radio Izuba, one of the larger privately owned community radio stations, is located here, and four journalists, including one who doubled as a technician, were interviewed there.

However, if only Kibungo in the East Province was included in this study, a large area of northeast Rwanda would be excluded. Therefore, three journalists from RC were interviewed, even though Nyagatare is not an administrative center. Again, one of those journalists also worked as a technician at the station.

4 The School of Journalism had also been located here until the summer 2011, when it moved to Kigali. University officials cited more opportunities for students to access media as the main reason for the move. 43

The West Province is the smallest of the five provinces. Here the two administrative centers, Gisenyi (Rubavu) and Kibuye (Karongi), were merged due to media outlets and proximity. One journalist was interviewed from the state-owned RC

Rubavu.

4.2 Survey

The survey component of this study was conducted between October 1, 2012 and

December 1, 2012. The cross-sectional survey differed from the in-depth interviews, in that only journalists were asked to participate. The same definition of journalist, drawn from Shoemaker and Reese (1996), was used for both the in-depth interviews and the survey. A journalist is defined as a trained professional working for an established news organization. This includes newspapers, radio news programs, online publications, and television news shows, both privately and government owned.

The target set was to survey 200 Rwandan journalists. The survey instrument was administered to participants online, using Survey Monkey. Although Internet access is not widely available in Rwanda, journalists typically have regular online access through their work. Every media outlet visited during the course of the in-depth interview phase of this study provided its employees with regular Internet access. Direct selection sampling (Shoemaker & McCombs 2003) was used in an effort to ensure journalists from a variety of media outlets from each of the provinces were surveyed. Lists of contact information were collected from journalists at the media outlets visited during the in- depth interview phase of the research. In addition, journalists working in Rwanda were

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contacted through information provided on media outlets’ websites. Four journalists, one online journalist, one newspaper journalist, and two radio journalists, were also recruited to forward the link to their colleagues. A total of 101 responses were collected, for a response rate of 50.5%. This amounts to 21% of the population of journalists, based on the Media High Council’s report that there are 469 journalists working in Rwanda. The survey was conducted in English and piloted on 15 journalists in Rwanda. Despite detailed instructions, some respondents skipped questions.

The survey instrument for this study was developed from Kalyango’s (2011) instrument design protocol. As his survey included both media professionals and audiences, questions were adjusted to evaluate only the opinions and attitudes of journalists. Questions about elements of peace journalism were also added. Journalists were asked basic demographic information, including age, gender, education level, journalism training, career length, type of media organization, media organization ownership, position, province, and details about their media organization (See Appendix

B for the complete survey instrument). Respondents were asked to rate 18 items concerning their opinion on media performance, including how the media covers corruption, ethnic conflict, and highlights peace initiatives. Respondents were asked to choose one number on a seven point scale, with 1 = very poorly, 2 = poorly, 3 = somewhat poorly, 4 = neutral, 5 = somewhat well, 6 = well, and 7 = very well.

Respondents were then asked to rate 15 statements to gauge their experiences working as journalists in Rwanda. Statements asked about the types of sources they used, the difficulties they face as a journalist, and where their story ideas originate. Respondents

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evaluated the statements on a seven point scale, 1 = strongly disagree, 2 = disagree, 3 = somewhat disagree, 4 = neutral, 5 = somewhat agree, 6 = agree, and 7 = strongly agree.

Finally, respondents were asked to list the three main topics they believed deserved more media attention, topics they believed were off-limits for media to report on, and the main challenges they faced as journalists. The survey took approximately 15 minutes to complete.

Once the surveys were completed, the data were exported from Survey Monkey in a Microsoft Excel file. That file was then imported into the Statistical Package for the

Social Sciences (SPSS) for analysis. The SPSS software was used to calculate descriptive statistics, chi-squares, and independent t-tests (Riffe 2003).

4.3 Research Questions

This study examined how journalists and media professionals in Rwanda make decisions about content and sources based on the theoretical frameworks of agenda building and frame building. The in-depth interviews included journalists as well media professionals, and the survey focused solely on journalists. The following research questions were used for both phases of research:

• RQ1: How do journalists and/or media professionals make decisions when

determining content?

• RQ2: What sources do journalists and/or media professionals use when

determining content?

• RQ3: What topics are self-censored for journalists and/or media professionals?

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• RQ4: What are some of the challenges journalists and/or media professionals

face?

• RQ5: What elements of peace journalism, if any, are journalists and/or media

professionals incorporating into the media?

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CHAPTER 5: CRITICAL CASE STUDY OF RWANDAN MEDIA

The purpose of this study is to examine the media landscape in Rwanda, using agenda building and frame building as the theoretical framework. Previous research on the media in Rwanda has mainly focused on the role of hate media in the 1994 genocide

(Des Forges 2007; Kimani 2007; Kamilindi 2007). More recent studies have examined

Rwanda from the perspective of the audience or as part of a larger study of East Africa

(Frère 2007; Kalyango 2011). This study focused on the role of journalists and media professionals, including how they find stories, use sources, and the challenges they face.

A series of 35 in-depth, semi-structured interviews were conducted with journalists and media professionals working across Rwanda, in both rural and urban areas. The data collected were used to conduct a case study of the Rwandan media. Case studies are well suited for explanatory questions, such as what is happening in the

Rwandan media (Yin 2012). Along with the in-depth interviews, direct observations of journalists and the conditions they worked in are included in the analysis.

5.1 Media Decisions and Sources

Previous literature suggests that in Rwanda and other developing countries in the region, agenda building begins and ends with the government. Kalyango (2011) indicated “the media provide political leaders with an outlet for their agendas, as opposed to independently reporting without interference from state leaders” (pg. 165). Scholars

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argue that despite an increase in the number of media outlets, due to government interference, the basic models for agenda building in Rwanda remain the Inside Initiative

Model and Mobilization Model (Frère 2007; Waldorf 2007; Kalyango 2011).

Interviews with journalists in Kigali are consistent with previous findings in regards to agenda and frame building. Political news, spearheaded by the government dominates the news in both the state-owned and private outlets. When asked about his sources for news, a journalist with Radio Rwanda and the state-owned television station said he mostly relied on citizens for stories.

We have to serve the citizens first. That’s the line of Radio Rwanda and TVR. We need to first note problems of citizens other than knowing problems of government officials. It’s like we weigh citizens more than officials, because citizens, we believe that they are the ones who vote, and they are the ones who put their own leader, so if they have a problem, you can’t just go to a government official because this person will tell you only the good side of him. But these people, because they are innocent, they tell you the truth. And then that’s when you can go to the government official to interview him (Radio Journalist 2011).

He said both stations were devoted to serving the community and the needs of the average citizens.

Later in the interview, however, he admitted that if the government sends an

“invitation” or , the station was required to attend. “When the government invites for some occasion, it’s a must, we have to cover it,” he said. “We have to cover it, because the invitation is something big from the government.” He also detailed how

Radio Rwanda worked with other media outlets to ensure that government information and events received coverage from other outlets.

We work together. We are in a field where we work together. It’s like if someone on Radio Rwanda has some information big, you can also inform

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someone for another media so they can get this idea. Because maybe someone is listening to Radio Rwanda, another is listening to Fresh FM there’s another listening to another radio, and we need people to get information. Sometimes we talk, and we tell them today we are going somewhere to cover a story, if you can also come, please do it so we can get different information in different areas (Radio Journalist 2011).

A journalist working for an online publication said he also relied on state-owned media for stories. “Sometimes I get a story from invitation,” he said, “and sometimes you can know the source of story from other colleagues or another radio or newspaper.

Sometimes we can get the idea from newspaper and do our own story.” This essentially means that media outlets continuously follow the lead of the state-owned media; a person listening to a private radio station is still receiving the government’s message.

A journalist working with the state-owned television station laughed when asked if the government influenced the content of the channel. “We know the editorial line of the house,” he said. “And you get your idea, people give you advice on that, and after you’ve done that, you’re free to put that on air. Which doesn’t happen everywhere.” One newspaper manager made no secret of his publication’s support of the government in power. “Politically, we are supportive of the government, of President Kagame, and his administration,” he said. “We are a private paper, but we think what Paul Kagame and his administration are doing is taking the country in the right direction. Even though there might be a few mistakes people make, even these people.”

A journalist working for a private radio station insisted that he enjoyed more freedom that the state-owned journalists. “There is big flexibility in private media, because there we explore many angles of a subject,” he said. He admitted, however, that politics still drove the majority of news and that often, the news appeared to be slanted

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toward a particular point of view. “It’s where the corruption comes in,” he said. “I’ve seen news where you see logically, the other part must get in to balance the story. But the other part isn’t there. It’s shocking.”

5.1.1 The Rise of Community Journalism

Journalists working in the rural areas seemed to take a different approach to their agendas. In recent years, community journalism in the rural areas has developed at a rapid pace. Beginning in the early 2000s, the Rwanda Bureau of Information and

Broadcasting (ORINFOR)5 set up community radio stations that basically work as affiliates for Radio Rwanda. Currently, the government owns RC Huye, RC Musanze,

RC Nyagatare, RC Rubavu, and RC Rusizi. The stations report on stories in the local community and provide reports for Radio Rwanda in Kigali. Other privately owned community radio stations, such as Radio Izuba in the Eastern Province, have also opened.

Perhaps because of distance or a lack of strong local government, community radio stations appear to focus on more tangible issues for the Rwandan public, as opposed to political coverage. One journalist at RC Rusizi in Cyangugu said that only one Kigali politician had visited since he had worked there.6 All the community radio stations’ journalists said they focused on stories that involved local businesses, agriculture, and culture; stories that could arguably better serve the public and lean more toward the outside initiative model of agenda building.

5 ORINFOR is the state-run media house in charge of all government-owned media institutions. Although headquartered in Kigali, ORINFOR has offices throughout the country. 6 Cyangugu faces a particular challenge. Located in the far west, the road to Cyangugu is one of the few roads in Rwanda that is not well maintained. One journalist in Kigali joked that Cyangugu is so remote, it is not even considered by most to be part of Rwanda. 51

Journalists working at Radio Izuba said many of their stories focus on farmers who call about different problems. One reporter proudly spoke about the investigative journalism his station conducted. He said, “The objective of radio is to change people, economically, but also positively.” His colleague added, “It is a radio which is different from other radios, because it is a radio that is working with the people.”

Radio Izuba further conducts workshops with local businesses to help people understand how the media can help them. “Last month we called people who are businessmen from this district and we had a meeting with them where we were explaining the importance of working with radio,” one journalist said. “We gave them a month of advertising with us for free of charge.” All the journalists working at Radio

Izuba said they received positive feedback about their station from their audience. One journalist said, “For us, we are working very well with them. And they have shown us that they are very happy to see us here working in the community.” Another journalist said, “They have understood the impact of working together with us. And also when we reach there we are explaining for them the importance of working with them, and we are not just going to talk to them without showing them some evidence.”

Even the state-owned radio stations appear to be following this pattern of community involvement, rather than focusing on political issues. A journalist at RC Huye who hosted a program on Rwandan culture and language said, “We many times are guided by our listeners. They many times ask us to conduct research on a different topic.

They may sometimes send us a message and ask us, for example, to give a detailed

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explanation on an issue, by that, we go in different areas, finding different people asking about that.”

He said he was not concerned about censorship because the station’s stories were solely premised on the needs of the community. “I can’t say that there are issues which we do not report on,” he said, “because we always are concerned with the life of the population. This is a community radio. We are always connected with the life of community. What seems interesting to the community, we report on it.” He also stressed that most of RC Huye’s stories focused on agriculture and the needs of local famers. He shrugged when asked if he used mainly government sources. “If their crops have been destroyed by floods, you have to also get the view of the government official who should talk about what the government is planning to do,” he said.

He said he had volunteered for the station for years, because he considered it such a vital part of the society. “Community radio is important basing on different reasons,” he said. “I have seen it as a bridge between the population and the government. If it would not be there, the population and different people would suffer, because someone may pass through this station to get an answer from different state officials.”

Journalists at RC Nyagatare told a similar story. “We really don’t cover politics so much,” one journalist said. “We are covering election campaigns and some political meetings, locally. We don’t make so many political stories.” Another journalist in

Nyagatare adamantly touted the value of the rural stories he reported. “Our news is based on the population,” he said. “Most of the population are farmers, so we do stories on cooperatives, general health. We encourage people to develop and help each other. We

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don’t cover politics. We cover information that can develop our rural area. Politics doesn’t benefit the people here.”

A RC Musanze journalist who eagerly spoke about his views on the media spoke at length about the differences between his radio station and the stations in Kigali.

In Kigali it’s more commercial. It’s more commercial, those guys are looking for stories that are more… we guys, in the country, we do more for the people. Those guys are paid, but I have kids who love their job. The message I give them is let’s not think about the money for now, let’s think about how we are promoting our radio and what we’re doing for the community” (Radio Journalist 2011).

He said recently they had conducted an investigation into why a local market was taking so long to build. He said his team was successful in opening the lines of communication between local leaders and the public.

He insisted that being affiliated with Radio Rwanda did not impact the station’s service to the community. “Even when we go for these official stories,” he said, “I make sure I tell these guys to look for what is important for our area. This is why they brought these local radios into the provinces. There were areas where the national radio could not really get to the locals.” He said reporters there enjoyed a strong connection with the community, which dictates the types of stories they report. “Everyone comes from a different part of town,” he said, “so we say, what did you see on your way to work, what do you think was newsworthy? That’s the first thing I say. We brainstorm.” He later added that balance and transparency were important to the success of the station and media as a whole. “We try to do balanced stories whereby we involve all parties,” he said. “We involve who we are telling, where we get the information from, and the people we’re trying to get the information to. And at the end of the day we get good results.” He

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smiled broadly before continuing. “After, how many years, 17 years, we are winning back our people,” he said. “Of late, we’ve won the trust of the people. Because what we say is basically, if there is a problem, there is a solution because of the media.”

5.1.2 Wary Sources

Winning back the trust of the people certainly influences the types of sources journalists are able to use for their stories. Frère (2007) contended that journalists are often “viewed with general suspicion and certainly members of the profession were seen as accomplices to the unspeakable crimes that had been committed” (pg. 95). Journalists seem to be aware of how they are viewed by their potential sources. “The history of media in Rwanda is not good,” a journalist from a radio station in Kigali said. “The media played an irreversible role to the genocide of 1994. So because of that history, that background, you find that some people are not eager to talk with media.” A journalist in the Eastern Province concurred. “There are problems with media credibility,” he said. “In this world, people are becoming complex. They need to be taught to understand what they are doing. We are facing this problems several times.”

Journalists routinely spoke of the difficulties they had getting sources to give information. One journalist in Kigali paused thoughtfully several times as he spoke of the difficulties he faced in the field.

You may go on the ground, you may go to conduct a given interview or a given research and your interviewee didn’t give you, what you really needed… because they’re not used to giving information, or because they are not really interested in working with journalists. And the main cause of that may be that... the media played a great role in the genocide (Radio Journalist 2011).

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Another journalist became visibly frustrated when asked about the types of sources he used. “To some extent I find it is the stupidity of people,” he said, “many people should not fear media, because they should be proactive to work with media.

They should call media. You find that even in political position, many leaders fear media.

They should be friends of media.”

The reluctance of sources to talk to media, at least regarding politicians and officials, is changing. In 2011, President Kagame mandated that elected officials must be available to speak to the media or face a penalty. Nearly every journalist interviewed here referenced this mandate and said they had seen a difference in the availability of sources.

One journalist spoke of the mandate with a smile. “What I love with Rwanda is there is a rule that was amended last month, I think,” he said. “Any government official who refuses to give you an interview is punished. He’s asked, ‘Why don’t you want to give information?’ It used to be you would come for information and they would say, ‘Excuse me, let us meet tomorrow.’ That one, in Rwanda is out.”

Even journalists in the rural areas said they had seen a difference in access. “It used to be so in the past that government official were hard to reach but now they are open,” a journalist in the Western Province said. A journalist in the Northern Province said he too had noticed changes in the openness of sources. “The local leaders, formerly there was that fear, they were not free with us,” he said. “Because they were always thinking we were going to come and hammer them. But then, the advantage we have is, we try and balance.” A journalist in the Eastern Province echoed his colleagues, describing the change in access to public officials. “In the previous days, there are some

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authorities or important men who didn’t want to be a source of information, but it is changing now,” he said. “Because the government put some laws to facilitate to information to journalists.”

A longtime freelance journalist said this new policy of transparency needed to happen in order to make the profession safe. “Journalism is a risky job,” he said. “In many countries, especially developing countries, most information is held by politicians.

And most of our politicians don’t want to tell you their views directly. I think they feel insecure also, they feel insecure because they fear we want to finish them.” He also cited a changing landscape for journalists and their sources. “If you want to get more information, this is why I’m saying it’s risky, is because you are pushing someone to tell you what he doesn’t want to tell you,” he said. “I’m seeing something very interesting in

Rwanda, politicians are no longer so fearful. These days, things are changing.”

Even President Kagame is taking part in the new policy. He now holds monthly press conferences where journalists get the chance to ask him questions about various issues in the news. One journalist said this new openness took some getting used to for media professionals. “I don’t advance the argument that journalists should talk what he wants,” he said, “but what I mean what is that when it is necessary, it is relevant, a journalist should talk about it. He should talk even about politics without any fear that he will go in jail.”

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5.2 Censorship in the Media

Although the general state of the media in post-genocide Rwanda remains an understudied topic, one facet of the media, indirect censorship, has received attention from both scholars and activist organizations. In 2010, IREX, a non-profit organization that examines media around the world, rated Rwanda a 1.81 overall on its Media

Sustainability Index’s four-point scale, calling it “a difficult one for the media in Rwanda as presidential elections fomented a crackdown on opposition voices” (IREX 2010). The report cited the blacklisting of media outlets and the unsolved murders of two journalists as reasons for Rwanda’s low freedom.

Reporters without Borders annual Press Freedom Index mirrors the IREX report in regards to Rwanda. Currently, the organization calls Rwanda a “difficult situation”

(Reporters without Borders 2012). Reporters without Borders, which advocates for the safety and freedom of journalists, ranks Rwanda 156th in the world for press freedom, right after Libya and Kazakhstan and just higher than Uzbekistan and Saudi Arabia.

Rwanda actually moved up in the latest report; in 2010, during the elections, the country fell in the bottom 10 countries in the world. Although Rwanda moved up on the list, the watchdog group refers to recent arrests of journalists as an indication of the dangers media professionals still face (Reporters without Borders 2012). The Committee to

Protect Journalists, another watchdog group, indicates the journalists have steadily fled the country due rather than face charges or worse, death (Committee to Protect

Journalists 2012).

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These reports, however, are not without their biases. Reporters without Borders, for example, bases much of its report on questionnaires filled out by journalists associated with organizations partnered with Reporters without Borders (Reporters without Borders 2012). This could skew results against the government. There also seems to be no allowance for the size of the country in question. Committee to Protect

Journalists similarly only compiles its finding from various reports from the field.

Regardless of the possible problems with such reports, these indexes are the only annual source of information for the state of the media in Rwanda. Furthermore, recent news from Rwanda seems to support the conclusion that the media remain far from free.

In July 2012, a journalism student at the National University who also wrote for The

Chronicle was arrested and charged with faking his own kidnapping. The student reported that he confessed to the kidnap being fake under duress, and the Committee to

Protect Journalists called for all the charges to be dropped. This case is still being investigated, but regardless of the outcome, the student was still kept from meeting with an attorney or anyone else for two days (Smith 2012).

Another reporter remains in jail, after his arrest in April 2012 for allegedly

“spreading genocide ideology” (“Radio Presenter Held” 2012). Habarugira Epaphrodite, while reading a report about the ceremonies marking the anniversary of the genocide, confused the Kinyarwandan words for “victims” and “survivors.” Colleagues called it a

“slip of the tongue” and said he read the same report the day before without incident

(“Radio Presenter Held” 2012). He was still fired and arrested the next day.

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Scholars have also documented the difficult situation Rwandan journalists and ordinary citizens face when it comes to freedom of speech. King (2009) found that participants in her study on education tended to see the past through the lens of the genocide, and their opinions were often bookended with the government position or line.

Concerns over persecution further kept people from discussing their ethnicity in public.

King argued, however, that these data problems are still important to conducting research in Rwanda. She argued these discrepancies and challenges hold “a wealth of information about the hidden transcripts informing social behavior, as well as the self-censoring that people feel they need to impose on themselves” (King, 2009, 135). This idea of self- censorship is particularly important to this study, because the self-censorship of journalists informs how they conduct their profession.

Self-censorship among media professionals happens on two levels (Frère 2007) argued that self-censorship among media professionals happens on two levels. They are concerned that critical reports may incite or fuel ethnic tensions, as they did in the past, and the media are further concerned about retaliation from the government. This creates a situation where media professionals participate in “passive” journalism, which involves simply taking the government position and repeating it, rather than engaging in investigative journalism. As Kalyango (2011) pointed out, journalists have a right to be concerned about government retaliation. Rwandan journalists have been murdered, have disappeared, forced into exile, and jailed without cause or trial. The hesitation of the journalists to conduct independent investigations is evident to the audience. A survey of

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Rwandese found that the majority of respondents were not sure if the private media were free from government control (Kalyango, 2011).

At the heart of this debate about censorship are the laws the current government created under the guise of preventing the hate media from returning. The 2002 media law declared divisionism a criminal offence, while failing to define just what constituted divisionism. Divisionism was considered “the use of any speech, written statement, or action that causes an uprising which might degenerate into strife among people based on discrimination” (Rwanda 2002). Watchdog groups and scholars criticized the law for being Draconian for mandating criminal sentences for offences that were not clearly defined, forbidding propaganda, and requiring journalists to reveal their sources on demand (Waldorf 2007). Waldorf (2007) argued, “As a result, there is less press freedom and media pluralism in Rwanda today before there was before the genocide” (pg. 404).

In 2009, the government passed a new media law that made sweeping changes to the previous legislation. These changes, however, did not necessarily translate into more freedom for journalists. Once again, any media concerning “the crime of genocide and genocide ideology, crimes against humanity, and war crimes,” along with “incitement to discrimination of any form” are listed as criminal offences (Rwanda 2009).

The law further required journalists to have formal training in order to be licensed with the Media High Council and provided steps for the government to suspend or shut down media outlets. After much criticism by watchdog organizations, the government agreed to review some provisions of the law and decided on enact a grace period of at least five years, in order for journalists to receive proper training. A Media High Council

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official stressed, “There has been nobody who has been denied registry as a journalist just because he or she has no degree.” His colleague added, however, “We have also to ensure that professionalism is respected in the profession. So it’s upon us to develop the professional standards, but not setting them as a requirement.”

Watchdog groups have commended the government for agreeing to revise the

2002 media law, but have also expressed concerns about the latest version. Article 19, an organization focused on freedom of speech around the world, released a statement warning that the new media law “fails to safeguard the right to freedom of expression and a free media” (Article 19 2012). Specifically the group argues the definitions of both journalist and news are too broad and could allow bloggers and social media users to be prosecuted. The statement also voice concerns that the definition of was too broad and “may be used to impose liability for the expression of opinions and to restrict in violation of international law certain forms of expression such as satirical publications or other forms of expression which by their nature are exaggerations, and parodies”

(Article 19 2012).

The three Media High Council officials interviewed for this study insisted that the criticism Rwanda receives regarding press freedom is mostly undeserved. They refuted claims leveled against the MHC and the government when asked about the closure of media outlets. “Censorship is not permitted by the law,” one official said. “It is highly discredited by the law. You cannot censure any newspaper or broadcast.” When pressed about the closing of outlets, however, another official seemed a bit exasperated:

What you’ve been asking about the prior closure of these papers by the Media High Council, it all comes back to the ethical standards that

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have been violated. So the process of doing that is not just waking up one day and we decide to close such and such media organs. There is a process (MHC Official 2011).

He continued by detailing the process in which any member of the public can file a complaint against a media outlet.

We write to these media organs that such and such has happened. Of course, we expect them to reform, they refuse, you warn them once again, telling them that if they don’t reform, actions will be taken against you. They do the same, by causing harm to the public, that is to be protected by the Media Council. So what the Media Council does, it takes action. And most of these actions are out of influence. No political influence, because there are standards that are followed in doing so. But even the closure is not permanent, it is temporary. It is only permanent when the courts decide that such and such media organ, its license must stop operating (MHC Official 2011).

He said that throughout the process, the outlet is allowed to continue publication, and other media practitioners are consulted to determine if the media outlet broke the law. His colleague said several issues with the previous law had been “wiped away.”

If these difficulties facing journalists have been wiped away by law, journalists still feel the intense pressure of government scrutiny. Nearly every journalist interviewed for this study said he or she believed the government imposed censorship on professionals. According to one radio journalist in Kigali, the past is creating a chilling effect. “Surely, for me, I have not confronted the political constraints, but I have heard about cases in Rwanda where journalists were killed because of what they have written.

And what they have talked.” Pausing, he looked down at his hands before continuing.

I think that there are many factors you cannot only blame politics. Journalists can also be blamed. But in a developed society, you cannot kill a journalist because he has written this. You cannot kill a person

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because they have said this. But you can refute the idea using another idea, using a pen or using speech. I can’t find any reason why a journalist should be killed for that (Radio Journalist, 2011).

Another radio journalist in Kigali concurred. A veteran of radio news, he had worked for Radio Rwanda for several years following the genocide before moving to a private station. He said that often, journalists succumbed to the idea of censorship, rather than actual action against them by the government. “Many journalists they censor themselves, fearing what has happened. No, we can’t say this in this way. They fear.” He paused and lit a cigarette, one of many he smoked throughout the interview.

When I worked for the state radio, when you are talking about the president you say ‘His Excellence.’ When I started with private media, I said I can’t say ‘His excellence.’ We are not doing protocol. We are doing journalism. And it works. The office of the president didn’t complain anymore. So you fear something, you say if I say this I will get in trouble, but when you get it, there is not ascension (Radio Journalist 2011).

Later in the interview, however, his remarks about censorship and fear became more defined. “Investigative journalism is dangerous,” he said, “because you are going to put attention on something they don’t want to be known.” He pointed out that investigations into corruption, political issues, and news on the army could all place journalists in a precarious position.

His age, experience, and prominent name may have emboldened him to both discuss the state of censorship in Rwanda. Other journalists, particularly young journalists just beginning their careers, keenly feel government influence. A graduating student at the Catholic school in Muhanga said he planned to pursue a career in

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, because he thought other forms of journalism were too dangerous.7

In Rwanda there’s no freedom in journalism. Because when you are talking about something about politics, for example, the President’s home, the Prime Minister’s health, something like that, if you talk something wrong about them, they can even kill you or put you somewhere. I can say that in Rwanda there’s no freedom of journalism. And to be a journalist in Rwanda, it’s very down. Freedom is down (Journalism Student 2011).

When asked if he thought the situation was improving, he took a few minutes before answering. “I just think that it can get better when we are free to talk about what we want,” he said. Then more firmly, he added with a deep breath, “It’s going to get better.”

Nearly every journalist said there were topics they considered off-limits, both officially and unofficially. By law, ethnicities are not used in conversation or the media.

An online journalist in Kigali said his organization monitored comments carefully for any hint of division. “At this time we do not use ethnicities,” he said. “Somebody can write a comment that contains that, we’re not allowed to publish.” As Frére (2007) pointed out,

“the issue of freedom of speech in Rwanda remains complex, because the word ‘free’ has undeniably led to death on a massive scale, and there is still an ongoing discourse about

‘coming back one day to finish the job’” (pg. 105). Ethnicity becomes particularly sensitive in April, during the mourning period that marks the anniversary of the genocide each year. Several journalists mentioned that they were particularly careful when writing stories about memorial services.

7 The Catholic Institute of opened in 2002 and includes a journalism and communication department. 65

Aside from ethnicity, journalists said they considered other topics off-limits as well. Troop movements, war crimes, and government corruption were three topics mentioned the most often by journalists. One journalist laughed heartily when asked about the issues he thought were off-limits. “There’s so many,” he said, “these issues of secrecy, security issues, you can not write who’s buying this type of gun, that kind of stuff. We are very careful with that kind of story.” Another radio journalist said most political issues contained potential minefields for journalists:

Normally, political issues are the most sensitive. And when the story is controversial, when you need a political party to give his side, it can be hard because in Rwanda the opposition is not much developed. In that manner, we cannot talk some politics, because the subjects are controversial and we journalists we fear to go to jail, because we have talked this and this (Radio Journalist 2011).

Other journalists concurred that they avoided some controversial topics over concerns that they may be jailed.

A newspaper publisher, who openly admitted that his paper was usually supportive of Kagame’s administration, scoffed at the idea of censorship. He argued that many of the claims leveled against the government were largely unfounded. “Last time I checked,” he said, “I can go outside my house and go to work and print things that may not be so flattering about Kagame and go back home and sleep, very peacefully, and no one arrests me.” A freelance journalist who had previously worked in government agreed that claims of censorship were overblown by journalists and watchdog groups.

“Sometimes things people think are untouchable, taboo,” he said, “you don’t ask that, it simply requires a good journalist to ask him [Kagame] that question. And that’s a part of it. It wasn’t as taboo as you thought.”

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That censorship and government restrictions were lessening or, in the case of ethnicity, a necessary evil, was a theme threaded throughout the interviews. This supports

King’s (2009) findings that often a person’s true opinion is often bookended by the government position. An online journalist in Kigali, who worked for a private media outlet, said that he was careful not to discuss ethnicity, because “you can’t easily talk of this.” “We believe that we are Rwandans, all of us,” he said. “No Hutu, no Tutsi, no

Twa. We are all Rwandans. So you go on the radio and you say a Hutu person, and he was doing this and this, that is fake, that is out of line. Because we don’t believe in that.

We believe that we are one person and we are Rwandans… yeah.” Another Kigali journalist, who works for the state-owned radio station, repeated a similar story:

What we know in Rwanda is we were the same person, it’s just that we were separated by some ideas of colonialists. But we were one. You know in Rwanda we are the only country in East Africa and I think in the world that has the same language, shares the same culture, and the same boundaries. But when you got to other countries, you find they have different tribes and different languages. So this is an indication that we are one (Radio Journalist, 2011).

A television journalist for the state-owned television channel also mentioned the unity of Rwandans before adding, “We’re not allowed to take up things that might create some division at the end of the day. That I know. I shouldn’t do things like that. Like judgmental stuff. Things that would bring to chaos or anything.”

One journalist said the restrictions made her job difficult, especially when her audience called for her to discuss ethnicity. An audience member had emailed her, asking her to address a sensitive issue on her program about health and families. “Someone sent to us an email,” she said, “saying she had a boyfriend, who was different. One was a

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Hutu. One was a Tutsi. The boyfriend Hutu, the girlfriend is Tutsi. Their parents had a problem and refused to let them marry because they are different.” She said she did use the email, and the response was overwhelming. “The audience gave their comments and contributions. We received feedback and people said, ‘I also have the same problem, but because you are doing this topic, my parents have accepted to give me the freedom to marry who is different from me.’” When asked if she was nervous about hosting that particular show, she looked down before shaking her head yes. “When you talk about it on the radio, on a microphone, the politicians can say to you, you have genocide words, hate speech. You have to be careful with a topic like that.”

The growing presence of online media has created a new venue for censorship.

Online news agencies carefully monitor comments for anything that could be construed as divisionism. “There are certain types of stories we’re not allowed to publish,” an online journalist said. “Some of these things, which are making problems in society, we don’t publish. And when there is a comment that is not good, or saying bad things we are not allowed to publish it. We delete those comments.”

At the National University, everyone interviewed justified the government’s restrictions in some way or another. One student said that reconciliation could be difficult without such laws. “I think it can be more difficult to let media talk whatever you want,” she said. “I think that is the reason why the government should regulate the media and be strict with the media. The media in ’94 played a great role in destroying our country.” A professor at the National University of Rwanda School of Journalism went on at length when asked about how he prepared students to deal with censorship.

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Every person that comes to Rwanda thinks that this issue of freedom of expression doesn’t exist in Rwanda especially because of the history of this country. The history of this country is so bad that they’re certain things the government may not allow people to do because it may invoke the memories of the past, or cause incitement for example. And some of those things, from the perspective of the government, can incite violence and bring conflict to society. Those things should not be allowed, and I agree with that (Professor 2011).

He continued to say that Rwanda was still “evolving” from the genocide and needed to be careful until the country had moved beyond it. “Then,” he said, “we can shout and say anything that we want.”

This idea of reconstruction and future freedom persisted throughout the interviews. A television journalist cited the hate media for many of the problems journalists faced. “They were all about segregation,” he said, “all about killing, about such things. So it’s like all media outlets, have to know what to do, because we are still reconstructing our country.” He said he agreed with many of the restrictions, in order to preserve the progress the country has made toward reconciliation.

If we let people just speak what they want, we may go back to the times that we passed. So what we have to know, we have to make sure that what is being aired is in line with the real root of the government. Media outlets were closed down because of what they were writing, they had been reading the same things of the ’94 genocide and we felt like these media outlets could take us back and would deprive us the roots that we need to enjoy in the future (TV Journalist 2011).

He said he hoped such media outlets would not reopen. “I’m sure most of the media outlets have begun going in line,” he said. “They know what to do. I’m sure that one time they will be free totally.”

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5.2.1 Do No Harm

To assume that all self-censorship by journalists is due strictly to government regulation would be excluding the journalists’ own sense of responsibility for Rwanda’s deadly media history. As Frère (2007) pointed out, “Self-censorship is very common in the media in Kigali, as if the journalists were afraid not only of incurring the wrath of the authorities, but also of their own power to do harm” (pg. 106). Nearly every journalist interviewed for this study spoke gravely of the hate media and emphasized that they wanted to keep history from repeating itself. The freelance journalist succinctly summed up the media’s role in the genocide when he said, “All of the journalists started singing the same criminal songs. People would say, this is not true, this is another face of the story, but they all sang about genocide.”

Journalists repeatedly spoke of the hate media, and its lingering influence on society. A journalist at Radio Izuba said, “We have to be careful because of hate media.

Especially I think this is the reason why some journalists say there are certain stories about politics that they are careful in relating this information.” His colleague followed up by adding, “I think that is in general how people used to fear political issues. You be careful, because it can be very dangerous for the society… It does not mean that we cannot announce them, but we must have evidence for showing that what we announce it is true.”

A radio presenter in Kigali reiterated that any censorship came from his own decision to promote reconciliation instead of government regulation. “We can talk about whatever we want,” he said, “but we won’t. It depends… You can say something and that

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can affect some lives, that’s why you have to look for deeper information about everything. Our history was hard, and that’s why you have to be careful.” Even the seasoned journalist who refused to address the president as “His Excellency” said he tried to keep the past in perspective. “There are some people who viewed the genocide, viewed death,” he said. “So you have to be careful not to shock people. Especially in the mourning period, it’s a period which is very dangerous, because people are affected.”

The newspaper publisher said certain topics could also fuel people who still support the eradication of Tutsis. “Here, you’re careful not to publish stories of a political nature that carry certain sentiments that we are trying to overcome,” he said. “There are also stories that would be of a nature, there are people who are still fighting based on the genocide ideology that people are still out there in Rwanda and even outside the country who are fighting a propaganda war of trying to portray everything as a kind of North

Korea.” He later added, “We really try as much as we can not to give ammunition to the negative people. We are very careful in the language we use when we criticize public officials. The choice of language, the choice of topics.”

Regardless of the reason behind censorship, whether it is government or self- imposed, many journalists seemed hopeful about the future. One radio presenter said:

Basically, where the culture is coming from, all this happened because the media actually had a hand in it. So it’s really trying to bring something new for the new generation. You can also listen to the media for a positive life, but you have to listen to the Media High Council because we have some rules that are hard for us to copy, but we still have to copy them because we need to change that image. Still not yet, but I think we are going there (Radio Presenter 2011).

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A journalism student the National University was certain he would see a new environment for journalists as his career progressed. “We feel responsible, he said,” but we feel we are the answer to this question. We want to change, we want to bring back the credibility of journalism in Rwanda.”

5.3 Media Challenges

Beyond government and self-censorship, no shortage of challenges face journalists and other media professionals in Rwanda. As Frère (2007) pointed out,

“Undeniable, painful problems remain” (pg. 111). Journalists who spoke frankly about the difficulties they encounter on a daily basis confirmed these problems. King (2009) found that participants in her study about education practices tended to see the past through the lens of the genocide, and their opinions were often bookended with the government position or line. Journalists said they face a similar problem. Beyond concern over delivering the government line, researchers and journalists who have worked in

Rwanda have noted that, culturally, Rwandans tend to be private and reluctant to talk to anyone about personal issues, much less foreigners (King 2009; Gourevitch 1998; Zorbas

2009).

This reluctance to talk did not apply to the journalists and media specialists interviewed for this study. Only one journalist hesitated to be interviewed, citing a previous encounter with a Western journalist who he said misquoted him. He agreed to participate in the interview when he learned that the interview would take place face-to- face. “People tell stories that aren’t true,” he said as he sat down for the interview, “I

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really appreciate it when they told me you wanted to come and talk to me in person”

(Journalist, Northern Province). Despite his initial hesitation, he proceeded to talk for well over an hour and a half. Most of the participants did not hesitate to be recorded.

Only one, a police officer who worked in public relations for the force, asked not to be recorded and that was only because he had not received official permission to participate yet. “It should not be a problem,” he said, “but just in case” (Information Officer,

Kigali). As his participation demonstrated, along with the enthusiastic participation of three Media High Council members, government officials were easily accessible. This would indicate, contrary to King’s (2009) assertions, that not all groups in Rwanda are hesitant to be interviewed as part of research.

5.3.1 “A Culture of Hiding”

The target demographic could explain the availability of participants for this study. Journalists, by nature of their profession, are typically outgoing and generally comfortable conversing with strangers. Many of the participants also gave the impression that they were excited to finally be talking about what they do as media professionals. The culture of privacy in Rwanda, however, presents a challenge for journalists working in Rwanda. Nearly every journalist interviewed spoke of the difficulties he or she faced to secure interviews with ordinary Rwandese.

“It is a culture of hiding,” one journalist in the Eastern Province said. “Rwandans work all of their life. They are usually hiding. They are not used to living in an open way.

Normally Rwandans to not want to speak or talk.” Another journalist said:

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If you go around, you see big fences on all the houses, so that says something about the privacy people want to have. So if their word is going to be broadcast, it is like they are being out there, which is not something they want to do. It is like if I am in my house, I need to stay IN my house. I do not need my neighbor to know what I am eating. Just simple things like that (Journalist, Kigali).

Other journalists specifically said that getting information was particularly a problem when they wanted to record the interview. “When you want to record, it’s a very big problem,” laughed one journalist. “We can go and talk to people, we can write, but when we want to record, this is a big problem. A lot of people in Rwanda, they don’t like to be recorded.” A journalist who worked for a television station in Kigali just laughed and waved his hands when asked if it was difficult to get people to give interviews. “Oh my, God. Television is even worse, trust me,” he said.

Like an average adult woman would not be able to come and talk to you, unless they have an issue. But if you are asking them their opinion on anything, the food they eat, the weather, or anything. It is like, oh no, no, no, you’re going to put me on TV. It is like they’re going to be exposed. I do not know why people have this fear. We really do have a problem getting interviews. I still do not know why because I have gone to some countries outside Rwanda, and it is so easy to get vox pops. But here when you’re filming on the streets, people start hiding. It’s like why are you hiding? (Journalist, Kigali).

He also speculated that many people equated the media as a platform for officials or authorities, and that when he needed an opinion from a citizen he would look for a younger person to interview.

Other journalists, however, blamed the history of the media in Rwanda for creating a general distrust of journalists and the media. Scholars examining the media in

Rwanda have documented this mistrust (Frère 2007; Zorbas 2009; Kalyango 2011).

Frère (2007) wrote that following the genocide, “journalists were viewed with general

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suspicion and certain members of the profession were seen as accomplices to the unspeakable crimes that had been committed” (p. 95). A journalism student at the

National University in Kigali echoed this sentiment. “People fear journalists,” he said.

“They do not want to provide information. Others provide information, but don’t want to be recorded. They think the story could bring a bad impact. This is the result of the hate media in Rwanda.” “We have a particular history with radio,” a journalist in Kigali said.

He looked down at his hands and shook his head as he continued. “It takes time for some wounds to heal. And if people have had a specific experience with radio, they are not going to understand that things have changed. It takes time for humans to really change, as in see things with another eye, through other lenses.” A journalist at a community radio station in the Eastern Province appeared sad and frustrated as he talked about his work. “It is very tough to show people that they should work with journalists, because journalists are not the enemy,” he said. “They are people that want them to know and to work in peace and unity.”

An older freelance journalist saw media literacy and a general lack of knowledge about the job of a journalist as the two main problems. He said:

Sometimes you need to take a soda or a beer to know what is happening. You go to the villages, if you don’t buy them something they will just take you as a spy. In some countries, I present my press card, everyone knows what it means. But not in our villages. You’re telling me this is a press card? A card for journalists? What does this mean? Not much. Not much. He won’t volunteer anything. He’ll take you as a spy. The general population doesn’t understand journalism as a profession (Journalist, Kigali).

A journalist working for the state-media agreed that education played a factor when asking for interviews, but downplayed it as a bigger problem. He said that people

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in Kigali would never ask for anything in exchange for an interview, “but deep in the villages, they tell you, you have to first buy me something.” He stopped and smiled a little before continuing. “But when you explain to this person why you need information, and you convince the person, he can easily give you the information.” Later in the interview, he once again pointed to the education level of his audience. “There is no distrust of the media,” he said. “To me, I feel the problem is just literacy here. Most of the people here are not educated. We have just begun educating people.” Pausing, he shook his head. “In Rwanda, if you do a survey on how many graduates we have, there are very few. There are very few.”

A lack of understanding of the media also exists within the government. A public relations officer for one ministry, who had previously worked as a journalist, appeared exasperated when he discussed how other people in his office viewed his role. “For our job, it’s a difficult job, if you can say,” he said. “Because it requires you to always look for information and the people do not, for the moment, think communication is the first thing they have to do. The principal challenge is the people who do not capture the role of communication and also try to get your role.” He designed campaigns to inform the public about various programs his office was implementing. He said just getting the information about the programs from his colleagues could take days, even when the issue was urgent. “You need something, but you can’t get it,” he said, wringing his hands.

“Because, for the moment, people do not understand very well the role of communication in providing the information that people need.”

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A lack of media literacy creates a different problem for outlets in the form of funding. One public relations officer with a Non-governmental Organization (NGO) that works with small businesses to grow their profits said that the people he worked with typically do not consider using the media to advertise. “It’s not really expensive and hard,” he said, “but it’s the mindset. They think you only advertise when your business is big. It’s just a mindset. Once they are sensitized in the role of media in the development of their businesses, they can do it.” This means that media outlets, already struggling with a lack of funding and resources, do not receive crucial advertising dollars from small businesses.

He said he believes many people think the media mainly benefit larger companies or the government. “Generally, people take it politically, with the media,” he said.

“There’s too much political, not enough business development. Whoever buys a newspaper, he buys it because a minister is jailed, a minister who did this. It’s more political than business.” He argued that the assumption that the media only exists for political purposes made NGOs and similar organizations more critical as Rwanda moves forward. “It shouldn’t be government,” he said. “It should be the private sector to sensitize people on the role of media in the growth of their business. Because once the government comes in, they’ll say it is political.” As Frère (2007) reported, NGOs have been working in Rwanda to build the media sector in the years since the genocide,

“creating an environment conducive to local initiatives” (pg. 109). These organizations have provided both material and financial assistance to both journalists and local businesses.

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In reality, all of these reasons probably contribute to the reluctance of Rwanda citizens to participate in interviews. Regardless of the reason, however, this hesitation to go on the record creates a paradox in the relationship between the public and the

Rwandan media. Although many journalists reference this disinclination toward interviews, participatory, call-in programming has long been a staple of Rwandan radio.

In fact, this aspect of Radio-Télévision Libre des Milles Collines (RTLM) is what made it so popular when first began broadcasting (Des Forges 2007). According to Des Forges

(2007). “RTLM brought the voice of ordinary people to the airwaves. Listeners could call in to request their favourite tunes or to exchange gossip with announcers and a wider audience” (pg. 44). As Frère (2009) documented, the Media High Council even debated if live call-in programs should be prohibited, after an incident in 2006 when an anonymous caller on Radio Contact suggested the work of the genocide should be finished.

Despite these controversies, the popularity and ubiquity of these shows continue.

Every station visited in the course of this study featured one or more shows which depended on listener participation through calling, texting, or social media posts. A journalist in the Southern Province talked excitedly about all the different ways his audience could participate in the programs at his station. “We many times are guided by our listeners,” he said. A radio presenter in Kigali said his program depended upon callers and citizen contributors. “Our audience, they like to call in and SMS their ideas, complaints, or thoughts on our daily topic,” he said. “This makes them feel like part of our program.”

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The lack of media literacy also presents another contradiction regarding the public’s view toward the media. Several scholars and journalists have cited a blind faith in the media for the reason why the hate media was able to gain traction and add to the climate of fear in Rwanda leading up to the genocide (Des Forges 1999; Des Forges

2007; Thompson 2007a; Dallaire 2007). Despite the outcome of the genocide, this attitude toward the media does not seem to have changed much. Several journalists cited the credibility of radio itself as a problem for the audience. A journalism student in Kigali spoke about the issue with a sigh. “There’s still media illiteracy in Rwanda,” she said. “If you are a journalist on the radio, and you are talking about anything, people will have credibility because they are on the radio. Even if you are lying, because they don’t know.

Radio is credible.” Just a few minutes after saying that people have a “fear of radio” and journalists, an online journalist in Kigali contradicted himself. He said:

Society, they believe in journalists. If you are writing a story, if you are making a story for radio, they do not analyze what you are saying, they take it as true. That is a problem… If you can say that there is an accident down there, the people do not want to come and see if it is true. No, no, that is the problem. They say, ‘the radio says, the radio says, and the newspaper said,’ and that is a problem (Journalist, Kigali).

The question then becomes, why are Rwandese simultaneously suspicious and trusting of the media? Although the answer to that question is beyond the scope of this study and deserves attention in future research, there seems to be little debate that it adds to the complexity of the current media environment in Rwanda.

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5.3.2 Education and the Media

According to previous research on Rwanda, another challenge facing journalists is lack of training. Many of the journalists and media professionals responsible for the hate media had never received formal training and in some cases, did not have the equivalent of a high school diploma (Thompson 2007a). Frère (2007) listed “lack of professionalism” as one of the biggest obstacles facing Rwandan journalists (pp. 100).

This challenge, however, at least in the traditional sense, appears to be somewhat dissipating. The opening of new schools of journalism and the Great Lakes Media Center, coupled with the mandate that all journalists receive training, means that more journalists have received or could receive formal training. According to the director of the journalism school at NUR, in 2011, enrollment was climbing; the diploma program had

350 students enrolled and the GLMC had 60 journalists attending classes.

Although training may be more available, that does not mean that this barrier has been completely eliminated. The costs associated with formal training are still there, along with what one professor called a basic misunderstanding of the field, which he said discourages students from choosing journalism. He said:

The field is not very well known. What I mean by not very well knows is that people believe that journalism is only about reporting politics. In other words, the majority of them only associate it with risky kind of reporting, that if you report politics you are risking, because you brush with governors and issues of politics. They don’t know all the other areas they could venture into once they do journalism (Journalism Professor, Kigali).

A newspaper publisher in Kigali agreed. “There are many challenges for producing a paper in this country,” he said. “I cannot count them. Most people have no

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idea what it means to be a journalist, so you train them, on the job. They learn skills on the job. It is really a serious challenge.” Three journalists interviewed said they actually studied law or economics, because they did not realize what journalism was about when they were in school. They only became journalists by volunteering at local stations.

The new opportunities for training bring with them their own set of problems for journalists and journalism students. First is the lack of qualified Rwandese to teach journalism, an issue addressed by Thompson (2007b). Allan Thompson started the

Rwanda Initiative in 2006, which formed a partnership between Carleton University’s

School of Journalism in Canada and NUR’s school of journalism. Besides holding a symposium on the media’s role in the genocide, the Rwanda Initiative also brought

Carleton University professors to NUR to teach journalism. Thompson (2007b) asked in an essay about the project if “it [is] possible, or even appropriate, for outside actors to contribute to building the capacity of the media sector in a post-conflict environment where press freedom still faces overwhelming challenges?” (pg. 24). He pointed out that the “Rwandan students have consistently raved about a teaching style that emphasizes practical, hands-on experience through field trips, real-world reporting assignments and open discussions about the role of media” (pg. 26).

The Rwanda Initiative likely provided some invaluable perspectives on journalism and journalism education, but the lack of qualified Rwandese to teach is deeply felt amongst the students. When asked about their education, two journalism students at first seemed reluctant to disparage foreign professors. One of them said, “We do have sometimes visitors, most of them are from Canada, from the journalism field. I

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think they are very good lecturers.” As they began to feel more comfortable during the interview, however, that story changed somewhat.

They don’t have much knowledge about the field in Rwanda. And you know, most of their examples are from Canada or their origin countries, and they are not involved in our own programs. And it is better to have someone from Rwanda, because he knows the field, he knows everything from Rwanda, and it is easier to catch explanations when you have been given examples from the life you experience everyday. And you know, some students are bored because of these foreign lecturers (Journalism Student, Kigali).

Another journalism student said he was desperate to get a master’s degree.

Shaking his head he said it was probably impossible, because he would have to leave

Rwanda to do it. He explained that money was scarce in his family, as his uncle supported him and several of his cousins on one salary. Most of his family died in the genocide.

Despite these barriers, more journalists are receiving training than ever before in

Rwanda’s history. A division between the trained and untrained journalists is evolving out of this increase in training and education for journalists. A graduating journalism student who was already working in a media outlet in Kigali said that he thought untrained journalists were the only ones that needed to worry about government censorship. “We’re not concerned about restrictions. For those who did not do journalism, they are being restricted. But we are being professional,” he said. He continued by blaming this lack of training for the media’s participation in the genocide.

“Now we have professional journalists and the problem is being resolved,” he said. “In the past we didn’t have professional journalists and this cause various problems, including genocide.”

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Another journalist who graduated from NUR in 2009 listed a lack of training as one of the major problems facing the media in Rwanda and disdainfully spoke of the untrained journalists he worked with in radio. “You can imagine what kind of logic a person who has not gone to journalism school, you can imagine what story would come,” he said. “We do not have many qualified journalists.” However, he spoke cheerfully about the future, citing that some of his colleagues were returning to the GLMC to receive training:

I think that within the forthcoming years, the journalism sector will be developed as we are working on other sectors in Rwanda. It’s not only journalism. Journalism is not the only sector which has many problems, we have problems in many, many sectors. We are rebuilding the economy, we are rebuilding our independence. We are encouraging people to join the schools, we are on pace of everything. But the education sector is also striving to improve, so that we can get sustainable development in Rwanda (Radio Journalist, Kigali)

He also said he considers the media an important part of rebuilding Rwanda. “I feel that media have a responsibility, had and have a responsibility to change their image towards development,” he said. “So however much we have a bad history, media have the responsibility to rebuild the country.”

When a Radio Rwanda journalist was asked if he had received formal training, he scoffed and said, “of course.” He seemed excited about the prospects of the MHC’s plans to require formal training:

After the 1994 genocide, we lost journalists. And not only that, some fled the country. So because of that, when Radio Rwanda and TV was put on air again, they had no professionals. So they had to hire some people who were at least skilled, who had worked with media and some people who felt they could do it. So these people have worked with it up to date. They are still there, so because of that, these people have experience, they retained them. But the rule says maybe next year,

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the thing will be amended so that they will hire professionals only. So many of them have already left and started their own outlets (Radio Journalist, Kigali).

Nearly every trained journalist interviewed immediately referred to a lack of training when discussing the challenges facing journalists. One online journalist, who received his journalism degree from NUR, spoke at length about the lack of professionalism in . “That runs into the problem of ethics,” he laughed.

“Some of us… don’t have an introduction or haven’t covered ethics. And that is a problem.”

For untrained journalists, this derision is keenly felt. A post-genocide veteran radio journalist said he recognized his lack of formal training could be a problem in the future, especially with the MHC soon requiring education for accreditation. A journalist volunteering at a radio station in the Southern Province detailed his struggle to receive formal training as a journalist. “I have a bachelor degree in economics, but when I was young I used to play like a journalist, in my games,” he said. “It was my passion. But I didn’t have a time to study it. There was a test for all students who wanted to become a journalist at the university. I’ve tried, but they held the exam and I wasn’t there. I was in

Kigali, and because it was my passion, I tried every time.” When asked if he felt a division between himself and other journalists who had received training, he shrugged.

“It is hard sometimes,” he said. “But now I think journalism is important because of the mission of journalism. It’s just to inform people. Now I see my part in society… What I am doing is not only my passion, it’s something important, powerful in the country.”

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This developing chasm between the trained and untrained journalists mirrors

Uvin’s (1998) assessment of a long-standing problem facing Rwandan society: the deep divide between the haves and have-nots. He argued that prior to the genocide,

“Widespread corruption, disappointment with the slow pace of development, and the occurrence of local famines all combined to challenge the [Habyarimana] regime from within” (pg. 60). Discontent began to rumble among the Hutu peasants, who were already marginalized by their lack of education and access to resources, a group key to keeping the government in power.

Uvin (1998) determined that the Hutu peasantry was victim of structural violence in both its physical, social, and psychological forms. The Hutu peasantry, denied access to resource and education, was hit the hardest by economic troubles and famine.

Exclusion was woven through the fabric of society, through policies that kept land and income out of reach. The exclusion was social, regional, and ethnic. Prejudice went beyond the ethnic Hutu versus Tutsi ideology; it further included a divide between the so- called evolués, the educated urbanites and the rural, uneducated “underdeveloped” peasants (Uvin 1998, 128). This “process of humiliation and disempowerment” left the average Rwandan without “self-respect and creativity, making them vulnerable to manipulation and simplistic ideas” (pg. 109).

In order to rally the people back to their side, the government turned to ethnicity as the one thing that could unite the Hutu majority. In the years leading up to the genocide, “Ethnicity was to be the tool of the elite, as it had been for the last thirty years”

(Uvin 1998, 63). Instead of faulting the government for its problems, the Hutu peasantry

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was encouraged to blame the Tutsis, through a “social revolution” campaign “based on the notion that Rwanda belongs to the Hutu, its true inhabitants, who had been subjugated brutally for centuries by the foreign exploiters, the Tutsi” (Uvin 1999, 257).

Although Rwanda appears to have made great strides in regards to ethnic prejudice, especially considering the scope of the genocide, the discrepancies between the elite and non-elite have not yet been fully mended. A station manager in the Northern

Province acknowledged the separation between Kigali and the rural areas, both in ideology and style of journalism.

Here is more or less educative. Here is informing the less educated. In Kigali are not as responsive as they are here. In Kigali, people go to school, guys read, they’re more intellectual. It’s not the same as it is here. In Kigali, everyone is more aware of what’s going on. They watch CNN, they watch BBC, they know what is going on. Here, I need even to tell my locals what is happening in the world. In Africa, in Europe, and then to tell them how to improve their lives, how we can be better (Station Manager, Northern Province).

This division, as evidenced by the growing separation of trained and untrained journalists, further directly impacts the media through media literacy and access to media.

Nearly every journalist interviewed for this study mentioned media literacy and access as a problem both for them and their audience.

A newspaper owner in Kigali said media literacy was an ongoing problem.

“We’ve seen this problem before, in the past,” he said. “Some people will be out there reading things, and some of them are so simple in their view of the world, that’s a process of people becoming more perceptive.” A citizen journalist cited generally literacy as hurdle for newspapers. “Traditionally, we are not readers,” he said. “You could have seen it, you are travelling in a bus. You hardly see guys reading papers. You go to other

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places, everyone’s reading.” His point was certainly observable. Despite dozens of people hawking newspapers and magazines at bus parks, rarely were passengers seen reading as they travelled. A police officer who worked in media outreach supported claims that people rarely turned to a mass communication medium other than the radio.

“The level of professionalism in the Rwandan media is a problem,” he said. “Also, the type of media is a challenge. A big number of people would rather receive messages through the radio. It’s hard to reach people through the newspaper.”

Even though the government-owned television station has been in place for quite some time, television still reaches a small, elite percentage of the population. A public relations official in the Ministry of Infrastructure noted that, “Television is still behind.

There should be some investments to increase and secure that development.” A television journalist in Kigali acknowledged that his work could only be seen by a select few. “Up to now, only in towns in the country do people have access to TV,” he said, “because also electricity is not everywhere, and you can’t turn on your TV without electricity.” He said that beyond the expense of television, people seemed hesitant to embrace it as a medium.

“It’s something that people need to get used to.” he sighed. “They don’t really know what it is. And they want to understand, and I think that’s why they’re a bit anxious, because they don’t’ really know what it is.” He added that the government recently installed more transmitters to increase access and planned to boost the distribution of electricity across the country by 2016.

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5.3.3 A Digital Divide

Access to media is a growing problem, especially as Rwanda begins to move toward online journalism. Several journalists and radio presenters acknowledged that the

Internet was a main source of stories for them. One radio presenter in Kigali, who hosted an entertainment news program, admitted that nearly all of his content came from websites. “We take the information and rewrite it, because we have to translate it,” he said. “And then write it back and see how you are going to give out information… Not everyone is educated, so you need to like to crack it down and then bring out your own version.”

A few web-based news organizations have also developed in Rwanda in the last few years, even though the Internet is not widely accessible outside of Kigali. According a 2010 International Telecommunication Union report, Internet penetration in Rwanda is only 7.7%. That is nearly double from the previous year, but Rwanda falls behind other countries in the region. The same report showed Kenya with a 21% penetration and

Uganda with about 12.5% (International Telecommunication Union 2010).

In Kigali, news organizations are taking advantage of the Internet where it is available. An online journalist in Kigali became animated as he excitedly spoke about his job. “Online is new in Rwanda, it’s very new,” he said. “It’s very, very new. In these years, they’ve opened a lot of websites, but before we didn’t have a website. Online journalism was unknown in Rwanda.” He pointed out the appeal of web-based news, including its immediacy and ubiquity in Kigali. “Especially online, the speed,” he said.

“When you publish things, in ten minutes everybody on the website see the story, they

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think, those people are very serious. I’m seeing it out there, I’m seeing it on the website. I think that is the major thing that can bring us credibility and traffic.” He touted the growth of smartphones and other “digital tools that can help people navigate the

Internet.” When asked about people in the rural areas, however, his smile waned. “The rural areas have big problems,” he admitted, “because they do not have Internet. They don’t have Internet, it is a big problem.” After pausing for a moment, he added, “Another thing which I can say is that we have a lot of radio stations, and they read the news from websites. That is where the people who are in the rural areas can know the news that was posted on website.” Despite the digital divide between the rural and the urban, he insisted that online media helped society at large. “The future is good for online journalism in

Rwanda,” he said. “Since we’ve opened our website, we have a following. The people, they see our impact.”

Journalists working in rural areas acknowledged access to the rural areas made news coverage difficult. In Cyangugu, which is widely regarded as the most remote area of the country, a journalist cited resources as a major roadblock to providing information to and covering news in the rural areas. “We don’t have a generator,” he said, “so when the power goes off, the radio stops. One car is not enough. We need to go to different areas, but it’s difficult to get to places by car. We can take a moto-taxi to get to places, but to pay them is a problem.” He said that before the station went on the air, the people living in that area listened to news from the Democratic Republic of the Congo, because no Rwandan media could be heard in that part of the country. Even with the radio station, people still are uninformed due to technical problems. “People like the radio station very

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much,” he said, “but part of the area still doesn’t get the signal. There are problems with the towers. They aren’t very powerful, but we’re hoping that will be solved.”

The response by the station manager in the Northern province echoed the problems facing Cyangugu journalists. “We don’t have enough equipment, we only have one car,” he laughed. “So it is not like Europe where everyone owns his own car. So the challenges are there.” The story was much the same in the Western province. “We don’t have enough equipment, and it’s hard to reach some of the villages,” one journalist there said. “Some areas are very far and a car is needed to reach the rural areas.” At Radio

Izuba in the Eastern province, journalists posted a list of possible “citizen journalists” they could call to receive information about outlying areas, after discussing the difficulty of reaching them by car or moto-taxi. Likewise, the equipment around the studio, papered with “USAID From the American People” stickers, seemed hardly enough to support a growing station.

Only the journalist who worked for Radio Rwanda in Kigali seemed to be confident in his ability to reach remote places of the country, once again demonstrating the difference between the urban and the rural, the government and private.

One is, the country is severe. The way the country is, the nature of the country, there are some people which we cannot easily access, to reach. It’s a big problem, but we normally try. If it’s a big story, and we feel there are some people deep in a village where you can’t go with a vehicle, maybe there are no roads, maybe the roads are too narrow and small, the car cannot got there, sometimes we use government helicopters to reach there to make sure that story is covered (Radio Journalist, Kigali).

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This would suggest, if Uvin’s (1998) assertions are correct, that Rwanda has perhaps not progressed from a violent environment, as it would have the world believe.

Resources are still scarce for journalists working in Rwanda, especially in the rural areas, and there is a distinct possibility that the digital divide is evolving into a new form of structural violence.

5.3.4 Scarce Resources

When asked about the challenges facing journalists and media professionals, every single person interviewed mentioned salary and the lack of equipment and resources they needed to do their jobs. As Frère (2007) remarked, journalists face challenges that includes a “lack of resources in an economy that is struggling through reconstruction” (pg. 100). Low salaries, a lack of equipment, and poor management plague Rwandan media, much as they do in other developing countries in the region and the world (Frère 2007).

The journalists who were interviewed lamented that they often had to work extra jobs to support their families. A radio presenter in Kigali said she worried constantly about money. “It’s a problem of freedom,” she said. “For journalists who work in private radio, they won’t pay the salary to their staff.” She said equipment was a problem across the board before adding:

Here journalism in Rwanda is a good profession, but the problem is the equipment for doing your profession, and bosses like money, but to give us the equipment is a problem. And obviously, the difficulty here is there is little money for salary. People say that people who work in the journalism area, is a person who cannot get other employment. Because the salary is very, very little (Radio Presenter, 2011).

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Several journalists cited the mismanagement of media outlets as a problem, and a government public relations officer concurred. “The media owners are not managing them as a business, you know,” he said. “It is a business. You have to communicate. You generate money, but you have the money you owe, you have to pay the expenses, salaries and so on. So it’s not very organized.”

Journalists in the rural areas feel the lack of equipment and salary, as well. A technician in the Eastern Province said he was one of the few people that could service their aging equipment. “We need computers and recorders,” he said. “There are only two of us to take care of all the equipment. I work with journalists, and it’s difficult because of means. Journalists need a good salary.” A journalist with Radio Rwanda said he stayed with the state-owned station over concerns that private media were too profit focused.

There are some media outlets who are working just for profit maximization. And they do whatever they want, they feel they want to get money, and they just air whatever thing, without having the first hand information. You have not done an interview with someone, you have not talked to the other part, maybe you have talked to the real person who hear the story, but you haven’t talked to the person who the information comes from and you just air. That is something we ought not to do (Radio Journalist 2011).

Later he confessed the he actually worked for free, and had been for more than a year. “I’m still working as a volunteer,” he said. “It’s like, I will get employed after getting my degree. Without it that, you know the government can’t take you on as a permanent employee.”

A few journalists warned that the low salary left journalists vulnerable to bribery or a kind of “envelope” journalism. One seasoned radio journalist in Kigali said,

“Corruption in the Rwandan media may be a problem. Many private media are not well

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paying their personnel. And when they pay them, they take two months, you get your salary for one month. And you have to live every day life. You have a family to care about.” He said that some savvy promoters offered to pay the expenses of journalists in order to entice them to cover a particular event. “I’ll tell you there is in some meetings, what they call a per diem,” he said. “That subject may not interest you, but you know that there is a per diem, and you go there only for the per diem. It’s a danger to the profession.”

Another journalist in Kigali who worked for both radio and online outlets said he knew of some people who turned to per diems for their livelihood.

Corruption in journalism is a problem and is our concern. The media sector, does not favor journalists who are doing such a career. You find certain media giving journalists 50,000 RF (USD 80) per month, you understand that journalists will be corrupted, will be bought. And I think that many people can use him so that he can write a very irrelevant story. So I think that corruption in this development process of journalism it is a concern. And it’s clear (Radio/Online Journalist 2011).

One journalist in the Southern Province said he actually worked unpaid as a journalist, and relied on two other jobs to survive financially.

As a television journalist in Kigali pointed out the lack of resources reach outside of the standard problems of low salaries and outdated or missing equipment. “The challenges are resources mainly,” he said. “Because you can’t be able to research thoroughly the subject you’re going to cover. And then afterwards, you can’t really do a survey about the viewership, so that you might adapt your programs accordingly. And the budgets are limited.” He laughed and added that it really affected the quality of what he put on television. Along with traditional media outlets, development and NGO

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communication organizations also suffer from limited means. The director of the popular

Urunana said, “Sustainability of an organization is not easy. Because we are running a program that is donor funded based on projects. Sometimes they are short lived and you have to find ways to sustain the programs. So it has not been easy.”

5.3.5 Women in the Media

Female journalists in Rwanda contend with the following set of challenges that their male counterparts do not necessarily see. Rwandan women have traditionally been seen as homemakers, with little control over finances, land, or power. Opportunities outside the home were limited by this “idealized image of women as child-bearers”

(Nowrojee 1996). Before the genocide, Rwanda women gave birth to an average of 6.2 children, one of the highest rates in the world (Nowrojee 1996). Married women had limited rights, and often what rights they had were tempered by their husbands. For example, a woman could open a bank account, but her husband could take money from the account without her permission (Jefremovas 1991).

Tutsi women faced a new set of challenges in the years leading up to the genocide. The denigration and vilification of Tutsi women persisted throughout the hate media, both in the printed pages of Kangura and the airwaves of Radio-Télévision Libre des Milles Collines (RTLM). The media framed Tutsi women as manipulative and propagated a stereotype of “Tutsi women as devious seductresses who would use their beauty to undermine the Hutu community” (Nowrojee 2007, 365). Kimani (2007) found that out of 72 RTLM broadcasts, Tutsi women were cited as spies in 21 instances.

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RTLM especially warned Hutu men not to associate with Tutsi women. One announcer proclaimed that when it came to Hutu sympathizers, “in the majority of cases, it is the

Hutus who married Tutsi women” (RTLM 1993). In another broadcast, the announcer pointed out:

I noticed that the not serious Hutus, are gluttons and therefore married our Tutsi women. It is not for the women to influence them by saying: “Let us go over the Inyenzi- Inkotanyi side.” In that event, then the Tutsi women will also be deemed an Inyenzi and the Hutu husband her puppet. She manipulates him at will, ordering him: “Come and let us go to the Inyenzi- Inkotanyi zone (RTLM 1994b).

The idea that Tutsi women were waiting to manipulate Hutus permeated the broadcasts.

Evidence suggests that the general frame of Tutsi women was accepted as well.

In attacks on Tutsis prior to the start of the genocide, women and children typically were not harmed; that changed in April 1994. Human Rights Watch reported that during the genocide, “ and other forms of violence were directed primarily against Tutsi women because of both their gender and their ethnicity” (Nowrojee, 1996). The report also stated, “The extremist propaganda. . . . fueled the sexual violence perpetrated against

Tutsi women as a means of dehumanizing and subjugating all Tutsi” (Nowrojee 1996).

Soldiers and participants in the genocide raped and mutilated tens of thousands of women and young children. General Dallaire testified before the ICTR that he would find the corpses of young girls and women “laid out with their dresses over their heads, the legs spread and bent. . . . a variety of material were crushed or implanted into their vaginas; their breasts were cut off” (ICTR 2004a). Dallaire’s assistant, Major Brent Beardsley gave similar testimony. Major Beardsley told the ICTR, “especially in the case of very

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young girls. I’m talking girls as young as six, seven years of age, their vaginas would be split and swollen from obviously multiple gang rape” (ICTR 2004b).

Survivors recounted what their rapists said, and in many cases, their words reflected the messages in the hate-media. One woman said the men that gang-raped her said, “they had to take Tutsi women because before the war they were not able to take them. They said that Tutsi women stayed to themselves before” (Nowrojee 1996). Words from other attackers reflected this idea that Tutsi women were arrogant. Jeanne, who was abducted and held captive by soldiers, told Human Rights Watch: “They would say things like ‘a certain girl was too proud- so we raped her and then killed her” (Nowrojee

1996). Another woman told her interviewer the man who raped her said, “You Tusikazi, you think you are the only beautiful women in the world” (Nowrojee 1996). Above all, the message that Tutsi were inyenzis permeated through the Hutu community. Account after account from survivors contained the slur. Chantalle, who was two months pregnant at the time, was attacked and thrown in a communal grave to die. She said her attacker said, “you Tutsi are inyenzis [cockroaches] with long tails. We must kill Tutsi women, we must rip them apart” (Nowrojee 1996).

The ICTR noted in its media trial judgment:

The portrayal of the Tutsi Woman as a femme fatale, and the message that Tutsi women were seductive agents of the enemy was conveyed repeatedly. . . defining the Tutsi woman as an enemy this way. . . articulated a framework that made a sexual attack of Tutsi women a foreseeable consequence of the role attributed to them (ICTR 2007, 304.)

No one involved with the media, however, was convicted specifically for gender related crimes. Nowrojee (2007) pointed out that the prosecution rarely brought the

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brutality against women into the equation. She called the omission appalling, and said it made “the prosecutor responsible for an injustice to women in the course of administering international justice” (Nowrojee 2007, 363).

In the years since the genocide, several developments have helped improve the lives of Rwandan women. Most notably, the 2003 constitution requires at least 30 percent of parliamentary and cabinet seats to be held by women. This quota, combined with independently elected women holding other seats, means that there are more women by percentage serving in Rwanda’s parliament than in any other country in the world.

Lawmakers have also passed laws to prevent violence against women and removed archaic laws such as the one that allowed a husband to access his wife’s bank account

(McCrummen 2008). A female journalist working in Kigali acknowledged the changing role of women in society. “Normally in Rwanda women don’t have jobs,” she said. “But now women are trying to have something to do to improve their development.”

Despite these strides, obstacles still remain for women. Old notions that women belong in the home seem to persist. In one conversation, a male journalism student dismissed the idea that the women in his class could become good journalists. “The women in my class,” he said, “they don’t speak really or talk. They’re very weak.”

Although there are no indications of how many women are working in the Rwandan media, casual observation indicated that most radio and newspaper employees were men.

Only three women agreed to be interviewed for this study: one journalism student and two journalists. Both of the working journalists hosted shows that dealt specifically with health or women’s issues.

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When asked about being a female journalist, one radio host shrugged her shoulders and admitted that it could be difficult. She said she was not married, and when she decided to marry, she seemed uncertain if she would continue to work. She pointed to the schedule as a major difficulty. “I work at night,” she said. “Working at the night for the women it is a problem. I think it cannot be accepted by every woman.” A female journalism student said she accepted that most people did not understand why a woman would want to be a journalist. “Women didn’t like the job,” she said, “because it was just talking, and it was dangerous. But now they see that even women can just do that.”

Another radio journalist in Kigali agreed that women needed to overcome misconceptions about what it meant to be a journalist or part of the media.

There was a time when women were afraid, just afraid to be in the media because of the freedom of speech. People would say that a woman who was just talking, who wanted to be in media wanted to be a politician or something like that, so they were afraid. But now people can see that you can just be a journalist, you’re not going to try and be a politician (Radio Journalist, Kigali).

She optimistically discussed her program, which profiles women in business across the country. She insisted that for women across Rwanda—even journalists—life is improving. “Now it’s getting better,” she said, “because in schools of journalism there are many women. I have just been to the school of journalism, and we women were just proud of what we were doing.”

Perhaps her show is instrumental in helping reshape the image in Rwanda. “We see women who are having their own business, women who are just doing something.

This is what we focus on. We talk to them about the job they’re doing, how it’s changing their life.” She said these types of programs are key to inspiring women to imagine a

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different life. “My focus was just to show the image of women, Rwandan women, how she can just be good, how she can just continue improving her life, how she can know that life is not just because of a man,” she said. “Also to show women, the culture is changing for Rwanda women is just changing, and improving the image of women.”

5.4 Moving Forward

As Rwanda moves forward, there is little debate that the media will shape what that future will look like. As one radio journalist in Kigali said:

The role of journalism is irreversible in society. Journalism as a communication field, and communication is the backbone of any developing society. When society is ill, it is the journalism that tells society it is ill. When there is an undefined policy, journalism is there to define it (Radio Journalist 2011).

Another journalist stressed the watchdog nature of the press. “Journalism plays a very important part of society as being the watchdog,” he said, “because it warns the society. It warns the government that what you are doing is not good.”

In order to ensure that the media flourish in Rwanda, many of the challenges facing journalists and media professionals needs to be addressed. Journalists live under a climate of self-censorship, whether from fear of government retaliation or worries that they themselves will do harm. The focus on politics in the capital arguably keeps people from receiving the information that they need. Media literacy is still a problem, as is a lack of well-paying journalism jobs and basic resources to produce quality news.

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5.4.1 Understanding Media

Some of these issues are slowly being addressed by different entities in the country. For example, there is a growing understanding of how the media can be used to connect different groups in society. A police officer who worked with media explained how the department was using the media to reach out to citizens. “We see media as an opportunity,” he said, “a kind of partner in policy. Media are the best way to link to the public, and we are always available to explain to the public how the police are operating.”

He said that some police officers receive media training, and besides publishing a magazine for the force, the department is also airing a weekly live radio show. Police officers use the publication and the radio show to address issues like drug use in teens, alcohol abuse, and gender-based violence. The department also publishes a website with both news and information about upcoming events. “PR is used to portray the institution positively,” he said, “to give a true version of information. It’s an obligation, because police are accountable to the public.” Even the ministry public relations officer who complained about his department’s views on media acknowledged that there seems to be a growing understanding of its influence. “It helps us so much, for the people who do communication,” he said, “access to information is increasing, freedom of speech is increasing, it helps us. Because for us as communicators, for example, you arrange a you get several people coming for the time, but before you couldn’t get so many people.”

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5.4.2 Non-traditional Media

The non-profit Urunana also manages to receive widespread audience attention with its non-traditional approach to issues facing society. Along with audience surveys and focus groups, writers also conduct rural familiarization visits each quarter. Writers visit a community to understand what life is like in that part of Rwanda. According to the director, “They get a sense of what kind of life these people are living. And that helps us to really touch, real issues in those areas in the country. It can be done in one village, but it is similar in that district, the life that people live.” He said it helps the organization produce programming specific to where people live. “There are slight differences in the way people live,” he said, “like you would imagine people living along a lake shore may live a slightly different life than those who live in another area without a lake. So this is why we decided to come up with those programs.”

Although Urunana mainly produces radio dramas, the foundation of programming shares many of the elements of peace journalism. Programming takes great care to humanize all sides of an issue or conflict, especially topics that are sensitive in society such as ethnicity and health issues. “Apart from HIV and AIDS, we’ve talked about other issues that were formerly regarded as taboo here,” he said. “I think today in our culture, talking about sex and sexuality was actually taboo. It’s hard here. A parent cannot talk about sexuality with a child. But since it started it has been addressing sexual reproductive health issues.” He said the public seems to be receptive to the messages in programming due to their format. “Sensitive issues are better discussed in a drama than

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discussing it direct,” he said. “And people tend to understand it better when you bring it out as a life that has been lived.”

Audiences flock to live performances of Urunana programs, with anywhere from

5,000 to 15,000 in attendance, and writers regularly receive mail and phone calls. Most importantly, however, the director says he has seen Urunana effect change in the community. “I think that it has helped some people actually in modeling their behavior, looking at the actors and actresses, they think they act in a way that will be able to portray what they want to change in their lives,” he said. “He’s entertained, he learns, and in the process he’s able to improve on his lifestyle.”

5.4.3 Overcoming the Digital Divide

The digital divide is still a real and problematic phenomenon, but Rwandese are slowly embracing online journalism and realizing what it can do. According to Obijiofor and Hanusch (2011), new technology, including the Internet and mobile devices, allow journalists in Africa to diversify both the sources of news they access. This certainly seems to be the case, as journalists interviewed for this study mentioned a variety of news and entertainment websites they used to gather information.

Besides being used as a resource for journalists, the Internet appears to be the next step in the evolution of a Rwandan media staple: the call-in program. Call-in, interactive radio programs have been widely popular in Rwanda both before and after the genocide

(Kimani 2007). Several journalists hosted such programs, boasting of their ability to give their audience a voice. Now those programs also use Facebook to receive feedback from

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their audiences. A journalist for an online outlet said the interaction of readers in the comments section constantly amazed him. “The people,” he laughed, “they like to comment, to comment, to comment.” He said there are typically two types of comments, one on the story and one on the news organization. He said the comments can also be a source of information for journalists. “Sometimes we get stories through the comments,” he said. “We have a problem with this thing or this thing, and then they give you the details through the comment.”

The government has efforts underway to improve understanding of social media.

A journalist from Radio Rwanda spoke of an initiative by the government to teach people how to use social media. “There are three vans,” he said. “They are installed with computers and connected to the Internet. So we go to villages very deep, teaching people on how to use Internet, Facebook, and twitter. So people can know what to do.”

Another journalist in Kigali who worked at both radio and online outlets said he hoped social media would create change in Rwanda.

The social networks like Facebook and those online websites, I think they are not much exploited, but if the social networks are well exploited, can favor the freedom of expression, freedom of speech that we talk about. I think that if we are trying to exploit those social networks, but maybe those social networks in Rwanda we are on a good track. But we still have a journey to go so that we can use those social networks (Radio/Online Journalist 2011).

Many of the younger or aspiring journalists concurred. A journalist in Kigali said his generation favored receiving news via social media, especially Facebook. “Youth in

Rwanda do not like to listen to the news,” he said. “That’s what I’ve observed. They don’t like to listen to the news, but by Facebook, it’s easier to make the youth know

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something about the news. They like Facebook instead of other media, because media in

Rwanda are now getting used to this social media, especially Facebook.” He added that the youth in Rwanda were carefully watching the development of the Arab Spring. He wondered if social media could be used to spark such activism in Rwanda. Another journalist added, “So economic aspects, political aspects, are a problem, but we are the ones, we are the forthcoming generation, we should push until something happens.”

5.4.4 A Sense of Hope

This sense of hope that the obstacles facing the Rwandan media could be overcome resonated throughout the interviews. One radio presenter said she had seen a great change in just her short time as a journalist. “The journalism we did have in 2009 is different from what we’re having in 2011,” she said. “People are changing, trying to go to school for journalism. They’re trying. They know that they have to just be professional and know ethics.” Several journalists cited a growing understanding of ethics as the key to the future of media. “We have the ethics,” one said, “in as far as, we know that journalism, even if it is with an international perspective. But also we act locally, we act according to our culture, we act according to ethics. We should go ahead in as far as achieving the principles of journalism.”

Seasoned veterans and young, eager students alike shared this sense of hope. An editor at a radio station in the Northern Province who had worked for more than a decade said he wished more people knew of the great strides the country was making. “Not everyone is happy here, but the future looks good. I wish the Western media would come

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down, come down on the ground.” He said he sees an openness in society not present at r the beginning of his career. “This has never happened in our country,” he laughed excitedly. “It’s really cool. It’s never happened. The door was closed, people had that fear to talk… I imagine, if I say this, what will happen to me… No, no that is never going to happen again.” A journalism student at the National University said he intended to fight against immorality in his career. “As far as I’m concerned, you have to feel journalism within you,” he said. “You have to live journalism. You have to follow a code of ethics, journalistic ethics, and also feel responsible for what you are doing. And also to consider that you are the voice of no voices.”

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CHAPTER 6: SURVEY OF RWANDAN JOURNALISTS

The purpose of this study is to examine the media environment journalists face in post-genocide Rwanda. Although the hate media’s role in the 1994 genocide has been widely researched and discussed, the current situation facing media professionals and journalists is an understudied topic. A survey of 101 journalists working in Rwanda was conducted in order to determine some of the challenges they face, within the theoretical frameworks of agenda building and frame building.

Journalists working in all five provinces in Rwanda — Kigali, Northern,

Southern, Eastern, and Western — were surveyed. In total, 101 journalists responded to the survey. This accounts for approximately 20% of the journalists working in Rwanda, based on the 2011 Media High Council report detailing the number of registered journalists. At the beginning of the survey, respondents answered questions about their age, gender, their training as journalists, and the media outlet where they worked.

Respondents were also asked questions about their experience as a journalist and their opinions on how the media perform in regards to various issues.

6.1 Survey Demographics

Demographically, the majority of respondents were in the youngest age bracket.

A total of 65 (65%) said they were in the 18-29 age bracket, and 32 (32%) reported they were between the ages of 30-30. No one reported being older than 60 years old. Nearly

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82% of the respondents were male. The majority of respondents, 83 (83%) worked in

Kigali Province. The Northern, Southern, and Eastern Provinces reported 5 (5%), 6 (6%), and 4 (4%), respectively. Only 2 (2%) reported they worked in the Western Province.

When asked the highest level of education completed, 57% of respondents reported they had completed college or university. Another 22% reported they only finished high school, 16% some college, and 5% received a master’s degree. No one reported earning a Ph.D. A majority of the respondents, 80%, received formal training to be a journalist. Of those, the majority, 68.8% received training in college or university, and 18.8% reported studying at the Great Lakes Media Institute. When asked to explain what type of training they had received, respondents said they had attended workshops sponsored by various entities, including the non-governmental organization Search for

Common Ground, the BBC, ORINFOR, and UNICEF. One respondent attended a training workshop abroad.

When examining the relationship between whether or not the respondent had received formal training and where they worked, a chi-square test showed a significant difference between Kigali Province and the rural areas (χ2 = 4.143 df = 1 p < .05, 95% CI

[-.36653, -.00668]). Journalists working in Kigali were more likely to have received formal training than journalists working in the Northern, Southern, Eastern, and Western provinces (See Table 6.1). The majority of respondents, 55.1% strongly agreed that formal training is important for journalists. A total of 36% agreed with the statement.

Only 2.2% of respondents somewhat disagreed that formal training is important in their field.

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Table 6.1

Formal Journalism Training by Province

Received Formal Kigali Northern, Southern, Eastern, Training Province & Western Province

Yes 66 10 (n=76)

No 15 7 (n=22)

Notes: The Northern, Southern, Eastern, and Western Provinces were combined in order to show the differences between the urban and rural media outlets. χ2 p < .05

A cross-tabulation of the respondents’ age brackets and whether or not they received formal training revealed that the younger journalists were more likely to have received an education in journalism, although the results were not significant (See Table

6.2). Only 30% of respondents between the ages of 18-29 did not have formal training. In contrast, only one journalist over the age of 40 received formal journalism training.

Table 6.2

Formal Journalism Training by Age Bracket

Received Formal 18-29 30-39 40-49 50-59 Training

Yes 50 27 1 0 (n=78)

No (n=22) 15 5 1 1

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Note: No survey respondents reported being over the age of 60.

When asked how long they had worked in journalism, one third of respondents were relatively new to journalism, having worked one year or less, 16% worked as journalists between 1-3 years, 22% had 3-5 years of experience, and 21% 5-10 years.

Fewer respondents, 6%, reported working between 10-15 years, and only 3% had between 15 and 20 years experience. No one reported having more than 20 years experience as a journalist.

The majority of respondents, 59%, worked at radio stations. Newspapers employed 21% of respondents, although online media nearly matched newspapers with

17%. Televisions and magazines each had 2%. More than three-quarters of the respondents worked for private media, and 17% worked for government-owned media outlets. One respondent reported not knowing the ownership of his or her media outlet.

No one reported working for a family-owned operation.

The largest number of respondents, 40% worked at well-established media outlets that had been open between 5-10 years. The next highest number, 28%, worked at outlets that had been open between 1-3 years. A total of 14% worked at media outlets in operation between 3-5 years, 10% had been open more than 10 years, and 9% had been open less than one year.

Half of respondents had been at their current media outlet for one year or less, while a third had been there for between 1-3 years. A total of 15% worked at their outlets for between 3-5 years, 2% between 5-10 years, and only one worked at his or her outlet for more than 10 years. More than half reported they had been at their current position

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for a year or less. A third responded they had been working at their current organization and position for between 1-3 years.

These demographics illustrate trends discussed by participants in the in-depth interviews. Many of the participants said they worked with mostly young colleagues. The media’s role in the genocide provides some explanation for the youth aspect of the media.

Journalists who did not participate in the hate media either fled the country or were killed; this means that media outlets basically needed to re-staff following the genocide.

Changes following the genocide explain other aspects of these demographics.

Prior to the genocide, there were fewer media outlets to provide jobs for journalists. As one journalist said, “Before genocide, or even after genocide, in Rwanda there was only one radio, which was Radio Rwanda. So, because of those people, you know it was the voice of the government. It only had issues related to the government.” Now there are 33 registered newspapers and 27 broadcast stations registered with the Media High Council

(Media High Council 2011). That means there are 60 media outlets providing jobs for journalists and media professionals, not including online publications, which currently do not have to register with the Media High Council. This explains why many of the respondents worked at relatively new media outlets and why the majority of respondents worked at private organizations.

Although radio is still the dominant medium, the fact that 17% of respondents said they worked at an online publication illustrates the growth of Internet news in

Rwanda. Two of the participants in the in-depth interviews worked at both radio stations and online publications, and many of traditional media outlets visited in the course of this

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study maintained some type of online presence, whether it be a website or Facebook page. Technology is also likely playing a part in the growth of online media. One online journalist said he appreciated how new technology allowed him to work anywhere.

“Sometimes we have breaking news,” he said, “and when you have a smartphone, from the United States, for example, sometimes I can edit, post the breaking news without a computer.” That online media outlets do not have to pay a licensing fee or be registered with the Media High Council could also add to the appeal of working for an Internet publication.

The responses concerning education are indicative of the results of the in-depth interviews as well. More working journalists have bachelor’s degrees, although not necessarily in journalism. As one journalist working in the Southern Province said, “I was absorbed by journalism, but there wasn’t an opportunity to study the profession.

Instead I decided to study law.” This explains why a large percentage of respondents had completed at least some college or university, but had not necessarily received that degree in journalism.

The significant difference in journalism training between the Kigali journalists and the journalists working Northern, Southern, Eastern, and Western Provinces show the divide between the urban and rural discussed by Uvin (1999) persists. There are a few possible explanations for why trained journalists are choosing to work in Kigali instead of the rural areas. Kigali, as the center of government and business for the country, affords more opportunities for journalists due to the number of media outlets. Moreover, the only established media outlets in the rural areas are radio stations. If a journalist has

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an interest in print journalism or television, Kigali is the only option. This could slowly be changing, however, with the increase in the number of online news outlets and the growth of websites at radio stations. Regardless of the reason for the concentration of trained journalists in Kigali, this difference strengthens the divide between the rural and urban areas, not just for journalists, but also for the audience.

That younger journalists were more likely to have been formally trained in journalism is indicative of the opportunities afforded journalists. The National University of Rwanda did not open its school of journalism until 2000, and the Catholic Institute of

Kabgayi opened its school of journalism in 2002. The Great Lakes Media Institute, which began in 2005, offers training to working journalists; however, a lack of time and money keeps many journalists from enrolling in courses. As indicated in both the survey and the in-depth interviews, however, people realize the importance of formal education in journalism. A journalist working in the Eastern Province said, “We need more training.

It’s a problem here.” He then added, “We have some journalists who are studying at the

GLMC, even though it is far, they are not discouraged. They’re just studying.” Changes to the media law, which will soon require journalists to have had some type of formal training, are also likely contributing to this increase in training.

6.2 Decisions Concerning Content

Data collected regarding how journalists make decisions about content show the majority agreed that most of their story ideas came from government or official press releases. Although 23.3% disagreed with the statement, 23.3% somewhat agreed, 22.2%

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agreed, and 4.4% strongly agreed. Respondents said they particularly relied on the president’s statements when it came to deciding what constituted news. A total of 57.1% agreed or strongly agreed that their media organization usually reported on the president’s statements. When choosing between the president’s statements and other issues, a majority of respondents, 64.4%, somewhat agreed, agreed, or strongly agreed that the president’s statements were given more attention at their media organization. A similar amount of respondents, 69%, somewhat agreed, agreed, or strongly agreed that statements by the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) are given more attention than statements from the opposition political parties.

Respondents working in Kigali were more likely to rely on the government for story ideas than journalists working in the Northern, Southern, Eastern, and Western provinces, although the results of an independent t-test were not significant. When asked if they agree or disagree with the statement “My story ideas often come from government or official press releases,” with 1=strongly disagree and 7=strongly disagree, the mean for journalists in Kigali was 4.23 and 3.60 for the other provinces (See Table 6.3).

Likewise, journalists in Kigali were more likely to give the president’s statements and the

Rwandan Patriotic Front’s (RPF) statements more attention than journalists in the

Northern, Southern, Eastern, and Western provinces (See Table 6.3). When asked if the president’s statements are given priority over statements from parliament, the mean scores were closer than the other statements concerning government related content. An independent t-test did show significance between the responses by journalists in Kigali

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(M=5.01, SD=1.477) and the other provinces (M=4.27, SD=2.017); t(86)=1.671, p < .05

95% CI [7.838, .006].

Table 6.3

Use of Government Story Ideas and Statements by Province

Province Story ideas often President’s statements President’s statements RPF statements from govt. given more attention given more attention given more (n= 89) than other stories than parliament’s attention than (n= 89) statements opposition (n= 88) (n= 89)

Kigali 4.23 5.03 5.01* 5.12

Northern, 3.60 4.13 4.27* 4.00 Southern, Eastern, & Western

Note: Shows the mean of responses with 1=strongly disagree through 7= strongly agree. * p < .05

These findings support both previous literature on agenda building and frame building in Rwanda (Frère 2007; Kalyango 2011) and the conclusions drawn from the in- depth interviews conducted in this study. Despite an increase in private news outlets, the government, particularly the president, is still driving the media agenda. According to the survey respondents, the majority of journalists receive story ideas from the government via press releases. As one Radio Rwanda journalist explained, if the government extends an invitation or press release to an event or news conference, the government-owned news organization is required to attend. Although the requirement only applies to Radio

Rwanda, several journalists interviewed said that they often spoke with journalists at 114

other outlets to find out what was making news that day. This means that Radio Rwanda is building the agenda for other radio stations in Kigali.

The survey further supports the findings of the in-depth interviews concerning the differences between the coverage of politics in Kigali and the rural areas. Journalists in

Kigali were more likely to agree that they relied on government press releases in stories than journalists at rural media outlets. Kigali journalists were also more likely to give the president’s statements more attention over other stories and give the RPF’s statements priority over opposition statements than journalists in other provinces. One reason for the difference is likely access. As one journalist in Cyangugu explained, politicians rarely visit the rural areas, and when they do, it makes the news. The rest of the time, however, journalists in the rural areas must rely more on the community than the government for stories.

One difference between the findings of the survey and the in-depth interviews, however, concerned the coverage of the Rwanda Patriotic Front (RPF) and opposition parties. When interviewed in person, several journalists said their news organization was careful to cover the opposition party as well as the RPF. Many especially pointed to elections, and the Media High Council’s requirement that all political parties receive equal airtime. One editor said:

Politics is a very wide area. I guess anything political is taken with care, because you never know who you are hurting with the messages you are putting on the media. Especially how people receive those messages. For example, when dealing with national elections, we are careful not to allow journalists just to give favorable coverage to one person and give a blackout to the rest. Because some people may misunderstand and think that one person has influence the media (Journalist, Kigali).

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The results of the survey tell a different story, however. A majority of respondents said the president’s statements and statements by the RPF received more attention from their media outlet. The variation could be explained by the difference in the two methods.

When speaking face to face, journalists might have been hesitant to admit they rely more on the president or the RPF’s statements for news, as according the Media High

Council’s laws and regulations, they are required to provide equal coverage. The survey, however, could have provided journalists with a level of anonymity that allowed them to speak more freely about their use of the RPF’s statements.

6.3 Journalists’ Sources

When asked about the types of sources used, respondents had varied answers in regard to government officials versus people who are not officials (see Table 6.2). The majority of respondents said they mostly used government sources for their stories. The highest number of respondents, 32.2%, somewhat agreed with the statement that they mostly used government sources, 21.1% agreed, and 12.2% strongly agreed. On the other end of the scale, only 3.3% strongly disagreed with the statement, 10% disagreed, and

12.2% somewhat disagreed. In contrast to the idea that journalists mainly relied on government sources, a majority of respondents said that government officials were not accessible. A total of 57.7% of respondents somewhat agreed, agreed, or strongly agreed that government officials are not accessible.

Although a majority of respondents said they mostly used government sources, a majority also said they used people who are not government officials as sources as well.

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The highest number of respondents, 32.2%, said they agreed that they used people who were not officials as sources, 29.9% strongly agreed, and 16.7% somewhat agreed. No one disagreed with the statement, while one person strongly disagreed and 4.4% somewhat disagreed.

Journalists in Kigali were more likely to agree that they used mostly government sources than journalists working in the other provinces (See Table 6.4). Although the results of an independent t-test were not significant, journalists working in the rural areas said they were more likely to use non-official sources. When asked to agree with the statement “government officials are not accessible to journalists,” the mean score was higher in Kigali, 4.68, than in the other provinces, 4.27.

Table 6.4

Types of Sources Used by Province

Province Use mostly govt. Use non-official Government officials sources sources are not accessible (n= 89) (n= 89) (n= 89)

Kigali 4.72* 5.58 4.68

Northern, 4.53* 5.73 4.27 Southern, Eastern, & Western

Note: Shows the mean of responses with 1=strongly disagree through 7= strongly agree. * p < .05

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How journalists used sources also differed between the privately owned media outlets and the outlets owned by the government or politicians. Journalists from private media outlets were more likely to agree they used mostly government sources than those working at a government or politician owned outlet (See Table 6.5). However, the mean for the statement “I often use people who are not government officials as sources” was higher for journalists at private outlets, 5.66, than at government or politician owned outlets, 5.39. Journalists working at government or politician owned outlets were less likely to agree that government officials were not accessible than journalists working at private outlets.

Table 6.5

Types of Sources Used by Ownership of Media Outlet

Outlet Use mostly govt. Use non-official Government officials Ownership sources sources are not accessible (n= 89) (n= 89) (n= 89)

Government/ 4.33 5.39 4.11 Politician

Private 4.76 5.66 4.73

Note: Shows the mean of responses with 1=strongly disagree through 7= strongly agree.

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When it comes to the sources journalists use, the results of the survey support those of the in-depth interviews and previous literature. Journalists rely on government officials for their stories, which reaffirms that the government is responsible for controlling the media agenda. Furthermore, the reliance of journalists on government sources indicates that government officials are contributing to the frames attached to stories. Without independent sources, the claims made by government sources in regards to particular issues are going unchecked.

Contrary to the question about relying on government sources, respondents did agree they use non-official sources as well. This is contrary to the results of the in-depth interviews, where many journalists expressed their frustration over the reluctance of people to provide information. One television journalist summed up the problem by saying, “Some people are shy of the microphone. Other people are not shy, but they don’t want to give you information. Some people sell information. So you may go to the field and ask someone, I need to ask you this and this, and they say, will you pay?”

The differences between the responses from the journalists working in Kigali and those in the rural areas support the findings of the in-depth interviews. Journalists in the rural areas simply do not have the same access to government officials as the journalists working in Kigali do and are forced to rely on non-government sources for their stories.

Contrary to what might be expected, journalists working at private stations were more likely to report that they relied on government sources. Often government owned stations are seen as the mouthpiece for politicians in power, and private stations are supposed to

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be the voice of dissent. These results illustrate the government’s influence on the media agenda.

One recent change in Rwanda discussed by interview participants but not reflected in the survey results concerned the accessibility of government officials. Nearly every journalist interviewed for this study mentioned a new mandate that officials must be available for media interviews. They said officials had become more accessible in the last several months. One journalist in Kigali said the mandate spoke to the changing media environment in Rwanda. “This is a very good sign,” he said. “And you can ask anything.”

The results of the survey also reveal a dichotomy between the types of sources journalists say they are using, and the accessibility of government officials. The majority of journalists surveyed said they mostly use government sources for their stories, however, a majority also said that officials were not available. These two results are at odds with each other, and add another layer of complexity to how the media agenda is built and framed in Rwanda. Furthermore, journalists in Kigali were also more likely to agree that government officials were not accessible, even though they work in the center of government and business.

6.4 Censorship in the Media

In regards to censorship in the media, the majority of respondents said there were stories they could not report. A total of 29.2% agreed with the statement, “I am not allowed to report on certain topics or issues.” Another 28.1% strongly agreed with the

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statement, and 15.7% somewhat disagreed. Only 3.4% of respondents disagreed with the statement, while 4.5% disagreed and 14.6% somewhat disagreed. Furthermore, the majority of respondents, 70%, somewhat agreed, agreed, or strongly agreed that government censorship made it difficult to do their job.

Views of censorship varied between journalists working in Kigali and in the

Northern, Southern, Eastern, and Western Provinces (See Table 6.6). An independent t- test showed a significant difference between journalists in Kigali (M=5.33, SD=1.616) and the rural provinces combined (M=4.87, SD=2.232); t(86)=.941, p < .05, 95% CI [-

.514, 1.438]. Journalists working in Kigali were also more likely to agree that government censorship made it difficult to do their jobs than journalists in the rural areas, although the results were not significant.

Table 6.6

Attitudes toward Censorship by Province

Province Not allowed to Government censorship report on certain makes it difficult to topics or issues my job (n= 89) (n= 88)

Kigali 5.33* 5.00

Northern, 4.87* 4.87 Southern, Eastern, & Western

Note: Shows the mean of responses with 1=strongly disagree through 7= strongly agree. * p < .05

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Overall, the journalists that participated in both the survey and the in-depth interviews admitted censorship marked the media landscape. Journalists in the rural areas seem to be less concerned about censorship, perhaps because they are more removed from the center of government. When asked about the media, one journalist laughed before he said, “It’s not free, of course.” Another journalist said that concern over government backlash haunted journalists in the field. “The truth doesn’t belong to one person,” he said. “The truth is the truth, regardless of who says it. So when you are on a mission of fact finding, you shouldn’t be hesitating. Why be hesitant in reporting what you have seen? Unless of course there is that fear.”

Through this fear, the government is controlling the editorial line at media outlets, even if they are privately owned. As indicated by the results of the survey, and the opinions of the journalists interviewed, most journalists know what topics are restricted.

One journalist said, “Depending on the editorial line of certain media, the editors, the managers of a radio can wish not to allow some ideas to pass. Because maybe someone can expect problems from the government something because they have said this and this.” Many journalists cited a culture of obedience as another reason why the government — and the editorial line — are rarely challenged. A seasoned journalist in

Kigali explained, “Some people are not used to challenging authority. We’ve got a proverb in Rwanda it says: ‘What the boss says you add nothing.’ Which is very dangerous.’” This control would even indicate the government influences the frame of stories, as journalists hesitate to criticize government initiatives or investigate corruption.

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6.5 Challenges facing Journalists

Along with reporting that government censorship made it difficult to do their job, many of the respondents reported that a low salary and a lack of equipment, including access to new technology, were problems (see Figure 6.1). Nearly 60% of respondents strongly agreed with the statement, “A low salary makes it difficult for me to do my job.”

Another 13.3% agreed with the statement, and 5.6% somewhat agreed. Only 18.9% strongly disagreed, disagreed, or somewhat disagreed with the statement.

Lack of equipment makes it difficult Strongly Disagree to do my job Disagree Somewhat Disagree Neutral

A low salary makes it difficult to do Somewhat Agree my job Agree Strongly Agree

0 50 100

Figure 6.1: Challenges Facing Journalists

Note: Journalists were asked to respond to the above statements on a scale of 1=strongly disagree through 7=strongly agree.

Journalists had a similar response to the statement: “Lack of equipment, including access to new technology makes it difficult for me to do my job.” A total of 74.5%

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respondents said they somewhat agreed, agreed, or strongly agreed that they did not have enough equipment to do their job. Only 17.8% said they strongly disagreed, disagreed, or somewhat disagreed with the statement.

Although the results of an independent t-test were not significant, journalists in the rural areas were more likely to agree that a low salary made it difficult to perform their job, than journalists working in Kigali (See Table 6.7). Likewise, journalists at rural media outlets were also more likely to agree that a lack of equipment made their jobs difficult.

Table 6.7

Challenges Facing Journalists by Province

Province Low salary makes it Lack of equipment and difficult to do my technology makes it difficult job to do my job (n= 89) (n= 89)

Kigali 5.68 5.35

Northern, 5.87 5.73 Southern, Eastern, & Western

Note: Shows the mean of responses with 1=strongly disagree through 7= strongly agree.

That journalists are underpaid and without access to proper equipment confirms the findings of the in-depth interview phase of this study. Nearly every journalist interviewed said low pay hindered his or her profession. These factors likely contribute to

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some of the other findings of the survey, including that the respondents skewed younger.

Journalists are leaving the profession for better paying jobs in other sectors. One interview participant said he had left his job as a radio reporter for a job in public relations due to the low pay. Another journalist said he was looking for another job because he could not pay his bills on his salary. Other journalists worked part-time jobs in other fields or worked at two different media outlets to make ends meet. Furthermore, the results showed, once again, that journalists in the rural areas face more challenges than those working in Kigali. Conditions such as these not only strengthen the divide between the urban and the rural areas, it could also discourage educated journalists from pursuing jobs at rural media outlets.

Beyond the turnover low pay can induce, such conditions, including a lack of equipment, influence the quality of journalism produced. One radio presenter in Kigali said, “Communication goes together with the money. You always need money in whatever you do.” A different journalist, who worked part-time at a news website and also at a radio station summed up the challenges facing journalists like this:

If the sector is jeopardized by economic aspects, political aspects, the story also is endangered. Imagine what will come out. In a story, we need both sides. And if the economy does not allowed to consult all sources, you can imagine what kind of story will be published. But even if there are political challenges, economic challenges, journalists, as professionals, should go beyond this constraint and follow the ideals of journalism and journalism ethics (Journalist, Kigali).

These issues represent just a few challenges Rwandan journalists continue to face on a daily basis as the country develops and recovers from the 1994 genocide.

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6.6 Elements of Peace Journalism

Respondents indicated that they practice some elements of peace journalism.

More than three-quarters of respondents said the media performed somewhat well, well, or very well when it came to focusing on reconciliation. Likewise, a majority said the media reported on ways to prevent conflict and focused on peacemakers in conflicts.

More than half, 58%, said that the media gave a voice to all parties in a conflict.

Respondents were split on one element of peace journalism, however. The largest number of respondents, 20.9%, selected neutral regarding the media’s performance in regards to making conflicts transparent. A total of 45.1% responded somewhat well, well, or very well to the question, and 34.1% responded very poorly, poorly, or somewhat poorly.

Journalists working for privately owned media outlets reported different attitudes toward the use of elements of peace journalism than journalists working at government or politician owned media outlets (See Table 6.8). When asked how well the media focuses on peace-makers in a conflict, journalists working for government or politician owned outlets averaged 5.00, whereas journalists working for private outlets averaged 4.63. In all other elements of peace journalism, however, the mean for journalists working at private stations was higher, including humanizing all sides of a conflict, reporting on ways to prevent conflict, and focusing on reconciliation.

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Table 6.8

Elements of Peace Journalism in the Media by Outlet Ownership

Ownership Humanizes all Reports on ways to Focuses on Focuses on peace- sides prevent conflict reconciliation makers (n= 89) (n= 89) (n= 88) (n= 89)

Government/ 4.28 4.44 5.17 5.00* Politician

Private 4.46 4.56 5.23 4.63*

Note: Shows the mean of responses with 1=very poorly through 7= very well. * p < .05

The results of the survey indicate that some elements of peace journalism are already present in the media. That a majority of journalists thought the media focused on reconciliation supports the findings of the in-depth interviews. Journalists often discussed the steps the media have taken to move past the hate media’s role in the genocide. In particular, the journalists interviewed spoke often about the mourning period in April.

One radio presenter in Kigali said he thought the annual remembrance helped heal the wounds the genocide left behind. “In that period of time,” he said. “We have to talk about what happened. We talk, we invite the survivors, we invite organizations, we talk about what happened, we talk about the annual topic. Each year, there’s a topic talking about genocide in order to prevent some other genocides.” One journalist said she and her colleagues focused on stories that would promote peace. “They are often difficult topics to discuss,” she said. “But I choose shows to try to educate people.”

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Given the results of the in-depth interview, “making conflicts transparent” is one element of peace journalism expected to be absent from the media. Nearly every journalist interviewed said that issues concerning the military, troop movements, and war crimes were topics that were censored for reporters. Without the ability to freely cover the military, transparent reports on most conflict would be nearly impossible. These findings were further reflected in the results of the survey, where journalists were split on the coverage of conflicts.

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CHAPTER 7: CONCLUSION

The Rwandan genocide in 1994 marked a dark chapter in both human history, and the history of media. During the course of a hundred days, fueled by the media,

Rwandese turned on their neighbors and friends, slaughtering at least 800,000 Tutsis and moderate Hutus. Nearly two decades later, the country, its people, and its media are still living with the scars of the genocide.

As this study demonstrates, change is slowly taking place in Rwanda. The media have progressed past the hate media largely instigated by outlets such as Kangura and

Radio-Télévision Libre des Milles Collines (RTLM), which rightfully earned the sinister nickname “Radio Machete.” Beyond the hate media, the opening of new media outlets creates an environment where government-owned news is not the only option; there is a growing plurality of voices in Rwanda.

As one journalist said, however, “I can say it is better than where the country came from. Although it’s improving, it’s a slow process.” The journalists and media professionals still face the following challenges:

• Despite a growing number of private media outlets, results showed the

government still builds the media agenda by dictating coverage on Radio Rwanda

and other state-owned media, which then sets the agenda for other outlets.

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• Results also showed the government also builds the media agenda through a

climate of censorship and fear.

• This study found self-censorship influences journalists on two levels. Firstly,

journalists are concerned about government retaliation, which prevents them from

conducting investigations and reporting on controversial topics. Secondly,

journalists know firsthand what a destructive force the media can be in society.

They avoid some issues and topics out of fear they will cause ethnic division.

• Results of both the in-depth interviews and the survey showed differences

between the rural and urban media outlets, including the types of sources used and

differences in pay and access to equipment.

• The scarcity of government sources in the rural areas forces journalists to turn to

their community for story ideas, which results in more community-oriented

reporting.

• Although a low salary and access to proper equipment are problems for journalists

across the country, they are more pronounced in the rural areas. The differences in

pay and equipment only reinforce the divide between the urban and rural areas of

Rwanda that has proved to be detrimental in the past.

• Access to education keeps many journalists from being properly trained, although

this is one area that is improving. More journalists are turning to entities such as

the Great Lakes Media Institute to be formally trained.

• Although some elements of peace journalism are being practiced in Rwanda,

incorporating other components could bolster the reconciliation process.

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Despite the issues that still face journalists and media professionals in Rwanda, many journalists profess feelings of hope about the future. One young journalist, who had just graduated from the National University of Rwanda the year before spoke enthusiastically about the potential of his chosen career. “I love my country,” he said.

“And because I love journalism, I think we should also change the image of journalism.”

He paused thoughtfully and smiled broadly before continuing. “It is a process. It is a process because people don’t really believe in journalism so much. People do love the radio, but they don’t really believe in us so much because of the past experience. But we are trying to make them believe in us.”

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APPENDIX: A

FIELD INTERVIEW QUESTIONS

Describe your role in media production.

What does your daily routine involve?

Where do you look for story ideas?

What sources to you rely on for your work?

How do you make decisions about what stories you write?

Who edits your work?

Describe that process.

How is your organization funded?

Does your organization have a code of ethics?

What are some of the main goals of your organization?

Do you feel your organization achieves those goals?

What are some of the most important issues in society the media address?

What issues do you feel deserve more attention from the media?

Do you feel that some topics or issues are off limits?

What are some limitations you face as a media professional?

What are the main challenges you face?

Do you receive feedback from the audience? How?

How is that feedback handled within your organization?

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APPENDIX: B

SURVEY INSTRUMENT

Ohio University Consent Form

Title of Research: Peace under Fire: Building the Media Agenda in Post-Genocide Rwanda Researcher: Sally Ann Cruikshank

You are being asked to participate in a research project. For you to be able to decide whether you want to participate in this project, you should understand what the project is about, as well as the possible risks and benefits in order to make an informed decision. This process is known as informed consent. This form describes the purpose, procedures, possible benefits, and risks. It also explains how your personal information will be used and protected. Once you have read this form you may continue onto the survey. You may print a copy of this page for your records.

Explanation of Study

This study is being done in order to determine the challenges faced by media professionals in Rwanda. If you agree to participate, you will be asked to participate in an online survey. The survey includes 18 simple questions and should take no more than 15 minutes of your time.

Risks and Discomforts

No risks or discomforts are anticipated. Participation is completely voluntary, and you may stop taking the survey at any time.

Benefits

You may not get immediate and direct benefits personally by participating in this study.

Confidentiality and Records Your study information will be kept confidential by the researcher. There will be no identifiable information requested during the survey. All results will be completely confidential.

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Additionally, while every effort will be made to keep your study-related information confidential, there may be circumstances where this information must be shared with: * Federal agencies, for example the Office of Human Research Protections, whose responsibility is to protect human subjects in research; * Representatives of Ohio University (OU), including the Institutional Review Board, a committee that oversees the research at OU;

Contact Information If you have any questions regarding this study, please contact Sally Ann Cruikshank, [email protected], 1-304-629-6274 or Dr. Yusuf Kalyango, [email protected], 1-740-597-3335.

If you have any questions regarding your rights as a research participant, please contact Jo Ellen Sherow, Director of Research Compliance, Ohio University, (740)593-0664.

By participating in the survey, you are agreeing that: • you have read this consent form (or it has been read to you) and have been given the opportunity to ask questions and have them answered • you have been informed of potential risks and they have been explained to your satisfaction. • you understand Ohio University has no funds set aside for any injuries you might receive as a result of participating in this study • you are 18 years of age or older • your participation in this research is completely voluntary • you may leave the study at any time. If you decide to stop participating in the study, there will be no penalty to you and you will not lose any benefits to which you are otherwise entitled.

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For questions 1-13 please choose only one option.

1. What is your age bracket? 1. 18-29 2. 30-39 3. 40-49 4. 50-59 5. 60-69 6. 70+

2. What is your gender? 1. male 2. female

3. What is the highest level of education you have completed? 1. High school 2. Some college 3. College/university 4. Masters degree 5. Other, please explain: ______

4. Did you receive formal training to be a journalist? 1. Yes 2. No

5. If yes, what type of training did you receive? 1. College/University 2. Great Lakes Media Institute 3. Other, please explain: ______

6. How long have you worked in journalism? 1. 1 year or less 2. Between 1 and 3 years 3. Between 3 and 5 years 4. Between 5 and 10 years 5. Between 10 and 15 years 6. Between 15 and 20 years 7. More than 20 years

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7. What type of media organization do you currently work at? 1. Newspaper 2. Magazine 3. Radio 4. Television 5. Online media

8. Who owns the media organization you currently work for? 1. Government owned 2. Privately Owned 3. Political Party or Government Official owned 4. Family owned 5. Don’t know

9. What position do you currently hold at your media organization? 1. 2. News editor 3. Reporter 4. On-air host 5. Other (please, explain) ______

10. In which province is your media organization located? 1. Kigali Province 2. Northern Province 3. Southern Province 4. Eastern Province 5. Western Province

11. How long has your current media organization been in operation? 1. 1 year or less 2. Between 1 and 3 years 3. Between 3 and 5 years 4. Between 5 and 10 years 5. More than 10 years

12. How long have you been at your current position at your media organization? 1. 1 year or less 2. Between 1 and 3 years 3. Between 3 and 5 years 4. Between 5 and 10 years 5. More than 10 years

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13. How long have you been at your current media organization? 1. 1 year or less 2. Between 1 and 3 years 3. Between 3 and 5 years 4. Between 5 and 10 years 5. More than 10 years

For question 14 please choose only one option that best represents your opinion on a scale of 1 (very poorly) through 7 (very well). Number 4, which is neutral, separates the levels of poor (1 to 3) from the levels of well (5 to 7)

14. Please rate how the news media perform or do the following:

Very Poorly Somewhat Neutral Somewhat Well Very Poorly Poorly Well Well A Cover 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 corruption or embezzlement B Cover civil wars 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 or ethnic conflict C Advocate for 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 citizens’ rights D Provide a forum 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 for political debate E Inform citizens’ 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 of political rights F Make elected 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 officials accountable G News content is 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 truthful H The privately- 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 owned press is responsible

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I The state-owned 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 press is responsible J Makes conflicts 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 transparent K Gives a voice to 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 all parties in a conflict L Humanizes all 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 sides of a conflict M Reports on ways 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 to prevent conflict N Focuses on 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 reconciliation O Exposes 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 untruths on all sides of a conflict P Focuses on 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 peace-makers in a conflict Q Highlights peace 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 initiatives R Reports on the 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 aftermath of conflict S Investigative 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 reporting is common

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For question 15 please choose only one option that best represents your opinion on a scale of 1 (strongly disagree) through 7 (strongly agree) Number 4, which is neutral, separates the levels of disagreement (1 to 3) from the levels of agreement (5 to 7)

15. Please rate the following statements according to your experience working as a journalist:

Strongly Disagree Somewhat Neutral Somewhat Agree Strongly Disagree Disagree Agree Agree

A I use mostly 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 government sources for my news stories B I often use 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 people who are not government officials as news sources C My story 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 ideas often come from government or official press releases D Following a 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 journalism ethical code is important to me E Formal 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 training is important for a journalist F Government 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 censorship makes it difficult for me to do my job G Lack of 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 equipment, 150

including access to new technology makes it difficult for me to do my job H A low salary 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 makes it difficult for me to do my job I Government 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 officials are not accessible to journalists J I am not 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 allowed to report on certain topics or issues K My media 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 organization usually reports on the president’s statements. L The 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 president’s statements are given more attention than other issues at my media organization. M Statements 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 from government officials are more important than statements from people

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who are not involved in the government. N The 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 president’s statements are given priority over statements from parliament. O Statements by 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 the RPF are given more attention than statements from the opposition political parties.

For questions 16-18 please choose fill in the blanks.

16. What are the main topics or issues that you believe deserve more attention in the media? Please, list the 3 topics or issues. o ______o ______o ______

17. What are the main topics or issues that you believe are off-limits to report on? Please, list the 3 topics or issues. o ______o ______o ______

18. What are the main challenges that you face as a journalist? Please, list the 3 challenges. o ______o ______o ______

THANK YOU FOR YOUR TIME AND PARTICIPATION!

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