“The British Government and the Rhineland Crisis” Benjamin Thomas Reynolds Submitted in total fulfilment of the requirements of the degree of Master of History (by Thesis Only) October 2010 School of Historical Studies The University of Melbourne Abstract The purpose of this thesis is to re-examine the historiographical debate concerning the response of the British Government to the German remilitarization of the Rhineland on 7 March 1936 in light of the recent resurgence of ‘traditional’ interpretations of the crisis. The traditional view argues that the Rhineland Crisis represented an opportunity for Britain and France to prevent the Second World War by using their armed forces to intimidate Hitler. By not opposing the weaker Wehrmacht in 1936, the British and French response, it is argued, encouraged Hitler’s later foreign policy demands. Despite ‘revisionist’ writers having uncovered evidence that Hitler was not prepared to withdraw his forces from the Rhineland and that efforts to do so would have provoked a war in Europe in 1936, the revisionist view has enjoyed a recent resurgence. This thesis investigates Britain’s social, economic, military and diplomatic situation between 1919 and 1936 and explores how these affected Britain’s response to the Rhineland Crisis. The thesis makes extensive use of archival records, especially the minutes from the Cabinet meetings held during the crisis. My analysis of this material leads to the conclusion that because of the social and economic crises of the inter- war years and the risk of simultaneous conflicts with other powers Britain did not possess sufficient armed forces to risk war with Germany in March 1936; the efforts of the Cabinet to reach a negotiated settlement can therefore be regarded as justified. I also conclude that Hitler would have resorted to war in March 1936 in the event of a military response to his move. i This is to certify that (i) The thesis comprises only my original work towards the Masters. (ii) Due acknowledgement has been made in the text to all other material used, (iii) The thesis is 32,436 words in length, inclusive of footnotes, but exclusive of tables, maps, bibliographies and appendices. ii TABLE OF CONTENTS Page INTRODUCTION. 1 CHAPTER I: MORE RELUCTANT TO GO TO WAR . 11 Introduction . .11 Fear of War and Pacifism. .11 The League of Nations and Public Opinion . .14 Poverty . .17 The First World War and National Debt . .21 Unemployment and Expenditure . .24 Economic Recovery . .28 Conclusion . .30 CHAPTER II: A DANGER EVEN TO THE CAUSE OF PEACE . .32 Introduction. .32 Army. .33 Navy . .35 Air Force. .37 Japan in Asia . .39 Germany in Europe . .42 Italy in Africa . .44 External and Internal Imperial Threats . 46 Communist Subversion . 49 Conclusion . 51 CHAPTER III: NEITHER THE MEANS NOR THE HEART . .53 iii Conclusion . .66 CHAPTER IV: REVISING THE TRADITION . .. 68 BIBLIOGRAPHY. .. .72 iv Introduction On 7 March 1936 the first of around 36,500 German troops, acting under the direct orders of Adolf Hitler, crossed the frontier into the previously demilitarized Rhineland. These, added to the 20,000 Landespolizei already stationed in the region, took the German presence in the zone to around 56,000. 1 This force contained no bomber aircraft or armoured fighting vehicles and was, so the Germans claimed, ‘in no way offensive in character.’2 The troops sent to the Rhineland were ‘symbolic’ and ‘acted only symbolically.’3 In the years before the demilitarization of the Rhineland Germany had stationed over 220,000 troops in the zone.4 In Germany there was ‘tremendous enthusiasm’ for the move. 5 Outside of Germany the response was far less enthusiastic. Hitler sought to calm the ‘hostile [international] reaction’ that accompanied the remilitarization of the Rhineland by claiming that Germany had ‘no territorial claims in Europe’ and by combining the move with a series of peace proposals which would satisfy Britain’s key security concerns. 6 Germany would agree to non- aggression pacts with Britain, France and Belgium, an air pact with the other western powers and, most importantly, a return to the League of Nations which would further ease British fears of German intentions in Central Europe. 7 Germany’s unilateral action, blatantly disregarding both the terms of the forced Treaty of Versailles and the freely negotiated terms of the Locarno Treaty, fundamentally undermined the security of Western Europe. Konstantin von Neurath8 claimed that ‘the creation of a fait accompli’ was necessary because ‘in view of all [Germany’s] experiences in recent years, [she] could have expected no results from negotiations with France.’ 9 In response to Germany’s violation of the Treaties of Versailles and Locarno, Britain, despite the clamouring of the French, sought to ‘appease’ the Germans and secure a negotiated settlement to the crisis. Britain’s reaction—or lack of 1 Though the War Office believed that the figure was actually ‘probably below 50,000.’ German Troops in the Rhineland, 12 March 1936. WO 190/391. Sourced from the National Archives, London. 2 Werner von Blomberg to the German Foreign Ministry, 23 March 1936. M. Lambert, Documents on German Foreign Policy Series C, Volume V (London: HMSO, 1966), 254. Henceforth DGFP Series C. 3 Alfred Jodl quoted from International Military Tribunal, Trial of the Major War Criminals Volume XV (Nuremberg: International Military Tribunal, 1947), 358. Henceforth TMWC. 4 Konstantin von Neurath to the German Embassy in Britain. 14 March 1936. DGFP Series C, Vol. V, 151. 5 TMWC, Vol. XXXI, 589. 6 Hitler quoted from TMWC, Vol. I, 196. 7 Neurath in a telegram sent to the German ambassadors in the other Locarno countries to announce the remilitarization of the Rhineland, 5 March 1936. DGFP Series C, Vol. V, 11; Anthony Eden, memorandum on Germany and the Locarno Treaty, 8 March 1936. CAB 24/261, 4. 8 German Minister of Foreign Affairs 1932-1938. 9 Neurath in a telegraph sent 6 March 1936 to all German Embassies announcing the German move into the Rhineland. DGFP Series C, Vol. V, 23. 1 reaction—to the German move immediately became, and has remained, a source of controversy. In the historiography of the Rhineland Crisis two distinct interpretations have emerged: the ‘traditional’ and the ‘revisionist’ views. Supporters of the traditional view interpret the Rhineland Crisis as a missed opportunity to prevent the Second World War and argue that if Britain had firmly opposed the remilitarization of the Rhineland she could have prevented Hitler’s future aggressive demands. This view rose to prominence during the Second World War and was widely accepted as an accurate assessment of the crisis until the late sixties. Between the late sixties and the early eighties the traditional view was challenged through the use of archival material that disproved the notion championed by the traditional view that a firm British response would have prevented war. Recently, however, the traditional view of the crisis has resurfaced, complete with the claim that Hitler was prepared to withdraw if he had been firmly opposed. These later accounts ignore the evidence uncovered in the sixties and seventies of Hitler’s willingness to risk war to preserve the new status of the Rhineland. In 2008 Patrick Buchanan underlined the swing back towards the traditional view and reopened the debate on the importance of the remilitarization of the Rhineland by referring to the crisis as ‘the last chance to stop Hitler without war.’10 By means of a thorough examination of Britain’s social, economic, military and diplomatic condition in the inter-war years and a close reading of the minutes of the British Cabinet meetings held during the Rhineland Crisis this thesis will re-evaluate the response of the British Government to the events of 7 March 1936. I will argue that the evidence strongly supports the revisionist claim that a firm British response to the remilitarization of the Rhineland would have resulted in war in 1936. The early historical analyses of the Rhineland Crisis overwhelmingly argue that through their inaction in March 1936 the British missed an opportunity to confront and discipline a weak Germany. Military action here, so the traditionalists argue, would have prevented the Second World War. Following their successful action in the Rhineland the leading Nazis began ‘laying the groundwork for further aggressive action.’ 11 Winston Churchill in the late forties argued that had the Rhine bridgeheads been reoccupied ‘until compliance [with the treaties freely signed by Germany] had been secured, without there being any possibility of effective resistance or likelihood of bloodshed….the Second World 10 P. J. Buchanan, Churchill, Hitler and “The Unnecessary War” (New York: Crown, 2008), 181. 11 Thomas Dodd, prosecutor at the Nuremberg Trials. TMWC Vol. II, 240. 2 War could have been delayed indefinitely.’12 Hitler, Churchill claimed, would have been ‘compelled’ to withdraw from the Rhineland if Britain and France had acted.13 Cato14, also writing in the forties, supported this claim. 15 The idea of Hitler’s vulnerability grew principally from French intelligence from the period and the later testimony of leading Nazis at the Nuremberg Trials.16 Alfred Jodl17 admitted that he and other German Generals had ‘the uneasy feeling of a gambler whose entire fortune was at stake’ during the crisis.18 Joachim von Ribbentrop19 believed that an Anglo-French military response in March 1936 ‘would have placed the Reich in a critical situation.’20 Hjalmar Schacht21 believed that Hitler was ‘resolved to withdraw’ due to the ‘somewhat menacing attitude’ adopted by the French and would ‘do anything rather than have a war.’22 Hermann Göring admitted to being ‘worried’ that the remilitarization of the Rhineland would lead to war.23 The evidence of these senior German figures, given under interrogation over a decade after the Rhineland Crisis and facing execution over their complicity in the outbreak of the Second World War, was accepted as fact and criticism of Britain’s inaction over the crisis grew.