The National Identity and the Other in The
Total Page:16
File Type:pdf, Size:1020Kb
In this paper I address the question of Born to Be Different the origins of modern Russian national National Identity And The identity by focusing on the discursive power of elites. More specifically, I argue that the “Other” In Russian Political observed change in attitudes and definitions Elite Discourse can be explained by the deliberate Anastasiia Vlasenko manipulations of political elites, who employ their discursive power to achieve their own economic and political goals. Elites are n his presidential address to the Valdai believed to have social power over other International Discussion Club on groups of the society; they can frame September 20, 2013, Russian President I discourses within the society by limiting the Vladimir Putin transformed national identity general public’s freedom of action through into the primary political concern for Russian mental control.282 Thus, the primary focus of elites: “Today we need new strategies to my research is the influence of elite interests preserve our identity in a rapidly changing in Russian political discourse, more world. […] For us, questions about who we specifically, how did the Russian elites’ are and who we want to be are increasingly political discourse influence Russian national prominent in our society. […] It is evident identity and the notion of the “other?” that it is impossible to move forward without The paper focuses on the formulation spiritual, cultural and national self- 281 of national identity in Russian elite political determination.” Putin’s speech activated a discourse in the period of Vladimir Putin’s discourse within the Russian political elite incumbency.283 The Russian government is concerned with who Russians are and who conventionally characterized by centralized, they are not. Previously fraternal ethnicities personalized power structures, which were categorized into the increasingly diverse effectively resist any manifestation of and expanding label of “other”; defining opposition.284 More importantly, the Russian national identity much more narrowly personalization of power in Russia is also than ever before. accompanied by the rise of nationalism, which The recent redefinition of Russian is often claimed to be popularized by Vladimir national identity is puzzling. It remains Putin.285 These considerations lead to the unclear why Russia changed its attitudes towards neighboring ethnic groups and 282 Teun Van Dijk (1989) “Structures of discourse nation-states, as well as its own population. and structures of power,” in Communication The latest transformations in national identity Yearbook 12, ed. James A. Anderson(Newbury are particularly perplexing if you consider that Park, CA: Sage, 1989), 19. ethnic Russians share many congenital and 283 Particular attention is paid to the president gained characteristics with the aforementioned due to the high level of personalization of state groups as well as a controversial history of power in Russia. For details, see Lilia interrelations. Russian national identity was Shevtsova, “The Return of Personalized Power,” not actively discussed on an official level until Journal of Democracy 20, 2 (2009), 61–65. 284 Dorothy Horsfield, “Casting shadows? recently. Authoritarianism in Putin’s Russia,” Asia Europe Journal, 12, 4 (2014), 445-456. 285 Uri Teper and Daniel Course, “Contesting 281 Vladimir Putin, Three Landmark Speeches by Putin's nation-building: the ' Muslim other' and the President of Russia (Kuala Lumpur: ITBM, the challenge of the Russian ethno-cultural 2014), 28. alternative,” Nations & Nationalism, 20, 4, JPI: Spring 2016 Issue 67 conclusion that the Russian elites’ message antagonism against other ethnicities.286 In this must be characterized by a high level of paper I argue that national identity is both homogeneity and consistency, thereby given and constructed. This equivocal nature justifying a study of the elites’ influence on the of national identity allows the political elites to Russian national identity and notions of the manipulate it in accordance with their material “other,” referring to the West and non-ethnic and instrumental interests. Russians. The fact that national identity is both The remainder of the paper is primordial and instrumental makes it Janus- organized in the following way. First, I discuss faced. People are limited in their self- the theoretical ramifications of national identification by their heritage, communities, identity research, then analyze primordial and and environment. From this point of view, constructivist approaches. I proceed to the identity is given. However, individuals are also analysis of Russia by first discussing its state free to alter their identities, depending on ideology and its influences on the perception both the judgments of others and the of the West as the “other.” The next section consideration of comforts or benefits desired focuses on the formulation of national from other identities. Thus, identity is also identity within the domestic political discourse constructed.287 and the conceptualization of the non-ethnic I apply this notion of Janus-faced Russian “other.” Finally, I conclude that there national identity to analyze the discursive are two coexisting notions of the “other”. identity formation by Russian elites.288 In one consideration, the Russian political elites APPROACHES TO NATIONAL IDENTITY cannot avoid the given characteristics of There are two major theoretical Russian identity, which is limited to Slavic approaches to national identity. An analysis of genetic heritage, Orthodox Christian religion, both will make it possible to draw conclusions and a long history of authoritarian power about the ability of elites to create the relations. In another consideration, Russian discourse of otherness. The first, identity is adjusted depending on countless primordialism, argues that identity is intrinsic domestic and international factors, namely and static. Ethnicity is biologically and neighbouring states, the economic and historically given, meaning that an individual strategic interests of the ruling party, ongoing is born with a certain ethnic identity, which domestic and international conflicts, and he/she cannot alter. According to the second survival-related interests of the elites. Inborn approach, constructivism, identity is traits of Russians can therefore be easily manipulative and ever changing; it is based on employed for construction of the national political, social and cultural resources. Thus, identity in accordance with the current needs. ethnicity is socially constructed and can be Thus, this paper is aimed at revealing the manipulated by outside forces to create interplay of the given and constructed 286 Andrzej Walicki, (1998) ‘Ernest Gellner and (2014), 721-741; Sean Cannady and Paul the "Constructivist" Theory of Nation’, Harvard Kubicek, “Nationalism and legitimation for Ukrainian Studies, 22, Cultures and Nations of authoritarianism: A comparison of Nicholas I and Central and Eastern Europe (1998), 611-619 Vladimir Putin,” Journal of Eurasian Studies, 5, 287 David Laitin, Identity in Formation: The 1, (2014), 1-9; Theodore P. Gerber, “Beyond Russian-Speaking Population in the Near Putin? Nationalism and Xenophobia in Russian Abroad (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1998), Public Opinion,” Washington Quarterly, 37, 3 20-21. (2014), 113-134. 288 Ivi. JPI: Spring 2016 Issue 68 characteristics of Russian identity and how it use the concept of sovereign democracy to is influenced by elite discourse. popularize the idea of the non-Western “special path” within the country and the CIVILIZATIONAL NATIONALISM AND THE necessity to counterbalance hostile WEST AS THE “OTHER” developments abroad. This process has a Recently Russian state ideology, the core direct influence on the Russian ideological of the political elite’s discourse, has gained framing of the “us and them” division. features of a so-called civilizational Sovereign democracy allows the political elites nationalism. This civilizational nationalism to emphasize the diversity of values, takes its roots from the 19th century idea of a differentiating between Western neo- non-Western path, which argues the Russian imperialism and the Russian tradition of highly centralized non-democratic political strong statehood.292 system is caused by civilizational An important component of Russian state predetermination.289 The Kremlin made a ideology is the notion of a Russia-centered deliberate choice to canonize the notion of a world as an alternative to the notion of the thousand-year-old civilization to replace the West as the world’s center.293 Usually, the old doctrines of Marxist-Leninist ideologies notion of a Russia-centered world is and to block the allegedly hostile Western articulated in opposition to the EU-centered liberal and democratic penetration into Russia. world and is connected to international According to academics Aleksandr political, economic, and social processes Verkhovskii and Emil Pain, civilizational taking place in the post-Soviet space. Russia is nationalism predisposes Russia to an juxtaposed to Europe, as a bearer of more authoritarian regime.290 More importantly, a advanced values and norms. In his address to positive attitude to civilizational nationalism is the Federal Assembly in 2013, Vladimir Putin shared by multiple groups within the society, said: “Today in many countries the norms of including the strong-arm branch of the morality and ethics are reviewed, national political elites, liberal thinkers, the political