In this paper I address the question of Born to Be Different the origins of modern Russian national National Identity And The identity by focusing on the discursive power of elites. More specifically, I argue that the “Other” In Russian Political observed change in attitudes and definitions Elite Discourse can be explained by the deliberate Anastasiia Vlasenko manipulations of political elites, who employ their discursive power to achieve their own

economic and political goals. Elites are n his presidential address to the Valdai believed to have social power over other International Discussion Club on groups of the society; they can frame September 20, 2013, Russian President I discourses within the society by limiting the Vladimir Putin transformed national identity general public’s freedom of action through into the primary political concern for Russian mental control.282 Thus, the primary focus of elites: “Today we need new strategies to my research is the influence of elite interests preserve our identity in a rapidly changing in Russian political discourse, more world. […] For us, questions about who we specifically, how did the Russian elites’ are and who we want to be are increasingly political discourse influence Russian national prominent in our society. […] It is evident identity and the notion of the “other?” that it is impossible to move forward without The paper focuses on the formulation spiritual, cultural and national self- 281 of national identity in Russian elite political determination.” Putin’s speech activated a discourse in the period of Vladimir Putin’s discourse within the Russian political elite incumbency.283 The Russian government is concerned with who Russians are and who conventionally characterized by centralized, they are not. Previously fraternal ethnicities personalized power structures, which were categorized into the increasingly diverse effectively resist any manifestation of and expanding label of “other”; defining opposition.284 More importantly, the Russian national identity much more narrowly personalization of power in Russia is also than ever before. accompanied by the rise of nationalism, which The recent redefinition of Russian is often claimed to be popularized by Vladimir national identity is puzzling. It remains Putin.285 These considerations lead to the unclear why Russia changed its attitudes towards neighboring ethnic groups and 282 Teun Van Dijk (1989) “Structures of discourse nation-states, as well as its own population. and structures of power,” in Communication The latest transformations in national identity Yearbook 12, ed. James A. Anderson(Newbury are particularly perplexing if you consider that Park, CA: Sage, 1989), 19. ethnic Russians share many congenital and 283 Particular attention is paid to the president gained characteristics with the aforementioned due to the high level of personalization of state groups as well as a controversial history of power in Russia. For details, see Lilia interrelations. Russian national identity was Shevtsova, “The Return of Personalized Power,” not actively discussed on an official level until Journal of Democracy 20, 2 (2009), 61–65. 284 Dorothy Horsfield, “Casting shadows? recently. Authoritarianism in Putin’s Russia,” Asia Europe Journal, 12, 4 (2014), 445-456. 285 Uri Teper and Daniel Course, “Contesting 281 Vladimir Putin, Three Landmark Speeches by Putin's nation-building: the ' Muslim other' and the President of Russia (Kuala Lumpur: ITBM, the challenge of the Russian ethno-cultural 2014), 28. alternative,” Nations & Nationalism, 20, 4,

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conclusion that the Russian elites’ message antagonism against other ethnicities.286 In this must be characterized by a high level of paper I argue that national identity is both homogeneity and consistency, thereby given and constructed. This equivocal nature justifying a study of the elites’ influence on the of national identity allows the political elites to Russian national identity and notions of the manipulate it in accordance with their material “other,” referring to the West and non-ethnic and instrumental interests. Russians. The fact that national identity is both The remainder of the paper is primordial and instrumental makes it Janus- organized in the following way. First, I discuss faced. People are limited in their self- the theoretical ramifications of national identification by their heritage, communities, identity research, then analyze primordial and and environment. From this point of view, constructivist approaches. I proceed to the identity is given. However, individuals are also analysis of Russia by first discussing its state free to alter their identities, depending on ideology and its influences on the perception both the judgments of others and the of the West as the “other.” The next section consideration of comforts or benefits desired focuses on the formulation of national from other identities. Thus, identity is also identity within the domestic political discourse constructed.287 and the conceptualization of the non-ethnic I apply this notion of Janus-faced Russian “other.” Finally, I conclude that there national identity to analyze the discursive are two coexisting notions of the “other”. identity formation by Russian elites.288 In one consideration, the Russian political elites APPROACHES TO NATIONAL IDENTITY cannot avoid the given characteristics of There are two major theoretical Russian identity, which is limited to Slavic approaches to national identity. An analysis of genetic heritage, Orthodox Christian religion, both will make it possible to draw conclusions and a long history of authoritarian power about the ability of elites to create the relations. In another consideration, Russian discourse of otherness. The first, identity is adjusted depending on countless primordialism, argues that identity is intrinsic domestic and international factors, namely and static. Ethnicity is biologically and neighbouring states, the economic and historically given, meaning that an individual strategic interests of the ruling party, ongoing is born with a certain ethnic identity, which domestic and international conflicts, and he/she cannot alter. According to the second survival-related interests of the elites. Inborn approach, constructivism, identity is traits of Russians can therefore be easily manipulative and ever changing; it is based on employed for construction of the national political, social and cultural resources. Thus, identity in accordance with the current needs. ethnicity is socially constructed and can be Thus, this paper is aimed at revealing the manipulated by outside forces to create interplay of the given and constructed

286 Andrzej Walicki, (1998) ‘Ernest Gellner and (2014), 721-741; Sean Cannady and Paul the "Constructivist" Theory of Nation’, Harvard Kubicek, “Nationalism and legitimation for Ukrainian Studies, 22, Cultures and Nations of authoritarianism: A comparison of Nicholas I and Central and Eastern Europe (1998), 611-619 Vladimir Putin,” Journal of Eurasian Studies, 5, 287 David Laitin, Identity in Formation: The 1, (2014), 1-9; Theodore P. Gerber, “Beyond Russian-Speaking Population in the Near Putin? Nationalism and Xenophobia in Russian Abroad (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1998), Public Opinion,” Washington Quarterly, 37, 3 20-21. (2014), 113-134. 288 Ivi.

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characteristics of Russian identity and how it use the concept of sovereign democracy to is influenced by elite discourse. popularize the idea of the non-Western “special path” within the country and the CIVILIZATIONAL NATIONALISM AND THE necessity to counterbalance hostile WEST AS THE “OTHER” developments abroad. This process has a Recently Russian state ideology, the core direct influence on the Russian ideological of the political elite’s discourse, has gained framing of the “us and them” division. features of a so-called civilizational Sovereign democracy allows the political elites nationalism. This civilizational nationalism to emphasize the diversity of values, takes its roots from the 19th century idea of a differentiating between Western neo- non-Western path, which argues the Russian imperialism and the Russian tradition of highly centralized non-democratic political strong statehood.292 system is caused by civilizational An important component of Russian state predetermination.289 The Kremlin made a ideology is the notion of a Russia-centered deliberate choice to canonize the notion of a world as an alternative to the notion of the thousand-year-old civilization to replace the West as the world’s center.293 Usually, the old doctrines of Marxist-Leninist ideologies notion of a Russia-centered world is and to block the allegedly hostile Western articulated in opposition to the EU-centered liberal and democratic penetration into Russia. world and is connected to international According to academics Aleksandr political, economic, and social processes Verkhovskii and Emil Pain, civilizational taking place in the post-Soviet space. Russia is nationalism predisposes Russia to an juxtaposed to Europe, as a bearer of more authoritarian regime.290 More importantly, a advanced values and norms. In his address to positive attitude to civilizational nationalism is the Federal Assembly in 2013, Vladimir Putin shared by multiple groups within the society, said: “Today in many countries the norms of including the strong-arm branch of the morality and ethics are reviewed, national political elites, liberal thinkers, the political traditions and cultures are erased. They [the establishment, and the mass public. West] demand […] the obligatory recognition Discussing civilizational nationalism of equivalence of good and evil […]. Russia 294 within the Russian official discourse is will keep to traditional values.” Thus, Putin impossible without the concept of sovereign constructs the discourse as focused on democracy, as opposed to the Western liberal preserving traditional values and capable of democracy. According to academic Thomas making an effective distinction between good Ambrosio, sovereign democracy “expresses and evil. Logically, the preservation of Russian independence on the world stage and traditional values depends on their holders, reject[s] the legitimacy of external criticisms 291 from the democratic West.” Political elites 292 Ibid., 79 289 Alexandr Verkhovskii and Emil Pain, 293 Roy Allison, “Russian ‘Deniable’ Intervention “Civilizational Nationalism. The Russian Version in Ukraine: How and Why Russia Broke the of the ‘Special Path,’” Russian Politics and Law Rules,” International Affairs 90, 6 (2014), 1256. 50, 5, (2012), 56. 294 Elizabeth Salkova, “Putin puts the traditional 290 Ibid., 52. Russian values, as opposed to the western 291 Thomas Ambrosio, Authoritarian Backlash: morality,” December 12, 2013’ Ok-inform.ru. Russian Resistance to Democratization in the http://ok-inform.ru/politika/vlast/7459-rossiya- Former Soviet Union. (Burlington: Ashgate, budet-i-dalshe-podderzhivat-traditsionnye- 2009), 70. tsennosti.html

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“true Russians,” with distinct behaviors and 80 percent.297 This rapid change initiated the characteristics from the others. process of national identity revision. As the Thus, the West is the most frequently proportion of ethnic Russians increased mentioned and to a certain degree relative to other ethnic groups, the possibility institutionalized “other” within Russian elite of speaking about Russians as a nation political discourse. It is an integral part of the (Russkiye), not of Russians as a people ideological framework of Russian politics, (Rosseyane) emerged. Secondly, the end of the which is used to justify both domestic and 1990s and the beginning of the 2000s was foreign policy decisions. Nevertheless, the marked by the rapid decrease in birth rates question remains: has Russia also transitioned among ethnic Russians and the opposite to a domestically nationalist ideology, as tendency amongst the Muslim population argued by the previous research?295 If the basis within the Russian Federation. The influx of of Russian state ideology is embedded in labor migrants from the Caucasus and thus, nationalism, we should expect to observe the increase in the number of ethnic groups well-defined national identity as contrasted living side by side in large cities, translated not only to the West, as occidentalists would religion and skin color into more relevant assume, but also to the domestic “other,” concepts in elite national identity discourse.298 threatening the aforementioned homogeneity These two factors created a demand from of the nation.296 This puzzle can be solved both the general ethnic Russian public for through a detailed analysis of elite discourse in national, cultural, and ethnic reassertion, regard to ethnic and non-ethnic Russians. which the political elites proved ready to satisfy. NON-ETHNIC RUSSIANS AS THE “OTHER” IN The clash between ethnic and non-ethnic THE RUSSIAN POLITICAL DISCOURSE Russians is highly problematic because the The formation of national identity and the Soviet Union kindled the process of national notion of the “other” through the discursive formation within each union republic in early power of political elites is an ongoing and 1920s (so-called policy of korenizatsiia), thus dynamic process in the Russian Federation. giving birth to nationalistic inclinations.299 Its relevance can be explained by two recent Currently, Russian elites find difficulty in changes. First, after the collapse of the Soviet criticizing Soviet policies, as the Russian Union, the proportion of the ethnic Russians Federation is considered to be the legal heir of in the country increased from 52 percent to the USSR, the collapse of which, according to Vladimir Putin, was “the greatest geopolitical

297 Luke March, “Nationalism for Export? The 295 Wayne Allensworth, The Russian Question: Domestic and Foreign-Policy Implications of the Nationalism, Modernization and Post- New Russian Idea,” Europe-Asia Studies, 64, 3, Communist Russia (Lanham, MD: Rowman and (2012), 404. Littlefield, 1998), 260; Edward Lucas, E. The 298 Agata Dubas, The Menace of a ‘Brown’ New Cold War: How the Kremlin Menaces Both Russia: Ethnically Motivated Xenophobia— Russia and the West (London: Palgrave Symptoms, Causes and Prospects for the Macmillan, 2008), 14; Pierre Hassner, “Russia’s Future (Warsaw: Centre for Eastern Studies, Transition to Autocracy,” Journal of Democracy, 2008). 19, 2 (2008), 7. 299 Rogers Brubaker, “Rethinking Nationhood: 296 Ian Buruma and Avishai Margalit, Nation as Institutionalized Form, Practical Occidentalism: The West in the Eyes of Its Category, Contingent Event,” Contention, 4, Enemies (New York: Penguin Press, 2005), 4. (1994), 3-14.

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tragedy of the 20th century.”300 The second such a way, neighboring ethnic groups are cleavage between the West and the East is presented as the same historically, but deeply rooted in the Russian civilization different currently. nationalist ideology and is mostly related to A similar approach is applied to the North the Russian foreign policy discourse. Finally, Caucasus, which is officially located within the the third cleavage addresses the conflict Russian borders. The Caucasians belong to a between ethnic identities (Russkiy) based on variety of ethnic groups, and thus, it is religion, language, culture and the civic difficult to use primordial similarities in this identity (Rossiyskiy) based on inclusive case. However, an analysis of state-sponsored citizenship.301 This cleavage is the most salient TV programs demonstrates that the North and important in regards to the notion of “the Caucusus is portrayed as having a different, other” within the Russian borders. forgotten identity: the Cossack one.303 North More specific analysis of the variety of Caucusus is depicted as the place of great wars elite discourse channels reveals the cleavage of Slavic Cossacks, a narrative that makes this between ethnic and civic identities is the most region one more bastion of Pan-Russian widely discussed and the most coherently context, in which the North Caucasian people presented. Marlene Laruelle found that the are assigned a secondary role. Thus, even if majority of Russian governmental TV the given identities are inapplicable, they are programs emphasize the Slavic roots of the used for constructivist purposes. Russian identity, and mention historical, The annexation of Crimea and the conflict religious, and cultural links with the in Eastern Ukraine activated the Russian neighboring ethnic groups (in particular elites’ nationalist discourse and brought forth Georgians and Ukrainians), spoilt by the so- valuable data for analysis. The President’s called nationalist diseases of the post-Soviet governmental speeches and announcements, epidemic.302 This approach to presenting the and those of other officials, regarding the interethnic relations reveals the dichotomy of dispute in Ukraine show that Russian elites Russian political discourse. “Others” are prefer to describe national identity in perceived to be the same in primordial terms; primordial ethno-linguistic and ethno-cultural however, they are criticized for developing terms. These terms reassert the boundaries into something different, as a result of the between Russians and the other (in this case latest political decisions of the titular elites. In Ukrainians) as a justification for Russian territorial claims.304 In his Kremlin address on the unification with Crimea, Putin used the 300 Katie Sanders, “Did Vladimir Putin call the word ‘Russkiy’ 29 times, thus initiating the breakup of the USSR 'the greatest geopolitical official transfer of the Russian elite political tragedy of the 20th century?” Pundit Fact, March discourse from civic identity to ethnic 6, 2014 identity.305 Taking into consideration the http://www.politifact.com/punditfact/statements/2 014/mar/06/john-bolton/did-vladimir-putin-call- aforementioned discussion of the Russkiy and breakup-ussr-greatest-geop/ 301 Vera Tolz, “Forging the Nation: National 303 Ibid. Identity and Nation Building in Post-Communist 304 Uri Teper, “Official Russian Identity Discourse Russia,” Europe-Asia Studies, 50, 6 (1998), 993- In Light of the Annexation of Crimea: National or 1022. Imperial?”, Post-Soviet Affairs (2015), 2. 302 Marlene Laruelle, “The Russian Idea on the 305 Vladimir Putin, “Obrashcheniye Prezidenta Small Screen: Staging National Identity of the Rossiyskoy Federatsii,” 2014 [Address of the Russian TV,” Demokratizatsiya 22, 2 (2014), President of the Russian Federation]. Kremlin.ru, 329-330.

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Rossiyskiy dichotomy in the Russian political Two dimensions of Russian national discourse, it can be concluded that Russia’s identity can be traced: (1) Russians as geostrategic interests resulted in the contrasted with the West, and (2) ethnic ethnicization of the Russian national identity Russians (Russkiye) as contrasted with non- and the notion of the “other.” ethnic Russians or fraternal ethnic groups Russian elites have proved to be extremely “spoiled” by the West. The first dimension opportunistic.306 Foreign and domestic policy aims to reassure Russia’s status as a great considerations provided the elites with power, destined to be different from the justification to transform once fraternal ethnic West, on an international level. The second groups into the threatening “other”.307 More dimension ensures the political survival of the importantly, this “other” exists both within ruling party, since its main goal is to show the and beyond the Russian borders, ensuring that otherness of the minorities within Russia and the Russian national identity as it is currently to justify the expansion of Russia beyond its presented in the Russian political discourse, borders. Combined, these two notions of the can exist only as long as it is strictly framed “other” serve both foreign and domestic within its ethnic boundaries. In such a way, objectives of the Russian elites. the primordial myths regarding threats to Russia as a nation, proved to be a solid and reliable basis for construction of the national identity and the “other.”

CONCLUSION Within Russian elite political discourse, national identity and the notion of the “other” are presented in primordial, ethnic terms. Elites manipulate the public’s perception of the inborn characteristics of Russians in order to construct an identity capable of reasserting the status of Russia as a whole on the international arena, and the position of the current incumbents on the domestic level. Thus, Russian national identity can be characterized as both given and constructed, as it combines the inherited, stable features with those imposed and manipulated by the political elites.

306 Galina Kozhevnikova, G. (2004) “Putin’skii prizyv’’: ideology ili mifotvortsy?”, in Putiami nesvobody [By Paths of Bondage], ed. Aleksandr Verkhovskii (Moscow: Information- Analytical Center ‘SOVA’, 2005), 6-17. 307 Vera Tolz, Vera, “Rethinking Russian- Ukrainian relations: A New Trend in Nation- building in Post-communist Russia?” Nations and Nationalism, 8, 2 (2002), 235–253.

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