Why China Grew: Understanding the Financial Structure of Late Development
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University of Massachusetts Amherst ScholarWorks@UMass Amherst Open Access Dissertations 2-2011 Why China Grew: Understanding the Financial Structure of Late Development Adam S. Hersh University of Massachusetts Amherst Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarworks.umass.edu/open_access_dissertations Part of the Economics Commons Recommended Citation Hersh, Adam S., "Why China Grew: Understanding the Financial Structure of Late Development" (2011). Open Access Dissertations. 334. https://scholarworks.umass.edu/open_access_dissertations/334 This Open Access Dissertation is brought to you for free and open access by ScholarWorks@UMass Amherst. It has been accepted for inclusion in Open Access Dissertations by an authorized administrator of ScholarWorks@UMass Amherst. For more information, please contact [email protected]. WHY CHINA GREW: UNDERSTANDING THE FINANCIAL STRUCTURE OF LATE DEVELOPMENT ADissertationPresented by ADAM S. HERSH Submitted to the Graduate School of the University of Massachusetts Amherst in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY February 2011 Department of Economics © Copyright by Adam S. Hersh 2011 All Rights Reserved WHY CHINA GREW: UNDERSTANDING THE FINANCIAL STRUCTURE OF LATE DEVELOPMENT ADissertationPresented by ADAM S. HERSH Approved as to style and content by: Gerald A. Epstein, Co-chair Robert Pollin, Co-chair James Heintz, Member Gerald A. Epstein, Department Chair Department of Economics To the 1.4 billion people who live on less than US$1.25 per day. May you escape the yoke of failed economic policies. ACKNOWLEDGMENTS This dissertation was made possible by the generous support of the Political Econ- omy Research Institute at the University of Massachusetts, Amherst, the David Boren National Security Education Program, and the Institute for Advanced Research at the Shanghai University of Finance and Economics. I am grateful to Gerald Ep- stein, Robert Pollin, James Heintz, Christian Weller, John Schmitt, and Dawn Le who provided patient support, studied intellectual guidance, critical feed- back, and much appreciated encouragement and inspiration. Through countless conversations and ping pong matches, Xiao Junji, Feng Shuaizhang, Bai Dangwai, Tao Changsheng, Allen Ding, and Zhao Minghui were treasured partners and collaborators helping me to dig through the weeds of Chinas economic reform process. Nancy Zhang and Con- nie Liu provided research assistance. Judy Fogg graciously accommodated me with administrative assistance from half-a-world away. Patrick Watson slugged through the entire draft manuscript. This dissertation was prepared using free open source software: Ubuntu Linux, Open Office Suite, LyX LATEXeditor, and Mozilla Firefox. v ABSTRACT WHY CHINA GREW: UNDERSTANDING THE FINANCIAL STRUCTURE OF LATE DEVELOPMENT FEBRUARY 2011 ADAM S. HERSH B.A., UNIVERSITY OF PUGET SOUND Ph.D., UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS AMHERST Directed by: Professor Gerald A. Epstein and Professor Robert Pollin This dissertation explores how economic institutions governing finance and in- vestment have contributed to growth in reform-era China. Economic and political reforms transformed Chinas prior centrally-planned economy. Although reforms in- corporated elements of market institutions and private enterprise, state institutions exercising extensive authority over a wide range of economic affairs critically and fundamentally played a central role in transforming this economy from one of the worlds poorest to the worlds second largest in the span of one generation. I explain the emergence of a unique configuration of institutions supportive of industrial pol- icy implemented by largely autonomous local government officials. In combination with state-directed bank credit, this local government industrial policy finance has played a significant and positive role in development of exports in China. Though pri- vate entrepreneurs are often seen as dynamic engines of growth in Chinas reform-era economy, I show the vast majority of entrepreneurs are low-skilled, low-productivity, vi and exhibit non-positive rates of capital accumulation. Most entrepreneurs would experience higher earnings were they not segmented into self-employment occupa- tions by adverse socioeconomic conditions. Rather than engines of growth, Chinas entrepreneurs resemble more the vast numbers of informal sector self-employment prevalent in many developing countries. vii TABLE OF CONTENTS Page ACKNOWLEDGMENTS ............................................. v ABSTRACT ..........................................................vi LIST OF TABLES ....................................................xi LIST OF FIGURES.................................................. xii CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION ................................................. 1 1.1 The Significance of China’s Late Development . 1 1.2 Playing Catch-up . 4 1.3 Specialization, Diversification, and Manufacturing . 7 1.4 The Entrepreneurial Role of the State . 12 1.5 Preview of the Study . 14 2. CHINA’S LOCAL GOVERNMENT INDUSTRIAL POLICY ..... 17 2.1 Qualitative Transformation of the Economic Bureaucracy . 21 2.2 Power and Incentives of Local Officials .............................26 2.3 Application of Local Industrial Policy ..............................33 2.4 TVE Reform and Endurance of Local Industrial Policy ...............42 2.5 Conclusion . 44 3. CHINA’S PRIVATE ENTREPRENEURS: CAPITALIST DYNAMOS OR RESERVE ARMY OF THE SELF EMPLOYED .................................................. 46 3.1 Introduction . 46 3.2 Institutions, Finance, and Entrepreneurship .........................52 3.3 Data on China’s Entrepreneurs . 56 3.4 Characteristics of China’s Entrepreneurs and Entrepreneurial Enterprises ..................................................60 viii 3.4.1 Characteristics of Entrepreneurs . 60 3.4.1.1 The geography of entrepreneurship . 61 3.4.1.2 Gender and Household Characteristics of Entrepreneurs . 65 3.4.1.3 Human Capital and Entrepreneurial Ability ..........66 3.4.1.4 Entrepreneurial Preference . 69 3.4.2 Evidence of Labor Market Segmentation. 72 3.4.2.1 Effects of Hukou Status . 73 3.4.2.2 Party Membership and Employment Dislocation. .76 3.4.2.3 Timing of Entrepreneurial Market Entry . 76 3.4.3 Wealth and Credit Relations . 80 3.4.3.1 Perceived Credit Access............................81 3.4.3.2 WealthandAssets ................................83 3.4.3.3 Debt and Sources of Credit . 85 3.4.3.4 Party-State Networks and Finance...................89 3.4.4 Characteristics of Entrepreneurial Enterprises . 91 3.4.4.1 Sectoral Distribution of Enterprises . 91 3.4.4.2 Enterprise size at entry . 94 3.4.4.3 Current size and capital accumulation . 96 3.5 Occupational Selection of Entrepreneurship . 99 3.5.1 Model Specification . 100 3.5.1.1 Individual Abilities...............................101 3.5.1.2 Segmentation Factors and Social Networks ..........101 3.5.1.3 Wealth and Financial Factors ......................103 3.5.1.4 Housing Privatization as Exogenous Wealth Shock . 105 3.5.2 Estimation and Results . 108 3.5.2.1 Selection in the Urban Labor Market ...............108 3.5.2.2 Selection in the Rural Labor Market . 112 3.5.2.3 Where’s the Wealth? .............................116 3.6 Determinants of Earnings for Entrepreneurs and Wage Workers . .117 3.6.1 Model Specification and Estimation of Average Earnings ......117 3.6.2 Results . 121 ix 3.6.2.1 Urban Labor Market .............................121 3.6.2.2 Rural Labor Market . 122 3.6.3 Opportunity Cost of Occupational Selection .................124 3.7 Conclusion . 131 4. FINANCING EXPORT DEVELOPMENT IN CHINA’S GROWTH .................................................... 133 4.1 Introduction . 133 4.2 Exports and Growth in China . 138 4.3 China’s Multiple Financial Structures .............................143 4.3.1 Banks . 144 4.3.2 Foreign Capital . 152 4.3.3 Local Industrial Policy Finance ............................157 4.3.4 Private and Informal Finance ..............................160 4.3.5 Capital Markets . 165 4.4 Evaluating the Efficacy of China’s Financial Structures .............167 4.4.1 Data and Descriptive Analysis .............................168 4.4.1.1 Measurement . 168 4.4.1.2 Correlations . 173 4.4.1.3 Locally Weighted Regression . 175 4.4.2 Estimation . 177 4.4.3 Robustness Checks . 181 4.4.3.1 WhereistheFDI? ...............................181 4.4.3.2 Residual dependence and quantile regression .........183 4.5 Conclusion . 186 5. CONCLUSION: FINANCIAL STRUCTURE AND FUTURE DEVELOPMENT ............................................ 188 BIBLIOGRAPHY .................................................. 194 x LIST OF TABLES Table Page 3.1 Demographics of Economically Active Population, By Occupation Group ......................................................64 3.2 Subjective Perception of Credit Access .............................82 3.3 Average Wealth and Asset Endowments ............................83 3.4 Average Household Debt and Composition ..........................86 3.5 Rural Self-Employed with External Credit: Usage and Sources.........89 3.6 Effect of Political Relations on Entrepreneurs’ Credit . 91 3.7 Entrepreneurial Enterprise Size....................................97 3.8 Determinants of Housing Prices ..................................107 3.9 Occupational Selection for Urban Economically Active Sample: Marginal Effects.............................................113 3.10 Occupational Selection for Rural Economically Active Sample: Marginal Effects.............................................115