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SOCIAL ENGINEERING 1 Topic:Social Engineering Risk and Management in Organisations References SOCIAL ENGINEERING 1 Topic:Social Engineering Risk and Management in Organisations References: Harvard Pages: 60 Words: 15000 words SOCIAL ENGINEERING 2 Social Engineering Risk and Management in Organisations [Name of the Writer] [Name of the Supervisor] [Course] SOCIAL ENGINEERING 3 Acknowledgement I am very thankful to my supervisor for his complete guidance in order to complete my dissertation; I was unable to accomplish my research without his practical advices. I have been really inspired by him because of his deep insight and experience which made me to perform at my best for my research. I am also thankful to my friends who supported me throughout the course and guided me for the completion of this research. Finally, I am really thankful to my parents for their on-going support, and always giving me the strength, courage and determination to face various challenges and for believing in my ability and trust. SOCIAL ENGINEERING 4 Abstract Social Engineering offers attackers a multitude of possibilities to reach through targeted manipulation and information to their desired goal. A particularly dangerous situation when the information of one person is used to access the computer system of an organization. The abuser is easily passed for a system operator or an IT manager or system engineer. Often the perpetrator is not even in direct contact with the victim. Even the most conservative in the management of sensitive information, people can fall into the trap of social engineering. On the one hand, the "technological neglect" makes people vulnerable when they treat their sensitive data too carelessly and publish private information on the Web and is sometimes too lazy to "clean up" their online profile regularly. On the other hand, we all are only human beings. Always in search of recognition, flattery, compliments, friendship etc. Human virtues as helpfulness and weaknesses as vanity are exploited by attackers to manipulate their victims. Most of the employees of a company believe that the most important thing is to be a good teammate and solidarity with colleagues; which is often at the expense of safety. This study describes the impact of social engineering attacks on organizations. The study also discusses the prevention techniques which can be used by the employees to thwart the threat of information leakage through social engineering. SOCIAL ENGINEERING 5 Contents Chapter 1: Introduction ........................................................................ 8 1.1 Background of the Problem ................................................................................................... 8 1.2 Statement of the Problem ...................................................................................................... 9 1.3 Aim of the Study ................................................................................................................. 12 1.4 Objectives ............................................................................................................................ 12 1.5 Research Questions ............................................................................................................. 13 Chapter 2 Literature Review .............................................................. 14 2.1 Need for Information Security ............................................................................................ 14 2.2 Types of Information Security Attacks ............................................................................... 17 2.2.1 Intrusion or Hacking ..................................................................................................... 17 2.2.2 Viruses and Worms ...................................................................................................... 18 2.2.3 Denial of Service (DoS) ............................................................................................... 18 2.2.4 Sniffing ......................................................................................................................... 19 2.2.5 Spoofing........................................................................................................................ 19 2.2.6 IP Spoofing ................................................................................................................... 19 2.2.7 DNS Spoofing............................................................................................................... 20 2.2.8 ARP Spoofing ............................................................................................................... 20 2.3 Social Engineering .............................................................................................................. 20 2.4 Social Engineering Types: .................................................................................................. 21 2.4.1 User Impersonate .......................................................................................................... 22 2.4.2 Staff Sympathy ............................................................................................................. 22 2.4.3 Intimidation .................................................................................................................. 22 2.4.4 Dumpster Diving ......................................................................................................... 22 2.4.5 Reverse Social Engineering .......................................................................................... 22 2.4.6 Shoulder Surfing ........................................................................................................... 22 2.5 Online Social Engineering .................................................................................................. 24 2.6 Earlier Work ........................................................................................................................ 26 2.6.1 Social Engineering Attack Model ................................................................................. 26 2.6.2 Social Engineering Trust Model ................................................................................... 29 SOCIAL ENGINEERING 6 2.7 Social Engineering Risk Management ................................................................................ 30 2.7.1 Insider ........................................................................................................................... 30 2.8 Social Engineering Attack Vectors ..................................................................................... 35 2.9 Incident Management .......................................................................................................... 36 2.10 Resolution Approach ......................................................................................................... 37 Chapter 3: Methodology ...................................................................... 39 3.1. Introduction ........................................................................................................................ 39 3.2. Research Methodology ....................................................................................................... 39 3.3. Research Philosophy .......................................................................................................... 40 3.4. Research Approaches ......................................................................................................... 41 3.5. Research Design ................................................................................................................. 42 3.5.1. Descriptive Design ...................................................................................................... 42 3.5.2. Experimental design .................................................................................................... 42 3.5.3. Surveys by Questionnaire ............................................................................................ 43 3.5.4. Interview ...................................................................................................................... 43 3.5.5. Phishing ....................................................................................................................... 44 3.6. Action Research ................................................................................................................. 44 3.6.1. Primary Data ................................................................................................................ 44 3.6.2. Secondary Data ............................................................................................................ 45 3.7. Analysis of Data ................................................................................................................. 45 3.8. Ethical Issues ...................................................................................................................... 45 Chapter Four: Result and Discussion ................................................. 47 4.1. Result .................................................................................................................................. 47 4.1.1 Survey ........................................................................................................................... 47 4.1.2 Interviews ..................................................................................................................... 53 4.1.3 Phishing .......................................................................................................................
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